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VOLUME V

Earth – Japan

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In Memoriam

We record with deep sorrow the deaths of Professor O. H. de A. Wijesekera, Mr. H. G. A. van Zeist and Mr. Upali Karunaratne who were associated with the Encyclopaedia of Buddhism project in different capacities and rendered valuable service for its growth.

Professor O. H. de. A. Wijesekera, a former Professor of Sanskrit and one time Vice-Chancellor of the Colombo University became Editor-in-Chief of the Encyclopaedia of Buddhism in 1973 as successor to Professor G. P. Malalasekera, the founder Editor-in-Cheif. In this capacity Professor Wijesekera worked until 1976 rendering remarkable guidance and leadership to the editorial staff. He died in 1990 at the age of 80 years.

Mr. H. G. A. van Zeist was a Hollander by birth, and was trained and disciplined to be a Roman Catholic clergyman, but became a convert to Buddhism in the prime of his youth. Coming to Sri Lanka to learn Buddhism in depth, he was ordained as a bhikkhu but after several years he reverted to lay life. Mr. van Zeist was one of the few to join the Encyclopaedia of Buddhism Project almost at its inception and served in the capacity of Assistant Editor cum Administrative Officer for over 11 years up to 1968. He died in 1989 at the age of 80 years.

Mr. Upali Karunaratne, a Pali (Special) Honours graduate from the University of Ceylon, Peradeniya joined the Encyclopaedia of Buddhism editorial staff in 1960 and served the project till his death in 1979 at the age of 54. A keen student of Buddhism, Mr, Karunaratne has compiled many articles on Abhidhamma and Vinaya topics, some of them already published and others still to appear in future fascicles.

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ABBREVIATIONS

A. .. Anguttara Nikāya, I–VI, ed. R. Morris, E. Hardy, C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *PTS.* 1885 - 1910.

AA. .. Anguttaranikāya Atthakathā, (Manorathapūrani), I-V, ed. M. Walleser, H. Kopp, *PTS.* 1924-56.

AAWG. .. Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen.

AbhK. .. Abhidharmakośa (Nāgari characters), ed. R. Sankrityayana Banaras, 1930.

AbhKbh. .. Abhidharmakośabhāsya, ed. Th. Stcherbatsky, *BB. XX,* 1930.

AbhKk. .. Abhidharmakośakārikā, ed. L. de la Vallée Poussin, Paris, 1931.

AbhKvy. .. Abhidharmakośavyākhyā, ed. U. Wogihara, Tokyo, 1932–36.

Abhs. .. Abhidhammatthasangaha, ed. T. W. Rhys Davids, *JPTS.* 1884, 1–48.

Abhsy. .. Abhidharmasamuccaya, ed. P. Pradhan, *VBS.* 12, 1950.

Abhvt. .. Abhidhammāvatāra, ed. A. P. Buddhadatta, *BM.* I, 1915.

ABIA. .. Annual Bibliography of Indian Archaeology, Kern Institute.

ABORI. .. Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute (Poona).

AbsPus. .. Abhisamayālamkāraprajñāpāramitā-upadeśasātra (Sanskrit text and Tibetan translation), ed. Th. Stcherbatsky and E. Obermiller, *BB, XXIII,* 1929.

AbsPvy. .. Abhisamayālamkārālokaprajñāpāra-mitāvyākhyā, ed. U. Wogihara, Tokyo, 1932 - 35.

AdsP. .. Adhyardhaśatikāprajñāpāramitā, ed. H. Leumann, Strassburg, 1912.

Akanuma 1 .. Akanuma, C.: Indo-Bukkyō, Koyūmeishi-Jiten (Dictionary of Buddhist Indian Proper Names), Nagoya, 1931.

Akanuma 2 .. Akanuma, C.: Kam-pa Shibu Agon Goshō roku (The Comparative Catalogue of Chinese Agamas and Pali Nikāyas), Nagoya, 1929.

AKM. .. Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes, herau g. von der Deutschen Morgenlandischen Gesellschaft.

AM. .. Asia Minor.

AMG. .. Annales du Musée Guimet.

Anāgv. .. Anāgatavamsa, ed. J. Minayeff, *JPTS.* 1886, 33 ff.

Anesaki. .. Anesaki, M.: The Four Buddhist Āgamas in Chinese, 1908.

AO. .. Archiv Orientālni: Journal of the Czechoslovak Oriental Institute.

Ap. .. Apadāna, I–II, ed. M. E. Lilley, *PTS.* 1925-27.

ApA. .. ApadānaAtthakathā (Visuddhajanavilāsini), ed. C. E. Godakumbura, *PTS.* 1954.

ArtA. .. Artibus Asiae (Ascona, Switzerland).

Arvś. .. Arthaviniścaya, ed. A. Ferrari, Rome, 1944.

AS. .. Aluvihāra Series (Colombo).

ASCAR. .. Archaeological Survey of Ceylon, Annual Report

ASCI. .. Archaeological Survey of Ceylon, Inscription

ASCMem. .. Archaeological Survey of Ceylon, Memoir

ASIAR. .. Archaeological Survey of India, Annual Report

ASIMem. .. Archaeological Survey of India, Memoir

AsP. .. Astasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā, ed. R. Mitra, Calcutta, 1888.

ASWI. .. Report of the Archaeological Survey of Western India

Atā. .. Atānātikasūtra, ed. H. Hoffmann (Bruchstücke des Atānātikasūtra), *KITurf.* V, 1939

Avk. .. Avadānakalpalatā, ed. S. C. Das, *BI,* 1888-96

Avś. .. Avadānaśataka, ed. P. L. Vaidya, *BST,* 19, 1958.

BASR. .. Bulletin de l' Académie des Sciences de Russie

BB. .. Bibliotheca Buddhica (Leningrad)

Bbh. .. Bodhisattvabhūmi, ed. U. Wogihara, Tokyo, 1930-36

Bc. .. Bodhicaryāvatāra, ed. L. de la Vallée Poussin, Calcutta, 1901-14

Bcp. .. Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā, ed. L. de la Vallée Poussin, 1902

BD. .. Buddhist Dictionary, by Nyānatiloka (revised edition), Colombo, 1956

Beal .. Beal, S.: The Buddhist Tripitaka, 1876

BEFEO. .. Bulletin de l'École Francaise d'Extrême Orient (Hanoi)

Bendall .. Bendall, C.: Catalogue of Buddhist Sanskrit Manuscripts, Cambridge, 1883

Bhkav. .. Bhadrakalpāvadāna, ed. S. Oldenbourg, 1884

BHS. .. Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit, Grammar and Dictionary, ed. F. Edgerton, Yale, 1953.

Bksk. .. Bhavasamkrāntisūtra (and commentary, reconstructed in Sanskrit from Tibetan translation), ed. N. Aiyaswami Sastri Adyar, 1938

BI. .. Bibliotheca Indica (Calcutta)

BiblB. .. Bibliographie Bouddhique (Paris)

BIIMEO. .. Bulletino dell' Instituto Indiano per li Medio ed Estremo Oriente (Rome)

BM. .. Buddhadatta's Manuals, I-II, ed. A. P. Buddhadatta, *PTS.* 1915, 1927

BMFJ. .. Bulletin de la Maison Franco-Japonaise (Tokyo)

BniPrāt. .. Bhiksunīprātimoksa ed. E. Waldschmidt (Bruchstücke des Bhiksunīprātimoksa), *KITurf.* III, 1926

BOH. .. Bibliotheca Orientalis Hungarica (Budapest)

BPrāt. .. Bodhisattvaprātimoksasūtra, ed. N. Dutt, *IHQ.* 7, 1931, 259 ff.

BS. .. Buddhistic Studies, ed. B. C. Law, Calcutta, 1931

BSOAS. .. Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, London

BSS. .. Bombay Sanskrit Series

BST. .. Buddhist Sanskrit Texts (Darbhanga)

Buc. .. Buddhacarita, ed. E. H. Johnston, Calcutta, 1935

Bup. .. Buddhaghosuppatti (with translation), ed. J. Gray, London, 1892

Buv. .. Buddhavamsa, ed. R. Morris, *PTS.* 1882

BuvA. .. Buddhavamsa Atthakatha (Madhuratthavilasini), ed. I. B. Horner, *PTS.* 1946

Cabaton .. Cabaton, A.: Catalogue Sommaire des Manuscrits Sanskrits et Pali, Paris, 1907

Catuś. .. Catuhśataka (Sanskrit and Tibetan texts reconstructed), ed. V. Bhattacharyya, Calcutta, 1931

CHJ. .. The Ceylon Historical Journal

CII. .. Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum

CJHSS. .. The Ceylon Journal of Historical and Social Studies

CJSc. .. Ceylon Journal of Science — Section G

Ckv. .. Chakesadhatuvamsa, ed. J. Minayeff, *JPTS.* 1885, 5-16

Cordier .. Cordier, P.: Catalogue du Fonds Tibétain, II-III, 1909-15

Cp. .. Cariyapitaka, ed. B. C. Law, Lahore, 1924.

CpA. .. Cariyapitaka Atthakatha (Paramatthadipani), ed. D. L. Barua, *PTS.* 1939

CPD. .. A Critical Pali Dictionary, Copenhagen

Cviśp. .. Cittaviśuddhiprakarana, ed. P. B. Patel, *VBS.* 8, 1949

D. .. Digha Nikaya, I-III, ed. T. W. Rhys Davids and J. E. Carpenter, *PTS.* 1890-1911

DA. .. Dighanikaya Atthakatha Sumangalavilasini), I-III, ed. T. W. Rhys Davids, J. E. Carpenter, W. Stede, *PTS.* 1886-1932

Dathv. .. Dathavamsa, ed. B. C. Law, *PSS.* 7, 1925

Dbhg. .. Daśabhumika-sutra (Gatha portion) ed. J. Rahder and S. Susa, Extract from the Eastern Buddhist, Vol. V., No. 4, 1931

Dbhs. .. Daśabhumika-sutra, ed. J. Rahder, Louvain, 1926

DCBT. .. Dictionary of Chinese Buddhist Terms ed. W. E. Soothill and L. Hodous, London, 1937

DeS. .. de Silva, W. A.: Catalogue of Palm-leaf Manuscripts, I, *MCM.* series A. No. 4, 1938

DeZ. .. de Zoysa, Louis: A Catalogue of Pali, Sinhalese and Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Temple Libraries of Ceylon, Colombo, 1885

Dhk. .. Dhatukatha (with commentary), ed. E. R. Gooneratne, *PTS.* 1892

Dhmpr. .. Dharmottarapradipa, ed. D. Malvania, Patna, 1955

Dhp. Dhammapada, ed. S. Sumangala *PTS.* 1914

DhpA. .. Dhammapada Atthakatha, I-V, ed. H. Smith, H. C. Norman, L. S. Tailang, *PTS.* 1906-15

Dhpr. .. Dharmapradipika(va), ed. Dharmakirti Sri Dharmarama (sixth edition), Vidyalankara Press, Ceylon, 1951

Dhs. .. Dhammasangani, ed. E. Müller, *PTS.* 1885

DhsA. .. Dhammasangani Atthakatha (Atthasalini), ed. E. Müller, *PTS.* 1897

Dhscy. .. Dharmasamuccaya, ed. Lin Li-Kouang (first part of Sanskrit text with Tibetan and Chinese versions), Paris, 1946

Dhsmg. .. Dharmasamgraha, ed. F. Max Müller and H. Wenzel, Oxford, 1885

Divy. .. Divyavadana, ed. E. B. Cowell and R. A. Neil Cambridge, 1886

DPPN. .. Dictionary of Pali Proper Names, I-II, by G. P. Malalasekera, London, 1960.

Dpv. .. Dipavamsa, ed. H. Oldenberg, London, 1879.

Dpv. 2. .. The Dipavamsa, ed. B. C. Law, *CHJ.* VIII, Nos. 1-4, Maharagama, Ceylon, 1959.

Dukap. .. Dukapatthana, ed. Mrs. Rhys Davids, *PTS.* 1906.

EB. .. The Eastern Buddhist.

EI. .. Epigraphia Indica (Calcutta, Government Press).

EncyBsm. .. Encyclopaedia of Buddhism, ed. G. P. Malalasekera, Ceylon.

ERE. .. Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, I-XIII, ed. J. Hastings, Edinburg, 1908-26.

EW. .. East and West (Rome).

EWA. .. Encyclopaedia of World Art, I-VIII, McGraw-Hill.

EZ. .. Epigraphia Zeylanica (Ceylon Government Press).

Gg. .. Gandistotragatha (reconstructed in Sanskrit from the Chinese Kien-ch'ui-fan-tsan) ed. Staël-Holstein, *BB,* XV, 1913.

GM. .. Gilgit Manuscripts, I-III, ed. N. Dutt, Srinagar and Calcutta, 1939-50.

GOS. .. Gaekwad's Oriental Series (Baroda).

Gst. .. Guhyasamajatantra, ed. B. Bhattacharyya, Baroda, 1931.

Gv. .. Gandhavamsa, ed. J. Minayeff *JPTS.* 1886, 54-80.

Gvyu. .. Gandavyuahasutra, I-IV, ed. D. T. Suzuki and H. Idzumi (second edition), Kyoto, 1949.

Hatthv. .. Hatthavanagallaviharavamsa, ed. C. E. Godakumbura, *PTS.* 1957.

Hbg. .. Hôbôgirin, Dictionnaire Encyclopédique du Bouddhisme, ed, P. Demiéville, Tokyo, 1929-37.

Hetub. .. Hetubindutika (with sub-commentary), ed. S. Sanghavi and M. S. Jinavijayaji, *GOS.* 113, 1949.

HJAS. .. Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies.

HOS. .. Harvard Oriental Series.

Hvp. .. Hastavalaprakarana (reconstructed in Sanskrit from Chinese and Tibetan translations) ed. F. W. Thomas, *JRAS.* 1918, 267 ff.

IA. .. Indian Antiquary (Bombay).

IAL. .. Indian Art and Letters (London).

IBK. .. Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū (University of Tokyo, Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies).

IC. .. Indian Culture (Calcutta).

IHQ. .. The Indian Historical Quarterly.

It. .. Itivuttaka ed. E. Windisch, *PTS.* 1889.

ItA. .. Itivuttaka Atthakathā (Paramatthadipani, I-II, ed. M. M. Bose, *PTS,* 1934-36.

J. .. Jātaka (with commentary), I-VI, ed. V. Fausböll, *PTS.* 1962.

JAOS. .. Journal of the American Oriental Society.

JAs. .. Journal Asiatique.

JASB. .. Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal.

JBHU. .. Journal of the Benares Hindu University.

JBORS. .. Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society

JBRAS. .. Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society.

JBRS. .. Journal of the Burma Research Society.

JBTS. .. Journal of the Buddhist Text Society.

JCBRAS. .. Journal of the Ceylon Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society.

JDLC. .. Journal of the Department of Letters, University of Calcutta.

JGIS. .. Journal of the Greater India Society.

JIH. .. Journal of Indian History.

Jinac. .. Jinacarita, ed. W. H. D. Rouse, *JPTS.* 1904-5, 1-165.

Jinak. .. Jinakālamāli, ed. A. P. Buddhadatta, *PTS.* 1962.

Jinal. .. Jinālamkāra (with translation), ed. J. Gray, London, 1894.

Jm. .. Jātakamālā, ed. H. Kern, *HOS.* 1, Boston, 1891.

JOR. .. Journal of Oriental Research.

JPTS. .. Journal of the Pali Text Society.

JRAS. .. Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland.

JSS. .. Journal of the Siam Society.

Keith. .. Keith, A. B.: Catalogue of Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Bodleian Library, Oxford, 1905.

Khp. .. Khuddakapatha ed. H. Smith *PTS.* 1915.

KhpA. .. Khuddhakapātha Atthakathā (Paramatthajotikā I), ed. Ho. Smith, *PTS.* 1915.

Khs. .. Khuddasikkhā, ed. E. Müller, *JPTS,* 1883, 88-121.

KhT. .. Khotanese Texts, I-II, ed. H. W. Bailey, Cambridge, 1946-54.

Klpm. .. Kalpanāmanditikā, ed. H. Lüders (Bruchstücke der Kalpanāmanditikā), *KlTurf.* II, 1926

KlTurf. .. Kleinere Sanskrit-Texte (Königliche Preussische Turfan-Expeditionen).

Kp. .. Karunāpundarika, ed. S. C. Das and S. C. Sastri, Calcutta, 1898.

Kśyp. .. Kāśyapaparivarta, ed. H. Stael-Holstein, 1926.

Ktr. .. Karatalaratna (reconstructed in Sanskrit from the Chinese translation), ed. N. Aiyaswami Sastri, Adyar, 1938.

Kvbh. .. (Karmavibhanga): Mahākarma-vibhanga (La grande Classification des Actes) et Karmavibhang opadeśa (Discussion surle Mahākarmavibharga), ed. S. Lévi, Paris, 1932.

Kvit. .. Kankhāvitarani, ed. Dorothy Maskell, *PTS.* 1956

Kvu. .. Kathāvatthu, I-II, ed. A. C. Taylor, *PTS,* 1894-95.

KvuA. .. Kathāvatthuppakarana, Atthakathā, ed. J. Minayeff, *JPTS.* 1889, 1-222.

Kvyū. .. (Avalokiteśvaraguna) Kāranda-vyūha, ed. S. Samasrami, Calcutta, 1873.

Lal. .. Lalitavistra, ed. P. L. Vaidya, *BST,* I, 1958.

Lank. .. Lankāvatārasūtra, ed. B. Nanjio, Kyoto, 1923.

Ligeti. .. Ligeti Louis: Catalogue du Kanjur Mongol, I, *BOH.* III, 1942-44.

Lś. .. Loksvaraśataka, ed. Suzanne Karpelès *JAs.* 1919, 5. 11, XIV, 357-465.

M. .. Majjhima Nikāya, I-IV, ed. V. Trenckner, R. Chalmers, Mrs. Rhys Davids, *PTS.* 1888 - 1925.

MA. .. Majjhimanikāya Atthakathā (Papañcasūdani), I-V, ed. J. H. Woods, D. Kosambi, I. B. Horner *PTS.* 1922-38.

MBT. .. Minor Buddhist Texts, ed. G. Tucci, *SOR.* IX Part I, 1956.

MCM. .. Memoir of the Colombo Museum.

Mdhvr. .. Mādhyamakavrtti, ed. L. de la Vallée Poussin, *BB.* IV, 1902-13.

Mdhvt. .. Mādhyamakāvatāra, ed. L. de la Vallée Poussin, BB. IX..

Mgh. .. Meghasūtra, ed. C. Bendall, *JRAS,* 1880, 288ff.

Mhbv. .. Mahābodhivamsa, ed. S.A. Strong, *PTS.* 1891.

Mhm. .. Mahāmāyūri, ed. Oldenbery in Zapiski Vostschnago Otdelenija Imp. Rusesk. Archeol. Obschestva, XI, 1899.

Mhps. .. Mahāparinirvānasūtra, ed. H. Waldschmidt, Abhandlungen der Deubachen Akademie, Berlin, 1950-51.

Mhs. .. Mahāsamājasūtra, ed. E. Waldschmidt (Bruchstücke Buddhistischer Sūtras, I) *KlTurf.* IV, 1932.

Mhsmg. .. Mahāyānasamgraha, I-II, ed. E. Lamotte (La Somme du Grand Véhicule d'Asanga), Louvain, 1938.

Mhv. .. Mahāvaṃsa, ed. W. Geiger (chapters i-xxxvii) *PTS*, 1908; Cūlavaṃsa, ed. W. Geiger, I-II, (chapters xxxviii-lxxii and lxxiii-ci), *PTS*. 1925-27.

MhvA. .. Mahāvaṃsaṭīkā (Vaṃsatthappakāsinī - Mahāvaṃsa Aṭṭhakathā), I-II, ed. G. P. Malalasekera, *PTS*. 1935.

MhvE. .. Extended Mahāvaṃsa, ed. G. P. Malalasekera, *AS*. III, 1937.

Mhvu. .. Mahāvastu, I-III, ed. E. Senart, Paris, 1882-97.

Mhvyut. .. Mahāvyutpatti, ed. R. Sasaki, Kyoto, 1916.

Miln. .. Milindapañha, ed. V. Trenckner, *PTS*. 1962.

Mmk. .. (Ārya) Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa, ed. T. G. Sastri, *TSS*. 1920-25.

Moc. .. Mochizuki, S.: Bukkyō-dai-jiten, 1-8, Tokyo, 1933-57.

Mūls. .. Mūlasikkhā, ed. E. Müller, *JPTS*. 1883, 122-32.

Mvibh. .. Madhyāntavibhāga, ed. S. Yamagucthi, Nagoya, 1934.

Mvyk. .. Maitreyavyākaraṇa, ed. S. Lévi-Mélanges Linossier, Paris, 1933, 381-90.

Nanjio. .. Nanjio, B.: Catalogue of the Chinese Translation of the Buddhist Tripiṭaka, Oxford, 1883.

Nd. I .. Mahāniddesa, I-II, ed. L. de la Vallée Poussin and E. J. Thomas, *PTS*. 1916-17.

Nd. II .. Cullaniddessa, I-III, ed. W. Stede, *PTS*. 1981.

NdA. I .. Nidddesavaṇṇanā (Saddhammapajjotikā - Mahāniddesa Aṭṭhakathā), I-III, ed. A. P. Buddhadatta, *PTS*. 1931-41.

NdA. II .. Niddesavaṇṇanā (Saddhammapajjotikā - Cullaniddesa Aṭṭhakathā), ed. Boruggamuwe Siri Revata *SHB*. XIV, 1923.

Nett. .. Nettippakaraṇa, ed. E. Hardy, *PTS*. 1902.

NettA. .. Nettippakaraṇa Aṭṭhakathā ed. Widurupola Piyatissa, *SHB*. IX, 1921.

NIA. .. New Indian Antiquary.

NR. .. Nagoya Daigaku Bungaku-bu Kenkyū Ronshū (Bulletin of the Faculty of Letters, Nagoya University).

Nrp. .. Nāmarūpapariccheda, ed. A. P. Buddhadatta, *JPTS*. 1913-14.

Nrs. .. Nāmarūpasamāsa, ed. P. Dhammārāma, *JPTS*. 1915-16.

Nyāb. .. Nyāyabindu, ed. Th. Stcherbatsky (Nyāyabindu, Nyāyabinduṭikā), I-II, *BB*. VIII, 1904; III, 1929.

Nyāp. .. Nyāyapraveśa (with commentary, ed. A. B. Dhruva, *GOS*. 38, 1930.

OM. .. Otani Daigaku Toshokan-zō Tibet Daizōkyō Kanjur Kandō Mokuroku, Kyoto, 1930-32.

Pañcag. .. Pañcagatidīpanī, ed. L. Feer, *JPTS*. 1884, 152-61.

PB. .. Prabuddha Bhārata.

PBO. .. Polski Biuletyn Orientalistyczny (The Polish Bulletin of Oriental Studies, Varsovie).

PED. .. Pali-English Dictionary, ed. T.W. Rhys Davids and W. Stede, *PTS*.

Pet. .. Peṭakopadesa, ed. A. Barua, *PTS* 1949.

Phrd. .. Prajñāpāramitāhṛdayasūtra, ed. F. Max Müller, Oxford, 1884.

Pjm. .. Pajjamadhu, ed. E. R. Gooneratne, *JPTS*. 1887, 1-16.

PMG. .. Publications du Musée Guimet.

PpA. .. Pañcappakaraṇa Aṭṭhakathā (Paramatthadīpanī), Part I, ed. Rerukāne Ariyañāṇa, *SHB*, XXXVII, 1936; Part II, ed. Rerukāne Candavimala, *SHB*. XL, 1938.

Ppind. .. Prajñāpāramitāpiṇḍārtha, I-II, ed. G. Tucci (Minor Sanskrit Texts on the Prajñāpāramitā), *JRAS*, 1947.

Prāt. .. Prātimokṣasūtra, ed. L. Finot (Prātimokṣasūtra des Sarvāstivādins) with a French translation of the Chinese version by ed. Huber, *J.As.* XI, 2(1913), 473 ff.

Prgsg. .. Prajñāpāramitāratnaguṇasañcayagāthā, ed. E. Obermiller, Moscow, 1937.

Prvār. .. Pramāṇavārttikam (with commentary and subcommentary) ed. R. Sankrityayana, Allahabad, 1949.

Ps. .. Paṭisambhidāmagga, I-II, ed. A. C. Tayler, *PTS*. 1905-07.

PsA. .. Paṭisambhidāmagga Aṭṭhakathā (Saddhammappakāsinī), I-III, ed. C.V. Joshi, *PTS*. 1933-47.

PSS. .. Panjab Sanskrit Series (Lahore)

PTC. .. Pāli Tipiṭakam Concordance, *PTS*.

PTS. .. Pali Text Society (edition).

Pug. .. Puggalapaññatti, ed. R. Morris, *PTS*. 1883.

PugA. .. Puggalapaññatti Aṭṭhakathā, ed. G. Landsberg and Mrs. Rhys Davids, *JPTS*. 1913-14 pp. 170-254.

PvśP. .. Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā, ed. N. Dutt, London, 1934.

Pvu. .. Petavatthu, with commentary: Petavatthu Aṭṭhakathā (paramatthadīpanī), ed. E. Hardy, *PTS*. 1894.

Ratgot. .. Ratnagotravibhāgamahāyānotta-ratantraśāstra, ed. E.H. Johnston Patna, 1950.

Rkāv. .. Roruka Avadāna (I: Tibetischer Text und Dt. übersetzung; II: Wörterbuch), ed. J. Nobel 1954.

Rpp. .. Rāṣṭrapālaparipṛcchā, ed. L. Finot, St. Petersburg, 1901.

Rsv. .. Rasavāhinī, ed. Ñāṇavimala Mahā thera, Colombo, 1961.

Rvibh. .. Rūpārūpavibhāga, ed. A.P. Buddhadatta, *BM.* I, 1915.

S. .. Samyutta Nikāya, I-VI, ed. L. Féer and Mrs. Rhys Davids, *PTS.* 1884-1904.

SA. .. Samyuttanikāya Atthakathā (Sāratthappakāsini), I-III, ed. F. L. Woodward, *PTS.* 1929-37.

Sādh. .. Sādhanamālā, ed. B. Bhattacharyya, Baroda, 1925-28.

Sāg. .. Samyuktāgama (fragments from Stein manuscripts), ed. L. de la Vallée Poussin, *JRAS.* 1913, 569 ff.

Sāl. .. Sālistambasūtra (reconstructed), ed. L. de la Vallée Poussin, (Bouddhisme, Études et Matériaux, Théorie des douze causes), Gand, 1913, 19-90.

Sāsv. .. Sāsanavamsa, ed. M. Bode, *PTS,* 1897.

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Sound K. .. Saundaranandakāvya, ed. Haraprasād Sastri, Calcutta, 1910.

SBB. .. Sacred Books of the Buddhists.

SBE. .. Sacred Books of the East.

Sdarś. .. Sarvadarśanasamgraha, ed. E. B. Cowell, 1878.

Sdmp. .. Saddharmapundarikasūtra, ed. U. Wogihara and K. Tsuchida, Tokyo, 1934-35.

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Sdms. .. Saddhammasangaha, ed. Nedimale Saddhānanda, *JPTS.* 1890, 21-90.

Sdurg. .. Sarvadurgatipariśodhanausnisa-vijayadhārani, ed. F. Max Müller, 1884.

Sgh. .. Sadgatihārikā, ed. P. Mus: La Lumiere sur les Six Voies, Paris, 1939.

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SHB. .. Simon Hewavitarne Bequest (Colombo).

SII. .. South Indian Inscriptions (Madras).

Siks. .. Siksāsamuccaya, ed. C. Bendall, St. Petersburg, 1897-1902.

Simā. .. Simāvivādavinicchayakathā, ed. J. Minayeff, *JPTS.* 1887, 17-34.

SIS. .. Sino-Indian Studies (Santiniketan).

Sn. .. Suttanipāta, ed. D. Andersen and H. Smith, *PTS.* 1913.

SnA. .. Suttanipāta Atthakathā (Paramatthajotikā II), ed. H. Smith, PTS, 1916-18.

Snir. .. Sandhinirmocanasūtra, ed. E. Lamotte (Sandhinirmocanasūtra, L'explication des Mystéres), Paris, 1935.

SOR. .. Serie Orientale Roma.

Srs. .. Samādhirājasūtra (chapters 8, 19, 22), ed. Régamey, Warsaw, 1938.

SśkP. .. Saptaśatikāprajñāpāramitā, ed. J. Masuda, Tokyo, 1930.

Semg. .. Suttasamgaha, ed. P. Chaudhuri and D. Guha, BI. 1957.

Semk. .. Saccasamkhepa, ed. P. Dhammārāma, *JPTS.* 1917-19, 1-25.

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Thag. .. Theragāthā, ed. H. Oldenberg, *PTS* 1883.

ThagA. .. Theragāthā Atthakathā (Paramatthadipani), I-III, ed. F. L. Woodward, *PTS.* 1940-59.

Thig. .. Therigāthā, ed. R. Pischel, *PTS.* 1883.

ThIgA. .. Therigāthā Atthakathā (Paramatthadipani), ed. E. Müller, *PTS.* 1893.

Thūpv. .. Thūpavamsa, ed. B.C. Law *PTS.* 1935.

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Tkp. .. Telakatāhagāthā, ed. E. R. Gooneratne, *JPTS.* 1884, 49-68.

T.M. .. TōhokuTeikoku-Daigaku Hōbun-gakubu Tibet-Daizōyō So-Mokuroku, I-II, Sendai, 1932.

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TT. .. Tibetan Tripitaka, Peking Edition, edited by D. T. Suzuki, Vol. 1-165.

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UCR. .. University of Ceylon Review.

Ud. .. Udāna, ed. P. Steinthal, *PTS.* 1885.

UdA. .. Udāna Atthakathā (Paramatthadipani), ed. F. L. Woodward, *PTS.* 1926.

UDvg Udānavarga, ed. N. P. Chakravarti, Paris, 1930.

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Vin. .. Vinayapitaka, I-V, ed. H. Oldenberg, London, 1879-83.

VinA. .. Vinaya Atthakathā (Samantapāsādikā), I-VII, ed. J. Takakusu, M. Nagai, *PTS.* 1924-47.

VinMS. .. Mūla Sarvāstivāda Vinaya: Gilgit Manuscripts, Vol. III, ed. N. Dutt, 1939-50.

VinS. .. Vinaya des Sarvāstivādin, ed. (and translated in French) J. Filliozat and H. Kuno, *JAs.* 1938, 21-64.

Vinvuch. .. Vinayavinicchaya, ed. A. P. Buddhadatta, *BM.* II, 1-230.

Vism. .. Visuddhimagga, ed. H. C. Warren and D. Kosambi, *HOS.* 41, 1950.

Vuu. .. Vimānavatthu (with commentary), ed. E. Hardy, *PTS.* 1901.

WZKM. .. Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes.

Yam. .. Yamaka, I-II, ed. Caroline Rhys Davids, *PTS.* 1911-13.

YamA. .. Yamakappakarana Atthakathā ed. C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *JPTS.* 1910-12, 51-107.

ZDMG. .. Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft.

CROSS-REFERENCES OF SPECIAL TITLES TO ABBREVIATIONS

Atthasālini	.. Dhammasangani Atthakathā	.. *(DhsA.)*
Madhuratthavilāsini	.. Buddhavamsa Atthakathā	.. *(BuvA.)*
Manorathapūrani	.. Anguttra Nikāya Atthakathā	.. *(A.A.)*
Niddesa-vannanā	.. Mahā-(Culla-) niddesa Atthakathā	.. *(NdA. I, II)*
Papañcasūdani	.. Majjhima Nikāya Atthakathā	.. *(MA.)*
Paramatthadipani	.. Cariyāpitaka Atthakathā	.. *(CpA.)*
Paramatthadipani	.. Itivuttaka Atthakathā	.. *(ItA.)*
Paramatthadipani	.. Pañcappakarana Atthakathā	.. *(PpA.)*
Paramatthadipani	.. Petavatthu Atthakathā	.. *(PvuA.)*
Paramatthadipani	.. Theragāthā Atthakathā	.. *(ThagA.)*
Paramatthadipani	.. Therigāthā Atthakathā	.. *(ThigA.)*
Paramatthajotikā I	.. Khuddakapātha Atthakathā	.. *(KhpA.)*
Paramatthajotikā II	.. Suttanipāta Atthakathā	.. *(SnA.)*
Paramatthmañjūsā	.. Visuddhimagga Atthakathā	.. *(VismA.)*
Saddhammapajjotikā I, II	.. Mahā-(Culla-) niddesa Atthakathā	.. *(NdA. I, II)*
Saddhammappakāsini	.. Patisambhidāmagga Atthakathā	.. *(PsA.)*
Samantapāsādikā	.. Vinaya Atthakathā	.. *(VinA.)*
Sammohavinodani	.. Vibhanga Atthakathā	.. *(VbhA.)*
Sāratthappadāsini	.. Samyutta Nikāya Atthakathā	.. *(SA.)*
Sumangalavilāsini	.. Digha Nikāya Atthakathā	.. *(DA.)*
Visuddhajanavilāsini	.. Apadāna Atthakathā	.. *(ApA.)*

EARTH. In Buddhist literature there are frequent references to the earth (*paṭhavī*, *paṭhavi-dhātu*, *paṭhavī* and *mahī*). The term *paṭhavī* is often used also to denote one of the five basic elements (*dhātu*) which constitute matter, which aspect would be adequately discussed in articles on DHĀTU, ELEMENTS and MAHĀBHŪTA.

There are numerous references in the texts to the location or situation of this great earth. According to them the earth is based or stands on water, the water in the air and the air in space (*D.* II. pp. 108-9). There is no reference to the shape of the earth, whether it is flat or round, but there are references indicating that the earth on which we live is not the only earth that exists and that many of them do exist in space. (See LOKA-DHĀTU).

According to Buddhist cosmology (q.v.), a mountain by name Sineru stands in the centre of our earth. It is sub-merged in the sea to a depth of eighty-four thousand leagues (*yojana*) and rises above the surface to the same height. Mount Sineru is surrounded by seven mountain ranges — Yugandhara, Īsadhara, Karavīka, Sudassana, Nemindhara, Vinataka and Assakaṇṇa. Tāvatiṃsa heaven is situated on the top of mount Sineru while the realm of Asuras (*asurabhavana*) is at its bottom (*DPPN* Vol. II. p. 1136). All the hells are supposed to be under the surface of the earth. Spence Hardy in his *Manual of Buddhism* (p. 16) mentions a tradition which says that Avīci (q.v.), the most dreadful of all hells, is seven hundred miles directly under the Bodhi tree at Gayā. According to several commentarial works (eg. *Dhammapada Aṭṭha-kathā* Vol. I. pp. 127, 147; III. p. 181) Avīci hell is situated in the womb of the earth, below all other hells.

The earth also plays a very important role as witness in support of the bodhisatta on the occasion of his attainment of Buddhahood. Mara, the evil one, was making his last attempt to dissuade the bodhisatta from attaining Buddhahood. With frightening weapons, Māra's forces started the assault on the bodhisatta who was serenely seated at the foot of the tree of wisdom. But by the power of virtues practised by the latter during an incalculable period of time in the past, all those weapons became garlands of fragrant flowers and fell at the feet of the bodhisatta. At last when all his attempts were of no avail, Māra came to the bodhisatta and said: "Prince Siddhattha, the seat on which you are seated is mine and not yours. Please go away from it." At this the bodhisatta said: "How can the seat used by the bodhi-satta to attain Enlightenment be yours, what evidence have you got to support your claim." All the forces of Māra roared: "We are evidence for it." Then Māra asked Buddha: "Now, what evidence have you got to support your claim for it?" At this the bodhisatta stroked the earth with the tips of his fingers, and the earth responded by trembling and roaring. The forces of Māra in mortal fear, took to their heels, dropping all their weapons. Girimekhala, Māra's elephant on whose back Māra was seated, [illegible] to drop Māra from its back and knelt [illegible] before the bodhisatta in obeisance (see also [illegible] MUDRĀ, EARTH GODDESS).

Apart from the above [illegible], the earth is mentioned many a time in Buddhist texts in similes when virtues such as patience (*khanti* q.v.) and equanimity (*upekkhā* q.v.) are discussed. In the *Majjhima nikāya* (*M.* I. p. 127) the Buddha says that however much a man may exert himself trying to dig up and empty the earth away, he would not be able to do so because of the vastness and the great depth of the earth. Even so should be the good disciple of the Buddha, remain unmoved and undisturbed when confronted with slander and abuse of evil people. In the *Aṅguttara nikāya* (*A.* IV. pp. 374-5) a noble disciple of the Buddha tells the latter that he could remain calm, without being disturbed, with thoughts of love and compassion to all, like the great earth that remains calm and serene, without being elated or angered when all sorts of clean, desirable things are cast on it or when all types of putrid and dirty rubbish are thrown on it. In the *Majjhima nikāya* (*M.* I. p. 423) the Buddha advises young Rahula to develop his mind in such a way that it does not become disturbed in any situation and thereby maintain complete equilibrium, like the earth. In the *Jātaka* (I. p. 24) it is seen how the Buddha Dīpaṅkara advises Sumedha Paṇḍita to develop the perfection of equanimity (*upek-khā*) which enables one to remain unmoved and undisturbed under all circumstances like the earth that remains calm and serene when good things as well as bad things are dumped upon it (see also EARTH-QUAKE).

W. G. Weeraratne

EARTH GODDESS. The cult of the Earth Goddess prevailed in the world from time immemorial and has been reckoned in popular Buddhism, too, with sporadic references in Buddhist texts from early times.

Earth Goddess has a prominent role to play as the divine mother or Mother Goddess in early religious practices of mankind. During the pre-historic times the Great Mother Earth was portrayed in *ex-voto* tablets and clay and stone carvings. Her primary characteristic is her capacity to reproduce. Hence the fertility and fecundity symbols were always associated with her images, unless these very symbols represented her. In early iconographic representations the Earth Goddess is portraryed with a belly showing thereby her eternal pregnancy.

In certain pre-Buddhist myths, especially those of Rgvedic origin, the Earth Goddess is impregnated by the sky god *par-excellence*, Indra, for her to produce the green growth in abundance. This is in fact an allegory of the rains falling on earth from the skies to produce in bounty for the children on earth.

Among clay, stucco and stone carvings discovered from ancient pre-Buddhistic sites in India and Sri Lanka, replicas of the Great Divine Mother, the Earth Goddess, are also found. Some believe that these finds belong to a pre-Buddhist era, but had survived even after the Buddhist Period.

In the later Buddhist tradition the personified and deified concept of the earth i.e. Earth Goddess, is referred to as either *mahī* or *patharī* with an added appellation *kantā*, signifying the feminine nature (*Pūjāvaliya*-ed. K. Gnanavimala, Colombo, 1965, p. 187, *Stūpavamsa*, Jinalaṅkāra Press, 1933, p. 59, *Dahamsaraṇa*, ed. Dhammanada Thera, 1927, p. 265).

It is but natural for Buddhists to give prominence to an age-old tradition by recognising the earth as a hyperphysical being. In the Indian *milleu* earth has already been elevated to the state of a divinity several centuries before the rise of Buddhism. Both in the Vedic as well as in the epic tradition, '*Pṛthivī* (feminine) has often been combined with the Divine Father, the sky (*Dyauspitā*, *Rv.* I. 89.4). Thus the dual compound (*devatādvandva*), *dyavāpṛthivī*. The universal or primordial parent is invoked as *Pṛthivī-mātā* (mother earth). This concept of deifying the earth and sky is universal and could be traced back to the beliefs and practices among several pre-historic civilisations. In many of the ancient cultures earth was also the bountiful mother. Her seismic behaviour too must have been counted as divine nature resulting in the investiture of divinity on earth. The procreative energy too has been reckoned, to call her the womb (*garbha* or *yoni*) to be impregnated by the Divine Farther Sky, in the form of rain. In the early Indian tradition this aspect has been emphasised by portraying her in art as the Great Mother, *Aditi-Uttanapad*, with the genital parts more prominently shown. Sculptures portraying this aspect of the goddess is found frequently in the Indian repertoire. The lotus too is a symbol of earth in this particular instance. It could be presumed that the later 'Srī and Gajalakṣmī' motifs, depicting a goddess (in both Buddhist and Hindu art) too could be a derivative of the same concept.

With the spread and growth of Buddhism as a popular religion it began to assimilate and accomodate such beliefs that are deep-rooted among the common poeple. It is in this light that one has to evaluate the presence of the Earth Goddess in Buddhist beliefs and cults of a ... ...

The Earth Goddess has seemingly played no less significant a role in the career of the Buddha, according to the Pali tradition as well. She is said to have helped the bodhisatta at a time of dire difficulty when all the gods and angels fled from the Buddha's presence on the advance of the Evil One (Māra) and his army. According to these legends, when the bodhisatta was about to attain Supreme Enlightenment (*Sambodhi*), Māra, the Evil One, who saw him in deep meditation under the Bodhi-tree, approached him with the view to distract him. When Māra's attempts failed, he put forward his claim to the very seat *Vajrāsana* on which the Buddha sat. He called upon his myrmidons (*māra-senā*) to bear witness and challenged the Buddha to show cause as to why he should not return the seat to Māra. (This is reminiscent of the Biblical reference to Satan's having authority to rule the entire world). At this point it is said that the Buddha reminded Māra of the ten perfections (*Pāramī*) he had cultivated on numerous previous births, and called upon the Earth to bear testimony to it by pointing to the Earth with his right hand. (*J*.I.p.71 ff).

Later elaborators of the same legend record that the Earth itself tremored seven times and Māra with his battalions fled away. E. J. Thomas puts this narrative which is found only in later Buddhist literature as follows: "That the elaborators of the Māra story were recording a subjective experience under the form of an objective reality." (E. J. Thomas, *The Life of the Buddha*, Kegan Paul, 1931, p. 230).

It is noteworthy that in the earliest stratum of Buddhist literature the reference to Māra's challenge to the Buddha under the Bodhi-Tree is found for the first time in the *Padhāna Sutta* of the *Sutta-nipāta*. See also "Gotama" in *DPPN*.

However it is significant that the Māra legend has played the primary role in introducing the Earth Goddess to the life of the Buddha by later compilers and to be elaborated greatly in Buddhist art too.

Earth Goddess thus appears in the illustrations of the Māra legend in countless Buddhist shrines both in sculpture and in painting, of many Buddhist lands. One such is an early painting (cir. 7th. AD) from Kyzyl (Central Asia) which shows a woman in humble submission rising up from a fiery circle below the dais, on which the Buddha sits. The Māra's army is shown hurling weapons at the Buddha while the Buddha is depicted in the earth-touching (*bhūsparśa*) attitude calling upon the Earth Goddess for witness (D. Seckel, *Art of Buddhism*, p. 268. See also *Ency. Bsm* I, fasc. 2, PL. XXI; III, fasc. 1, PL. VII)

A still early illustration is found in Sāñci showing Māra's attack wherein the Buddha is represented in the

Vajrāsana and the Sacred Bodhi Tree. The fleeing Māra and his acolytes are shown to the left of the tree while on the right side of the tree (quite close to it) is a figure of a woman holding a water pitcher. One could conjecture that this female is non other than the Earth Goddess (*The Way of the Buddha*, Govt. of India publication. p. 67. fig. 70).

The Earth Goddess is shown in a medieval Pāla Sculpture from Bengal where she is shown holding a pitcher-like object (in like manner the female is depicted in the Sāñci panel) and rising from the bottom of the Buddha's seat. The great event is symbolically illustrated in the earth-touching pose (*bhūsparśa-mudrā*) of the Buddha figure. The crown of the head of the Buddha signifies that he had attained Buddhahood, symbolically crowned in the kingdom of Buddhaland (B. Rowland. *Art and Architecture of India*. Pl. 94 A. on "Crowned Buddha". See A. D. T. E. Perera, in *The Paranavithana Commemoration Volume*, Leiden. ed. J. E. Van Lohuizen de leew. K. Indrapala, L. Prematilake).

In an Ajaṇṭa cave sculpture depicting the Buddha's Enlightenment at the foot of the sacred Bo-tree, the Buddha is shown in the earth-touching attitude while a woman is shown rising up below the Buddha's seat and holding a pitcher in both hands (*The Way of the Buddha*) p. 69. fig. 73). Here the Māra's hands are shown unleashing their weapons on the Buddha.

In the early sculptures or paintings available in Sri Lanka, it is difficult to trace the Māra legend, hence the Earth Goddess also. But this episode has been a lively theme for later artists of Sri Lanka as seen in the numerous illustrations of the Māra's attack in the medieval temple murals with the prominence given to the Earth Goddess (*mahī kāntā*) too. One such is the mural from the Degaldoruwa temple near Kandy where the Earth Goddess is shown holding a pitcher and rising up from the bottom of the Buddha's seat (W. G. A. Archer and S. Paranavitana, (*Ceylon*). UNESCO, World Art Series, Paris, 1957. PL. XXIII).

"The Earth Goddess and Māra's discomfiture" theme that has so very prominently been depicted in the South East Asian Buddhist Art of Burma, Thailand, Laos and Cambodia, could have been derived from the Pāla School of Buddhist art of East Bengal. In the South East Asian Field, the Buddha in the *Bhūsparśa-mudrā* has become so prominent and common that some have erronesouly identified that this was the very first type of Buddha image in the world. In fact it is possible to call these images of the *bhūsparśa* attitude not as 'Buddha' images but icons produced to illsutrate the particular event in the career of the bodhisatta when he called upon the Earth Goddess to bear testimony to his claim to the Adamantine Seat, the "*Vajrāsana*". A lively Pāla image depicting this episode, probably one of those that gave inspiration to the artists from South-east Asia, shows the bodhisattva in the attire of royalty, wearing a crown The Earth Goddess is shown at the bottom panel of the seat exactly in the middle flanked by two figures on either side. The one to the left of the Earth Goddess is unquestionably the Māra in a dejected mood showing his defeat. (B. Rowland. *The Art and Architecture of India*. London 1953, pl. 94A. See also *The way of the Buddha* op. cit p.175 fig. 93. Buddha image from the Pāla School of Buddhist Art). On analogical grounds it is not impossible to argue that those female figures carved on stone columns placed at the entrance to some Buddhist shrines of Sri Lanka of the late classical and early medieval period, are of the Earth Goddess herself. At the entrance to some shrines of the famous Daladāmāligāwa Complex (in Kandy) huge figures of the Goddess holding a pitcher can be seen carved on stone blocks. (See also BHŪMISPARSA-MUDRĀ).

A. D. T. E. Perera

EARTHQUAKE (Pali *paṭhavi-kampā*, *°cala*, °calana or *bhūmi-kampā*, *°cala*, *°calana;* Sanskrit *pṛthvi-kampā*, *°calana* or *bhūmi-kampā*, *°calana*). Eight reasons for the occurrence of earthquakes are enumerated by the Buddha in the *Sutta Piṭaka* (*D.* II. pp. 107 f.; *A.* IV, pp. 312 f.; see also *Divy.* p. 204). In the *Mahāparinibbāna Suttanta* of the *Dīgha-nikāya* (II. p. 72 f.) it is related that Ānanda, being incapable of comprehending the suggestion of his master, failed to request him to live longer. Māra then approached the Buddha and the latter renounced his remaining life span (*āyusamkhāram ossaji*), declaring that within three months time he would attain *parinibbāna*. It is stated that a mighty earthquake 'awful and terrible, bursting forth the thunders of heaven' (*bhiṃsanako lomahanso deva-dundubhiyo phaliṃsu*) took place at this utterance. Ānanda then inquired as to the reasons, proximate and remote, for the occurrence of a great earthquake (*ko nu kho hetu ko paccayo mahato bhūmicālassa pātubhāvāyāti?*). At this point the Buddha avails himself of the opportunity to enumerate the eight reasons for the quaking of the great earth.[1]

The first, the most significant for Buddhist cosmogonical studies, deals with the physical aspect of an

1. For an exemplification of this process see *AA.* IV, p. 155.

[illegible] quake the Buddha [illegible] earth, Ananda, [illegible] *[illegible]* [illegible] the water on wind [illegible] and [illegible] space [illegible]. And [illegible] such [illegible] mighty winds blow (*[illegible]* [illegible]) [illegible] and the earth [illegible].

[illegible] foreshadows one of the earl[illegible] theory of cosmogony as depicted [illegible] COSMOGONY), and [illegible] (*ERE*, IV, 131), the [illegible] [illegible]. It is also the [illegible] seismological explana[illegible] earthquakes. According to the commentary [illegible] (*AA*. IV p. 155), this [illegible] first of the traditional series of eight [illegible] given as that which is conditioned by the [illegible] elements (*dhātukopena*)[3].

[illegible] should be agitated in this manner is not [illegible]. But the seven other conditions[4] for earthquakes as enumerated in the list found in the *Sutta [illegible]* more or less supply the remainder [illegible] found lacking in the first [illegible] to suggest that the various factors which condition earthquakes listed under these seven types may be treated as the ancillary conditions necessary for the physical occurrence of an earthquake which would be the immediate effect of the agitation of the elements [illegible] in the first instance (i.e., *dhātukopa*).

According to the Buddha's enumeration an earthquake may also be the effect of the great energy of a recluse or brahman of great intellectual power with controlled feelings, or a god or fairy (*devatā*) of great might and power. By intense meditation such a being is able to make this earth tremble and shake violently. To elucidate this point, Buddhaghosa (*DA*. II, p. 558 f.) relates the story of Saṅgharakkhita, the arahant monk, who attaining arhantship on the very day he entered the order, tried in vain to shake the palace of Sakka, the king of the Gods (*vejayantha-pāsāda*). Later, having consulted the advice of his teacher, the monk makes the resolve that the space on which the palace stood should turn into water. Owing to the firmness of his resolve Saṅgharakkhita accomplishes this and to the utter consternation of the celestial dwellers watching from within, succeeds in shaking the great structure with his toe.

Two other occasions when the earth trembled owing to a similar reason are mentioned in the *Paramatthadīpanī*, the commentary to the *Theragāthā* (*ThagA*. III, p. 133 f; see also *AA*. pp. 180 f). In the commentary to the *Mahā-kassapa-theragāthā* it is related that Bhadda-Kapilāni and Kassapa, (later Mahā Kassapa Thera) when they decided to part at the cross-roads after renouncing worldly life and joining the Saṅgha together, made the mighty earth, though it could bear all Sineru, tremble at the weight of their virtue. This earthquake was also a signal to attract the attention of the Buddha. For the text comments that the Buddha, who was at Veluvana at that time, knew what the earthquake signified and with eighty chief theras walked in the direction of Kassapa. Again, when the Buddha gave away his rag-robe (*paṃsukūla*) to Kassapa, in exchange for the outer-robe (*paṭipilotikasaṅghāṭi*) of the latter, it is stated (*ThagA* III, p. 135; *AA*. p. 133, also p. 182) that the earth quaked in the recognition of Kassapa's virtues, for no ordinary being would have been fit to wear even the cast-off robe of the Sākyamuni.

According to the *Sumaṅgalavilāsinī* (*DA*. I, p. 131) the earth trembled from the water upwards (*udaka-pariyantaṃ eva katvā paṭhavī akampittha*) when the Dīghabhāṇaka theras recited the *Brhamajāla Sutta* at the place called Ambalaṭṭhikā.

The idea, which forms the basis of this notion, undoubtedly is that extreme virtue and piety are capable of producing various thaumaturgical phenomena. This is a notion found in many religions, but the extent to which it is possible to furnish a factual basis for such an assumption is yet undefined and as T. W., and C. A. F. Rhys Davids have observed, in the case of Buddhism, 'The train of early Buddhist speculation in this field has yet to be elucidated' (*Dialogues of the Buddha*, II, p. 115, note 2).

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2. There are similar descriptions of the constitution of the universe in Hindu literature (see *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, iii, 6 and *Aitareya [illegible]*, xi, 6.4). But in these works, instead of *mahāpaṭhavī, udaka, vāta*, and *ākāsa* as listed in the Pali sources, the sequence is given as [illegible], *sarvam, āpo, vayu* and *antarikṣa-loka*.

3. [illegible] identical description of earthquakes, the *Sumaṅgalavilāsinī* (*DA*. II, p. 559) gives the variation *dhātukkhobhena*, while a Sinhalese MS. of the same commentary has the variant form *dhatukhepana*. However all three terms, *kopena* (from *kopeti*), *khobhena* (from [illegible]) and *khepana* (from *khepeti*) imply the same meaning in the context referred to. In other words the idea implied is that the '[illegible]' or 'commotion' of the physical elements (*dhātu*) gives rise to earthquakes.

4. Buddhaghosa (*DA*. II, p. 559; *AA*. IV, p. 155) enumerates these seven in the following manner: secondly, an earthquake may be [illegible] by the power of thaumaturgy (*iddhanubhava*), thirdly and fourthly by the energy of merit (*puñña-teja*), fifthly by the power [illegible], sixthly by way of expressing approval (*sādhukāradana*), seventhly through compassion (*karuññasabhava*) [illegible].

Thirdly, according to the Buddha's enumeration, an earthquake occurs when a bodhisatta consciously and deliberately leaves his abode in the heaven of delight (Tusita) to descend into his mother's womb. The *Nidāna-kathā* of the commentary to the *Jātaka* (*J.* I. p. 51) says that the twelve thousand world-systems shook greatly at the very moment when the bodhisatta entered queen Māyā's womb.[5] The *Paramatthadipani* (*Thag.* 4. II. p. 94) mentions that the earth quaked at the conception of Tissa, the Buddha-to-be. At this, the people in terror seek the sage called Varaṇa, who explains the significance of it to them saying that earthquakes are harbingers of the birth of a Buddha-to-be. It is also stated that Varaṇa himself acquired great joy in contemplating the glory of the Buddha.

Later literature echoes this idea with additional embellishments. For instance, the *Mahāvastu* states regarding the conception of Dīpamkara, that the earth quaked six times and that 'there was something thrilling in this quaking, something beautiful, merry, gleeful, amiable, exhillarating, admirable, cheerful, assuring, graceful, lovely, gladdening, causing no misgiving nor fear. For while the earth quaked, it destroyed no life whatever, whether animal or plant. (J. Jones, *The Mahāvastu*, I. p. 164).

Next, the Buddha gives the birth of a bodhisattva (in his last life) as the fourth reason for the occurrence of an earthquake (*Yadā Bodhisatto sato sampajāno matu-kucchismā nikkhamati, tadā ' yam paṭhavi kampati sam-kampati sampakampati sampavedhati*).

Again, when a Tathāgata arrives at supreme and perfect enlightenment, the earth shakes and trembles violently (*yadā Tathāgato anuttaraṃ sammāsambodhim abhisambujjhati, tadā......*). The later books, especially the *Nidānakathā* of the *Jātaka* commentary, contain detailed descriptions of the miracles which took place when the Thatāgata sat under the Bodhitree (q.v.). The accounts of the earthquakes which occurred at this time add colour to these descriptions. For instance, according to the *Avidūrenidāna* (*J.* I. pp. 70 f.) the bodhisatta, after accepting eight bundles of grass from Sotthiya, the grasscutter, looks for the right place to sit for attaing-ing Buddhahood. The text says that the bodhisatta, ascending the rising ground around the Bodhitree, stood at the south of it, facing the north. At that moment the sourthern horizon seemed to descend below the level of the lowest hell (*avīci*) and the nothern horizon mounting up seemed to reach above the highest heaven (*bhavagga*). From this the bodhisatta realised that it was not the correct place for attaining Buddhahood. Next, he tried the western side and the earth seamed to bend up and down like a great cart wheel lying on its axis when its circumference is trodden on. In this way, the bodhisatta tried all but the eastern side (*puratthimadisābhāga*) and it is said that the earth showed its impropriety by undulating and receding in the same rythmic fashion. But when he tried the eastern side, the place neither trembled nor shook, for the east is the place where all Buddhas have sat cross-legged. Only then did the great being perceiving, 'This is the steadfast spot chosen by all Buddhas' make his seat there.

After the bodhisatta had thus sat down, Māra tried to harass him but all attempts to drive away the future Buddha proved utterly useless. As a last resort Māra challenged the bodhisatta to prove by way of a witness, that he has given alms. The great being answers, 'I have in this place no living witness at all but let this great and solid earth, unconscious though it be, bear witness'. So saying he withdrew his right hand from beneath his robe and stretching forth towards the earth said, "Art thou or art thou not witness of the seven hundred fold gift I gave in my birth as Vessantara". The texts narrate that the earth, overwhelming the hosts of Māra uttered a voice, 'I am witness to thee of that.' (also see J. Jones, ibid. II p. 313). Later when the bodhisatta traced backwards and forwards the chain of causation (*paticca-samuppada*) under the Bodhitree the ten thousand world-systems quaked twelve times to their ocean boundaries (*J.* I. 75). Finally, when he attained complete enlightenment at break of day the ten-thousand world-systems again shouted for joy (See EARTH GODDESS).

The *Mahāvastu* delineates in an even more awe-inspiring manner the wondrous earthquake which took place when the Buddha stood on the *bodhi-maṇḍapa*. The text has it that even the soles of his feet (*samehi padatalehi*) made the earth tremble. It was terrifying and hair-raising, for the great earthquake made the great system of the three thousand worlds 'level like the palm of the hand.' Through the power of the Enlightened One, Sumeru, Cakravāḍa, Mahācakravāḍa, Nimindhara, Yugandhara, Isandhara, Khadiraka, Aśvakarṇa, Vinataka, Sudarśana and other Kala mountains subsided to the ground and the great oceans were violently stirred.

A significant thing about the descriptions of earthquakes in the *Mahāvastu* is that special mention is very often made of the harmless quality of such earthquakes. Besides this, the text also often relates that the earth quaked in six ways (*ṣaḍ-vikāram*) which is as follows:

When the eastern extremity rose, the western sank.
When the western extremity rose, the eastern sank.

5. *Bodhisattassa pana matukucchimhi patisandhigahanakkhane ekappahareneva sakaladasasahassi lokadhatu sankampi sampakampi sampavedhi* (*J.* I. p. 51).

When the nothern extremity rose, the southern sank. When the extremities rose, the centre sank. When the centre rose, the extremities sank.

At times, although the author says the earth quaked in the sixfold manner, only a few of these ways are alluded to specifically. In the Pali sources, too, especially in the commentaries, mention is made of a sixfold quaking (*chahi ākārehi akampittha* : *A.A.* II, p. 374 etc.). But this is not identical with the stereotyped sixfold version of the *Mahāvastu*

The sixth reason for the occurrence of an earthquake, according to the list given in the *Mahāparinibbāna Suttanta*, is when a Thatāgata preaches his doctrine for the first time (*yadā Thatāgato anuttaraṃ dhammacakkam pavatteti, tadā* ......). The seventh reason for an earthquake is the Buddha's declaration of his decision to renounce his remaining life-span and finally the eighth reason for the quaking of the earth is when the Tathāgata enters complete *nirvāṇa* (*yadā tathāgato anupadisesāya nibbāna-dhātuyā parinibbāyati, tadā* ......).

Besides the above eight reasons for earthquakes as given in the *Digha nikāya*, it is mentioned in the commentaries that when the Buddha walked along, the earth, unconscious though it is, filled up deep places, and made its steep places plain.[6] In the *Milindapañha* (p. 179) this forms a dilemma, when king Milinda asks Nāgasena how a splinter of rock could graze the Buddha's foot, when it could have turned aside. Nāgasena ascribes the falling of the splinter to chance (*animittakatadisā*).

Also in the *Milindapañha* (p. 113 f.) the seven earthquakes which occurred at Vessantara's great *dānas* become the focal point of another dilemma. Milinda inquires how the earth could have quaked at Vessantara's largess when the Buddha had not included it under his eight reasons for a mighty earthquake. Nāgasena's solution is that the earthquake which repeated itself seven times at Vessantara's bequests, was an isolated and extraordinary occurrence distinct from the eight usual ones and not reckoned among these eight.

Besides the instances mentioned above, there are also scattered references to earthquakes. Frequently, concurrently with the utterances of the Buddha, the earth is reported to have quaked as if to bear witness to the Buddha's statements (eg. *Kālakārāma Sutta*, *A.* II, 24 f., *Gotamaka Sutta*, *DA.* I. p. 130; *J.* II, p. 259 etc.). Moreover, at the conclusion of the *Milindapañha* (p. 419), once the puzzles and solutions were all given, the great earth is said to have shaken six times.

In certain Mahāyāna Sūtras mention is made of earthquakes which took place when the Buddha attained to or rose from certain states of concentration (*samādhi*). For instance, the *Aṣṭādasasāhaśrikā-prajñā-pāramitā-nāma-mahāyāna sūtra* relates that the earth trembled in a sixfold manner, when the Buddha rose from the *samādhi* called *Siṃhavikrīḍita* (see also COSMOGONY, EARTH MIRACLES).

G. K. Wijesekera

ECLIPSE. means "interception of the light of a luminous body by intervention of another body between it and the eye or between the luminous body and what illuminates it"; the word is technically used with reference to the eclipse of the sun and the moon. The Pali word used in this sense is *gaha* from *ganhāti* to catch, to seize, to take hold of. The compounded words *candaggaha* and *suriyaggha* (*D.* I. p. 10), therefore, mean the eclipse of the moon and the sun, respectively.

This natural phenomenon of eclipses has been considered and explained by ancient peoples, who deified various objects and acts of nature, through myths, as the work of supernatural beings. The ancient Indians believed that the sun and the moon were gods (*sura*) whose enemies were *asuras*, and that the eclipse of the sun and the moon was an act of an *asura*, named *Rāhu*.

"The churning of the ocean" is a well-known episode in Indian mythology. When the gods were churning the ocean for the nectar of immortality (*amṛta*). Rāhu, the *asura*, disguised himself like one of them and drank a portion of *amṛta*; but the sun and the moon, both luminous gods, revealed this fraud to Vishnu, one of the warrior gods, who cut off Rāhu's head, which thereupon, fixed in the stellar sphere, and having become immortal through drinking *amṛta* has ever since wrecked his vengance on the sun and the moon by occasionally swallowing them. This is the ancient Indian mythological interpretation of a natural phenomenon, that is the eclipse of the sun and the moon.

This must have been a popular belief among the ancients, and is evidently pre-Buddhistic in origin, for in the Pali suttas there are a number of instances where allusion is made to this incident. The seizure of the moon by Rāhu and the escape from him is often used as a simile in the suttas (*Sn.* v. 465; *J.* pp. 183, 274 etc.).

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6 *DA.* I p. 45
unnata bhumippadesa onamanti, onata unnamanti, padanikkhepa-samaye sama va bhūmi hoti.

Rāhu is one of the four stains of the sun and the moon, preventing them from shining in all their glory (*A.* II, p. 53. *Vin.* II, p. 295, etc.).

The *Samyutta nikāya* (I, pp. 50. 51) refers to two occasions when the sun and the moon were seized by Rāhu and that the latter (referred to here as *devaputta*) invoked the aid of the Buddha, who instructed the former to let them free. Rāhu immediately let them go and, trembling and with stiffened hair, ran to Vepacitti, the leader of the *asuras*. This incident evidently refers to the Indian myth of the eclipses, and the legend has been appropriated by the Buddhists to illustrate the Buddha's power and compassion.

According to the commentaries (*DA.* II. pp 487-8; *MA.*IV, p. 421; *SA.* I, pp. 108-9; *AA.* III, p. 20) Rāhu possessed a body, four thousand and eight hundred leagues in height; his chest is one thousand and two hundred leagues broad and his mouth one hundred leagues deep. He is jealous of the sun and the moon and stands in their paths with wide-open mouth. When they fall into his mouth, the gods abandon their abodes and flee for their lives. Sometimes he caresses their abodes with hand only, or with the lower part of his jaws or with his tongue. Sometimes he takes them up and places them against his cheek, all amounting to partial eclipses; but in no case can he stop the course of either the sun or the moon, for, if he attempted to do so, he would meet with disaster. So he journeys along with them.

This is the Buddhist popular mythological description of the eclipses. Although in detail it differs from the Hindu interpretation, there is no essential difference between the two, except the fact that the Buddhists have shaped the legend in such a way that it shows the power of the Buddha.

From the *suttas* of the *Sīlakkhanda Vagga* of the *Dīgha nikāya* we gather that there was a practice prevalent among the ancient Indians, as among other ancient peoples, of foretelling the consequences of eclipses. This practice, which belongs to the sphere of astrology, is condemned as a low art (*tiracchāna-vijjā*), amounting to a wrong means of livelihood that should be given up by monks. (*D.*I. p. 10 etc.).

Upali Karunaratna

ECONOMICS. The complexity of the subject of economics, as it is understood today, defies any attempt at giving a precise, adequate definition. Originally economics simply meant the administration of household resources. The earliset of the modern definitions were usually in terms of wealth. For example, Adam Smith called his famous work 'An inquiry into the Nature and causes of Wealth of Nations'. J. S. Mill, considered economics as the 'practical science of production and distribution of wealth.' Nowadays definitions lay more emphasis on the problems of exhange and price determination. Some even define it in terms of welfare, thus representing economics as a means of studying how through increased production the standard of living of people could be improved. Alfred Marshall sees it not only as a study of wealth but also as a study of man. Some of the latest definitions are based on the theory of scarcity and choice which gives economics yet another dimension.

What becomes clear from these above mentioned numerous definitions is that economics is a complex, yet composite subject, to a large extent concerned with activities and to a lesser extent with motives of man adopted by him in the process of securing all kinds of things with which he aims to satisfy his various wants. These definitions make it clear that econnomics also explains the causes upon which the material well-being of mankind depends, the causes that influence and control the production of goods and their distribution etc.

As human activities and motives are involved in all aspects of economics it inevitably gets linked up with ethics. Inspite of this natural linkage economists are not generally directly concerned with the ethical aspect of human behaviour involved in economics. But on the contrary whatever interest shown by the Buddha on problems of economics is primarily due to ethics involved in it. Buddhism is primarily an ethical religion whose main objective is the moral, ethical and spiritual development of an individual's character. According to Buddhism all human activities should be made subservient to ethical or moral advancement. Hence economics which comprises of numerous human activities is made subservient to ethics, thus lending itself open to ethical evaluation.

Though Buddhism accepts that freedom from want or economic security (*atthi-sukha*) as a helpful prerequisite for the production of a congenial atmosphere for spiritual development, it is clear that the Buddha did not consider the formulation of a comprehensive economic theory as a part of his mission. His mission obviously was not aimed at bringing about an economic-revolution in the meterial sense. As pointed out earlier his concern was more on the ethical aspect of the economy rather than on the theory or subtle mechanism involved in it.

Textual evidence points to the fact that the Buddha took for granted the economic system prevailing at

[illegible] transition [illegible] trading economy to a [illegible] economy. The emerging economic [illegible] was a [illegible] one with [illegible] of capitalism. Though both the state and [illegible] were [illegible] [illegible] with [illegible] of the new multimillionaire business class [illegible] in texts as *setthi*. While land was mostly owned by [illegible] trade was totally in the hands of [illegible] private [illegible]. Both the state and the private sector [illegible] employment for people, the former in its state service and the latter in its industrial and business ventures. While the state coffers were filled by taxation, the private entrepreneurs got enriched through profit-making. The lot of the masses does not seem to have been very encouraging with the working class not getting their proper due.

From the Buddha's reaction to this economy it is evident that he was aware of the numerous shortcomings that needed correction. The texts reveal that the Buddha spotted in this economic system certain shortcomings and areas that needed better organization, which if put right would contribute to the material wellbeing of all and also conduce to their spiritual progress. Hence, what one finds scattered in Buddhist texts is not a comprehensive economic theory but some *ad hoc* observations, directions, guidelines and prescriptions pertaining to particular crucial areas of the economy which needed correction and better guidance. The peculiarity of these observations is that, even though made *ad hoc* and even though directed at a comparatively primitive economy over two thousand fivehundred years old, many of them have a direct bearing on, and relevance to, most of the modern economies.

Being empirical in approach Buddhism views all problems, including economic problems, faced by man in the most practical way. It is this empirical approach that led the Buddha to accept the basic premise that all beings subsist on food (*sabbe sattā āhāraṭṭhitikā*: *D.* III, pp. 211, 273; *A.*V, pp. 50, 55). Working on this premise the Buddha realized that people had to resort to various ways and means to acquire this basic need. Here he intervened to regulate the ways and means adopted by people and to keep them within ethical boundaries. For this he applied the general ethical norms that control and guide action (*kamma*) of people. Thus one sees that in this manner the Buddha formulated theories that indirectly influence production, distribution, consumption and preservation of all types of goods required to satisfy the wants of people to foster their material wellbeing.

Buddhism points out that lack of economic security or, to put it more positively, pressure of poverty is the bane of people, societies and nations. Both the *Cakkavattisīhanāda Sutta* (*D.* III, p. 58 ff) and the *Kūṭadanta Sutta* (*D.* I, p. 127 ff) point out how decrease in production and mal-distribution of goods and wealth break up the whole social fabric thereby making the economic structure to crumble and plunging a country into chaos and destruction. To avoid such disastrous results Buddhism puts forward both remedial and preventive measures. Buddhism admonishes the State to take immediate remedial measures by pumping in necessary capital sufficient to gradually and methodically rebuild the economic system. The above mentioned suttas very emphatically state this as the bounden duty of the state. These suttas are careful to point out also that this pumping of capital should not be done in a haphazard manner but in accordance with a well laid out plan. The *Cakkavattisīhanāda Sutta* (*D.* III, p. 58ff.) is very illustrative in this regard. In this sutta is depicted a country where poverty has become rampant resulting in thievery and disruption of social institutions. King's inquiries reveal that people resort to thievery as they have no other means of livelihood. To remedy the problem the king, in good faith, bestows capital on them. But as time goes on more and more people resort to thievery as a ruse of obtaining an easy living. This episode clearly indicates that Buddhism is quite aware of the fact that economic problems need constructive well-laid out solutions and that they cannot be solved by patchwork remedial measures.

Equally important is the *Kūṭadanta Sutta* (*D.* I, p. 127 ff) which very effectively illustrates how unwise it is to spend national wealth on festivities and celebrations, which are not only non-productive but also destructive in the long run, when the country is undergoing social unrest caused by economic depression. To put across this view the sutta narrates a story about a king called Mahavijita who feels elated about his having abundance of all good things a mortal could possibly enjoy. Being thus elated the king decides to hold a grand sacrificial ritual which, as the story shows, involves waste of state resources, slaughter of cattle, a valuable item of national wealth - and finally burden the people by imposition of extra taxes to recover the expenses involved in these wasteful activities. The story also indirectly points out how necessary it is for the State to be aware and conscious of the prevailing situation in a country if a country is to progress economically. As shown by the story it is this unawareness on the part of the State that worsen the already declining economic conditions by its wasteful economic policies.

As the story goes the chaplain of the king advises him to desist from implementing such futile ventures.

and instead suggests the adoption of a more constructive economic policy. He advises thus. 'Whosoever there be in the king's realm who devote themselves to keeping cattle and the farm, to them let his majesty give food and seed-corn. Whosoever there be in the king's realm who devote themselves to trade, to them let his majesty the king give capital. Whosoever there be in the king's realm who devote themselves to State service, to them let his majesty the king give wages and food. Then those men, following each his own business, will no longer harass the realm; the King's revenue will increase; the country will be quiet and at ease; and the people will be pleased with one another and happy. Fondling their childern in their arms they will dwell in their houses with doors wide-open, because there will be no danger from robbers and criminals.

From these episodes it becomes clear that, according to the Buddhist view, conservation of national resources, methodical planning and investment of capital in constructive ventures in a gainful manner are essential for national economic stability and growth.

These references also show the Buddha's awareness of the economic importance of gainful employment of labour. From the *Kuṭadanta Sutta* it is apparent that what Buddhism prescribes is not mere mass scale employment of people, but the use of human resources in a planned manner in keeping with the totality of the economic struture, so that labour so utilized will contribute to the enhancement of total production. This sutta makes it clear that Buddhism encourages coordinated planning of the whole economic structure which involves selection of areas that require State aid, the type of aid required and the proper utilization of such aid.

Being thus aware of the importance of labour in all economic developmental projects, Buddhism explains how labour should be organized, trained, managed and motivated, so that it would make the maximum contribution to the development of a country's economy. It is in order to achieve the maximum out put from workers that Buddhism emphatically lays down, almost in a prescriptive tone, that one should apply oneself diligently, sweating and devoting one's total strength to the task undertaken (*A*. II, pp. 67, 89; III, pp. 45, 76). To increase labour-efficiency and production of high-quality goods Buddhism encourages specialization. Perhaps this is one of the reasons why the Buddha did not denounce the division of labour that prevailed at that time. He totally rejected the Brahmanic claim that one's profession is indicative of one's caste. Yet he did not disapprove of division of labour which facilitated the proper organization of labour by the formation of guilds and corporate bodies. Such organizations helped to control labour, maintain a high level of efficiency and skill and also safeguard workers interests and rights.

Buddhism accepts also the fact that to achieve maximum output, workers should be made content, for discontentment shatters workers' morale, reduces efficiency and leads them to resort to corruption and malpractices that will adversely affect production. It is to prevent this sort of break-down in labour morale that Buddhism prescribes the importance of having worker-welfare schemes. In fact Buddhism announces a labour charter or what appears to be a series of labour laws aimed at safeguarding workers' right and interests, thus safeguarding employees from exploitation at the hands of employers. In this regard Buddhism deals with assignment of work, fixing of work-hours, provision of leave, medical care etc. granting of reasonable wages, bonuses and incentives etc. Dealing with assignment of work it says that age, sex and physical fitness should be taken into consideration when work is assigned. Employers are requested to fix work-hours of regular shifts so that they may not over-work their workers. They are asked to grant leave at proper times. Provision of medical care and proper nursing of sick workers is insisted. Employers are requested not only to give reasonable wages but also to provide meals. Granting of incentives, bonuses and other fringe benefits, too, are recommended to help improve labour efficiency. Inculcating a sense of dignity of labour by denouncing the caste stigma attached to various professions, the Buddha helped to build the worker morale (*D*.III, p. 190 ff. *DA*. I. p 296)

Improvement in the quality of life of the people is a true indicator of the economic development of a country. From all evidence available it could be surmised that Buddhism's views on economic development are all aimed at producing conditions that would contribute to the improvement of quality of life of the people. To achieve such conditions the Buddha advocated better distribution of wealth. To attain this desired result he encouraged liberality and charity and condemned concentration of wealth due to hoarding by a few. The Buddha while advocating such broad-based economic principles was also aware that the individuals too have the responsibility of playing a major role in the total economic development of a country. The State's attempts to eradicate poverty, provide employment and other basic necessities with a view to improving the quality of life will fail, the Buddha realized, if the individuals do not confirm to certain life patterns that would be in keeping with the economic conditions that prevail. From canonical references it becomes obvious that the Buddha laid much stress on proper management of the household economy as an essential pre-requisite for the improvement of the quality of life of the people. Thus,

one comes across in canonical literature numerous guidelines and instructions to individuals concerning the proper management of household economy. Being the brilliant psychologist that he was, the Buddha knew that the people in general are under the clutches of overwhelming desires, ambitions and aspirations, that they have an uninhibited acquisitive tendency which really is an obstacle to enjoyment of life, for it usually leads to unhappiness, dissatisfaction and even to the misery of falling into debt. Buddhism shows how, being goaded by unchecked desires, individuals lose all sense of priorities and become confused and muddled when faced with scarcity and choice. So in such suttas as the *Sigālovāda* (*D.* III, p. 180 ff.) *Vyagghapajja* (*A.* IV. p. 281ff) one finds the Buddha's instruction to house holders regarding the proper management of their household economy. To check householders from losing sense of priority and indulging in excessive expenditure which inevitably leads them to indebtedness the Buddha advocates the practice of a balanced way of life (*samajivitā*). This not only enables the individuals to enjoy the happiness of debt-lessness (*anaṇasukha*) but also make them enjoy economic stability (*atthisukha*). His injunction to all was to enjoy maximum happiness with minimum possessions. Individuals are advised to limit their needs to bare necessities (*appicchatā*). He gave a formula to help the proper management of household income. According to this formula one is advised to divide the income into four parts of which one is to be used for day to day expenses, another to be deposited to be used in case of an emergency. The remaining two parts, the Buddha advised, should be gainfully invested. This shows that the Buddha was very conscious of the fact that individuals have an important role to play and that if they allow their money to go waste or remain idle that will bring about serious adverse effects on the whole economic structure of the country.

Such methodical management of the household economy enabled individuals also to keep away from falling prey to consumerism. Individuals who succumb to such temptation and incur excessive expenditure which drains out their income is compared to a fig-tree glutton (*udumbarakhādika*), who wishing to eat fig-fruits shake the fig-tree causing much fruit to fall and go waste (*A.* IV. p. 283). This shows that proper utilization and conservation of individual income has great bearing on the quality of life of an individual and also on the national economy.

From the above account it will be seen that there is no validity in the view, that Buddhism is pessimistic in its outlook and that this outlook has been detrimental to economic development. Firstly, Buddhism is not pessimistic but realistic. Secondly, as shown above, Buddhism even by way of *ad hoc* formulation of norms and principles has effectivly contributed to the economic stability and development. In this respect its realistic outlook, ethical bias and its objective of bringing about universal good has enabled it to formulate economic principles, even in a piecemeal manner, to show the way for a righteous and stable economy. (see also EMPLOYMENT).

S. K. Nanayakkara

ECSTASY, primarily means overwhelming mental joy or rapture. As a religious technical term it conotes a deep religious fervour, a sublime state of the mind usually produced by deep and prolonged meditation. In this sublime state, though the meditator remains mentally aware and alert, receptivity and sensitivity of the meditator's mind to external stimuli get either inhibited or altered in character. Hence his mind remains undisturbed by travails of day to day experiences. Very often writers use the term 'ecstasy' to render into English the sense connoted by such Pali terms as *jhāna* and *samāpatti* (*Kindred Sayings*, I, p. 164; *The Compendium of Philosophy*, pp. 55f; Cf. *Dialogues of the Buddha*, I, pp. 84 ff. 248 ff, where the term 'rapture' is used to convey the same meaning). It should be noted that in certain contexts the Pali term *rati*[1] connotes the sense of ecstasy (*Thag. vv.* 518ff.).

According to the Buddhist tradition there appear to be different levels of ecstasy with the state of the sublimation of the mind progressively increasing in the four *jhānas*, and reaching the climax with the experience of the ecstatic happiness which results from the attainment of the knowledge that gives an insight into the true nature of things (*yathābhūtañāṇa*).

Attempts to sublimate the mind above the ordinary level of experience and attain ecstatic happiness could be traced back to ancient times and to numerous cultures of the world. It is evident that some even have resorted to the use of drugs (q.v.) and alcohol which are supposed to induce mental rapture (see *ERE*. s.v. ECSTASY). This practice is widely prevalent now, and the use of 'mind-expanding,' 'psychoactive' or 'psychedelic' drugs such as LSD, *marijuana* etc. is a common feature in numerous societies particularly

1. The term *rati* generally connotes the meaning of mundane love, attachment, pleasure and fondness. But as used in the *Thag. verses* (581 ff.) it clearly conveys the sense of spiritual enjoyment.

among the youth. In the west this has almost reached epidemic levels.[2]

Though there seems to be certain similarities between the mental experiences produced by drugs and meditation, there is no experimental data that either warrant or justifies a toral identification of these experiences.[3] On the contrary, when compared exclusively with the Buddhist textual descriptions of such ecstatic mental states attained through meditation, personal accounts of experiences undergone during drug induced ecstatic states appear quite different in content. Experiments have also shown that, unlike meditational practices, drugs cause physical damage and tend to deprive one of sense control, which could even become a permanent characteristic if one gets addicted to the habit of experiencing ecstasy through drugs. Moreover, when one comes under the influence of psychedelic drugs one becomes subject to hallucinations, imaginations, and chaotic upsurgence of feelings and thoughts. One also loses power over all voluntary activity and gets automatically and indiscriminately involved in irrelevant emotions and prolific thought constructions. The expanded and diffused thought constructions transfer the ecstasy seeker mentally to an imaginary world.[4] These effects and results experienced through drug-induced ecstatic states are the direct opposite of those ecstatic experiences attained through meditational practices. Buddhist meditational practices are not to be mistaken as being hallucinogenic. (Further See DRUGS)

Buddhist meditational practice elevates the mind from a reflective to an intuitive state which ultimately pierces through the veil of ignorance that conceals the truth. It is through a gradual and a methodical process that the mind could be sublimated to such a high level of experience, and in this process, the cleansing of the mind of the five-hindrances (*pañca-nīvarana*) is considered to be a basic requirement. In inducing ecstasy through drugs neither is an attempt made nor any importance attached to ridding the mind of defilements, and consequently effects of drugs cause more and more confusion and ignorance. The fulfilment of this basic requirement of divesting the mind of the five-hindrances, prior to embarking on the attainment of mental absorptions or *jhānas* is seen in the general description of the life of the Buddhist disciple given in the *Sāmaññaphala Sutta* (*D.* I. p. 73).

The predominant feeling experienced in the first *jhāna* is that of elation of mind brought about by detachment from lustful thought and evil ways (*vivekajaṃ pītisukhaṃ*) in contrast to the chaotic psychosis that takes place under the influence of drugs. While being in this state one behaves consciously and voluntarily, for one does not lose control of onself in any jhānic state, pervades (*abhisandeti*) permeates (*parisandeti*), fills (*paripūreti*) and suffuses (*parippharati*) the whole personality with this feeling of elation which is the first level of ecstasy that could be gleaned from Buddhist texts.

In the second jhānic state feeling of elation is further intensified by divesting the mind of the two factors *vitakka*[5] (initial application of thought) and *vicāra* (investigation) which are sources of thought proliferation (*papañca*). When freed of these two factors one becomes internally more pacified, further limiting one's involvement in mundane thoughts. This makes the mind more pliable for concentration, and the feeling of elation that arises from intensified concentration (*samādhijam pītisukham*) is experienced by the meditator more acutely. This form of ecstasy is of a higher level than that experienced in the first *jhāna*.

Usually the meditator is alert and aware in all jhānic states. These two factors namely, alertness (*sati*) and awareness (*sampajañña*) are further sharpened in the third *jhāna*.. At this level of sublimation of the mind the meditator experiences a feeling of happiness (*sukha*) devoid of personal excitement (*nippītikena*).

2. See Richard H. Blum, *Drugs I, Society and Drugs; Drugs II, Students and Drugs*, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, Washington, London. 1969.

3. See Lama Anagarika Govind, *Drugs or Meditation*, Bodhi Leaves, No. B. 62, Buddhist Publication Society, Sri Lanka, 1973; Earnest R. Hilgard, Richard C. Atkinson, Rita L. Atkinson, *Introduction to Psychology*, 6th edition, Harcourt Brace Jovanovick, New York. 1975; Lawrence S. Wrightsman and Fillmore H. Sanford, *Psychology, A Scientific Study of Human Behaviour*, 4th edition, California, 1975, p. 491 ff; Brain Wells, *Psychedelic Drugs*, New York, 1974.

4. Through Buddhist meditation one definitely undergoes a mental change in which all his attitudes, outlooks and values are divested of egoistic considerations. One is never transported to an imaginary world, but instead one is brought down from his 'mind-made' world to fall on reality. It is believed that *jhānas* are capable of effecting even physical 'transport,' and the *Vism.* I. pp. 143 f. refers to two such cases. This however, is not the purpose of *jhāna*, cf. Mrs. Rhys Davids, *Birth of Indian Psychology and its Development in Buddhism*, London, 1936.

5. *Vitakka* (initial application of thought) by which *thina-mida* (sloth and torpor) is inhibited. Similarly *vicāra* (investigation) inhibiting *vicikicchā* (sceptical doubt); *piti* (elation) inhibiting *vyāpāda* (aversion) and *sukha* (happy feeling) inhibiting distraction and worry (*uddhacca-kukkucca*). The other factor present is the detachment from sensuous and unwholesome objects which inhibit sensuous desires (*kāmacchanda*).

In the fourth jhānic state the meditator's mind is further cleansed and made translucent by the further cultivation of awareness (sati) and equanimity (upekkha). At this state of sublimation of the mind, feelings of pleasure (*sukha*) and pain (*dukkha*), elation (*somanassa*) and dejection (*domanassa*) have no bearing on the meditator. All his feelings and emotions which are of purely a personal character get submerged in the sublime feeling of equanimity. The ecstatic feeling that arises when the meditator permeates his whole personality with the sublime and translucent mind is the highest level of ecstasy that could be reached through jhānic practices.

However, the Buddhist texts refer to a still higher level of ecstasy attained throught the realization of the truth, which in other words is the realization of the true nature of things.

Jhānas are only a means to an end, and are not an end in themselves. As they are effected (*abhisankhata*) and thought out (*abhisañcetayita*) they are liable to cease. Not only *jhānas*, all things that are effected and thought out are liable to cease (*yam kho pana kiñci abhisaṅkhatam abhisañcetayitam tadaniccam nirodha-dhammam*).[6] This is the Truth, the true nature of all things. When this Truth is fully comprehended and thoroughly internalized one acquires a new depth of vision, and the mind gets released from all cankers of sensual pleasures, of becoming and ignorance. The happiness that results from this freedom (*vimutti-sukha*) is the highest level of ecstasy. In this ecstatic state one does not experience any form of excitement or elation or any selfish or personal concern. The feeling that one experiences is that of complete spiritual equilibrium (*tatramajjhattata*) resulting from the perfect harmony of all psychic factors.

Unlike the ecstatic states attained through *jhānas*,[7] ecstasy resulting from the freedom from saṃsāric bondage remains as long as one lives. This does not, however, mean that after attaining freedom from saṃsāric bondage one is constantly in a state of ecstasy. What is meant is that one could, if one wants, recollect and reflect on his attainment of 'freedom' and then re-live and re-experience the state of ecstasy of freedom (*vimuttisukha*) he originally experienced. The Buddha is said to have done this, re-experiencing his ecstasy of freedom for several weeks. Buddhist texts, also record paeans of joy (*udāna*) uttered by the Buddha when experiencing this highest form of ecstasy. Not only the Buddha but also his disciples are said to have done this. A well known example is that of Mahakassapa (see *Thag.* vv. 1059 ff.). Another example is that of arahant Bhūta who describes this as the highest form of ecstasy (*Thag.* vv. 518 ff.). See JHĀNA.

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EDICTS, Edicts as *either* official proclamations *or* orders issued by a sovereign to his subjects as a rule or law requiring obedience[1] seem to figure for the first time in the history of Buddhism in the reign of Asoka (circa 278-232 B.C.)

Buddhism and State Authority

The Buddha during his life-time was closely associated with several kings of the region in which he was active. Of them at least three important monarchs namely, Pasenadi Kosala, Bimbisāra and Ajātasattu - were ardent adherents to his teachings. While much is recorded of their munificence to the Buddha and the Saṅgha, no mention is made of *either* their exercising at any time their royal authority to promote Buddhism through decrees, commands or proclamations *or* the Buddha or any of his disciples requesting of them to do so. Even in the grave crisis which occurred in the Saṅgha and which resulted in the Buddha's retirement to the Pārileyyaka forest, no role was played by or expected of the ruler of the territory.

A probable instance of royal intervention in Buddhist affairs in early times is suggested in the Sri Lankan historical tradition as recorded in the *Mahāvaṃsa* Chapter 4 verses 30 - 34. It is said that Kālāsoka, urged by the dissident Vajjian monks, issued a public order in their favour and later rescinded it when apprised of the facts. But none of the earlier accounts of the Second Council (e. g. *Cullavagga*; Ch. XII, *Samanta-pāsādikā* - I pp. 33 - 35; *Dīpavaṃsa*; Ch. V) refers, to such an order. One might, therefore, conjecture that the *Mahāvaṃsa* has projected into the past a royal function which had come into vogue much later in Sri Lanka. It should also be noted that the leading theras of the first two Buddhist Councils had not requested their patron kings (i.e. Ajātasattu and Kālāsoka respectively) for anything but material facilities and security for the sessions.

6 Cf. *M.* I, p. 350 f; III, p. 244; *S.* II, p. 65; *A.* V, p. 343.

7 Jhānic ecstasy lasts only as long as the meditator remains in a particular *jhāna*. Either when he voluntarily rises or, accidentally falls away from it he loses the jhānic ecstasy.

1 Standard definition of an edict: "*Webster's New Universal Unabridged Dictionary* s.v.

Emperor Asoka the Righteous - Dhammāsoka. That Asoka (q.v.) did play a direct and decisive role in the affairs of the Saṅgha and the propagation of the teachings of the Buddha is no longer debated. Thirty-five of his lithic records have hitherto been discovered scattered all over the Indian sub-continent in multiple copies totalling to over two hundred in several dialects of the Middle Indian Prakrit besides Greek and Aramaic, written in four main scripts - Brāhmī, Kharoṣṭhī, Greek and Aramaic. Even if the bulk of these inscriptions conveys an ethical message which is universal and hence common to the different religious systems of contemporary India, there are ample and unequivocal assertions in several of them as regards his partiality to Buddhism and his personal involvement in its protection if not propagation.

On meticulously careful comparisons with all available literary sources both within and without India, the Sri Lankan Pali records are found to be the most reliable and comprehensive. They portray Asoka as supremely devout, generous, and single-minded in his role in raising Buddhism from a local religion into a pan-Indian and consequently a world religion. On this evidence, the Asokan scholars even went to the extent of assuming - erroneously as it has since been established - that Asoka applied his autocratic power to the "Buddhist Church" of which "he was head" (sic!) and that during the last twenty-five years of his life, he distinctly adopted the "position of ruler of both Church and State"*(sic!)

Edicts of Asoka

As sources of the most cogent *prima facie* evidence on the contribution of Asoka to the evolution of Buddhism as both a religion and a cultural force, his inscriptions - and specially those that are called EDICTS- need to be examined in depth. Hence, the devotion of the bulk of this article to the Edicts of Asoka.

It is necessary at the outset to recognize that the term *Edict* is applied to a part of Asokan inscriptions rather loosely for terminological convenience. A careful content-analysis would show - as will be discussed in due course - that several documents which Asokan scholars call edicts, are autobiographical and reflectional in character and hardly contain any element of command which would justify their description as edicts. It will be necessary to examine whether Asoka really intended them to be disjointed as the system of numbering now in vogue suggests.

Inscriptions not classified as edicts: Already excluded from the category of edicts by consensus among Asokan scholars are the three Cave Inscriptions and the two Pillar Inscriptions. The short inscriptions at the Sudāmā, the Visva Jhopri and Karna Chaupar caves of the Barabar hills near Gaya in Bihar record gifts of caves by Asoka to Ājivikas twelve years and nineteen years after coronation.

The Pillar Inscription at Rummindei (Lumbini) commemorates Asoka's pilgrimage twenty years after coronation to the place where the Buddha was born and records the tax concession given to the people "because the Buddha was born here". The other Pillar Inscription - also in the Nepal Terai not too far from Lumbini - is at Nigali Sagar. It states that Asoka enlarged a stūpa enshrining the relics of the Buddha Kaṇakamuni (= Koṇāgamana) fourteen years after coronation and came there on pilgrimage twenty years after coronation.

Thirty "Edicts" of Asoka — Classification and Provenance: Excluding the five inscriptions discussed above, the other thirty are called "*Edicts*." There appears to be a widespread if not universal agreement on the nomenclature based on their size and the kind of lithic surface used. They are generally discussed under four somewhat arbitrary categories:

(1) Minor Rock Edicts: MRE numbered I - IV.
(2) Rock Edicts: RE numbered I - XVI (with Rock Edicts XV and XVI, which are found only in Kalinga in single copies, called Separate Rock Edicts - SRE - by some scholars)
(3) Minor Pillar Edicts: MPE numbered I - II (also referred to as Schism Edict).
(4) Pillar Edicts: PE numbered I - VII.

In the course of this article, it will be shown that these thirty texts actually constitute *thirteen* Edicts, which Emperor Asoka had issued between twelve and twenty-seven years after his coronation.

The far-flung provenances of these lithic records vouch for the impressive extent of Asoka's dominions, which seemed to have covered the whole of the Indian sub-continent from Afghanistan to Orissa and Nepal to the northern borders of Tamil Nadu and Kerala States. Equally demonstrated by their distribution is the uniform interest which Asoka had shown in conveying his basic ethical messages to every corner of his empire.

MRE I is found in a longer and a shorter version in not less than fourteen localities in Rajasthan, Uttar Predesh, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka States and the Union Territory of Delhi. In five localities in Anadhra Pradesh and Karnataka, MRE II is appended to it. At Bairat or Bhabru in Rajasthan, along with MRE I was found MRE III, which is unique *first as*, no other copy has

* Vincent A. Smith: *Asoka* (2nd Edition) p. 92 and Romila Thapar: *Asoka and the Decline of the Mauryas* (5th impression) p. 37.

yet been discovered anywhere and *second* as, in tone and content, it is very different from all other inscriptions of Asoka. What is called MRE IV was found in two versions, namely Greek and Aramaic, near Kandahar in Afghanistan.

RE I - XIV (sometimes called Major Rock Edicts) constitute a series which is found intact, though with textual variations, in five places: Shahbazgarhi near Peshawar and Mansehra in Hazara District in Pakistan; Girnar near Junagadh in Gujarat, Kalsi near Dehra Dun in Uttar Pradesh and Erragudi in Kurnool District in Andhra Pradesh in India. RE I-X, and XIV appear at Dhauli in Ganjam District and Jaugada in Puri District in Orissa (ancient Kalinga) along with RE XV and XVI, which are found only at these two places.

The omission of RE XI, XII and XIII in Kalinga has raised several questions especially because conspicuous by its absence is RE XIII which contains Asoka's moving confession of his grief and repentance during the havoc he caused in the conquest of Kalinga. Fragments of RE VIII and IX were discovered in Sopara near Bombay. A substantially abridged Greek version of this series appears to have been in existence in Kandahar in Afghanistan, for fragments of RE XII and XIII have been found here.

MPE I - the Schism Edict - occurs in three versions at Sanchi near Bhopal (Madhya Pradesh) and Sarnath near Varanasi (U.P.) and in Allahabad on the Allahabad-Kosam Pillar (U.P.) which had originally been set up in Kosam (ancient Kausámbi). To the Sarnath text is appended MPE II, which contains further directives on the diffusion of MPE I and on inspection tours connected with its implementation.

MPE III (also called the Queen's Edict) inscribed on the Allahabad-Kosam Pillar, is a specific directive on recording separately the donations of the second queen Cāruvāki, mother of Tivara.

PE I - VI, like RE I - XIV, form a series apparently issued in quick succession over a brief period. Six almost identical texts have been found: two in Delhi on pillars called Delhi-Topra and Delhi-Meerut on the basis of their original locations; three in the Champaran District of Bihar at Lauriya-Araraj, Lauriya-Nandangarh and Rampurva; and another on the Allahabad-Kosam Pillar.

PE VII is found intact on the Delhi-Topra Pillar while some fragments have been discovered in Kandahar.

Awaiting further study and eventual inclusion in this classification are the fragmentary inscriptions from Taxila and Pul-i-Dharunteh in Aramaic script, the small fragment of the inscription at Amarāvati and the four edicts discovered in 1969 in the Laghman Province in Afghanistan.

Chronological sequence: Not all of Asoka's inscriptions are dated. Some refer to the regnal year during which a certain event is said to have occurred (i.e. visits to sacred spots, the appointment of Dharma-Mahāmātras, the writing of edicts, the enlargement of the stūpa of the Buddha Kaṇakamuni and gifts of caves). These dates provide the upper limit for dating the document in question.

In PE VI, Asoka states that he commenced the practice of issuing *Dharmalipi* twelve years after coronation (*duvādasavasa-abhisitena me dhammalipi likhāpita*). It is assumed by Asokan scholars that the term Dharmalipi applies to all those inscriptions which are categorized as edicts. But it is important to note that in none of the MREs or MPEs is this term used. Nor is it applied to RE XV and XVI, the latter being simply called "iyam lipi" (this document). That the appelation *Dharmalipi* applied particularly to the two series RE I - XIV and PE I - VII is amply borne out by its use as a specific description of these sets of documents in RE I, XIII and XIV and PE I, IV, VI and VII. Of these the PE I - VI are clearly. dated twenty-six years after coronation and PE VII, which is the last among the inscriptions hitherto discovered, was issued 27 years after coronation.

The internal evidence indicates that the series of REs was not issued together. From the dates in RE II and IV a justifiable conclusion is that RE I - IV were inscribed twelve years after coronation. RE V, which records the creation of the new administrative cadre of Dharma-Mahāmātrās thirteen years after coronation, expressly opens a second instalment of edicts. RE V and XII give the impression that this office was no longer an innovation but a well-established institution in all parts of the Mauryan empire by the time these edicts were written. RE XIII is a record of services which could have gone on for many years since Asoka's change of policy and could belong to an even later instalment.

Content-Analysis of Edicts:

MRE I - IV: A content-analysis of MRE I-IV should be preceded by an examination of their grouping in the fourteen locations where MRE I is found by itself or with *either* MRE II *or* MRE III. In five places (namely, Brahmagiri, Erragudi, Jatinga - Rames'vara, Rajula-Mandagiri and Siddhapur), MRE II in either a shorter or a longer version is appended to MRE I. In Bairat or Bhabru MRE III was found on a separate block of granite but alongside MRE I.

MRE IV in Aramaic and Greek versions have an affinity to MRE I-II as regards content, though in presentation it is compact and straight-forward, apparently to appeal to their specific readership. It is evident, as will be further elaborated, that MRE I - IV consist

of bits and pieces and versions of Asoka's very first Dharmalipi (i.e. the First Edict).

In comparison with the extra-oridinary degree of uniformity which underlines RE I - XIV in different localities, MRE I - III show a surprisingly significant tendency to be dissimilar. They vary in length and verbosity as much as in the contents. Three copies (i.e. Brahmagiri, Chitradurga District of Karnataka) start with the statement: "Under the instructions of the Prince (Āryaputra) and Mahāmātras from Suvaṇṇagiri, the Mahāmātras of Isila are to be wished good health and addressed as follows." It is also at these three localities that we come across a longer version of MRE II, with specific instructions for compliance by these officers.

The gist of MRE I in all fourteen localities is that

- two and a half years prior to the issue of this edict, Asoka had become a lay Buddhist devotee - not so vigorous in his exertions in the cause of the *Dhamma* during the first year but devoutly attached to the Saṅgha and vigorous in his exertions since;
- the result of his efforts is that gods who did not mingle with the people of Jambudipa in the past were now mingling with them; and
- the objective he has placed before the people in this process was equally achievable by the rich and the poor.

The directives contained in it were:-

to the rich and the poor within and outside his dominions to continue this exertion for a long time and to achieve a progress equal to one and a half times (the present).

- to officers to have it engraved on rocks and pillars in Asoka's dominions and to go on tours throughout the districts in their charge.

MRE I ends with the information that it was issued on a tour of pilgrimage when Asoka had spent 256 nights away from the capital (according to several copies) and "since the relics of the Buddha ascended the platform" (according to the Ahraura text.)

MRE II shorter version is expressly a continuation of MRE I, as it opens with: "Thus said Devenapiya with reference to the above." Here occurs the succinct formulation of Asoka's Dharma as "One should obey one's mother and father and likewise one's elders. One should be steadfast in one's kindness towards living beings. One should speak the truth. In this way one should profound these attributes of Dharma."

The longer version, as already pointed out, proceeds to instruct the Mahāmātras of Isila how this message is to be communicated through Rajjukas and Prādeśikas to the local populations and how it is to be diffused through elephant-riders, scribes, charioteers, and teachers of the Brahman Community. In the process is described lucidly the role of teachers and pupils and those of the teacher's household.

What accompanies MRE I in Bairat or Bhabru is a unique edict - MRE III - addressed by Asoka to the monks and nuns as well as the male and female devotees. Following the customary salutation, Asoka, in this edict, declares in no uncertain terms his reverence for and faith in the Triple Gem of Buddhism and, saying that whatever is said by the Buddha is well-said, proceeds to propose "a way as to how the Dharma could be perpetuated." The directive expressed in terms of a wish or a desire - is that monks and nuns should constantly listen to and reflect on seven specified texts and the lay-followers should do likewise. The seven texts so recommended are:

1. Vinayasamutkarṣa
2. Āryavāsāh
3. Anāgatabhayāni
4. Munigāthā
5. Mauneyasūtra
6. Upatiśyapraśna
7. Rāhulovāda on falsehood

What is signficant is that MRE I-III taken together underscore Asoka's own declaration of faith as a devout Buddhist. Working back from the statement in PE VI that *Dharmalipi* or edicts on the Dharma were issued for the first time twelve years after coronation and and assuming MRE I - III are in the category of such edicts, the earliest date assignable to these edicts is twelve years after coronation.

The statement in MRE I that he had been actively exerting in the Dharma for a little more than a year prior to the issue of the edict, enables us to date the beginning of his mission as a propagator of the Dharma around ten years after coronation. The most important information which the Aramaic and the Greek version of MRE IV is that Asoka became a teacher of piety (i.e. "showing piety to the people") when ten years had elapsed (from his coronation). Besides this chronological confirmation, MRE IV records Asoka's humanitarian acts and his achievements in ushering an ethical amelioration of the people.

An issue which calls for attention is the date assignable to MRE I - III. The following internal evidence suggests that it could have been Asoka's very first essay in issuing and inscribing edicts:-

- lack of uniformity explicable as a proliferation of tentative drafts;

straightforward and less formal descriptions of Asoka as someone yet not universally known: Cf. Devanampiya Asoka at Maski, Devanampiya Piyadasi Asokaraja at Gujarra and Piyadasi of Magadha at Bairat. As Asoka consolidated his position and name, he was uniformly called Devānampiya Piyadasi in all later edicts and inscriptions.

- all the hitherto discovered copies are within a short distance from his capital and the most number along the southern border of his dominions. They had not received the wide diffusion which RE I - XIV had been subjected to.

RE I-XIV: Five Edicts and an Editorial Note: A careful study of RE I - XIV *in situ* shows very clearly that the division into fourteen texts or edicts and the system of numbering we use are purely arbitrary. These were done by early Asokan scholars and are continued as convenient labels for identification and discussion.

The structure, the style and the contents strongly suggest the original format of this series was one of five edicts and an editorial note. Each of these reconstituted five edicts has a preamble, a directive and a fitting peroration. As we assumed MRE I - III to be the *First Edict*, RE I - XIV could be numbered from second to sixth and analysed as follows:-

Second Edict: RE I - IV: *Commencement* "This *Dharmalipi* has been caused to be written by king Devānampiya Piyadasi"; *Motivation:* humanitarian, with a concern for animals slaughtered for sacrifice as well as for food; *Justification:* the emperor's own example in royal kitchen; his record of humanitarian services within his dominions and outside - e.g. medical treatment, medicinal herbs, wells and shady trees for the benefit of human beings and animals; *Reinforcement:* Recalling the specific directive issued to Rajjukas and Prādesikas and the Council of Ministers twelve years after coronation as regards the teaching of the Dharma. Evaluation of the positive results of these instructions; *Directive:* addressed to sons, grandsons and great-grand-sons to promote the Dharma to the end of time. *Peroration:* Praising the Dharma: "An increase is good as also its non-decrease"; *Conclusion:* the date when it was caused to be inscribed.

Third Edict: RE V. *Commencement:* "Thus said Devānampiya Piyadasi." *Motivation:* his reflection and conviction that doing good to others is difficult; *Justification:* his own record of good things done which he wants his progeny to emulate to end of time; *Reinforcement* : a positive evaluation of how his innovation in the administrative machinery of creating the posts of Dharma-Mahāmātras is being effectively implemented; *Directive:* addressed to his descendants to conform to this edict.

Fourth Edict: RE VI *Commencement:* same as above *Motivation:* a lapse in previous administrations where state business and reporting to the king did not take place at all hours of the day; *Justification.* the effective and comprehensive day-long involvement he had introduced; *Reinforcement:* asserting his commitment to the prompt dispatch of people's business, with due emphasis on the ethical responsibility - "that I may discharge the debt which I owe all living beings, that I make them happy in this world and that they may attain heaven in the next". *Directive.* addressed to sons, grandsons and great-grandsons to conform; *Peroration:* "This, however, is difficult to accomplish without utmost exertion."

Fifth Edict: RE VII - X *Commencement:* "King Devānampiya Piyadasi wishes that all religious sects should live harmoniously in all parts of his dominions". *Motivation:* Reflection on the superior importance of self-control. *Justification and Reinforcement:* his departure from the old practice of kings to go out on pleasure trips and hunting and the manner in which he utilizes his pilgrimages. *Directive:* addressed directly to the people to desist from trivial and meaningless rites and ceremonies and to concentrate on Dharma to attain a desired object in this world and to gain merit for the next. *Peroration:* his disinterested devotion to the welfare of the people - "Whatever endeavours made are for the sake of the people's happiness in the other world and that all people experience a reduction in corruption." *Conclusion:* "This freedom from corruption is more difficult for the rich to achieve."

Sixth Edict: RE XI - XIII. *Commencement:* Same as in the second and the third edicts above. *Motivation:* Reflection on the Dharma - "there is no such gift as the gift of Dharma; no such act as the separation of Dharma from what is not Dharma; no such kingship as kingship through Dharma"; *Justification:* how the conduct enjoined as Dharma produces benefits here and hereafter. *Reinforcement:* his policy of religious tolerance and his reflections on how religious dissensions are caused and fostered and how they could be avoided by becoming well-informed of the doctrines of different religions; his instructions to the Dharma-Mahāmātras and other officers to promote religious tolerance by supporting all sects and to act for the glorification of the Dharma; his most spirited declaration of how the havoc created by the Kālinga war brought remorse and repentance to him and how he had abandoned wars of expansion in favour of conquest by Dharma; an assertion of his willingness to pardon repentant wrong-doers even though he

has the power to punish them severely; a detailed statement on how his conquest through Dharma has encompassed dominions as far away as six hundred yojanas, including the Greek kingdoms of Antiyoka, Turamāyā, Antikini, Makā and Alikasundara and extending as far south as Sri Lanka; *Peroration:* Praise for conquest through Dharma: "In the conquest through Dharma, satisfaction is derived by both the victors and the vanquished." *Directive:* addressed to his sons and great-grandsons to abandon the idea of conquest by arms, to adopt a policy of forbearance and light punishment to the vanquished even if they conquer by arms and to regard the conquest through Dharma as the true conquset. *Conclusion:* "Let all their intense joys be associated with Dharma. For this brings happiness in this world as well as in the next."

Editorial Note: *RE XIV:* not an edict but an editorial explanation on why the edicts would not appear everywhere in the same form.

The identification of five edicts issued at different intervals within RE I - XIII provides a reasonable explanation to several questions: viz:

(a) why as many as four among the thirteen REs do not embody any directive to be considered an edict;
(b) what relevance the philosophical reflections and autobiographical details had in several texts;
(c) for whom the directive was meant and why in most instances Asoka described the orders given to officials and what they did to implement them without addressing any directive specifically to them; and
(d) how RE XI - XIII could be dropped fully from Dhauli and Jaugadā.

RE XV - XVI. An assumption is prompted by this grouping about RE XV and XVI, that take the place of RE XI - XIII at Dhauli and Jaugada. It is that these two edicts which are specificaly addressed to the Mahāmātras of Samāpā and Tosali could have been issued before RE XI - XIII. Such an assumption could be justified on the ground that their omission at these sites was due to lack of space on the rock sapce. Some Asokan scholars argue that these two inscriptions preceded RE I - XVI. This argument is not altogether invalid.

From the point of view of contents, RE XV and XVI are very different from the *Dharmalipi* series; Firstly, they are addressed specifically as 'royal orders' (*rājavacanikā*) or instructions (*anusathi*) to two sets of officers- one of them judicial officers of the city of Tosali - and the objectives to be gained are immediate. They do not digress into philosophical reflections or autobiographical notes but address a major question in which the efforts of the officers are urgent : that is, to placate and pacify the people in unconquered territories lying beyond the borders of Asoka's domination.

The general administrators in Samāpā are instructd to convince these people of the emperor's desire to provide them with all kinds of welfare and happiness in this world and the next as he considers all men to be his children and to inspire in them confidence and goodwill towards the emperor.

In RE XVI, the objective remains the same and the judicial officers of Tosali are required to accomplish it by impartiality and meticulous care in imparting justice without being subjected to jealousy, anger, cruelty, hastiness, want of perseverence, laziness and fatigue. They are specially directed to desist from unnecessary imprisonment and harassment. This instruction also refers to the tours of inspection which were to be organized from Ujjayini (by the Prince Viceroy) and from Takṣaśilā. These two could be counted as the *seventh* and *eighth* edicts of Asoka, pending further evidence on their chronological precedence.

Minor Pillar Edicts I - II: (The Schism Edict): The Ninth Edict: Addressed to the Mahāmātras stationed at Kausambi and undoubtedly also to those at Sānchi and Sarnath, this edict announces the success of Asoka's effort to purify and unify the Buddhist Order and instructs the Mahāmātras on steps to be taken by them to ensure the durability of such purity and unity.

In content, all three texts are identical although the one at Sānchi is slightly more detailed. Whereas Allahabad-Kosam Pillar text says simply, "I have made both the Saṅgha of monks and the Saṅgha of nuns united," the Saranath text continues the sentence adding "to last as long as my sons and great grandsons shall reign and the moon and ths sun shall shine." It also adds a concluding sentence to the effect, "For my desire is that the Saṅgha may remain united and flourish for a long time."

The instructions to the Mahāmātras are:-

(a) to disrobe (=put on white garments) and expel from monasteries monks and nuns who jeopardize the unity of the Saṅgha.
(b) to ensure that no heretics are admitted to the Saṅgha (Allahabad-Kosam Pillar version only); and

MPE II, found only at Sarnath, gives instructions as to how the edict is to be diffused and how its implementation is to be ensured through tours of inspection by the Mahāmātras as well as their subordinates. Among the persons to whom the edict has to be particularly made accessible are "the lay followers of the Buddha," who are also to be assembled near the document on every fast day "in order to be inspired with faith."

Like MRE I - III, the Schism Edict in MPE I - II displays Asoka's direct association with Buddhism and, above all, demonstrates how he used his royal authority and the imperial administrative machinery for the promotion of Buddhism. From the point of view of style, this is the only document which can really be dubbed an edict. Here the formula "*āha*" (stated or declared) which is used in all other inscriptions is replaced by "*āṇapayati*" (commands or orders). This edict, which could be numbered as the *ninth* is undoubtedly an order demanding obedience. In all others the injunction to even the officers are couched in less forceful language.

An approximate date could be assigned to this edict on the basis of the evidence of the Sri Lankan Pali sources. The action reflected in the edict was taken around the same time that the Third Buddhist Council was held. That was in the seventeenth year of Asoka's region. That would mean that the Schism Edict was issued only three or four years after the series of five edicts, found in RE I - XIV. On epigraphical evidence, Asoka had been, by this time, a devout patron of the Saṅgha for five or six years and apparently, as vouched for by Pali sources, it is the emperor's munificence which had attracted heretics and opportunists to the Saṅgha.

Pillar Edicts I - VI: Three Later Edicts: Almost a decade after the Schism Edict, Asoka had issued a series of inscriptions, namely, PE I - VI. In between there had been three short inscriptions: one at Karṇa Chaupar Cave dated nineteen years after coronation and the others on the Nigali Sagar Pillar and Rummindei (Lumbini) Pillar dated twenty years after coronation. Like MRE I - III and the Schism Edict (MPE I - II), the last two of the three inscriptions are specifically associated with Asoka's role as a patron of Buddhism. From that point of view, PE I - VI have much in common with RE I - XVI. While Dharma is upheld, taught and defined in these, no unequivocal reference to Buddhism *per se* could be identified.

PE I - VI have apparently been issued in the same year - that is, twenty-six years after coronation. PE I, IV, V, and VI, which are described in the preamble as *Dharmalipi*, actually carry this date. This fact alone should persuade one to consider PE I - III as one document rather than three. On that basis we could identify three documents, which could be numbered as the tenth, eleventh and twelfth Asokan Edicts as follows:-

Tenth Edict: PE I - III: *Commencement*, the usual opening statement, "Thus said Devānampiya Piyadasi" followed by "This *Dharmalipi* has been caused to be written by me twenty-six years after my coronation;" *Motivation:* his realization that happiness here and hereafter is difficult to be secured without intense love of Dharma, rigorous self-examination, implicit obedience to elders, great fear of sin and excessive zeal for Dharma. *Reinforcement:* the satisfactory results observed in increased love for Dharma on the part of the people and the success of officers of all ranks in conforming and urging others to conform to Dharma; the policy of governing, administering justice, causing happiness and protecting people according to Dharma as implemented by the Mahāmātras in charge of border districts; Asoka's own achievements in enlightening even criminals and his humanitarian measurers to protect animals, birds and fishes. *Directive:* The people should act according to Dharma and it should endure for a long time. *Peroration:* a sprited sermon on how one is blind to one's own sinful acts and the need for self-retrosepection, "These passions surely lead to sin such as violence, cruelty, anger, vanity and jealousy." *Conclusion:* One should reflect, "This is good only for this world and the other is good for the next world also."

Eleventh Edict: PE IV: *Commencement:* exactly as above; *Justification:* some felt need to explain the role of Rajjukas, why they had been appointed and what was expected of them. *Reinforcement:* the feeling of confidence he enjoyed on the realization that Rajjukas were looking after the welfare of the people just as an expert nurse cares for a child entrusted to her. *Directive:* Rajjukas should be impartial in judicial proceedings and impartial in punishment; specific instruction on allowing time for condemed convicts to appeal or to be consoled by their relatives who could also perform meritorious deeds in the name of the condemned. *Conclusion:* expression of Asoka's desire to ensure happiness for the convicts in the next world and to promote the practice of Dharma through self-control and distribution of gifts.

Twelfth Edict: PE V - VI: a unique document constituting perhaps the oldest proclamation of sanctuary to animals. *Commencement:* exactly as above; *Directive:* exempting a long list of species of animals from slaughter; restrictions on killing, castrating, branding and destruction of animals on all times in some cases and others on specified holy days. *Reinforcement:* Asoka's twenty-five amnesties extended to prisoners during his reign; his practice of issuing *Dharmalipis* (edicts) to guide the people to develop Dharma and to attain welfare and happiness; his reflection on how to bring happines to people without any form of discrimination; his

policy of being equally disposed to all religious sects, whom he honours alike. *Conclusion:* "I consider my principal duty is meeting the people of different sects personally."

Thirteenth Edict: P.E. VII: The last of the Asokan inscriptions as the present evidence goes is PE VII which is also a dated document. Called a *Dharmalipi*, it was inscribed twenty-seven years after coronation–that is, one year after PE I - VI.

This inscription is also classified as an edict only because the very last paragraph directs that it be engraved on stone pillars and stone tablets, whenever they are available in order that it may endure for a long time. In a previous paragraph the objective of the document is explained as follows: "that it may last as long as my sons and grandsons shall reign and the moon and the sun shine and also that the people may conform to it."

The bulk of PE VII, which is one of the longest texts among Asokan inscriptions, is a recapitulation of his reflections, policies and deeds, highlighting what he had done for the promotion of Dharma during his reign. Divided into ten parts each starting with the statement, "Thus said Devānampiya Piyadasi," the words of Asoka are presented in a tone of reminiscence and historical record.

The contents of the ten paragraphs are briefly as follows:-

(1-2) The *question* which Asoka had posed to himself on why previous kings failed in their desire to endure the people's progress through the promotion of Dharma: "How can I elevate them through the promotion of Dharma?"

(3) His *plan:* Dharmalipi or edicts to be issued; various kinds of instructions to be given to officers to disseminate them; Rajjukas appointed over many hundred thousands of people to instruct the people on Dharma.

(4) Further *steps:* setting up pillars with Dharmalipi; appointing Dharma Mahāmātras and issuing proclamations on Dharma.

(5) *Social services* instituted: shade trees, wells, rest-houses, watersheds along roads just as previous kings but with the new objective that people conform to Dharma.

(6) *Duties and functions of Dharma-Mahāmātras:* engaged in activities beneficial to ascetics and householders of all religious sects including Buddhists (referred to as affairs of the Saṅgha), Brahmans, Ājivikas, Jains etc.

(7) How these officers and others are engaged in the distribution of gifts donated by Asoka as well as members of his family. His intention: "to promote noble deeds of Dharma and practice of Dharma, which consists of compassion, liberality, truthfulness, purity, gentleness and goodness."

(8) How the people have imitated Asoka and, as a result, the obedience to parents and elders and courtesy to the aged, the Brahmans, ascetics, the poor, the distressed, and even to slaves and servants have increased.

(9) The *two ways* adopted to promote Dharma: (a) imposing restrictions and (b) exhortation. Why the latter is superior. How exhortation has reduced violence and slaughter of animals. Also stated is the objective of the Pillar Edict, which ends with a peroration: "If a person conforms to this happiness will be attained in both this world and the next."

(10) *Directive:* This record should be engraved on stone pillars and stone tablets wherever available.

We have thus in all thirteen Asokan Edicts among the inscriptions so far discovered and published.

Historical and Religious significance of the Inscriptions of Asoka: The undisputed value of the epigraphical records of Asoka as far as the history of Buddhism is concerned is that they provide solid evidence for the accuracy of the historical tradition recorded and transmitted through the Pali literary sources of Sri Lanka.[3] The inscriptions themselves could not have been reliably ascribed to Asoka or accurately interpreted without the Sri Lankan Pali commentaries and chronicles.

Asokan scholars without a sufficient grounding in this literature have often lumped all Buddhist literary sources togther. Further, by assigning higher credence to Sanskrit, Chinese and Tibetan works, they have come to conclusions whose indefensibility is increasingly established. While there are still a number of unresolved discrepancies (e.g. Kālinga war which only RE XIII mentions; sequence and chronology of certain events), there is no doubt that Asokan inscriptions and Sri Lankan historical tradition are mutually supportive.[4]

The inscriptions which are generally called edicts have been extensively analysed for the historical informa-

3. Ananda W. P. Guruge: Emperor Asoka's Place in History: A Review of Prevalent Opinions, *Sri Lanka Journal of Buddhist Studies*. Vol. I. 1987.

4. Ananda W. P. Guruge: Emperor Asoka and Buddhism: Unresolved Discrepancies between Buddhist Tradition and Asokan Inscriptions, in *Buddhist Philosophy and Culture, Essays in honour of N. A. Jayawickrema*, 1987.

tion they provide on Mauryan administration and also for the content of Dharma as conceived and disseminated by Asoka.[5]

Much has been said on the absence of any mention of undeniably Buddhist doctrines such as the Four Noble Truths, Dependant Causation, Noble Eightfold Path and Nibbāna. It has also been stressed that, in keeping with Asoka's admirable tolerance and dedication to religious freedom, his Dharma was nonsectarian and ecclectic. It it is true that the basic tenets of good conduct which he had diffused are universal. But his partiality to Buddhism and his direct involvement in its promotion are amply borne out by quite a number of edicts. There is no doubt, therefore, that Asoka deserves the place which Buddhist history has assigned to him as its most dynamic patron at the crucial moment when it grew from a restricted local sect to a world religion (See PLS. I and II).

Other Edicts in Buddhist History

Sri Lanka: One looks in vain among the early Brāhmi inscriptions for edicts comparable to those of Asoka. Over a thousand epigraphical records have hither to been discovered and published. In script and language, they are very close to Asokan inscriptions but all of them are short announcements of donations. Nor do we have any mention in the early literary sources of any specific edicts issued by kings for the promotion of Buddhism, even though it could be assumed that kings of Sri Lanka right from the introduction of Buddhism in the third century B.C. used their royal authority to safeguard Buddhist interests and establish Buddhist practices.[6]

The earliest specific edict issued by a king to be mentioned in the *Mahāvaṃsa* is the total ban on killing (Māghāta) by Āmaṇḍa-Gāmaṇi (22 A.C. - 31 A.C.) and a similar rule by Vohārika-Tissa abolishing torture. Attributed to Silākāla (522 A.C. - 535 A.C.) Aggabodhi IV (667 A.C. - 683 A.C.) and Kassapa III (724 A.C. -730 A.C.) are decrees guaranteeing sanctuary to all creatures (*Mahāvaṃsa* : 35, 6; 36, 28; 41, 30; 46, 3; 48, 23). There could have been similar decrees on observing the *Uposatha* (Pōya) days as holy days. Badulla Pillar Inscription of the tenth century (*E.Z.* III p. 74) prescribes fines to those trading on such days.

An edict which according to the *Mahāvaṃsa*, was issued by Mahāsena against the residents of the Mahāvihāra, was engraved on rock as is evident from the fragmentary inscription from Jetavanārāma now in the Colombo Museum (*E.Z.* IV. pp. 273-285).

Most of the Sri Lankan monastic inscriptions of the ninth and tenth centuries (e.g. Abhayagiri Sanskrit Inscriptions - *E.Z.* I, pp 1 - 9; Slab-Inscriptions of Mahinda IV - *E.Z.* I pp. 23 - - 39; pp. 230 - 241, pp. 241 - 259; Slab Inscription of Mahinda V - *E.Z.* I pp. 41 - 57) are regulations promulgated under royal authority for the administration of monasteries and their properties. They are addressed to the Saṅgha as well as the laity. Reminiscent of Asoka's instructions in some of his edicts is the concluding sentence of the Slab Inscription of Kassapa V: "(this record) shall be written up and read out before the community of elders at the expiration of every year."

A class of edicts specific to Sri Lanka are the *Katikā vatas*[7] (q.v.) in which several kings had promulgated rules of conduct for the Saṅgha. The rules, according to a elaborate stereotyped preamble are formulated by the leading members of the Saṅgha through discussion among themselves based on custom and practice. The king grants his authority by figuring as the initiator of the process at whose invitation the Saṅgha had undertaken the task. The emphasis given to certain norms of conduct in each extent *Katikāvata* reflects the contemporary situation of Buddhism which demanded royal intervention. The *Katikāvatas* differ from the decrees in inscriptions, referred to above, by being solely devoted to the conduct of monks whereas those inscriptions deal also with monastic administration and management of income and property.

Two of the earliest *Katikāvatas*, as far as our current knowledge goes, are also inscribed on rock: namely, the *Katikāvata* of Parākramabāhu I (1153 A.C. - 1186 A.C.) at Galvihāra and that of Nissanka Malla (1187 A.C. - 1196 A.C.) which is in a damaged condition - at Hātadāgē, both in Polonnaruwa. Texts of the following *Katikāvatas* have also been published: *Dambadeṇi Katikāvata* of Parākramabāhu II (1236 A.C. - 1270 *Katikāvatas* have also been published: *Dambadeṇi Katikāvata* of Parākramabāhu II (1236 A.C. - 1270 A.C.) Fragmentary *Katikāvata* of Parākramabāhu VI (1412 A.C. - 1467 A.C.); *Katikāvata* of Kīrti Śrī Rājasiṃha simha (1747 A.C. - 1760 A.C.) and that of Rājādhirājasiṃha (1782 A.C. - 1798 A.C.).

Burma: A fair number of inscriptions - some of them quite long and detailed - is available from Burma for

5. D. R. Bhandarkar: *Asoka* (fourth edition) 1959; R. K. Mookerjee: *Asoka* (third edition) 1962; Beni Madhab Barua: *Asoka and His Inscriptions*, Parts I & II (second edition) 1955; See also E. Hultzsch: *Inscriptions of Asoka*, Corpus Inscriptionfm Indicarum, 1925. Jules Bloch: *Les Inscriptions d'Asoka*, 1950, A.C. Sen: *Asoka's Edicts*, 1956, D. C. Sircar: *Inscriptions of Asoka* (Third Edition), 1975.

6. Walpola Rahula: *History of Buddhism in Ceylon*, 1956, p. 64.

7. D. B. Jayatilaka: *Katikāvat Saṅgarā*, 1984.

the reconstruction of the history of Buddhism in several of its kingdoms. But these belong to a relatively later date commencing with the rise of Pagan and its contacts in the reign of Aniruddha (1044 A.C. - 1077 A.C.) with Sri Lanka. Neither in these many inscriptions nor in extant chronicles and literary works, has any evidence been found on edicts comparable to those of Asoka. While historical accounts abound and some royal interventions in reconciling religious dissensions could be surmised (e.g. from Pagan inscription of 1260 and Pegu Kalyāṇi Simā Inscription of 1476), no documents similar to *Katikāvatas* have yet been reported. See KATIKĀVAT

It is nevertheless, clear that the practice of engraving decrees on rock was not totally unknown. In 1249 A.C. Klacwā had issued an edict against robbers and it is assumed that its objective was to protect religious monuments.[8] The tone of an edict is also discernible in records of dedications wherein the blessings and benefits on the proper use of the donations and curses and punishments on misuse are listed. (e.g. Face B lines 14 - 36 of the Pagan inscription of Siri Jeyyasura of 1442 A.C.).[9]

China: From the history of Buddhism in China come a number of royal edicts both for and against Buddhism. In its long history, Buddhism had been in conflict with the local religious traditions of Confucianism and Taoism. In 426 A.C., the Tartar chief of of the Wei dynasty issued an edict against Buddhism and it resulted in the destruction of many books and it resulted in the destruction of many boks and images and the massacre of monks. In 451 A.C., however, his successor issued another edict permitting Buddhists to build a temple in each city. Following a conspiracy in which the involvement of a Buddhist monk was detected, an edict in 458 A.C. brought the Buddhist Saṅgha under very close administrative and judicial surveillance, Monks who were guilty of misconduct were ordered to be executed.

An edict assuring full toleration to Buddhism by the Sui Dynasty appeared in 581 A.C. In between periods of prosperity enjoyed by the Buddhism, there came times when long forgotten edicts were invoked against it, as for example, in 714 A.C. when, under the weak rule of the sixth emperor of Tang Dynasty, such an old edict was revalidated. The result was the disrobing of 12000 monks and nuns and prohibition of writing sacred books, building temples and casting images. Severe persecution enacted by emperor Wutsung's edict in 845 A.C. led to the destruction of 4600 monasteries and 40,000 shrines and the disrobing of more than 260,000 monks and nuns.

Buddhism in China, however, revived and regained the favour of emperors. After a fairly long period of tranquility, the fourth Ming emperor issued an edict in 1426 A.C. which imposed a qualifying examination for candidates for monkhood and in 1450 A.C. another edict fixed a ceiling for the land to be owned by a monastery. More recently under the Manchu emperor Shunchi a tolerant and favourable attitude to Buddhism was displayed by his "Sacred Edict" which is known as the imperial book of moral instruction to the common people.[10]

Far East: State intervention had figured prominently in the establishment and the development of Buddhism in Korea and Japan. In the three ancient states of Koguryŏ, Paekche and Silla, Buddhism was recognized as the state religion by decree in 372 A.C., 384 A.C. and 528 A.C. respectively. In Silla, king Pophung employed Buddhism for establishing his monarchical authority and, for this purpose, identifed himself with the Buddha. In the centralized State of Koryo, Kwanjong (850 A.C. - 875 A.C.) intervened in reconciling Doctrinal and Son sects, in systematizing the T'ient'ai theories and in developing a spirit of tolerance among adherents to Buddhism, Confucianism and Taoism.

Edicts against Buddhist interests, too, had been issued from time to time as in China. For instance, Songjong (928 A.C. - 997 A.C.) decreed to restrain the power and influence of Buddhist monasteries and replaced with new ritual those originating in Buddhism, while Yi Pang-won, in a similar process of restrengthening Confucianism, ordered in 1401 A.C. the confiscation of extensive Buddhist temple land as a part of the official suppression of Buddhism. Three decades later, Sejong, the famous patron of medicine, astronomy, science and literature, oppressed Buddhism at first and later changed his policy.[11]

Japan, to which Buddhism was introduced via Korea, followed a similar pattern of royal intervention through decrees and proclamations. The first official act of Prince Shotoku in assuming the regency in 593 A.C. was to proclaim Buddhism as the state religion. In 604 A.C., he proclaimed what is known as the "Constitution in Seventeen Articles" and its second article is reminiscent of Asokan edicts:

8. G. H. Luce and Tin Htway: A 15th Century Inscription and Library at Pagan, Burma in *Malalasekera Commemoration Volume*, 1976, p. 208.
9. Ibid. p. 9.
10. Joseph Edkins: *Chinese Buddhism*, 1893, pp. 87 - 154.
11. Sohn Pow-key, Kim Chol-choon, Hong Yi-sup: *The History of Korea*, 1970, pp. 58-88, 131, 136.

"Sincerely revere the 'three treasures.' The 'three treasures' are Buddha, Dhamma and Saṅgha. the final resort of all beings and the supreme object of faith for all peoples. Should any age or any people fail to revere this truth? There are few men who are utterly vicious. Everyone will realize it if duly instructed. Could any wickedness be corrected without having resort to the 'three treasures'?"

A similar degree of piety was marked by emperor Shomu (724 A.C. - 749 A.C.), whose reign known as the Era of Heavenly Peace saw the enactment of many decrees and edicts for the promotion of Buddhism and Buddhist institutions. The state appointment of Buddhist religious dignitaries was such an edict.

Though in more recent times, a deliberate suppression of Buddhism was in progress on the grounds that it flourished under the Shogunate Government, it was found that Buddhism grew in strength as the danger of being swept away brought the leaders together for united action – a state of affairs which was well nigh impossible during the preceding three centuries. In a significant proclamation, the Buddhist bodies were granted full autonomy in 1877. [12]

Need for Further Research:

A systematic study of all available proclamations, rules and regulations and laws which constitute edicts in the history of Buddhism in diverse cultures is yet to be undertaken. The information gleaned from a sample of instances in this article bears out the fact that state intervention both for and against Buddhism has been growing in magnitude and importance. Recent laws enacted in traditionally Buddhist countries such as the Sri Lankan Constitutional Provision to assign Buddhism a special place in the country would figure among the most recent edicts. Although the Buddha founded Buddhism without recourse to royal authority, the Buddhist institutions today seem to need the legal authority which state legislation provides.

Ananda W. P. Guruge

EDUCATION, BUDDHIST

1. Introduction

Very little is really known of the contribution of Buddhism to education. Even in the Buddhist countries where an unbroken tradition of Buddhist education persisted for many centuries, the current educational systems are neither a direct evolution of the past tradition nor in any way related to it. The Buddhist educational tradition has been supplanted almost entirely but for a few vestiges which have fortunately been preserved in monastic organizations for training of novices and monks.

The paucity of documentation on Buddhist education is astonishingly staggering. The situation reported in the *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics* vol. V, p. 177 in 1911 to the effect that it was hardly possible to present a consequent history of the educational theory or practice among the Buddhist peoples in the absence of historical records" remains unchanged. One could examine the indexes of a hundred standard works on Buddhism, Buddhist culture and civilization or history with hardly a reference to education. Where any reference is found to education, the information given is most likely to be restricted to vignettes of Indian education in such centres of intellectual activity as Taxila or Varanasi, as narrated in the Buddhist Jātakas or to the accounts of Buddhist centres of learning in India and Sri Lanka visited or reported on by the great Chinese travellers, Fa-hien, Hiuen-tsang and I-tsing.

If the coverage extends to more recent times, one finds reference to the Buddhist monastic system of education and the temple schools which were systematically relegated to the background, if not total oblivion, by the onset of modern education. A few attempts have been made to unravel a Buddhist philosophy of education with limited results.

2. Foundations of Buddhist Education:

The Buddha's forty-five year mission as a wandering teacher was to proclaim a path of deliverance. He was popularly called a teacher of men and gods (*satthā devamanussānam*) and a guide who tames men (*purisadammasārathi*-lit. a charioteer unto the (horse-like) amenable folk) - two of the nine epithets used even today in a formula of homage to the Buddha. Moral discipline (*sīla*), concentration of mind (*samādhi*) and the wisdom gained through the realization of the true nature of life (*paññā*) constituted the essential steps of the Path he taught. It enjoined a life of study and meditation aimed at training and taming the mind. It is but logical that a religious system like Buddhism, which regarded ignorance to be the root cause of all misery and postulated an undeveloped mind to be the fundamental obstacle to emancipation, should place the highest stress on mental development and the educational processes most appropriate for the prupose.

A distinctive system of education had begun to evolve during the life-time of the Buddha. Four factors relating to his educational effort constituted its foundations.

12. Masaharu Anesaki: *History of Japanese Religion* (Second printing) 1964: pp. 57, 88, 334-336.

They were:-

(i) The Buddha as the model teacher;

(ii) The Saṅgha as a learning society;

(iii) The monastic establishments as the institutional base for Buddhist education; and

(iv) The intellectual liberalism of Buddhism as an incentive to educational development.

2.1 The Buddha as the Model Teacher:

2.1.1 Pedagogical Principles and Methods of the Buddha:

The Buddha was, undoubtedly, a skilful teacher and believed strongly in the power of the spoken word to convince people to change their way of life, adopt new values and seek new goals. At a time when rival religious teachers resorted to magical and miraculous deeds to win disciples for themselves, the Buddha upheld only one type of miracle: "The Miracle of Instruction" (*anusāsani-pāṭihāriya*).

His discourses were organized with meticulous care. Clarity and logical presentation marked his longer sermons which he had delivered on his own accord. In these he addressed small or large groups and sought to take them step by step to a point of view he sought to establish. Clear examples of these are the *Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta* and *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta.* A few characteristics stand out in these discourses; He began with an attention-catching statement, e.g. "There are two extremes which the truth-seekers ought not to follow" or "There is one sure and straight path, etc."

He analysed a concept to its constitutent elements and presented them with a numerical enumeration, serving both as a framework for orderly presentation of ideas and an aid to memory.

The Buddha used similes and analogies freely and frequently and drew them usually from the day to day life of the people, e.g., the work of the farmer, the butcher, the florist, the boatman, the soldier, the royal official. He repeated the important concepts over and over again, returning to them whenever it appeared permissible. The presentation of such concepts developed almost to the level of standardized and stereotyped formulae which were expected to reappear in identical phraseology whenever the concept was referred to. The discourse led the audience gradually to the conclusion which usually was a strong plea for the pursuit of the path of deliverance he advocated.

His dialogues with individuals are livelier as he used several other learning devices: Usually he would get the discussant to clarify his point of view and to adopt a definite position. But the Buddha would not proceed unless he was sure that he understood clearly the discussant's standpoint. Clarification of premises was diligently resorted to at the beginning of each discussion. If he disagreed he would not ridicule the opponent or his ideas, but would begin asking questions. These were always searching questions, carefully arranged to convince the discussant of the fallacies of his arguments. The discussant was gradually led to make concessions and give up his original stand. The impression often given is that the Buddha reorganized the discussant's thinking process by rapid-fire questioning. Similies and analogies were used in elaborating and explaining these questions. Anecdotes from legend and history figured prominently in his sermons. The evaluation of the original standpoint of the discussant to the point of downright ridicule and denunciation, as on several occasions, would be done only when the discussant had given up his ground and was ready to agree with the Buddha.

Only after such a point of agreement would the Buddha begin to expound his own ideas on the point at issue: Whatever be the subject of discussion, the Buddha led the discussant gradually to an exposition of the path of deliverance.

Whether in sermons and expositions or dialogues and debates, the Buddha resorted to a series of standard educational practices. He aimed at the intellectual level of the "pupil". He had expounded the same idea in so many different ways according to the nature and composition of the audience. He started with the known and insisted on it as a fundamental principle in all his teachings. He eschewed speculation as a waste of time. He urged that one should endeavour to "know it as it really is" - the emphasis being on both knowing and reality.

The Buddha assigned little value, however, to knowledge *per se.* knowledge was valid only up to the point it was applied. A little knowledge but duly applied was rated far superior to vast stores of knowledge with no effort to practise what was learnt. Those who believed in the latter were criticized as cowherds who looked after cattle for other people's benefit.

He was never satisfied until he was sure that the pupil actually understood what was being expounded. He tested them as he went along with searching questions. He used strings of synonyms for important words. He narrated stories. When appropriate, he summarized the lesson into a capsule form, usually a metrical composition in the form of a quatrain of thirty-two syllables.

The advantages of poetry, particularly as an aid to memory, were recognized. Being a poet, himself, the use of poetry to reinforce learning was constantly pursued. Most of the popular themes were expounded in versified sermons. But he was not in favour of presenting his teaching in Sanskrit verse - the medium of

elitist philosophers and religious teachers of his day. He preferred to allow each person to learn the doctrine in his own language and the Buddha himself chose to speak in the vernacular of the day - Māgadhi rather than elitist Sanskrit.

2.1.2 Organization of Learning: The role of the Teacher:

He encouraged his pupils to discuss and debate and he was often only an arbitrator. He arranged prominent pupils to become teachers for others. He evaluated their teaching ability and ranked them according to their specializations and instructional methodologies.

The Buddha organized the Saṅgha to be a learning society in which the members spent their life-time learning, practising what they learnt, teaching others, engaging in debates and discussions to clarify concepts, memorizing sermons and utterances of the Buddha and transmitting them by word of mouth for preservation. developing commentaries and winning more and more members who would similarly continue a lifelong learning process.

As a teacher the Buddha demonstrated many other remarkable competencies. He could convert any incident to an occasion for teaching. If all occasions on which he preached to an audience are analysed as classes, one would be amazed at his ingenuity to use any situation or any congreation of people as an opportunity to teach something. Urchins harassing a snake, an old man abandoned by his children, the search for a bandit murderer, the sacrificial ceremonies of a Brahman, a war between kinsmen and scores of similar occasions provided him the "class".

Sometimes, he contrived them himself. He did not fail to use opportunities which others provided. He readily accepted the challenges of others and was always keen to participate in a debate. Though a consumate user of the spoken word, he was equally adept in using other methods of instruction. Discovery method finds one of its earliest, and perhapst the most perfect, applications when a mother grieving over her dead child was made to realize the universality of death by getting her to beg for a mustard seed from a home that had not seen death (See *DPPN*.s.v.-Kisāgotami).

Buddhist literature ascribes to Moggallāna one of the earliest recorded incidents when diagrammatic representation was utilized to reinforce and enrich a lesson. According to *Divyāvadāna*. Ānanda reports how Moggallāna illustrated a talk on Dependent Origination (*paṭiccasamuppāda*) with the diagram of a wheel in which the twelve causal factors were symbolically depicted. Not only does the Buddha express his admiration for Moggallāna as a teacher but suggests that the diagram be displayed over the gateway in the monastery of Veḷuvana in Rājagaha. This illustration is reputed to be the origin of the "Wheel of Becoming, seen in a 7th century cave painting in Ajaṇṭā in a fragmentary condition. It is a popular theme in the Tibetan and Nepali Tangka paintings.

The Buddha himself is attributed with the use of a series of visual images, miraculously created, to convince an arrogant young queen of the fleeting nature of beauty and life itself. (See *DPPN*.Abhirūpā Nandā therī).

Far more important as all practical applications of a number of important educational devices are the Buddha's views on teaching and learning and related subjects.

An interesting passage in the *Sigālovāda Sutta* (*D*. I. p. 189) enumerates the duties of teachers and pupils:

The Teacher should:

(1) show affection to his pupil;

(2) train him in virtue and good manners;

(3) carefully instruct him, impart unto him a knowledge of the science and wisdom of the ancients;

(4) speak well of him to frinds and relations; and

(5) guard him from danger.

The Pupil should:

(1) minister to his teacher;

(2) rise up in his presence and wait upon him;

(3) listen to all he says with respectful attention;

(4) perform the duties necessary for his personal comfort; and

(5) carefully attend to his instructions.

These were meant to be obligations between teachers and pupils in a secular setting, because the same Sutta lays down a similar set of duties between religious teachers and their lay disciples. Here the ethical content of what is taught is emphasized and, interestingly, an obligation is cast on the lay disciples to make themselves accessible to their teachers.

In both the cases of secular and religious education, the obligation cast on the pupil or disciple as regards learning is very important. The pupil is expected .to to listen to everything the teacher says with respectful attention. The lay disciple similarly is asked to minister to their teachers with respectful attention in their words, deeds and thoughts.

At no time did the Buddha advocate unquestioned acceptance of anything on the authority of the teacher. Such an assertion would have gone against one of his own basic principles of guaranteeing to each person the full and undisputed right to think for himself. The Buddha's approach to learning as a free and unfettered exercise of one's own intellectual capacity to think

was in keeping with his over riding principle, so eloquently enunciated to the Kālāmas (*A.* I, p. 188f.).

2.1.3 ***Teaching-Learning:*** Process of Gradual Progress

The method which the Buddha proposed for this process of self-examination of all knowledge is observation and analysis. His own philosophy or religion was described as *ehipassika* (come and observe or examine) *paccattaṃ veditabba* (to be realized by each one independently). Buddhism was given very early in its career the epithet *vibhajjavāda*, meaning the doctrine of analysis. The Buddha's position was also stated as that of a pointer of the way whille each individual had to realize the truth for himself.

One would, of course, ask here whether the role of the teacher as conceived by the Buddha was a passive one. Our brief sketch of the Buddha as a teacher showed that he was anything but passive. In several passages the Buddha describes his role as a teacher in some detail. Speaking to Bhaddāli in the *Majjhima-nikāya*, he compares himself to an expert horse-trainer. He draws a parallel between his method and that of graduated exercising which a horse-trainer adopts with a new horse. "In this way," runs the Sutta, "the Buddha offers everyone who submits to his guidance by methodical exercise of concentration, therefore by pure thinking, to free him from all passions and to make him the holiest place in the world."[1]

Again in the *Majjhima-nikāya*[2] the Buddha's method of gradual onsetting, gradual progress and gradual ascension from the lowest step upwards has been compared to learning processes in archery and accountancy. "When we take pupils we first make them count one, the unit, two, the duality, three, the trinity and thus we make them count up to hundred", the illustration goes. In an *Udāna* verse, the Buddha explains this process further, "Just as the great ocean becomes deeper, gradually steepens, gradually becomes hollowed out and there is no abrupt fall, in exactly the same way, in this Doctrine and Discipline, the training is gradual, the working is gradual the path is gradual and there is no sudden advance into full knowledge."[3]

In another passage of the *Majjhima-nikāya*,[4] the Buddha compares himself to a trainer of elephants, who by means of a tamed elephant lures the wild elephant into a clearing and takes out its wild ways through methodically progressive exercises to make it "become accustomed to the environs of the village and to adopt the manners in vogue among men."

To summarize these statements, it can be assumed that the Buddha assigns for the teacher the task of designing and administering these "methodically progressive exercises." It is important to note here that the entire emphasis of the Buddha's course of spiritual training is one of progressively difficult mental execises. Morality or *Sīla* is only the foundational preparation. Starting with simple heedfulness (by which one learns to be conscious of everything one does in all his waking moments), through contemplation on inhalation and exhalation, the process of exercising the mind advances through meditation on a varitey of subjects to higher mental states called *dhyānas*.

Here, the Buddha recognized the significance of individual differences and developed individualized courses of meditation for his disciples according to each one's psychological make-up. Concentration of the mind to which all this training leads, is again only a means to an end.

The end of this learning process is the supreme knowledge (*paññā*) with which the disciple reaches the highest attainment of the realm of deathlessness. Here, the disciple leaves everything behind including the very teachings of the Buddha, which were meant to serve only as a raft, a means of going across, but not meant to be retained.

2.2 The Saṅgha as a Learning Society

Within a few months of the commencement of his mission, the Buddha recognized that the spread of a message such as his needed an organization and some procedures. With the converts who could join him in the state of homelessness, he formed the Saṅgha – a very informal organization to begin with.

The procedure, he adopted, was to send the first batch of sixty members in all directions announcing the advent of the new doctrine. This very early missionary exercise paved the way for the rise of the Buddhist educational system in which every monk was potentially a teacher, converting new recruits to the Saṅgha or winning lay supporters.

The content of their teachings came from the Buddha and so were the methods, in that the monks imitated the Buddha. The Buddha himself explained occasionally his methods as well as his concept of learning and teaching. *Aṅguttara-nikāya*, in particular contains very instructive observations.

1. *M.* I, p. 445.
2. *M.* III, p. 1.
3. *Ud.* V, p. 5.
4. *M.* I, p. 179 ff.

Dhamma-desanā (preaching the doctrine) was developed as an act of teaching and *Dhamma-savana* (listening to the doctrine) as a form of learning. On identifying monks capable of performing as missionaries propagating the Dhamma, the Buddha issued the following instructions which are found in both the *Vinaya Piṭaka*[5] and the *Aṅguttara-nikāya*.[6]

> A bhikkhu is fit to go on a mission when he has eight qualities. What are the eight? Here a bhikkhu is one who listens, who gets others to listen, who learns, who remembers, who recognizes, who gets others to recognize, who is skilled in the consistent and the inconsistent, and who does not make trouble. A bhikkhu is fit to go on a mission when he has these eight qualities. Now Sāriputta has these eight qualities; consequently he is fit to go on a mission.
>
> 'He does not falter when he comes
> Before a high assembly;
> He does not lose his thread of speech,
> Or cover up his message.
> Unhesitatingly he speaks out;
> No questioning can ruffle him-
> A bhikkhu such as this is fit
> To go upon a mission.'

The characteristics highlighted are those of a competent teacher.

The Quality of the listener has also received his attention: "Then the Buddha said; There are are these sorts of people to find in the world:

> The empty-head, the fool who cannot see, -
> Tho' oft and oft unto the Brethren going,
> He hears their talk, beginning, middle, end, -
> Can never grasp it. Wisdom is not his,
>
> Better than he the man of scattered brains,
> Who oft and oft unto the Brethren going
> Hears all their talk, beginning, middle, end,
> And seated there can grasp the very words,
> Yet, rising, nought retains. Blank is his mind.
>
> Better than these the man of wisdom wide.
> He, oft and oft unto the Brethren going,
> Hears all their talk, beginning, middle, end
> And, seated there, can grasp the very words,
> Bears all in mind, steadfast, unwavering,
> Skilled in the Dhamma and what conforms thereto.
> This is the man to make an end of Ill."[7]

Recognizing the diversity of individual differences of the people who constituted his audience, the Buddha did adopt a variety of individualized approaches. He would not preach to an eager but hungry and tired learner until he was fed and rested. He would not discuss impermanence of life or certainty of death with a woman whose mind was distraught with grief. He devised simple exercises for those whose mental capacities were limited.

Similarly, *dhamma-sākacchā* (doctrinal discussion) as a means of clarifying, evaluating and analysing the teachings of the Buddha, has also been a major intellectual activity of the Saṅgha. While the process is not adequately elaborated, the result of such an activity is to be seen in the vast exegetical and scholastic literature which found inclusion in the Tripiṭaka itself. The *Abhidhamma Piṭaka* is, in itself, a product of such a process. In style a work like *Kathāvatthu* exemplifies the interaction and interplay of diverse points of views which had to be analysed in the light of the doctrine as enunciated by the Buddha. Perhaps, we get a limpse of the process of *dhamma-sākacchā* from the debates between Nāgasena and king Menander as recounted in *Milindapañha*. The effectiveness of the process as a learning methodology is beyond question.

As the numbers grew larger and the peripheral units had their contacts with the Buddha only at intervals, a system of institutionalized training and updating of knowledge and experience became necessary. The fact that the Buddhist Saṅgha met this challenge effectively is proved by the result of their activities, even though our knowledge of the actual operations during the life-time of the Buddha is quite limited. But we have records of incessant literary activity, which evidently back-stopped the missionary educational movement.

The words of the Buddha were carefully committed to memory, arranged and designated according to literary form in a very early classification called the "nine elements" (*navaṅgasatthusāsana*). Other arranegments had also been attempted. Within three months of the Buddha's demise, the disciples could embark on a general rehearsal of all teachings and a codification under quite a systematic classification. The Tripiṭaka in its present form was also completed within the first three centuries. During the life-time of the Buddha, itself, commentaries on some of the teachings had already begun to appear. Mnemonical summaries had been developed to facilitate the recall of narratives. A system of indexing was established. See AṄGA.

Monks and nuns prepared and delivered their own sermons and even composed poetic appreciations of

5. *Vin.* II, pp. 5, 7 ff.
6. *Anguttaranikāra*, VIII, p. 16.
7. *A.* I, p. 131.

their way of life and the Buddha's guidance (Cf. *Theragāthā* and *Therigāthā*). They produced a massive scholastic literature in which they submitted the Buddha's teachings to a thorough and systematic analysis. All these could not have been possible over a brief period of the first two centuries unless the educational function of the Buddhist Saṅgha was firmly established with almost the beginning of the Buddha's missionary activity.

This would mean that even before the monastic establishments came into existence, the Saṅgha was an itinerant educational institution. The fact that, in such a system, some had to specialize is borme out by designations given to certain monks as specialists of the doctrine, specialists of the discipline (i.e. *dhammadhara* and *vinayadhara*). and learned in a *piṭaka* or all three *piṭakas* (*peṭaki, tipeṭaki* respectirely) In due course the tenaency to specialize seemed to have extended further for we hear in the inscriptions of Asoka of monks who were specialists in particular texts of the Buddhist Canon (i.e. Dīghabhāṇaka, Majjhimabhāṇaka, etc.).

2.3 The Monastic Establishments as the Institutional Base for Buddhist Education:

Thus through a gradual process, the Buddhist monastery became an educational institution a tradition preserved up-to-date in that even the humblest Buddhist temple in the remotest corner of a Buddhist country is essentially a centre of learning. In the growth of this monastic system of education, a number of significant principles appear to have operated.

The monks and nuns were expected to have mastered a minimum quantum of the Buddha's teaching. In the Bhabru Edict, Asoka recommended them a set of seven texts for study. Even today in the Buddhist tradition of Sri Lanka, a monk is tested for his knowledge of basic texts of the Canon before ordination is granted. The senior monks and nuns were required to engage themselves regularly in scholarly discussions to deepen their knowledge and understanding and to guide their practices while, at the same time, educating new recruits and novices. The monastery was also to be a centre for the formal as well as informal education of the laity living in the vicinity.

These expectations meant that the monastery should organize itself into an educational institution in a variety of ways. First, it had to provide for the initial and continuing education of the monks and nuns themselves. In the initial stages, this meant that a monastery should have at least the periodical services of specialist reciters of texts. The travelling specialist was quite a phenomenon in the early stages. Second, it had to organize the education of the laity. It was possibly restricted to regular or occasional sermons on religious themes at the early stages. But with the laity, who either sought deeper knowledge as a preparation to join the Saṅgha or for engaging themselves in studies for its own edification, this service had to assume wider proportions. It was not very long before the teaching of the young became a social responsibility of the monks.

In the evolving educational role, the Buddhist monasteries have recorded a series of remarkable activities and achievements:

(i) The Buddhists, among all religious groups of India, were the first to recognize the importance of literacy. As far back as 84 B.C. the Buddhist Canon was reduced to writing (in Sri Lanka) and the earlier reliance on oral tradition was relaxed. The art of writing travelled to many countries with Buddhism. The script used in early Buddhist writings (e.g. Brhāmi script of Asokan inscriptions) became the base of many Asian alphabets. The monks were keen promoters of literacy and the reading habit among their followers. The significance of these efforts is to be observed even today, when the Buddhist countries of Asia were found to maintain higher literacy rates than their non-Buddhist neighbours long before universal education became a national objective.

(ii) The search for knowledge took Buddhist monks and nuns on incredible missions across the wilds of the entire Asian continent. Either they went on their own in search of teachers and books as did the famous Chinese travellers or were invited by distant lands to come as teachers. Others travelled as self-appointed missionaries, motivated solely by their keen desire to spread the message of Buddhism. Hundreds of such brave and devoted teachers and seekers are recorded in the histories of almost all Asian countries.

(iii) The monasteries became repositories of valuable manuscripts and documents. Every Buddhist temple has its modest library and the older institutions had turned out to be veritable treasure-houses of literature. Libraries of the Mahā Vihāra of Anuradhapura and Nālandā in India were described as vast collections of books on many subjects, amassed over several centuries. The massive hoards of books found in Tung Huang, Potala and Korean monasteries also testify to the Buddhist practice of building up and maintaining extensive libraries.

(iv) The educational activity which was originally restricted to religious knowledge extended in due course to cover all known knowledge. Starting with linguistic and literary studies. the monasteries

extended their fields of study to include medicine, astronomy and mathematics. Centrally located monasteries developed into the stature of Universities (Nālandā being a singularly important example) and attracted scholars from all over the Buddhist world.

(v) The monasteries developed into centres of literary activity. To begin with the literary endeavours were limited to commentaries. In due course they became centres of experimentation with new literary forms. The spirit of search for new media to spread the message is clearly exemplified by the fact that the Buddhist monks did not hesitate to try out any new literary form for religious literature. The ornate Sanskrit poetry and drama were both employed very early in their development by the Buddhist monks. (e.g. *Buddhacarita*, *Saundarānandakāvya* and *Śāriputraprakaraṇa* of Aśvaghoṣa). Experimentation with new literary forms by monastic institutions had continued to this day.

(vi) The monastery perfected sculpture and painting as effective visual aids to the teaching of Buddhist stories and the doctrine. The use of art for both aesthetic beauty and educational reinforcement is a significant Buddhist innovation. It even overcame the earlier reluctance to depict the Buddha in human form and resorted to a set of symbolic representations. The Buddhist artist evolved an exceptionally clever form of artistic shorthand in the medallions of Bhārhut and Amarāvati. Here, a complicated story could be brought back to the viewer's mind through the mnemonical use of a few major events of the story, compressed with exquisite artistic refinement into a single medallion. To date, the Buddhist temple is the preserver and promoter of local artistic talent. The temple murals are really the prime source of religious information to the common folk.

(vii) The monastery played a leading role in community activities by being a focal point from which new ideas and techniques could be propagated. The Buddhist monks organized the population to build roads, hospitals, orphanages and such other community amenities. They promoted coopeperative undertakings in agriculture and the construction of private and public utilities. The monastery continues to be the main meeting place for the people to organize community development activities in Buddhist countries. The monk has been invariably the convenor, patron and animator.

(viii) Through its ceremonials, the monastery has also been the principal promoter of folk art whether it be decorative motifs using such local materials as banana leaf, tender coconut leaves, bamboo, etc., or performing arts in the form of dance and drama. Music, too, has received much encouragement from these ceremonials. Apart from nurturing the popular participatoin in and appreciation of the national cultural heritage, these festivals, processions, exhibitions and such other events of the monastery subscribed to the development of professional artists, musicians, dancers and dramatists. The village temple, generally, provides sustenance to families which pursue these arts. In addition, they give a boost to local handicrafts.

2.4 Intellectual Liberation of Buddhism as an Incentive of Educational Development

An overriding factor which conditioned the Buddhist attitude to teaching, learning and research has been the intellecutal liberalism which the Buddha expounded; his injunction to his disciples, as pointed out earlier, was to eschew tradition and dogmatism and to submit even his own teachings to critical examination.

From a social point of view, he upheld the capacity of every individual irrespective of caste, class, creed or sex, to attain the highest intellectual and spiritual goals of his Path of Devlierance by means of application and perseverance. From an intellectual standpoint, he denounced both conservatism and the tacit acceptance of an idea on someone else's authority. In the rules of discipline for monks, it is laid down that the student "should combat by discussion any false doctrine the teacher might hold or get others to hold." The emphasis was on analysis and investigation.

These principles gave Buddhist education a significant openness as regards both clientele and content. Monasteries have been open to all classes of people and specially, have catered for the socially and economically disadvantaged. The freedom of analysis and investigation, while subjecting the Buddha's teachings to dissent, innovation, reinterpretation and even misinterpretation, promoted a spirit of tolerance which permeated the Buddhist educational system. Not only have the curricula included the study of rival religious and philosophical systems, besides subjects not related to religious purposes but the scholastic activity in the monasteries resulted in the rise of many Buddhist sects and schools.

As Buddhism spread to various parts of Asia, principles and practices of education, emerging from these foundations, evolved in response to needs and challenges of the intellectual and spiritual life of each host country.

3. Historical Development

The historical development of Buddhist education has been largely determined by the position which Buddhism held in a given society. Where rival religious and philosophical systems were strong and the Buddhist Saṅgha had to explain and defend its doctrines, in order to retain and augment adherents, the thrust of the monastic training was directed to debate, discussion, logic and apologia. But, where Buddhism was unchallenged and enjoyed popular or state patronage, the emphasis was on the preservation of the word of the Buddha through reliable modes of transmission, with special attention to exegesis. In both instances, the education of the laity was pursued by means of informal sermons, which combined doctrinal expositions with illustrative storytelling. Knowledge, thus conveyed to the community, was reinforced through visual aids in the form of temple paintings and sculptures.

3.1 Buddhist Education in India:

In India, itself, Buddhism encountered opposition not only from Vedic Brahmanism but also other religious and philosophical systems, notably Jainism and classical schools of Hindu philosophy. In the processof "explaining and defending," Buddhism, itself, underwent a major change, bringing into existence the Mahāyāna school. Essential to its growth in popularity was the effectiveness with which debates and discussions were conducted with both the exponents of traditional Buddhism and others. Influenced by this need, Buddhist education concentrated on the training of the disputant, resulting in three developments:

(a) the curriculum grew rapidly to consist of a wide variety of subjects including secular studies such as medicine, astronomy and mathematics, for a successful missionary had to be a well-informed and socially useful person;

(b) dialectics, logic and epistemology received the utmost attention both in instruction and in the production of scholarly literature; and

(c) Sanskrit, the language of the intellectual elite and therefore, the medium of debate, was adopted for instruction and literary purposes.

Such an expanding system of monastic education favoured large institutions where scholars from various parts of India as well as from neighbouring countries could meet and pursue study and research. Three Chinese pilgrims, who visited some of these institutions between the fifth and the seventh century A.C., describe them as centres of educational and literary activity, maintained and supported through royal grants and endowments from the laity. Nālandā and Valabhi in Eastern and Western India respectively were the most important among them.

Hiuen-Tsang's account of Nālandā, where he was a student for over five years, shows that it was a ful-fledged university with schools of studies, admission and examination procedures, a complex system of academic administration and requisite facilities such as libraries and lecture halls. 1500 teachers catered for 10,000 students[8] (both religious and lay, Indian and foreign), who studied 100 different subjects including philosophy grammar, astronomy and medicine. "Learning and discussing they find the day too short," was Hiuen-Tsang's observation. While the educational efficacy of Nālandā is borne out by the quality of its teachers and students, who had left a lasting imprint on Buddhist history through their writings and missionary activities, the vast campus which has been excavated and conserved testifies to its grandeur.

For Valabhi our information comes from I-tsing who says that, in status, it was equal to Nālandā. Courses of studies were of 2 to 3 years' duration and the names of exceptional graduates were inscribed on the gates. The university imparted education in secular subjects as well. The government of Valabhi sought graduates of this university to fill important positions.

Tibetan records testify to the prestige and fame of two more Buddhist universities namely Vikramaśilā and Odantapuri – both associated with Dīpaṅkara Srījñāna, better known as Atiśa, (q.v.) who was invited in the eleventh century to revamp Buddhism in Tibet. He was an alumnus of Odantapuri and head of Vikramaśilā, both of which had functioned for several centuries and, in his days, were receiving the patronage of the Pāla kings of Bengal. In Vikramaśilā, admission had to be gained by displaying one's proficiency in logical argumentation in a debate with one of its six *dvāra-paṇḍitas* (literally "gate-scholars"). On the successful conclusion of one's studies, one was awarded the degree of Paṇḍita. Odantapuri is said to have been the model for the earliest monastic educational establishments in Tibet. Jagaddalā, founded by the Pāla King, Rāmapāla, in the first quarter of the twelfth century, had a rather short existence of one and a half centuries but made a significant contribution to Buddhist learning.

8. A. L. Basham doubts the accuracy of these figures. He says "The remains of Nālandā, however, belie Hiuen-Tsang...it could hardly have accommodated a thousand monks in anything like the comfort described by the Chinese traveller". Here, Basham has made questionalbe assumptions on the uniformity of building matrials used, the transformation of the institution including rebuilding over 600 years, the extent of destruction by invaders and the completeness of the present archaeological excavations.

Though not so extensively known and documented, there had been many monasteries in the Indian sub-continent which could be rightly described as Buddhist universities. Among them them were possibly Taxila and Kânchi which had been centres of learing from pre-Buddhist times.

3.2 Buddhist Education in Theravāda Countries:

In Sri Lanka, where Theravāda Buddhism flourished with an unbroken history since the third century B.C., with no serious rivalry from any other religious or philosophical system, monastic education concentrated on transmission of the teachings and their explanation, with special emphasis on preserving the word of the Buddha in the language in which he preached. The Buddhist Canon which the missionaries of Emperor Asoka brought to Sri Lanka was in Pali (literarally meaning 'the text') – most probably a formalized version of the vernacular of Magadha, the region where the Buddha was most active. Until it was reduced to wrting, a principal goal of monastic education was its oral transmission through memorization and regular rehearal while the text was thus preserved in Pāli, the commentaries and exegetical works were produced in Sinhala, the national language. This vast commentarial literature was translated, in the fifth century A.C., into Pāli. With this movement, Pāli superseded Sinhala as the language of literary expression and, possibly also, as the medium of Buddhist education.

From time to time, Mahāyāna schools, with Sanskrit as their medium of expression, gained ground in Sri Lanka. Sanskrit opened the door to a rapidly developing secular literature ranging from ornate court poetry and drama to scientific treatises on medicine, astronomy, mathematics and architecture. The education imparted in the monasteries – some of which, like the Mahāvihāra of Anuradhapura and Āḷāhaṇa Piriveṇa of Poḷonnaruva, had become veritable universities – expanded its scope from traditional monastic training for monks and nuns to include a wide range of linguistic, literary and secular studies. Among them a very important element was the study of history which brought into existence a copious literature of chronicles. Education in these monasteries was not restricted to monks and nuns. They catered for the laity too and a number of notable Buddhist scholars of Sri Lanka were lay people (e.g. Guruḷugomi and Vidyā Cakravarti and the kings Kāśyapa V and Parākramabāhu II).

At a particular stage, a concern was expressed over the growing secular content of monastic education. A royal decree of the twelfth century actually banned the study as well as the teaching of "poetry, drama and such other base subjects." In spite of this concern, the monastic educational institutions, which came to be known as *Piriveṇas*, continued to provide an all-round education as conceivable at the time. Several contemporary accounts of the fifteenth century *Piriveṇas* testify that the curriculum included Sinhala, Pali, Sanskrit, Prākrit and Tamil language and literature, Buddhist studies ranging from the Pali Canon to Mahāyāna texts, Indian philosophy, mathematics, architecture, astronomy, medicine and astrology.

When Theravāda Buddhism spread to Myanmar (Burma), Thailand, Kampuchia and Laos, the Sri Lankan model of Buddhist education went with it. Pali (with special emphasis on grammar), as a necessary preliminary to the study of the Buddhist Canon, became so widespread that a history of Buddhism, written in Myanmar in the thirteenth century, says that grammar was popular even among women and young girls. Another contemporary chronicle describes king Kyaswa to have "read and become a master of every book, held public disputations and seven times a day instructed his household."

National languages received equal attention although Pāli, as the ecclesiastical language common to all Theravāda countries, was used in the production of learned treatises. An impetus was given to the art of writing and alphabets were evolved with kings taking the initiative as in Thailand where king Rama Khamhaeng invented a Thai script in 1283. Monasteries, attracting students from far and wide and engaging in a wide range of literary activity and research, existed in or near all major cities of the region. A similar pattern of Buddhist learning appears to have been prevalent in earstwhile Buddhist lands constituting Malaysia, Indonesia and the Maldive islands.

A very significant innovation in Myanmar, Thailand, Kampuchia and Laos was "temporary ordination" which encouraged, if not demanded, every young man to spend at least a few months as amonk in a monastery. Persisting still as an important socio-religious institution, this practice ensures that at least the male population is exposed to a period of formal learning.

3.3 Buddhist Education in Mahāyāna Buddhist Countries:

As Mahāyāna Buddhism spread through Central Asia to China, Tibet, Mongolia, Korea and Japan it faced opposition from popular beliefs as well as established religious and philosophical systems. Interactions with Confucianism and Taoism, in particular, re-emphasized the training of the debater. The need to gain popular support underscored ethical and moral values, on the one hand, and public services, including lay education, on the other. Formal logic dominated the curriculum and, as exemplified, for instance, by the prevailing Tibetan system, learning was achieved by teachers and students engaging themselves in a debate where, through strict application of logic, they

aimed at reaching an unassailable conclusion. The vast literature in defence of Buddhism against Confucianism and Taoism bears further testimony to this aspect of Buddhist education. An insight into the scholarly life in a monastery is provided by the murals of Tung-Huang. In these are depicted monks engaged in reading, writing and copying books.

As new schools – particularly those which sought to Sinosize or Japanize Buddhism – arose, various unconventional methods of teaching were developed. Particularly in the meditational schools of Ch'an/Zen, the control of mind and body was taught not only through practice in quiet meditation, but also (as specially in Linchi/Rinzai school) through beatings and verbal paradoxes (namely, kung-an/koan). In Japan, the Zen approach to education influenced the training of the samurai (warrior statesmen).

The monastic system supplemented the state-sponsored lay education in two significant ways: First, it provided popular elementary education, mainly to boys, and, in particular, for commoners and poor sections of the population to whom state schools were not accessible. Schools attached to temples (e.g. Terakoya in Japan), provided them with basic instruction in reading, writing and arithmetic, Second, the monastic system founded specialized schools for the liberal student to engage in study and speculation, as in Shu-yuan in China. These efforts in lay education gave a further impetus to printing. In all these countries Buddhist texts were the first to be printed. In Korea, one of the two books which king Sejorn utilized to make his subjects literate with the new alphabet that he invented was the life of the Buddha.

3.4 Decline and Regeneration:

With the expansion of Islamic influence in Asia in 12th-15th centuries, Buddhist education along with Buddhism, itself, declined in the Indian sub-continent as well as Malaysia, Indonesia and the Maldive Islands. Elsewhere, it persisted in varying degree of vigour and effectiveness until the advent of modern education, whether through colonial or national policy.

In some countries, the colonial policy of encouraging Christian missionaries to take over public education, on the one hand, and the incentives provided for study in the language of administration, on the other, deprived monastic educational institutions of lay participation and support. Similarly, under the impact of modernization, secular school systems sprang up in China, Japan, Korea and Thailand. Paradoxically, in almost all countries under reference it is the Buddhist monastery that helped the modern system of education to become wide-spread in that the modern school owes its ubiquity even in very remote areas to the Buddhist monk who provided it with the first base. The Japanese Terakoya reformed itself under the Meiji Restoration in 1873 to be a base for universalizing primary education and their Buddhist character disappeared only with the new education scheme of 1886. In Myanmar (Burma), the British policy of developing secular primary education was achieved in 1868-70 by grants of specified modern books and the appointment of a qualified teacher to each of the existing 3500 temple schools. In Thailand, 71.3 % of all schools and 85.6 % of primary schools in 1931 were conducted in monastic grounds and about a third of the schools in the kingdom are yet in temple lands. The situation has been identical in Sri Lanka, even though the traditional temple schools were ordered to be closed in 1865.

But the two systems did not blend even where they co-existed in the same premises. Thus, reverting to a strictly monastic role, Buddhist education, in its formal mode, could hardly survive. But the informal, social educational function of the Buddhist monastery was not affected.

Where Buddhism remained the popular religion, a part of the strategy for nationalistic revival or struggle for independence was to promote the regeneration of Buddhist education. Revial and modernization characterized these efforts, which were two-fold:

(a) to streamline monastic education through curricular reforms to incorporate not only advances in knowledge in general, but also the broadening range of Buddhist studies developed by world-wide research; and

(b) to develop a system of Buddhist schools for children, based on the model of Christian missionary schools, but paying due attention to Buddhist learning and practices.

Several new types of Buddhist educational institutions have come into existence over the last one hundred years.

Sri Lanka saw the revival of *Pirivenas* which cater for both monks and lay students. Vidyodaya and Vidyālankāra Pirivenas were established in 1873 and 1875 by Hikkaduwe Sri Sumaṅgala Nāyaka Mahā Thera and Ratmalane Sri Dhammārāma Nāyaka Mahā Thera respectively. The system of *Pirivenas*, thus revived, has resulted in nearly 200 institutions catering for over 10,000 students. The Buddhaśrāvaka Dharmapīṭhaya, a university for monks, was established in 1966 and a Buddhist and Pali University operating through traditional *Pirivenas* as its constituent colleges came into existence in 1981. Myanmar and Thailand developed Pali schools. In Thailand, the regeneration of the traditional system of monastic education began

under King Mongkut (Rama IV). His son, Prince Vajirañāṇavaroros, established in 1893 the counterpart of a *Piriveṇa* under the name Mahāmakuṭ Rājavidyālaya. By 1946 it was elevated to the level of a university. This University and the Mahāchūlalongkorn Rājavidyālaya, dating from 1947 as a University, remain the premier monastic educational establishments of the country.

Japan, China and Korea set up Buddhist colleges. In Japan, the Buddhists followed the lead given by Enryo Inouye, who besides writing the influential book *Bukkyo Katsu-ron* in 1890, founded his own college of Buddhist philosophy. It served as a model in the reorganization of Buddhist schools and colleges. Some of these institutions have been elevated to the level of universities and provide the Saṅgha with facilities for higher education in a wide range of subjects. Their main objectives are to train Buddhist monks for missionary, scholarly and social service functions and to facilitate scholars to pursue research into Buddhist philosophy, literature and civilization.

Schools and colleges which the Buddhists established for children provide, in general, a secular education according to respective national policies. At the early stages of national movements for cultural identity and independence, these institutions played a significant role. But they are gradually being absorbed in objectives, contents and methods (if not in management) into the growing systems of national schools, which have adopted, to a major extent, the cultural function of the Buddhist schools. The impact of the Buddhist intervention in secular education in a number of Asian countries is to be observed in the emphasis on national languages, history and civilization, on the one hand, and, quite interestingly, on agriculture, traditional crafts and vocational education, on the other. Thus it paved the way for a transition from the narrow civil service oriented school systems to those reflecting wider national needs. Religious education of the lay Buddhist is imparted through Sunday schools which in Sri Lanka and Thailand receive state patronage and support.

4. Distinctive Features and Curricular Specifications of Buddhist Education:

On an examination of concepts, modalities, methods and practical approaches in Buddhist education, as known from both historical accounts and the existing institutions in Asia, a number of significant distinctive features and curricular specifications could be identified:-

4.1 Goals and Objectives:

The ultimate objective of Buddhist education and its process of mental development is the liberation of the individual from all types of bondages. This liberation is to be achieved by each individual at his own pace and at his own initiative. The teacher is a facilitator, a guide and, more than that, a skill model to be emulated. Example rather than precept is epmhasized as the true medium of communication between the teacher and the pupil. The teacher takes note of individual differences among students and designs each one's courses of training (specially the subjects of meditation) to suit his particular traits. Learning is not an end in itself, but a process leading to self-realization, which is equated in Buddhism to deliverance or *liberation*– the ultimate aim of the religious life. What leads a particular person to self-realization is a series of strictly personal experiences which cannot be reproduced at random to apply to any other individual. Time involved in the process is as variable as the techniques.

This same principle, which has been in operation with regard to *spiritual* training has been applied to all learning experience in the Buddhist monastic system. In Buddhism, there is no book or a set quantum of literary material to be studied or mastered or to be held as authority. To know just enough to set one's self on the path of mental training has been the primary objective. That is to say that knowledge itself was not an objective of learning. The Buddha consistently discouraged those who wanted to be "masters of the books." While recognizing the importance of scholastic achievement and rewarding scholarship with both honours and material benefits, the monastic system maintained that learning had to be accompanied by ethical sensitivity and moral principles. Learning was valuable only up to the point it made the individual a better person morally and spiritually.

4.2 Individual-centered Learning:

In the monastic system, a class being taught collectively by a teacher is a relatively recent development. A teacher, ordinarily, met each student individually to ensure whether the assigned tasks were correctly accomplished and to set new tasks. Teaching in the sense of lecturing or explaining a lesson to a group of students was rare and was stricity confined to matters which students had either misunderstood or failed to comprehened.

The student spent almost all his time in self-learning using commentaries, sub-commentaries, glossaries, indexes and lexicons. The Buddhist literature in many languages is replete with such self-learning materials. The method of evaluating learning outcoms was two-fold: The student was required *either* to show his capacity to draw from the self-learning materials and present his own commentary or explanations of a given text, *or* to enther into a debate with his teachers and peers and defend a particular point of view. An original

composition by the student usually marked the culmination of studies.

In the monastic system, no student was deemed a failure. While the intellectually gifted ones proceeded to research and teaching, the average students were prepared for the task of preserving and transmitting the canonical texts either by learning selected texts by rote or by transcribing or printing texts for dissemination.

4.3 Operational Aspects of Concept Formation:

The maieutic method of questioning and leading the disciple to realize the limitations of his premises or conclusions made a contribution both to the evolution of a distinct Buddhist system of logic and to the fashioning, through interaction, of the growth of the Indian theory of epistemology. In the process, the Buddhists played a pioneering role in delving into the mechanics of concept formation.

Developed in greater detail in the *Abhidhamma Piṭaka* subsequent commentaries and treatises, this particular branch of Buddhist scholarship moves away from a pure theory of cognition and consciousness to operational aspects which are later exemplified by the methods of training and meditational observances, particularly, of Zen and Tibetan Buddhism.

4.4 Committed Change Agents:

The training of the Saṅgha to be a band of self-renewing change agents has been a significant feature of Buddhist education. The constitution of the Saṅgha as a decentralized democratic organization of peers enabled it to evolve according to the genius and needs of different peoples at different places and times. The motivation came from an ideal which bordered simultaneously on both personal benefit and altruism. The Buddhist monk has, primarily, left the householder's life for his own spiritual advancement and salvation. Yet, he is involved in many activities aimed at perpetuating the organization and repaying in service those that support it. As one of the most resilient organizations with a proven capacity for self-regeneration, the Saṅgha had been an effective change agent not only preaching change but adjusting itself to it.

4.5 Teacher-Pupil Relations:

The Buddhist concept of the teacher is a very wide one: anyone from whom one learns something, even a single syllable, is one's teacher. The parents are designated the first teachers (*pubbācariya*). Buddhist education promotes the development of an emotional and moral bond between the teacher and the taught. While no obligation is cast on the student to agree with the teacher or to take him as an undisputed authority, the Buddhist tradition requires the teacher to be held in respect. Irrespective of the age of the parties concerned, the relationship engendered is that between parent and child. As such, the teacher is required not only to protect the pupil from all kinds of danger, but also to introduce the pupil to friends and spread his reputation. A significant corollary to this is that the teacher is never a rival of the pupil. Instead, the pupil's accomplishments and success add to the reputation of the teacher. It is considered bad form, however, for a pupil to presume to compete with his teacher. The interpersonal relations so promoted between the teacher and the pupil generated a wholesome atmosphere for study and search for knowledge. A salient feature of monastic education is that learning is expected to take place without tension.

4.6 Medium of the Spoken Word:

The spoken word was the only medium which the Buddha and his early disciples used. Its use as a means of instruction in the formal monastic education was limited. But in the informal education of the masses, the Buddhist Saṅgha down the ages has produced masterly users of the rhythmic charm, the convincing power and the image-conjuring versatility of the spoken word.

The traditional pattern of the sermon comes down from the Buddha himself. Thus, the characteristics described in relation to long discourses of the Buddha are to be found in most sermons even today. But the variations that have been effected testify to a remarkable capacity for innovation.

"Sermon from two seats" is how one of such innovations is designated. Instead of the signle monk who usually delivers the sermon, two monks take the floor. They follow one of several alternatives. One would recite a text from a Buddhist Sutta and the other would expound it with background information and supporting narratives. More interesting from the point of view of the audience are the sessions in which one asks questions and the other answers them or they actually conduct an impromptu debate. In another modality, the second monk is replaced by a layman, who, to give dramatic effect, would impersonate the Greek king Menander. The monk, then, assumes the role of Nāgasena and the famous debates of these two personalities of early Budhism are re-enacted. The dramatic effect is, in some instances, further heightened by representing the twent-four previous lives of the Buddha when he met each of his twenty-four predecessors and was assured of becoming a Buddha. These are just a few innovations of the sermon as practised quite frequently in Sri Lanka untill a few decades ago. Ousted by modern entertainment, these modalities have almost disappeared. In the other Buddhist countries, there have been similar innovations (See DRAMA).

Buddhists have been among the earliest to use drama as a medium of religious propagation. The oldest Indian drama hitherto discovered is on a Buddhist theme. The religious drama and wandering drama troupes in all Buddhist countries preserve a very old tradition. Particularly important as a means of mass education on Buddhist ethics and ecclesiastical history are the travelling dance troupes of Myanmar and Tibet.

4.7 Medium of the Written Word:

Starting from the edicts of Asoka, wherein the spirit of Buddhism was conveyed to the people in the vast Mauryan empire of 3rd century B.C., Buddhists have pressed the written word into service in a variety of ways. Commencing from the first century B.C., when the Canon was written down, the monastic educational system relied on the book as the primary tool of self-learning.

The written word became very early an important medium of the Buddhist informal education. The earliest books imitated the style of the preachers and produced what could be called written sermons. Community reading has remained until very recent times a regular pastime of the rural folk, both in temples and in their homes.

In two sites in Mandalay, Myanmar, are hundreds of marble slabs on which is neatly engraved the whole of the Tripiṭaka. This openair "library," by itself, is an invitation to people to read.

The display of religious writings in flags, wall-hangings as in Japan, Korea, Mongolia and Tibet serves a similar purpose. A purely religious motive keeps on adding to the popular Buddhist literature. Both writing and publishing religious boks is considered a form of Dhammadāna (gift of dhamma) and an aphorism of the Buddha rates the gift of dhamma to be superior to all other gifts.

4.8 Visual Aids:

More than for aesthetic reasons, the Buddhists employed sculpture and painting as a means of communication. The temple wall evolved to be another medium of informal education. Themes were drawn from the entire narrative literature comprising the present and past lives of the Buddha, biographies of his disciples, and the history of Buddhism as well as figurative accounts of hells and heavens. A pilgrimage, often, is a study tour to temples which are famous for their painting and scultpure.

4.9 Methods of Formal Learning:

To train scholars and specialists, writers and preachers, organizers and administrators, Buddhists developed and maintained a formal system of education with special emphasis on three aspects: namely, memorization; calligraphy and clear and faultless diction.

Memorization of large volumes of textual and commentarial materials is resorted to mainly as a means of training and exercising the mind. With the reliance on the book, the widespread establishment of libraries and the regular exercise of copying manuscripts (or in Tibet, Korea, Japan and elsewhere of printing from wood-blocks), the memorization is not an effort to store information in one's head. The ability to repeat long texts from memory may still be admired as a feat but is not, by itself, reckoned to be a sign of learning. Learning is assessed on the ability to correlate and synthesize what has been acquired through different media. No Buddhist educator would uphold rote-learning, but he would argue in favour of a very strict regime of memory-training.

Good handwriting has been regarded as more than an asset. In the monastic system, it is the very sign of scholarship. As such, a student spends a major part of his time perfecting his script. In Tibetan monasteries, that is about the main activity, because memory training accompanies writing and a student produces volumes of "copy books" as proof of studying.

With the importance attached to oral communication, the student has to acquire the ability to read and speak clearly and correctly, articulating each syllable. It is a training needed for group chanting of scriptures (both as a daily monastic ritual and as a service to the laity) and for the delivery of sermons. Graduated texts, starting with simple words and progressing systematically to very complex words, have been in use for this purpose alone.

Thus a good memory, legible and well-rounded handwriting and clear speech are assoiated with learning. The disciplined drill, which is required to achieve them over years of application, is regarded worthwhile and strongly upheld by some scholars to be the very essence of learning.

4.10 Work Experience:

In Buddhist monastic education, learning is not divorced from work. The student, whether religious or lay, has to perform a variety of tasks relating to the maintenance and upkeep of the monastery. Frequent ceremonials entail special types of works. A fair amount of wood-work, masonry and metal-work has to be picked up by students to be useful on these occasions. Skills pertaining to painting, paper and butter sculpture and other artistic creations have opportunities for development. The average alumnus of the Buddhist monastic system of education is a versatile worker, with a wide range of manual and technical skills. In

the Tibetan system, monks actually studied carpentry, masonry, sewing and embroidery, besides their examination subjects.

4.11 Social Services:

A monastery has obligations to fulfill to its lay supporters in the community. A student monk usually participates in household ceremonials which bring him in contact with community life.

A common task is to teach young children, as, in most Buddhist countries, the parents still try to supplement the children's school education with an exposure to the traditional literacy and literary training of the temple. They participate in community activities whether they be for development or for relief and rehabilitation. The unstructured programme of studies, usually with no time-bound requirements like examinations or promotions, enables the student monks to combine study, work experience and social service and extend their period of studentship as long as circumstances permit.

4.12 Promotion of Art and Crafts:

Folk arts and crafts and music were informal elements of monastic Buddhist education, on account of frequent and elaborate ceremonials. As in social services, the student's participation was encouraged by the absence of rigid time-tables or examinations.

5. Conclusion: Need for Research

As this article demonstrates, the information available on Buddhist education-both past and present-is extremely limited. A few attempts have been made to unravel a Buddhist philosophy of education with modest results as a comprehensive analysis of the literature has not been undertaken. Histories of Buddhist education confine themselves to vignettes of Indian education, as narrated in Buddhist stories, or to accounts of institutions visited by Chinese pilgrims. The ouster of the temple school, the attempts to revive Buddhist education and the socio-cultural impact of these developments in each of the Buddhist countries of Asia remain to be documented and critically studied. Of equal significance is to examine whether concepts, modalities, methods and practical approaches developed by Buddhist education are, in any way, relevant to current efforts in educational development.

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EFFECT. Dictionaries define the word effect as: something caused or produced; result or consequence. Several Pali words are used in Buddhist texts to denote these ideas of effect, among them being *vipāka* (q.v.): result or consequence, *phala*: effect or fruition, *nissanda*: outcome. The ablative form *paccayā* of *paccaya* (q.v.) which means cause or condition is also used to imply this idea of effect as something causally generated, as in *avijjā paccayā saṅkhārā*, i.e. *saṅkhāras* are causally produced by *avijjā* or they are, in other words, the effect of *avijjā*. In the Buddhist context, the word *vipāka*, which is inseparably tied up with the word *kamma* or action, implies the result or outcome of conscious, motivated activity (*sañcetanika kamma*: *A.* V, p. 292) undertaken by the average worldling. The emphasis here is on the impact it has on the person who is responsible for it, both with regard to the modification

of the nature of his character and with regard to the general level of comfort and discomfort he experiences in life, here and hereafter. It appears to be possible to make a general observation here that the first of these, namely the modification of the nature of one's character, essentially comes into operation in this very life (*diṭṭheva dhamme*), almost with the commission of an action. The second, i.e. the change in the nature of one's experience (as *sukha* or *dukkha*) is generally referred to as an effect operating in the life after (*sāmparāyika*) i.e. in a new phase of life or new world (compare such usages as...*lokaṃ uppajjati. A.* I. p. 122 and ..*kāyassa bhedā paraṃ. maraṇā apāyaṃ...uppajjanti:* op. cit. p. 55).

This question of action and its reaction on the doer has been one of major concern in Indian religious thought. Thus says the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*: 'According as one acts, according as one behaves, so does he become. The doer of good becomes good, the doer of evil becomes evil. One becomes virtuous by virtuous action, bad by bad action.' (*Bhr. Up. IV,* 4.5.). There are also, on the other hand, those who denied the impact of good and bad deeds on the doer (*natthi dinnaṃ natthi yiṭṭhaṃ... natthi sukaṭadukkaṭānaṃ phalaṃ vipāko: M.* III, p. 71). Such views have been generally ascribed to materialist thinkers who rejected the idea of ethical import of human action. (See *D.* I. p.p. 52 f. and 55 for similar ideas ascribed to Pūraṇa Kassapa and Ajita Kesakambali).

The Buddhists reject this as a serious misconception or *micchādiṭṭhi* which they wish to combat with the idea of *sammādiṭṭhi* (*M.* III. p. 72).[1] They elaborate their theory of *kamma* further and trace the origin of *kamma* or conscious action to its psychological basis or motivation. Since motivation precedes action and action of every sort is determind by it (*cetayitva kammaṃ karoti kāyena vācāya manasā: A.* III, p. 415), the Buddhists go so far as to identify action, and very correctly perhaps, with motivation (*cetanāhaṃ bhikkhave kammaṃ vadāmi:* loc. cit.). Greed, hatred and delusion, as mental states in their grosser, unrefined form are given as the major source of motivation for action (*lobho nidānaṁ kammānaṃ samudayāya doso nidānaṃ...mohonidānaṃ...A.* I, p. 263). True to the nature of their psycho-ethical character, they complicate and ramify both thought processes and consequent action processes. They contribute to the perpetuation of the process and not to its reduction (*taṃ kammaṃ kammasamudayāya saṃvattati na taṃ kammaṃ kammanirodhāya saṃvattati:* ibid.).

Thus conscious actions committed do not cease or exhaust themselves without impacting the doer. *Kamma* (q.v.) in Buddhism being defined as and identified with motive or *cetanā* (q.v.), it would be reasonable to expect that the first reaction of *kamma* would be, where it is of unwholesome origin, the bringing about of moral corrosion of the individual who sets in motion such activity. (Compare: *manasā ce paduṭṭhena bhāsati vā karoti vā: Dhp. v.* I.). It contaminates the very source of its origin. Evil actions generated through thought, word and deed, on account of their unwholesome origin, are referred to as being rooted in evil intentions (*akusalasañcetanika: A.* V. p. 292) and as producing unpleasant experience (*dukkhudraya* and *dukkhavipāka:* ibid.). Here one is compelled to note two stages, as it were, of the impact of *kamma* on the doer. Primarily, there is the psychologically significant moral degeneration of the individual which is more or less an inward and internal process. There also seems to be the outward and physical expression of the outcome of this moral degeneracy (which in fact is the intensification of the already inherent evils of *lobha, dosa* and *moha*), in plunging the doer to a state of discomfort and displeasure (*savyāpajjhaṃ lokaṃ: A.* I, p. 122). One has here to stress adequately the word 'outcome' for according to Buddhism, it is not the 'raw deed' (*kamma*) itself which one suffers as 'tooth for a tooth and an eye for an eye' but the consequences of the corrosion (*vipāka*) that has been started by the acts committed. If it were not so, it is clearly argued, there would be no possibility of terminating the process of suffering (see *A.* I, p. 249). It is further argued that a man of great strenght of character (*aparitto mahattā*), by virtue of the religious culture he has acquired (*bhāvitakāyo hoti, bhāvitasīlo, bhāvitacitto, bhāvitapañño*), could wear out, in this very existence, the evil effects of an action committed by him. He need not necessarily be led to a state of suffering in a life after (ibid.). It is also worth adding here that this implies a process of self-correction and a determination against a possible recurrence of such action rather than one of repentance or paying a penalty, for misdeeds done.

In the case of an average worldling, on the other hand, who commits such unwholesome acts, the fruition or *vipāka* of his actions is said to take place at any of three possible stations in the saṃsāric career: (a) in this very existence (*diṭṭha-dhamma*): (b) in the next birth (*upapajja*) or (c) at any time in *saṃsāra* in a subsequent birth (*apare vā pariyāye*) *A.* V, p. 292). Thus

1. But the concept of *sammādiṭṭhi* here as that which upholds the moral efficacy of action is pointed out to be of a gross (*sāsava*). down-to-earth type (*upadhivepakka*) which at any rate contributes to the prolongation of the saṃsāric process (see DIṬṬHI), contradicting the concept of release or salvation.

actions of the average worldling, being rooted in greed, hatred and delusion, lead consequently to unpleasant results as their effect, and through continuous *kamma*-activity contribute to the perpetuation of the saṃsāric process.

On the other hand, the opposites of these corrosive states, viz. non-greed, non-hate, non-delusion (*alobha, adosa, amoha*) also lead to action or *kamma* but *kamma* of a different type with a very different reaction. Being non-involving in character, action resulting from such motivation as non-greed and non-hate leads to reduction and elimination of the *saṃsāra*-building *kamma* process (*kamma-nirodhāya*). In consequence of such action there shall be pleasant experience (*sukhavipākaṃ*). Viewed from a transcendental angle, on the other hand, such action is non-defiling and non-contaminating (*asaṃkiliṭṭha*: See *M.* I, p. 318). That in itself is the bliss (*sukha*), that in itself is the achievement, in the pursuit of salvation.

At the same time it is to be noted that the Buddhist teachings are quite clear on the issue that not all experience one goes through in life, pleasant or unpleasant is necessarily the effect of *kamma* done by one in a previous life. According to a record in the *Saṃyutta nikāya*, a *paribbājaka* by the name of Moliya Sīvaka once questioned the Buddha as to what he thought of this position which he said was held by certain contemporary religious teachers (*S.* IV. p. 230). The Buddha then categorically stated that this was not only untrue (*micchā*) but was contrary to what one knows through one's experience (*yañ ca sāmaṃ ñātaṃ tañ ca atidhāvanti*: ibid.). There is room left for misadventures and accidents of the physical world which are termed *visama-parihārajāni*. Some disasters also come about through contrivances and machinations (*opakkamikāni*). Thus according to the Buddhist position the experience which a being goes through in life, if viewed as effect, in conformity to a theory of cause and effect, is not always necessarily produced by one's own *kamma*. The possibility also of there being other factors which contribute to the quantum of life experience, besides the effect of one's own *kamma* is clearly recognised.

In discussing the Buddhist theory of *kamma* in relation to the concept of effect, reference has also to be made to a view elaborated in the *Visuddhimagga* (p. 601) which speaks of the effect of *kamma*, in relation to its fruition, being reduced, eliminated or enhanced on account of the influence of other items of *kamma* which have been integrated into the psychophysical *saṅkhāra* complex of a saṃsāric being. While the *upapīḷaka kamma* of this classification reduces the intensity of the effect of an act of *kamma* and an *upaghātaka* eliminates its effect; the *upatthambhaka*, on the other hand, being unable to bring about effect by itself, props up an act of *kamma* to bring about the full effect of that other *kamma*. In this same discussion the *Visuddhimagga* also reckons with certain types of *kamma* where only the action takes place - *ahosi-kamma* but would find no occasion to bring about its effect - *na ahosi kammavipāko na bhavissati kamma vipāko natthi kammavipāko*. These are the situtions of 'no-effect' *kamam* which really are 'action only, *sans* effect' *ahosi-kamma*. By the time specific dead-lines come to be set for the fruition of *kamma* (as *diṭṭhadhammavedanīya* and *upapajjavedanīya*), those that get beyond the specified points invariably come into this group of 'written off kamma.' See also KAMMA.

Jotiya Dhirasekera

EFFORT. See **ENDEAVOUR**

EGALITARIANISM. Derived, as it is, from the French term 'EGALITAIRE ('EGAL meaning EQUAL),[1] egalitarianism has come to mean the doctrine of equality among mankind, and is primarily social in content. While the concept of equality is nothing new in the annals of civilized human history, it may be noted in passing that as a present day social doctrine egalitarianism came into its own with the emergence of social forces like class - consciousness resulting from the Industrial Revolution in the West. What is important is the fact that equality was, and is, circumscribed by limitations in actual application; for instance, it has been rightly pointed out that apart from the abstractions of logic and mathematics, no two things or persons can be claimed to be equal in all respects[2] and this is a matter that has been argued out with great finesse (loc. cit). The claim that all men are equal, for instance, is more prescriptive than descriptive, and actually means that "there is some respect, at least, in which no difference ought to be made in the treatment or consideration given to all men, whatever differences there might be in their qualities and circumstances." (ibid. vol. III, p. 39). Egalitarianism has therefore to be viewed within the framework of such limitations.

While recognizing such limitations, Buddhism sees firstly a basic equality between man and man in respect

1 Cf. Marguerite-Marie Duboid, *Dictionnaire Moderne Francais-Anglai*, (Librairie Larousse), Paris, 1960.
2 'EQUALITY, MORAL AND SOCIAL,' *The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*. Vol. 3, pp. 38 ff.

of man's essential nature, although Buddhism notes, mainly at the intellectual and religio-ethical levels, what it calls a "difference between individuals" (*puggala-vemattatā*, cf. *M*. I. p. 494; *S*. II. pp. 21f), springing from more deep-seated human conditions (*S*. V. p. 200). This is owing to the fact that, according to Buddhism the historical evolution between two given individuals, viewed in the broad saṃsāric context, cannot be identical. This, in turn, can lead to the "inequality of individual endowment" as noted by certain present-day social scientists,[3] and would result in inequalities in social life. However, as observed elsewhere (s.v., DEMOCRACY), it is with Buddhism that "the fundamental equality of all mankind as one community" is recognized for the first time in human thought, "in the sense that man's essential nature is the same whatever the individual differences due to heredity, environment or karmic factors may be."[4] This sense of equality fundamentally seems from the Buddhist view that (a) all mankind, in the ultimate analysis, faces the basic problems of saṃsāric "becoming" (*bhava*), viz. birth (*jāti*) decay (*jarā*) dissolution or death (*maraṇa*) basic to every other problem of life succinctly expressed by the compound term *sokaparidevadukkha-domanassupāyāsā* and spelt out as the First Noble Truth, and (b) that at the same time man is capable of overcoming these problems by attaining the very highest morally and spiritually, since human life is so placed in the cosmic scheme of things that human beings alone enjoy the best opportunity of release from saṃsāric sorrow. Men are equal in that they share the same basic poroblems and a common but unique potentiality to attain the highest. Furthermore, apart from the distinctions of sex, the psychosomatic constitution (*nāma* and *rūpa*) of every individual being the same in large measure, the basic physical, psychological and emotional needs among two given worldlings (*puthujjana*) (for it is with them that we are actually concerned) are never reduced and remain almost identical. Let us first examine the main arguments in support of this conception of equality in man's essential nature – two arguments in particular, viz (a) biological and (b) anthropological:

(a) The biological argument points to the fact that *homosapiens* constitute a single species in contradistinction to different species to which various types of fauna and flora belong. This, incidentally, is in accord with the modern biological outlook[5] which tends to restore the view of the unity of man as upheld in many religious traditions. Human beings, therefore, are fundamentally on a par with each other. Adducing the biological argument, the *Vāseṭṭha Sutta* of the *Suttanipāta* (*Sn. vv.* 600-611) states that unlike in the case of the plant and animal kingdom which are characterised by differences of species (*liṅgaṃ jātimayaṃ*), notwithstanding minor differences in the colour of the hair or in the tigmentation of the skin and other similar visible aspects, all men should be looked upon as belonging to one single species, since in physical and other vital characteristics all human beings are the same. What is implied here is that in the biological scale of evolution, in due order (*anupubbaṃ*) and as things really are (*yathātathaṃ*), there is a distinction in species (*jātivibhaṅgaṃ*), for species are manifold: *aññamaññā hi jātiyo* (*Sn. v.* 600). Firstly, there are (various kinds of) grasses and trees, with characteristics that constitute (different) species amongst them (*liṅgaṃ jātimayaṃ tesaṃ*), although they do not exhibit them: *na cāpi paṭijānare*.[6] Then (*tato*), there are the worms (*kiṭe*), the moths (*pataṅge*) and different kinds of ants (*kunthakipillike*); then come the quadrupeds, small and big (*catuppāde khuddake ca mahallake*) and serpents like the long-backed snakes (*pādūdare…urage dīghapiṭṭhike Sn. vv.* 602-604). Next, to be reckoned are the fishes in the waters (*macche vārigocare*) and the birds roaming the sky (*pakkhi… vihaṅgamā*). Although in all these species the marks that constitute the (different) species are manifold (*puthū*), there aren't in men many such marks which indicate (different) species amongst them (*evaṃ n'atthi manussesu liṅgaṃ jātimayaṃ puthū* - ibid. *vv.* 605-607). Thus, there are no differences among men, in contradistinction to o: (different) species (*liṅgaṃ jātimayaṃ n'eva, yathā aññāsu jātisu* ibid, *v.* 610). Difference there is in beings endowed with bodies (*paccattaṃ sarīresu*), but amongst men this is not the case (*manussesu-etaṃ na vijjati*, ibid. *v.* 611). To speak of a difference between man and man is to speak in the common tongue: *vokārañca manussesu samaññāya pavuccati* (ibid).

In view of this basic biological equality, distinctions of birth between two given persons – such as the advantage, as the sutta puts it, of being born to a particular mother (*yonijaṃ mattisambhavaṃ*: ibid. *v.* 620), should not count in determining one's station in life. The latter is really determined either by temporal considerations (such as the division of labour in society, of change

3. Inequality of individual endowment is factually true, although some would prefer to dismiss it as an elitist theory. Cf. T. B. Bottomore, *Elities and Society*, Pelican Books, Reprint 1977, p. 15 f.

4. K. N. Jayatillake, *The Principles of International Law in Buddhist Doctrine*, Extract from the "*Recueil des Cours*," Vol. II, 1967, (Private Circulation only), Leiden, p. 518.

5. Cf. L. C. Dunn, 'RACE AND BIOLOGY', in *The Race Question in Modern Science*, Unesco, Paris, 2nd Impression, 1959, pp. 245 ff.

6. Sn. 601. The Commentary on this verse says: *mayaṃ tiṇa mayaṃ rukkhā ti evampi na vatijānanti.*

of profession, ibid, *vv.* 612-619; 653-656) or through moral and spiritual criteria (*Sn. vv.* 620-650 653, 656). In the either case, biologically all human beings are born equal. It is significant that Buddhism found it possible to arrive at the biological truth of the one-ness of mankind "from searchings quite other than those underlying present-day laboratory work"[7] indicating, incidentally, that the verities it propounds call for no scientific props. The biological argument is expanded in subsequent Buddhist polemics against social distinctions like caste, for instance, by Aśvaghoṣa in his *Vajrasūci*.

(b) The anthropological argument is best adduced by the *Aggañña-Sutta* of the *Dīgha-nikāya* (*D.* III, p. 93 ff.). In the beginning, says this sutta, all human beings were "like unto themselves and not unlike", *aññesaṃ sadisaññeva no asadisaṃ*.[8] Social distinctions arose in settled society through a division of labour as a nescessity for its very existence, culminating in a contract of society and a contract of government (s.v. DEMOCRACY). Unlike in Brahmanic theory, Buddhism would not say that class-structures were absolute.[9] Since this equality among human beings is said to be "in accordance with the universal Norm and not contrary to it" (*dhammen'eva no adhammena*, *D.* III, p. 93), the equality implied is basic, fundamental and natural. The sutta suggests that a recognition and appreciation of this fact would partly constitute a knowledge of the origin or primeval condition (cf. *aggañña*) of things; this absolute equality between man and man in respect of his essential nature should be recognized in human affairs whether conceived in terms of the life led here or hereafter (*diṭṭhe c'eva dhamme abhisamparāyañca*) for the Universal Norm is said to reign supreme in man's life: *Dhammo hi seṭṭho jane tasmiṃ* (loc. cit). Distinctions among two given individuals could arise through social needs leading to caste or class and occupational distinctions, but, as a globe-trotting animal, man has basically been the same. While the hunting and food-gathering economy of primitive man got transformed to one of agriculture, and settled - life and class distinctions became a reality, all human beings were yet "like unto themselves and not unlike."

Since there is an equality in respect of man's essential nature (as buttressed by biological and anthropological arguments), equality in other respects like the social, legal, moral, ethical and religious or spiritual becomes meaningful; and this, in turn, makes egalitarianism a multifaceted concept, relfecting a number of dimensions.

Sociologically just as much as class-distinctions in human society were not absolute, nor have ever been universal. The *Assalāyana Sutta* of the *Majjhima-nikāya* illustrates the point. (*M.*II,p.149). It states that among the Yona-Kambojas (*Yona-Kambojesu*), i.e. certain states in the early Buddhist period adjoining North-Western India, and in certain other bordering districts (*aññesu ca paccantimesu janapadesu*) there were "only two classes" (*dve'va vaṇṇā*), to wit, the lords and the serfs (*ayyo c'eva dāso ca*). Furthermore, this division was not rigid, in that it is said that "lords (could) become the serfs and the serfs the lords" (*ayyo hutvā dāso hoti, dāso hutvā ayyo hoti*). The basis of social distinctions being patently relationship,[10] it is further pointed out that in this situation the Brahmin claim to superiority is without foundation (cf. *Ettha... Brāhmaṇānaṃ kiṃ balaṃ ko assāso yad ettha brāhmaṇā evaṃ āhaṃsu Brāhmaṇā 'va seṭṭho vaṇṇo, hīno añño vaṇṇo...brahmadāyādāti* : *M.* II, p. 149). Elsewhere (*D.* I, p. 72; *M.* I, p. 275), reference is made to the possibility of release from serfdom (cf. *dāsavyā mucceyya*). Even by (later) diehard Brahmanic standards, a *śūdra* or an outcaste, though not released from servitude (which is said to be innate in him), may be emancipated by his master.[11] Regardless of whether social distinctions were still in the making or were an accomplished fact during the Buddha's day, Buddhism would not regard such distinctions as universal. The Buddhists upheld the egalitarian cause "by pointing to actual conditions prevailing in the society of the times."[12] as may be inferred from the above. As the *Madhura Sutta* of the *Majjhima-nikāya* shows, services of others are at one's command due to nothing but one's economic power, and this has nothing to do with considerations of social class (*M.* II. p. 85).

The legal argument is that an individual, whatever his or her caste or social distinction be, if held liable for an infringement of the law, is punishable with the the same type and degree of punishment, which, incidentally, from the Buddhist point of view, should be reformatory and not punitive. This argument is spelt out in the *Madhura Sutta* (*M.* II, p. 88) which adds the constant refrain that the Brahmin's claim to superiority was simply

7. The Preface (anonymous) to G. P. Malalasekera and K. N. Jayatilleke, *Buddhism and the Race Question*, Unesco, Paris, 1958, at p. 6 (from where we quote) seems to look down upon findings through scientific, if arrived at by means other than laboratory work.
8. *Ibid.*; v.l. *aññesaṃ* (ibid., p. 93, fn. 12) should be preferred to *anaññesaṃ* in the text of the *PTS.* Edition.
9. Cf. K. N. Jayatilleke, *The Principles of International Law in Buddhist Doctrine*, pp. 509–512 et 516.
10. Cf. T. W. Rhys Davids, *Buddhist India*, Sixth Ed., Calcutta, 1955, pp. 33 ff.
11. Cf. *Manusmṛti*, VIII, 414.
12. G. P. Malalasekera and K. N. Jayatilleke, op. cit., p. 47.

an empty claim, with no substance whatsoever: *ghoso* [illegible] *lokasmim* (*M*. II, p. 84). It is only propaganda among the people. Whatever his caste or class be, says this sutta, a robber is a robber: *corot'eva saṅkhaṃ gacchati*.[13] In these circumstances (*evam sante*), these four castes (viz. *khattiya*, *brāhmaṇa*, *vessa* and *sudda*) are on a par with one another and in this matter there is no difference whatsoever between them: *ime cattāro vaṇṇā samasamā honti; na'sam ettha kiñci nānākaraṇaṃ*.... (*M*. II, p. 88). In legal relations or in relations between persons to whom justice is to be meted out, no understood difference (such as caste in this instance) should be a ground of distinction. It is in this sense that men are equal before the law. This conception of legal equality was subsequently exemplified by the Buddhist Emperor Asoka. In his Pillar Edict IV he says that "It is most desirable that there should be absolute equality for all in legal proceedings and in the punishments awarded..."[14] This is, however, different from the rigid Brahmin attitude, especially towards the *śūdras*, to whom unequal treatment (as compared with that for 'higher' castes) was meted out, both in criminal and civil procedures.[15]

The moral argument maintains that all are the same before the psycho-ethical law of *kamma*. Notwithstanding the social gradation to which one belongs, the law of *kamma* is operative with equal force. The *Madhura Sutta*, for instance, states that in terms of moral recompense, all men stand on an equal footing. Whether one be a *khattiya*, *brāhmaṇa*, *vessa* or *sudda*, morally bad deeds - mental, verbal or physical - would lead one to unpleasent consequences (the corollary being that morally good deeds lead to pleasant results irrespective of caste distinctions). Morality is objective in its deserts. While one could accept this as a logical and reasonable possibility (*cf. evañ ca pana me etaṃ arahataṃ sutaṃ* loc. cit,), since they possess the extra-sensory perception necessary for the purpose, (which is a valid means of knowledge recognized in Buddhism), developed through an extension of human capacity. Thus "all men are... equal before the moral law. Men are judged in the hereafter by the good and evil they do, and not by the stations of life in which they were placed by virtue of their birth..."[16] While moral and spiritual advancement is open to all and within the reach of all, the course of moral recompense could be influenced, for, this is what makes religious life (*brahmacariya* q. v.) meaningful. Moral law, as recognized by the Buddha, is not fatalistic.

The ethical argument states that all men are capable of both good and evil notwithstanding the circumstances of life in which they find themselves. The *Saṅgīti Sutta* of the *Dīgha-nikāya* (*D*. III, pp. 250 f.) says that a person of evil disposition or of bad character (*kaṇhābhijātiko samāno*) could easily beget what is bad (*kaṇhaṃ dhammaṃ abhijāyati*); but if he so wishes, he could certainly beget the good (*sukhaṃ dhammaṃ*). The same holds good, in the revese order, in the case of persons of good disposition or character. Both types of persons could also attain Nibbāna, which, in identical terms, is shown as being beyond the relative plane: *akaṇhaṃ asukkaṃ nibbānaṃ*. Ethical endeavour is therefore equally possible for all.

The religious or spiritual argument is to the effect that all human beings are capable of spiritual development and final emancipation from *dukkha* notwithstanding their individual capacities and social gradations. This is referred to as "(the theory of) the purity of the four castes" - *cātuvaṇṇiṃ suddhiṃ* - propounded by the Buddha (*M*. II, pp. 132, 147). The *Kaṇṇakatthala Sutta* of the *Majjhima-nikāya* states that neither in terms of spiritual exertion (*padhāna*) nor in terms of actual emancipation (*vimutti*) is it possible to say that there is a difference (*nānākaraṇaṃ*) between the individuals of the four castes (*M*. II, pp. 128 ff.).

While the egalitarian principle may be discerned in looking at man in terms of the foregoing considerations, the same principle is enshrined in the conception of the ideal Buddhist community as visualized in the texts. This community is fourfold, comprising the monks (*bhikkhu*), the nuns (*bhikkhuṇī*), the laymen (*upāsaka*) and laywomen (*upāsikā*). In the social plane, distinctions other than the distinction of seniority - are not at all recognized within each of the first two groups, while such distinctions ought to be minimal within each of the last two (cf. *M*. II, p. 128). All distinctions of caste, class or profession are lost on admission to the Order of Buddhist monks or nuns. Just as the great rivers Gaṅgā, Yamunā, Aciravatī, Sarabhū and Mahī, on entering the ocean become one with the ocean, even so the people of the four castes, on entering theBuddhist Order of Recluses, give up their former distinctions of name and clan (*jahanti purimāni nāmagottāni*) and

13 *M*. II, f. 88. *Manusmṛti*, III, 150 refers to Brahmins forfeiting the rights to Brahminhood if they are thieves.
14 *Edicts of Asoka*, (Adyar Library Services), p. 95, as quoted in G. P. Malalasekera and K. N. Jayatilleke, op. cit., p. 62.
15 *Āpastamba Dharmasūtra*, ii, 16, 17 *et* 27. Also Cf. R. K. Mookerji, Hindu Civilization, 1936., p. 138.
16 G. P. Malasekera and K. N. Jayatilleke, op. cit., p. 50.

come to be known as the Recluses of the son of the Sakyas: *samaṇā Sākyaputtiyā tv'eva saṅkham gacchati* (*Vin.* II, p. 239; *A.* IV, p. 202). While social distinctions were not allowed within the monastic community, on occasions, even monks with seniority and authority are subject to a process of levelling down in their relations with the rest of the monastic community. This may be noted for instance, in the *Pavāraṇa* Ceremony in which all *bhikkhūs* stand on an equal footing (*Vin.* I, p. 159) or when a pupil (whether *antevāsika* or *saddhivihārika*) would find it necessary to tender advice to his teacher (whether *ācariya* or *upajjhāya*) regarding any matter (*Vin* I, pp. 46, 49, 61) or even reporting the teacher to the Saṅgha for disciplinary action in regard to any "grave offence" (*garudhamma: Vin.* I, pp. 49, 61). And in their relations with the world outside, monks and nuns preached the doctrine of equality between man and man.

Equality in lay society-whatever the sphere concerned be - presupposes an equality of opportunity. Where the latter is lacking, it has to be presumed that the Buddhist view is that the state should ensure its resurgence through proper state-craft (*ariyaṃ cakkavatti-vattam: cf. D.* III, p. 65). Equality of opportunity basically involves an equitable distribution of economic strength among the people, and it is the duty of the State to ensure this first, for, "planning the economic welfare was part of the functions of the king or state."[17] And the moral sense of a people necessary for spiritual progress - for it is in this that Buddhism ultimately has a stake-initialy depends on economic and allied factors, as noted in the *Cakkavattisīhanāda Sutta* of the *Dīgha-nikāya.*[18]

Buddhism, in the ultimate analysis, values the egalitarian ideal (as a social doctrine) not so much for its own sake, but as a step to the opportunity it provides in the transition to higher forms of equality for man, namely intellectual, moral and spirital. Firstly, any two persons of the four-fold community referred to above are certainly equal - and in these matters, sex[19] or spatio-temporal considerations[20] do not count by virtue of the fact that, Buddhism acknowledges, they posses an inherent potentiality to attain its goal. Those "pious and good-natured folk" (*silavanto kalyāṇa-dhammā*) that came later (*pacchā samannāgatā*)are all equal in that they tread the trail blazed by the Buddha - the first among those who reached the goal. Secondly, they are also equal if, intellectually, morally or spiritually they could be proved to have attained the same plane. For instance, intellectual equality is recognized when the *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta* of the *Dīgha-nikāya* places the membrs of the fourfold community on the same footing in the matter of mastering the *Dhamma* (*D.* II, p. 104 ff; 112 ff.). Here, the Buddha is recorded as repeating to Ananda, his disciple and life-long companion, what he told Māra, the Evil one, when the latter, immediately after the Buddha's Enlightenment wanted the Buddha to pass out of existence: "When Māra spoke thus, Ānanda," says the Buddha, "I replied him in these words: I shall not pass away from existence, Evil One, until the *bhikkhūs*, the *bhikkhuṇīs*, the *upāsakas* and the *upāsikās* shall have attained (true) discipleship, become wise, well-trained and learned, and are masters of the Dhamma and act in conformity with the *Dhamma* (as handed down by their teachers), shall be able to convey it (to others), to preach it, to make it known, to establish it, to open it up, to analyse it and lay it bare and until they shall be able to preach well the wonder-working *Dhamma* by refuting the assertions of others by its own truth..." (*D.* II, pp. 112 ff). It will be noted that the fourfold society was being looked upon as capable of becoming wise, well-trained, learnod and mastering the *Dhamma: viyattā vinītā visāradā bahussutā dhammadharā.*

Moral and spiritual equality, in the Buddhist sense, may be said to have been attained when a cut-off point, as it were, on the path to perfection and emancipation is reached, above which all are equal in that they are bound to realize the *summum bonum.* This, in the minimum, entails the attaining to the first stage of sanctity known as 'entry into the stream' and joining the Path (*magga*) of the Flow (*sota*) - a foothold from which one dose not fall back: *avinipàtadhammo* (*D.* II, p. 155). The point is driven home by the same sutta when it records the Buddha as telling Ānanda that even the latter-most (ordained) *bhikkhu* in that assembly of five hundred (that the Buddha was addressing) was

17. K. N. Jayatilleke, *The Principles of International Law in Buddhist Doctrine.*

18. *D.* III, pp. 65 ff. Also cf. O. H. de A. Wijesekera, *Buddhism and Society,* (Tenth Lecture under the Dona Alpina Ratnayake Trust), Colomco, 1952, p. 15.

19. With a fundamental equality of all men granted, it is superfluous, in this respect to distinguish between the sexes. Woman too has potentialities similar to that of man. While there is certainly a patriarchal stamp in its attitude towards the weaker sex, (as may be noted from certain monastic rules governing the life of nuns), and while early Buddhism had to contend with an environment which, as a whole, was prejudiced against women, Buddhism saw no reason why woman should be discrimated against, especially in matters of moral and spiritual uplift. Given the necessary pre-conditions, Buddhism asserts that a woman might do better than a man (cf. *S.* I, p. 86). In the Buddha's mind "there seemed to have been no real doubt ... as to the equality of the powers of man and woman." (I. B. Horner, *Woman Under Primitive Buddhism,* London, 1930, p. 104).

20. Dhirasekera, Jotiya, *Buddhist Monastic Discipline,* Ph. D. Thesis submitted to the University of Ceylon, 1964, pp. 19 ff.

destined to attain Enlightenment: *imesaṃ hi Ānanda pañcannaṃ bhikkhu-satānaṃ yo pacchimako bhikkhu so sotāpanno avinipātadhammo niyato sambodhiparāyaṇo* (loc. cit)

L. P. N. Perera

EGOISM. In the Buddhist analysis of ethical considerations egoism is pointed out to be a derivative concept coming in the wake of the mistaken view (*diṭṭhiṭṭhāna*: *M.* I, 135) of an enduring and eternal self or soul (Pali: *atta*, Skt. *ātman*). The crystallization of such a concept of self is held to be invariably the result of the inherent weakness of man which is reflected in his unconscious struggle for survival, his attempt to defy death and his desire to seek an identity for himself (i. e. a process of individuation which solidifies the notion of I or *ahaṅkāra* and its derivative concept of mine, *mamiṅkāra*). Thus the concept of self, according to Buddhists, is the imaginary mould in which this over-rated separatist identity is cast. Once the notion of self as 'I' is conceived, there follows the concept of what belongs to the self or mine (*M.* I, p. 135 ff.) with all the concomitant psychological aberrations such as thirsting for, craving, and being arrogant about (*taṇhā-diṭṭhi-māna*) which come in its wake (summed up as *ahaṅkāra-mamiṅkāra, mānānusaya*... *M.* I, p. 486. See also *S.* II, p. 252 f.).

On the other hand, what are looked upon as entities of existence in the world of man, held by some as products of a Creator who also presides over their destiny, are philosophically viewed in Buddhism as being no more than the incessant, conjoint functioning of certain psycho-physical factors which are collectively and severally referred to as the Five Aggregates or *pañcakkhandha* (*M.* I, *loc. cit.*). This psycho-physical duality which constitutes man is also reckoned in terms of *nāma-rūpa* and *viññāṇa* and it is their ceaseless interdependent rolling on, the responsibility for which rests entirely with each individual, that constitutes the *saṃsāric* life-process of a being (*ettāvatā vaṭṭaṃ vaṭṭati itthattaṃ paññāpanāya yadidaṃ nāmarūpaṃ sahaviññāṇena*).

While a being of the world (i. e. the *pañcakkhandha* or the complex of five-fold aggregates) is thus engaged in its communication with the world of day-to-day experience, the unguarded intake of stimuli through the sense organs leads to the massive build-up of the five *upādānakkhandhas* which form the core of the unsatisfactory situation of life or *dukkha*, and which in turn continue to provide the momentum for the furtherance of the *saṃsāric* process of *bhava* or becoming of each individual (*upādānapaccayā bhavo* of the well-known chain of causation. See *M.* I, p. 191). Thus the existence in *saṃsāra* of countless individual beings is no more than the expression of this process of *bhava* in its infinite plurality. This is the basis of life in the world which manifests itself unceasingly as beings, individuals or persons: *bhavapaccayā jāti*. When the complex of five-fold aggregates is analytically viewed, each in turn, as being transient (*anicca*) and, therefore, providing little solace or satisfaction (i.e. *dukkha*. Note the recommended cultivation of this outlook referred to in *anicce dukkhasaññāparicitena bhikkhave bhikkhuno cetasā*...*A.* IV, p. 52), it leaves no room whatsoever for a concept of self or what belongs to a self (*Dukkhe anattasaññāparicitena*...*cetasā*: *op. cit.* p. 53). Thus such assertions as 'this is mine, this am I and this is my self' (*etaṃ mama eso 'hamasmi eso me attāti*: *M.* I, p. 136; *S.* II, p. 125) which are but different manifestations of egosim, are declared in no uncertain terms to be illogical and untenable (*S.* I, p. 112 See also *M.* I, p. 486). Its stupidity is unhesitatingly declared: *nanāyaṃ paripūro bāladhammo*: *M.* I, p. 138). The eradication of such notions leaves one in a healthy state of detachment (*evaṃ virattaṃ khemattaṃ*: *S.* I, *loc. cit*). In such a situation, neither with regard to one's own person nor with regard to things of the world (*imasmiṃ ca saviññāṇake kāye bahiddhā ca sabbanimittesu*: *S.* III, p. 80) would there be any notion of appropriation or possession (...*ca sabbanimittesu ahaṃkāramamaṃkāramānānusayā na honti*: ibid.). A person with such a view of things is said to have liberated himself from rating oneself (in the threefold rating of over-rating, under-rating and equating of oneself) in relation to others which leaves one in a stirred up and agitated state of mind (*ahaṃkāramamaṃkāramānāpagataṃ manasaṃ hoti vidhāsamatikkantaṃ santaṃ suvimuttanti*: op. cit. p. 81). The *Aṅguttara-nikāya* too records this same process of purge but with a more prescriptive emphasis on the cultivation of the required outlook (*A.* IV, p. 53). The *Suttanipāta* (*v.*842) records it in greater detail when it says:

samo visesi uda vā nihīno
yo maññati so vivadetha tena
tīsu vidhāsu avikampamāno
samo visesī ti na tassa hoti.

Equal superior, inferior:
Such thoughts beget argument and dispute
Unagitated through this three-fold rating
Of equal and superior, one thinks not.

In these contexts the use of *vidhāsamatikkanta*: 'transcended rating' together with sānta: tranquil and *suvimutta*: liberated and *vidhāsu avikampamāno*: 'not agitated on account of rating' clearly point to the pathological states of mind which this process of rating and comparing can bring about. The philosophic illegitimacy of rating, comparing and contrasting of oneself against

others of which Buddhism is eloquent *and* emphatic is further argued out on the basis of the doctrine of transciency, unsatisfactoriness and change which is characteristic of life in the world. It is pointed out that within a frame of recurring change, a frame within which totality of life is conceived, no rigid norms for such assessment can be found (See *S.* III, p. 48 f.).

This total purge from expressions of egoism which manifests itself in diverse ways, marks in Buddhism the goal of salvation. For such a one is referred to as the *arahant* (*S.* III, p. 80 f.). It is to be noted at the same time that this ego-effacement as an ethical process underlies the entire salvation scheme of Buddhism. At the stage the Buddhist disciple gets for himself an assurance that he is invariably heading for enlightenment (*niyato sambodhiparāyaṇo*) on becoming a *sotāpanna*, he has along with it, rid himself of the initial warped beliefs in an enduring self, viz. *sakkāyadiṭṭhi*. The philosophic foundation on the basis of which egoism is combatted in Buddhism is the doctrine of no-soul or *anatta*. (*q.v.*).

With this emphatic awareness of selflessness as a philosophic basis running through the entire salvation scheme of Buddhism on the one hand and the regard for others as a principle of action in Buddhist ethics, which is clearly enunciated in the *Ambalaṭṭhika Rāhulovāda Sutta* (*M.* I, pp. 415 f.) on the other, the social dimension of Buddhist salvation cannot be over-rated. It brings man to man in a true spirit of equality and friendship which is also the implication of the basic virtue of *maitrī* (*mettā*) in Buddhism. In consequence of this non-differentiation and the total identification of one-self with another, it is clear that within the religious fold of Buddhism no one shall stand in the way of development of another, development being looked upon as the complete process of ascendence from the worldly and mundane (*lokiya*) to the transcendental or the plane beyond it, i. e. the *lokuttara*. Whenever any positive action of serving others is contemplated it should be calculated to prop up the other, to muster his own strength or augment his resources with regard to his material as well as spiritual needs, all of which play their role in the Buddhist salvation scheme. Altruism which consequently flows out of complete selflessness at this stage is a natural by-product of unquestionable high quality which at no point can ever turn corrosive or malignant. In Buddhism, it is obviously a product of self-correction and is not strained after for its own sake, as a means to an end.

Jotiya Dhirasekera

EGYPT. It is most unlikely that there was any contact between India and Egypt in the lifetime of the Buddha, though it is possible that there was some indirect contact following the invasion of the North-East region of India, by Alexander the Great. The earliest reference to Egypt in an Indian document appears in the thirteenth Rock edict of the Emperor Asoka, where it is stated that the principles of morality preached by the Emperor were being observed in several border kingdoms some of them in the Middle East including the territory of the King Tulamaya identified as King Ptolemy II Philadelphos, King of Egypt from 285–246 B.C. Reference is made in this inscription also to territories where these principles were being followed, even though they had not been visited by his envoys, and by implication Egypt appears to have been visited by Asoka's envoys to propagate his principles of morality (*Hultzch*, p. 46). Ptolemy II Philadelphos who made Alexandria, the Capital of Egypt, a leading centre for arts and sciences had despatched embassies to Rome and India, (Bowman, p. 90). The suggestion has also been made that Ai Khanum in Afghanistan represents the City of Alexandria established by Ptolemy II Philadelphos on the river Oxus. Further investigations at Ai Khanum are expected to provide definitive evidence regarding the origin of the Gandhara School of Buddhist Sculpture (Wheeler, p. 86) which has been a matter of controversy since the beginning of the present century. Another view holds that Ai Khanum was established very much later when the Maurya dynasty came to an end in 184 B.C. resulting in the termination of Indian rule in this part of North-West India (Wheeler, p. 184).

Some characteristics of the early Buddhist art of India can be traced to Egyptian sources. The so-called Persepolitan or bell capital of the Asokan pillars can ultimately be traced to the columns used in Egyptian architecture, with lotus capitals (Wheeler, 141), while the rock cut temples of ancient Egypt are said to have influenced similar shrines in India, such as the Buddhist temples at Kārle and Bhāja (Lannoy, p. 31).

Certain conventions employed by Egyptian painters and sculptors in their work find their parallels in the Buddhist art of ancient India. A common practice among Egyptian painters and sculptors was what is known as 'continuous narration', according to which an event would be presented in a sequence of incidents constituting the event. The same convention has been adopted by ancient Indian painters and sculptors as can be recognised in the bas-reliefs of the Bhārhūt Stūpa, the Sāñchi Stūpa and in the paintings in the Ajaṇṭā Cave temples and elsewhere (Gombrich, pp. 34–35; Hauser, p. 56, Rowland, pp. 50–51, 141–142 and Plate 92). Another convention adopted by Egyptian artists is the presentation of men, animals and objects conceptually, i.e. as conceived in their minds and not as seen by them. A pond, for example, with flower plants

and fish in it would be shown as if the pond is viewed from right above and the plants and fish as seen from a side. So that the artist presents what he conceives to be the pond, the plants and fish but not as they would appear to an observer standing nearby (Gombrich, pp. 35–36; Hauser, p. 56; Rowland, pp. 50–51). Persons of importance such as kings and princes would be shown in Egyptian bas-reliefs and paintings quite prominently out of proportion to other figures appearing in the scene, a convention again adopted by Indian artists in their work in the ancient Buddhist Stūpas and rock-cut temples such as Kārale and Bhājā (Gombrich, p. 36 and Rowland, Plates 18B and 89). These Egyptian conventions would appear to have been transmitted to India during a period of over two thousand years stretching upto the region of Ptolemy II Philadelphos or even beyond his reign. A bronze statuette of the Graeco–Egyptian god Harpocrates, wearing the unmistakable double crown of Egypt, made about the 2nd century A.C. was found in Begram, the ancient Kapiśā, in Afghanistan. Kapiśā served as the capital of the Kings of the Kuṣāṇa dynasty, who were all Buddhists, from the latter part of the 1st century A.C. (Wheeler, pp. 110–111).

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P. F. E. Fernando

EHI-BHIKKHU-PABBAJJĀ, the oldest form of admission and ordination as a monk by pronouncing the formula beginning with the words *ehi bhikkhu* (Skt. *ehi bhikṣu*, come monk). This was used only by the Buddha.

When a layman after hearing the doctrine preached by the Buddha and understanding it expressed his desire to leave the household life and become a monk, by saying, "May I, Lord, receive the 'going forth' (*pabbajjaṃ*), the Buddha pronounced the formula 'come monk' (*ehi bhikkhu*), well taught is the dhamma, fare the brahma-faring for making an utter end of ill (*svakkhāto dhammo cara bhamacariyaṃ sammā dukkhassa antakiriyāya*). The Sanskrit parallel of this is *ehi bhikṣu cara tathāgata brahmacariyaṃ* (*Vin.* I, p. 12; *Mhvu. III*. p. 180).

When this formula, which is more like an invitation, was pronounced by the Buddha the invitee received both the admission to the order and the ordination. This points to the fact that at the time when this formula was used neither were the ordination regulations formulated nor was ordination separated, by a period of probation, from the time of admission. This may have been so because most of those early entrants had invariably attained, prior to their admission and ordination, some spiritual advancement, and as such the need for eleborate ordination regulations and a period of probation may not have been felt. But this situation changed during the time of the Buddha himself for, by the time when Rāhula was admitted to the order a different formula, namely the seeking of refuge in the Triple Gem (*saraṇāgamana*) and an eleborate procedure had taken the place of this simple formula (*Vin.* I, p. 82).

The first to receive *ehi-bhikkhu-pabbajjā* was Aññāta Koṇḍañña. He was followed by the other four of the *pañcavaggiya* group and Yasa and his companions (*Vin.* I, p. 12 f.). As soon as this formula was pronounced on them they assumed, by the *iddhi*-power of the Buddha, the form of monks, complete with robes and bowl (*Dh. p. A.* I, 95; cp. *Mhvu* III, pp. 180, 379).

When two or more laymen were admitted to the Order and ordained at one and the same time the plural of this formula was used (Pali: *ethabhikkhavo*... = Skt. *etha bhikṣavo* ...), Even the feminine form *ehi bhikkhuṇi* is referred to in the *Vinaya* (*Vin.* IV, p. 214). See PABBAJJĀ.

S. K. Nanayakkara

EIGHT-FOLD-PATH, NOBLE, (Pali: *Ariya aṭṭhaṅgika magga;* Skt. *Ārya-aṣṭhāṅgika mārga*) is the course of action advocated in the teachings of the Buddha for human beings to ensure happiness in this world (*diṭṭha-dhamma-sukha*), well-being in the future existences (*samparāya-hita*) and final deliverance from the woes in *saṁsāric* existence (*nibbāna-saccikiriyā*). It is called the Middle Path (*majjhimā paṭipadā*) because it steers clear of the two extremes of self-indulgence (*kāmasukhallikānuyoga*) and self-mortification (*attakilamathānuyoga*). It is called the Eight-fold Path because it constitutes eight limbs or factors, namely, Right Views (*sammā diṭṭhi*), Right Thoughts (*sammā-saṅkappa*), Right Speech (*sammā vācā*), Right Action (*sammā-kammanta*), Right Livelihood (*sammā-ājīva*), Right Effort

(*sammā-vāyāma*), Right-Mindfulness (*sammā-sati*), and Right Concentration of mind (*sammā-samādhi*) - *S.* V. pp. 420–22.

According to the *Mahā Cattārisaka Sutta* (*M.* III. p. 72) there are two levels in this path namely, the mundane level (*lokiya*) and the super-mundance level (*lokuttara*). In the mundane level the bare ability of a person to distinguish between what is beneficial to one and all and what is harmful to one and all constitutes Right-Views. In the supra-mundane level one's ablity to comprehend the Four Noble Truths (*Catu-ariya-sacca*) constitutes Right Views.

Thoughts of non-violence, thoughts free from hatred and thoughts of renunciation are called Right Thoughts.

Avoidance of falsehood and speaking the truth alone, avoidance of slander and gossip and speaking in a way to bring about amity and concord among people, avoidance of harsh speech and using gentle and refined speech, and avoidance of frivolous speech and speaking only what is relevant to the occasion, constitute Right Speech.

Refraining from killing and causing injury to life, refraining from appropriating what is not voluntarily given by its legitimate owner and refraining from wrongful gratification of the senses constitute Right Action.

Not resorting to wrong and unrighteous pursuits but resorting only to harmless and righteous means to earn one's living, constitute Right Livelihood.

A four-fold effort is mentioned in connection with with Right effort, namely, effort on the part of a person to dispel evil traits in one (*pahānappadhāna*), effort to obstruct the entry of evil traits anew into one (*saṃvarappadhāna*), effort to cultivate and develop in one the good qualities that are not already found (*bhāvanappadhāna*), and effort to safeguard and bring to maturity the good qualities that are already found in one (*anurakkhanappdhāna*: *D.* II. p. 312). Right Effort is involved in all other stages of the path for, without it, none of them could be cultivated and developed. For example, one has to make a genuine effort to distinguish between right views and wrong views. Having done that one has to make a concentrated effort to dispel wrong views and cultivate right views alone. This process applies to the remaining stages of the Path too.

Right-Mindfulness is nothing but awareness, alertness and constant vigilance of the mind so that one can understand properly everything that passes on in one's thinking process, enabling one to control and dispel undesirable thoughts while at the same time safeguarding and developing the desirable ones. Like in the case of Right Effort, Right Mindfulness, too, plays a leading role in helping one to develop the remaining factors of the Noble Eight-fold Path, for, without Right Mindfulness, one cannot differentiate between right views and wrong views, between right thoughts and wrong thoughts, between right speech and wrong speech, between right action and wrong action, between right livelihood and wrong livelihood, between right effort and wrong effort and between right concentration of the mind and wrong concentration of the mind.

Right Concentration of the mind, the eighth factor of the Noble Eight-fold Path, is the net result of treading the seven preceding factors of the Path. The more the strength of practice of the preceding seven factors of the Path in a person, stronger and more stable becomes the concentration power of the mind in him. The Buddha says in the *Mahācattārīsaka Sutta* (*M.* III. p. 71): "Right Concentration of the mind is the one pointedness of mind (*cittassa ekaggatā*) achieved through cultivating the preceding seven stages of the Path."

In cultivating the eight factors of the Noble Eight-fold Path, one has to keep in mind the all-important position of the first factor, namely Right Views. Right Views precede (*pubbaṅgama-hoti*) the development of each of the factors of the Path, including Right Views itself. Right Views help one to differentiate between right views and wrong views, between right thoughts and wrong thoughts, between right speech and wrong speech, between right action and wrong action, between right livelihood and wrong livelihood, between right effort and wrong effort, between right mindfulness and wrong mindfulness, and between right concentration of the mind and wrong concentration of the mind. (*D.* III. p. 71).

The eight factors of the Path are grouped into three to constitute three phases of the way leading to emancipation (*nibbāna*). Emancipation from the woes in *saṃsāra* is achieved by a person by developing detachment (*virāga*) from the pleasures of the senses (*kāma*). Detachment is the direct result of the knowledge of things as they truely are (*yathābhūtañāṇa*). When a person realises that things (*dhamma*) are evanescent by nature (*anicca*), that they are engrossed with suffering (*dukkha*), that there is no essence or substance in things (*anatta*) and that things are causal in genesis (*paṭicca-samuppanna*), attachment and repulsion to objects of sense pleasures do not arise in him. To understand this true nature of things a person should have in him emaculate wisdom, and this wisdom arises in a person whose mind has reached the peak of concentration power (*samādhi*). Concentration power develops in a person who has disciplined himself thoroughly through practice of virtue (*sīla*). Hence the statement:"A wise man having established himself firmly in virtue, develops concentra-

tion power and wisdom, and being diligent and mature, dis-entangles the tangle of *saṃsāra*" (*Vism.* p. 1). In this grouping Right Speech, Right Action and Right Livelihood form the group of virtue (*sīla*), Right Effort, Right Mindfulness and Right Concentration form the group of concentration (*samādhi*) and Right Views and Right Thoughts form the group of wisdom (*paññā*).

The Buddha did not claim that the Noble Eight-fold Path is an invention of his. He himself referred to this Path as an ancient path (*purāṇam añjasaṃ*) trodden by wise people in former days. In a very apt simile in the *Nidāna Saṃyutta* of the *Saṃyutta-nikāya* (*S.* II, p. 105f.) the Buddha says: "just as if brethren, a man faring through the forest, through the great wood, should see an ancient path, an ancient road traversed by men of former days. And he were to go along it, and going along it, he should see an ancient city, an ancient prince's domain, wherein dwelt men of former days, having gardens, groves, pools, foundations of walls, a goodly spot. And that man, brethren, should bring word to the prince or to the prince's minister: 'Pardon, lord, know this. I have seen as I fared through the forest, through the great wood, an ancient path, an ancient road traversed by men of former days. I have been along it, and going along it I have seen an ancient city... a goodly spot. Lord restore, that city; and brethren, the prince or his minister should restore that city. That city should thereafter become prosperous and flourishing, populous, teeming with folk, grown and thriven.

Even so have I, brethren, seen an ancient road traversed by the rightly Enlightened Ones of former times."

The goal of Nibbāna and the Path that leads to its attainment were already there, but were obliterated by the veils of ignorance (*mohajāla*), and the Buddha only re-discovered them and tread on the Path and attained the goal; and to that extent he was the pioneer (*ādimapurisa*), the first person to tread the Path re-discovered by himself. Having re-discovered the Path and having tread it and having reached the goal to which that Path leads, the Buddha laid bare all his experience before the world, so that anyone who is so inclined may follow that Path and reach the identical goal reached by him. (*S.* II. p. 106). See ATTHAṄGIKA MAGGA, MAJJHIMĀPAṬIPADĀ, SACCA.

W. G. Weeraratne

EIHEIJI, a temple located in the village of Shibidani near Fukui in Echizen in Japan is one of the two headquarters of the Sōtō sub-sect of Zen Buddhism, the other being the Sōjiji temple at Yokohoma.

This temple founded by Dogen (1200 - 154 A.C.) is reckoned perhaps as the finest monastery in Japan (C. Eliot, *Japanese Buddhism*, London 1959, P. 284). It is situated at a foot of a hill and claims an area of seventy-acres as the temple grounds. "The first gate leads to a two-storied gate, flanked by a long colonnade. At the end of the flight of stone-steps heading from the storied gate is another gate called Chūjakumon, beyond which is the hall for Buddhist images and another for worship." (*Japan*, the official Guide, Japan Travel Bureau. 1955, p. 504). Turning to the left and then to the right from the hall for worship one finds another gate leading to the Shoyo-den (Founder's Hall) and the refectory.

Eiheiji is an elaborate temple complex consisting of more than seventy buildings connected by corridors extending into a deep forest of Japanese cedars. The environment of this temple is ideally suited for the attainment of *Zenjo* (the *samādhi* achieved by meditation). "It combines the finest in temple design, architecture and landscape gardening..." (*The Young East*, Vol. VI, No. 23, p. 39).

Among many treasures housed in this temple, a picture painted by Dogen, which is listed as a 'National Treasure', is said to be the most noteworthy.

Hundreds of young monks residing in this temple are said to lead a well-disciplined and systematic Zen life on meditation (*Zazen*). The monk's entire existence is centred around the Zen-Do (Meditation Hall), where he eats, sleeps and meditates on the *tatami* (Straw mat). Their chanting of the sūtras in the early dawn is said to be of exceptionally high standard.

Many outsiders, particularly the Europeans, who seek spiritual peace through meditation, visit this temple and frequently become initiated into the Zen Buddhism (cf. *The Young East*, Vol. VI, no. 23, pp. 38-40; ibid. vol. VII, no. 26, pp. 18-20; ibid, vol. IX, no. 36 pp. 2 ff.).

C. S. Ranasinghe

EKABBOHĀRIKA (var. Ekavyohārikā, ekabbohārā Skt. Ekavyavahārikā Ekottiya), one of the earliest and short-lived Buddhist sects in India that branched off from the mahāsaṅghika school (*Dhpy. v.* 40; *Mhv. v.* 4; W. W. Rockhill, *Life of the Buddha*, p. 182; Jiryo Masuda, *Origin and Doctrines of Early Indian Buddhist Schools*, p. 15). It is short-lived most probably because the differences it had with the other sects of the same school were very insignificant; it could very well have merged with one or the other sect. In fact, Vasumitra in his *Nikāyabhedopacaraṇacakra* enume-

merates 48 doctrinal points this school held in common with the Mahāsaṅghikas and the two other branches of the Mahāsaṅghikas, namely, the Lokottaravāda and the Kaukkutika (Masuda, op. cit. pp. 18 ff.).

The Pali literature is not very helpful in forming a satisfactory view of the doctrine of this school; only the *vaṃsatthappakāsinī*, the *Mahāvaṃsa* commentary has made an attempt at giving an explanation, but even that does not throw any light on the matter. It says that the two sects that arose from the Mahāsaṅghikas, namely, the Ekabbohārika and the Gokulika misunderstood the passages like, "all, monks, is ablaze... All conditioned things are full of misery" (*sabbaṃ bhikkhave ādittaṃ...sabbe saṅkhārā dukkhā*) and interpreted them, without making any distinction, to mean that all conditioned things are hot ashes (*kukkula*) and are like the hell of ambers (*Mhvt*, I, 173). See also *DPPN*. s. v. Ekabbohārā.

According to the *Nikāyabheda-vibhaṅga vyākhyāna* of Bhavya and the *Nikāyabhedopadarśanasaṅgraha* of Vinītadeva (*Ten-Gyur*, Vol. 90), the Ekavyavahārikas were so named because the members of this sect held that all the doctrines are thoroughly understood by a unique and immediate (*ekavyavahāra*) wisdom, for all the doctrines of the Buddhas are comprehended by the intellect (Rockhill, op. cit. p. 183).

It is, however, Vasumitra who gives a fairly comprehensive account of the doctrine of this sect (*Nikāyabhedopacaraṇacakra*, translated from its Chinese and Tibetan versions into English by Jiryo Masuda op. cit. pp. 18 ff.) According to this account, Ekavyavahārikas held 48 views in common with the Mahāsaṅghikas, the Lokottaravādins and the Kaukkutikas. Vasumitra also gives nine views as the later differentiated views of these four schools; but, of these nine views, he does not mention the particular views held by the divergent sects.

The 48 views they held in common are connected with the nature of the Buddha, the bodhisattva, the arahants and the *srotāpannas*; mind and mental states (*citta* and *caitasika*), dormant passions (*anusaya*) and their outbursts (*paryavasthāna*), and the unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*).

They held docetic views about the personality of the Buddha and the bodhisattva which later on developed into the Mahāyāna Trikāya doctrine. Concerning the nature of the arahants they upheld the five points of Mahādeva which declared that the arahants are defective, the germ that gave rise to the Mahāyāna bodhisattva ideal, as opposed to the Theravāda arahant ideal. The *srotāpannas*, according to them, are not excluded from retrogression, and are liable to commit all sinful acts except the five heinous ones (*ānantarya*). These views, which the Ekavyavahārika sect held together with the Mahāsaṅghika school and its branches, clearly point to the fact that the tendency towards Mahāyāna was very early and they can properly be called the precursors of Mahāyāna.

As far as the mind and mental states are concerned they rejected the view, held by the Theravādins and the Sarvāstivādins, of the existence of indeterminate states (*avyākṛta-dharma*); they accepted only the states which are wholesome (*kusala*) or unwholesome (*akusala*). The dormant passions (*anusaya*) are neither mind (*citta-dharma*) nor mental (*caitasika-dharma*); they never become the objects of thought. The dormant passions are different from their outbursts (*paryavasthāna*) and vice versa. The *anusayas* do not combine themselves with the *citta* while *paryavasthāna* does. This latter view is opposed to the Theravādins and Sarvāstivādins who denied the existence of *anusayas* apart from *paryavasthānas*. Regarding the unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta-dharma*) they advocated nine kinds of it as against the the one in the Theravāda and the three in the Sarvāstivāda (Masuda, op. cit. pp. 18–32).

These, in brief, are the doctrines they held in common with the other sects of the Mahāsaṅghika school. The nine points enumerated by Vasumitra as the divergent views that arose later on among the four sets include the doctrines that there are (a) things which are caused by the agency of self (*svayaṃkṛta*), (b) things which are caused by the agency of others (*paraṅkṛta*) and (c) things which are caused by both (*ubhayaṅkṛta*); (d) that two thoughts can arise side by side at one and the same time, etc., views which are alien to Theravāda. See Mahāsaṅghika.

Upali Karunaratne

EKABĪJĪ "having one seed," "germinating only once more" is the name for one of the three kinds of stream-winners (*sotāpanna*); he has only one future life in which he will attain parinibbāna (*A.* I, p. 233; *S.* V, p. 205; *Nett.* p. 189; *Kvu.* II, p. 471; *KvuA.* in *JPTS*. 1899, p. 137).

The other two kinds of stream-winners are the one passing from one noble existence to another (*kolaṃkola*) and the one with seven rebirths at the most (*sattakkhattuparama*). The difference between the *ekabīji* and the *sakadāgamī* who both are reborn only once before attaining Nibbāna, lies in a higher degree of development of the five controlling faculties (*pañcendriyāni*) and in the partial weakening of the fetters (*saṃyojana*) of lust, malice, delusions in the case of the *sakadāgāmī* (*S.* I, p. 233) 233). See SOTĀPANNA.

Upali Karunaratne

EKĀDAŚAMUKHA (Jap. Ju-ichi-men kannon), a form of Avalokiteśvara having eleven faces (ekādaśa-mukha). This form is very popular in the Tibetan region of China and Japan. The arrangement of the eleven heads as well as their facial expressions vary considerably. Sometimes the principal head carries the others grouped th three rows, each row consisting of three heads, placed one above the other and finally surmounted by a single head, or else the principal head carries two rows consisting of five and four heads which are also surmounted by a solitary head. The most common arrangement seems to be the principal head flanked by two other heads carrying two rows of three heads crowned by two heads placed one above the other. (For different types of representations see *The Art Treasures of Japan*, ed. Yashiro Yukio 1960, (Japan) I, plates No.8 137, 138, 140; *Asiatic Mythology*, ed. J. Hackin, New York, Thomas Y. Cowell Co. plate facing p. 440.

In some representations as in the one produced in the *Asiatic Mythology* (loc. cit.) there are twelve heads in all, including the one at the top which is identified as that of Amitābha, the spiritual progenitor of Avalokiteśvara. The arrangement of the heads and the facial expression in this representation, according to Hackin, is of religious symbolic importance. In this representation the principal head carries two rows of six and four heads respectively, on which is placed the head of Amitābha. Hackin says that according to Japanese sūtras the three frontal faces of Ekādaśamukha should have the expression of the bodhisattvas, the three faces to the left should bear ferocious expression, while the three faces to the right should also have the expression of the bodhisattvas but with teeth protruding from the mouth. The face placed almost at right angle to the principal head should be represented as laughing and the one at the top, being the head of Amitābha. should bear the expression of a Buddha. He says that these different expressions of the eleven faces are to be linked with the three sections of the Garbha-world (Taizô-kai).

According to the same authority the three frontal faces represent the section of the treasure (Ho-bu) the three faces to the left the section of the vajra (Kongo-bu). The three faces to the right with teeth projecting are considered as representing the section of the lotus (Renge-bu), the protruding teeth being symbolic of Amita's great power. The laughing face is considered as representing the section of karma (Katsuma-bu) while the head at the top is taken as representative of the section of the Buddha. Thus the eleven heads, as whole, are regarded as symbolising the five sections of the Vajra-world (Kongo-kai).

Alice Getty says that in some representations the central head of the 1st or the 2nd row is replaced by a small figure either standing or sitting like the Buddha. closely draped with the hands covered. She identifies this figure with Kikuta Sanzo, an Indian prince who came to Japan by about the 7th or 8th century (*Gods of Northern Buddhism*. 1914. p. 81).

The number of arms of Ekādaśamukha also varies. He is often represented as having two, four or eight arms. When represented as having two arms the right one is in the wish-granting posture (*varada-mudrā*) and the left is made to hold a vase with a lotus. When represented as having more than two arms he is made to form such gestures as wish granting-gesture (*varada-mudrā*) or worshipping-gesture (*namaskāra-mudrā*) or safety granting-gesture (*abhaya-mudrā*) and he is also made to carry various symbols such as a string of beads. a discus, a lotus. a vase. a bow and an arrow which are differently disposed. (See PLS. III and IV).

Ekādaśamukha seems also to be represented under different names. Thus the form called Āryāvalokiteśvara having eleven heads and 1000 arms with the two main hands in the *namaskāra-mudrā* and others arranged in a halo appears to be one such representation. (A. K. Gordon, *Iconography of Tibetan Lamaism*, Charles E. Tuttle and Co. 1959, p. 67 and plate facing p. 65). There are two other forms under the names Gaganarāja and Vajragarbhapramardin Avalokiteśvara (W. E. Clerk. *Two Lamaistic Pantheons*, Harvard University Press 1937, II, pp. 268, 269, Nos. 174, 177 see also No. 173). B. Bhattacharayya also refers to a form of Avalokiteśvara under the name Mahāsahasrasūryya Lokeśvara. He also has eleven heads, eight arms and stands on a lotus. The gestures he shows and the sympols be carries are typical of those found in the representations of Ekādaśamukha (*Indian Buddhist Iconography*, 1958, p. 400; see also the illustration No. 57 (A) p. 415).

The mantra *Ekādaśamukha* or the *Ekādaśamukha-hṛdaya-nāma* is probably connected with this form of Avalokiteśvara. This mantra is supposed to have the power of bringing about the well being of oneself as well as of others. It is said that even yakṣas or rākṣasas could be subdued by this mantra. The Sanskrit text of the mantra is published in the *Gilgit Maniscripts* II, p. 35, ff.

S. K. Nanayakkara

EKAGGATĀ (Skt. *ekāgratā*), a Buddhist technical term generally meaning one-pointedness, is one of the seven mental properties common to all forms of consciousness (*sabba-citta-sādhāraṇa*). The compound *ekaggatā* is made up of the words *eka* meaning 'one' and

aggatā, the abstract noun of *agga*, meaning 'pre-eminence', 'prominence', 'superiority'. Invariably, in Buddhist texts, this compound occurs in combination with the word *citta*-or *cittassa*-and then the whole compound means 'one-pointedness of the mind' (*Vism.* p. 311; *S.* V, p. 21; *A.* IV, p. 40). Besides being used in its general meaning, the term is also used in Buddhist literature in its extended meanings of tranquillity, contemplation and even concentration.

Primarily, *ekaggatā* is the mental property by which an object of consciousness is individualized. It is by this mental property that the mind becomes aware of only one object and is able to withstand being distracted by several objects. Thus *ekaggatā*, when taken in its basic meaning, denotes the germ of all attentive, selected, focussed or concentrated consciousness and as such, it is found in all beings in different degrees of development.

Buddhist canonical as well as non-canonical texts consider this to be synonymous with *samādhi* (*Dhs.* pp. 11, 24, 85; *DhsA.* p. 118, Cp. also *Vism.* p. 84, n. 2). But it is quite apparent that, in their basic meanings, the two terms *ekaggatā* and *samādhi* are different. *Ekaggatā*, being the germ of concentrated consciousness, has to be developed and cultivated for it to attain the high state of a *samādhi*. And as long as the mind is perplexed by the presence of applied and sustained thought (*vitakka-vicāra*) *ekaggatā* cannot be fully developed into *samādhi*. *Dhammasaṅgini* (p. 24) defines right concentration (*sammā-samādhi*) and one - pointedness (*ekaggatā*) in the same manner. But the Nikāya books seem to maintain some difference between these two. In explaining the *ariyan* right concentration (*ariyo sammā-samādhi*), which is associated and equipped (*sa upaniso saparikkhāro*), it is said that it is one-pointedness of mind which is equipped with the seven limbs of the Noble Eight-fold Path namely Right view, Right thought, Right speech, Right Action, Right Living, Right Effort and Right Mindfulness (see, *S.* V p. 21; *A.* IV, p. 40). Some scholars are of ipinion that *ekaggatā* is identical with ***ekodibhāva*** (*Skt. ekotibhāva*). But there is no conclusive proof to establish their identity. However it is clear that the two forms are very close in meaning and that ***ekodibhāva*** denotes a developed stage of *ekaggatā* (see also EKOTIBHĀVA).

S. K. Nanayakkara

EKOTHIBHĀVA (**vars.** *ekotibhāva*, ***ekoṭibhāva***; **Pali** *ekodibhāva*), a technical term usually occurring in the formulaic statement of the process leading out of the first *dhyāna* into the second (***Mhvu.*** I, p. 228; III, p. 131, *Daśabhūmika Sūtra*, p. 34; *Vism.* p. 156). It is also noticeable from numerous occurrences that the term is often used to indicate a particular state of mind attained by meditation (*D.* I, p. 37; II, p. 78; *M.* I, p. 116; *Bbh.* p. 109). Besides this compound term, the word *ekodi* (Skt. *ekoti*) alone is used in a few instances (*A.* III, p. 354; *jhānāni upasampajja-ekodi nipako sato*; cp. *Sn.* v. 926; *S.* I, p. 52). But mainly it is found combined with the root *kr* to do or *bhū* to be (*M.* I, p. 116, *S.* IV, p. 263; V, p. 196, *Mhvu.* III, p. 212; *Bbh.* p. 109).

The opinions of scholars differ with regard to the meaning and the derivation of the term *ekotibhāva*. Of the numerous renderings suggested by modern scholars a few are as follows: state of concentration on one single object, tranquillity, blissful serenity (state of mind, following after conversion: Monier Villiams, *Skt. Eng. Dict.* s. v.); single mindedness, intellectual simplicity (J. Evola, *The Doctrine of Awakening*, p. 186); unity, predominance (of mind; see R. C. Childers *The Dict. of the Pali Language* s. v.). The meaning often assigned to this term is one-pointedness.

Nemerous attempts have been made from early times to explain the derivation of this compound term *ekotibhāva*. One very early attempt is by Buddhaghosa. He splits the compond into *eka udeti* (*eko udeti ti ekodi*). As to its meaning, he says, it comes up as the foremost, the best because it is not overtopped by applied and sustained thought (*vitakkavicārehi anajjhāruḷhattā aggo seṭṭho hutvā udeti ti attho*). He further adds that the last is referred to as unique (*eko*) in the world; or *eko* could be taken to mean single, for, being without applied and sustained thought it is without companion. Buddhaghosa puts forward another alternative. It evokes (*udayati*) associated states (*sampayuttadhamme*) and, therefore, it is an evoker (*udi*); It is unique (*eka*) in the sense of best (*seṭṭha*) and it is an evoker, too. Thus it comes to be a unique evoker (*seṭṭhatthena eko ca so udi ca it ekodi*). This is a designation (*adhivacana*) for concentration (*samādhi*). Since the second *jhāna* causes to be or develops this single thing (*ekodim*) it is called singleness. But as this single (thing) is of the mind and not of a being or of a soul, so it is spoken of as the singleness of the mind. (Cp. *DhsA.* p. 169).

This is the explanation quoted by Childers in his dictionary, though Suhuti, who supplied him the information, makes no reference to the source. However, this etymological explanation is rather fanciful and as such cannot be much relied upon.

The opinion of modern scholars with regard to the origin of this word is divided. One group takes this to be of Pali origin whereas others consider it to be a term of Sanskrit origin. Richard Morris derives it from *eka odhi* or *avadhi* meaning end, point, aim.

Avadhi or *odhi* is from *ava* + the root *dhā* to place. Thus, *odhi* or *avadhi* could mean putting down, fixing, i. e., boundary, limit, extent (See *PTS Pali-Eng. Dict.* under *odhi*). In support of his view R. Morris cites the Burmese versions of Pali texts which give *ekodhi*, the aspirate instead of the dental *d*. He remarks that the loss of aspiration in the term *ekodi* may be due to the following aspirate in *bhāva*. Thus, *ekodhi-bhāva*. He cites parallels from Jaina literature in favour of his argument. Basing his view on the observation made by H. Kern (*Sad dharmapuṇḍarika*, *SBE.* XXI, p. xvi) 'that certain parts of the nothern Buddhist books, more specially the verses, have been Sanskritised to a very large extent,' suggests that the nothern Buddhists Sanskritised the form *ekodi* or *ekodhi* into *ekoti* which was more intelligible to them (*JPTS.* 1885 pp. 32 f.). This view is endorsed by T. W. Rhys Davids and William Stede (*Pali-Eng. Dict.*, s. v.). They observe, also, that its combination with roots *kṛ* and *bhū* points to a form *ekoda*, with the regular change of *a* to *i* in connection with these roots.

There are others who attempt to seek a Sanskrit origin for this term. They split the compounded *ekotibhāva* into *eka-ūti-bhāva*. According to them the Pali *ekodi* is from Sanskrit *ekoti* The word *ekotyaḥ* (plural of *ekoti*) occurs in the *Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa* (xii, 2, 2, 4). Eggeling commenting on this particular occurrence says that it means one-webbed. He derives *ūti* from the root *vā* to weave and takes it in the sense of web or weft. However, it should be noted that Monier Williams in his *Skt.-Eng. Dict.* does not mention the root *vā* in this sense. Weber prefers to derive the word *ūti* from the root *av* to favour, to impel, and considers it to mean 'striving after a goal, course.' Eggeling adds that *ūti* can have both the meaning of web and course (*JPTS.* 1885, pp. 37 f.).

This word *ūti* is found quite often in the *Rgveda* (i, 166, 13; iv, 44, 6) to connote both meanings mentioned above. It can be derived from both roots, *ve* to weave, to plait, to string or join together and *av* to favour, protect, impel, satisfy etc. (see Monier Williams, op. cit. pp. 96, 1013, and also 221).

R. Mitra, too, favours the view that Sanskrit *ekoti* has become *ekodi* in Pali. He cites the Skt. word *vitatsi* which becomes *vidatthi* in Pali as an example where Skt. *t*. becomes *d* in Pali. He also splits up the word *ekoti* into *eka-ūti*. He gives numerous instances from the *Ṛgveda* where the word is used in the sense of preserving, sewing, wearing, distilling, oozing, sport, and recreation. He also cites the authority of Śridhara Swāmi, who in his commentary on the *Bhāgavata* assigns to this word the meanings of attachment to work, and of play. According to Mitra, of all the meanings connoted by the word *ūti*, the meanings of preserving, attachment to work, and play (*līlā*) suffice to explain the compound *ekotibhāva*.

He cites an instance from the *Lalitavistara* (p. 90) where this compound occurs and takes it to be a term used to describe the first *dhyāna* which is characterised by applied and sustained thought (*savitarka-savicāra*) and born of solitude (*vivekaja*). He cites parallels from Bhoja's commentary on the *Yoga-sūtra* in which pondering plays an improtant role in meditation. Therefore, he adduces that *ekotibhāva* means pondering on a single object. He takes *ūti* in the sense of object, and as that object is calulated to produce joy, he deems it quite reasonable to indicate it by a term which implies recreation, sport or play (*Proceedings of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, 1886, pp. 101 ff.).

There is another noteworthy contribution by S. C. Das on the meaning and the derivation of this term. He favours the term *ekotibhāva* instead of *ekotibhāva* with short *i*. He says that the Tibetan texts as well as the *Mahāvyutpatti*, written in the *nāgari* script, which is available in Tibet, contain the term with the long *i*. He derives it from *eka-uta-bhāva*. *Uta*, according to him is from the root *ve* meaning sew, unite, and the affix *kta*. The Tibetan parallel of this term is *rgyud gcigtu gyur-pa*. *Rgyud gyur-pa* means strung or united together; *gcig* means one and *tu* means into. Therefore, the compound means 'formed into one string or line.' He quotes an observation made by a certain lama who explains *ekotibhāva* as the continued connection of one with another without a break or division. As an example he cites the consciousness (*vijñana*) which runs through an unbroken line of existences until it is stopped by *nirvāṇa*.

According to S. C. Das *ekotībhāva* connotes a cardinal doctrine in Tibetan Buddhism. In Tibet it is believed that when a grand lama dies his spirit reappears in some other person. After the death of an eminent lama a committee is set up to identify the spirit of the dead lama with that of the claimant. This identification is referred to as *rgyud gcigtu gyur-pa* (*ekotibhāva* :ibid. 1887, pp. 173 ff.).

R. Mitra rejects the form *ekotībhāva* on the ground that the Tibetan language does not make any distinction between short and long *i* (ibid. pp. 75 f.). N. Mukerjee, who also favours the term *ekotībhāva*, takes it to mean absorption into one. He derives the term from *eka uta chvi bhāva*. He explains the long *i* as due to the suffix *chvi*. He cites forms such as *ekībhāva*, *guṇībhāva*, *bhasmībhāva* as parallels. His suggestion is also rejected by R. Mitra who is of opinion that there is no need for a suffix *chvi* to explain the derivation of the term (ibid. p. 179 f.).

Max Muller puts forward a suggestion, for which he claims neither the merit nor the responsibility, that this term in question could be irregular contraction of ekakotibhāva. Instead of ekotibhāva he prefers the form *ekoṭibhāva* with a cerebral ṭ for he has found it to occur so (*JPTS.* 1885, p. 36 f.). F. S. Grouse favours Max Muller's suggestion and quotes the grammatical rule of Vararuci that *k*, *g* and other consonants when simple and non-initial, are generally elided, the first letter of the latter member of a compound being regarded as non-initial. R. Mitra, who rejects Max Muller's suggestion due to lack of parallels to prove *ekakoṭi* being contracted to *ekoṭi*, also refuses to accept the explanation given by Grouse on the ground that Vararuci's rule is applicable only to Prakrit orthography *Proceedings of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, 1887, pp. 57 ff.).

The meanings arrived at by all derivations are almost similar. They ultimately connote the firm resolving or fixing of the mind on one object or course. This meaning is established by textual evidence, too. Very often this term occurs in the phrase *cittasa ekotibhāva* Pali *cetaso ekodibhāva*: see *Mhvu.* I, p. 228; II, p. 131; III, p. 213; *Vism.* 156) Sometimes it is found to occur in the sentence *cittam ekodikaroti* or *karohi* (*S.* IV, p. 263; *Bbh.* p. 109). In meaning, this is quite close to *cittaṃ sthāpayati*, *cittaṃ avasthāpayati* or *cittam samādhatte* in Sanskrit (*Bbh.* p. 109) and *cittam santiṭṭhati sannisīdati* or *samādhiyati* in Pali (see *S.* IV, pp. 196, 263 and also V, p. 144), all connoting the firm fixing of the mind on one object.

Max Muller and Mitra are of opinion (loc. cit.) that *cetaso ekoṭibhāva* and *citta-ekagratā* (*Lal.* p. 90) or *cittassa ekaggatā* (*A.* I, p. 36; IV, p. 40) are the same in meaning. There is no doubt about the fact that they are very close in meaning. Yet there is no conclusive evidence to hold them as identical. Unlike *ekodibhāva*, *ekaggatā* is a mental property common to all consciousness (*sabba-citta-sādhāraṇa*), and it has to be cultivated and developed for it to become *samādhi*. *Ekaggatā* is the germ of all concentrated consciousness and *ekodibhāva* is a developed form of that germ. Textual evidence proves that there is a distinction between these two mental properties. The *Lalitavistara* (p. 90) says that the *bodhisattva* acquired one-pointedness of mind (*citta-ekagratā*) even before he entered the first *dhyāna*. Therefore, *ekagratā* is not exclusively a mental property of the *dhyāna* consciousness. The *Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha* (p. 3) mentions *ekaggatā* as appertaining to all *jhānas* The Nikāyas generally do not speak of *ekaggatā* even in the first *jhāna* and this may be due to the fact of its being a *sabba-citta-sādhāraṇa*, and the Nikāyas seem to take it for granted that it is present in all *jhānas*. In the formulaic statements describing the process of attaining the different *dhyānas*, *ekotibhāva* is assigned to the second *dhyāna*. (On the gramatical and syntactical problems involved in this formulaic statement, see *Mhvu.* trsl. I, p. 184). There is one instance in the *Mahāvastu* (III, p. 213) where it is said that *ekotibhāva* belongs to the first *dhyāna*: "I know also what my lord Brahmā means by *ekotibhāva*. It is that a man, by suppressing applied and sustained thought through his mind becoming inwardly calm and one-pointed, enters and abides in the first meditation, which is born of solitude (*vivekajam*) and is full of joy and ease (*pīti-sukham*) This I know is what lord Great Brahmā means when he talks of *ekotibhūta*."

It is quite clear that except for *vivekajam* in place of *samādhijam* the rest is a description of the second *dhyāna*. As pointed out in the *BHS.* (s. v.) this seems to be due to a strange confusion in the formulas. Except in a rare occurrence as mentioned above, both Pali and Sanskrit texts take *ekotibhāva* to be a mental porperty attained in the second *dhyāna* which is born of concentration (*samādhijam*) Moreover, it is evident that there cannot be a firm fixing of the mind on one object or course when applied and sustained thought are still present. To achieve this developed state of concentration one has to get rid of *vitakka* and *vicāra* and firmly establish the mind on one object or course; and this is the state achieved in the second *dhyāna*. The *Aṅguttara Nikāya* (I, p. 254) says that if there happens to be any form of *vitakka*, then such concentration is not characterised by one-pointdness (*ekodibhāva*). This strengthens the view that *ekodibhāva* appertains to the second *jhāna* which is reached by suppressing *vitakka* and *vicāra*, and also that it is a state of mind more developed than that connoted by *ekaggatā* which is common to all forms of consciousness and which can prevail even when *vitakka* and *vicāra* are functioning. See also EKAGGATĀ.

S. K. Nanayakkara

EKOTTARĀGAMA See ĀGAMA, AṄGUTTARA-NIKĀYA

ELEMENTS are explained as 'that which cannot be reduced to simpler terms under the conditions of investigations' (*Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*, J. H. Baldwin, s. v. element). This term is often found used to render into English the term *dhātu* and *dharma* as found used in *Sarvāstivāda* Buddhism. The Buddha's analysis of existence i. e. of individual and things, into aggregates (*khandha*, *skandha*) elements (*dhātu*) and

bases (*āyatana*) is referred to as the doctrine of elements. Reference is also made to the ability for elemental analysis of existence (*dhātu-kusalatā A.* I, p. 85).

As the Buddha himself declares the primary aim of his teaching is to explain the problem of *dukkha* and show the way out of it (*M.* I, p. 140). He pointed out also that ignorance or the lack of knowledge about the true nature of things (*yathābhūta-ñāṇa*) is the basic cause of this *dukkha*. Due to this ignorance, the Buddha pointed out, beings are prone to consider that there exists an ever-perduring, permanent self or substance (*atta*) behind all saṃsāric existence. According to the Buddha's teaching it is this baseless belief in a permanent self that generates the misleading notion of "I"-ness and 'mine'-ness (*ahaṅkāra, mamiṅkāra*), giving rise in turn to craving which makes individuals plunge into the vortex of life and death i.e., *saṃsāra*.

To dispel this misleading belief which is the root-cause of *dukkha* the Buddha analysed and reduced existence i. e., both individuals and things, into the simplest terms possible and explained that existence is a compound (*saṅkhata*) of a variety of factors which are causally inter-connected. It is said that the Tathāgata sees in its true nature the world which consists, of a variety of elements (*Tathāgato aneka-dhātu nānā-dhūtu lokaṃ yathābhūtam pajānāti: M.* I, p. 70).

In reducing existence into these simple elements the Buddha did not present them as ultimate realities of permanent, unchanging nature. On the contrary he emphatically pointed out that these elements, too, are subject to impermanence (*anicca*) suffering (*dukkha*) and non-substantiality (*anatta: Sn* v. 1119, *S.* III, p. 142; IV, p. 54).

However, it is apparent that a marked change in interpretation has taken place in Sarvāstivāda teachings. According to Sarvāstivāda *dharmas* are the simplest elements to which existence can be reduced. These elements which are seventy-five in number are considered momentary appearances, momentary flashings into the phenomenal world out of an unknown source (Th. Stcherbatsky, *The Central Conception of Buddhism*, London, 1923, p. 3). This Sarvāstivāda explanation brought about a dichotomy of an element as having a substance (*svabhāva*) that is unknowable and also as having a phenomenal appearance (*laksana*) that is casually conditioned. According to the Sarvāstivādins' this substance (*svabhāva* or *dravya*) is ever perduring (*sarvadā-asti*) and, hence, their appellation *sarvāstivāda*.

This teaching, however, is in direct conflict with the early Buddhist teachings of the Nikāyas which clearly state that everything is non-substantial (*sabbe dhammā anattā: M.*I, p. 228; *S.* III, p. 133; IV, p. 401, *A.*I., p. 286; *Dhp.* v. 279). It is this deviation from the original teaching that came under Nagārjuna's criticism. See also also DHĀTU.

S. K. Nanayakkara

ELLORĀ, a village in the Indian state of Mahārāṣṭra, near the city of Aurangabad, lat. 20° 21′ N.; long. 75° 13′ E., is famous for its rock cut temples. The temples are about half a mile east of the village and lie along the west face of the low ridge of the Sahayādri hills, rising up from the vast Deccan plateau. They extend for about three-quarters of a mile in a straight line along the sloping face of the hill. The caves belong to the three leading Indian religions, viz., Buddhism, Brahmanism and Jainism. The caves at the southern end are Buddhist; those at the nothern end Jain, while those between these two groups are Brahmanical (*ERE.* V, 269; *Encyclopaedia Britanica*, V, 375). The earliest cave temple at the site is the Brahmanical cave 21 (Ramesvara), probably dating from the mid 6th century. The present survey is limited to the Buddhist temples.

There are twelve such Buddhist rock-cut temples at Ellorā, which have now been assigned to the period from the 6th to the 8th centuries A.C.. The cave temples here belong, therefore, to a later phase of rock-cut architecture than the cave temples at Ajaṇṭā, some sixty miles away, and there is considerable difference in character between the two groups. Here, in these monasteries the Buddhist monks of the Mahāyāna fraternity dwelt and practised their religion for some centuries from cir. 450 A.C. -700 A.C.

The twelve caves may be divided into two sub-groups, caves 1–5 and caves 6–12, the latter group slightly later in date than the first group. Each group comprise of a prayer-hall and its attached monasteries. In the first group religious assemblies seem to have been held in cave 5 which is a pillared hall of an unusual and entirely new type.

In the latter groups we have cave 10, the so-called Viśvakarma, as the only caitya-hall at Ellorā. Of the twelve caves those numbering 2, 5 and 10 are mentioned as being of special significance.

Cave 1 at the southernmost corner of the hill with four cells in the southern wall and four in the eastern wall is a residential monastery. It has neither pillars nor sculpture and is presumed to have been one of the earlier excavations.

Cave 2 is one of the Buddhist caves of special significance. Its hall is 48 ft. square and the ceiling is supported by twelve pillars. Its exceptional feature is that the cells

in the side walls are supplanted by galleries which, are divided into compartments, containing images in bold relief. These features give the cave a distinguished appearance, thus converting it into an elaborate hall-cum-shrine.

On the left wall of the veranda of this cave is a pot-bellied figure of Jambala, the Buddhist god of wealth holding a lotus in one of his hands and a bag of money in the other. On the two sides of the entrance to the hall are two *dvārapālas* (guardian deities) identified with the bodhisattvas Avalokiteśvara and Vajrapāṇi. Inside the hall, on the back wall of the veranda is a figure of Tārā with a female attendant on either side and six flying *vidyādharas* above, carrying offerings. Tārā is carrying a lotus in her left hand. In her right hand which is in the *abhaya mudrā* are seen the remnants of a rosary. On the two raised galleries of the hall are seated Buddha figures, seven in each gallery, in the *pralambapāda – āsana*, in preaching attitude. The figures of the Buddha are flanked by bodhisattva attendants with flying couples above.

The twelve pillars which support the roof are of the *āmalaka* type (i.e. 'chamferred cushion' type). The shaft is square and is vertically fluted. The upper portion of the shaft shows a garland design and then becomes octagonal, showing *yakṣa* figures at the corners.

In the centre of the back wall of the hall is the entrance to the shrine guarded by two colossal *dvārapālas*, identified with the bodhisatvas Padmapāṇi, Avalokiteśvara and Maitreya. The former is flanked by a male companion, probably Maṇidhara and a female companion, probably Ṣaḍakṣari Mahāvidyā. Inside this shrine is a large seated figure of the Buddha in the *pralambapāda–āsana* and the *dharma–cakra–mudrā*, flanked by a bodhisattva on either side.

Cave 3 is a monastery 46 ft. square and 11 ft. high, the ceiling being supported by twelve pillars of the *ghaṭa–pallava* (i.e. pot-and-folliage) type.

The entrance to the shrine is flanked by two bodhisattavas. Inside the shrine is a seated Buddha in the *pralambapāda–āsana* and the *dharma–cakra–mudrā*, also flanked by two bodhisattva figures. Above the Buddha are flying couples, and in two corners of the shrine are a number of kneeling devotees with folded hands.

Cave 4, measuring 35 ft. by 39 ft., is a two storeyed monastery datable to the 7th century A.C. On the ground floor are a few carvings. The upper storey contains a shrine and two cells. In the shrine are the figures of Avalokiteśvara, Mañjuśri and Tārā. On the back wall of the shrine is a well carved Buddha figure seated in the *pralambapāda–āsana* in the *dharma–cakra–mudrā*. On the left of this figure is a standing figure of Maitreya.

Cave 5 which was mentioned above as one of the three outstanding rock-cut Buddhist temples at Ellorā is a large and elaborate excavation, going deep into the rock base and measuring 117 ft. by 58½ ft., excluding its two side chambers. The ceiling of the hall is supported by twenty-four massive pillars which have square shafts and ornamental carvings. In the side walls of the cave are excavated twenty-three cells for the residence of monks. This cave was used probably as an assembly hall or a hall for the delivering of sermons by learned monks.

In the left side wall of the cave is a small shrine in which is a statute of the Buddha. The main shrine is guarded by two huge *dvārapālas* each of which is flanked by a graceful female figure on either side.

On the back wall of the shrine is a seated Buddha in the *pralambapāda–āsana* and *dharma–cakra–mudrā*. This Buddha is also flanked by figures of Avalokiteśvara and Maitreya on either side. Above, on either side of the Buddha are flying couples, males with garlands and females carrying food offerings. At the centre of the central nave, two low stone benches have been left in the rock extending the whole length of the hall.

Regarding this unusual feature of this cave Percy Brown (*Indian Architecture, Buddhist and Hindu Periods*, Bombay, 1965, p. 59) observes: "...... Down the centre of the nave, two low, narrow and parallel platforms have been left in the rock, extending the whole length of the hall, an unusual feature of which there is only one other instance, namely the "Mahārāja" or "Durbar Hall" at Kanheri; from this circumstance it may be inferred that, although many miles apart, both were designed for the same form of ceremonial usage. What the usage was is revealed by the Lamastic services in the monasteries (gumphas) in Sikhim and Tibet, obviously a survival of those which prevailed in Buddhist India centuries before. There the priests (lāmās) sit in two lines facing one another on raised platforms, the abbot, on a higher seat at the head and on the right, with the altar and holy image beyond all of which confirm to the Mahanwada plan. It is evidently in order to suit a similar type of ritual that the Mahanwada prayer-hall at Ellorā, and the "Durbar Hall' at Kanheri were designed in such a manner".

Cave 6 consists of a central rectangular hall, two side halls, an antechamber and a main shrine. The pillars of this cave have a plain and square lower portion but the upper portion is very decoratively carved with *yakṣa* figures, floral bands and the *ghaṭa-pallava* design. In this cave are also the usual figures of the Buddha and Avalokiteśvara and also several other uncommon figures like those of Mahāmāyuri, Mahāvidyā, Maṇidhara and Vajrapāṇi.

Cave 7 which is also datable to the same period as cave 6 has a ceiling supported by four pillars. There are also twelve unfinished cells and the excavation is apparently left incomplete.

Cave 8 is a chapel – cum – monastery with circumambulatory passage and a number of cells in the side walls. On the back wall, in the centre is a seated Buddha figure in preaching attitude, flanked by bodhisattvas and their consorts.

On the back wall of the shrine is also a seated Buddha on a lion throne in the *pralambapāda–āsana*. On the left of this Buddha image is Maitreya well adorned and holding a chauri. On the right is the bodhisattva Padmapāṇi, depicted here with four hands in different mudrās and with different attributes in them. On the left of the bodhisattva Padmapāṇi are a male and a female devotee holding offerings. On his right is the figure of Tārā standing on a double–petalled lotus and having a fleeting smile on her face and beautifully ornamented. There are other divinities like the Mahāmāyūri, Hāriti and Pañcika carved in the walls of this cave.

Cave 9 has a beautiful facade and pillars of the 'vase and foliage' type. In the centre of the back wall is a seated Buddha with Padmapāṇi Avalokiteśvara on his left. In this cave is also a figure of Tārā flanked by five emblems of danger, viz. snake, sword, elephant, fire and shipwreck–the only one of its type in western India.

Cave 10 has been described by Percy Brown (*op. cit.* p. 60) as the most notable production of the whole series of Buddhist rock-cut temples at Ellorā. This cave, commonly known as the '*Viśvakarma*' (see Pl. V) (after the name of the God of the Arts), is the last of the great rock-cut Caitiya halls of India (See PL.VI.). It is a type of building which dates back nearly 1000 years, to the 2nd century B.C. and is a development on the Māhāyāna caitya-halls such as caves 10 and 26 at Ajaṇṭā.

The interior of the hall measures 85 ft. by 44 ft. with a height of 34 ft. The ceiling is supported by twenty-eight pillars of the vase and foliage design. The central feature of the hall is the stūpa 26 ft. 10 in. high which at the same time is a foundation for the support of a large projecting nitch containing a seated figure of the Buddha. The stūpa is profusely carved. It has a three-tiered base above which rises the dome. The height of the base is nearly two and a half times the height of the dome. Above the dome rises the *harmikā* surmounted by a four tiered tee.

Many elements of this caitya-hall are still in imitation of wooden construction. The ceiling shows cross – beams cut out of stone. The facade also shows two beams cut out of stone issuing out of it, appearing as if they have issued forth from inside the cave and are held in position by nails driven into them. The ceiling too shows stone ribs carved out.

Traces of late construction like the perpendicular pillars and figure sculptures with Tantric influence are evident. Among these figures are Avalokiteśvara, Maitreya, Jambhala, Tārā, Cundā, Mahāmayūri and Bhrukuti.

The central door-frame of the hall is carved with a number of *mithuna* figures. At the end of the door jambs are figures of *nāgas*. The stūpa at the apsidal end of the hall is also covered with sculpture.

The sun–window of this caitya-hall is strikingly different from the usual, semicircular windows like those of Ajaṇṭā, Bhājā and Karle which curve gracefully at the lower ends and become pointed at the top. Here it is of the horse-shoe type with a new decorative element on the two sides, giving it a trefoil shape. Two beams jut out of the window imitating wooden constructions. On the two sides of the window are carved beautiful flying gāndharva figures, depicted as having come with their consorts to pay homage to the Buddha. These figure sculptures, slim but full and graceful show influence of Pallava art.

In its entirety, Cave 10 is one of the most beautiful caves showing great imagination and skill of the architects of this period.

Cave 11 known as *Do Thal* (two storeys) is a three-storeyed monument. It was misnamed *Do Thal* for until 1876 A.C. the ground floor was hidden under the accumulation of earth. Though it is not as spacious as the other three-storeyed cave, the *Tin Thal* (Cave 12), it is planned on somewhat similar lines. This temple has no cells for monks. Cave 12 known as *Tin Thal* (i.e. "Three Storeys") is one of the most striking temples at Ellorā with sufficient cells to provide residence for at least forty monks and a large assembly hall providing room for congregations of many times that number. It rises to a height of nearly 50 ft. with an ample courtyard in front.

The hall is entered through a rock-cut gateway which opens on to a qradrangle 108 ft. wide and 60 ft. deep. On the far side the facade rises in three equal tiers, each storey having a veranda. The exterior of this temple has a plain appearance but the interior offers a striking contrast in that each hall is richly carved with beautiful sculpture. It is also significant that each hall is differently treated and each is of significant aesthetic and architectural merit.

The ground floor of this vast temple has a pillared verenda 112 ft. by 43 ft. The shrine chamber which is 23 ft. by 15 f.t contains a seated image of the Buddha with other images in relief, on the walls.

The first storey comprises of one large hall 112 ft. across, 72 ft. deep and $11\frac{1}{2}$ ft. high, divided into five aisles by five rows of pillars of eight each. Beyond this hall is another vestibule 38 ft. wide by 17 ft. deep

beyond which is a chamber 20 ft. square, enshrining a seated figure of the Buddha. The walls right round the hall and the vestibule are recessed for the reception of statues in high relief.

Staircases on either side of the hall of the first floor lead to the topmost storey. In the centre is a rectangular hall 78 ft. by 36 ft. divided into three aisles by two rows of pillars of five each. At the end of this central hall is a chamber 20 ft. square containing the usual seated Buddha image flanked by the attendant bodhisattva figures.

The pillars of the cave show simple design, the two patterns which occur frequently being those of the lotus and the pot. The austerity of decoration and pattern of the hall indicate that this rock-cut temple belongs to the early period.

Caves 11 and 12 belong to the latest phase of Buddhist rock-cut architecture at Ellorā. The Mahāyāna community of Ellorā continued and developed the basic concept of the rock-cut temples, viz. the chaitya-hall (the hall for worship) and the monastery (*vihāra*). It is in stylistic treatment and iconography that the greatest change is noticeable, as the deification of the Buddha permitted the reproduction of his image in sculpture, sometimes in colossal proportions.

In its architectural arrangements, the excavated hall was transformed into the arrangements found at Cave 10, where the *stūpa* is almost superseded by the Buddha image, and Caves 2 and 5 where there is the combination of hall and shrine. In the *vihāra* plan, the cells which were originally meant to be used as the residences for the monks have subsequently been converted into sanctuaries for images of the Buddha. This marks a significant change in religious emphasis. It meant that the *vihāra* was now fulfilling the functions of both abbey and church, and also that relic worship was being supplanted by image worship.

The technical method used in carving these temples seems to have been by cutting three great trenches down into the rock and then carving the temple out of the isolated blocks of stone that remain. The blocks that remained in the middle were later converted into huge pillars.

Commenting on the architectural achievement displayed by the Buddhist rock-cut temples of Ellorā, Percy Brown (*op. cit.* p. 60) observes: "In some of the vihāras, notably in the *Tin Thal* there will be found the most precise and mathematically accurate craftsmanship throughout the entire range of rock-architecture. Lines are straighter, angles more correct and surfaces more true than in any other examples, indicating that at Ellorā rock-cut architecture, in its technical aspect, had reached its culmination."

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EMANCIPATION. In Buddhism, the concept of emancipation or release, expressed diversely in Pali as *mutti, vimutti, mokka* and *vimokkha* etc. seems to reckon with two forms of bondage relating to the involvement of beings in saṃsāra. One is the more directly conceivable phenomenon of man being trapped in the whirl of saṃsāra, i.e. of births and deaths. Therefore, the termination of the process of births and deaths whereafter there is no more rebirth, is referred to as release from saṃsāra or release from the cycle of *dukkha*. In fact, this is the basic notion of the Indian concept of *mokṣa* or emancipation. Taking a more fundamental approach to the problem Buddhism delves deeper and discovers that this involvement in *saṃsāra* is due to ignorance or *avidyā* which implies that the mind of man, in that state, is unable to realise the true nature of things as it is overpowered by defiling traits (*āsavas*) of lust for sense-pleasures (*kāmāsava*), craving for existence (*bhavāsava*) and perverse views (*diṭṭhāsava*). Freeing one's mind from these *āsavas* is the basic and primary emancipation which brings enlightenment and wisdom in its wake which is the key to release from *saṃsāra*.

Buddhism teaches that beings are in bondage, bound to saṃsāric existence by numerous fetters (*saṃyojana* q.v.) and that they are consumed by desires and aspirations springing out of craving. According to Buddhism, to be in bondage is suffering (*dukkha*). Emphasis laid on this aspect of suffering is clear when the Buddha explains that the whole world is founded on suffering (*S.* I, p. 40). This is further made evident by the fact that the two Pali terms *loka* (world) and *dukkha* (suffering) are used synonymously in texts (*A.* II. p. 48). Though this

is a universal truth few are deeply and continuously aware of this. Buddhism points out that if and when one sees things (*dhamma*) as they are (*yathābhūta*) one would not fail to realise that one is in bondage to saṃsāra. Since one's view is normally blurred by ignorance one fails to see the true nature of things and consequently fails to realise that one is in bondage to saṃsāra. As long as one's view is veiled by ignorance one regards the five aggregates (*pañcakkhandha*), which constitute all physical and mental phenomenon of existence, as one's own ego, and arising out of this ego-consciousness are other derivatives in the form of craving (*taṇhā*), conceit (*māna*) and views (*diṭṭhi*) which further obliterate the true nature of things. Under the influence of these conditions one indulges in an ever-prolific process of conceptualisation with regard to all objects of senses and get entranced with them. Thus, he becomes still more fettered and burdened.

The Buddha emphatically states that just as there is suffering there is also cessation of suffering (*M.* I. p. 140), and this conception of emancipation from suffering (*dukkha pamocanaṃ*), from the bondage (*mokkhanti māra bandhanā, Dhp. v.* 37) and burdens of existence (*vimutto upadhisaṃkhaye, A.* II. p. 24) is the *raison d'etre* of Buddhism.

From the nature of bondages it is clear that emancipation from them depends on the cessation of the process of conceptualisation by the mind. This is possible by eradicating ignorance (*avijjā*), the root-cause of all misconceptions, and by developing intuitive knowledge (*paññā*) which enables one to see things in their true perspective. This has to be achieved by following the Middle Path (*majjhimā-paṭipadā*), also called the Noble Eightfold Path (*ariya-aṭṭhaṅgika-magga*). To win emancipation from the bondages and burdens of saṃsāra one has to be equipped with three virtues viz., *sīla*, *samādhi* and *paññā*. As one progresses along the Middle Path one becomes able to perfect one's ethical conduct (*sīla*), practise mental culture (*bhāvanā*) and develop mental concentration (*samādhi*) and sharpen intuitive knowledge (*paññā*). The more one progresses along this path the more one becomes progressively detached from saṃsāra for, one begins to see the true nature of things. Perfection of ethical conduct helps to develop mental concentration and intuitive knowledge. With the development of mental concentration one could systematically eliminate initial application of thought (*vitakka*) and investigation (*vicāra*) that give rise to a complex process of conceptualisation. With these ethical and mental developments the intuitive knowledge gets sharpened and perfected, enabling one to see that all phenomena of existence are impermanent (*anicca*), are subject to suffering (*dukkha*) and without a permanent entity (*anattā; M.* I. pp. 4 ff. 235 f.). When convinced of this fact the ego-consciousness gets completely eradicated, and thenceforth one becomes able to regard what is seen just as the seen, what is heard just as the heard, what is sensed just as the sensed and what is cognised just as the cognised, without indulging in any process of conceptualisation with regard to them (*Ud.* p. 8). With this non-conceptualising position the mind becomes emancipated of all the inflowing impulses of sensuous gratification (*kāmāsava*), of becoming (*bhavāsava*), of ignorance (*avijjāsava*). Such a one is emancipated of all cankers (*khīṇāsava*). In such a one arises the knowledge that he is emancipated, and such a one comprehends that destroyed is the birth, brought to a close is the holy-life and that there is no more being such and so (*M.* I. p. 438). One so emancipated is described as one who has utterly destroyed all fetters of existence (*parikkhīṇabhava-saṃyojana, M.* I, pp. 4, 235).

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EMBRYO. See BIRTH, CONCEPTION and GANDHABBA.

EMERALD BUDDHA. According to the Pali text *Ratanabimbavaṃsa* the Emerald Buddha was made by a *deva* who afterwards presented the image to one of the arahants named venerable Nāgasena in Pāṭaliputra. Venerable Nāgasena is supposed to have miraculously got seven relics of the Buddha to reside in the statute. The image was in Pāṭliputra and subsequently removed to Ceylon, Cambodia and from this last-named country to Ayudhya, Lopburi, Kampaengpet and Chiengrai, respectively in Thailand. In order to conceal the precious statue, the governor of Chiengrai had the statue plastered, lacquered and gilded and then enshrined in a pagoda in that town.

The above story appears to be more or less a legend. Historically speaking, it is known that in 1434 A.C. a gilt image of the Buddha was found enshrined in a pagoda in Chiengrai which had been struck by lightning. Consequently the image was removed to a *vihāra*, but two or three months later the plaster on the nose of the image had flaked off revealing the emerald structure. The plaster covering was taken off and the fame of the image spread widely attracting many worshippers. At that time Chiengrai was under Chiengamai and the king of Chiengmai sent a procession to bring the image to his capital. The elephants carrying the sacred image, on their own accord, headed for Lampang. Here the statue remained for 32 years. King Tiloka who ruled over Chiengmai (1443–1487) succeeded in bringing the Eme-

rald Buddha from Lampang to Chiengmai in 1468, and there the image reposed for 84 years. In 1552 Jaijettha, king of Chiengmai, the son of the king of Lānchān and grandosn of the former king of Chiengmai, went back to rule at Luang Prabang (now in Laos), the capital of Lānchān, and brought the Emerald Buddha along with him. The statue on this occasion was kept in this city for 12 years. In 1564 the king of Burma who had become very powerful was having designs of foreign conquest, and king Jaijettha, in order to defend himself against the Burmese king, removed his capital to Vientiane (Laos). The Emerald Buddha was also transferred to the new capital where it was housed for 214 years.

In 1778 a war broke out between Thailand and Lānchān. At that time the capital of Thailand was at Dhonburi. Cao Pya Cakri, (afterwards king Rama I of Bangkok), the general of the King of Dhonburi, went to attack Lānchān. He captured Vientiane and brought back the Emerald Buddha and another image, Pra Bang, down to Dhonburi. After ascending the throne he founded Bangkok as his capital in 1782, and constructed the temple of the Emerald Buddha in the present precincts, namely, the Royal Palace, where he placed the precious image. It has remained there since 1784 in the royal shrine of Pra Keo or Sriratanasasadaram (more commonly called Chapel Royal), attached to the Grand Palace. He designed two seasonal costumes for the image, one for the summer and another for the rainy season. During the reign of King Rama III (1824–1851) a costume for the winter season was added. (See PL. VII).

According to R. Lingat, the French scholar who had made a careful study of the image, the material is not emerald but a kind of green stone found in the Nan region in northern Thailand (as well as in southern China). Probably it is chrysoprase, an apple-green variety of chalecedony. It was Monkut (Rama III), who, so to say, fixed the identity of the stone, for in declaration he held it to be jade and, therefore concluded that it came from China.

The image is held in the greatest veneration as it is regarded as the nation's palladium, much in the way that the Tooth Relic was held by the kings of Sri Lanka. As with the case of the Tooth Relic the Emerald Buddha too is in the personal custody of the king, particularly because it is also the tutalary spirit (so to say) of his own Cakri Dynasty. It is he who takes the leading part in the seasonal changing of the robes of the image.

The image has been fashioned out of a single block measuring 48.3 cm. by 60 cm. and in this about 2 ff. high. On the head is a painted golden crown; into the forehead a diamond has been set serving as the *ūrṇā*, the body is in a meditational posture. A pyramidal throne 10.4 m. high forms the base. Stylistically it is northern Thai, and chronologically it is one of the earliest (if not the very earliest) of Thai images. (PLS. VIII and IX)

On days of religious significance vast crowds of worshippers congregate to pay veneration to their palladium. This veneration is most marked on *uposatha* days when the precincts are opened to general public.

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Subhadradis Diskul

EMOTION The term 'emotion' is used in the English language to signify a wide variety of psychological characteristics which are attributed to human beings. It is one of the principal psychological terms of a generic nature. In Buddhist usage there is no generic concept which exactly corresponds to the concept of emotion. Buddhism has adopted its own mode of conceptualizing psychological phenomena giving rise to the difficulty of finding exact equivalents in European languages for the psychological terminology it uses. This is understandable because concept formation is closely associated with forms of life, world views and the cultural setting within which language is used.

Most psychologists believe that motives and emotions are very closely intertwined. The nature of the relation between motivation and emotion as well as the precise definition of emotion itself may be considered as an unresolved issue in psychology. In the opinion of most psychologists emotion is the term used to describe basic affective processes. Emotions are usually aroused by external stimuli, and emotions so aroused are expressed towards the stimuli in the environment that arouse them. According to Gilbert Ryle,who made a remarkable contribution to the Philosophy of Mind in the Western world, the term 'emotion' is used to designate a number of different kinds of mental activity such as inclinations or motives, moods, agitations and feelings.[1] Although Buddhism lacks a generic term corresponding to the term 'emotion', it deals extensively with the kinds of mental activity designated by that term.

1. *The Concept of Mind* (Penguin Books, 1963) p. 81.

The fundamental problem that Buddhism as a religious and philosophical system deals with is the problem of unsatisfactoriness (*dukkha*) as formulated in the Four Noble Truths presented in the first sermon of the Buddha. According to the Buddha, the problem of *dukkha* is closely connected with a person's level of understanding or cognition and the nature of the motivational and emotional structure of his personality. *Dukkha* is to be eliminated by the replacement of ignorance (*avijjā*) with wisdom (*paññā*) and transforming one's unwholesome motivational and emotional nature by the replacement of unwholesome motives and emotions (*akusalā dhammā*) with wholesome ones (*kusalā dhammā*). *Nibbāna*, the ultimate goal of Buddhism which is conceived as the destruction of unsatisfactoriness (*dukkhakkhaya*) is often defined as the eradication of greed, hatred and delusion (*lobhakkhayo, dosakkhayo, mohakkhayo*). According to the Buddhist analysis of human behaviour, greed (*lobha*) and hatred (*dosa*) resting on delusion (*moha*) are the two main motivational roots of unwholesome human behaviour (*akusala samācāra*). The Buddha teaches that liberation from the predicament of human misery is possible by a transformation at the level of understanding. A transformation at the level of understanding leads to a transformation at the level of motivation and emotion as well, changing the entire pattern of man's behavioural responses and feelings. In the techincal terminology adopted in Buddhism such transformation is described as *paññāvimutti* (liberation through wisdom) and *cetovimutti* (liberation of mind). The latter can be understood as the liberation consisting of a transformation in the emotional stucture of personality. Buddhism attempts to identify and classify numerous mental phenomena which are supposed to be by products of greed and hatred in its deep, penetrative and somewhat exhaustive analysis of the unwholesome emotions that create human misery. The Buddhist analysis is characterised by an intense practical and ethical interest and concern. For its attempt is to distinguish experientially, between the kinds of emotion that are desirable and those that are undesirable for man, and between kinds of emotion that are conducive to his well-being and happiness and those that are not. Such a distinction is made with a view to promoting the cultivation of the wholesome emotions (*kusalānaṃ Dhammānam bhāvanāya*) and the elimination of the unwholesome emotions (*akusalānaṃ dhammānaṃ pahānāya*). With a practical and ethical end in view, Buddhism presents extremely interesting and significant analyses of man's emotional constitution and despite the fact that they appear within the context of a doctrine of liberation which is generally associated with religious world views, they are of great psychological significance.

Instead of the generic term emotion, Buddhism uses the term *dhamma* to refer to mental phenomena in general, classifying them ethically as *kusala* or *akusala*. There are a number of Buddhist concepts that have an affinity to and connection with the concept of emotion although those concepts cannot be said to be exactly equivalent to what is signified by the term 'emotion'. There is in Buddhism an analysis of the origin of emotions, a detailed enumeration of wholesome as well as unwholesome emotions, a method of training and educating human emotions and an account of the nature and consequences of certain emotions. A significant question that has drawn the attention of contemporary philosophy of mind in the West has been whether emotions should be conceived according to the traditional theory of mind which affirms a dualism of mind and matter or whether such a dualism entirely misconstrues the logical character of our concept of emotion. Although Buddhism has shown no direct concern with such logical issues, there is much that is of philosophical interest implied by the references to emotoin in the Buddhist teachings.

In Buddhism the discussion of emotions usually occurs in moral contexts. Specific emotions are discussed under terms having a general psycho-ethical import. Among Buddhist terms that may be said to be related to the concept of emotion the term *āsava* is of special importance. As mentioned above, Buddhism shows an ethical bias in its classification and enumeration of emotions and this is clearly seen in its characterization of *āsava*. The term is translated into English as 'influxes' or 'intoxicants'. It does not, in the Buddhist usage, have a purely descriptive psychological meaning; an evaluative meaning is also built into the term. Therefore, when Buddhism refers to certain emotional traits as *āsava* the term not merely describes a certain psychological or emotional trait but also at the same time implies a certain evaluation. To attain sainthood or the perfection of character which Buddhism calls *arahatta* one has to eradicate the *āsava*. Accordingly the person who has attained perfection is called *khīṇāsavo*. The knowledge that leads to the attainment of liberation in Buddhism is called *āsavakkhayañāṇa*.

The Pali Nikāyas enumerate four *āsava*, namely, *kāmāsava* (those associated with sensuality), *bhavāsava* (those associated with rebecoming) *diṭṭhāsava* (those associated with speculative views or dogmatism) and *avijjāsava* (those associated with ignorance). It is appropriate to consider *āsava* under the Buddhist psychology of emotions as it is clearly indicated that they are mental phenomena which create feelings of anxiety, agitation and vexation (*vighāta parilāha*) to anyone affected by them. In the above enumeration *āsavā* are classified

in terms of their psychological roots of a cognitive and motivational character which give rise to the excitation of certain unwholesome human emotions.

The second concept connected with the Buddhist psychology of emotions is the concept of *anusaya*. The Pali Text Society Dictionary gives the meanings 'bent', 'bias', 'proclivity', 'the persistence of a dormant or latent disposition' and 'tendency' as the principal meanings of this term.[2] Describing people in terms of their psychological tendencies we often refer to them as being 'hateful', 'kindhearted' 'vain', 'lustful', 'conceited' and so on. According to Ryle, these are emotions in the sense that they are "motives by which people's higher level behaviour is explained".[3] However, as in the case of the term *āsava* the Buddhist term *anusaya* also designates certain general dispositional traits of the mind which are exclusively of an unwholesome nature. The *anusaya* are enumerated as those involving (1) attachment or lust (*rāgānusaya*), (2) repulsion or hatred (*paṭighānusaya*), (3) dogmatic views (diṭṭhānusaya), (4) doubt or perplexity (*vicikicchānusaya*), (5) conceit in terms of measuring oneself with such psychological complexes as equality, inferiority and superiority (*manānusaya*), (6) attachment to the round of becoming (*bhavarāgānusaya*) and delusion or ignorance (*avijjānusaya*).[4]

The psychological phenomena designated by the terms *āsava* and *anusaya* seem to overlap. The main difference between the two appears to be that the former emphasizes the arising of these emotional phenomena on the occasion of the excitation of the senses and the latter emphasizes their dispositional nature. *Āsava* are inevitably produced in the activity of sense-perception in an individual who has not become enlightened, while *anusaya* are deep-rooted tendencies or dispositional traits in terms of which people's character and emotional tendencies could be described. Thus *kāmasava* may be produced in a man at the sight of an attractive woman whereas someone may have *rāgānusaya* as a deep-rooted tendency or relatively permanent trait of his character. Thus the term *āsava* denotes the immediacy of the psychological responses to the sensory environment, whereas *anusaya* denotes the dispositional character of those responses. The Buddhist view is that all unenlightened individuals are not free from the afflictions of such *āsava* and *anusaya*. They are the unwholesome aspects of a human being's emotional constitution or nature which need to be transformed or overcome in order to become a worthy or noble person (*ariyapuggala*). As long as a person is subject to their afflictions it is not only the case that he cannot help being miserable, but also he cannot help making others around him miserable by his own unwholesome behaviour. In the *Madhupiṇḍika Sutta anusaya* is associated with all manner of conflict that arises at the societal level, such as quarrels, strife, debates, violence, and other moral evils.[5]

A third Buddhist concept which can be said to have some relation to the concept of emotion is the concept of *papañca*. *Papañca* is described in the psychology of Buddhism as a psychological response to the perceptual environment. It can be understood as a combined complex of a cognitive and emotional response to perceptual stimuli consequent upon the nature of the feelings experienced by the perceiver and his evaluation of those feelings with reference to the ego. According to the Pali commentarial tradition *papañca* is threefold as *taṇhāpapañca* (that which is characterised by craving), *diṭṭhipapañca* (that which is characterised by dogmatism) and *mānapapañca* (that which is characterised by conceit). Here too Buddhism deals with the interrelated dual aspects of unwholesome behaviour consisting of the cognitive and emotive constitution of personality. A person who is liberated is said to be free from *papañca*. To be overwhelmed by ideas of *papañca* is said to be the source of many conflicts in society.[6]

Buddhism pays very little attention to an analysis of the lower level or basic physiological motives such as hunger and thirst but focuses its attention intensely on the higher level motives and emotions of a characteristically psychological nature. It concerns itself deeply with such psychological concepts as *taṇhā* (craving), *abhijjhā* (intense greed), *vyāpāda* or *paṭigha* (malice or hatred) because they are related so closely to the Buddhist analysis of the origin of human suffering.

According to Buddhism, no special effort is needed on the part of the individual in order to effect the arising of the above mentioned baser or unwholesome emotions. They arise in a kind of a mechanical or instinctive manner. The baser or unwholesome emotional and motivational traits become strengthened by the constant repetition of patterns of behaviour which accompany their expression. On the one hand a behavioural change at the level of overt expression of a persons emotional nature becomes necessary in order to weaken or eliminate

2. Edited by T. W. Rhys Davids and William Stede (Luzac & Company Ltd., London (1959) p. 44.
3. *The Concept of Mind* p 82.
4. *M*. I, p. 105.
5. *M*. I, p. 110.
6. *M*. I, p. 110.

the unwholesome emotions. On the other hand as long as a person's motivational and emotional constitution is of an unwholesome nature his overt behavioural responses also tend to be unwholesome. Therefore, the predicament of the unenlightened person is one which is viciously circular. He behaves unskillfully because of the unwholesome nature of the emotional constitution of his personality, and those psychological dispositions become further strengthened by repeated unskillful behaviour. This vicious circle can be broken by the person who with great determination and effort treads the noble path consisting of *sīla*, *samādhi* and *paññā*. The development of *sīla* involves an attempt to transform consciously one's patterns of behaviour: the development of *samādhi* involves an attempt to attain mental composure preventing the excitation of unwholesome emotions creating a disturbed and unsettled state of mind, and the development of *paññā* involves an attempt to cultivate the understanding that cuts off all the unwholesome motives and emotions at their root. Wholesome motives and emotions are to be cultivated with great effort, for one is constantly faced with the danger of being overwhelmed by unwholesome emotions and lapsing into unskillful patterns of behaviour. Buddhism offers practical methods of training and educating human emotions in the form of techniques of mental development called *bhāvanā*. A liberated and enlightened person like the Buddha is referred to as one who has developed what ought to be abandoned (*bhāvetabbaṃ bhāvitam*) and abandoned what ought to be abandoned (*pahātabbaṃ...pahīnam*). This means, among other things that he has abandoned all emotional dispositions of an unwholesome nature and developed those of a wholesome nature.

The origin of all unskilled states (*akusalā dhammā*) is explained in Buddhism in terms of the principle of Dependent Origination (*paṭiccasamuppāda*). *Avijjā* (ignorance) and *taṇhā* (craving) are very crucial links in the twelve fold formula of Dependent Origination which is meant to explain the genesis of suffering. Ignorance and craving are said to have no known beginning (*pubbākoṭi na paññāyati*). This shows that suffering is a beginningless process resting on the interaction between two crucial conditions one of which is cognitive and the other emotive but both of which are closely interlinked. The problem, as Buddhism sees it, lies in the cognitive and emotive dispositions involved in man's suffering condition. The unskilled cognitive and emotive dispositions persist or disappear together. The solution to suffering consists in transforming one's cognitive and emotive constitution. According to the *Mūlapariyāya Sutta*, the problem is that ordinary beings are struck with the *saññā* mode of responding to the perceptual world.[7] It is this cognitive mode which gives rise to the emotive responses of attraction and repulsion. This has to be replaced by the *abhiññā* and *pariññā* modes of cognition which enables a person to respond to all the data of perceptual experience with equanimity.

Buddhism traces all unskilled emotional responses to the basic response of attraction towards pleasant sensory stimuli and repulsion towards unpleasant ones. The psychological process involved is analysed in a number of Suttas of the Pali canon. According to the *Mahātaṇhāsaṅkhaya Sutta*, a person whose sense faculties reach maturity, comes into contact with the external stimuli and becomes attached to those that are pleasant (*piyarūpe rūpe sārajjati*) and shows opposition or repulsion towards those that are unpleasant (*appiyarūpe rūpe byāpajjati*). This way of responding to sensory stimuli amounts to allowing the mechanical flow of unskilled responses unchecked by the exercise of mindfulness (*sati*) and wisdom (*paññā*). It is this process which determines the unwholesome aspect of the emotional life of a person leading to the undesirable consequence of clinging (*upādāna*) and rebecoming which bring in its train all the miseries of existence.[8] As shown in a number of contexts where the Buddha explains the psychological origins of *dukkha* in terms of the principle of *paṭiccasamuppāda* unwholesome emotions are a consequence of a confused response to perceptual experience. A standard formulation of this process in the Pali canon goes as follows:

> Depending on the eye and material form there arises visual consciousness. The coming together of the three is sense contact. Depending on sense contact there arises feeling. One recognizes that which one feels. What one recognizes, one reasons about. One gets obsessed with what one reasons about. As a consequence of this ideas of obsession relating to past, present and future objects of visual experience overwhelm him.[9]

This can be said to be an elaboration of the process which is elsewhere presented more succinctly as "feeling depends on sense contact (*phassa paccayā vedanā*) and craving depends on feeling (*vedanā paccayā taṇhā*). Unskilled emotional reactions are reactions to the agreeable or pleasurable feelings (*sukhā vedanā*) and the disagreeable or unpleasant feelings (*dukkhā vedanā*)

7. In this connection see P. D. Premasiri. "Early Buddhist Analysis of Varieties of Cognition", *Sri Lanka Journal of Buddhist Studies* (Buddhist and Pali University of Sri Lanka) Volume 1, 1987.

8. *M.* I. 266f.

9. *M.* I. 111f.

generated in sense perception. The pleasurable feelings induce an attachment to pleasant things (*rāga*), and the unpleasant feelings rouse anger or hatred (*paṭigha*). Emotions which are usually reckoned as unwholesome in Buddhism are different facets of this attraction towards or attachment to (*anurodha*) what is pleasant and withdrawal from or resistance against what is felt to be unpleasant (*virodha*) under the influence of ignorance or delusion (*moha/avijjā*) the main component of which is the dogmatic clinging to a belief in an ego (*attānudiṭṭhi*).[10]

Apart from the principal emotions *rāga* and *dosa* mentioned more frequently than others, Buddhist scriptures enumerate a number of other unwholesome emotions particularly in instances where the need for cleansing the mind of such emotions to attain happiness and tranquillity is emphasized. The *Vatthūpama Sutta* for instance, considers the mind to be similar to a cloth full of stains and dirt (*vatthaṃ saṅkiliṭṭhaṃ malaggahitaṃ*) when it is subject to certain unwholesome emotions. It is said that happiness or well-being cannot be expected by someone whose mind is subject to such emotions. The unwholesome emotions mentioned in this instance are: *abhijjhāvisamalobha* (intense and uncontrolled greed), *vyāpāda* (malice), *kodha* (anger), *upanāha* (enmity), *makkha* (ill feeling), *palāsa* (spite), *issā* (jealousy), *macchariya* (miserliness), *māyā* (deceit) *sāṭheyya* (treachery), *thambha* (obduracy), *sārambha* (impetuosity), *māna* (pride), *atimāna* (conceit), *mada* (intoxication) and *pamāda* (indolence). There are other emotions which do not fall within this enumeration such as *chanda* (desire or favour), *dosa* (hatred) and *bhaya* (fear) which are classed among the *agatigamana* that hinder a person from acting with a sense of justice and fairness. Some emotions can be interlocked in such a way that one could spring from another. Fear (*bhaya*), and grief (*soka*) for instance, are considered as emotions which are interlocked with other emotions like intense attachment or desire. Thus states of mind like *pema* (love in the sense of personal affections such as the affection to one's dear ones as distinguished from *mettā* which is of a more wholesome and spiritually more superior kind), could give rise to fear and grief. The joy and delight (*pīti*, *nandi*, *rati*) one experiences in relation to sensuous objects could result in deep states of depression when those objects are lost.

Buddhism also mentions certain emotions which could occur in typically moral situations and contexts. *Vippaṭisāra* (remorse) is an unwholesome emotion felt as a consequence of doing what one considers to be wrong. It is an emotion that has to be overcome in order to reach higher levels of mental culture. The perfection of *sīla* (moral practice) is considered to be conducive to the disappearance of remorse. The wholesomeness or unwholesomeness of some emotions depend on the nature of the objects that they are connected with. *Pīti* (joy), for instance, is a wholesome emotion when it is related to certain spiritual attainments but is unwholesome when it is derived from the hankering after material or sensuous things. *Saddhā* (faith) or confidence is a useful emotion when it is properly based, while it could be misleading when it is improperly based. It is counted among the spiritual faculties that the disciples of the Buddha are expected to cultivate. Rightly placed *Saddhā* could initiate a process of mental culture leading to gladness (*pāmojja*), joy (*pīti*), relaxation or calmness (*passaddhi*), ease (*sukha*) and finally mental composure (*samādhi*) which is an important stage in the elimination of unwholesome emotions.

Fear, as an emotion is considered to have a healthy effect when it is focussed on the consequences of doing wrong. Thus one may refrain from doing wrong due to the fear of numerous consequences such as the moral disapproval of others, the remorse one may have to suffer as a result of one's own conscience, possible retribution in an afterlife and so on. *Hiri* (a moral sense of shame to do what is immoral) and *ottappa* (a moral sense of fear or shrinking with disgust towards an act of immorality) are reckoned in Buddhism to be foremost among wholesome emotions. These two moral emotions are counted among the noble wealth (*ariya dhana*) that a Buddhist is expected to acquire.

The Buddhist approach to emotions is sometimes misunderstood as an attempt to achieve a state of emotional vacuity. This is evidently a consequence of misinterpreting some stages of mental culture in Buddhism. The attempt in Buddhism is not to dispense with all emotions but to get rid of those that are unwholesome and cultivate those that are wholesome. The disappearance of unwholesome motivational roots like greed (*lobha*) and hatred (*dosa*) leads to the establishment of the wholesome emotions like loving kindness (*mettā*), sympathy (*karuṇā*), sympathetic joy (*muditā*) and an equanimous state of mind characterised by emotional stability (*upekkhā*). These wholesome emotions are called the sublime abidings (*brahma vihāra*) in Buddhism and are strongly recommended for meditative cultivation. *Upekkhā*, as translated in some instances is not indifference or a psychological state of emotional vacuity, but a condition of emotional stability under which other wholesome emotions such as *mettā* could meaningfully co-exist.

10. For an illuminating discussion on this theme see Padmasiri de Silva, *An Introduction to Buddhist Psychology*, (The Macmillan Press Ltd. 1979) p. 424.

Buddhism explains unwholesome behaviour as an expression of unwholesome emotions. According to one mode of analysis *taṇhā* (craving) is at the root of all unwholesome behaviour. *Taṇhā* is threefold as *kāmataṇhā* (the craving for the enjoyment of sensuous pleasures) *bhavataṇhā* (the craving to become) and *vibhavataṇhā* (the craving for destruction or annihilation). It is these forms of craving that are designated elsewhere as the emotions of greed and hatred which find expression in forms of misconduct such as killing, violence, various forms of aggressive behaviour, stealing, unchastity and untruthful speech.[11] Buddhism pays special attention to the emotions of greed or lust (*lobha/rāga*) and hatred or anger (*dosa, kodha, paṭigha*) for they along with *moha* (delusion) are considered as the roots of all unwholesome states (*akusalamūla*). The emotions of greed and anger, for instance, are singled out in the Buddhist scriptures to show how good sense and rationality can completely be obliterated under their maddening influence. It is pointed out that a person who is under the sway of anger becomes ugly; he cannot sleep in comfort; his mind is constantly disturbed. When a person is overwhelmed by anger, he does not know what is right and wrong and is unable to understand even what is beneficial to himself. When anger becomes most intense one looses all sense of discrimination and does not hesitate to kill even his own kith and kin or in the end even himself.[12]

What is of paramount importance in the Buddha's teachings about emotions is its therapeutic aspect. The Buddha insists that we could with effort transform the emotional constitution of our personality. Such transformation is directly beneficial to the individual concerned and also has significant social consequences. Buddhism asserts in this connection the possibility of a triumph of moral effort, initiative and will over instinctive tendencies and the influences of the natural environment. A strict mechanistic determinism with regard to our emotional responses is rejected. Rational human beings have the capacity to redirect their emotions by deliberation and choice. The Buddha's teaching in this connection is incompatible with attempts to disregard the crucial importance of conscious experience in the life of man, and all attempts to reduce mental phenomena to purely mechanistic physical processes. However, early Buddhism does not commit itself either to the metaphysical doctrine of monism, whether it is monism of the materialist type or monism of the idealist type, or that of dualism. It leaves the question whether the mind is identical with the body (*taṃjīvaṃ taṃ sarīraṃ*) or mind and body are completely independent of 'each' other (*aññaṃ jīvaṃ aññaṃ sarīraṃ*) as undetermined questions (*avyākata*). For its concern is not a metaphysical one of a choice between monism and dualism, but the practical one of overcoming unsatisfactoriness (*dukkha*).

In accordance with this practical concern, the Buddha considers the mind to be of paramount importance in human activity. The mind is considered to be the forerunner of mental phenomena (*manopubbaṅgamā dhammā*). The world is said to be led and directed by the mind (*cittena nīyati loko*). This is not to be understood as an assertion of metaphysical idealism, but a statement of the experimential fact that in the sphere of human activity, the human mind plays a foremost role. Man's material environment too is recognized in Buddhism as a major factor in determining his psychological responses. But it insists that the ordinary perceptual process unchecked by the rational or reflective intervention of man produces undesirable consequences. Unwholesome emotions, as shown above are a consequence of this ordinary perceptual process. According to Buddhism an attempt to transform the emotional constitution of man purely through adjustments in his material environment is bound to fail, for in so far as such adjustments involve the participation of human beings, their inner mental constitution has an important determining effect upon them. This shows that the Buddha's teachings on motivation and emotion have a bearing even on theories of social transformation.

The therapeutic aspect of the Buddha's teachings on emotions imply a rejection of reductionist theories of mind which attempt to deny the significance of conscious experience and the inner mental life of man. While Buddhism does not fall in line with a strict metaphysical dualism of the Cartesian type, it cannot also fall in line with the opposite view of Gilbert Ryle which attempts to ignore altogether the importance of the mental origins of emotions and to analyse them entirely as mechanically determined material processes. Gilbert Ryle rejects the dualism of mind and matter calling it the 'dogma of the ghost in the machine' and takes great pains to refute the view that emotions are turbulences in the stream of consciousness to which only the owner of that stream can have privileged access. He argues that it is a logical error to conceive of emotions as not occurrences which take place in the public, physical world but in people's secret mental worlds.[13] Although the Buddhist analysis of emotion takes into

11. *A.* IV, p. 98 f.
13. *The Concept of Mind*, p. 81.

account part of what Ryle has to say about emotions. from the Buddhist point of view Ryle's account of emotions can itself be considered as an oversimplification.

This point may be further elucidated by considering an instance from the Buddhist scriptures where the emotion of anger is discussed. *Mahāniddesa*, a commentarial text which has gained canonical status in the Theravāda tradition due probably to the importance of the canonical suttas included in the *Suttanipāta* on which it comments, offers a detailed analysis of the emotion of anger. This analysis has an important bearing on the philosophy of mind. According to this analysis anger is a complex process consisting of both mental and physical elements. The initial stage of the process is conceived primarily as a mental and introspectively observable turbulent or disturbed state of the mind. There is a component of anger which becomes part of the experimential content peculiar to the person who is affected by the emotion, in addition to the overt bodily processes which are open to the observation of any external observer. This component of anger is described in the *Niddesa* as the mental displeasure (*anattamanatā cittassa*) directly and experientially felt at the initial stage of the process itself. Buddhism does not make the mistake of trying to identify a simple entity as what is meant by the term anger. Anger is a complex series of events which proceeds from the mind as its forerunner. The problem with Ryle's account is that he thinks it possible to leave out of account the role of the mind altogether and understand anger purely in terms of the mechanical series of observable physical events. The *Niddesa* says that at times anger manifests itself only as a disturbance or stirring of the mind (*atthi kañci kālaṃ kodho cittāvilakaraṇamatto hoti*). But it could manifest itself in more violent forms of physical behaviour such as the utterance of abusive words and the acquisition of harmful weapons to inflict injury on one's opponent. When anger develops to its highest intensity it involves even disregard for one's own life, for one would kill one's opponent as well as oneself (*Yato kodho parapuggalaṃ ghātetva attānaṃ ghāteti; ettāvatā kodho paramussādagato paramavepullappatto hoti*).[14]

According to Ryle when we explain actions in terms of motives and emotions it is a mistake to conceive of those motives and emotions as expressing categorical narratives of episodes.[15] According to him reference to motives and emotions should be construed as elliptical expressions of general hypothetical propositions of a certain sort. Ryle argues that emotions cannot be conceived as mental causes of physical events. To say that A Killed B because A was angry does not mean that A's anger was a mental cause of his physical act of killing B. Ryle argues that "to explain an act as done from a certain motive is not analogous to saying that the glass broke because a stone hit it, but to the quite different type of statement that the glass broke, when the stone hit it, because the glass was brittle."[16] Ryle's objective here is to show that emotions have no non-physical status. Being dispositional terms like "brittle" emotions are analyzable into the observable physical processes which are witnessable public events. However, Ryle's analogy cannot be said to do justice to emotion words. The actual manifestation of the brittleness of glass occurs only at the moment something hits it. This cannot be the case with the person who is prone to anger. The glass does not feel the disturbance of its brittleness when it is not being hit by a stone, nor does it harbour brittle thoughts, but the person prone to anger harbours countless angry thoughts even at moments when he has not resorted to any verbal or physical expression of his anger. This is a point that is made clearly in the *Niddesa* analysis. It makes it clear that prior to anger manifesting itself in overt behaviour quite a complex mental activity goes on in the conscious stream of the angry person. To ignore this crucial stage of anger is to leave out what is of utmost importance in the investigation of mental phenomena. Besides the theoretical error involved in the kind of reductionist approach that Ryle proposes, it also can have many undesirable practical consequences.

It needs to be emphasized that unlike theories of mind which attempt to offer reductionist and mechanistic accounts of the nature of mental activity, Buddhism pays a great deal of attention to the reflectively or introspectively observable flow of conscious experience in its treatment of psychological phenomena. From a practical point of view Buddhism considers man's ability to cultivate awareness of what goes on in his stream of conscious as a very important step in redirecting a person's emotions and attitudes. Very often people are not mindful of the arising of emotional experience. Part of the meditative training in Buddhism involves the development of mindfulness with regard to all mental as well as physical processes connected. with the activity of a person's psychophysical organism. Mindfulness helps to detect the arising of unwholesome emotions such as lust and anger at the initial point of their mental origin. Unwholesome emotions are com-

14 *Nd.* I, p. 215f.
15 *The Concept of Mind*, p. 83.
16 Ibid. p. 84.

parable to springs that have their source in the depths of the human mind. Their outflow can be prevented by exercising mindfulness (*yāni sotāni lokasmim, sati tesaṃ nivāraṇaṃ*). Insight meditation (*vipassanā bhāvanā*) in Buddhism is a method of observing the way in which emotions arise, stay and pass away at the level of conscious experience. Such watchfullness over the process of unwholesome emotions has the effect of preventing them from passing beyond the confines of the mind and manifesting themselves in overt behaviour. The path of liberation in Buddhism consisting of *sīla, samādhi and paññā* can be seen as one designed to deal with the manifestation of unwholesome emotions at different levels of human activity. *Paññā* destroys the cognitive basis on which unwholesome emotions spring and as a consequence unwholesome emotions are destroyed at the dispositional level itself. *Samādhi* prevents the excitation or the initial stirring of unwholesome emotions *Sīla* prevents the overt expression of unwholesome emotions in terms of verbal and physical behaviour.

The Buddhist treatment of emotion is selective and not exhaustive•For its concern with emotion is governed by an ethical and practical end in view. Buddhism does not pay attention to all the variety of motivational and emotional facets of life but deals selectively with those facets which are related to human happiness and suffering. But it can be said that even within the confines of this limited concern Buddhism has made a very significant contribution to psychology and the philosophy of mind.

P. D. Premasiri

EMPIRICISM. In modern Western philosophy, the term *empiricism* is generally used to designate philosophical schools that rely upon sensory experience as the primary source of human knowledge, and is often contrasted with *rationalism* which highlights the role of reason. However, because the term empiricism is derived from the Latin word *empiricus*, meaning "the experienced," there is also the tendency to extend the scope of empiricism by including under the category of experience those that are neither sensory nor founded upon the sensory, that is, experience that totally transcends sensory experiences. Sometimes, this latter is referred to as intuition, and is more popular with the spiritualist rather than with critical philosophers. Yet even among philosophers who call themselves empiricists, and who consider sensory experience as the primary source of knowledge, there is no concensus as to the nature of sense experience itself. Thus we have at least three versions of empiricism. The first is represented by the three British empiricists, John Locke, George Berkeley and David Hume. With minor variations, they all recognized the immediate impression as the real component in sense experience. Among them, the one who influenced the development of empiricism in the modern world is Hume. Hume assumed that the immediate sense impression as the primary source of knowledge is undiluted by either memories or by any ideas, the latter being merely vague copies of the immediate impressions. This was an essenatialist search for a pure percept, and it contributed toward the conception of a reality where relations are confined to ideas rather than to impressions. This led to extreme skepticism regarding ordinary human knowledge and understanding. The subsequent development known as logical empiricism is a combination of Lockean and Humean ideas. As may be pointed out later, logical empiricism came to a dead-end as a result of its attempt to formulate absolutely valid, logically consistent universal laws of nature to be confirmed by experience. There is yet another version of empiricism less popular among philosophers because it involves a thoroughgoing analysis of the psychology of experience rather than a pure philosophical analysis. It recognizes the complex psycho-physical mechanism involved in sensory experience and, without attempting to weed out psychological factors, provides a more holistic description of experience. According to the conception of reality generated by this form of empiricism, the events as well as their relations are part and parcel of human experience. However, it refrains from interpreting these relations as instances of absolutely incorruptible laws. To distinguish this from the previous version it is called *radical empiricism*, and its strongest advocate in the modern world was the American pragmatist, Willam James.

Thus, allowing for the most generous definition of empiricism, we are left with four versions:

(1) the transcendentalist version that takes veridical experience to be beyond all sensory awareness,

(2) the essentialist version that restricts experience to the immediate sense impressions,

(3) logical empiricism, with its emphasis on logically consistent theories seeking conformation from experience, and

(4) radical empiricism which admits both perceptual and conceptual elements as inalienable parts of experience.

Recent studies in Buddhist thought has provided sufficient evidence to indicate that the philosophical standpoint adopted by its founder, Siddhārtha Gautama,

was a form of empiricism.[1] Yet it cannot be denied that Buddhism, during the last two and half millenia, did not remain one single philosophical system. It is as complex and veriegated as any other philosophical tradition, Eastern or Western. Since its formulation by the Buddha in the sixth century B.C. a variety of philosophical standpoints comparable to those that are available in the Western world have been advocated by philosophers all of whom claimed themselves to be faithful followers of the Buddha. Thus, in the vast canonical and non-canonical literature belonging to the so-called Theravāda and Mahāyāna, one can perceive a rich variety of philosophical standpoints that renders the search for homogeneity meaningless. At the same time, Buddhism cannot be satisfactorily explained as a gradual growth and development from rudimentary beginnings to sophisticated systems. On the contrary, there is clear evidence that the system formulated by the Buddha was complete in itself, and that the subsequent philosophers were either deviating from it or attempting to resurrect it. What is most interesting is that the Buddha himself started with a radical empiricist approach, and was followed by the main line of thinkers like Moggaliputta-tissa, Nāgārjuna, Vasubandhu and Dignāga, all of whom remained faithful to the Buddha, while schools like the Sautrāntikas followed the essentialist version of empiricism and text like the *Lankāvatāra Sutra* retained the transcendentalist empirical stance.

Emerging as a revolutionary against the absolutist, substantialist and essentialist thinking prevalent in India during the sixth century B.C., the Buddha resorted to a detailed psychological analysis of human knowledge and understanding, the first of its kind in history, in order to demonstrate the futility of any search for absolutes, substances or essences. That psychological enterprise also led him to renounce two other pursuits which have been rather popular with most philosophers, namely, the search for absolute certainty with regard to human knowledge as well as for knowledge totally free from error. Realizing that these latter tendencies are corollaries of a Platonian epistemology, namely, knowledge of things "as they are," the Buddha focussed upon the knowledge of things "as they have come to be" (*yathābhūta*).[2] For him, this represented the highest knowledge, a form of knowledge that led him to the realization of the four Noble Truths (*ariya sacca*).[3]

To know things as they have come to be is to perceive them in relation to the observable causes and conditions. Such perception would naturally involve consciousness or awareness not merely of the immediate sensory impressions, but also of the background. It is the knowledge of this background that is accounted by for the "stream of consciousness" (*viññāṇasota*).[4] Without such a stream of consciousness, mindfulness (*sati*) or reflective awareness (*anupassanā*) is not possible. Indeed, the latter represents the "royal road" to enlightenment and freedom.[5] This is the foundation of his radical empiricism

The general response to the above form of radical empiricism from a realist or one who is committed to objectivism is that this is another version of idealism. But the defenders of radical empiricism, the Buddha as well as William James, did not allow room for such criticism. The dichotomous or polar philosophical standpoints such as materialism and idealism, or realism and idealism are the inevitable consequences of a philosophy of language adopted by the essentialist empiricists, for whom each abstract idea with a name to it makes a distinct species.[6] Thus, mind and matter, mental and physical constitute distinct nominal essences. Unfortunately, this empiricist philosophy is not much different from the rationalism of Descartes which it was supposed to dethrone. The sharp dichotomies like mind and matter which, for the rationalist, constituted substances, are now being replaced by nominal essences. The rationalist problem in the sphere of metaphysics now becomes the empiricist problem in the area of linguistic philosophy. The prevalence of such extreme schools of thought like materialism, physicalism as well as behaviorism in the modern world is now being attributed to this philosophy of language logic (see below).

The Buddha's radical non-substantialism (*anatta-vāda*) as well as the "middle path" (*majjhimā-paṭipadā*) he adopted in the explanation of human experience and conception prevented him from conceiving of sharp dichotomies or bi-polar opposites. For him there was no mind-body problem because he did not define mind as non-material or matter as non-mental. That definition was to appear in the Buddhist tradition with the emergence of realist metaphysicians like the Sarvāstivādins or the essentialist empiricists like the Sautrāntikas.

1. See K. N. Jayatilleke, *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*, London: Allen & Unwin, 1963, which represents the first detailed treatment of the subject. See also David J. Kalupahana, *Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1975, and *Nāgārjuna: The Philosophy of the Middle Way*, Albany: The State University of New York Press, 1986.
2. S II p. 17; V. pp. 422 423, etc.
3. Ibid., V. pp. 422-423.
4. D III p. 105.
5. D. II p. 290 ff.; M. I. p. 55 ff.
6. See John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, 1690, book III, chapter vi, section 38.

For the Buddha, consciousness (*viññāṇa*) is an integral part of the human person. It is not an entity, separable from the body, but a function.[7] While its occurrence in a human body is a necessary condition for that human body to be considered a human person,[8] it is also the most important part of that human person. Thus, along with the dispositions (*saṅkhāra*), which accounts for the individuation of the person, consciousness functions as the means of maintaining the continuity in experience.[9]

How this radical empiricism of the Buddha avoids the bi-polar oppositions such as realism and idealism, essentialism and nominalism, or subjectivism and objectivism is further illustrated by the manner in which he explained the process of sense experience. In a rather significant and oft-quoted discourse called *Madhupiṇṇika Sutta*,[10] the Buddha drew a causal connection between peaceful living (that is, avoidance of conflict, *na viggayha tiṭṭhati*) and one's attitude toward perception, namely, not allowing perception to overwhelm oneself (*saññā nānusenti*).[11] Questioned further, the Buddha explined:

> Where obsessions (*papañca*) relating to perception (*saññā*) and conception (*saṅkhā*) overwhelm a person, if there were to be nothing that one should be delighting in, extolling and committing oneself to, that itself is the end of a variety of tendencies such as lust, hatred, dogmatic view, perplexity, pride, lust for existence, ignorance and that itself is the end of meting out punishment, taking up arms, quarrel, conflict, debate, strife, slander and falsehood. Herein, such evil and unwholesome things cease without remainder.[12]

The above passage clarifies the Buddha's view that perception and conception are not in themselves reasons for the unfortunate conflicts in the world. On the contrary, it is the manner in which perception and conception are understood and treated that generates such conflict. When the Buddha left the congregation after making the above remarks, the monks were still not clear as to what he meant. It is at this point, the great expositor, Mahākaccāyana, comes to their rescue by analysing in greater detail the very process of perception and conception and showing how it leads to obsessions. This explanation was subsequently approved by the Buddha. It is from the statement of Kaccāyana that one can obtain a clear understanding of how the radical empiricism of the Buddha can avoid the criticism of being an idealism. Kaccāyana's exposition reads as follows:

> Depending upon eye and visible form arises visual consciousness. Concomittance of these three is contact. Depending upon contact arises feeling. What one feels, one perceives; what one perceives, one reflects about; what one reflects about, depending upon that. obsessed perceptions and conceptions overwhelms a person in regard to visible objects, past, future and present.[13]

Kaccāyana's description avoids both realism and idealism, since it does not begin either with the object of knowledge as something impinging upon the sense organ and, through that, impressing upon a *passive* consciousness (a view favoured by the essentialist empiricists) or with consciousness creating its own awareness of the object which is, therefore, deprived of genuine objectivity (a theory sponsored by the idealists). It privileges neither the object nor consciousness. Instead, it focusses upon the sense organ itself which serves the primary role of linking up the object with consciousness. This emphasis upon the sense faculty is a recognition of the centrality of sense experience in human knowledge and understanding.

A further objection may be raised at this point. If consciousness is said to arise depending upon the eye and the visible object, it would mean that consciousness is a by-product of the physical or the material. The Buddha would then be advocating some form of epiphenomenalism. However, placed in the context of other statements regarding the nature of consciousness, especially those relating to the stream of consciousness as an integral part of the human person, a consciousness that come to be located in the human person at the time of his conception, again conditioned by various factors, the present statement could only mean that this stream of consciousness is continually conditioned by the sense organ and the object of experience. The close relationship between disposition and consciousness (*saṅkhāra-*

7. *M.* I. p. 292, *Vijānāti vijānātiti āvuso viññāṇan ti vuccati.* See also James, *Essays in Radical Empiricism*, ed. Burkhardt, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1976, p. 4, "Let me then immediately explain that I mean only to deny that the word (consciousness) stands for an entity, but to insist most emphatically that it stands for a function."
8. *D.* I. p. 76; II. pp. 62–63.
9. See *A.* II. p. 79 where *saṅkhāra* and *viññāṇa* are together referred to as *bhava*, a term used to explain "*becoming*" implying human existence.
10. *M.* I. pp. 108–114.
11. Ibid., I. p. 108.
12. Ibid., I. pp. 109–110.
13. Ibid., I. pp. 111–112.

..accayā viññāṇaṃ)[14] is also very significant. Consciousness, which is not competent to deal with the myriad of sense data presented to it, is said to select its material on the basis of interest or disposition. In other words, radical empiricism is inextricably bound up with pragmatism. Epistemologically, it is not that the object is created according to one's interests. Instead, human interest plays a significant role in perceiving and conceiving of an object that is presented to consciousness.

However, such interest or rudimentary dispositional tendencies can grow into monstrous proportions at the time when sense perceptions occur, especially at the stage of feeling involving the emotive aspects of human ..e, thereby creating an ego out of the subject of experience. The change in the linguistic formulation of this process of experience from one of dependence to an active one, as implied in the statement of Kaccayana: "What one feels, one perceives" (*yaṃ vedeti, tam sañjā-..ti*) is intended as a warning that what follows as perception and conception of the object can be the cause of obsession (*papañca*) with regard to objectivity. Once the cause of that obsession, namely, the ego is eliminated ..th perception and conception can function without generating unwholesome tendencies (*akusalā dhammā*) ..ch as lust (*rāga*) and hatred (*dosa*) toward the very object of perception and conception.

As pointed out earlier, the inspiration for the analysis of experience in the *Madhupiṇḍika Sutta* is not a theoretical interest, but rather a practical human concern, namely, the avoidance of conflict (*viggha*). It focusses ..on sense experience (*saññā*) and conception (*saṅkhā*) suggesting that conflict is the result of obsession (*papañ-..*) rather than of sense experience and conception themselves. Conflict is avoided by a proper understand-.. and a healthy attitude towards sense experience and conception. In the *Araṇavibhaṅga Sutta*, a similar understanding of and attitude towards language is pro-..ed as another way of preventing conflict (*raṇa*).[15]

Remaining faithful to this radical empiricism, the Buddha explained experience, conception and language ..eing dependently arisen (*paṭiccasamuppanna*). A ..ception of a dependently arisen phenomenon in-..es both the phenomenon, thing or event experienced .. conceived as well as its relations. Thus, on the basis ..the experience and conception of such dependently ..sen phenomena, the Buddha was able to formulate a universal principle, the principle of dependent arising (*paṭiccasamuppāda*),[16] without making it an absolute law. It is a principle of pragmatic value that enables human beings to deal with the unknown future.

It would be interesting to examine the reasons why the Buddha came to formulate a radical empiricism instead of any other form of empiricism, especially in view of the popularity of the other versions in the East as well as in the West. In fact, the Buddha can be considered the first radical empiricist and pragmatist in the world.

We have already indicated that radical empiricism was the Buddha's solution to the problem of human conflict. It is appropriately called the "middle path" (*majjhimā-paṭipadā*) that avoids the extremes in almost every sphere of philosophical speculation, in epistemology and metaphysics,[17] in normal philosophy or ethics[18] as well as in linguistic philosophy.[19] Does this mean that the other versions of empiricism are extremes and are, therefore, liable to lead to conflict of some sort?

We may begin such an inquiry with the first of the empiricist philosophies listed at the beginning of this article, namely, that which recognizes an experience transcending sense experience. Let us assume that such an experience is possible. The traditions that recognized such experiences almost always argued that it can be verified by a select few who are completely dedicated to the development of a special faculty or faculties not within the reach of the vast majority of human beings, even the most intelligent (*viññu*). In some cases, it is not even one that can be developed, but one that a person comes to be endowed with often through some external power. The vast majority of human beings, including the intelligent and the wise ones, will have to accept the existence of such experiences primarily on the basis of *faith*. The Brahmanical notions of *ātman* or the ultimately real relating to all phenomena, subjective or objective and *brahman* or the ultimately real pertaining to all moral life can be counted as examples from the early Indian tradition, while a similar moral ultimate appears in the speculations of a more recent philosopher from the Western world, Immanual Kant,[20] not to speak of the classical version in Plato. The attempt to explain everything on the basis of a sense-transcending experience was known to the Buddha, and was rejected by him. This is the content of the brief but extremely

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.. II p. 17, etc.

.. III p. 230 ff.

.. II p. 25

.. ..*nagotta Sutta*, *S*. II. p. 17.

..*akkappavattana Sutta* or *Tathāgatena vuttā*, *S*. V. p. 420 ff.

..*bhaṅga Sutta*, *M*. III. p. 230 ff.

See Hilary Ptnam, *The Many Faces of Realism*, LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court, 1987, pp. 41 ff.

important "Discourse on Everything" (*Sabba Sutta*).[21] If 'everything' (*sabbam*) meant everything in a literal sense, which has to include the things of the future as well, or the essence of everything in a metaphysical sense, the Buddha will have nothing to do with it. For him 'everything' meant eye and visible form, ear and sound, nose and smell, tongue and taste, body and tangible as well as mind and concepts. If someone were to insist that there is something other than what is available to the six senses and which constitutes 'everything', the Buddha argues that he may have a topic to talk about (*vacā vatthu*), but when questioned he will not be able to provide a satisfactory answer, and therefore will be greatly offended (*uttarim ca vighātam āpajjeyya*). The reason for this being that it is beyond the sphere of experience (*avisaya*).

Here the Buddha is not denying that one who claims to have a sense-transcending experience actually does not have such experience. On the contrary, he is arguing that if one were to make any statement about it, which is necessary for communicating such an experience to others, then one ought to depend upon the six sense faculties and their objects because language is invariably associated with these senses and the objects. If an experience cannot be communicated, then there certainly cannot be agreement as to what that experience is. It can be anything, and this would result in meaningless conflicts. The Buddha is here taking a rather strong position regarding experiences that are supposed to be incommunicable. It seems that for the Buddha an incommunicable experience is no experience in the sense that is really "no object," which is the literal meaning of the term *a-visaya*. So much for experience that is said to transcend sense experience and linguistic description.

More problematic are the other two versions of empiricism. The Humean version which asserts the reality of the immediate sense impression undiluted by any memories and conceptualizations would be too metaphysical according to the Buddha's understanding of experience. Indeed, taking the three most important elements relating to sense experience, namely, feeling or sensation (*vedanā*), perception (*saññā*) and consciousness (*viññāṇa*), the Buddha assigns different functions to them, but refuses to make absolute distinctions. According to Sāriputta, one of the chief disciples of the Buddha, "whatever one feels, that one perceives, whatever one perceives that one is conscious of. Therefore, these *dhammas* are associated, not dissociated. It is not possible to indicate their distinction by repeatedly analysing them."[22] Analysis has always been a useful tool in the clarification of meaning of ideas, concepts or even statements. The Buddha readily accepted the importance of analysis and utilized it as a means of avoiding metaphysical assumptions.[23] Hence he came to be called a *vibhajjavādin* ("an analytical philosopher").[24] However, when the analysis is repeatedly applied in the hope of reaching the ultimate constituents, the analytical process can generate conceptions of distinct entities with no relations to one another. Humean empiricism in the world recognized such atomic experiences and, therefore, was left with a world-view that is appropriately characterized as a "sand-heap world."[25] In the later Buddhist tradition, the Sautrāntikas proposed a world-view which is comparable to Hume's in every detail. The statement of Sāriputta quoted above should have been a warning to the Sautrāntikas against resorting to such an analysis. Indeed all the problems that the essentialist Buddhists like the Sautrāntikas faced when explaining the principle of dependent arising (*pratītyasamutpāda*) are the consequences of abandoning the Buddha's radical empiricism and adopting the essentialist version.

A statement in the same discourse that wisdom (*paññā*) and consciousness (*viññāṇa*) cannot be discriminated in any absolute way,[26] should prevent anyone from asserting that the highest form of knowledge recognized by the Buddha transcends sense experience and, therefore, linguistic expression.

The third form of empiricism, namely, logical empiricism, gained prominence in the Western world during the early part of the twentieth century, especially among philosophers who were trying to provide a theoretical foundation for science which was making enormous strides, especially in the areas of physics and astronomy. The accuracy with which the scientists were making predictions regarding the behaviour of phenomena triggered a research program by the logical empiricists directed at discovering the means by which universally valid laws could be formulated in philosophical language.

21. *S* IV, p. 15.
22. *M*. I, p. 293, *Yam h' āvuso vedeti, tam sañjānāti, yam sañjānāti tam vijānāti, tasmā ime dhamma samsaṭṭhā no visamsaṭṭhā, na ca labbhā imesam dhammānam vinibbhujitvā vinibbhujitvā nānākaraṇam paññapetum*. Note the repetition of the term *vinibbhujitvā* which emphasises repeated analysis.
23. *D* III, p. 229; *A* II, p. 46.
24. *Mahāvamsa* V, p. 271; *Tikapaṭṭhāna*, p. 366; *VbhA*. p. 130.
25. James, *The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy*, ed. Burkhardt, Cambridge, Massachussets: Harvard University Press, 1979, pp. 60–61.
26. *M*. I, pp. 292–293.

Abandoning the use of ordinary language, they developed a more precise technical language, the language of symbolic logic. The basic assumption on the part of those who formulated this language seems to be that human knowledge consists of knowledge of things or events and knowledge of the relations between such events.[27] Even though the things or events may change, the relations themselves are constant. Once the relationship is captured, it would be possible to formulate it in technical language which can then be applied on a universal scale. To take a popular example: "A swan is white" can be formulated as Pa . Qa where P = swan, Q = white and a = the relationship between the two. Focussing upon the relation which is supposed to be constant, and separating it from the things related, its universalization is expressed as

$$(X)(PX \supset QX)$$

However, the future not being a great consolation to the empiricist, the discovery of one black swan would violate this universal principle. The only way the logical empiricist can strengthen the validity of the above universal proposition is by supplementing it with a contraposed negative:

$$(X)(\sim QX \supset \sim PX).$$

This latter would mean that the earlier positive assertion ... about all of space-time. The negative formulation adds no new information, but simply states that at no place and at no time will we ever encounter an object which is both non-white and a swan.[28] All that the logical empiricist has achieved in this instance is the manipulation of a concept, that is, providing a definition of the term swan in such a way that it can never be associated with anything other than white. To speak of a non-white swan would be a contradiction in terms. Thus, through the process of *exclusion* the logical empiricist has established the meaning of the term "swan" once and for all. This is the logical way of arriving at the nominal essences, and which, as mentioned earlier, was recognized by Locke on the basis of an analysis of general terms. The Buddhist logician Dharmakīrti, moving away from the position of Dignāga who remained faithful to the radical empiricism of the Buddha,[29] proposed such a conception of general terms.[30]

Such a fixing of concepts, though intellectually satisfying, may not produce the desired result, namely, the safeguarding of truth, if truth is what is known on the basis of experience. It is this fixing of concepts as "this alone is true, everything else is false" (*idam eva saccam mogham aññam*) that the Buddha rejected because he perceived it as a potent cause of conflict (*raṇa*). The following passage from the Buddha's discourse on peace (*araṇa*) will illustrate his attitude.

> When it is said, "one should not strictly adhere to the dialect of a country and one should not transgress common parlance," in reference to what is it said? What, monks, is strict adherence to the dialect of a country and what is transgression of common parlance? Herein, monks, this itself (*tad eva*, probably referring to the bowl that he was carrying at the time) is recognized in different countries as *pāti*, ... as *patta*, ... as *vittha*, ... as *sarāva*, ... as *dhāropa*, ... as *poṇa*, ... as *pisila*, [these being dialectical variants for the word "bowl", a utensil used for various purposes which functions are highlighted by the different terms]. When they recognized it as such and such in different countries, a person utilizes this convention obstinately clinging to it and adhering to it [saying]: "This alone is true, everything else is false." Thus, monks, is strict adherence to the dialect of a country and transgression of common parlance. What, monks, is the strict non-adherence to the dialect of a country and the non-transgression of common parlance? In this case, monks, this itself is recognized in different countries as *pāti*, ... as *patta*, ... as *vittha*, ... as *sarāva*, ... as *dhāropa*, ... as *poṇa*, ... as *pisila*. Thus they recognize it as such and such in different countries. "These venerable ones utilize it for this purpose," and thus saying he utilizes it without grasping. And thus, monks, is strict non-adherence to the dialect of a country and the non-transgression of common parlance."

To sum up: Radical empiricism does not constitute another theory or view (*diṭṭhi*) inviting any form of commitment (*abhinivesa*) as one that is logically or ontologically true, but only a means of overcoming such commitment by highliting the impermanent and non-

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See Bertrand Russell, *Logic and Knowledge*, ed. Robert C. Marsh, New York: Capricorn Books, 1968, p. 107.

See the criticism of logical empiricism in, Harold I. Brown's *Perception, Theory and Commitment. The New Philosophy of Science*, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1979, pp. 26–28.

See David J. Kalupahana, Review of Radhika Herzberger's *Bhartrhari and the Buddhists. An essay in the development of fifth and sixth century Indian thought* (1986), in *History and Philosophy of Logic*, 9 (1988), 225–232. pp.

See Dharmakīrti's *Nyāyabindu*, ed. F. E. Shcherbatskoi, Osnabruck: Biblio Verlag 1970; also F. Th. Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic*, 2 Vols., New York: Dover Publications.

M III. pp. 234–235.

absolute nature of experience and the provisional and pragmatic value of conception. It is a means to enlightenment, freedom and peace.

David J. Kalupahana

EMPLOYMENT. The task of Buddhism is to help man to bring about a total revolution within and change himself, for his own good as well as for the good of others, from what he is to what he ought to be. According to the Buddha's teaching the Noble Eightfold Path is the way to achieve this goal (See AṬṬHAṄGIKA-MAGGA). Leading a morally good life is a *sine qua non* in this path. Buddhism teaches that ethical purity in life conduces to generate the necessary background for mental culture (*samādhi*) and penetrative insight (*paññā*). Since a major part of one's day to day life is taken up by the employment in which one is engaged, it has a significant bearing upon one's ethical development. This is precisely why the Noble Eightfold Path assigns employment or perfect livelihood (*sammā-ājīva* as referred to therein) an important place in its graduated scheme towards the envisaged goal.

It is very clear that ethical perfection advocated by Buddhism has not only a personal but also a social dimension. Therefore, the general criterion employed to differentiate good (*kusala*) from evil or bad (*akusala*), which has wide social implications, is also adopted to differentiate between good (*sammā*, right, perfect) and bad (*micchā*) mode of living (*ājīva*). Famous suttas such as the *Ambalaṭṭhikā Rāhulovāda* (*M.* I, p. 451 ff.) *Bāhitika* (*M.* II, pp. 114 ff.) and *Kālāma* (*A.* I, pp. 180 ff.) clearly enunciate what this criterion is. The basic considerations involved in this criterion are whether what one does leads to harmful consequences to oneself, to others or to both oneself and others.

The significance attached to *sammā-ājīva* is such that even monks are strongly advised to strictly adhere to the practice of the right mode of livelihood; besides, purity of livelihood (*ājīva-pārisuddhi*) is considered a primary requisite of monkhood (see ĀJĪVA for details on this aspect).

Adopting the above criterion of differentiating good types of employment from bad ones, Buddhism admonishes the devoted Buddhist lay-followers (*upāsaka*) not to engage in the following five types of trade (1) trade in armaments (*sattha-vāṇijja*), (2) trade in slaves (*satta-vāṇijja*), (3, 4&5) trade in meat (*māṃsa*), intoxicants (*majja*) and poison (*visa*: *A.* III, p. 208). This admonition covers only certain types of trade, and certainly trade was not the sole form of employment practised in Buddhist India. Therefore, there is no doubt that this list of prohibitions is not exhaustive. Slaughtering of animals, fishing, soldiering, and those professions that involves deceit, treachery, sooth-saying, trickery, usury etc. are said to be included in this list of prohibited kinds of employment (see *BD.* s.v. MAGGA). The limitation of this list of prohibitions is also proved by the textual definition of 'wrong mode of livelihood (*micchā-ājīva*). Wrong mode of livelihood is defined as any form of livelihood that involves 'desire of adding gain to gain by resorting to trickery, fraud and hypocritical talk' (*M.* III, p. 75). This definition gives an idea of the wide range of forms of employment and their mode of operation that would come within the parameters of wrong livelihood. From this, one could justifiably deduce that according to Buddhism any form of employment that brings about harmful consequences on onself and/or on others is categorized as wrong (*micchā*).

To understand the relevance of the Buddha's teaching on employment it is necessary to have a clear understanding of the social and political changes that have been affecting North India from a couple of centuries prior to the time of the Buddha. Even a casual perusal of the history of the region during this period reveals that drastic political changes were taking place in this region. Four powerful kingdoms were coming into prominence expanding their domains by annexing minor kingdoms and aristocratic confederacies. As an inevitable consequence of these political changes social and economic conditions too were undergoing rapid transition. Rural societies, in which agriculture and cattle-breeding happened to be the most important forms of employment, were getting transformed into more urbanized societies, consequently bringing a multiplication in the types of employment. In the economic sphere the barter system was fast going into desuetude, and instead the use of money was fast gaining ground. In this social and economic background trade gained much importance. The flourishing of trade gave rise to the spread of numerous arts and crafts producing saleable products. When a fair section of the population moved into the fields of arts and crafts those who remained in the sphere of agriculture, cattle-breeding and such food-producing forms of employment had to increase their production to feed those who were engaged in other profession and to increase production, farmers needed more and more better utensils. Accordingly, in this new economy all types of employment became almost interdependent.

These changes in the economic sphere brought into being an opulent class of wealthy land-owning farmers, prosperous cattle-breeders and rich merchants. These changes brought about also drastic changes in life-styles and social values. The needs and values of the opulent classes were different from those of the old

traditional rural farmers, cattle-breeders and petty-traders. These well-to-do people were able to afford luxuries, grand comforts and personal services. These changes in life-patterns and social values not only helped the expansion of already existing forms of employment, but also opened up opportunities for new types of employment. Thus one beigns to hear more frequently about reed-workers (*nala-kāra*), potters (*kumbha-kāra*), chariot-makers (*ratha-kāra*), gold and metal smiths (*suvaṇṇa-kāra, kammāra*), weavers (*pesa-kāra*), etc. These workers had to increase their rate of production to meet the new demand.

Constant reference is also made to those who were offering personal services. Thus the services of washerman (*rajaka*), barber (*nahāpita, kappaka, kasāvaṭa*), cook (*alārika, sūda*), garland-maker (*mālā-kāra*) seem to have had a great demand among the affluent sections of society.

It is also seen that the rise of great kingdoms, and the constant wars that prevailed necessitated the maintenence of large, permanent armies and a steady supply of arms. Thus military service and production of arms became two forms of permanent employment. The complicated administrative system opened up the way for a host of new administrative positions. Soldiers or policemen (*rāja-bhaṭa, rāja-purisa*), jail-gurds (*bandhanāgārika*), village-headmen (*gāmaṇi*) village-overseers (*gāmika*), batmen (*khatta*), park-keepers (*ārāmika*) were just a few of these new forms of employment.

The old, traditional professions in the field of medicine and surgery (*vejja, bhesajja, sallakatta*) acquired special significance in this new set-up. So are accountancy (*gaṇana, mudda*) and secretarial (*lekha*) services which were not of much importance in the rural economy.

In this new opulent society various forms of entertainment became a necessary feature and, therefore, a class of professional entertainers, too, came into being.

It is apparent that, as time went on, these numerous types of employment became an integral part of the society on which depended its smooth functioning. Therefore, it became necessary to sustain these numerous kinds of employment. The brahmins who were the law-makers cleverly exploited this situation to further safeguard their own supremacy in the society by averting the overt threats to their position from the powerful warrior (*kṣatriya*) and the up and comming monied merchant (*vaiśya*) classes. To achieve this objective they supported a social philosophy which they claimed to be a divine decree. This social philosophy upheld that the society is a divine creation with a class or caste (q.v.) division, with each caste being assigned with particular functions which they labelled as *svadharma* - one's own duty or employment. *Svadharma* being a divine decree was declared inviolable and, hence, employment became hereditary. And besides, in this assignment of duties to different classes the brahmins took special care to assign what they considered menial employments to the members of those down-trodden classes which the brahmins themselves had classified as belonging to the lower rungs of the social ladder. Thus came into being a relation between social status and employment, the latter indicative of the former.

This does not, however, mean that this social theory did not have any beneficial effect on employment. Once various types of employment became hereditary it induced those who were engaged in them to organize themselves into corporate bodies and guilds. Such organizations not only helped them to increese their efficiency and skills, but also helped them to safeguard their interests and rights. As there was a keen market competition. all types of employment demanded a high level of proficiency and skill which the guilds helped to provide. Not only those who were engaged in production of goods but also those who were engaged in providing personal services (i.e. cooks, barbers etc.) had to master their profession if they were to survive in the competetive labour-market. Thus all those who sought employment had to undergo an apprentice period under skilful masters (*dakkha, dakṣa*) who made the apprentices (*antevāsi*) go through the mill. This helped not only to produce skilled craftmen and workers but also high quality products. Constant references to high-quality silks and sandal-wood products of Benares is evidence to this.

By 6th century B.C., that is by the time of the Buddha, the above mentioned system of employment had become still more complex. In such a multifaceted and multiflex system of employment, along with exemplary features, discrepencies, deficiencies, shortcomings, malpractices and such other malefic features affecting the employer, employee, the consumer and in general the society as a whole were bound to occur. The Buddha's intervention was to prevent these malefic features in the system and give proper guidance ad direction to both employers and employees so that they as well as the society at large, too, would get benefited.

With his utilitarion and pragmatic approach the Buddha tried to straighten out numerous conflicts and anomalies that prevailed in the field of employment. For this purpose he primarily applied his social philosophy based on the concept of universal good and oneness of mankind. For example the Buddha rejected with reason the brahmanic teaching which presented the society as a divine creation with its members divided into four classes or castes (*vaṇṇa*) namely, *brāhmaṇa, khattiya vessa* and *sudda* in a decreasing order of social

status. Consequently he rejected the view that *svadharma*, too, is a divine decree (see CASTE). Realizing, however, that this hereditary system of employment had certain beneficial features the Buddha was careful not to completely disrupt the existing system. Hence while rejecting the malefic features the Buddha made use of the beneficial features for the good of all concerned. Thus, he pointed out that division of labour is not a divine creation but a necessary outcome of the economic conditions of a given time. He pointed out that in certain countries like Kamboja there are only two categories, masters and servants, and that these positions were revertible according to one's economic standing (*M*. II. p. 149).

According to the Buddha employment is not indicative of one's caste. He very forcefully established the fact that designations, denoting numerous types of employment in which people are engaged, have merely a functional value. Then, he pointed out that it is natural for a man to become known by the employment he performs, as for example, a cattle-breeder will be called a husbandman and not a brahmin or a warrior. Similarly one who lives by archery will be known as a soilder not as a farmer and so on (*Sn. Vāseṭṭha Sutta*). These, the Buddha pointed out, are conventional designations, names of mere functional value, with no genetical significance whatsoever. To drive this point still deeper he takes the case of kindling a fire and says that brightness of a fire kindled by a man belonging to a caste accepted as high will not be different from the brightness of a fire kindled by a man of the so-called low caste. Underlying this is the fact that if given equal opportunity and if made to perform a task under similar conditions, all members, irrespective of their caste affiliations, would be capable of performing a task equally well (*M*. II. pp. 151, 152). The Buddha upheld dignity of labour and in keeping with this attitude he freely admitted persons of all professions into his Order and treated them alike (*Thag. vv.* 620 ff.).

The brahmanic teaching which represented employer (master) - employee (servant) division as a divine creation was inclined in favour of the employer as against the employee. This teaching gave religious sanction to the employer to enjoy unlimited benefits at the expense of the employee. This placed employers and employees at cross-purposes, each interested in one's own rights to the neglect of duties, and each trying to exploit and undercut the other at every turn. It is precisely to evolve a harmonious and mutually beneficial relationship between them that the Buddha put forward his classic code of ethics for them, found embodied in the *Sigālovāda Sutta* (*D*. III pp. 180 ff.).

According to this code of ethics an employer should be an exemplary person observing the five precepts, unbiased and carefully avoiding the avenues leading to downfall and dissipation of wealth (*apāyamukha* q.v.). Such an employer is advised to assign work to his employees taking into consideration their physical capabilities. This means that an ideal employer should not assign a young boy any work that should be performed by a grown up man and *vice versa*. Similarly he should not assign a female employee[1] any job of work that is meant for a male employee and *vice versa*. Such an employer is advised to see that all employees are properly fed and paid. According to this code of ethics the provision of meals and wages is a duty incumbent upon every employer. The commentary (*DA*. III, p. 956) points out that what is meant is that food and wages should be provided according to the needs of the employee, for, the requirements of a youngish employee, an unmarried one and a married one are different.

The provision of medical facilites to the employees is another duty incumbent uon the employers. An employer should relieve an employee during times of illnesses and see that he is provided with appropriate medical care ad treatment. Not only during illnesses, but also during normal times too employees should be granted leave. The commentary (*loc.cit*) explains that what is meant here is that there should be fixed work-hours and the workers should be relieved and sent away once they have completed their shift. This is to prevent the employers from exploiting labour by over-working employees. Besides, they should be granted leave on festive occasions. And, on such occasions the workers should be presented with beautiful gifts and eatables (*DA*. loc. cit). In fact this code of ethics goes a stop further and says that in order to further and foster employer-employee relationship the employers should even make it a habit to share with their employees special delicacies, thus paving the way for an stmosphere of comradeship between them.

The *Sigālovāda Sutta* futher points out that when so treated the employees, out of consideration for the employer, would rise early and sleep late, meaning that they would put-in their maximum. When so treated the employees would be satisfied with what they earn and will not try to rob and cheat the employers. They would perform their assigned tasks well and would also spread the fame of the employers.

1. During the 6th century the bulk of the work-force in North India was formed by men. There was no prohibition for women to seek employment. Due to natural reasons women were mostly engaged in light-work and in kinds of employment geared to provide personal services.

This code of ethics was not meant only for the private sector. This was a general code of ethics covering employer-employee relations and as such was applicable both to the private and state sectors. In fact the Buddhist view appears to be that the provision of employment to the subjects is the responsibility of the State (*D.* I. p.. 135ff). Buddhist social philosophy identifies poverty generated through unemployment as a basic cause of unrest, gradually leading to chaotic, violent conditions in a country. The *Kūṭadanta Sutta* (*D.* I, op. cit.) emphatically states that for social harmony as well as for personal well-being man-power resources in a country should be utilized to the maximum, that the people should be given opportunities for productive endeavour or they should be fruitfully employed with adequate remuneration. If not there is the danger of people getting frustrated and turning into anti-social elements. *The kūṭadanta Sutta* very clearly points out also that at a time when a country is harassed and harried, with towns and villages being pillaged by citizens who have turned into anti-social elements the state will not be able to bring about peace and order by resorting to dictatorial methods or by performing religious rituals to appease supernatural beings. The only effective remedy is to utilize human resources fruitfully so that there will be personal and social well-being. The text says: 'Now there is one method to adopt to put a thorough end to this dis-order. Whosoever there be in the king's realm who devote themselves to keeping cattle and farm, to them let his majesty the king give food and seed-corn. Whosoever there be in the king's realm who devote themselves to trade, to them let his majesty the king give capital. Whosoever there be in the king's realm who devote themselves to state service, to them let his majesty the king give wages and food. Then those men, following each his own business, will no longer harass the realm; the state coffers will swell; there will be peace and harmony in the country. And, the subjects pleased with one another and happy, will dwell with open doors, dancing their children in their arms.'

The *Dīgha* commentary (*DA.* I, p. 29 f.) further explaining the duty of the state to utilize man-power in suitable forms of employment says that when giving capital aid to those who are engaged in trade, the state should not call for guarantors nor should such grants be entered in ledgers. Such capital grants should be made as out-right grants (*mūlacchejja-vasena*) and, therefore, not as loans. The commentary is very emphatic also about the provision of daily meals and monthly wages for state employees. It adds that employees should be given promotions and other forms of rewards and incentives in keeping with their efficiency.

It is clear that Buddhism accepts the premise that economic security (*atthi-sukha*) leads to the generation of a congenial atmosphere conducing to spiritual development. Hence, it not only stresses the importance of providing employment for the people and building up harmonious employer-employee relations but also lays down guide-lines to achieve economic stability of both employer and employee, directing them how to utilize their well-earned income. As an initial step towards economic stability Buddhism insists on personal discipline. It admonishes all alike to adhere to five precepts, to keep away from avenues leading to dissipation of wealth, to lead simple lives with few needs and wants (*appiccha*). Such a mode of living, the Buddha has often pointed out, conduces to a balanced life (*samajīvitā*) enabling one to make ends meet. One who leads such a life will be able to enjoy economic security (*atthi-sukha*), the pleasure of meaningful use of his wealth (*bhoga-sukha*), pleasure of not being in debt (*anaṇa- sukha*: *A.* II, p. 69). A person who leads such a life will not yearn for anything that is not essential and will be quite content (*santuṭṭhi*) with the fulfilment of his basic needs.

Offering basic guidelines regarding the proper spending of rightly earned income the *Sigālovāda Sutta* (*D. II*, p. 188) says that one should divide one's wealth (*bhoga*, here meaning income) into four portions. Of these four he should utilize one portion for his day to day recurring expences. One is advised to invest two portions in some productive enterprise, while depositing safely the remaining portion for use in times of difficulties.

Naturally a primary concern of any person who earns his living, is his own happiness. But Buddhist texts point out that besides making himself happy he has numerous other duties and obligations to perform. He has to look after his wife and children, his mother and father and his servants and workmen. He is expected to help his friends and comrades, treat his relatives and guests. While doing all this he has also to perform his religious obligations by making offerings to the departed ones, deities and to brahmins and *samaṇas*. But this is not all. The texts even remind one that one has to pay taxes due to the state. It is said that wealth that is not spent in this manner is "wealth that has failed to seize its opportunity, failed to win merit, unfittingly made use of", whereas wealth spent in the above mentioned manner is called wealth that has seized its opportunity, turned to merit, and fittingly made use of" (*A.* II, p. 67; III, pp. 45, 76).

A question arises as to whether Buddhism inculcates a particular attitude towards employment or work. Or in other words, is there a Buddhist work ethic? The term 'work ethic' in its widest connotation means attitude to work. It is seen that attitude to work of an individual in any given society depends on a number of variables such as social pressures, economic imperatives.

cultural and religious influences etc. Of these numerous variables, religious influence plays an important role, for, religion in any given sociaty is a major influence in shaping its value system, and work ethic has a direct relationship to the value system of a society. There is a widely prevalent tendency among scholars, mostly among the western scholars, to consider Buddhism as being pessimistic in its outlook and consequently the attitude generated by it as being fatalistic. Some even have gone to the extent of pin-pointing that 'traditional Sinhalese Buddhism should bear some responsibility for retarding economic development (Trevor Ling, Buddhist Values and Development problems: A case study of Sri Lanka. *World Development* Vol. 8, pp. 557-586).

There is not even an iota of evidence to prove that the Buddha advocated that man should resign to fate or that he should look up to the grace of god. On the contrary there is abundant textual evidence to establish that the Buddha considered man to be supreme and that one's betterment or downfall is dependent on the attitude adopted by oneself to the problems one faces. The Buddha urged everybody alike to put forth effort (*viriya*), and manliness (*purisathāma-purisakāra*). He singled out laziness as a cause of downfall (cf. *Sn. Parābhava Sutta*). In the *Sigālovada Sutta* Buddha explains how laziness in its manifold ways retards enthusisam and economic development, finally causing dissipation of wealth (*D.* III, p. 184). Therefore there is no gainsaying of the fact that the Buddha always adopted a very realistic, pragmatic outlook and encouraged all to strive to improve their condition.

This attitude of his made him uphold dignity of labour. It is specifically said that one should earn one's living by diligent application (*uṭṭhāna-adigata*); one is admonished to earn one's living by the strength of one's hands (*bāhābalaparicita*), through one's sweat and toil (*sedāvakhitta*: *A.* II, pp. 67, 89, III, 45, 76). What looms large over all these is the emphasis on justice and fairplay or righteousness (*dhamma*). One could diligently apply oneself to achieve success in a corrupt profession. Similarly one could diligently adopt corrupt means to achive a good end. Both these attitudes are decried in Buddhism. Both employers and employees are cautioned that the objective as well as the means adopted to achieve it or in other words the employment engaged in to earn ones living as well as the effort put forth to achieve success in that particular employment should be righteous and fair (*dhammehi dhamma-laddehi*). It is this attitude to work that impels one to stick to *sammā-ājīva* (good mode of living) avoiding the use of incorrect weights and measures (*tulākūṭa, kaṃsakūṭa mānakūṭa*.) deceit, fraud, corrupt practices and breaches of contract (*ukkoṭana - vañcana - nikati - sāciyoga*: *D.* I, p. 64).

This is the work ethic, attitude to employment that is strongly inculcated in Buddhism. Through such a work ethic one could pursue a good mode of livelihood and lead a contended life complete with economic stability which is very essential for spiritual progress. Therefore, this Buddhist work ethic will not only conduce to personal well-being but also to social well-being by bringing about economic progress along with social harmony, finally creating a congenial atmosphere for spiritual pursuits.

S. K. Nanayakkara

EMPTINESS. Although a full doctrinal discussion on this very important subject will have to wait for an exposition on the technical term *śūnyatā* (q.v.), it will not be out of place to show here already the essential and basic platform of the earliest teaching of the Buddha, as represented in Theravāda as it has survived up to this date, and of the early developments in other Hīnayāna schools, Madhyamaka, Sarvāstivāda and Vijñaptimātratā, covering the first centuries of world-Buddhism leading to Mahāyāna.

Already in the *Anatta-lakkhaṇa Sutta* (*Vin.* I, pp. 13-14; *S.* III, p. 66 ff.), the second discourse delivered by the Buddha to his newly found disciples, he explains his doctrine of denial of a theory of the permanent nature or of the reality of an 'ego' behind the psychical phenomena or of a 'substance' underlying the physical phenomena. In a purely analytical argument, the individual is seen as a psycho-physical compound, and whatever there is of body or of mind is further analysed without discovering anything of a permanent nature.

All conflict is based on the delusion of a permanent self, and, therefore, the discovery of the unreality of this delusory self will bring about the solution of all conflicts. Hence, the teaching of *anattā* has become the key-note of the entire structure of Buddhist thought. Conditioned exsistence is impermanent and wrought with woe (*sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā, sabbe saṅkhārā dukkhā*), yet not only conditioned (*saṅkhārā*), but also the unconditioned (*asaṅkhata*), i.e., Nibbāna, is without self-entity (*sabbe dhammā anattā*). And this has never been in doubt with any school of Buddhist thought. This essential emptiness of mere phenomena (physical and mental) was fully understood for all its importance by commentors like Buddhaghosa in his *Visuddhimagga* (xix, S 20) where he follows the orthodox tradition of the Mahāvihāra, one of the earliest institutions in Ceylon, dating from the time of arahant Mahinda. Aśvaghoṣa in his *Saundarānanda* (*BI.* XVI, p. 102) compares Nirvāṇa to the extinction of a flame; and likewise when individuality is extinguished, there is no more conflict.

Nāgārjuna, the great philosopher and founder of the Madhyamaka system of Buddhist philosophy, holding that truth is attainable by synthetic negation, also denied the reality of all physical and mental phenomena (*sarva-dharma-śūnyatā*). According to the Madhyamaka conception, Nirvāṇa is nothing but *Śūnya* (void), which means a state about which neither existence nor non-existence could be predicated, for there is no abiding entity of which such an assertion could be made.

The Sarvāstivādins, although holding that everything exists (*sarvaṃ asti*), maintained also the essential emptiness of everything that has individual existence (*pudgala-śūnyatā*). The great commentator, Vasubandhu, in the beginning of the 5th century A.C., formulated an idealism which arose as a reaction against the extreme passivity of Nāgārjuna's negativism. For him, the middle path lies neither in recognising the reality of all things, because outer things do not exist, nor in recognising the non-reality of all things, because ideations do exist. The *Vijñaptimātratā*, holding that ideation alone exists, denies the reality of everything else (*bāhya-artha-śūnyatā*). The reality of a concept, however, does not endow it with an abiding entity. This idealism was naturally opposed to the nihilism of the Satyasiddhi school where Harivarman maintained that truth is attainable by the recognition of non-entity, denying the reality of individuality (*pudgala*) as well as of matter and mind (*dharma*). That truth is the void of Nirvāṇa.

Even when the Yogācāras proposed a more positive emptiness with the element of *vijñāna* in it, and when later still an element of happiness (*mahāsukha*) was added and when subsequently this emptiness was formulated as the goddess Sūnyā in whose eternal embrace the individual mind (*vijñāna*) is locked in bliss and happiness, she is still called Nirātmā, the soulless one.

It is the doctrine of no-self which gave rise to the doctrine of compassion with others; and thus *śūnya* and *karuṇā* together constitute what is called the thought of enlightenment (*bodhicitta*) in which is realised the true nature, the such-ness (*tathatā*) of all in the inherent purity of the non-existent, unborn void. See further ŚŪNYATĀ.

H. G. A. van Zeyst

ENDEAVOUR *The Shorter Oxford Dictionary* (Ed. C. T. Onions, 3rd ed., 1956, p. 607) gives the following meanings to this term: 'to exert oneself', 'to direct one's effort's 'to try' 'make an effort for a specified object', 'to attempt strenuously.' There are several Pali words with Buddhist ethical connotations, equivalent in meaning to the term endeavour, some of them being: *vāyāma, viriya, padhāna* and *ussāha*.

While, Buddhism rejects the belief in divine creation (*issaranimmāṇa*) it posits also that nothing happens without causes and conditions (*ahetu-appaccayā*). It maintains that incessant change (*anicca*) is a salient characteristic of phenomena and that this change takes place in relation to causes and conditions (*sahetu-sapaccayā: M.* II, p. 217, *A.* I, pp. 173-4). Man is also subject to this law (*dhammatā*). But unlike other things and sentient beings man is endowed with a mind, which, if developed in the proper way is capable of understanding the functioning of this law, so that he could utilise that knowledge for his benefit.

Buddhism explains man's saṃsāric existence and suffering present in it as causally connected and conditioned (*S.* II, p. 41) So, if man wants to minimise suffering in *saṃsāra* and finally do away with it completely, it is man himself who can do it (*Dhp. v.* 165). Suffering in *saṃsāra* does not cease by itself. Man has to make a consistent effort to minimise it and ultimately do away with it completely. Buddhism accepts the presence of a conative ability in man (*cetanā: Dph. vv.* 1, 2; *A.* III, p. 415) which could inspire him to initiate action that would help to minimise suffering and finally eliminate it completely. Each and every individual is born with this potentiality, but the degree of its strength may vary in individuals. Buddhism advocates a way of life, a path, by following which a man could develop this potentiality to its highest peak enabling him to understand the true nature of things (*Sn. v.* 1130; *M.* III, pp. 75-78). Endeavour or effort plays an important role in this way of life. Right endeavour (*sammā vāyāma*) is the sixth limb in the Noble-Eight-fold Path, the path advocated in Buddhism for man to achieve the goal of religious life in Buddhism, namely, Nibbāna.

A practising Buddhist should have in him a four-fold endeavour or striving. Firstly he should endeavour to obstruct the entry of unwholesome phenomena (*akusalā dhammā*) into his mind; secondly he should endeavour to dispel from his mind unwholesome phenomena that are already there; thirdly he should endeavour to protect and develop wholesome phenomena that are already in his mind; and fourthly he should endeavour to cultivate anew and develop wholesome phenomena that are not found in him (*D.* III, p. 225; *A.* II, p. 16) This four-fold endeavour on the part of a person constitutes only one aspect of the sixth limb of the Noble-Eight-fold Path. Endeavour has another role to play in the Noble Eight-fold Path. One cannot properly follow and develop the remaining seven limbs of the path without the help of this sixth limb of Right Endeavour. As rightly shown in the *Mahācattārīsaka Sutta* (*M.* III, pp. 72, 75), Right Endeavour helps one to differentiate between right views and wrong views, right thoughts and wrong thoughts, right speech and wrong speech,

right actions and wrong actions, right livelihōod and wrong livelihood, right mindfulness and wrong mindfulness and right concentration of mind and wrong concentration of mind. When one, with endeavour differentiates between the right and the wrong, one has to further endeavour to avoid the wrong one and cultivate and develop the right one. In this regard it should also be mentioned that two other limbs of the Noble-Eight-fold Path play a similar role, namely Right views and Right Mindfulness.

It is not only with regard to the Noble-Eight-fold Path that Right Endeavour plays an important role. Though it is not specifically mentioned, the five basic precepts of a practising lay Buddhist, the ten precepts of a monk initiate, or the *pātimokkha* rules of a monk, cannot be properly observed without an element of endeavour in the individual concerned.

The importance attached to endeavour in the Buddhist scheme of spiritual development is seen by its being incorporated as one of the ten perfections (*paramī*) of a Buddha aspirant (bodhisatta). The Jātaka tales illustrate the various arduous tasks performed by the bodhisatta during a long period of time in *saṃsāra*, from the day he received the prediction of becoming a Buddha at the feet of Dīpaṅkara Buddha, to the time he completed his bodhisatta career as King Vessantara (*J.* I, p. 22). Even in the case of perfections, the perfection of endeavour (*viriya*) is not only one of the ten *pāramīs*, but it is an element that should be present in a person in order to fulfil the other perfections successfully. Endeavour is also reckoned as one of the seven limbs of Enlightenment (*bojjhaṅga*, *DhsA.* p. 217; *D.* II. pp. 79, 83; *M.* I. pp. 11, 61). It is the 16th of the twenty-two faculties (*indriya*) of a being (*Vbh.* p. 122; *Vism.* p. 491). It is also the second of the five strengths (*bala*) of a man on the path to perfection (*D.* III, p. 253; *S.* v. p. 251) and the fifth of the five faculties (*indriya*: *S.* V. pp. 281-22).

Thus it is clear that endeavour (*viriya*) is an essential ingredient in the life of an individual who is keen to minimise suffering in *saṃsāra* and finally eliminate it fully by realising the goal of the religious lfe, as taught in the Dhamma. See also EXERTION, VIRIYA and PADHĀNA.

W. G. Weeraratne

ENDURANCE. *The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary*[1] defines this terms as 'the fact, the habit or the power of enduring'. The Pali word with an ethical connotation that comes very close in meaning to this term is *khanti* (Skt. *kṣānti*), which again is explained in English as 'tolerance', 'patience', 'impartiality', 'forbearance' and 'forgiveness'. The Pali word *khanti* is very comprehensive in meaning, and the above words taken individually explain only an aspect of it. The *Dhammapada* (*Dhp. v.* 184) says: "Endurance is the highest form of asceticism or penance" (*khanti paramatapo*). It is a very sublime mental condition of a person who has advanced much spiritually. The *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* (*Dhs.* p. 230 section 1341) describes *khanti* as ability of a person to forgive (*khamanatā*), to bear up (*adhivāsanatā*), gentleness, (*acaṇḍikkam*), freedom from harshness (*anasurūpo*) and contentment of mind (*attamanatā cittassa*). It is thus evident that *khanti* has the meaning of *adhivāsanatā* and *upekkhā* too,which are both used in an important ethical sense in Buddhism.

Khanti is the sixth of the ten perfections (*pāramī*) of one who aspires to Buddhahood (*J.* I. p. 22.). Dīpaṅkara Buddha, while predicting the future Buddhahood of Sumedha Paṇḍita, requested the latter to practise this virtue to perfection, to make him competent for Buddhahood. In this context *khanti* is described as the ability of a person to have mental balance in facing both honour or praise and insult or censure without jubilation or dejection. A person who has in him such a developed mentality is compared to the great earth (*mahāpaṭhavī*). It is shown here that the earth neither loves a person who casts all type of clean and pure things on it, or hates him who casts all types of putrid waste matter on it, but accepts all those things without protest. It is this same mental attitude that is highly praised in the *Mahāmaṅgala Sutta* (*Sn.* p. 47), namely the ability of a person to maintain perfect control, equipoise and complete balance of mind in facing the vicissitudes of life (*phuṭṭhassa lokadhammehi cittam yassa na kampati*). *Lokadhamma* are explained in some texts as consisting of eight things or four pairs of opposites, i.e., gain and loss (*lābho alābho*), ill-reputation and fame (*ayasoyaso*), insult and praise (*nindā pasaṃsā*) and happiness and sorrow (*sukha dukkha*: *D.* III. p. 260; *A.* IV. pp. 157 ff). It is shown in these texts that an ignorant worldling (*assutavā puthujjana*) who has no recourse to noble ones and their teachings, feels delighted and joyful when he gains something and becomes resentful and dejected when he loses (*A.* IV. p. 158). But an intelligent (*sutavā*) person who has the opportunity of associating with the noble ones and who has the chance of knowing their teachings, realises that a loss or gain is a thing that is impermanent, unsatisfactory and subject to change as any other component thing and as such he should accept whatever that comes with complete composure of mind, without resentment or jubilation

1 *The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary*, revised and edited by C. T. Onions, 1970.

(*A.* IV. p. 158). Such a person treats all beings alike (*sabba-bhūtesu tādino*). His thoughts are well under control (*saṅkappo vasikato*) regarding pleasant (*iṭṭha*) and unpleasant (*aniṭṭha*) things. The best example from the life of the Buddha aspirant (*bodhisatta*) to illustrate this sublime attitude of mind is the *Khantivāda Jātaka* (*J.* III. pp. 39-43). In the very distant past the *bodhisatta* was practising very severe penance in the Royal Park in Kāsi. One day the king of Benāres who was a disbeliever, met this ascetic in the Royal Park, and to test the ascetic's power of endurance ordered his men to torture him. The king's men subjected the ascetic to various forms of physical torture, but they could not create a mental disturbance in him. Finally, the king ordered the men to sever the ascetic's limbs, which they did in no time. The ascetic was left with only the head and the limbless body, but even then he bore up the pain and agony without protest, with calmness, serenity and courage and ultimately succumbed to the injuries mindfully, with full mental equilibrium without any grudge to his torturers, but with a blessing to them on his lips.

Incidents from the life of the Buddha wherein he displayed this noble virtue are not rare. He was not at all disturbed by the various cruel attempts of his cousin Devadatta to kill him, to slander him and to wreck his missionary career, in a diversity of ways. In all these situations he could maintain mental balance, equipoise and wish for the welfare and happiness of Devadatta in the same way he wished for the welfare and happiness of his one and only son **Rāhula** (*S.* II. p. 156; *Vin.* II. p. 184; *J.* I. p. 113). When Aggikabhāradhvaja brahmin reviled him with very harsh, unkind and abusive words, he remained undisturbed and serene till the brahmin finished pouring out his wrath over the Buddha. When the brahmin finished reviling him, the Buddha addressed him in a very friendly tone and explained to him the inappropriateness of his vituperation (*Sn.* pp. 21-25), and preached to him comprehensively the sublime truth he had discovered. After the sermon the brahamin became quite pleased with the Buddha and accepted him as his teacher.

On another occasion, a group of wandering ascetics who became envious of the growing popularity of the Buddha and his organisation, plotted to bring discredit on him. They hired a woman to hover around the monastery of the Buddha and the *bhikkhus*, to give the impression to the public that she was a constant visitor to the monastery. They later got this woman murdered secretly and buried her near the monastery. When the woman disappeared mysteriously the people around the place became suspicious, and when the body of the woman was found buried in a thicket near the monastery, the wandering ascetics spread the talk that the Buddha and the *bhikkhus* were responsible for her death. People became so furious that the Buddha and the *bhikkhus* were scorned and insulted and were turned away with empty bowls when they went for their alms round. For sometime the *bhikkhus* could not come out of the monastery. Things became so intolerable and unpleasant that Ānanda, on behalf of the other *bhikkhus*, suggested to the Buddha that they leave that monastery and go elsewhere. The Buddha in his usual serene manner explained to Ānanda that it was no solution to the problem, and that all should bear up with courage, without resentment, the ill-treatment of the people; for he told them that before long the truth would be out and then things would become normal (*Ud.* IV. p.8; *UdA.* pp. 256 ff; *DhpA.* III. p. 474). Again, when rival religious teachers charged the Buddha saying that he was a killer of the embryo' (*bhūnahu*), a nihilist (*uccheda-vādiko*) etc., he was not offended and did not resent such charges or made counter charges against those religious teachers, but patiently analysed and examined them to show his rivals that those charges actually could not be made against him (*A.* IV. pp. 174, 182). His constant advice to his disciples was that they should not become elated at praise or feel dejected at blame, for, he told them, one cannot discern the truth if one becomes elated and dejected at praise and blame respectively. (*D.* I. p. 3).

With regard to physical pain and uneasiness too, the Buddha has evinced the highest degree of patience and endurance. Once when his foot was cut with a splinter of stone, he bled profusely and the wound caused him acute and unbearable pain; yet he did not show any signs of agony or bewilderment, but consciously and mindfully bore up that pain (*bhusā-sudaṃ Bhagavato vedanā vattanti sārīrikā vedanā dukkhā tibbā kharā kaṭukā asatā amanāpā. tā sudam bhagavā sato sampajāno adhivāseti avihaññamāno*: (*S.* I. p. 27). On another occasion in the last days of his life, there developed in him an acute abdominal pain, due to an indigestion caused by a disagreeable dish served by Cunda (*D.* II. p. 126). Though the pain was acute, severe and unbearable, he courageously and ungrudgingly endured it all.

Buddhism teaches that suffering inherent in samsāric existence is brought about by conscious activities of man himself and that man alone is capable of minimising this suffering and ultimately eliminating it by mindfully treading the path that leads to freedom from suffering. Craving, hatred and ignorance are called the three roots of evil that lead to suffering of man in *samsāra*. Therefore, if one were to minimise suffering and experience some degree of happiness in this world or in the world to come, one has to gradually diminish the power of craving and hatred in one, by developing their opposites, namely liberality and true friendship to all. It is

no secret that all conflicts in society are caused by the lack of a friendly attitude in its members. If the members of any society are friendly to one another, they would not only refrain from activities that are injurious in any way to any of its members, but on the contrary would engage themselves in activities that would help to make the lives of the people happy and content.

The *Dhammapada* says: "Hatted never ceases by hatred in this world. It ceases only with forebearance and forgiveness." This is an ancient law. (*Dhp. v.* 5).

When people become used to forgiving and tolerating the wrongs done to them by other people, and when they treat their opponents and enemies in a decent way without scheming to put them in difficulty and destroy them, the wrong-doers too would gradually change their attitudes to other people, and try to become friendly. In this way when wrong-doers become restrained regarding their behaviour, any society would become peaceful, and the degree of happiness in such a society would increase greatly. When things take such a turn people would find such a social atmosphere quite congenial to undertake a course of discipline to control the natural fickleness of mind so that it could be trained to concentrate attention on a single object of thought that is essential to develop true wisdom. When one is able to develop wisdom to see things in their true perspective, prejudicial thinking would cease in such a person and this mental development would help him to destroy craving (*taṇhā*), the root cause of samsāric existence. see also KHANTI.

W. G. Weeraratne

ENGLAND. See BRITAIN, BUDDHISM IN

ENJOYMENT. When juxtaposed with the teaching on *dukkha* i.e. unsatisfactoriness which according to Buddhism is the most outstanding characteristic of existence, the concept of enjoyment appears to be quite alien to Buddhism. This seems to be more so if one were to accept blindly the view put forward by some writers that Buddhism is pessimistic in its attitude to life. But a correct analysis of the Buddhist teachings and of the place assigned to enjoyment in Buddhism reveals much evidence to the contrary. By emphasising the predominence of *dukkha* in sensory stimulation (*kāmā... bahu dukkhā bahu - upāyāsā*) Buddhism does not stifle one's hope for happiness and enjoyment. On the centrary, by stressing this aspect and analysing it objectively, Buddhism shows how one could enjoy life without any fear of subsequently feeling dejected due to loss of enjoyment.

If by enjoyment is meant indiscriminate gratification of senses by excessive indulgence in sense pleasures (*kāmasukhallikānuyoga*) such enjoyment is denounced downright in Buddhism as being low, vulgar, mundane, ignoble ad not conducive to well-being (*S.* IV. p. 330). But this denunciation does not amount to complete negation of enjoyment and substitution of a path of self-mortification (*attakilamathānuyoga*) which path, too, is denounced in a similar vein. In the first sermon itself the Buddha rejected both these extremes as being harmful to the well-being of the individual (*Vin.* I, p. 10) who is pursuing the path of religious upliftment. Though this sermon is addressed to an audience solely comprising of recluses, its overall emphasis on the virtue of following a middle-path (*majjhimā-paṭipadā*) has greatly influenced the general Buddhist way of life. It is this middle-path attitude that is generally adopted by lay Buddhists with regard to enjoyment.

Buddhism takes for granted that on the whole, worldlings are given to the enjoyment of pleasures of life. This, according to Buddhism is particularly so in the case of householders (*gihī*), and hence the descriptive appelation 'pleasure - enjoying householders' (*gihī-kāma - bhogin*). Accepting this factual position, Buddhism speaks of numerous sources of worldly enjoyments such as sex and marriage (*sehi dārehi santuṭṭho*), family, wealth (*bhogasukha*) and so on, generally resorted to by householders. Though such enjoyments are a part and parcel of day to day life of the lay-folk, Buddhism, in keeping with its fundamental teaching of moderation in ways of life, duly cautions its adherents not to over-indulge in them; and elaborately and methodically illustrates the evils of over-indulgence. It shows how the mind, if given free reins, runs amuck and gets, enmeshed in worldly enjoyments and subsequently end up in utter dejection and misery.

Though the emphasis is on moderation, Buddhism, in moulding the lay attitude towards enjoyment, does not stop at exalting the virtues of moderation. It is accepted that the worldlings are in general given to the enjoyment of pleasures. But the fact remains that amidst such worldlings there are both male and female lay devotees (*upāsaka, upāsikā*) who are more prone to lead ethical lives, and yet others who are specially devoted to religious and spiritual advancement. The texts refer to them as white-clad householders (*gihī odātavasanā*) the lay-devotees (*upāsaka, upāsikā*), leading religious lives (*brahmacārī*) as against white-clad lay-devotees who are given to the enjoyment of pleasures (*upāsakā upāsikā gihī odātavasanā kāmabhogino* : *M.* I, p. 491). To such lay-folk the teaching of moderation is inadequate as a guiding principle and hence Buddhism preaches to them a more profound teaching on this subject of enjoyment. Going deeper into this subject

Buddhism explains and illustrates what enjoyments are by analysing the whole psychological process of enjoyment. According to this explanation a particular consciousness, is said to produce sensory impingement (*phassa*) which in turn gives rise to feeling (*vedanā*). What one feels one begins to perceive and what one preceives one begins to ponder about (*M.* I, p. iii). Feeling is either pleasurable, painful or neutral. The general tendency of the being is to withdraw from painful feelings and get attached to pleasurable feelings. Therefore it is natural for one to delight in and cling on to such pleasurable objects perceived through one's sense - organs (*so cakkhunā rūpaṃ disvā piyarūpe rūpe sārajjati... M.* I, p. 266). These acts of 'delighting in' and 'clinging on' are manifest signs of intrusion of the false idea of the ego into the field of enjoyment. With the rise of this false ego - consciousness, one becomes inextricably personally bound up in enjoyment. Enjoyment of sense pleasures becomes the main drive in life. The impulse to satiate the desire to enjoy, leads one to over-indulgence in pleasures. This enmeshes one, more and more, in bondage to wordly existence, escape from which should be the sole aim of all Buddhists. Thus it is clear that enjoyment and more precisely over-indulgence in enjoyment is an obstacle in the path of ethical and spiritual perfection that leads to liberation from *saṃsāra.* Hence Buddhism preaches sense-restraint as the most effective means of removing this obstacle. However, responsibilities, duties and commitments in lay-life do not quite conduce to the practise of self-restraint to the maximum. Lay-life is full of obstacles (*sambādho gharāvāso: M*, I, p. 179) and not so is the life of the monk (*pabbajjā*) which is compared to the open-air (*abbhokāsa:* loc. cit.).

It is this monkish life that provides the proper environment to practise self-restraint, and it is primarily because of the fact that monks lead a life not given to the enjoyment of worldly pleasures that their vocation is regarded as being superior to that of the householders (*M.* I, p. 460). In this life it is the enjoyment of renunciation (*nekkhamma-sukha*) that is held above the enjoyment of sense – pleasures (*kāma-sukha: A.* I, p. 80). By opting to enjoy renunciation, monks naturally renounce most of the enjoyments pertaining to lay-life. Yet their life is not morbid and dull, for cultivation of joy (*pīti*) is a necessity for them. Spiritual enjoyment enhances their joy.

Obviously, owing to the differences in vocations the range and sphere of form of enjoyment permitted for monks are different from, and in certain respects limited than, those allowed to lay householders. The special code of discipline and ethics (*vinaya*), which is far more stringent than the one meant for laymen, illustrates this. But the ethical training and the deeper understanding of life the monks acquire bring about a total inner revolution, effecting a change in their views, values, desires and goals. In this process of ethical and spiritual growth their sense of enjoyment becomes thoroughly filtered and refined enabling them to appreciate and derive a deep sense of joy out of simple things in life, which the average worldling overlooks as being insignificant or even as being sources of misery and unhappiness.

The monks thoroughly enjoy their lives pledged to few wants (*appiccha*), and remain content and satisfied (*santuṭṭha*) with a frugal living (*sallahuka-vutti*). They enjoy living in forests, shady groves, mountain caves and in hermitages on river banks. Trees laden with fruits, creepers in full bloom, long winding rivers and streams, snow-capped mountains, cooing of birds and rumblings of thunder are for them sources of deep aesthetic enjoyment. The *Thera–therīgāthā* bears ample testimony to this. Yet they are not enamoured by any of these sources, for they have truly grasped what enjoyment (*assāda*) is and what its evils (*ādīnava*) are. In them, gone is the ego-centered feeling of possessiveness and craving with all its anxieties and fears. Their sense of enjoyment is tempered with dispassionateness (*virāga*) which heightens the experience of enjoyment by arresting personal involvement that diminishes the effects of such deep experiences by bringing about complex conceptualisation, leading to craving.

Enjoying them in a detached manner the monks utilise these sources of enjoyment as sources of inspiration for musing (*jhāna*) out of which they derive a deep feeling of ecstatic joy - a profound sense of enjoyment never to be experienced by laymen enjoying worldly pleasures. Yet they do not cling on even to such forms of spiritual enjoyment for, they are aware that these jhānic attainments, too are effected and thought out, and hence liable to cease and bring about dejection (*M.* I, p. 350; III, p. 244; S. II, p. 65; *A.* V, p. 243). For them the only lasting peak experience is the enjoyment of the bliss of freedom (*vimutti-sukha*). Eloquent expressions given to such ecstatic experiences resulting from the attainment of freedom from *saṃsāra*, are found in such texts as the *Thera-therīgāthā* and the *Udāna*. In this state of freedom, gone are their personal biases and evil dispositions: ego-centered thoughts find no footing in them. The transmutation brought about by this attainment enables them to live in the world and enjoy all pleasant things seen, heard or congnized without clinging on to them, for they are trained to consider what is seen just as the seen, what is heard just as the heard, what is sensed just as the sense and what is cognized just as the cognized (*Ud.* p. 8). Their sense-restraint has reached such a high level of development that they are able to enjoy sense-objects without being led astray by them.

S. K. Nanayakkara

ENLIGHTENED ONE. See **BUDDHA**

ENLIGHTENMENT. The idea of enlightenment (*bodhi*) as final religious attainment, historically speaking, starts with the Buddha, for in the Buddhist way of thinking, he was the first to be enlightened. The word Buddha itself (from the root *budh* - to know) means one who has gained knowledge, knowledge about the true nature of the process or phenemenon of life. Coming into being, based on the principle of conditionality (*idappaccayatā*), life proceeds with unfailing predictability (*avitathatā*) and invariability (*anaññathatā*, *S.* II, 26). This truth or principle is at work in the universe, irrespective of the enlightenment of persons about it (*uppādā vā tathāgatānaṃ anuppādā vā tathāgatānaṃ ṭhitā vā sā dhātu dhammaṭṭhitītā dhammaniyāmatā idappaccayatā*, *S.* II, p. 25 f.). Hence its objectivity (*tathatā*). This conditionality is the unfailing and unalterable order that governs the working of the life process. In enlightenment one comes to know of it (*taṃ tathāgato abhisambujjhati abhisameti...* ibid.) and thereby transcends the very process which is regarded in Buddhism, in its overall estimation, as being unsatisfactory. This cessation of the recurring life process which is referred to as (*bhavanirodha*) is Nirvāṇa, the *summum bonum* of Buddhism (See CESSATION). The reversal of the process too, is based on the same causal principle.

Buddhist texts express this idea of the Buddha's enlightenment, that being the significant first instance, using several idioms. In an autobiographical account, speaking about his own enlightenment, the Buddha is seen making the statement that' eye appeared the (*cakkhuṃ udapādi*), that 'wisdom arose' (*ñāṇam udapādi paññā udapādi vijjā udapādi*) and that 'there was illumination' (*āloko udapādi*: *Vin.* I, p. 11). Hence the path or the Middle way (*majjhimā paṭipadā*) which leads to this Nibbānic goal of enlightenment is described (*M.* I. p.15) as 'producing the eye' (*cakkhukaraṇī*) and bringing about wisdom (*ñāṇakaraṇī*). Nevertheless, enlightenment is not merely the end product of the Buddhist religious life which brings about release (*sammā ñāṇassa sammā vimutti pahoti*, *D.* II, p. 217). It is also reflected in the process which leads to that final product. The Buddhist Middle way, i.e. the Noble Eightfold Path, in fact, begins with Right View (*sammādiṭṭhi*) which means an initial enlightened outlook that has to be cultivated and acquired both with assistance from outside and intelligent thinking within oneself (*parato ca ghoso yoniso ca manasikāro*, *M.* I, 294). This enlightened outlook which is essentially the basis of discipline in Buddhism and which a disciple is expected to acquire and develop in order to liberate himself from the *saṃsāric* process, reflects an awareness of the three characteristics of life or *tilakkhaṇa* which are impermanence (*anicca*), unsatisfactoriness (*dukkha*) and soullessness (*anatta*: *M.* I. pp. 138, 232). This awareness reduces the over-inflated ego-consciousness of an individual (*ahaṅkāra* and *mamiṅkāra*) and consequently also of the corroding manifestations of attachement and aggression (*abhijjā* and *vyāpāda*). It helps the disciple in a refined withdrawal from involvement in the affairs of the world, helps him to deepen his vision and acquire total detachment and freedom (*op. cit.* p. 138). In the Noble Eightfold Path Right View leads to right thought patterns (*sammā-saṅkappa*) and thereby to right speech and right action consequently. Profitable spiritual attainments like self-posseesion (*sati*) and tranquillity of mind (*samādhi*) come in the wake of these. Viewing it differently, disentanglement from the painful involvement in life comes through this maturity of vision, through a realistic attitude to life in the world (*evam etaṃ yathā bhūtaṃ sammappaññāya daṭṭhabbaṃ*: *M.* I. p. 139). This brings the necessary detachment which makes release from the bonds of life, and hence of existence, a reality (*evam passam bhikkhave sutavā ariya sāvako rūpasmiṃ nibbindati.... nibbindam virajjati virāgā-vimuccati*: ibid).

This enlightenment, also referred to as gaining of knowledge (*aññārādhanā*) is said to be the result of a process of culture (*sikkhā*) which is gradual (*anupubbasikkhā anupubbakiriyā anupubbapaṭipadā aññārādhanā hoti*: *M* I. p. 479 f.) and not instantaneous (*nāham bhikkhve ādikeneva aññārādhanam vadāmi*, ibid). Contributing to the attainment of this enlightenment (*bodhi*) are a group of seven items referred to as *bojjhaṅgas* (q.v.) or factors of enlilghtenment which in turn have come to be included in a larger list of thirty-seven qualities or items constituting or contributing to enlightenment (*bodhipakkhiyā dhammā*, q.v.). It is said of the seven factors of enlightenment that their steady cultivation (*yesam bhāvitattā bahulikatattā...M.* III. p. 275) brings about final release or emancipation (*āsavānam khayā anāsavam ceto-vimuttim paññāvimuttim diṭṭheva dhamme sayam abbhiññā sacchikatvā upasampajja viharati*, ibid). They are also described as being conducive to disengagement (from damaging types of involvement in the affairs of the world: *vivekanissitam M.* I. p. 11), to detachment (*virāganissitam* ibid.) and to final cessation (*nirodhanissitam*, ibid.) It would be of interest to observe that these factors of enlightenment include, at the very outset, mental alertness (*sati*) and a capacity for discriminatory analysis of pertinent data relating both to oneself and to the environment (*dhammavicaya*). The energetic application that is necessary is brought under *viriya*, and the sustaining joy or *pīti* one gets in the process of this spiritual upliftment contributes to the composure of body (*passaddhi*). The tranquillity of mind (*samādhi*)

which one attains at the end of all this and the healthy neutrality of outlook (*upekkhā*) complete all the factors necessary for enlightement (*satta-bojjhaṅga*).

This enlightenment or gaining of knowledge which opens the gates to final release is the highest expression of Buddhist culture referred to earlier as *sikkhā*. It is the third and final stage of the threefold culture (*tisso sikkhā*) and goes under the name of *adhipaññāsikkhā* or culture relating to the development of wisdom. This is inevitably so because *samsāra* from which release is sought is brought about by *avijjā* or the absence of this correct knowledge (*avijjā paccayā saṃkhārā*... etc.). It is clearly stated in the *suttas* that in the presence of this wisdom the foundations of an individual's samsāric process or *āsavas* are shattered (*paññāya cassa disvā āsavā parikkhīṇā honti*, *M*. I. p. 477: seeing his wisdom, the defilements which ensnare his mind totally disappear).

In the Canonical Pali texts two phases of knowledge or enlightement seem to be associated with the ultimate release in Buddhism, one succeeding the other (*pubbe kho Susīma dhammaṭṭhiti ñāṇam pacchā nibbāne ñāṇam S. II. p.* 124). They are *dhammaṭṭhitiñāṇa* or the initial knowledge of the law of causal genesis and *nibbāne ñāṇa* or the knowledge leading to final cessation. *Dhammaṭṭhiti* undoubtedly forms the basic or major premise of Buddhism, for it is the term with which the principle of causal genesis is introduced (...*thitā sā dhātu dhammaṭhititā dhammaniyāmatā idappaccayatā*, *S*. II. p. 25). In fact, the first true initiation into the doctrine of Buddhism which is often referred to as the appearance of the eye of the *Dhamma* (*dhammacakku*) is closely tied up with this comprehension of the causal principle which inspires confidence in the disciple by bringing into his view release from *samsāra* as a hopeful reality, which in other words means that, of all conditioned things or things that come into being, a cessation can be brought about (Cf...*virajaṃ vitamalaṃ dhammacakkhuṃ udapādi yam kiñci samudayadhammam sabbam taṃ nirodhadhammanti*: *M*. I. p. 380; *A*. IV, p. 186). The result of this initial gaining of knowledge (*diṭṭhadhammo pattadhammo viditadhammo pariyogaḷhadhammo*. ibid) is described in the Buddhist texts as elimination of sceptical doubt (*tiṇṇavicikiccho vigatakathaṅkatho*, ibid) and gaining of confidence and self-assurance with regard to the teaching professed (*vesārajjappatto aparapaccayo satthusāsane*, ibid).

In the higher reaches of enlightenment leading to complete emancipation in Buddhism one meets with the regular reference to the threefold knowledge or *tisso vijjā*. On the attainment of each of these *vijjās*, it is said that *avijjā* or ignorance is destroyed (*avijjā vihatā*), darkness is dispelled (*tamo vihato*) and light has appeared (*āloko uppanno*: *M*. I. p. 23). They are 1. *pubbe nivāsānussati ñāṇa* or recollection of one's former lives, 2. *sattānam cutūpapātañāṇa* or vision into the death and birth processes of beings and 3. *āsavakkhayañāṇa* or knowledge leading to the final disappearance of all defilements which prolong the *samsāric* process. *Pubbenivāsānussati* appears to be a first-hand experience or total conviction of the fact of rebirth, verified in terms of oneself. It is one aspect of the truth of *samsāra*. *Cutūpapātañāṇa*, on the other hand, is a personal discovery of the operation of the law of *karma*, which is the other complementary aspect of *samsāra*. When viewed from this angle they are an integral part of the psychology of Nirvaṇa. *Āsavakkhaya*, which comes finally, is the natural outcome of the two preceding phases of knowledge, well-grounded and powerful enough to shatter the foundations of *samsāra*. It is explained as the grasp of reality (*yathābhūtam abbhaññāsi*: *ibid*.) in terms of the four noble truths.

The concept of enlightenment came to be subsequently looked upon as consisting of different grades and therefore as being different in contrast according to the three modes of liberation or *yāna*, i.e. of the Buddha, *paccekabuddha* and *arhant* or *śrāvaka*. The Buddha's enlightenment which is generally referred to as *sammāsambodhi* contains, besides its basic contents of *yathābhūtañāṇa* or knowledge of the true nature of things, other factors such as Four Noble Truths, many extra powers and possibilites peculiar only to the Buddha, culminating in his omniscience or *sabbaññutāñāṇa*. (For these differences and distinctions see ARAHANT, BODHI, BUDDHOLOGY, OMNISCIENCE and SABBAÑÑU).

Jotiya Dhirasekera

ENMITY, a state of hostility and hatred. An enemy (*inimicus*) is the opposite of a friend (*amicus*). But although opposites, they have one common basis, the subjective self. For, it is the 'I' which seeks support in friends and which shuns those who do not provide such support. It is, therefore, in a lack of understanding (*āvijjā*) that emmity is born. Hatred (*dosa*) and its many synonyms of anger, ill-will, malice, are hardly distinguishable from one another except perhaps in the intensity of emotion. As a state of hatred, enmity is naturally far deeper rooted than an occasional outburst of anger. But basically, although perhaps not etymologically, all forms of enmity (*dosa*, *dveṣa*) are founded on conflict, opposition and duality (*dve*). And whereas enmity seeks to solve the conflict of duality by eliminating the opponent, the deeper understanding of the conflict will see its cause in the 'I'. Through understanding the emptiness of that 'self', the foundation of all opposition and duality disappears, and therewith the arising of enmity becomes an impossibility.

In Buddhist Psychology, joy, ease and happiness are imcompatible with enmity and hate. In enmity (*paṭivirodha*) life itself becomes sour, 'like gruel that has gone bad' (*D.A.* I. p. 211), temper becomes disordered (*Dhs.* p. 84) and one is thrown off one's normal state (*DhsA.* p. 258). It is the cause of mental fetters and moral corruption and cannot be put away by accumulation of good deeds, but only by mind-culture (*bhāvanā*) and insight (*dassana*: *Dhs.* p. 184.) i.e., through a mental awakening, which is an intellectual and spiritual conversion. The hostility (*paṭivirodha*) of Devadatta against the Buddha forms a point of discussion between king Milinda and Nāgasena (*Miln.* p. 203), and in the *Dhammasaṅgani* p. 190 it is shown as one of the 27 maintestaions of hate. See DOSA.

H. G. A. Van Zeyst

ENRYAKUJI is on Mt. Hiei, Shigagun District, Omi Province (presently Shiga Prefecture), Japan. This is the main temple (Sōhonzan) of the Tendaishū sect. It is also called *Hieiji, Hieji, Hieizanji, Sanmon* (or temple of the mountain). The name Enryakuji comes from the fact that the temple was founded by Saicho (767-822 A.C.) in the 4th year of the Enryaku period (785 A.C.). He, then, built the main hall (*Konpon-Chūdō*) in the 7th year of the Enryaku period (788 A.C.), and he placed there the statue of Bhaiṣajyaguru Tathāgata carved out by himself. He named the main hall Ichijō-Shikwan-in (or Ekayāna Samathavipaśyana Vihārā), and composed an ode for the hall,

"Anokutara-sanmyakusanbodai no hotoketachi.
Wagatatsusoma ni myōga arasetamaye!"
OR
Obeisance to all the Buddhas of Anuttarasamyaksam bodhi, Be so good enough to protect the new hall (wagatatsusoma) built by me!

After that the hall was also called: *Wagatatsumoma*. On the third of September in the 13th year of the Enryaku period (794 A.C.), the emperor Kwanmu visited the hall for his *pūjā*. After this imperial visit the foundation of the temple was completed.

Its campus was bounded within 88 acres by the method of Sīmābandha, and is the first Sīmābandha territory in Japan.

In the 16th year of the Enryaku period (797 A.C.) Saicho was appointed to the post of chaplain to the royal court and was given all the taxes of the Omi Province as the funds for the temple. In the following November he began the ten lectures on *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra*. In the 23rd year of the same period ([illegible] A.C.) Saichō went to China and returned next year. Immediately after returning he constructed a big temple attached to Enryakuji, by the order of the emperor, whereupon the temple became the principal one in the imperial capital.

In the 13th year of the Konin period (822 A.C.) Saichō the founder, passed away, and the themple was given the right to impart ordination for priesthood, viz., the right of *upasampadā* (Daijō-Kaidan). In the first year of Jowa period (834 A.C.), Encho, the successor of Saicho, and others founded the Shakadō (or the shrine of Sākyamuni) by the imperial order of the emperors Kōkō and Uda. In the thirteenth year of the same period (846 A.C.), the Jōshin-in temple was founded and the next year ten teachers (Zenji) were appointed to give lectures and chantings on *Mahāprajñāpāramitā-sūtras* every day, which last up to the present day. In the first year of the Kashō period (848 A.C.) Ennin founded Yokawa Shurōgon-in (shrine room) which is one of the most distinguished temples annexed to the Enrya-kuji temple. After the return of Ennin and Enchin from China, the sect became very prosperous and many buildings were constructed in the campus. In the eighteenth year of the Jakwan period (876 A.C.) eight priests were appointed as permanent preachers of the temple and they dwelt in the newly built Hōtōin temple. In the fifth year of Gwangyō period (881 A.C.) about one hundred acres of paddy land was donated to the temple by the government.

In the second year of the Engi period (902 A.C.) the emperor Uda visited the temple and he also donated about twenty-five acres of paddy land.

At present the temple complex is called "Ku-in Jūroku-in" or the nine or sixteen shrines. Ku-in is as follows: Konpondaijo-shikwan-in, Hokkesanmai-in, Ichigyō-sanmai-in, Hanshū-Sanmai-in, Kakuisanmai-in, Tōtō-in, Sai tō-in, Hō-tō-in, Bosatsukaidan-in, Gokoku-in, Sōji-in, Konpon-hokke-in, Jōdo-in, Zenrin-in, Datsuzoku-in, and Kōshin-in.

Sometimes it is also called "Santō Jūrokutani" or the three pagodas and sixteen valleys, among which three pagodas are Tōtō (or the eastern pagoda) to which five valleys belong, Saitō (or the western) to which five valleys belong and Yokawa-to (or the pagoda at Yokawa) to which six belong.

In short, the histroy of Enryakuji is mainly the history of Japanese Buddhism as almost all sects of it are sprung from the Hieizan or Enryakuji. The founders of the new sects of the Kamakura period, such as Nichiren of the Nichirenshū sect (or the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka sect), Hōnen of the Jōdōshū sect (Pureland sect) and Shinran of the Jodoshin-shu sect (True Pure Land sect had spent their young days on this mountain. The Tendaishū sect itself is also divided into many

schools, or so called *Taimitsu Jusanryū* (or the thirteen sects of Tendai Esotericism) or *Edan Hachiryu* (or the eight branches of Tendai Precepts). When the temple enjoyed its greatest popularity, it is said to have had three thousand subordinate temples. On account of this enormous prosperity, in mediaeval ages, the temple counted among its inhabitants many monk soldiers (Yamahōshi) who fought against other big temples and big *Daimyōs* (feudal lords). Finally, all the buildings on the mountain were burnt and more than three thousand monks were killed by Oda Nobunaga, the ruler of Japan in the second year of the Genki period (1571 A.C.). After this destruction the temple became almost ruined. But by the effort of Zenso and Senshun who were supported by the new ruler, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, the buildings were reconstructed almost the same according to the former plans.

The temple might still be said to be one of the greatest temples in Japan. The existing important buildings are as follows: (1) Yakushidō or the hall of Bhaiṣajaguru, or so-called Konpon-chūdō; the greatest building in the temple, built in the 12th year of Tensho by Toyotomi Hideyoshi and remodelled in the 11th year of the Kawn'ei period (1634) by Tokugawa Iyenitsu. It measures 56 feet each side. (2) Daikodo or the lecture hall was also burnt many times and the newest one which had been built in the thirteenth year of the Kwan'ei period (1636 A.C.) was also burnt in 1957. Now it is being rebuilt. (3) Ichijōkaidan-in or the meditation hall of precepts. It measures 30 feet each side, and has a two storied pagoda. Besides these there are, (4) Sorinto or the iron pagoda, (5) Yokawa Chūdo or the main hall of Yokawa subordinate temple, (6) Anrakuritsuin, or the hall of Anrakuritsu precepts, (7) Hiye Jinja or the Shinto Shrine of Hiye, who is a guardian of Buddhism.

In these temples many statues, scrolls and paintings are preserved and most of these are listed as national treasures.

S. Kanoaka

ENTITY, a word used by writers on Buddhism to denote an ontological existence such as essence, substance, a soul, being and so on that is permanently perpetuating itself and is believed to be exempted and immune from change: *aviparināmadhammo sassatisamam tathe'va ṭhassati*. Theories of entity was a characteristic feature of the philosophic thought which was contemporaneous with Buddhism. Thus, the Upanishadic philosophy - a school sprung from the Brahmanic tradition upheld the belief in a microcosmic entity called the *ātman, pratyag-ātman* or *pudgala-ātman* which was considered to be the essence, the substance of the individual. Similarly this philosophy promulgated its counterpart the macrocosmic entity the *mahā-ātma* or *paramātma* or the *Brahma* the cosmic essence (*jagadātman*) or soul. Not only the philosophical schools belonging to the Brahmanic tradition but also some belonging to the rival *śramaṇa* tradition, e.g. Ājivakas, too, held an almost similar view. Buddhists at the very outset rejected the belief in an entity. Their basic doctrine *anicca* made them reject such a belief.

According to the Buddhist explanation, all phenomena or existence are impermanent (*anicca*), subject to suffering (*dukkha*) and non-substantial (*anatta*). In fact the characteristic *anicca* is the most important one and the other two are corollaries (S. III. p. 67). It is clear from numerous *suttas* such as the *Brahmajāla* (D. I. p. 1 ff.), the *Alagaddūpama* (M. I. p. 135) and the *Poṭṭhapāda* (D. I. p. 178 f., p. 256) - all belonging to the earliest stratum of the Pali Canon that early Buddhism emphatically rejected the belief in such an entity, both at the microcosmic and macrocosmic levels. In the *Alagaddūpama Sutta* the Buddha clearly explains the baselessness of the belief in a 'self', a 'soul'. This rejection of an entity or a being is very effectively stated in the *Samyutta* (S. I. p. 135) where it is said that there is no entity or being to be found; it is just a nomenclature used to connote the five aggregates (*khanda*), it is just a bundle of perception (*saṅkhārapuñja*). From the *Poṭṭhapāda sutta* (D. I. p. 178 ff.) it is equally clear that the conception of the universe as an entity was to the Buddha as much a fiction as an individual soul.

However, a shift of position is discernible in later Buddhism. With the gradual development of the Abhidharma school of thought which adopted a method of analysis and classification in its attempt to explain existence or being, Buddhism became exposed to non-Buddhistic philosophical influences. Consequently, Abhidharmikas came to accept such theories as the theory of atoms (*paramāṇuvāda*) and the theory of moments (*kṣaṇa-vāda*) which were the current philosophical trends of the time. The effect of these infuences are clearly reflected in Sarvastivāda, the Sammitīyas and to a lesser extent in the Sautrāntika school of Buddhism. Thus these schools in their attempt to present a logical analysis of the doctrine of *anicca* (impermanence) were led to posit a belief in some sort of an entity (See. D. J. Kalupahana *Causality, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, 1975 Honolulu, chap. iv.). Though it is true that the Sarvāstivāda denied an entity or a being, a composite entity which is identical with the individual, it is seen that they held the elements (*dharma*) that constitute the individual to be ultimate elements or entities which are seperate, disconnected and momentary. The Sautrāntikas too have accepted that there are entities or elements (*skandha*) that pass from

existence to existence. The Sammitiyas posited an entity which they called the *pudgala* which they held to persist from existence to existence. The Sarvāstivādins and the Sautrāntikas who did not go to the extreme of positing a *pudgala* were forced to posit an underlying entity, an unchanging, everlasting substratum. The Sautrāntikas called this entity the *svabhāva* or *dravya* which according to them exists during the three periods of time, i.e. past, present and future.

In fact, it appears that the Buddha seems to have anticipated such a development and had already illustrated its falsity in the *Saṃyutta* (*S.* III, pp. 70–73) wherein he points out that a theory which says that an entity exists in the past, the present and the future oversteps the limits of linguistics convention. Even subsequent texts like the *Kathāvatthu* (*Kvu.* p. 115 ff.) completely refutes the Sarvāstivadins' theory of entities. The two *Assutavā Suttas* in the *Saṃyutta* (*S.* II, 94 ff.) too refute the conception of an entity. Herein both the physical body (*kāya*) and the mind (*citta, mono* or *viññāṇa*) are analysed and shown that there is no entity underlying them. In this context it should be noted that even the rebirth consciousness (*paṭisandhi-citta* or *viññāṇa*), too, is not an entity as it was supposed to be by Sāti. The Buddha, while declaring Sāti's conception to be false, points out that he has in many ways spoken of consciousness as being causally produced and that apart from conditions there could be no arising of consciousness (*M.* I, p. 256).

Though an underlying entity is denied, the endurance of the physical body and the mind which, however, are subject to change, is granted. Similarly the existence of all phenomena is accepted. Such a position is arrived at not as a result of an attempt to seize the infinitesimal through metaphysical inquiries or mystic intuition but through a process of empirical analysis. Thus, it would not be denied, according to Buddhism, that a person exists in the pesent so long as one does not mean by it a person, an entity enduring in time (see. K.N. Jayatillake, *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*, London 1967 pp. 316, 363, 366).

Though there appears to be some sort of influence of the theory of momentariness on Buddhaghosa's attempt to explain the perceived duration of the physical body (*SA.* II, p. 99) it is quite clear that neither he nor the subsequent Theravāda commentators such as Dhammapāla and Ānanda subscribe to a theory of entities (see further, ANICCA, ANATTA, CAUSALITY).

S. K. Nānayakkara

ENVIRONMENT. Living in a suitable environment (*paṭirūpadesavāsa*) is reckoned as one of the auspicious things in Buddhism (*Khp.* p. 3). The commentary explains *patirūpadesa* as a place where the fourfold people live, namely where the monks, nuns, lay male devotees and female devotees live, where meritorious activities such as liberality prevail and where the teachings of the master are taught and studied. Such a place is called auspicious (*maṅgala*) because people living in such areas are in a position to acquire merit (*KhpA.* p. 132).

Buddhism recognises the fact that environment plays an important part in the moulding of the character of individuals as well as of the group, though it does not believe that it is the one and the only factor. In the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* (*A.* I. p. 126) the Buddha says that a person who associates freely those who are immoral and given to low practices, himself will assimilate those base ways (*nihīyati puriso nihīnasevi*). It is because of this fact that the Buddha reckoned non-association with the low as an auspicious thing (*maṅgala*) for a man who wishes his own welfare.

People gather experience and knowledge from the environment in which they live and the temperaments and inclinations are developed in them in accordance with the knowledge and experience they gather from their particular environment. So, in an environment where educational facilities, moral guidance, suitable means of livelihood are not found, people grow up, ignorant of what is good and what is bad, ignorant of duties and obligations to one another and they indulge in diverse corrupt practices. But in a society where these facilities are properly provided and where means of righteous livelihood are assured to all, people grow up quite well-informed of what is happening in the world, conscious of their moral obligations to one another and efficient in their handling of all work in that society. The way of thinking and temperaments of beings in the latter society will be quite different from those of the former one.

The doctrine of causality (*paṭiccasamuppāda*) teaches that nothing happens without conditions and causes (*S.* II. p. 78) and hence by changing those conditions and causes a change in the result too could be brought about. This is very well illustrated in the *Chakkavatti-Sīhanāda Sutta* wherein it is shown how people became corrupted due to the unfavourable conditions that prevailed in a society and how same people progressed when those conditions that gave rise to corruption were changed (*D.* III. pp. 65–77).

The episode of Aṅgulimāla (*DA.* I. p. 240; *J.* IV, p. 180), too, helps us to understand how the environment can fully change the nature of a being. Aṅgulimāla, who was in his early days called Ahiṃsaka, became a dangerous criminal, not through any fault of his own, but due to the viciousness of his immediate environment. The criminal

Aṅgulimāla once again became a virtuous man by his association with the Buddha, that is with the change of the environment.

Buddhism emphasised the importance of the environmental factor in the spiritual developemnt of the people, at the very outset. The Buddha set up the organisation or the brotherhood of monks (*Bhikkhusaṅgha*) in order to provide the adherents with the proper environment for spiritual culture. The environment of the householder's life is not one that encourages the cultivation of higher virtues (*sambādhoyan gharāvāso: A.* II, p. 208). In the environment of the monastery the conditions are very favourable to the cultivation of the mind, because it is free from bonds of lay life, no distractions to wean one away from meditation and the conditions there do not arouse one's greed and hatred.

Meditation is not possible unless the proper environment is there. A person who is keen on cultivating higher virtues to develop the mind has to withdraw to a place where the suitable environmental conditions are found. The places mentioned as very favourable for meditation are: a remote wilderness (*arañña*,) the foot of a tree (*rukkhamūla*), a mountain range (*pabbata*), a rock cave (*giriguhā*), a cemetery (*susāna*), a secluded place (*vanapattha*) away from human habitation, an open space (*abbhokāsa*), a heap of straw (*palālapuñja: D.* I, p. 71; *M.* III, p. 3).

Even in the present day it is the custom of lay Buddhists to withdraw to the quiet atmosphere of the village monasteries to observe the Poya day precepts (*sīla*). The environment in the monastery is quite favourable to that purpose, as it is devoid of various distractions found in the environment of the ordinary lay society.

W. G. Weeraratne

ENVY The shorter Oxford English Dictionary (edited by C. T. Onions) defines the word envy as: "Mortification and ill-will occasioned by the contemplation of another's superior advantages, a longing for another's advantages". Commentator Buddhaghosa too, defines *issā*, the Pali equivalent of envy, in similar terms: "Envying is envy. It has the characteristic of being jealous of other's success. Its function is to be dissatisfied with that. It is manifest as averseness from that. It's proximate cause is another's success" (*issāyanā issā. Sā parasampattinaṃ ussūyanalakkhaṇā, tattheva anabhiratirasā, tato vimukhabhāva paccupaṭṭhānā, parasampattipadaṭṭhāna Vism.* p. 470).

In Buddhist literature, envy is always shown as accompanied by avariciousness and selfishness (*macchera A.* I. p. 95). An envious person is also considered to be stingy and selfish. *Visuddhimagga* (*Vism.* p. 470) defines stinginess or avariciousness thus: "Avariciousness is avarice. Its characteristic is the hiding of one's own success that has been or can be obtained It's function is not to bear sharing these with others. It is manifest as shrinking or it is manifest as meanness. It's proximate cause is one's own success (*maccherabhāvo macchariyaṃ Taṃ laddhānaṃ vā labhitabbānaṃ va attano sampattinaṃ nigūhana lakkhaṇaṃ tāsaṃ yeva parehi sādhāraṇabhāva-akkhamaṇarasaṃ, saṅkopanapaccupaṭṭhānaṃ, kaṭukañcukatāpaccupaṭṭhānaṃ vā; attasampattipadaṭṭhānaṃ, cettaso virūpabhāvo ti daṭṭhabbaṃ*).

Buddhism considers this psychological phenomena an obstacle (*samyojana*), not only to the spiritual progress of the individual, but also for his social well-being and happiness. A person who has in him this disturbing element becomes distracted and worried at the sight of even a slight success of another, and such a person is naturally led to express his uneasiness and ill-will by word and deed. With a view to harming a successful person, an envious man would resort to falsehood (*musāvāda*), harsh speech (*pharusā rācā*) and slanderous speech (*pisunāvācā*). Such a person would fabricate stories and spread them to harm the object of his envy. Not content with this, he would scheme to bring about the downfall, or sometimes the physical destruction of the object of his envy.

Viewed from its social dimension envy would cause damage to the individual who harbours it as well as to the society where he lives. A person who is envious of others' success and hides his own, would be despised by others (*Sn. v.* 102). He cannot win the friendship and good-will of others. When such a person is in distress others would not come to help him or console him. People would treat him as an alien, an out-caste (ibid. *v.* 124). As such an envious person would always be worried and unhappy and would be at conflict with many in his society. Such a person would not only be the cause of his own unhappiness, but also the source of irritation and unrest for many others.

Envy is also an obstacle to the spiritual developement of an individual. As an envious person would harbour ill-will, malice and hatred to others, he would always be irritated and disturbed in mind. Envy and avariciousness are called defilements of the mind (*issā maccheramalam Dhp. v.* 242; *A.* IV, p. 8; *A.* I. p. 105). When the mind is stained it would not be possible to reflect on an object as it is, even as a stained or broken mirror cannot give the true reflection of an object. Owing to his inability to see things as they are (*yathābhūta*) he would always harbour wrong views (*vipaññadiṭṭhi*), an outcome of ignorance (*avijjā*), which is the strongest obstacle to spiritual development.

A person who is concerned about his social well-being and spiritual development, therefore, has to get rid of this malevolent psychological phenomena, and cultivate in its place altruistic joy (*muditā*). Altruistic joy as taught in Buddhism is the ability of a person to feel at ease and happy at the sight of another's happiness or success (*D.* I. p. 251; *S.* V. 118; *SnA.* p. 128). It is only a person whose disposition is one of unreserved friendship to all, that can feel happy at the happiness of another. See, ISSĀ, MACCHERA and MUDITĀ.

W. G. Weeraratne

EPICS. Epics or epic poetry is the designation given to that kind of narrative poetry where the achievements of a heroic personage of history or legend are celebrated at length in a set literary pattern.

In Indian literature, of which Buddhist literature forms only a part, the *Mahābhārata* and the *Rāmāyaṇa* (of about the 4th and 2nd centuries B.C. respectively) have been regarded as the models for this kind of literary creation, in the same way the two Homeric poems, the *Odyssey* and the *Iliad*, (of about the 8th century B.C.) were regarded as epic models in the west. Of the two Sanskrit epics mentioned above, it is actually the *Rāmāyaṇa* that has received the correct epic treatment at the hands of its author, *Vālmiki*. Consequently, the later rhetoricians and the poets took the *Rāmāyaṇa* as the first epic (*ādikavya*) and Vālmiki as the first epic writer (*ādikavi*).

Coming to Buddhist Literature, the writer who has created a name as an epic writer is Aśvaghoṣa (q.v.), the great Mahāyāna teacher of the first or the second century A.C. He has composed the two epic poems, the *Buddhacarita* (q.v.) and the *Saundarānanda-kāvya*, modelled on the epic traditions formulated by Vālmiki. Aśvaghoṣa was a native of Ayodhya, who seems to have been a brahmin converted to Buddhism and become monk. And it was in the brahmanic circles of Ayodhyā that the Rāma epic also grew. All these factors make it easy to understand why he felt the urge to compose Sanskrit *kāvyas* on Buddhist themes. The *Buddhacarita* deals with the life of the Buddha, who is the hero of the epic, while the other *kāvya* contains the story of the conversion of Nanda, the Buddha's half-brother.

It may not be irrelevant if here a few words were said about the epic elements found in Buddhist literature. Professor M. Winternitz (*History of Indian Literature*, 2 volumes) traces the evolution of the Indian epic from the narrative and ballad kind of compositions scattered in the Vedic literature. In Pali literature, too, he sees a similar kind of ballad poetry (e.g. *Nālaka*, *Pabbajjā* and *Padhāna Suttas* of the *Suttanipāta*) in which the epic version of the Buddha's life is traceable in miniature. Then in the *Lalitavistara*, a Sanskrit work dealing with the Buddha's life are found all the germs of an epic. The type of legends and ballads that must have helped Aśvaghoṣa in his delineation of the Buddha's life are also found in other Buddhist Sanskrit works such as the *Mahāvastu*, *Divyāvadāna* and *Jātakamālā*. Although the sources of his *kāvyas* were not these books themselves, Aśvaghoṣa must have drawn from the same sources as the authors of these works made use of in their narratives.

Aśvaghoṣa was both a great poet and an erudite monk. His poetic talent, his deep reverence and love for the Buddha and his correct grasp ofthe Buddha's teachings-all have found fulfilment in the *Buddhacarita*. Conforming to the classical requirements of an epic he divides his poem into cantos (*sarga*), brings forth the heroic nature of the Buddha's character, presents in regular sequence such epic requirements as descriptions of love-scenes (iv. 24–53), sermons on state-craft (*niti-śāstra*: iv. 62–82); he even presents a battle-scene in canto xiii where the Buddha's struggle with Māra is described. E.H. Johnston, who has translated the *Buddhacarita* into English, (*The Buddhacarita* or Acts of the Buddha, II, pp. xviv.-xcv), has to say the following about the epic and its author, "This analysis of Aśvaghoṣa's teachnique suggests that, if we call him rough, the Ennius to Kālidāsa's Virgil, we do not quite find the centre of the target; if an analogy be found in European poetry, I would rather seek it in Milton, equally a scholar and equally fond of displaying his learning, who similarly sought to express his religion within the limits of an epic. For where Aśvaghoṣa's text survives undamaged, he polished enough and his work is usually highly wrought and well finished. But his intricacy and elaboration are those of the primitive, not of the sophisticated writer."

It would be no exaggeration to say that the status gained by the *Buddhacarita* in Buddhism, specially in Mahāyāna, is similar to that of the *Rāmāyaṇa* in Hinduism. It may be mentioned here that just as Vālmiki and his immediate successors were the predecessors of Aśvaghośa, the latter himself was the predecessor of Kālidāsa. The parallelisms between Aśvaghoṣa and Kālidāsa would perhaps mean that Kālidāsa was familiar with the poems of Aśvaghoṣa. But it is also possible that as both modelled their works on Vālmiki these parallelisms are more or less convergences rather than borrowings.

In addition to Aśvaghoṣa's *Buddhacarita* and the *Saundarānanda* there is another *kāvya* dealing with the Buddha's life. This is *Padyacūḍāmaṇi* ascribed to one Buddhaghoṣa (not the Pali commentator) who seems to have been familiar with Aśvaghoṣa and Kālidāsa (Winternitz, ibid, II, p. 276).

The Jātaka stories like the *Vidhurapaṇḍita* (No. 545) and the *Vessantara* (No. 547) also have the 'epic touch both in composition and in presentation. Yet it should be noted that in the *Vessantara Jātaka* the hero, the bodhisatta, is one of generosity and renunciation and not of war. The Jātakas like *Ghaṭa* (No. 454) and the *Dasaratha* (No. 461) show that the legend of Rāma was known to the writers of the Buddhist Jātakas. It may be mentioned here that some Jātakas have received epic treatment, (apparently in imitation of the Sanskrit writers), at the hands of Sinhalese writers. Parākramabāhu's *Kavsiḷumiṇa* (13th century) is the best example of a *mahākavya* (epic) in Sinhala. It is the story of the *Kusa Jātaka* and even a later poet, Alagiyawanna (16th century) has written a poem on it. Śrī Rāhula's *Kāvyaśekharaya* (15th century), which deals with the *Andubhūta Jātaka* (No. 62) is another example. A versified form of the *Vessantara Jātaka* is even today recited at funeral houses in Sri Lanka reminding us of similar recitations in ancient India.

In the Pali chronicles of Sri Lanka, specially in the *Mahāvaṃsa*, the "Duṭṭhagāmani Epic," is seen as an attempt to fashion an epic poem out of the traditions contained in the Sinhala commentaries (*sīhala aṭṭhakathā*).

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EPIGRAPHY.

Burma. It is not known exactly when Buddhism was introduced to Burma though it is traditionally believed that Buddhism was introduced to this country in the time of the Indian Emperor Aśoka. Unlike in Sri Lanka, however, the earliest inscriptions associated with Buddhism found in Burma cannot be assigned to a point of time earlier than the fifth century A.C.

Among these early inscriptions are two gold plates found embedded in a brick found at Maunggun in the Prome district. On these plates are inscribed in Pyu characters, the formulae expressing some of the fundamental teachings of the Buddha, as *ye dhammā hetuppabhavā*... and the Four Noble Truths. One plate contains the well-known formula extolling the virtues of the Buddha reading *Iti pi so Bhagavā Arahaṃ Sammāsambuddho*... The inscriptions on two funerary urns, a very short inscription around the lid of a relic casket and a terra-cotta votive tablet with a Sanskrit legend are among the rest of the records of this period. The inscriptions around the urns are in the Pyu language and in the same characters. All these records have been discovered in the vicinity of Hmawza, a village close to Prome in lower Burma, and are of considerable value as documents relating to the early history of Buddhism in Burma.

Equally valuable, perhaps, is a series of Sanskrit inscriptions engraved on stone pillars found at Mrohaung in Arakan. This record has chronicled the events of the reigns of several kings of Arakan. Most of these inscriptions have been caused to be engraved by a ruler by the name of Ānandacandra.

Most of the inscriptions in Burma which have a bearing on Buddhism are bilingual. One version of an inscription being given in Mon and the other in Pali or Sanskrit, depending on whether the Theravāda or the Mahāyāna School of Buddhism is the prevailing religion at the time.

At the Ānanda Temple in Pāgan completed at the end of the eleventh century, the titles of the jātaka stories illustrated in the first and second roofs and the three terraces above are written in Talaing, the illustrations being for the edification of the people at large.

An important inscription of this period is the great inscription of the Shwezigon Pagoda at Pagan, of the reign of king Kyanazitha (A.C. 1084–1112) also called King Śrī Bhuva-nāditya-Dharmarāja. The first part of the inscription is in Pali with a Mon translation, the rest being in Mon. In the preamble to the inscription lay men and lay women are admonished to live a righteous life. The rest of the record gives a long account of the life and career of king Kyanazitha. The record is virtually a panegyric of the king. Most of the inscriptions of the eleventh and twelfth century were set up by king Kyanazitha to extol his own achievements and good deeds.

An inscription set up by king Alaungsithu, grandson of king Kyanazitha, appears to serve the same purpose, namely to extol the good works of his grandfather, but its real value lies in the circumstance that the inscription has been carved on the four faces of a pillar, in four languages, set up at the Myazedi Pagoda, South of Pegu. The four languages are: Pali, Burmese, Mon and Pyu, each of the pillars containing the inscription in one of the four languages. The Pali and the Burmese versions

f this inscription discovered in 1911 have thrown considerable light on the Mon and Pyu versions, two languages which had not been well understood at the time.

An inscription found at the Nandamanna temple at Pagan, issued in A.C. 1248 is of unusual interest in regard to the development of Buddhist Sects in Burma. This inscription records that a person named Shin Arahan travelled to Tenasserim in the South to enshrine a relic of the Buddha in a temple of the sect known as Ari. Provision also was made to supply the inmates of the temple with rice, meat and fermented spirits, both in the morning and in the evening. As fermented spirits are not permitted to Buddhist Monks, it can only be surmised that the Ari Monks who lived at Tenasserim were probably of the Vajrayāna school of Buddhism who were not prohibited from taking fermented spirits.

A famous inscription discovered in 1820's at Buddhagayā in India describes how a mission was sent to Buddhagayā where the Sacred Temple of the Mahābodhi had fallen into decay, with instructions to take all measures to restore the temple as was deemed appropriate. When the temple fell into decay again sometime afterwards a second mission was despatched to effect repairs at Buddhagaya, in the reign of a Prince named Dhammarāja, who cannot be identified with certainty. The suggestion has been made that Prince Dhammarāja may be another name of Prince Klacwa who reigned as king from A.C. 1289 to 1297.

Undoubtedly the most valuable inscription from the point of view of the history of Buddhism in Burma is the Kalyāṇi Sīmā Inscription set up by king Dhammaceti of Burma in A.C. 1479–80 at Pegu. The inscription consists of two accounts: one in Mon engraved on four slabs of stone and the other in Pali engraved on three slabs. The contents of the two versions are more or less the same, the Mon version containing some additional material. The object of the inscription was to provide in permanent form, for everybody to see, an authoritative ruling on the conflicting views on the conduct of the *upasampadā* and *pavāraṇā* ceremonies, based on authoritative Pali texts, consequent to a visit of a chapter of learned monks from Sri Lanka, on the invitation of a delegation of Burmese monks led by the Ven. Uttarajīva. The delegation arrived in two batches in Sri Lanka in the reign of King Bhuvanekabāhu VI (A.C. 1470–1478). The account of the mission's voyage to Sri Lanka, their travels in Sri Lanka and of the directions laid down in respect of the conduct of the *upasampadā* ceremony and other ecclesiastical acts are preceded by a long account of the history of Buddhism in Burma from the time of King Aśoka. It may perhaps be mentioned here that the accuracy of the contents of the Kalyāṇi Sīmā Inscription has been questioned by at least one scholar.

Prince Sinbyuyin, second son of king Alaunpaya, *circa* the year A.C. 1774, travelled from Ava to Rangoon to construct a *chatra* (umbrella) on the Shwe Dagon Pagoda. The old *chatra* had crashed down, being struck by lightning.

The prince's journey from Ava to Rangoon together with the construction of the *chatra* are described at some length in an inscription at Po Vo Daung.

Cambodia. Mahāyāna Buddhism appears to have been introduced to Cambodia as early as the fifth century but no inscriptions of such early date, bearing on Buddhism, have been discovered. The earliest extant inscription of such a character is the Vat Preivar Stone Inscription of Jayavarman I set up in A.C. 665. By this inscription the king grants to one Subhakīrti, son of the sister of two Buddhist Monks Ratnabāhu and Ratnasimha a religious property as a hereditary grant. As is to be expected most of the inscriptions of Cambodia register grants made to religious foundations. The rulers and also the people were quite eclectic in their views though professing to be followers of the Mahāyāna School of Buddhism . In their inscriptions it often happens that though the Buddha is the principal object of their invocations, Hindu divinities such as Rudra, Viṣṇu are not forgotten. The earliest document that furnishes clear evidence of the prevalence of Mahāyāna Buddhism in Cambodia is the Prasat Ta Kam Inscription set up in A.C. 791. It mentions the Mahāyānic divinity Lokeśvara.

Perhaps with a view to securing their unswerving loyalty ascetics,both of the Mahāyāna and the Theravāda tradition, in all places, temples, monasteries and hermitages, were required to transfer the merit gained by them by their austerities to the king, and those who disturbed the peace of the monks and the ascetics were informed that they would be expelled and handed over to the state tribunal for punishment. These orders appear in an inscription of king Suryavarman I written in the Khmer language and set up at the beginning of the eleventh century.

In A.C. 1112 in the reign of king Suryavarman II, Saka Kamraten An Sri Vīrendrādhipati, according to the Phimai Inscription, installed an image of Tri-Lokavijaya, general of the God Vimaya, and provided slaves and land for its maintenance. Vīrendrādhipati has been identified as Suryavarman II (112–52) who built the Angkor vāt Temple, famous for its grand conception.

King Jayavarman VII (A.C. 1181–1201) was an indefatigable worker in the cause of Mahāyāna Buddhism and his relatively lengthy inscriptions provide useful information not only in respect of the growth of Buddh-

sim in Cambodia but also in respect of current social conditions. The Ta Prohm Inscription of this ruler, for example, begins with an invocation to the Triple Gem, Lokeśvara and to the mother of all Buddhas, Prajñā-Pāramitā. This invocation is followed by a geneology of his line and the victorious campaigns conducted by Jayavarman VII. The body of the inscription enumerates the various materials required for ceremonies held in temples and the contributions that farmers are required to make towards these temple ceremonies. The inscription concludes with a description of the spring festival together with the rules governing this festival, and a prayer that the merit generated by these good works of the king should assist his royal mother to secure release from the endless cycles of birth. This inscription contains 145 Sanskrit stanzas in 290 lines.

Another lengthy but informative inscription of the same ruler is the Pra Khan Stele Inscription recording the consecration of an image of the Bodhisattva Lokeśvara. Reference is again made to the numerous pious foundations king Jayavarman had set up, and the large sums of money spent in connection with the foundations. The king is said to have made 20400 images of gold, silver, bronze and stone and built 514 seperate temples and 2066 accessories to temples or minor constructions. The inscription is nothing but a review of all the king's good works, not altogether, perhaps free from an element of exaggeration. The Say-Fong Inscription of the same ruler records the foundation of a hospital and sets out the regulations formulated by the king for its administration.

Inscriptions set up by rulers who were followers of the Mahāyāna were, it should be noted, written in Sanskrit and Khmer languages. After the introduction of the Theravāda to Cambodia about the latter part of the thirteenth century inscriptions came to be written in Pali and Khmer, One of the first such inscriptions written partly in Pali and partly in Khmer is the Kok Svay Cek Inscription of Sri KIndravarman set up in A.C. 1230. This inscription records the grant of a village named Siri Sundararatana-gāma to the Mahāthera Sirindamoli and the grant of four villages to a monastery and eight plots of land to some monks.

The Indian Sub-Continent: The oldest inscriptions of the Indian Sub-continent are, generally speaking the inscriptions of the Emperor Aśoka which are dealt with elsewhere (see. EDICTS). The inscription written in Brāhmī characters on the Piprahva Relic Casket is considered to be as old as the inscriptions of Aśoka and records the fact that the casket contains some relics of the Buddha, the Blessed one, enshrined therein by a Sākyan family headed by one Sukirti.

Later in date are the inscriptions, in Brāhmi characters, that appear on the railings around the two famous stūpas of Bhārhūt now dismantled and the several stūpas at Sāñcī, Central India. The latter with their magnificent *toranas* (gateways) appear to have provided many opportunities for numerous short inscriptions to be engraved at appropriate spots. ohe inscriptions engraved on these railings are mostly of a donatory character but provide also useful information in respect of the economic and social conditions of the time.

At Bhārhūt besides the donatory inscriptions are short epigraphs identifying the bas-reliefs carved on the pillars, which illustrate some of the previous lives, jātakas of the Buddha and incidents in his own life. The standing figures of various divinities in high relief carved on the pillars that were around the stūpa are also identified by appropriate titles. Among the titles of jātakas that appear at Bhārhūt are *Miga-jātaka* and *Mahakapi-Jātaka*. The bas-relief illustrating the offering of the Jetavana monastery to the Buddha by the merchant Anāthapiṇḍika carries a caption stating that here Anāthapiṇḍika is offering the Jetavana Monastery (to The Buddha) after covering the monastery grounds with millions (of coins) while the bas-relief illustrating the assembly of gods in heaven paying homage to the Sacred Hair Relic of the Buddha carries a similarly appropriate title.

The inscriptions at Bhārhūt can be assigned to the second century B.C. while those at Sāñcī are of a slightly later date, a few of them being assigned to even modern times.

In the stūpas of Sāñcī already referred to, Sonali and Andher, all near Bhopal, in Madhyapradesh, relic caskets have been found bearing the names of the saints whose relics are enshrined in them. Some of these were identified as the names of those teachers who, according to the Pali chronicle, *Mahāvaṃsa*, were set to neighbouring countries by the Emperor Aśoka to propagate the teaching of the Buddha. These identifications have now been shown to be open to doubt.

Further south were situated two other well-known stūpas, namely the Amarāvati Stūpa and the Nāgārjunakoṇḍa Stūpa both situated on the River Kistna. Most of the inscriptions of Amarāvati are again of a donatory character and refer to the construction of the various parts of the Stūpa and can be assigned to the period 2nd century B.C. to the second century A.C. Prominent among the donors appear the members of the royal dynasty known as the Sātavāhanas. The records at Nāgārjunakoṇḍa have been set up by or under the patronage of the members of the Ikṣvāku family. Foremost among the Ikṣvāku patrons of Nāgārjunakoṇḍa

was Queen Chāntasiri whose name appears repeatedly in many records, described as a most munificent and charitable lady. A record of considerable historical interest is an inscription engraved on the floor of an apsidal temple here stating that *upāsikā* Bodhisiri has dedicated the temple to the fraternity of Sri Lankan monks. A Siṃhala Vihāra, for the accommodation of monks from Sri Lanka is also mentioned in this record. Thus inscriptions at Amarāvati and Nāgārjunakoṇḍa provide very valuable evidence for the history of the Sātavāhanas and Ikṣvākus. Inscriptions at both these places are in one of the dialects of Prakṛt and in Brāhmi characters whose gradual evolution can be traced in them for about four centuries. Inscriptions on the relic caskets found in the Bhaṭṭiprolu Stūpa, Guntur District, have been assigned to the third century B.C.

Inscriptions in the cave temples in Western India, such as Nāsik, Bhājā, Kārle, Kanheri, Ajaṇṭā and Ellora are very much similar in character to the donatory inscriptions found at Amarāvati and Nāgārjunakoṇḍa. They record the names of the donors and whatever was gifted to the temple, with an indication of the specific charity that the donation was to support.

At Nāsik an inscription records the donation by a merchant of one hundred *kahāpaṇas* as a perpetual endowment to the Buddhist Order of monks and it is stipulated that twelve *kahāpaṇas* from the proceeds of the endowment be paid to four monks who observe the *vassa*, the rainy season retreat. A second inscription at the same temple records that a Greek named Dattamitra caused a caitya-gṛha, a stūpa carved out of rock inside a chamber, to be excavated, for securing the happiness of his father and mother. In another instance an Army Commander has donated a sum of one thousand *kahāpaṇas* of the guild of Odayamtikas and other sums of money (from elsewhere) to be deposited as an endowment to provide medicaments to monks who have fallen ill. A pillar inscription at Kārle states that the pillar (in question) carrying relics (of the Buddha?) is the gift of the preacher Sātimita of the venerable (monks) of the Dhamuttariya (sect) of Sopāra. These cave temples and the inscriptions in them can be assigned generally to the period first century B.C. to the second century A.C., though some inscriptions at Ajaṇṭā are as recent as the fourteenth century. These latter inscriptions are in no way related to Buddhism. All the inscriptions at the cave temple mentioned above are in Prakṛt and written in the contemporary Brāhmī script, though some inscriptions of a later date are written in the Sanskrit language and in Nāgarī characters.

In South India, in a few places such as Tirupparangunram, Karungalakkudi and Mettupatti inscriptions have been found carved on the drip-ledges of caves. These inscriptions are written in Brāhmī characters of 2nd century 1st century B.C. in an archaic Tamil dialect and are quite similar in content to the cave inscriptions in Sri Lanka. These caves are now considered to have been occupied by Buddhist monks.

Numerous short inscriptions in Brāhmī characters have been found in Mathura, South East of Delhi. These short records are often engraved on the pedestals of Buddha or Bodhisattva images. Among these is an interesting inscription recording the gift of a Buddha image by a nun named Dhanavatī, niece of another nun named Buddhamitrā, together with her father and mother.

Similar short donative records in Brāhmī characters have been found at Sārānāth, Buddhagayā and Srāvasti (modern Sahet Mahet). As expressions of infinite piety and charity towards others these records provide an insight into the spiritual qualities of the people of North India in the first two or three centuries of the Christian era.

At Nālandā, the site of the famous University in Bihar, and at Vaisāli (Besarh) large quantities of seals containing the names of the different monastic foundations , in Gupta script, or some pithy quotation from the canon, were found. A typical text in a seal would read Sri-*Nālandā Mahāvihāriyāryabhikṣusaṅghasya* or *yedharmā hetuprabhavā*... The seals from Nālandā can be assigned to the period *circa* 5th to 12th century A.C. while those of Besarh belong to a somewhat earlier period. Inscriptions are found at Nālandā and its vicinity recording various kinds of donations made to the University.

During the period of the Gupta Emperors a few inscriptions written in the Sanskrit language were set up mostly recording the foundation of some monastic dwelling and installation of Buddha statues. These records are found at Buddhagayā, Allahabad, Mathura, Kasia and Sāñcī. Among these is an inscription at Sāñcī which records the grant of a sum of money by a female Buddhist lay devotee named Harisvāminī to the vihāra at Kokanādabota (Sāñcī) for the feeding of one monk in the monastery and for maintaining lamps in the image house of the vihāra. This inscription was set up in the year A.C. 450–451. The Buddhagayā Inscription of Mahānāman set up in the latter part of the sixth century records the gift of a monastic building or an image house at the Bodhimaṇḍa at Buddhagayā. The personal name Mahānāman appears twice in this inscription referring to two different persons. The second person referred to by this name has probably to be identified with the Sri Lankan monk Mahānāma who was the author of the Pali chronicle *Mahāvaṃsa*, though there appears to be some discrepancy regarding dates. Inscriptions set up during the mediaeval period (A.C. 800–1200) having a direct bearing

on Buddhism are rare. except those placed on statues of the Buddha and Buddhist divinities. These records are written in the Sanskrit language and in the Nāgarī script. A comparatively large number of these records are found in West Bengal and have been set up in the time of the rulers of the Pāla and Sena dynasties, who were however. Hindus by faith. A rare but important record of this period is the Nālandā Copper Plate of King Devapāladeva registering the grant at the request of Balaputradeva of Suvarṇabhūmi (Burma or Sumatra) of several villages for the maintenance of the Saṅgha of the four quarters. to meet the cost of transcribing Buddhist texts and for the upkeep of the monastery at Nālandā.

While the Brāhmī script was being used in written records in the Northern Central and the Southern parts of India up to about the fifth century from about the third century B.C., an altogether different script was employed in writing in the area that today forms the modern States of Afghanistan and Pakistan. It was the Kharoṣṭhī script derived from Aramic that was used from the time of the Emperor Aśoka till about the third or fourth century A.C. in this area. The earliest Kharoṣṭhī inscriptions in this area are the rock-inscriptions of Emperor Aśoka which vare discussed elsewhere. However. inscriptions in Kharoṣṭhī appear to have become popular in the time of the Kuṣāṇa rulers. Generally these inscriptions are quite short and record the deposit of Buddha relics. the dedication of a residence to monks or the grant of land to the Saṅgha.

Perhaps one of the earliest documents of this type is an inscription engraved on the lid of a relic casket discovered at Bimarān. near Jalalabad. in Afghanistan. The record belongs to the time of the first Kuṣāṇa ruler Azes who became king in 80 B.C. It records that the Buddha relics in the casket were enshrined by Sivarakṣita of the Mujavant family in homage to all Buddhas. It is a common characteristic of these inscriptions that the donors being members of the various branches of the Mahāyāna school of Buddhism. the merit accruing from the charities recorded are offered to the reigning king. parents and other relatives. For example. the Taxila Silver Scroll Inscription records that some relics of the Lord Buddha were enshrined by a person named Urasaka of the family of Intavhria in his own Chapel in the Dharmarājika Compound of Takṣaśilā. for the bestowal of health on the Great King.King of Kings. the son of Heaven. the Kuṣāṇa. in honour of the Buddha. in honour of the Pratyekabuddhas. in honour of all beings, in honour of father and mother of friends, ministers. kinsmen and blood relatives and for the bestowal of health upon himself. Finally. he prays that this act of charity will lead all beings to Nirvāṇa. The Mathura Lion Capital Inscription which records some charitable acts of the queen of the Mahākṣatrapa Rājūla, Ayasia. Karnaia. is a rare instance of a record in India proper being written in Kharoṣṭhī characters.

Malaysia and Indonesia: The area covered by these two modern states came under the influence of Buddhism relatively early. about the fourth century. A.C. Even then the number of people who accepted Buddhism as their religion was small. the majority of them being Hindus. Inscriptions relating to Buddhism. therefore, are quite rare about this time. The earliest of these is an inscription in Sanskrit containing the Buddhist creed beginning with the words *yedharmā hetuprabhavā*. The creed is engraved on a stone discovered in a stupa mound at Kedah in the Malay Peninsula and is assigned to the fourth century. This is said to be the oldest Buddhist epigraph ever discovered in South-east Asia.

Another Sanskrit epigraph. also from the site of a stūpa mound at Kedah, has been assigned to the 5th-6th century. The epigraph consists of six lines of verse written in Sanskrit in a script of South Indian Origin. The verses enumerate the qualities that a person should possess to attain to supereme knowledge. The content of the verses seems to be derived from Mahāyānist teachings.

An inscribed rim from a silver vessel found in one of two earthenware jars unearthed in another mound at Kedah bears some writing in Pali or Sanskrit. This inscription is presumed to be of Buddhist origin. The record has been dated in the sixth or the seventh century. A document of unusual interest is the Sanskrit Inscription. written in the Pallava script used in South India. engraved on a slab of stone brought to light in the ruins of a Buddhist *vihāra* situated in what was known as the Wellesley Province in the Malay Peninsula.

The slab contains in illustration of a stūpa with a seven-tiered umbrella over it. Below it is inscribed a Buddhist stanza in Sanskrit with a prayer for the success of a voyage planned by a master mariner named Buddhagupta. On Palaeographical grounds this epigraph can be assigned to the seventh century. An inscription dated 697 of the Saka Era (A.C. 775) discovered at the monastery of Wat Semamaung at Ligor in the Malay Peninsula consists of some Sanskrit verses commemorating the foundation of a Mahāyānist sanctuary by a king of Sri Vijaya. The importance of the inscription lies in the clear reference to a Mahāyānist sanctuary indicating the prevalence of the Mahāyāna school of Buddhism in the Malay Peninsula in the eighth century. Of a sligthly later date perhaps are the short epigraphs appearing in six silver discs and one gold disc unearthed from the remains of a Buddhist Vihāra at Kedah. The name of a Buddha, a Bodhisattva or of some other saint appears on one side of each disc. It is possible that the discs were offered in homage to the Buddha or the saint whose

names appears on each disc. It has also been suggested that the names are those of individuals who participated in the foundation of the *vihāra*. Though the inscriptions found in Malaysia are few and insubstantial they clearly indicate the prevalence of the Mahāyāna form of Buddhism in this reign in the period 4th–9th century.

In the island of Sumatra only a very few inscriptions relating to Buddhism have been found. The earliest among them, perhaps, is a Malay inscription found near Palembang in the South-eastern corner of the Island. It records the foundation of a public park called Srīkṣetra by order of king Jayasena in A.C. 684, as an act of Buddhist charity. It may be recalled that according to the teachings of the Buddha the construction of parks, bridges and such other amenities is considered as acts conferring great merit on the donor.

Two inscriptions of a relatively lare date are two gold plates, one of the 12th century and the other of the 13th; they are most probably *yantras* each containing a geometrical device with some Nāgarī characters. These were found at Tandjung Medun in Western Sumatra.

Sanskrit inscriptions written in Pallava Grantha characters have been found at several places such as Great Karimin and Bukit Seguntang, which may be assigned to the eighth century. These inscriptions refer to a footprint of the Buddha and to the dedication of some religious edifice. Inscriptions found in the Island of Java are written either in the Old Javanese script or in the Pallava Grantha used in South India Perhaps the oldest Buddhist inscription found in construction of a temple there dedicated to the Mahāyāna divinity Tārā, and of a residence for monks well-versed in the Vinaya and Mahāyāna doctrine. It is dated A.C. 778. Another inscription of about the same period is a gold plate containing the text in Sanskrit of the *pratīya-samutpāda* (dependent origination) which enunciates an important teaching in Buddhism. The provenance of this inscription is not known with certainty but the probability is that it was found in some part of Java.

Reference is made to the Mahāyānist divinity Kuvera in a gold plate inscription discovered in Central Java at a place called Tjandigdjo. The script employed in this inscription is old Javanese and the gold plate has been assigned to the 7th–8th century.

The Ratubaka Inscription found in Central Java refers to the constrtuction of a Vihāra by the name of Abhayagiri by Simhala monks from Sri Lanka. It is assigned to the last decade of the eighth century. It is to be noted that a vihāra known as the Abhayagiri Vihāra was constructed at Anuradhapura in Sri Lanka by King Vaṭṭagāmini in the first century B.C. The relevant part in the record lends itself to be construed also in the sense that the vihāra was meant for the use of Simhala monks.

Yet another gold plate found in Central Java at a place called Tjandi Plaosan contains four lines of a *dhāraṇī* written in Sanskrit. The recitation of *dhāraṇīs* was peculiar to Mahāyāna and Tantric Buddhist practice. This gold plate thus provides evidence of the prevalence of Mahāyāna or of Tantric Buddhism in Central Java about the 8th–9th century to which this inscription can be assigned. A pre-Nāgarī inscription from Tjandi Plaosan in Central Java, in a poor state of preservation, refers to the erection of an image (probably of a Buddha) and an image house in order to get across *saṃsāra*. It was issued by a devotee probably in the time of one of the Sailendra rulers of Java and may be assigned to the 9th century. Two inscriptions from Tjandi Perot written in the old Javanese script and language records the foundation of a *sīmā* for holding ecclesiastical ceremonies, giving an account of the King and his officials who were serving the state at the time. The inscription concludes with the names of the witnesses to the foundation with their designations.

Sri Lanka: The earliest inscriptions in Sri Lanka can be traced as far back as the third century B.C. These are short inscriptions in Brāhmī characters engraved on the prepared surfaces of drip-ledges of caves, distributed throughout the Island except in the Nothern Province. They consist usually of about a dozen words recording the donation of the caves in question to the Buddhist Order of monks and contain the name of the donor and his or her parentage. The donors are usually important personages such as the ruler or members of his family. These records despite their brevity reflect the simple lives of the monks who preferred a life of seclusion to the comforts of the cities where perhaps monks lived in structural buildings provided with conveniences and facilities not available to the cave-dwelling monks.

Chronologically these cave inscriptions were succeeded by an extensive series of longer records engraved on rocks, registering the grant of lands, fields or revenue from tanks and fords to vihāras for their maintenance or for special purposes such as the periodical recitation of prescribed parts of the Buddhist canonical texts. Transference of revenue in this manner to *vihāras* apparently became necessary with the development of these vihāras as organised centres of religious practice. These inscriptions are written in Brāhmī characters of a more developed type than those appearing in the cave records and belong to the first three or four centuries A.C. A rare document of this class of document is the Tonigala Rock Inscription of the time of King

Siri Meghavaṇṇa (A.C. 303–331), recording the conditions on which certain quantities of grain had been deposited in a guild by the son of a member of the Council of Ministers of the King. With the interest accruing from this deposit of grain, the guild was required among other obligations to hold the *vassa* ceremony (retreat) at a monastery named Yahisapavaya. The guild was also required to provide certain specified items of food and spices to the refectory of the monastery.

Attention may be drawn here to two important epigraphs of this period. The earliest evidence we have of the arrival of Mahinda Thera in Sri Lanka is in the Pali *Dīpavaṃsa* of the fifth century A.D. Mahinda Thera who is said to be a son of the Indian Emperor Asoka is not mentioned in the latter's inscriptions. But a short epigraph of *circa* the first century written in Brāhmī characters found at Rāssagala refers to a stūpa where the ashes of Thera Mahinda and his companion Thera Itthiya were enshrined. Yet another inscription engraved on a rock at Mihintale where Mahinda Thera is said to have arrived first when he came to Sri Lanka, refers to Mahinda Thera and some of his companions.

In the subsequent period up to about the end of the eigth century relatively few inscriptions appear to have been set up, recording matters of any significance, with the exception of a series of short records, which may be described as private records, registering the manumission of slaves belonging to monasteries specifically named in each inscription, by the payment of sums of money by interested parties. A noteworthy feature of these short records is that the donor in almost every instance wishes happiness to all beings by virtue of his attaining Nibbāna as an Arahant, a Pacceka Buddha or *Sammāsambuddha.*

Towards the end of the Anuradhapura period, i.e., by about the eighth century places of Buddhist worship starting as simple residences for monks, with a *stūpa*, a Bodhi tree and perhaps an image house, had developed into complex monastic institutions possessed of considerable property in the form of land and even gold, leading to abuses and malpractices. The state therefore, had to intervene to prevent these irregularities. Monastic property was traditionally inviolable and non-transferable, and therefore confirmatory legislation had to be promulgated in the form of inscriptions engraved on pillars known as *attāni-kaṇu*, set up in all parts of the Island where monasteries were situated. These inscriptions usually contained clauses prohibiting illegal activities such as felling of trees in monastic lands and taking away cart bulls from monasteries. An important record of this period giving a detailed account of the administrative and the service organisation of a large monastery is the inscription known as the Mihintale Tablets, engraved on carefully dressed slabs of stone set up at Mihintale, about eight miles north east of Anuradhapura, by King Mahinda IV. (A.C. 956–972). It enumerates the persons employed in the monastery at Mihintale with the payments that had to be made to them in kind or cash, lays down rules regarding the day to day conduct of the resident monks and even lays down precautionary measures to prevent irregularities in respect of property and revenue.

A document of unusual interest of this period, however, is an inscription engraved on the rock-wall of a cave at Kalu-diya Pokuṇa in the Matale District. This inscription which can be assigned to the reign of king Sena II (A.C. 853–887) or King Kassapa IV (A.C. 898–914) records the endowments made by some private individuals to a monastery named Dakinigiri. One of the donors named Dalana, it is interesting to note, who has contributed some gold as an endowment, has stipulated that rice should not be given to monks uncooked, evidently to prevent abuses. It is also laid down that in case of dissension among the inmates of the monastery, the food intended for them should be fed to crows and dogs.

Small copper plaques not bigger than six square centimetres, inscribed with two or three words extracted at random from important Mahāyāna works like *Prajñā-pāramitā* and *Kāśyapaparivarta*, have been found at several places at Anuradhapura. Of similar import are the inscription engraved on a rock at Tiriyāya and the *Trikāyastava* engraved on a rock at Mihintale. Both these records are in characters similar to the Pallava Gantha script and may be assigned to the seventh or the eighth century.

Consequent to the occupation of Anuradhapura at the end of the tenth century by Coḷas from South India a period of instability and turmoil set in. The Coḷas themselves found it safer to move the capital to Polonnaruwa. When in due course the invaders were driven away, and Vijayabāhu I (A.C. 1055–110) ascended the throne, his efforts and those of his successors were mainly directed at promoting Buddhism. It is to record their efforts in this direction that most of the inscriptions of the period have been directed. Particular mention must be made here of the Ambagamuva Rock-inscription of king Vijayabāhu I where he recounts the improvements he effected at Samanoḷa (Adam's Peak) and the facilities he provided for the convenience of pilgrims who travelled from all parts of the Island to pay homage to the Buddha's Foot Print there. One of the most important documents for the history of Buddhism in Sri Lanka was set up during this period by king Parākramabāhu I (A.C. 1153–1186), namely the Gal Vihāra Rock Inscription wherein are laid down

guidelines for the conduct of monks in their novitiate. even to the extent of prescribing the essential text books in Pali and in Sinhalese that they should master before they can be released from their novitiate.

King Niśśaṅkamalla (A.D. 1187–1196) who appears to have continued the work of his predecessor Parākramabāhu set up relatively lengthy inscriptions in all parts of the Island, describing in detail, perhaps not without an element of exaggeration, the services he had rendered to the promotion of Buddhism in the Island. His Galpota Inscription engraved on a block of stone 26 ft. 10 inches by 5 ft. 7 inches and 2 ft. approximately, specially prepared for the purpose, is largely biographical in content and recounts some of his good works, besides uttering some words of admonition to his subjects.

Some Tamil inscriptions relating to Buddhist interests were also set up in the Polonnaruwa period. Of these reference may be made here to some inscriptions at Velgamvehera in the Eastern Province. One of them refers to the offering of five oxen and thirtyfive cows to the vihāra at Velgama and another to the provision made by a devotee to maintain a sacred perpetual lamp at the same vihāra. Others record similar gifts. Of great interest in regard to the history of the sacred Tooth Relic of the Buddha is the slab inscription of the Velaikkāras set up at Polonnaruwa, most probably in the reign of Parākramabāhu I or a few years earlier. The record briefly recounts the achievements of King Vijayabāhu I, sets out the donations made by the Veḷaikkāra community to the Temple of the Tooth and registers an affirmation by the Velaikkaras of their undertaking to protect the Sacred Temple of the Tooth at Polonnaruwa. Both Tamil and Grantha characters have been employed in these inscriptions.

Another important inscription of about the same period is the Galapāta Vihāra Rock-inscription assigned to the reign of king Parākramabāhu I or the second of that name. This inscription records the foundation of a monastery at Galapāta, South of Colombo, by a dignitary named Mindel (Mahinda) with the support of his mother and some other relatives, and provides a long list of various blocks of land donated to the Vihāra for its maintenance.

From about the middle of the thirteenth century the capital of Sri Lanka was moved to several places, in succession from Polonnaruwa to Dambadeniya, thence to Yapahuwa and Kurunegala and thence to Gampola. It was at the last named place that a measure of stability was achieved in the country for any major steps be taken to promote Buddhism in the region. Accordingly, three major vihāras were built, all in the vicinity of Gampola, with the active support of the ruler, King Buvanekabāhu IV (A.C. 1341–1351.) Accounts of the construction of these vihāras and the provisions made for their maintenance and the maintenance of the monks who resided in these vihāra are to be found in several inscriptions engraved on stone and on copper plates. These are the Niyamgampāya Rock Inscription, the Gadalādeṇiya Rock Inscription and a set of rock inscriptions at the Laṅkātilaka Vihāra and a set of *sannasas* engraved on copper plates relating to the last named vihāra.

Perhaps one of the last lithic records of significance in the history of Buddhism in Sri Lanka is the Slab Inscription of the Pāpiḷiyāna Vihāra recording the foundation of a monastery by king Parākramabāhu VI (A.C. 1412–1467) for the particular purpose of offering merit to his late mother, Queen Sunetra Devi. This inscription while giving a very detailed account of the grants made to the monastery for its maintenance and stipends in cash and kind paid to the monks resident in or on visit to the monastery, provides an insight into the administration of a medieval Buddhist monastery in Sri Lanka. Related to this inscription is the Veragama Sannasa, a copper plate land grant confirming an ealier grant made by king Parākramabāhu VI to Dharmālaṅkāra Paṇḍita who had been employed as a scribe to transcribe palm leaf manuscripts at the Sunetrā Devi Vihāra at Pāpiliyāna. This *sannasa* now granted by King Vijayabāhu VI of Kotte (A.C. 1509–1521) transfers the benefits of the earlier grant to one Bodhinayā who was currently employed in the same capacity at the vihāra. The Mädavala Copper Plate *sannasa* was issued by King Kīrti Srī Rājasimha (A.C. 1747–1782) of Kandy to provide for the maintenance of the image house completely built anew at Mäḍavala not far from Kandy. The *sannasa* traces the history of this vihāra from the time of King Vaṭṭagāmaṇi (first century B.C.) and gives a very detailed account of the architectural features and the mural paintings of the new image house.

Thailand: The earliest examples of inscriptions related to Buddhism are formulae quoted from Buddhist texts engraved on clay tablets, on one side of which appeared a statue of the Buddha. The formula very commonly engraved on these votive tablets is the so-called Buddhist creed beginning with the words *ye dhammā hetuppabhavā tesaṃ hetu tathagato āha*. Bricks engraved with the same formula also have been found, particularly at Pra Pathom. These tablets can be assigned to the 5th century or the 6th century. The script employed is a sort of proto-Thai script related to the later Brāhmī Script used in South India.

A more substantial document is an inscription discovered at Rājabūri, recording the installation of a Buddha statue by an ascetic named Samiddhigupta. This inscription is assigned to the 6th or the 7th century. The script employed is a proto-Thai script.

An inscription that throws very valuable light on the religious intercourse between South India and Thailand is a short epigraph appearing on the socle of a standing Buddha statue found at the Mahadhatvārāma in Lopbūri. What is most interesting in this record is the statement that the statue was caused to be set up by a person named Nāyaka Arjava, the *adhipathi* (lord) of Janjaur (Tanjore in South India.) This inscription has been assigned to the eighth century A.C.

Siamese inscription of exceptional interest is the Noen Sa Bua Inscription of Dong Si Maha found at Prachinbūri, about fifty miles north east of Bangkok. The inscription is engraved on a slab of stone in a script quite similar to the Pallava script of South India, and had been set up in A.C. 761. The inscription consists of twenty-seven lines, which incorporate three quatrains from a Pali poem called *Telakaṭāhagāthā* composed by a Sri Lankan author. Though this work has been assigned to the eleventh century the instant inscription proves that it had been composed some time before A.C. 761. The sections of the inscription which do not form apart of the *Telakaṭāhagāthā* are written in the Mon script.

An inscription assigned to the year A.C. 1377 records the establishment of a sect known as the *Siṃhala-Saṅgha* the Sri Lanka Order of monks, in Siam by a delegation of monks who had visited Sri Lanka. This inscription had been set up by the Burmese King Ramkhahaeng who had conquered Siam earlier. Several other inscriptions were set up during the fourteenth century, reflecting the devotion and religious fervour of the Thai people who were now followers of the Theravāda school of Buddhism.

Viet-Nam: Though it has been suggested on the evidence of the Vo-Canh Inscription of King Srī Māra of the second or the third century A.C. that Buddhism had been known in Viet-nam, known in ancient time as Champā, the clearest evidence of the presence of Buddhism in this country is an inscription assigned to the second quarter of the ninth century, set up by a Buddhist of a place called Paṇḍuraṅga, Samantha by name to record the dedication of two shrines and two monasteries to Jina and Siva. The name Jina in this inscription refers to the Buddha, Buddhism being at this stage closely associated with Buddhism. The *praśasti* recording the dedication has been significantly, written by the donor's son Sthavira Buddha-Nirvāṇa. Buddhism in its Mahāyāna form most probably, prevailed in Viet-nam till about the second quarter of the thirteenth century. Assigned to this period is the Kim Choua Inscription of King Jaya Parameśvaravarman. its main interest being a list of Buddhist divinities held in great reverence by Vietnamese Buddhists at the time. such as Srī Jina Lokeśvara, Srī Saugatadeveśvara.

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EPISTEMOLOGY

1. Introduction Epistemology or theory of knowledge is that branch of philosophy which inquires into the nature and scope of knowledge. It attempts to analyze the concept of knowledge with a view to determining the criteria applicable for making the distinction between valid and invalid claims to knowlekge. It examines the variety of alleged means and sources of knowledge and lays down the conditions under which claims to knowledge could be accepted to be reliable. In the history of the Buddhist philosophical tradition considerable attention has been paid to epistemological issues. The teachings of early Buddhism have shown an interest in philosophy as a way of life, and this is reflected among other things in the discussions concerning epistemological questions as well. The primary concern of Buddhism was the attainment of emancipating knowledge. The discussion of epistemological questions occurs

in so far as it is related to the attainment of the ultimate goal of Buddhism. This approach is more marked in the early Buddhist teachings than in the later ones where in certain instances questions of logic and epistemology seem to be discussed for their own sake. The way of life advocated in Buddhism is based on its theory of reality, and its theory of reality has an epistemological foundation. Although the Buddha himself was not concerned with raising philosophical problems about the nature and scope of knowledge purely in the form of an academic pursuit and an exercise in logical analysis, to the extent that the way of life recommended in Buddhism was claimed to depened on statements about the nature of man and the universe which were believed to be true, it became necessary to specify how the alleged truths of Buddhism were to be known.

At the time Buddhism emerged in India as a distinct world view, a plurality of mutually contradictory theories about the nature of man and the universe were advocated by other schools of religious and philosophical thought. Indian thinkers had already developed a considerably high level of critical and analytical inquiry and if the message of the Buddha was to win the acceptance of the intelligent truth seekers of that time it was necessary to state clearly the epistemological foundations of the Buddhist world view. In presenting an alternative world view as well as a goal of ultimate happiness and liberation in terms of it, the Buddha criticized not only some of the existing theories about the nature of reality, but also the epistemological foundations on which these theories were claimed to be based. Buddhism also claimed that the teachings of the Buddha were meant for the intelligent or the wise and not for the stupid or the unwise. The Buddhist scheme of emancipation consisting of three stages has the cultivation of wisdom (*paññā*) as the final stage. In referring to the knowledge of the Buddhist saint, the Pali canonical sources appear to use a special set of cognitive terms to mark the distinction between such knoweledge and other modes of cognitive activity. Paññā (Sanskrit-*prajñā*) is one such term which occurs very frequently in the Buddhist literature of all periods. Buddhism also uses various qualifying prefixes and adjectives with the verbal root *jñā* 'to know' leading to derivations such as *āsavakkhayañāṇa vimuttiñāṇa*, *abhiññā*, *pariññā*, *sammappaññā*, etc. to signify the specific knowledge that Buddhism considers to be directed to the attainment of the goal of emancipation. According to the Buddhist teaching human bondage and suffering are a consequence of ignorance (*avijjā*). The enlightenment [illegible] of the Buddha is believed to have consisted in the dawning of knowledge and vision into certain realities of life (*cakkhuṃ udapādi ñāṇaṃ udapādi*) expressed in the form of the Four Noble Truths (q.v.). Buddhism contrasted subjective conviction about the truth of any assertion with direct personal knowledge and understanding. A fundamental question of epistemological importance that can be raised in connection with the Buddhist position is how the alleged knowledge of truth and reality in Buddhism is to be characterized. Is it a special kind of religious knowledge describable as a kind of mystic intution? what role does ordinary sense knowledge or empirical knowledge play in the ultimate understanding claimed by the Buddhist saint? Does Buddhism reject the validity of ordinary sense experience and recommend other sources of knowledge such as revelation or intellectual intuition as the means of discovering truth? Answers to such questions as these could be obtained by a careful study of the Buddhist doctrines that were formulated in the different periods of the historical development of the Buddhist tradition.

More attention will be paid in the sequel to the ideas contained in the literature preserved in the Pali Nikāyas on the assumption that it contains the teachings of Buddhism which are closest to those expressed by the Buddha himself. It is reasonable to assume that the Pali Nikāyas as well as the Chinese Āgamas agree in content and go back to a common source. The fact that the Pali Nikāya literature was preserved by the Theravāda school of Buddhism need not lead to the prejudice that the Buddhist teachings contained in this corpus of literature presents a partisan point of view about the original teachings of the Buddha.

2. The pre-Buddhist Background

Examining the pre-Buddhist background of Indian thought K. N. Jayatilleke shows that thinkers of the period belonged to three principal classes according to the epistemological ground accepted by them for their truth claims.[1] The first class of thinkers may be called traditionalists or those who depended on authority of some kind. There were some who derived their knowledge wholly on the basis of a sacred scriptural tradition. The foremost among this class of thinkers were the Brahmins who believed in the sacred authority of the *Vedas*. To the second class belonged those thinkers who may be called rationalists. They propounded their theories on the basis of reasoning and speculation. They can be identified with some of the metaphysicians of the early Upaniṣadic period and other independent thinkers who denied the reliability of the orthodox Vedic tradition such as the materialists and the sceptics. Thirdly, there were thinkers who claimed a direct

1. For a detailed discussion of the Pre-Buddhist background see *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge* (*EBTK*). K. N. Jayatilleke. (Allen and Unwin, London 1963) Chapters 1–3.

personal knowledge of the truths they propounded. The Indian materialists who accepted perception alone as a valid means of knowledge belonged to this class of thinkers. What is more interesting is that there were others who based their claims to knowledge not on ordinary sense perception, but on some kind of super-cognitive ability acquired through the practice of mental culture. It is to be noted that in the Middle and late *Upaniṣads* there was a belief in the super-cognitive powers of the meditative person or the Yogi. Verbal forms from *dṛś–* to see were used in these *Upaniṣads* to signify a kind of seeing which did not make use of the eye but a kind of direct intuitive apprehension. This kind of knowledge was claimed. specially when referring to the knowledge of the transcendental truth of the reality of *Ātman*. It was claimed that subtle seers by their subtle and superior intuition see the transcendental reality (*dṛśyate tvagryā buddhyā sūkṣmadarśibhiḥ. Katha Upaniṣad* 1.3.12). Such knowledge was referred to in the *Upaniṣads* as *jñāna*. The *Ātman* is said to be obtained by right knowledge (*samyag-jñāna*). In addition to Upaniṣdic seers who claimed such knowledge there were other teachers outside the Vedic fold who claimed knowledge of a superhuman kind including omniscience.

K. N. Jayatilleke's discussion of the Pre-Buddhist background in terms of the above classification was most probably influenced by the kind of classification which the Buddha himself is reported to have made in answer to a question raised by a Brahmin named Saṅgārava regarding the nature of the knowledge that the Buddha claimed (*M*. II. p. 211). The Buddha mentions in this context a class of teachers whom he described as *anussavikā*. K. N. Jayatilleke translates the term *anussavikā* in its broad sense as traditionalists. These thinkers are identified by the Buddha himself as the Brahmins who were versed in the three *Vedas* (*brāhmaṇā tevijjā*). The second class of teachers are referred to by the Buddha as *takkī vīmaṃsī*, rendered into English by K. N. Jayatilleke as reasoners and metaphysicians respectively[2] The Buddha identifies himself with the class of teachers who base their teachings about the good life on what they have understood by some super-cognitive means without dependence on hearing from traditional sources (*pubbesu ananussutesu dhammesu sāmam veva abhiññāya*). It appears that this third class of thinkers referred to by the Buddha were none other than those who claimed super-cognitive powers through meditative culture of the mind or *yoga*. The Pali Nikāyas throw much light on the Buddhist evaluation of the three approaches to truth and knowledge accepted by the teachers belonging to the three groups mentioned above.

3. The Buddhist Attitude Towards Authority

There are several instance in the Pali Nikāyas where the Buddhist criticism of the teachers described as *anussavikā* occurs. One such instance occurs in the context of a moral discussion. Here, the Buddha insists on the importance of being guided. in a moral situation, by one's own personal knowledge and understanding. He speaks of *anussava* as the first of ten grounds on which one should not base one's moral behaviour. What is implied by this discussion is that there is a distinction between the ten ways of claiming knowledge headed by *anussava* and what the Buddha refers to in this instance as 'know by yourself' (*attanāva jāneyyātha*). Six ways of claiming knowledge mentioned in the *Kālāma Sutta* including *anussava* could be considered under the general heading of authority. Authority was accepted as a *pramāṇa* (an epistemological ground) in some non-Buddhist Indian philosophical schools of the post-Buddhist period under the concept of *śabda* (ibid. p. 172f). According to the *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā śabda* denotes the authority of the *Vedas* alone. This reflects the attitude of the ritualistic Brahmins against which the early Buddhist criticism was primarily directed. The *Mīmāṃsā* school upheld the absolute authority of the *Vedas*. The Nyāya school treated the scriptural statements of the *Vedas* as a subclass of verbal testimony while the Vaiśeṣika school treated them as a subclass of inferential propositions. According to the Naiyāyikas the *Vedas* are reliable either because God (*īśvara*) who revealed it is trustworthy. or because the seers who are its authors are trustworthy. The Mimāmsakas on the other hand denied any personal authorship to the *Vedas* and claimed that the *Vedas* are eternal. The importance of *śabda* as a means of knowledge in the post-Buddhist philosophical tradition shows that claims to knowledge on the basis of authority took many different forms. This is also indicated in the *Kālāma Sutta* where six different forms of dependence on authority are mentioned in the following order: (1) *anussavena*, (2) *paramparāya*, (3) *itikirāya*, (4) *piṭakasampadāya*, (5) *bhavyarūpatāya* and (6) *samaṇo no garu*.

Anussava appears to have been used specially to denote the authority of the Vedic scriptures as *śabda* was used in the post-Buddhist Mimāṃsā tradition. The *Caṅki Sutta* refers to a discussion of the Buddha with a Brahmin youth well versed in the Vedic scriptures. The Brahmin youth wishes to know the Buddha's opinion on the attitude of the Brahmins who came absolutely to the conclusion (*ekamsena niṭṭham gacchanti*) that only what is contained in the *Vedas* is true and everything else is false (*idam eva saccam mogham aññam*). In response to the Buddha's criticism that the Brahmin attitude

2. *EBTK*. see p. 171 for K. N. Jayatilleke's translation of the *Saṅgārava Sutta* passage.

amounts to one of blindly following a tradition the truth of which has not been personally tested at any point. the Brahmin youth retorts that it is not merely on faith that the Brahmins claim the validity of the *Vedas* but also on the basis of *anussava*. This suggests that for the Brahmins of this period Vedic scripture represented a sacred, holy or revelational tradition. During the time of Early Buddhism *anussava* had come to mean the sacred Vedic tradition. When referring to this tradition the Pali suttas use words which suggest that it had already become a sacred tradition which was systematized, ceremonially chanted, and authoritatively handed down by a successive line of teachers (*gītaṃ pavuttaṃ samihitaṃ tad anugāyanti tad anubhāsanti bhāsitam anubhāsanti vācitam anuvācenti*: *D.* I, p. 241; *M.* II, p. 169). The *Vedas* were often believed to have had a divine origin. The creation of the *Vedas* is attributed to Prajāpati or Brahmā.

K. N. Jayatilleke has identified three possible senses in which the term *anussava* has been used in the religious literature of the time. First, as used of the Vedic tradition the word could mean 'divine revelation', 'systematically handed down. Secondly it could have meant authoritative tradition', the source of its authority being the Vedic or any other tradition. Thirdly, it could have meant a 'report' come from mouth to mouth(*EBTK*. p. 182).

There are several suttas in the Pali canon which state the Buddha's reasons for rejecting *anussava* as a reliable means of knowledge. In the *Tevijja Sutta* the Brahmanical claim that the *Vedas* have a divine origin is criticized on the ground that not even the original composers of the Vedic scriptures have had direct personal knowledge of Brahma by seeing Brahma face to face (*D.* I. p. 238). The originators of the Vedic tradition themselves were not in a position to claim 'We know this, we see this' (*mayam etaṃ jānāma, mayam etam passāma*) with regard to the existence of Brahmā. In the *Caṅkī Sutta* the Buddha's criticism is at a different level. Here the Buddha rejects the absolute validity of Vedic scripture on the ground that none of those who handed down the tradition could claim direct personal knowledge of its truth. They are compared to a string of blind men (*andhaveṇuparamparā*). Yet another criticism which the Buddha found to be commonly applicable to [illegible] as well as four other grounds on which one may believe in the truth of a statement (*saddhā* = faith. [illegible] = personal like or inclination, *ākāraparivittaka* = superficial reflection and *diṭṭhinijjhānakkhanti* = approval of a theory upon speculative reflection or thinking) is that these grounds alone do not guarantee the truth of the relevant statements. The content of a revelation may be held in very high esteem for having been faithfully preserved (*svānussutam*). but it may be empty, hollow and false (*rittaṃ tucchaṃ musā*), while something else which is not the content of such revelation may be factual and true (*bhūtaṃ tacchaṃ anaññathā*). The Buddha points out that the only claim that one can legitimately make with regard to what one has acuired from *anussava* is 'such is what I have acquired from *anussava*' but he is not entitled to make an absolute and exclusive claim to its truth. It is a person who does not make such an illegitimate claim that can be called one who preserves the truth (*saccaṃ anurakkhati*).[3] What is implicit in this criticism of the Buddha is that none of the above grounds logically imply the truth of the statements based on them. If one claims to have heard something from some source or to be firmly convinced of the truth of something, it does not logically follow that what he has heard or what he is firmly convinced of is true On the other hand if one claims to know something, and if he actually knows it, it must be true.

In the *Sandaka Sutta* Ānanda mentions the distinction that the Buddha is said to have made between two classes of thinkers who gave instruction on a way of life to be followed by others. According to the Buddha, as reported by Ānanda in this sutta, the world view affirmed by one class of thinkers cannot be accepted as one which implies a noble way of life. They are therefore described as *abrahmacariyavāsa*. The world views condemned by the Buddha as *abrahmacariyavāsa* were the materialist world view which denied individual survival after death, and those world views which denied moral values, moral responsibility and free will. Another group of teachers is referred to as those whose world view implied an unsatisfactory doctrine about the noble life (*anassāsikaṃ brahmacariyaṃ*). Those who hold to the truth of *anussava* are said to belong to this group.[4] The Buddhist criticism here of *anussava* is that such an authoritative tradition may or may not suffer from lapses of memory on the part of those who are responsible for handing it down, Moreover, even if it is properly handed down without lapses of memory it may be true or false (*anussavikassa kho pana ... satthuno anussavasaccassa sussatampi hoti dussatampi hoti, tathāpi hoti aññathāpi hoti*; *M.* I, p. 520).

[illegible] *hoti evam me anussavoti vadaṃ saccaṃ anurakkhati na tveva tāva ekaṃsena niṭṭhaṃ gacchati idam eva* [illegible] *M* II. pp. 170–171.

[illegible] *hoti anussavasacco so anussavena itihitiha paramparāya dhammam deseti* *M.* I, p. 520.

The Buddha did not reject the Vedic teaching outright, but considered it to be propounding an unsatisfactory teaching about the noble life because it was based on *anussava*. The materialist criticism of the Vedic tradition was much stronger when compared with that of Buddhism. The materialists condemned the authors of the *Vedas* as ignorant and vicious.[5] The Buddhists were much more moderate in their criticism of the *Vedas*. Buddhism recognized that the Vedic teaching contained factual and moral truths opposed to a purely nihilistic world view. The Brahmin teachers were criticized on epistemological grounds for not having personally verified the truth of their beliefs.

Paramparā and *piṭakasampadā* also denote forms of triditional authority. These terms are also used in close association with the Vedic tradition (*brāhmanānaṃ purāṇam mantapadam itihitiha paramparāya piṭakasampadāya; M.* II, p. 169). *Paramparā* may have stood for the unbroken succession of a teaching belonging to the Vedic tradition or outside it. *Piṭakasampadā* also may have stood for an authoritative scriptural tradition in general. *Itikirā* which also occurs in the *Kālāma Sutta* as a separate ground is probably connected with *itihitiha* which has already been mentioned in connection with the other terms denoting revelation and authority. Both *kira* and *ha* are particles which generally occur in the introduction of anecdotal material. The Buddha's teaching is often said to be *anitiha* (*Thag. v.* 331; *A* II, p. 26), which meant that it was not based on hearsay or tradition. Consideration of the contexts in which the term *itikira* occurs in the Pali canon and other occurrences of terms related to it in other Indian literary works shows that the translation of *itikira* as hearsay is reasonable.

The other two forms of authority rejected in the *Kālāma Sutta* are denoted by the terms *bhabbarūpatā* and *samaṇo no garu*. According to the commentarial explanation of *bhabbarūpatā*, it stands for the acceptance of someone's words considering him to be a competent person (*ayaṃ bhikkhu bhabbarūpo, imassa katham gahetum yuttam, AA.* II. p. 305). The other ground of acceptance, *samaṇo no garu*, which may be translated as 'our prestigious teacher' is similar to the former. Both forms of authority can be considered under verbal testimony, which as a matter of fact came to be recognized as a means of knowledge in the late Indian philosophical tradition under *āptopadėsa* or *āptavacana*. The criticism levelled against *anussava* applies to all other forms of authority as well although it is not explicitly stated with reference to them.

In determining the early Buddhist attitude towards authority (q. v) it is important to see the extent to which Buddhism depended on the orthodox teachings of the pre-Buddhist Vedic tradition in the formulation of its own doctrines. It has often been suggested that the Buddha uncritically accepted some of the dogmas of Brahmanism (EBTK, p. 369 f) E. J. Thomas, for instance, says that Buddhism took for granted some of the pre-Buddhist Indian beliefs like the belief in transmigration and the doctrine of the retribution of action. However, an examination of the pre-Buddhist background shows that these doctrines were neither fully developed nor universally accepted at the time of the emergence of Buddhism. There is no evidence that the Buddha admitted them on the authority of the previous tradition (ibid.p. 372 f)

A question that may be raised with regard to the Buddha's attitude towards authority is whether he expected from his disciples with respect to his own teachings the same critical attitude that he recommended towards external traditions. Some scholars suggest that revelation and faith are as much central to Buddhism as to other religious traditions of a theistic character. The belief that the Buddha was an omniscient teacher (*sabbaññu*) is said to leave no room for critical inquiry. In the evaluation of the place of *saddhā*, a term which is translated as 'faith', it has been suggested that Buddhism also involved a faith in revealed truths (ibid p. 383 f). K. N. Jayatilleke shows that omniscience was attributed to the Buddha in a much later stratum of the Pali canonical scriptures. In the earlier stratum of the canonical literature the Buddha not only denied that he was omniscient in the sense omniscience was claimed by some of his contemporaries, but also affirmed that he possessed only a threefold knowledge (*tevijjā*) which was also shared by a large number of his disciples as well (ibid. pp. 317-381).

It is also clear that in the early sections of the Pali canon *saddhā* in the sense of trust, confidence or faith is contrasted with knowledge (*ñāṇa*). It is also treated as an emotion insufficient for salvation. Buddhism values knowledge above faith. However, as a preliminary stage in the spiritual progress of a disciple faith is believed to play an important role. Sometimes *pasāda* is used as a synonym of *saddhā*. The Pali suttas often use the expression *avecca ppasāda*, which means 'faith consequent upon inquiry'. Buddhism speaks of some forms of faith of the Brahmin teachers in the authority of the *Vedas*. The Buddha contrasts such groundless faith with faith based on inquiry, and calls it *ākāravatī saddhā*.

[5] *Sarvadarśanasangraha*, p. 14.

Ākāravatī saddhā and *aveccappasāda* appear to be referring to similar states of mind. See BHAKTI.

In the *Caṅkī Sutta* the Buddha is represented as applying the same reason for rejecting both *anussava* and *saddhā* as guaranteeing the truth of a statement. He says that one may have firm faith in the truth of a statement but that statement may be false. It is unlikely that the attitude expressed here excludes the doctrines preached by the Buddha. We find the early Buddhist attitude re-echoed in a much later work which says: "Just as wise men test gold by burning, cutting and rubbing, so O monks, should my statements be accepted after examination and not out of respect for me.[6] In the *Vīmaṃsaka Sutta* the Buddha invites his disciples to test him in order to discover whether he is enlightented or not (*vimaṃsakena bhikkhunā...tathāgate samannesanā kātabbā sammāsambuddho vā no vā iti viññāṇāya*: *M.* I p. 317). The inquiry is to be made into the condition of the Buddha's mind by observing the Buddha's bodily and verbal behaviour using one's eyes and ears (*dvisu dhammesu tathāgato samannesitabbo cakkhusotaviññeyyesu dhammesu*). In the *Caṅkī Sutta* a similar process of inquiry is proposed to someone who wishes to depend on a teacher in one's inquiry into truth. Before one professes faith in a teacher one should, according to the *Caṅkī Sutta*, examine the character traits of the teacher to see if he is a person who has a greedy, hateful or deluded psychological disposition or not. In the *Vīmaṃsaka Sutta* the Buddha calls upon his disciples to do this inquiry on himself by observing the Buddha's behaviour as stringently as possible to ensure that he is possessed of absolutely pure psychological dispositions. This sutta suggests that even the Buddha's claim to full enlightenment is not an impenetrable mystery, but one that could be tested by an external observer. If the Buddha is enlightened, he must be free from greed, hatred and delusion. If observation of the behaviour of the Buddha shows that he is not free from those evil traits of mind, then the claim to be enlightened can also be judged to be false. In this sutta inquiry into the claims of the Buddha is not condemned, but is strongly recommended before one professes faith in him. Yet this is given merely as an initial stage in the development of one's faith. After such inquiry one becomes convinced that it is worth approaching such a teacher for instruction. But faith in the teacher is said to become firm and unshakable only when one partially verifies in one's own experience the truths taught by such a teacher. It is such faith that is established as a consequence of inquiry that Buddhism called 'rational faith' (*ākāravatī saddhā*) as opposed to the baseless faith (*amūlikā saddhā*) of the Brahmins.

In Buddhism faith (*saddhā*) was considered as a preliminary requirement, finally leading to knowledge (*paññā* or *ñāṇa*). Some sutta passages clearly suggest that ultimately *saddhā* has to be replaced by knowledge. Citta, a lay disciple of the Buddha is represented as saying in answer to Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta's question whether he believed in the Buddha's statement that there is a state of meditative rapture in which there is no discursive thought and reflection (*saddhahasi tvam samaṇassa Gotamassa atthi avitakko avicāro samādhi atthi vitakkavicārāṇam nirodho ti*) says that it is something he directly knows and sees, and that there is no need for him to accept it on faith in any teacher (*so khvāhaṃ evaṃ jānanto evam passanto kassaññassa samaṇassa vā brāhmaṇassa vā saddhāya gamissāmi*). It is also said in this context that knowledge is better than faith (*saddhāya kho ñāṇam eva paṇītataram*: *S.* IV. p. 298 f.) The Buddhist saint must be in a position to claim the highest knowledge without having to depend on faith (*aññatra saddhāya aññam vyākareyya*). The *Dhammapada* (*v.* 97) describes the Arahant as devoid of faith (*assaddho*: *A.* iii. p. 39; *D.* ii. p. 155) This early Buddhist attitude towards faith is expressed later too in the words of Nāgārjuna who says: "One associate with the teaching out of faith, but one knows as it realy is through understanding: understanding (*prajñā*) is superior although faith precedes it.[7].

However, this evaluation of faith as inferior to knowledge appears to belong to an earlier stratum of the Pali canon. With the later attribution of omniscience to the Buddha and the attempt to sharply distinguish the enlightenment of the Buddha from the attainment of the disciples which became much more pronounced in the later Mahāyāna literature, the Buddhist attitude towards the Buddha's authority and the evaluation of faith in Buddhism came closer to that of theistic religions. In the opinion of K. N. Jayatilleke the attempt to distinguish the knowledge of the Buddha from that of the *arahant* has already begun in the later phase of the development of the Pali canon. The emergence of the concept of a saint who is released by intellectual

6. *Tattvasangraha*, 3588.
7. *Śraddhatvād bhajate dharmam*
prajñatvād vetti tattvataḥ
Prajñā pradhānam tvanayoḥ
Śraddhā pūrvaṅgamasya tu
The Ratnāvalī of Nāgārjuna, ed. G. Tucci. *JRAS*. April 1934, p. 309.

knowledge alone (*paññāvimutta*) is explained by Jayatilleke as a consequence of the development of the belief in the omniscience of the Buddha. According to this concept of the enlightened saint, one could become enlightened purely through intellectual conviction of the truth of the specific teachings of the Buddha without having to develop the supercognitive faculties referred to elsewhere under the concept of *abhiññā* (*EBTK* p. 400).

4. The Buddhist Attitude Towards Reason

Out of the ten grounds rejected in the *Kālāma Sutta* four grounds can be identified as involving some kind of reasoning or reflection. These four are (1) *takkahetu*, (2) *nayahetu*, (3) *ākāraparivitakkena* and (4) *diṭṭhinijjhānakkhantiyā*. In the *Brahmajāla Sutta* where the various philosophical dogmas which are said to have been in existence during the time of the Buddha are enumerated, some dogmas are categorically stated to be based on reasoning and speculative reflection (*takkapariyāhatam vimamsānucaritam sayampaṭibhāṇam*). In order to determine the early Buddhist attitude towards reason it is important to examine the references in the Pali canon to the class of thinkers who are described as *takkī* and *vimamsī*.

There is evidence of people who were skilled debators. They are said to have participated in public debates, sometimes with the intention of proving their own theses or with the intention of rationally demolishing the theories of others. One such person mentioned in the suttas is Saccaka who is described as one who displayed his wisdom and skill in debate (*bhassappavadako paṇḍitavādo* see also DEBATE). The Pali suttas also speak of recluses and Brahmins who had mastered the theories of others, wise and subtle hairsplitters, who went about shattering the theories of others with their intelligence (*paṇḍitā nipuṇā kataparappavādā vālavedhirūpā vobhindantā maññe paññāgatena diṭṭhigatāni*: I. p. 26). The Pali suttas contain evidence to the effect that some thinkers during the time of the Buddha affirmed definite theories about the nature of man and the universe. Some of these theories were constructed by *takka* and also defended by means of it. The *Aṭṭhakavagga* of the *Suttanipāta* which presents the Buddha's attitude towards philosophical controversies and debates, says that people come to judgements about the truth or falsity of speculative theories in the context of the debate by employing *takka* (*takkañca diṭṭhisu pakappayitvā saccam musā ti dvaya dhammam āhu*, *Sn.* 886). There is evidence that there were proponents of different theories about the nature of reality and that these theories were publicly propounded and defended by adducing reasons in favour of them. The use of the terms *sutakkita* (well reasoned) and *duttakkita* (ill reasoned) suggests that there was a conception of valid and invalid reasoning at this time. Certain rules of argumentative procedure for determining the validity of an argument also seem to have been accepted (*EBTK* p. 20 f.)

Buddhaghosa, commenting on the word *takkī* lists four types of reasoners, namely, (1) *anussutiko*, (2) *jātissaratakki*, (3) *lābhitakkiko* and (4) *suddhatakkiko*. The first type reasoned on the basis of traditional authority, report or revelation. The second and third types reasoned on the basis of some super cognitive experience obtained by means of meditation. The fourth type depended on pure reason. According to what Buddhaghosa says, a pure reasoner argues in the form "If A is true then P is true and if B is true then P is not true." It is not clear from the way Buddhaghosa puts it whether it is a strictly deductive form of argument based on self-evident premises as in the case of rationalist metaphysicians in the Western philosophical tradition. However, the description *suddhatakkiko* used by Buddhaghosa to distinguish this type of reasoner suggests that the reference is to those who did not depend on empirical premises or statements based on traditional authority in their reasoning.

The expression *nayahetu* is also used to denote a kind of rationalist criterion for accepting something as true. The Jains were well known during this period as a class of teachers who talked about a doctrine of standpoints on the basis of which the truth of a proposition is to be judged.

The next term which denotes some form of reasoning is *ākāraparivitakka*. The commentary explains it as "accepting something thinking this is a good reason for accepting it" (*sundaram idaṃ kāraṇan ti evaṃ kāraṇaparivitakkena*, *AA.* II. p. 305). It is most probably a reference to a superficial examination of reasons. Another ground falling within the same category is *diṭṭhinijjhānakkhanti*. The commentary explains it as occepting something because it agrees with a view that one holds with conviction after reflecting on it (*amhākaṃ nijjhāyitvā khamitvā gahitadiṭṭhiyā saddhiṃ sameti*, *AA.* II. p. 305). There is no reason to doubt this commentarial explanation.

Out of all the above terms used to mean some form of reasoning *takka* appears to take the foremost place. This is perhaps why it is the first to be mentioned among four terms occurring in the *Kālāma Sutta*. According to the *Sandaka Sutta* a system based on reason and speculation like one which depends on revelation, traditional authority or report, is unsatisfactory. For such a system may or may not be well reasoned (*sutakkitampi hoti duttakkitampi hoti*) and whether it is well reasoned or ill reasoned will have no bearing on its truth or

falsity (*tathā pi hoti aññathā pi noti*: *M.* I. p. 520). The same criticism applies to other forms of the application of reason to come to conclustion about what is true.

The above criticism of *takka* may be construed as a logical or an epistemological criticism. Early Buddhism appears to have criticized the attempt to construct metaphysical theories or the attempt to defend metaphysical dogmas already held by resorting to *takka*. This is implicit in the Buddha's refusal to answer categorically, certain questions of a metaphysical or transcendental nature by leaving them aside as *avyākata* (undeclared). Apart from the logical and epistemological reason stated in the *Sandaka Sutta* for rejecting the consistency of reasoning as the sole ground for the determination of the truth of a particular thesis, the Buddha also had numerous empirical reasons for rejecting it. In the *Aṭṭhakavagga* of the *Suttanipāta* where the Buddha's attitude towards philosophical debates is expressed, reason is considered as a tool used by most people to rationalize their prejudices, propensities, proclivities, likes and dislikes. In most instances reason functions only as an aid to safeguard the dogmas that one already clings to. Those who rely on their argumentative skill have little respect for truth, and once they cling to an opinion they get strongly attached to the opinion itself. The Buddha considered this as a source of ideological conflict. Such conflict was considered by the Buddha to be spiritually harmful. In the *Cūlaviyūha Sutta* the Buddha says: "One stands in judgement according to one's own criteria, and enters into controversy in the world. But leaving aside all judgements, let not one come into conflict in the world" (*Sn.* v. 894). The Mahāviyūha *Sutta*, which also deals with philosophical debates says: "The doctrine which is claimed to be the highest by some is called inferior by others, which among these doctrines is the true one? They all claim to be experts" (*Sn.* v. 903). The Buddha sees the spiritually mature person, the real sage (*muni*) as one who shuns debates and philosophical controversy (*Sn.* v. 912). In the *Cūlaviyūha Sutta* it is said: "Each claiming oneself to be an expert clings to one's own view and comes into dispute with others saying, 'One who understands this, knows the truth; whoever rejects this is imperfect" (*Sn.* v. 878). This attitude, according to the Buddha only results in making a person puffed up with pride. Such people are overwhelmed by the passion for their own views (*sandiṭṭhirāgena hi te bhirattā*) and this obsession with their own dogmas becomes a great source of dejection and despair. Thus in the Buddha's opinion *takka* is not merely an unreliable means of knowledge, but also a much abused intellectual instrument of the spiritually immature person.

The teaching of the Buddha is sometimes described as one beyond the scope of *takka* and one that wise people are capable of realizing (*atakkāvacaro paṇḍitavedaniyo*). It is sometimes suggested that it is with reference to the absolute and ultimate Truth that the Buddha claimed this transcendence of reason. This absolute Truth is sometimes identified with *Nibbāna*. The Buddha's reluctance to speak about the after death state of the person who attains ultimate *Nibbāna* is interpreted as suggesting a transcendental ontological reality which is beyond the grasp of language and logic.. However, it is difficult to find any evidence in the Pali canon to conclude that the Buddha considered *Nibbāna* to be anything other than the elimination of suffering and the attainment of tranquillity. As far as the attainment of *Nibbāna* concerns the living experience of the person who attains it, it can be described by means of language. There does not seem to be any evidence in the Pali Nikāyas to suggest that the Buddha believed in an inexpressible or ineffable ultimate reality as opposed to what could be expressed and understood in terms of language and logic. The Buddha's criticism of *takka* applies mainly to those who attempt to construct metaphysical theories without any concern for experiential facts. The Noble Truths of Buddhism are distinguished from the metaphysical. dogmas that are the products of speculative reason, for the former are believed to be based on intersubjectively verifiable experiential facts while the latter have no experiential basis, and consequently are unverifiable. It is to convey this sense of the experiential verifiability of the teaching of the Buddha that it is said to be beyond the scope of reason.

Although the Buddha has sometimes been called a rationalist there does not seem to be any justification for this if the term 'rationalist' is taken in its strictly philosophical sense. The term 'rationalism' is used in the western philosophical tradition to signify an epistemological doctrine which is in direct opposition to the one described as empiricism (q.v.) Rationalist philosophers in the West were those who constructed deductive systems of philosophy based on self-evident first principles. According to rationalist epistemology human knowledge is a superstucture built on the foundations of the deliverances of reason. The basic propositions of rationalist systems are not statements of sense experiences, but of intellectual intuitions which have the status of indubitable truths. There is no evidence that the Buddha founded any of his teachings on such self-evident premises. The Buddha rejects the criticism of Sunakkhatta who describes him as one who does not depend on any extraordinary knowledge, but depends for his teachings on reasoning and speculation. (*M.* I. p. 68).

Although Buddhism does not advocate reason as a sure way of reaching truth, the Buddhist teachings have often been presented in such a way that they have a rational appeal. In the *Apaṇṇaka Sutta* for instance

where the Buddha addresses his teaching to the rational elite of the time (*viññu*), who were inclined to be sceptical about the Buddhist teaching of rebirth, he advises them to lead a good life purely on rational considerations. The Buddha points out that if there is another birth, as affirmed by those who claim to have knowledge of it, a person who does not lead a good life will lose both worlds, while a person who leads a good life will stand to gain in both worlds. On the other hand even if there is no rebirth, if one lives a good life one is honoured by others for one's moral qualities in this life itself. There are also instances in which the Buddha reasoned with those who held views that contradicted his teaching. In the *Upali Sutta* for instance, the Buddha is seen to be arguing in Socratic fashion, leading his opponent by a process of questioning to contradict his own assumption (*M.* I. p. 376–378). Although logical consistency in itself was not considered to be a mark of truth, the Buddha believed that what one holds to be true needs to be logically consistent.

5.1. The Buddhist Analysis of Knowledge

We have seen that the Buddha rejected both authority and reason and recommended direct personal knowledge as the sure way of reaching truth. The Buddha rejects other grounds for accepting a belief as true. For a belief based on those grounds could turn out to be true or false. Emphasis on personal and direct knowledge is found throughout the Nikāyas. Direct knowledge and vision of what is claimed to be true is frequently attributed to the Buddha. The Buddha is described as one who knows and sees (*jānaṃ jānāti passam passati*, *M.* I. p. III). He is often called the knowing and seeing one (*jānātā passatā*, ibid). Even those who follow the holy life prescribed by the Buddha are expected to do so in order that they may know, see, attain, realize and comprehend what they have not so far known, seen, attained, realized or comprehended (*yam... aññātam adiṭṭhaṃ appattaṃ asacchikataṃ anabhisametaṃ tassa ñāṇāya dassanāya pattiyā sacchikiriyāya abhisamayāya bhagavati brahmacariyaṃ vussatiti*. *A.* IV. p. 384). It is important to see that the Buddha was interested in a special variety of truth, namely, truth that leads to liberation. The truths of the Buddha are distinguished from other truths by describing them as noble truths (*ariyasaccāni*). While using a variety of terms signifying a variety of cognitive activity, Buddhism seems to distinguish a form of knowledge in evaluative terms, as noble or higher knowledge (*ariyañāṇa*). What is of special importance to Buddhism is this emancipating knowledge for the cultivation of which Buddhism prescribes a systematic and detailed procedure. From a general epistemological standpoint it is important to see how this special knowledge is different from other forms of knowledge that Buddhism itself refers to by a variety of cognitive terms.

The Pali Nikāyas express distinctions in modes of knowing by varying the prefix which is attached to the root *jñā*, each variation signifying a difference in the level of cognitive activity or a difference in the perspective from which the cognitive activity is performed. The terms that occur most frequently in the suttas are the following:

sam + *jñā* = *saññā* (noun), *sañjanāti* (verb)
vi + *jñā* = *viññāṇa* (noun), *vijānāti* (verb)
abhi + *jñā* = *abhiññā* (noun), *abhijānāti* (verb)
pari + *jñā* = *pariññā* (noun), *parijānāti* (verb)
pra + *jñā* = *paññā* (noun), *pajānāti* (verb)

Like the English term 'knowledge', *ñāṇa* in Pali can be taken as the cognitive term used in the most generic sense. From the Buddhist point of view the same objective existence can be cognized from a variety of ways. The manner in which cognitive terms are treated in Buddhism suggests that all knowing does not conform to a single pattern, but that knowing is relative to the various needs and purposes of conscious rational beings. The world of experience can be known in the *saññā*, *viññāṇa* or the *paññā* ways. *Saññā* and *viññāṇa* are not forms of knowing which give emancipating knowledge. These two forms of cognitive experience are to be handled cautiously as they could lead to bondage and suffering. The noble truths are to be grasped not by the ordinary cognitive processes of *saññā* and *viññāṇa*, but by the special cognitive processes called *abhiññā*, *pariññā* and *paññā*. However these latter processes are distinguished from dependence on authority, speculative reason or faith.

5.2 Ordinary sense cognition, *saññā* and *viññāna*.

A brief examination of the variety of cognitive terms used in early Buddhism is useful to gain clarity about the Buddhist concept of knowledge. The Pali Nikāyas explain *saññā* as that mode of cognition which arises on the occasion of the meeting of a particular sense-organ with the corresponding sense object. The standard description of this process of cognition as found in the Pali Nikāyas is as follows:

"Depending on the eye and material forms there arises visual *viññāṇa*. By the coming together of these three arises sense impingement. Depending on sense impingement arises sensation . That which one senses one "knows in the *saññā* way."[8]

[8] *Cakkhūca paṭcca rūpe ca uppajjati cakkhuviññānam Tiṇṇam saṅgati phasso. Phassapaccayā vedanā. Yam vedeti taṃ sañjānāti. M.* I. p. 293.

The question that arises here is what "knowing in the *saññā* way" signifies. It is possible to interpret *viññāṇa* in the passage quoted above as mere sensory awareness and *saññā* as a subsequent stage in the process of perceptual activity.[9]

Saññā may be considered as a stage where distinctions are introduced into the primitive sensation by selective attention. Although this interpretation does not seem to agree with the commentarial explanation of the Theravāda tradition, it appears to be justified by the Pali canonical suttas. The activity of *saññā* seems to depend on repeated perceptual experience as well as the mind's ability to formulate ideas and recognize the sensory environment in terms of them. The treatment of *saññā* in the Nikāyas suggests that there is no uniform manner in which the sensory environment should be cognized from the *saññā* perspective. According to Buddhism *saññā* do not represent indelible Forms or Ideas in the Platonic sense imprinted in the Soul of a person, but they are variable depending on the way one trains oneself. *Saññā* response, like other perceptual responses is a conditioned response. According to the *Poṭṭhapāda Sutta*, by training, some types of *saññā* could emerge and other types could cease to be (*sikkhā ekā saññā uppajjanti, sikkhā ekā saññā nirujjhanti*: *D.* I, p. 183). The training mentioned in this context probably refers to the systematic meditative cultivation of the mind to experience reality in certain mentally determined modes. *Saññā* is altered in accordance with these mental determinations. According to the *Poṭṭhapāda Sutta* it is possible for a person to transcend altogether the *saññā* experience of material form, put an end to the experience of the resistance of material objects, withdraw the mind's attention from the experience of a plurality of objects and enter into and abide in a state of mental rapture in which the *saññā* experience would be of infinite space (*sabbaso rūpasaññānam samatikkamma paṭighasaññānam atthagamā nānatta-saññānaṃ amanasikārā ananto ākāso ti ākāsānañcāyatanam upasampajja viharati... ākāsānañcāyatana sukhumasaccasaññātasmiṃ samaye hoti*).

Saññā, from the Buddhist point of view is a way of cognition which has to be transcended. Buddhism recognizes a stage of meditative rapture of the mind in which *saññā* completely ceases. *Saññā* is believed to lead to bondage and suffering through the process of *papañca*, a process which involves a proliferation of concepts in the mind linked to the notion of self and associated with the unwholesome emotions of craving (*taṇhā*), conceit (*māna*) and dogmatic belief (*diṭṭhi*). The *Madhupiṇḍika Sutta* describes this psychological process as follows:

> That which one "knows in the *saññā* way" one thinks about. One gets obsessed with that which one thinks about. Due to this (obsession) one is assailed by the ideas of conceptual proliferation with regard to the past, present and future material forms which are cognizable by means of visual *viññāṇa*.[10]

Early Buddhism considers *saññā* as the characteristic cognitive response of the unenlightened individual. According to the ***Mūlapariyāya Sutta***, the *saññā* response to any category of experience inclusive of the four material elements to which the whole of material reality can be reduced, all the data of the senses (*diṭṭha, suta, muta*), meditative experiences and even the highest spiritual category conceptualized as *Nibbāna* involves an unenlightened response and consequently leads to bondage and misery (*M.* I. p.3).

Saññā is here contrasted with two cognitive perspectives of a different type called *pariññā* and *abhiññā*. These latter cognitive responses are those that the Buddha's disciples are expected to cultivate. The disciples are advised to cultivate *pariññā* with respect to *saññā* itself in order to attain emancipation (*saññaṃ pariññā vitareyya oghaṃ Sn. v.* 779).

Viññāṇa too, like *saññā* is distinguished from the cognitive perspectives referred to as *abhiññā*, *pariññā* and *paññā*. *Viññāṇa*, as represented in the standard formulation of the perceptual process in the Pali Nikāyas, appears to refer to the perceptual awareness of the respective senses prior to conceptualization. However, usage in the Pali canon appears to vary according to context and there are instances where *viññāṇa* occurs in the sense of ordinary perceptual knowledge as distinguished from *paññā*, the higher knowledge of the saint. The *viññāṇa* response, considered in the suttas as requiring no special effort for its cultivation, unlike the *paññā* response is also said to be associated with dangers like the *saññā* response.

5.3. Higher forms of Cognition — the concept of *abhiññā*.

Reference has already been made to the Buddhist claim that the Buddhist way of life and the world view on which it is based is derived from a special way of knowing called *abhiññā*. According to the *Saṅgārava*

10. *Yaṃ sañjānāti, taṃ vitakketi, yaṃ vitakketi taṃ papañceti yaṃ papañceti tatonidānaṃ purisaṃ papañcasaññāsaṅkhā samudācaranti atītānāgata-paccuppannesu cakkhuviññeyyesu rūpesu*: *M.* I, p. 11. 111.

Sutta, the Buddha claims to be one of those who based the teachings about the holy life on 'a personal higher knowledge'. This suggests that there were others too before and during his time who made similar claims. According to K. N. Jayatilleke, the thinkers of the Middle and Late *Upaniṣadis* who emphasized *jñāna* or knowledge, favouring the *jñānamārga* instead of the earlier *karmamārga* can be identified with this group of thinkers. More specifically Jayatilleke believes that they were the Upanisadic thinkers who rejected both the traditional authority of the *Vedas* and the intellectual or rational knowledge of the early *Upaniṣads* and held that access to the deepest truths about reality can be had in the rapturous states of *yoga* meditation (*EBTK*. pp. 61, 417 f.) It was believed to be a kind of direct intuitive knowledge. Such claims appear to have been made by other contemporaries of the Buddha as well, like some of the Ājivaka teachers and Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta. Jayatilleke argues that despite the similarity between this claim to an extraordinary means of knowledge made by the Buddha and other contemporary teachers, the Buddhists do not treat such knowledge as mystical, but as natural causal accompaniments of mental discipline and composure.

The prefix *abhi* in *abhiññā* signifies 'superiority' 'speciality', 'extraordinariness' or 'greatness'. Accordingly, the term *abhiññā* can best be rendered into English as 'supercognition'. An examination of the variety of cognitive powers comprehended under *abhiññā* in Buddhism is useful in understanding this concept.

The Pali Nikāyas enumerate the following six forms of *abhiññā*: (1) *iddhividha*, (2) *dibbasota*, (3) *paracittañāṇa*, (4) *pubbenivāsānussati*, (5) *dibbacakkhu*, and (6) *āsavakkhaya*. (q.vv.). Out of these, what is said to be unique to Buddhism is the sixth one, 'knowledge of the destruction of the cankers.

Buddhism recognized a causal relation between the attainment of mental composure and the emergence of super–cognitive abilities. Except for *āsavakkhayañāṇa* which Buddhism claims to be its distinctive contribution, it acknowledged the genuineness of the claims of others to have possessed super–cognitive abilities. The Pali Nikāyas mention certain doctrines held by pre-Buddhist teachers on the nature of the world and the individual on the basis of super-cognitive experience. The eternalist theory that the soul and the world are eternal (*sassato attā ca loko ca*) is said to have been based on the super-cognitive ability of some recluses and brahmins to remember their previous existences (*D*. I, p. 14). This experience of the memory of previous existences (*pubbenivāsānussati*) is said to occur in the rapturous state of mind generated by means of effort, exertion and application of the mind (*ātappam anvāya padhānam anvāya anuyogam anvāya tathārūpam cetosamādhim phusatiyathā samāhite citte anekavihitam pubbenivāsam anussarati*). Speaking of the progressive meditative development of the mind in the Buddhist attempt to incline the mind to the attainment of the super-cognitive knowledge and vision it is said in the Pali Nikayas that this becomes possible when the mind reaches a very advanced stage of composure, clarity, purity, pliability and steadfastness (*so evam samāhite citte parisuddhe pariyodāte anaṅgane vigatūpakkilese mudubhute kammaniye ṭhite āneñjappatte pubbenivāsānussatiñāṇāya cittam abhinīharati abhininnāmeti*. *D*. I, p. 81).

Iddhividha (q.v.) the first *abhiññā* recognized in Buddhism cannot strictly be described as a form of knowing, the content of which can be formulated in propositions. It is explained as an extraordinary ability to perform certain acts like walking on water, levitation, etc..

Dibbacakkhu (clairvoyance q.v.) and *dibbasota* (clairaudience q.v.) can be classed together in that they merely involve an extension of the sensory capacities of the visual and the auditory sense. *Dibbacakkhu*, of which *cutūpapātañāṇa* (q.v. the knowledge of the passing away and arising of beings) is said to be a particular application, is the ability to experience visually, contemporaneous events beyond the range of one's normal power of vision. The passing away of other beings and their arising in accordance with their character traits is said to be seen by means of this super-cognitive ability. The experiential basis for the Buddhist theory of *kamma* is believed to be *cutūpapātañāṇa*, which is a special application of *dibbacakkhu*. According to the evidence contained in the Pali Nikāyas *dibbacakkhu* can be exercised only for the purpose of seeing contemporaneous events, and therefore, it is not a means by which one could directly witness the past or the future. It is also a noteworthy feature of the Buddhist theory of *abhiññā* that it is admitted that in order to develop and exercise *dibbacakkhu* the ordinary physical eye is necessary as its natural causal basis. According to the *Itivuttaka*, the presence of the physical eye is necessary for the operation of *dibbacakkhu* (*mamsacakkhussa uppādo maggo dibbassa cakkhuno*. *It*. p 52). This idea is confirmed in the following *Milindapañha* passage:

> It is said in the sutta that when the causal ground is destroyed, in the absence of the cause, in the absence of the basis there is no arising of *dibbacakkhu* (*hetusamugghāte ahetusmim avatthumhi natthi dibbacakkhussa uppādo ti sutte vuttam*. p. 119).

What is referred to as the causal ground here is clearly the physical eye.

The Pali Nikāyas do not speak of the possibility of extending the capacity of the senses of smell, taste and touch by *abhiññā* but only of vision and hearing. There is also no admission of a super-cognitive power capable of directly cognizing the past or the future. The past is known only by retracing the memory, the experience of which is characterized as *satānusāri viññāṇam*. The only certain knowledge that the Buddha claims about the future is what he claims to be the knowledge born out of his enlightenment that there is no rebecoming for him in the future (*anāgatam kho addhānam ārabbha tathāgatassa bodhijam ñāṇam uppajjati ayam antimā jāti natthi dāni punabbhavoti*: *D*. III. p. 134). *Dibbacakkhu* was not admitted as a means of direct access to the past or the future although this is how it is often popularly conceived.

Cetopariyañāṇa (q.v.) enables a person to examine directly and comprehend by one's own mind the mental traits in the mind of another. By this means one could know whether another person's mind is lustful or free from lust, hateful or free from hatred and so on (*so parasattānam parapuggalānam cetasā ceto paricca pajānāti sarāgam vā cittam sarāgam cittan ti pajānāti*... *D*. I, p. 79).

Pubbenivāsānussatiñāṇa (q.v.) is said to be an extension of one's memory into the past beyond one's present life experience. It does not enable a person to have any direct access into a past occurrence, but only to recall one's own previous memory experiences, just as one would recall the past experiences of the present life. This is what was referred to above as *satānusāri viññāṇam*. This type of super-cognitive ability was considered as one of the experiential bases for the Buddhist theory of rebirth.

What remains to be examined is *āsavakkhayañāṇa* (q.v.) the highest and that which is claimed to be unique to Buddhism. The term itself contains the meaning that it is a kind of self transforming knowledge. Where the Pali Nikāyas refer to this knowledge it is invariably associated with the insight into the Four Noble Truths of Buddhism, the understanding of the three characteristics of being and the comprehension of the law of dependent co-origination (*paṭiccasamuppāda*). *Āsavakkhayañāṇa* can be understood first, as the knowledge which brings about the eradication of the cankers and secondly, as the introspective knowledge of one's liberated condition of mind.

It is clear from the above account that the early Buddhist notion of *abhiññā* leaves no room for any mysterious objects to be apprehended by an extraordinary intuition. Out of the six super-cognitive powers recognized in Buddhism, in (2) to (5) there is no recognition of a cognitive content that is other than material forms (*rūpa*), the data of vision, sound (*sadda*), the data of hearing, or some mental content such as a memory experience or the mental condition of another person. In Buddhism these super-cognitive powers are valued merely because they are believed to augment our factual knowledge of the world which is ordinarily restricted due to certain natural limitations in our sensory capacities. However, Buddhism does not consider these cognitive powers as inherently capable of leading to infallible truths about the nature of existence. Some recluses and Brahmins who possessed these powers are said to have reached erroneous conclusions about the nature of reality on the basis of the data of such super-cognitive experience. In the *Brahmajāla Sutta* for instance, some metaphysical theories described as eternalism and semi-eternalism are said to be based on the super-cognitive experience of the memory of past lives. Buddhism appears to have given special importance to three of the *abhiññā* classing them under the concept of *tevijjā*. It is to be noted that the Buddha himself preferred to be called one possessed of *tevijjā*, rather than being called 'omniscient' (*sabbaññu*) in the sense omniscience was claimed by some of his contemporaries. The three kinds of knowledge included under *tevijjā* in Buddhism were (1) *pubbenivāsānussatiñāṇa*, (2) *cutūpapātañāṇa* and (3) *āsavakkhayañāṇa* The first two had a special significance to Buddhism because they were believed to be the means of experientially verifying the truths of rebirth and *karma*, which in turn was believed to contribute to the attainment of the final knowledge described as *āsavakkhayañāṇa*.

Āsavakkhayañāṇa, which is claimed to be unique to Buddhism is itself not a mysterious vision into a supra-sensible or absolute reality, but a cognitive approach or perspective with reference to experiential reality which tends to bring about a certain psychological and attitudinal transformation. It is constant meditative reflection on certain observable realities, observable even by the methods of ordinary observation, that produces what Buddhism called *āsavakkhayañāṇa*. Analytical and introspective observation of the physical and mental nature which constitutes empirical reality, directed to the comprehension of their *anicca*, *dukkha* and *anatta* character as recommended in the *satipaṭṭhāna* method of developing insight is what produces the self-transforming knowledge described as *āsavakkhayañāṇa*.

5.4 Higher forms of cognition — of *pariññā* and *paññā*.

According to the *Mūlapariyāya Sutta* (*M*. I, p. 1 ff.) enlightened persons like the Buddha and the saints who have eradicated the cankers have attained *pariññā* with regard to all the data of experience. It is because

they have known things in the *pariññā* way that they are freed from all *dukkha*. *Pariññā* is a cognitive term frequently used in the Pali Nikāyas to signify the comprehensive understanding of the nature of things. According to the *Mahādukkhakkhandha Sutta* (*M.* I, p. 83 ff.) one gains comprehensive understanding of *kāma*, *rūpa* and *vedanā*, by knowing them in terms of their satisfaction (*assāda*), their harmful or perilous consequences (*ādīnava*) and the possible freedom from bondage to them (*nissaraṇa*) Here *pariññā* involves no mysterious intuition but a comprehensive understanding of the nature of *kāma*, *rūpa* and *vedanā* by an empirical observation of their multifarious aspects.

Paññā as a stage in the Buddhist path to spiritual perfection is said to be developed on the basis of *sīla* (good conduct) and *samādhi* (mental composure). In indicating the difference between *paññā* and *viññāṇa*, the *Mahāvedalla Sutta* says that unlike *viññāṇa*, *paññā* is a cognitive capacity that ought to be developed (*paññā bhāvetabbā*: *M.* I, p. 292). In the same context the content of the *paññā* way of cognition is given as the four noble truths. Buddhism also uses the term *paññā* when referring to the knowledge of moral distinctions (*kusalañ ca pajānāti kusalamūlañ ca pajānāti*: *D.* I, p. 83). It is the emancipating knowledge, which is insightful and goal-directed, culminating in the destruction of the cankers that Buddhism calls *paññā*. To know something from the perspective of *paññā* does not involve any mysterious intuition, but merely a self-transforming understanding as a result of repeated meditative attention paid to certain empirical features of the nature of reality. A repeated admonition of the Buddha found in the Pali Nikāyas is as follows:

> O monks, material form is impermanent. That which is impermanent is unsatisfactory. That which is unsatisfactory is devoid of substantiality. That which is devoid of substantiality is not mine, I am not that, that is not my self. One ought to see in this manner as it has really come to be with proper *paññā* (*S.* III, p. 32).

Paññā involves much more than a mere knowledge of empirical facts. It involves an intelligent systematization of those facts and an insight into the various connections between the known facts with selective attention in order to achieve a certain goal. It is also to be noted that there are certain prerequisites for the development of the kind of special knowledge which Buddhism calls *paññā*. It requires moral discipline and mental composure, which is not a prerequisite for the kind of knowledge that a natural scientist may have in the form of scientific knowledge. The natural scientist may need a different kind of discipline but not the kind of moral discipline that is required of the person in search of self-transforming wisdom. However there is an empirical content to *paññā* as it is developed on the basis of initial empirical observations on the nature of mental and material reality. The validation of this kind of knowledge depends partly on the fact that it succeeds in achieving the anticipated goal, namely that of transforming oneself, and overcoming suffering. The three cognitive terms *abhiññā*, *pariññā* and *paññā* are clearly distinguishable from the other two *saññā* and *viññāṇa* in the sense that the former are forms of cognition which are specially cultivated directing them towards the achievement of a particular goal.

6. Buddhism and Empiricism

The Buddhist rejection of authority and reason and the emphasis on direct personal knowledge has led some scholars to consider Buddhism as a form of empiricism. K. N. Jayatilleke and D. J. Kalupahana are of the opinion that perception, normal and paranormal, and inductive inference are considered the means of knowing in the Pali Nikāyas.[12] Jayatilleke expresses the opinion that the term *anumāna* has been used in the Pali Nikāyas in the sense of inference. There is no dobt that in the later logical schools of Buddhism such as that of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, the term *anumāna* had the technical sense of inference based on a general premise established on the basis of observation. The Pali Nikāyas do not explicitly mention the use of *anumāna* in that sense. However, Jayatilleke observes that a distinction made in the Pali Nikāya period in terms of two types of knowledge called *dhamme ñāṇa* and *anvaye ñāṇa*, could be interpreted as knowledge of specific instances of a causal correlation and the knowledge of a general inductive law covering the past, present and the future (*EBTK*, p. 441 f.).

D.J. Kalupahana refers to the *Sabba Sutta* (*S.* IV, p. 15) in support of his view that the acceptance of paranormal experience in Buddhism, does not affect its empiricist position. In the *Sabba Sutta* the Buddha asserts that the question "What is everything?" can be answered by saying "Everything is the eye and material form, ear and sound, nose and odour, tongue and taste, body and tanjible objects, mind and objects of mind." The Buddha adds in this context that anyone who speaks of anything over and above these senses and their corresponding objects cannot make oneself intelligible. In our discussion of *abhiññā* (2) to (5) above it was pointed out that the content of this knowledge is not considered to be any mysterious objects. The data of *dibbacakkhu* for instance is nothing but *rūpa*, which

11. *Middle Length Sayings* (Pali Text Society), Vol. I, p. 116.
12. *EBTK*, p. 463. See also *Buddhist Philosophy*, D. J. Kalupahana (University Press of Hawaii, 1976), p. 22f.

is also the data of ordinary vision. The *abhiññā* in the context of the operation of these super-cognitive powers can be conceived merely as extensions of the sensory capacities by means of *yogic* training. Whether such training is in fact possible or not cannot be determined a *priori*, but only on the basis of empirical observation. If such super-cognitive capacities do in fact exist, as sometimes attested by those researching into para-psychological phenomena, there could be no objection to considering them as useful instruments in extending the experiential content of our knowledge. It is due to this reason that it is maintaineed that despite the admission of *abhiññā*, truths in Buddhism have an empirical foundation. A.B. Kerith does not agree with the above position. He treats the special insight of the Buddha as a mystical one not open to any intersubjective empirical verification. According to Keith:

> The Buddha, like the sage of the Upanisad sees things as they truly are (*yathābhūtaṃ*) by a mystic potency, which is quite other than reasoning of the discursive type. The truth of this insight is assured by it alone, for it is obviously incapable of verification in any empirical manner.[13]

Keith's comments do not seem to apply to the content of the higher knowledge claimed on the basis of the *abhiññā* (2) to (5), for it may be argued that at least some of that content is verifiable by means of the ordinary methods of sense observation. Logical objections raised against the claim that one could use paranormal powers to observe certain phenomena that cannot be observed by the ordinary senses such as the occurrence of rebirth and the existence of other realms of existence were countered by early Buddhism by pointing out that the mere fact that some people do not experience them is no reason to reject them. According to Buddhism the acquisition of the paranormal powers of perception are a natural causal consequence of the appropriate mental training. The experience of these faculties can be shared by those who accomplish the required training. In the *Subba Sutta*, a Brahmin youth named Subha expresses the opinion of a Brahmin teacher named Pokkarasāti that the claim of some recluses and Brahmins to possess paranormal powers is an inadmissible false claim. The Buddha's response to this was that those who deny the knowledge of people who possess paranormal powers are like blind men who deny the existence of visible forms, colours and objects merely because they could not experience them (*M*. II, p. 201). It can be argued that there is no reason why the sphere of the empirical could not be extended to include the data of such super-cognitive experience, provided that such data can be found to cohere with the other sense experiences of human beings.

Attention is often drawn to some special features of the Buddha's doctrine in support of the thesis that Early Buddhism can be described as a form of empiricism on epistemological grounds. Buddhism does not posit a first beginning of existence. It also rejects the theistic doctrine involving the notion of a creator God. It explains existential reality on the basis of its principle of dependent co - origination (*paṭiccasamuppāda*) which cautiously avoids the notion of an uncaused first cause. Buddhism does not posit an absolute beginning for the individual or the universe. Where the Buddha speaks of the universe, he talks only about relative beginnings within a cyclic process of evolution and dissolution (*saṃvaṭṭamāna kappa* and *vivaṭṭamāna kappa*). With regard to the recurring process of becoming which Buddhism calls *saṃsāra* it holds that there is no known beginning. This position is consistent with the Buddhist theory that the main access into the past in experiential terms is through memory. The Buddha held that even a person who has developed the super-cognitive ability to recall his past existences to the highest degree is incapable of finding an absolute beginning. In the Buddha's opinion, some advocates of the theistic belief were misled by their limited super-cognitive experience of the memory of past lives into thinking that they were created by an eternal God. The Buddha appears to have been critical even about the so called mystical or religious experiences as a valid ground for the theistic belief, because he conceived the possibility of misinterpreting such experiences and drawing erroneous conclusions from them. He rejected the Brahmanical doctrine about the path to the attainment of the world of Brahmā on the ground that none of those who spoke about such a path had direct personal knowledge of the existence of Brahmā (*natthi koci tevijjānaṃ brāhmanānaṃ yāva sattamā ācariyamahāyugā yena Brahmā sakkhidiṭṭho*: *D*. I, p. 239). He compared the effort of the Brahmins with that of one who constructs a ladder to climb a mansion of which the location and dimensions are unknown. The doctrine of an immortal and immutable soul also finds no place in the Buddha's teachings. The Buddha analyzed the person into five component aggregates (*pañcakkhandhā*) and showed that in none of these aggregates is to be found an immutable substantial nature which was then commonly assumed to be the nature of the metaphysical *ātman* and conceived as the real essence of the individual. The Buddha refused to employ reason beyond the limits of human experience and left all questions of a metaphysical nature unanswered. He, like Kant, left the question whether space is finite or infinite unanswered because answering that question would involve an illegitimate use of reason. The Buddha's denial in the *Subba Sutta* referred to above, that there could be anything that can be meaning-

13. *Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon*, A. B. Keith, (Oxford 1923), p. 90.

fully talked about, beyond the six speheres of sense, also points in the same direction. These are very strong reasons in favour of concluding that the Buddha's teaching contained certain positivistic and empiricist features.

However, there are other features of Buddhism which could raise difficulties in an attempt to identify its epistemological position with what came to be regarded as logical positivism and empiricism in the Western philosophical tradition. Philosophers in the Western philosophical tradition have for a long time been engaged in the search for the indubitable foundation of all knowledge combined with the pursuit of a single paradigm to which all knowledge could conform. The rationalists adhered to the view that knowledge has the nature of a deductive system founded upon the indubitable and self-evident truths of reason, while the empiricists insisted on the view that the most certain and indubitable knowledge claims are those about our immediate sense data. The consequence of both points of view have been scepticism with respect ro certain areas of human knowledge. The admission of the mind as a sixth sense enables Buddhism to consider reason as a function of the mind. This appears to dissolve the absolute distinction between sense and reason on which the rationalist-empiricist distinction rests. Buddhism is not in disagreement with the empiricist insistence on the significant role of the senses in human knowledge. However, Buddhism does not maintain that the indubitable objects of knowledge are the deliverances of the senses, for it does not get involved in the pursuit of knowledge in the absolutist sense. Instead of turning its attention on absolute objects of knowledge, early Buddhism gives a value orientation to the activity of knowing. Accordingly, its search is directed to forms of knowing which in its view serves best the human interest. There are no forms of knowing which have epistemological finality, whether they be founded on the senses or on reason. The early Buddhist treatment of the concept of knowledge leaves open the possibility of admitting varieties of knowing relative to the needs and purposes of human beings. In stating the early Buddhist position in more modern terms, it may be said that from the early Buddhist point of view, the ordinary sensory knowledge of the table as a solid object having certain sensory properties such as colour and shape is as valid as the scientist's knowledge of it as an object composed of a molecular structure. The knowledge of the properties of the table, as known in our ordinary sense experience suffices for the various activities that we perform with the table at the level of ordinary day to day experience. So is the scientist's knowledge of the constitution of the physical world which is validated by the various practical consequences of such knowledge. Early Buddhism too, by its notions of *abhiññā, pariññā, paññā, āsavakkhayañāṇa* and *vimuttiñāṇadassana* presents a form of goal directed knowledge which involves the seeing of the empirical world as having the characteristics of change, unsatisfactoriness and insubstantiality. It claims that this knowledge works in that it succeeds in achieving the anticipated goal, and assures that it works for anyone who cares to come and test it in his own experience (*ehipassiko paccattam veditabbo*). Early Buddhism combines a pragmatic approach with a sense of realism in admitting the role of the senses, as well as the intellect in the various forms of human cognition. *Paññā* in early Buddhism is not considered as a form of knowing completely divorced from sense cognition. For according to the analysis presented in the *Mahāvedalla Sutta* of the principal terms having a cognitive import, *paññā* and *viññāṇa* are not absolutely separable cognitive activities. (*Yā ca...paññā yañ ca. viññāṇaṃ ime dhammā saṃsaṭṭhā no visaṃsaṭṭhā, na ca labbhā imesam dhammānaṃ vinibbhujitva vinibbhujitvā nānākaranaṃ paññāpetuṃ: M.* I. p. 292) The objects of *paññā* and *viññāṇa* are not different. That which is the object of *viññāna* itself becomes the object of *paññā* as well (*Yaṃ...pajānāti taṃ vijānāti, yaṃ vijānāti taṃ pajānāti*). The difference lies only in the nature of the cognitive response. As we have already mentioned the *paññā* response is not a mere passive response to the sensory presentation, but a specially cultivated and goal directed response. In this respect there is an implicit difference between the Buddhist concept of knowledge and the classical empiricist concept according to which knowledge is conceived as a superstructure erected upon the indubitable foundation of the primitive elements passively received through the senses. Unlike in the case of contemporary Empiricism and Logical Positivism, early Buddhism should have no difficulty in accounting for moral or aesthetic knowledge. For it allows for a variety of cognitive perspectives without confining itself to an absolute perspective alleged to possess epistemological finality.

7. Later Developments in Epistemology

The central concern of early Buddhism was the attainment of inner peace through the eradication of the unwholesome psychological traits and the cultivation of wholesome qualities of mind. It valued the kind of knowledge and insight which was found to be conducive to that goal. All activity which posed a hindrance to this objective was not encouraged in the early teaching. Philosophical debate and controversy was to be avoided by the Buddhist sage. However later Buddhist teachers who were confronted with the intellectual challenges from other systems of Indian Philosophy, sought to introduce greater intellectual precision and logical clarity to the doctrines of Buddhism in order to meet those

challenges. Thus Due to the continuing dialogue., interaction and ideological conflict between Buddhism and other schools of Indian Philosophy like the Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Mīmāmsā and Vedānta traditions, a vast literature dealing with logical and epistemological issues on an argumentative basis emerged within the Buddhist tradition as a parallel development with those other schools. All principal schools of Indian Philosophy were engaged in the task of determining the nature of right knowledge, and examining the grounds for accepting the validity of knowledge claims. According to the Indian usage of that time they were interested in determining the valid *pramāṇas* resulting in what was known as *prāmāṇya-vāda* (epistemological theory). In these developments an effort has been made by renowned Buddhist teachers far removed from the time in which the Buddha lived, to preserve the fundamental elements of the early teaching, despite the sophistication and analytical skill displayed in their treatises sometimes exclusively devoted to the treatment of issues on logic and epistemology. The masters Dignāga, Dharmakīrti, Dharmottara, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla for instance can be considered as foremost among the illustrious teachers of later Buddhism who contributed enormously not only to the philosophy of Buddhism but also to Indian logic and epistemology in general. These Buddhist teachers engaged in the discussion of epistemological issues with the intention of revealing the natural and general logic of the human understanding. They did not intend to derive their doctrines directly from Buddhism as a religious system or as a path towards salvation. Therefore their discussions are not confined to the validation of Buddhist notions, but have a general philosophical significance. An attempt will be made in the sequel to treat very briefly some principal aspects of these later developments.

In the *Nyaya Bindu* of Dharmakīrti and the commentary to the same text by Dharmottara, there is an attempt to analyze the two main sources of knowledge that later Buddhism recognized.[14] According to Dharmottara's commentary to *Nyāya Bindu* all successful human action is preceded by right knowledge. Right cognition is defined as successful cognition. It is knowledge that is not contradicted by experience. Knowledge is right when it makes us reach the goal which it points to (*pradarśitam artham prāpayan samvādakam ucyate*).[15] Buddhism retained its opposition to reliance on the authority of the *Vedas* and criticized the Mimāṃsakas, the most orthodox theologians of the old Brahmanical sacrificial religion. The Mimāṃsakas attempted to defend a theory of eternal sound in order to safeguard the authority of the *Vedas*. They believed that the meaning of a word (*śabdārtha*) is an eternal object and held that the Vedic statements represent eternal and enduring truths The Buddhists did not use the term *artha*, in the sense of an eternal object. Therefore the Buddhist definition of knowledge was opposed to the idea of absolute objects of knowledge, and it inclined more towards a pragmatist definition. According to the opinion of these Buddhist teachers right cognition is successful cognition. It is cognition followed by a successful action.[16] According to Dharmottara, right knowledge is twofold. It is either instinctive or discursive. In the case of the latter, we direct our attenion to a possible object of successful action through a process of remembering, willing, acting and reaching the desired goal. Buddhist teachers undertook to analyze this discursive thought, leaving aside cases where purposive action appears directly and aims are attained straight off as in the case of instinctive knowledge (ibid. p. 61) According to their analysis, sensibility is the primary source of our knowledge of reality whereas the intellect produces the forms of this knowledge, and the verbal expression of the cognitive process is made in terms of the syllogism.

The Buddhist insistence on the empirical foundations of human knowledge, which is a characteristic of early Buddhist teachings is reiterated in the discussions of these later Buddhist philosophers. The Mimāṃsaka view that scriptural statements need no further validation but are self-validated is criticized by the Buddhist teachers. Kamalaśīla, for instance rejects the view of the Jaiminiyas who maintained that all our sources of knowledge in general are right by themselves in their attempt to establish the authority of scripture. According to the Buddhist teachers, right knowledge is efficient knowledge, and it is through consistent experience that truth becomes established.

In the *Nyāya Bindu* Dharmakīrti says that there are two varieties of right knowledge, namely, perception and inference (*dvividham samyagjñānam pratyakṣam anumānam ca*). In Dharmottara's commentary perceptual knowledge is explained as any knowledge that makes the object appear before us directly (*yat kimcidarthasya sākṣātkārijñānam tatpratyakṣamucyate*). Dharmottara, observes that although according to the etymological meaning of the term *pratyakṣa*, it stands for sense-knowledge, by usage it includes other forms of direct knowing. Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara recognize

14 *Dvividham samyagjñānam pratyakṣam anumānam ca, Nyāya Bindu*, edited by Peter Peterson, (Bibilotheca Indica Calcutta, 1889), Chapter 1.

15 *Buddhist Logic*, Th. Stcherbatsky (Mouton & Co. Printers, The Hauge, 1958), Vol. II, translation of *Nyāya Bindu* and its commentary, p. 4; *Nyāya Bindu Ṭīkā*, edited by Peter Peterson, (*Bibliotheca Indica* Calcutta, 1889), p. 3.

16 *Buddhist Logic*, Th. Stcherbatsky (Leningrad 1932), Vol. I, p. 59.

four varieties of perceptual or direct knowledge. They are (1) sense knowledge (*indriyajñāna*), knowledge of the five senses, (2) mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*), which corresponds to the sixth sense admitted in the early Buddhist teachings, (3) self consciousness with respect to all inner mental phenomena such as pleasure and pain (*cittacaittānam ātmasamvedanam*) and (4) the knowledge of the Yogi which arises on account of meditation on reality (*bhūtārthabāvanāprakarṣaparyantajam yogijñānam*). It is important to note that the later Buddhists in keeping with the early Buddhist position that even the highest knowledge of the Buddha is experiential and perceptual include under their notion of direct perceptual knowledge (*pratyakṣa*), what early Buddhism included under super-cognitive experience.

> Explaining the term *anumāna* used in the technical sence of inference Dharmottara says:
>
> (The word for inference means etymologically "subsequent measure"). The word "measure" suggests an instrument (by which an object is measured, i.e., cognized). A source of knowledge is thereby indicated, whose characteristic essence is coordination. It is called subsequent measure, because it appears after the logical mark (or middle term) has been apprehended, and its concomitance (or major premise) has been brought to memory. When the presence of the mark upon the subject (i.e., minor premise) has been apprehended, and the concomitance between the minor and the major term, (i.e., the major premise) brought to memory, the inference (or conclusion) follows (ibid. II, p. 13).

Thus inference is defined as cognition of an object through its mark. Inference is also considered as the cognition of an invisible, concealed object. Inference enables us to cognize an object that is not present. In the definition given by Vasubandhu in his *Vādavidhi* he lays stress upon the observed inseparable connection uniting the mark with the inferred object. A person who has previously observed this inseparable connection between two occurrences, applies it to make a new inference. Thus when one has observed the inseparable causal tie uniting smoke with its cause fire, one cognizes the concealed fire whenever one finds the presence of smoke. It is evident that the inferential knowledge referred to by the Buddhist teachers is a kind of inductive knowledge based on the assumption that there is a uniformity of nature which entitles us to infer the unexperienced on the basis of generalizations from experience. We have already noticed that although the term *anumāna* was not used in the later technical sense in the Pali canonical literature, it expressed the notion of inferential knowledge based on experience in terms of *naye ñāṇam*, according to which one could use one's knowledge of an observed causal connection (*dhamme ñāṇa*) to infer that the same connection holds with respect to the past and future.

Later Buddhist logicians like Dignāga and Dharmakīrti introduced a number of refinements to the epistemological doctrines of Buddhism. One such notable refinement was the sharp distiction they made between direct and indirect knowledge. According to Dignāga's analysis of perception pure perceptual knowledge is non-constructive (*nirvikalpaka*).[17] According to the Buddhist teachers of the school of Dignāga, real sense-perception or cognition by the senses is only the first moment of perception. The function of sense perception is to make the object present to the senses. Its object is the particular thing (*svalakṣaṇa*). The construction of the image of the object whose presence has been made known is another function consisting of a subsequent operation of the understanding. Sense perception in itself is non-constructive and is followed by the construction of the image. Dignāga and his followers attempted to identify the pure sensational core of perception. We do not see such a treatment of perception in the early Buddhist teachings represented in the Pali Nikāyas. Although terms like *viññāṇa*, *saññā* and *vitakka* may be interpreted as representing several stages in the perceptual process, there is no attempt to distinguish them sharply from one another in the Pali canonical tradition.

Buddhist philosophers made a special attempt to establish the reality of what they understood as the sensational core of perception. One such attempt by Kamalaśīla is presented by Stcherbatsky in the following quotation from Kamalaśīla's *Tattvasaṅgraha-Pañjikā*:

> At the very first moment when an object is apprehended and it appears in its absolute particularity, a state of consciousness is produced which is pure sensation. It contains nothing of that content which is specified by a name. Thereupon, at a subsequent moment, when the same object has been attentively regarded, the attention deviates towards the conventional name with which it is associated. After that, after the object has been attentively regarded, according to its name, the idea of its (enduring) existence and other qualifications arise; we than fix it in a perceptual judgment.[18]

According to Dignāga a man who is absorbed in the contemplation of a patch of blue, perceives the blue, but he does not know that it is the blue.[19] What this suggests

17 *Pramāṇasamucchaya*, I. 3.
18 *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. I, p. 152.
19 *Pramāṇasamucchaya Vṛtti*, I. 4.

is that pure perception is to be distinguished from the perceptual determination of the object which is a function of the understanding. According to this analysis in every cognition one part is sensible and the other is intelligible. The senses cognize the thing itself. It is the imagination (*kalpanā*) which constructs its relations and general characteristics.

The later Buddhist analysis of the nature of knowledge and reality was connected with the developments in the interpretations of fundamental Buddhist notions like the notion of impermanence and causality which played a central role in the early teachings of Buddhism. The early Buddhist idea of impermanence (*aniccatā*) was interpreted in later Buddhism in terms of a theory of momentariness (*kṣaṇavāda*). The later Buddhist theory of causation was also influenced by the theory of universal momentariness. Reality interpreted in terms of these two theories is reduced to point-instants of effeciency arising in functional dependence upon other point-instants. Real existence or ultimate existence is considered to be nothing but efficiency. Only the present moment of physical efficiency is ultimately real. The particular alone which is only the present, which is the 'here' and 'now' is real. Universals are unreal and are mere names. However, the later Buddhist teachers recognize another level of reality. When an image arising from the first moment of perceptual is objectivized and identified with some point of external reality it receives an imputed reality. Even from this special point of view there are real and unreal substances. From the point of view of these teachers, an example of a real substance at this level is some object like a cow. Examples of unreal substances are metaphysical ones like God, Soul and Matter (in the sense of the Primordial Matter of the Sāṅkhyas). The Buddhists of this period recognized two kinds of reality, the one pure of ultimate reality consisting of bare point instants, the other consisting of objectivized images. The latter is supposed to have a position in time and space and possess all the variety of sensible and abstract qualities. Thus a distinction was drawn between ultimate reality which is unrepresentable and unutterable (*anabhilāpya*) and phenomenal or empirical reality (*samvṛtisat*).

The treatment of epistemological issues in early Buddhism is confined to a clarification of the kind of knowledge essential for attaining the goal of the holy life. Early Buddhism insisted that what is essential for attaining such a goal is a kind of knowledge that has to be developed on the basis of an arduous process of self discipline. Ordinary sense knowledge at the level of *saññā* and *viññāṇa* and pure intellectual reason, faith and reliance on external authority are inadequate to bring about the self-transforming wisdom which is signified by the Buddhist terms *paññā* and *āsavakkhayañāṇa*. Early Buddhism did not take any interest in the argumentative discussion of general epistemological issues but was concerned with them only to the extent that such discussion was found to be relevant to its immediate goal. In this respect later Buddhism is notably different in that the Buddhist intellectual geniuses of later centuries, took up the argumentative discussion of epistemological issues as a general philosophical exercise. Many sophisticated ideas and theories emerged in the course of these discussions which could be compared with the finest intellectual achievements in Western philosophy.

P. D. Premasiri

EPITHETS of the Buddha, Dhamma, Saṅgha and Nibbāna. Epithets characterising these four important topics in Buddhism are so numerous and varied that it would not only be tedious but also of little value to collect all of them. Therefore it is intended here to give a cross-section of them presenting them in such a way so that they would bring forth various aspects of the subject described. It may be noted here that, in general, the epithets describing these four topics are very often not synonyms but words referring to their different aspects.

Buddha:

At first when the literary descriptions of the Buddha were not numerous the number of epithets describing him were limited. But with the increase of Buddhist writings the writers went on inventing epithets to cover every possible aspect of his personality. The important aspects of his personality that have been covered by these epithets are mainly concerned with his intellectual and ethical eminence while there are many terms having metaphorical, allegorical and ancestral references.

The most general and the most important of these is the term Buddha (from the root *budh* to be awake) meaning an enlightened one. This is not a proper name but a generic term used to describe all those who are enlightened by themselves, without the help of any extraneous agency. In order to distinguish between the Buddhas and *pacceka-buddhas* the term *sammā*, *samyak* or *sam* is prefixed to the term Buddha which then means the perfectly enlightened one, who, by his self-realised knowledge of the Truth, is superior to all other beings both human and divine. Gautama Buddha is sometimes called the Buddhaseṭṭha or the Buddhavīra, meaning the best or the excellent Buddha. The term *arahant*, which is applied to anyone who has realised Nibbāna and meaning the one deserving (of respect etc.) is also applied to the Buddha in that sense. This is a pre-Buddhist honorific title adopted by the Buddhists. Some of the other epithets expressing his intellect or wisdom

... *anantadassin*, he whose (intellectual) vision is ...mited; *anomapañña*, he whose wisdom is supreme: ...*pañña*, or extensive wisdom, is explained at *Ps.* II. ...as 'endowed with wisdom, extensive as the earth'; ...her epithet having the same meaning is *bhūrimedhas*; ...*añña* (Skt. *mahāprājña*), or great wisdom; *vara*-... and *aggapañña*, of excellent wisdom, are two other ... used; *sādhupañña*, of good wisdom, is also used. ...*ñña* endowed with wisdom, *paññādada*, bestow-... wisdom, are some others of this class. The ... *sayambhū* (Skt. *svayambhū*) is commonly used ... expresses the idea that the Buddha realised the ... on his own. The fact that he can read the past, ...ent and the future, has made him to be called ...*ña* (knower of the three periods of time). Epithets ... *mahajñānin* (of great wisdom), *vijña* (knower), ...*uddha* (the great Buddha), *prājña* (wise one) are ...sed. Epithets describing his knowledge are also ... used. While *sarvajña* (Pali, *sabbaññu*) expressing ...science is the commonest of these, a few more ...mpels are: *lokavit* (Pali, *lokavidū* knower of the ... *sabbadassāvi* (he who sees everything); *sabba*-...*pāragū* (versed in all the *dharmas*); *vedagū* ...ed in the *veda*, meaning knowledge in general); ...*eau* (knowing the knowable); *dhyānakovida* (versed ... the states of mental absorption); *sarvavidyādipa* ...aster of all the various kinds of knowledge); *pra*-...*prabhākara* (illuminator of wisdom and know-...ge ... *vitasārada* (not unexperienced, i.e., wise); *vipassin* ...ed with insight, i.e., wise); *visārada* (self-confident, ... *tevijja* (possessed of the threeford knowledge ...ned at *A.* I, 164); *veda* (knower). *Cakkhumant*, along ... *samantacakkhu*, also refers to the intuitive know-...ge of the Buddha. It is the allround, all-comprehensive ... of the Buddha that is referred to as his super-... all-seeing eye. The Buddha is said to have five ... such eyes (*Nd.* II. 235) and hence he is called ... he who has eyes), *mahāmati* (very wise) and *nipuṇa* ...mplished). *Dhira* is a term expressing his firmness ... self-reliance. His possession of the right kind of ...wledge is expressed in the epithet *jñānin*. The fact ...at he is given to the practice of meditation (*jhāna*) has ...ade him to be called *jhāyin* and his freedom from all ...ntal obstructions is expressed in the epithet *pabhin*-...*ṇa*. The possession of ten powers by him, all per-...ining to his powers of understanding, has given him ...e common epithet *dasabala* (*daśabala*).

The Buddha's teaching being one of ethics *par excel*-...*ce* it is natural that his ethical attributes are so ...merous and varied. Based on his quality of compassion ...ere are innumerable epithets describing him. The ... *abhayamkara* describes him as the giver of safety, ...at he is not a source of danger to anyone, while *akuto*-... qualifies him as the one who is not afraid of anyone, as the fearless one in any sense. The epithets *appaṭibhaya* (*apratibhaya*) and *nirbhaya* are also expressive of his fearlessness. Some others of this class are: *paramahitanukampaka* (supremely friendly and compassionate); *mahākāruṇika* (of great compassion); *kāruṇika* (compassionate); *karuṇānidhāna* (source of compassion), *karuṇāsāgara* or *karuṇākara* (ocean of compassion); *khemaṅkara* (giver of peace); *śivaṅkara* (giver of happiness); *varada* (giver of boons); *kāruṇyadhenu* (giver of compassion); *karuṇātmaka* (full of compassion); *premadarśin* (exhibiting kindness); *āśvasaka* (he who comforts); *lokānugrahapravartin* (wishing the welfare of mankind); *karuṇāvadāta* (of pure compassion). The epithet *akuha* refers to him as the honest and upright one, while *aneja* describes his state of freedom from lust. Some other examples of his ethical attributes are: *anigha* (the calm one); *bhāvitatta* or *bhāvitātman* (self-composed or sober one); *guttindriya*, *jitindriya* and *bhāvitindriya* (whose sense-organs are well-controlled); *danta* (self-restrained); *dhona* (purified); *guṇasāgara* (ocean of virtues); *hatadviś* (whose anger is gone); *anāsava*, *khiṇāsava* (whose defilements are gone); *khiṇa-saṃyojana* (whose fetters are broken); *mānacchida* (whose arrogance is gone); *mānamakkhapahāyin* (free from arrogance and hypocricy); *mudita* (joyful); *nikkāma* (desireless); *nikkaṅkha* (free from doubt); *nirādāna* (free from attachment); *niravadya* (free from taints); *pahina-malamoha* (free from taints and delusion); *samantabhadra* (good in every way); *śāntapāpa* (free from evil); *satiman* (mindful); *śiti-(siti-)bhūta* (cool); *suci*, *suddha* (purified); *vitatṛṣṇa*, *taṇhacchida*, *vitalobha*, *vitarāga* (free from craving); *tridoṣāpaha* (free from lust, hate and delusion); *tusita* (contented); *vāntadoṣa* (free from hatred); *vera-bhayātita* (gone beyond hatred and fear); *vigatamoha* (free from delusion); *vigatarajas*, *viraja* (free from defilements); *suddhācāra* (of pure conduct). The well-known epithets, *vijjācaraṇa-sampanna* (endowed with wisdom and virtue) along with *yathāvādi-tathākāri*, practising what he preaches, are also important as his ethical attributes. A few other epithets belongings to this category are :*trividhadamata-vastukuśala* (with body, mind and speech controlled); *viśuddhadhi* (of clear wisdom); *mahādhira* (very intelligent); *vaiśāradya* or *viśarada* (skilled); *kṛtajña* (grateful).

The fact that the Buddha is regarded as the best among all living beings has resulted in the countless epithets expressing this fact. Thus he is *advitiya* (second to none); *naragga*, *naravara*, *naravira*, *narottama*, *agga-puggala*, etc. (best among men); *aggappatta* (who has reached the highest); *anomanātha* (superior teacher); *anuttara*, *anupama*, *appaṭibhāga* (*apratibhāga*), *appaṭi-puggala*, *appaṭisama*, *appaṭima*, *asahāya*, *asama*, *asama-sama*, *atula* or *atulya*, *nirdvandva*, *uttamapuggala*, etc. all meaning 'the incomparable one'; *aparājita* (undefea-

ted), [illegible] referred to as being honoured [illegible] *devamanussapujita*) and also as the [illegible] and men (*satthā devamanussānam*) [illegible] is very widely used. When he is [illegible] among the two-legged creatures [illegible] *dipaduttama* etc.), it is seen [illegible] their imaginative powers to invent [illegible] to describe the great being. By the [illegible] suffixes to the word *loka* or *jagat* meaning world [illegible] of epithets have been coined: [illegible] of the world), *lokajit* (conqueror of [illegible] *lokanātha* (leader of the world); *lokanāyaka* [illegible] the world), *lokāntagū* (he who has gone to the end of the world); *jagatsāstṛ* or *jagatguru* (teacher of the world); *jagatsvāmin* or in Pali *lokasvāmi* or [illegible] the world); *jagadālokabhūta* (the light of the world); *jagannāthat* (leader of the world); *jagatbhartṛ* (maintainer of the world). He is simply called [illegible] (the refuge). He is also called *mahātman* (the great being), thereby implying that this greatness referred to here is not limited to one aspect. He is the sage (*isi*) or the great sage (*mahesi*, *maharṣi*, [illegible]), the great debator (*mahāvādi*) or the great [illegible] (conqueror) is often used to refer to him. Sometimes he is referred to as the conqueror of Māra (*mārajit* or *māramathana*) or of the god of love Ananga (*anangajit*) or of the world (*lokajit*) or simply the victorious one (*vijāyin*). *Vijitasaṅgāma* (he who has won the battle), *vijitavijaya* (who has won the victory) and [illegible] (the victorious one) are also used. The personal name of Gautama Buddha, *Siddhattha* or *Siddhārtha* (having achieved the purpose) is also very often used. *Sarvarthasiddha* is also sometimes found. Conceiving him as the dispeller of the darkness of the world, darkness figuratively meaning ignorance, he is called *tamanāsaka* or *tamonuda*. The same idea is expressed by the epithets *pabhaṅkara* and *pabhāsakara*. He is called *uttamapuggala* (noble man) and the worthy one (*arahā*, *vandi*, *varārha*, etc.). The terms *virāj* and *vibhu*, meaning sovereign and which are used as epithets of the important Vedic gods, are also found. He is called *viśvantara* (all-subduing), *venayika* (one who disciplines) and (*udantadamaka* (tamer of the untamed), *vira* (hero) or simply *nara* (man). The fact that he is only a preacher, in the sense that he shows the way and is not a saviour is expressed in the epithet *akkhātā*. He is called the caravan-leader (*satthavāha* or *sārthavāha*) in the sense that he leads men in the correct path to Nirvāna.

The term *purisadammasārathī* meaning the tamer [illegible] of the untamed, expresses his ability of [illegible] uncontrollable men.

Similies and metaphors of every kind have been used in describing the Buddha. He is very often compared [illegible] in wisdom. *Jutimant* or *jutivanta* (bright one) also has the same idea. Animals like the lion, the elephant and the bull are taken as metaphors in describing him. Thus he is called the *Buddhanāga* (elephant among the Buddhas) or merely the elephant (*kuñjara*, *nāga* or *mahānāga* (the great elephant) or *muṇikuñjara* (elephant among the sages), *narasiha* (lion among men), *nisabha* or *narāsabha* (bull among men) or merely the bull (*ṛṣabha* or *usabha*), *varāha* (boar), *purisājañña*, *ājāniya* (horse among men), *sakyapuṅgava* (the leading bull among the *Sākyas*), *svayambhusiha* (lion among the self-enlightened), or merely the lion (*siha*), *vādisiha* (lion among the debators). He is also brought into comparison with gods and other superhuman beings. For instance, he is called the *brahmā*, *brahmabhūta* or *brahmapatta*, where *brahma* means excellent. He is also called the god of gods (*devātideva*, *devadeva*), god among men (*naradeva*), *visuddhideva* (the blemishless god). The name of the king of gods (*Sakka*, *Sakra*) is not left out, for he is called Sakka or Purindada. *

The Buddha is very often connected with the solar dynasty (*sūryavamsa*) and the epithets *ādiccabandhu*, *arkabandhu* or *arkabāndhava* (kinsman of the sun) are often used. Sometimes *sūryavaṃsa* in itself is used. Like the epithets Sākya and Gautama, which indicate his clan and family respectively, and Siddhārtha his personal name, the Buddha is also called Aṅgirasa, which seems to be a patronymic, as the Gautamas belonged to the Aṅgirasa tribe. The epithets *ariya* (*ārya*) and *brāhmaṇa* also have some historical significance. The term *brāhmaṇa*, which was originally a non-Buddhist term, was given an entirely ethical concept by the Buddha. Another epithet with ancestral significance is *ikṣvākukulanandana* (joy of the family of the Īkṣvākus) as well as *okkākakulasambhava* (born in the family of the Okkākas). Epithets like Sākyaputta, Sākyasiha or Sākyamuṇi are also related to his clan. He is called the 7th seer (*isisattama*) as he is the 7th Buddha since the Buddha Vipassin (*MA*. III, 97). Sometimes the matronymic Māhādevisuta and the patronymic Sauddhodana, Sauddhodani or Suddhodani are used. Viśvantara (*Vessantara*), which is also used, is explained at *MA*. III, 96, as having crossed the uneveness (*visa*) of passion. Gotama his family name, is mostly used along with 'Buddha.'

Various epithets coined in relation to the Buddha's doctrine are also of frequent occurrence. An off-used epithet of this kind is *advayavādin* (teacher of non-duality), indicating his denial of the dual theories. The word *dhamma* (*dharma*) meaning his doctrine is very often prefixed to various words to describe: him Dhammassāmi (*Dharmasvāmin*) (lord of the Dhamma), Dhammarāja (king of the Dhamma), Dhamadhātu (essence of the Dhamma), Dharmākara (ocean of the Dhamma), *sarvadharmesvara* (lord of all the *dharmas*), subhadhar-

...ākara (source of good *dhamma*), *varadhammappakāsaka* (preacher of the noble *dhamma*), etc. are some of those belonging to this category.

There are some more epithets which are very common... For instance those like *bhagavā* (blessed one), ... (well-gone), *tathāgata* (thus gone), etc. are impor... The term *bhagavā* is one of the commonest and ... the most reverential of epithets. In English it ...ns lord or the rich or the blessed one. *Sugata*, ...ning one who has attained bliss, is also commonly ... *Tathāgata*, one of the most important of the ...ddha's epithets, is significant in another aspect in that ... the term used by the Buddha when he refers to ...self. A few more general ones are: *oghatiṇṇa* (he who ... crossed the ocean, i.e., of *samsāra*), *antima-sarīra*, who bears his last body, *pannadhaja*, he whose flag ... ne, i.e., whose fight is over, in the sense that he has ...shed his struggle in *saṃsāra*; *saccavhaya*, deserving ...name, i.e., Buddha, *tādin*, such-like in 5 ways (see ... p. 202), *bhavāntakṛt*, he who has put an end to ...rth, *asaṃsaya*, free from doubt, *āhuneyya* and ...khiṇeyya, deserving of worship and offerings, *gam*... the deep one, i.e., in wisdom.[1]

Dhamma:

The term that is commonly used to designate the ... philosophy taught by the Buddha is Dhamma. ... the teacher lives through his teaching it is natural ... the *dhamma* came to be treated with the same ... and significance as the Buddha himself and many ...ets are coined to describe it from various angles.

...e of the commonest passages (*D*. I. 62; *S*. I, p. 10; *A*. ... etc.), praising the dhamma is the one which ...ibes it as lovely (*kalyāṇa*) in the beginning, lovely ...e middle, lovely in the end, which is full of both ... and of letter (*sāttha* and *sabyañjana*), which is ...prehensive in all aspects (*kevalaparipuṇṇa*), pure ...uddha) and pertaining to the pure life (*brahma*...). Another very common formula (*D*. II. 93; III. ... 9 etc.), which is also used by the Buddhists in their ...nary worship of the *dhamma*, is the one in which ... praised as well proclaimed (*svākkhāta*, *supravedita*, ...), well-seen (*sandiṭṭhika*), applicable at all times ..., inviting all to practise and verify for themselves ...sika), leading to release (*opanaika*) and to be ...tually realised by the wise (*paccattam veditabbo* ...). Dhamma is the Buddhs's teaching that is noble (*S*. p. I. 30; *A*. V, p. 241) and great (*mahā*: S. IV. ...). It is health-giving (*nirjvara*), leading to freedom ... bondage (*niyāmika*: *nairyānika*) and needs no ... help (*apratisaraṇa*). The fact that the Buddha's ...ing is honestly and openly promulgated is also ...ssed (*uttāna*, *vivaṭa*, *pakāsita*, *chinnapilotika* or ...

Saṅgha:

Generally designated as the community of disciples (*sāvaka-saṅgha*) or the community of monks (*bhikkhu-saṅgha*) the attributes used to describe them are more or less descriptive of the *arahant*. Being the third member of the Buddhist Triple Gem there is the popular formula used along with the formulas used in worshipping the Buddha and the dhamma where some of the attributes of the Buddha's disciples are collected (*S*. V. 343, *D*. II. p. 93 etc.). Here they are referred to as walking along the correct path or as well established in their ways as the Buddha's genuine disciples (*supatipanna*); they are honest, upright (*ujupatipanna*) and law-abiding (*ñāya-patipanna*). They are blameless in their ways of living (*sāmicipatipanna*). The fact that they are on sure way to release is expressed by their being referred to as the four pairs or the eight kinds of men (*cattāri purisayugāni, aṭṭhapurisapuggalā*), each pair being comprised of the one in each of the four paths (*magga*) and the one in each of the four fruitions (*phala*). As such they are deserving of respect (*āhuṇeyya*), worthy of hospitality (*pāhuṇeyya*), worthy of offerings (*dakkhiṇeyya*), worthy of worship (*añjalikaraṇiya*) and thus they comprise an incomparable field of merit in this world (*anuttaram puññakkhettam*). As it was pointed out earlier most of the epithets used in literature are mainly applicable to *arahants* and the terms coined to describe them go on increasing endlessly. As they are free from defilements they are often referred to as *khīṇāsava* or *kṣīṇāsrva* and *nikkilesa* or *niḥkleśa*. Their wisdom has qualified them to be referred to as of great wisdom (*mahāprajña*), of wide wisdom (*pṛthuprajña*), of deep wisdom (*gambhira-prajña*), of incomparable wisdom (*asamaprajña*), of quick wit (*āsuprajña* and *javanaprajña*) etc. They are well-informed (*bahuśruta* or *śrutadhara*) and free from burdens or worries (*ohitabhāra*). Their wishes have been fulfilled (*paripūrṇasaṅkalpa*) and they have done what has to be done (*katakicca*, *katakraṇīya*).

Nibbāna:

Being the state of the man who has achieved perfection according to the Buddhist ideal, Nibbāna is lavishly described in Buddhist literature and hence its epithets are innumerable. Negatively it is described as the cessation of becoming (*bhavanirodha*), as the overcoming of craving (*taṇhakkhaya*) or of suffering (*dukkhakkhaya*, *avyāpajjha*). While the term Nibbāna or Nirvāṇa itself is a negative description meaning the extinguishing of the fires of lust (*lobha*), hatred (*dosa*) and delusion (*moha*), it is also the state of deathlessness and changelessness and hence of eternity (*amata*, *akkhara*, *accuta*). It is a state free from craving (*virāga*, *anālaya*), without form (*arūpa*) and also without attributes (*anidassana*) in the sense that it cannot be described in words but has

1 ...ets of the Buddha contained in the well-known formula '*iti pi so bhagavā* ...... are discussed in their appropriate places

to be realised in practice. One of the most important aspects of Nibbāna is that it is a state that is uncaused *(akata)* and unconditioned *(asankhata)*, in the sense that it is beyond the laws of causality. It is the state free from worldly ties *(mokkha, vimutti)* and hence a state of indifference were in one remains undisturbed by the effects of worldly phenomena and can face life calmly *(nibbidā, virāga)*. Positively it is very often described as the state of highest happiness *(parama-sukha)* and as the refuge or the island in the flood of samsāra *(sarana, khema, tāna, lena* and *dīpa)* and also as the final rest, the goal of Buddhist life *(parāyana, apavagga)*. As a state in which perfect peace and safety is achieved it is frequently referred to as *yogakkhema*. It is the further shore of the sea of samsāra *(pārima-tīra)*, the true, peaseful, auspicious, permanent and accomplished state *(sacca, santa, siva, dhuva, nipuna)*, which once realised, cannot be lost *(appativāniya)*. It is the state free from samsāric sojourns and therefore not subject to change *(vivatta)*. Its quality of complete purity *(suddhi, visuddhi)* is very significant as it signifies its tital freedom from defilements. It is difficult to be realised *(sududdasa)* but once realised it is the complete realisation *(abhisamaya)*. And as a state free from the fever of samsāric ills it is called the cool state *(sitibhūta, nibbuta)*. In the ultimate sense it is a state not lacking or deficient in anything and therefore a state of totality of completion and of perfection, *kevala*.[2] See also EULOGY.

A. G. S. Kariyawasam

EQUALITY. Buddhism recognises the fact that all human beings are equal in birth and that their conduct in society makes them exalted or low. It rejects the idea of privileged classes or individuals. In the *Vāsettha Sutta (Sn.* pp. 117-9) the Buddha extends the idea that, though distinct differences could be seen among various types of birds, quadrupeds, reptiles, trees, creepers etc., such distinctions cannot be observed among human beings. All human beings co-habit in the same way. The conception of a child, its development in the womb, its birth, its growth, its instincts etc. follow the same pattern. With regard to hair, head, ears, mouth, teeth, nostrils, eyebrows, lips, throat, shoulders, belly, buttocks, back, chest, private parts etc. all human beings are the same, and the only distinction to be seen among them is the difference of sex.

People are given diverse names according to the various activities they engage in, in order to make a living. One who cultivates the land is called a farmer; one who produces various utensils and instruments is called a craftsman; one who serves others for a living is called a servant; one who serves in the army is called a soldier; one who learns the books and imparts knowledge to others is called a teacher; one who robs others' things is called a robber; one who rules a country is called a king; one who counsels and helps the king to rule a country is called a minister. When one changes one's profession one will be known after the new profession he takes himself to, for instance if a king fails in his duty towards the people and being driven away by them takes to begging for a living, he will be called a beggar; if he takes to stealing he will be called a thief; if he takes to farming he will be called a farmer. Therefore the birth is of no consequence in this matter. It is his activities that determine his social status. The Buddha says: 'By birth one is not a brāhmin or an out-caste. It is his activities that makes one a brāhman or an out-caste' (*Sn*, p. 23). Here the word 'brāman' is used to denote a virtuous man, who refrains from all actions that are harmful and injurious to others and engages in activities that are beneficial to oneself as well as to others. One whose activities are injurious to oneself as well as to others is an out-caste, *(vasala)* according to the Buddha.

The Buddha strongly criticized the brahman's claim, based on birth, for supremecy in society. In the *Aggañña Sutta (D.* III, pp. 81-2) he scoffs at the claim of brahmins to have been born through the mouth of the Creator *(Brahma)*, saying that when it is quite obvious that brahmin women, like all other women, become pregnant with child and deliver children in the natural way, it is absurd on the part of brahmins to claim that they are born of the mouth of the Creator. Exalting one's own self *(attukkamsana)* taking into considerations one's own abilities, social position, family, wealth, looks, education etc. and despising others *(paravambhana)* on similar grounds is declared by the Buddha as a grave wrong (*M.* I, p. 402; *Sn. v.* 132). A person who does so should be regarded as an enemy of society, an out-caste *(vasala)*. In the *Tuvataka Sutta (Sn.* I. 179), the Buddha says that a true recluse should not engage himself in comparing himself with others, thinking: 'I am superior to him *(seyya)* in this attainment', 'I am his equal *(sadisa)* in this' and 'I am inferior to him *(nīca)* in this', but should aim only at bringing about internal calm *(ajjhatta-upasama)*.

In the Order of monks founded by the Buddha no restrictions, regarding birth were placed on membership. Anybody who wished to follow the Dhamma could enter the Order. The Buddha says: 'In as much as the waters of various rivers, such as Gangā, Yamunā, Aciravati, once

2. For reference of the Pali forms occuring in this essay see *PED*, and for the Sanskrit forms see *Mhvyut*, sections 48, 63 and 95. See also *Abhidhānappadipikā* and *Apadāna*.

they enter the sea will be called sea-water, even so, all people, from whatever family they come, would be known as the recluses (of the fraternity) of the son of the Sakyan (*A.* IV, p. 202). It was recognised that anybody who had the inclination and the will to follow the Dhamma could attain even the highest fruit of the religious life. The Buddha says in the *Ariyapariyesana Sutta (M.*I, p. 169) that the gates to immortality *(amatassa-dvārā)* are wide open and that anybody wishing to enter may put forth faith (in his teachings). In the Buddhist Order of monks respect and veneration was shown not considering the social background from which a particular member entered the Order. It was virtue and learning alone that won respect and veneration for a monk. Any one who follows the path conscientiously would reach the loftly heights reached by the Buddha himself, and no one is debarred from aiming at such heights merely because of one's so-called low-birth. In the *Mātanga Jātaka* (*J.* IV, pp. 375-90) it is shown how Mātanga, an out-caste by birth, attained to great spiritual heights and how even reputed brahmin teachers came to salute him and wait upon him. Among the great disciples of the Buddha Sunita (*Thag. vv.* 620-31) was a scavenger before entering the Order, and Upāli (*Vin.* II, 183) was a barber. In the account of Upāli's entering the Order, it is stated that Upāli was ordained a monk before the six Sakyan lads, Upāli's former sires, so that they would first salute and respect Upāli as a monk before becoming monks themselves (*Vin.* II, p. 183). So it was recognised that given equal opportunities and the necessary guidence and encouragement anybody could rise to an exalted position, irrespective of the status of the family to which one belonged.

The concept of equality was extended also to women. Women were not treated as inferior to men with regard to the potentialities of spiritual development (*Thig. v.* 61). Once the Buddha told king Pasenadi Kosala (*S.* I, 86) that a daughter well-disciplined and educated would prove a better asset than a son. The Buddha extended membership to women in the Order founded by him. A separate Order of nuns was established with Mahā Pajāpati Gotamī as its first recruit (*Vin.* II, pp. 253-7), and many were the women who entered this Order and gained distinction in the dispensation of the Buddha. In the *Etadagga Vagga* (q.v.) of the *Anguttara Nikāya (A.* I, ...) the Buddha mentions the names of female disciples who had gained distinction in various fields in the Order. Mahā Gotamī was acclaimed the most experienced ..., Khemā as the wisest, Uppalavannā as the best of those who possessed psychic powers, Paṭācārā as the best of those who were experts in the rules of discipline, Dhammadinnā as the best preacher, Nandā as the best of those who meditated, Soṇā as the most courageous, Sakulā as the best of those who possessed the divine eye, Bhaddā Kundalakesī as the cleverest of those who could understand a thing quickly, Bhaddā Kapilānī as the best of those who possessed the power to recall past births and so-forth. The *Therigāthā* is full of instances of *theris* who had atained arahantship (Thig. pp. 126, 129, 131). Mrs. Rhys Davids in her introduction to the translation of *Therigāthā* states that the instances of *theris* declaring the attainment of arahantship are more in the *Therigāthā* than monks doing so in the *Theragāthā*.

Thus we see that Buddhism does not recognise the superiority of a person by birth, sex or social position. All people are born equal and it is their conduct that makes them noble or ignoble. See *Caste, Egalitarianism.*

W. G. Weeraratne

EQUANIMITY *(upekkhā,* q.v.) is a detached state of mind which may cause a person to appear disinterested, or rather unbiassed, without however, losing his watchfulness and self-possession. It is an intelligent way of being aware without becoming attached and, therefore, the mind remains evenly balanced. Although this condition of the mind is always there in any stage of mental absorption *(jhāna)*, it is not obviously observable while the mind is immersed in the early stages of concentration *(vitakkavicāra)* or when it is elated in spiritual ecstasy *(pīti)*, or relaxed in well-being *(sukha).* And thus, it becomes the characteristic of the final stage of mental absorption in the spheres of form *(rūpa-jhāna).* The commentary (*DhsA.* p. 177) compares this selection by means of elimination with that of a cowherd who does not attempt to capture directly a particular bull of the herd, but who allows all the animals to come out of the pen one by one, till the bull of his choice presents itself.

It is thus far from that kind of disinterestedness which is prompted by ignorance. Such lack of interest as a result of lack of understanding *(aññāna)* is a false manifestation of loving kindness (*DhsA.* p. 193). The proper function of equanimity is based on the appreciation of others and is manifested as well as consummated in the quieting of aversion and flattery (loc. cit.). It is, therefore, the intellectual control of emotional feelings which can produce a balanced attitude of equanimity, the acceptance of pleasure and pain, of prosperity and ill fate, when all is seen as the heritage of *kamma* (loc. cit.).

Equanimity does not always carry an ethical implication, for it may simply indicate a neutral feeling, when it is grouped together with other indeterminate *(avyākata)* factors, such as contact, sensation and perception (*Dhs.* 431) to constitute a mental state.

Equanimity is also referred to in Pali as a position and force of balance *(tatramajjhattatā*, q.v.) and is as such incorporated in the "other incorporeal, causally induced states" *(ye vā pana tasmiṃ samaye aññe pi atthi paṭicca-samuppannā arūpino dhammā Dhs.* 1, p. 9). It is explained by the commentator as a balance of mind which is a neutrality regarding various states; its function is checking deficiency and excess, or cutting off partisanship. By virtue of its indifference regarding consciousness and mental properties it should be regarded as a charioteer who treats with impartiality the well-trained horses he is driving (*DhsA.* p. 133).

Equanimity or poise *(upekkhā)* is the development of what are called the infinitudes *(appamāṇa* or-*appamaññā)* or the four divine states *(brahmavihāra*, q.v.), viz., benevolence *(mettā)*, compassion *(karuṇā)*, sympathetic joy *(muditā)* and equanimity *(upekkhā. D.* I, p. 250; *M.* I, p. 38, *S.* IV, p. 296, *A.* V, p. 299). It is through dwelling in these divine abodes that freedom of mind *(ceto-vimutti*, q.v.) can be attained

H. G. A. van Zeyst

EQUIPOISE or condition of perfect balance or equilibrium in the intellectual and emotional aspects of character. This represents the concept of a well-integrated and well-adjusted character as understood in Buddhist ethical phychology. Perfect equipoise in such a sense could be found only in a perfected character like that of a Buddha or an *arahant*. But in the general sense of a man aiming at such perfection, a certain degree of equipoise is expected and is necessary. Attempting a definition of equipoise in that sense is considered profitable here.

One fairly comprehensive method whereby this problem could be viewed is to define equipoise in terms of the five spiritual faculties *(indriya)* which are taught in Buddhism as a group of moral faculties or powers associated with the emotional and intellectual life of a person and which should counter-balance with each so that the desired equipoise of character is achieved *(indriya-samattapaṭipādana: Vism.* pp. 129-30). These consist of confidence in the Buddha and his teaching *(saddhā)*, effort or exertion in avoiding evil and cultivating good *(viriya)*, correct mindfulness at all times *(sati)*, right concentration *(samādhi)* and wisdom *(paññā)*. For details see *Indriya*.

As wholesome *(kusala)* motivating powers that should guide a person's actions these faculties play a very important role in the correct formation of a person's character in terms of Buddhist ethical psychology. As these are expected to regulate one's behaviour and actions along the lines expected in Buddhist practice, the manner in which this should happen assumes significance. This means that there are two pairs of faculties in each of which both faculties should function in equal manner counter-balancing each other. The first of these two pairs constitute *saddhā* and *paññā*. If a person were to have excessive confidence with deficient wisdom he would act like an 'honest fool' with blind belief. Similarly, excessive wisdom with deficient confidence can lead to hypocracy. With the other pair which constitute *viriya* and *samādhi* too, excessive exertion without the corresponding degree of concentration would lead to restlessness and fruitless fatigue while excessive concentration without the required degree of exertion could result in lethargy and indolence. Accordingly an equal degree of intensity is required for each faculty so that they function smoothly producing the required equipoise of character as a whole, resulting in a very high degree of mindfulness *(sati)* and concentration*(samādhi)*.

There is another angle from which equipoise of character could be viewed, namely, the unshakableness and steadfastness of the individual in the face of vicissitudes of life. In the face of worldly conditions *(Loka-Dhamma* s.v.) such as gain *(lābha)* and loss *(alābha)*, ill-fame *(ayasa)* and fame *(yasa)*, blame *(nindā)* and praise *(pasaṃsā)*, happiness *(sukha)* and sorrow *(dukkha)* the man of integrity is expected to remain unperturbed maintaining one's equipoise. It is said (*Sn.* v. 229) that the righteous man *(sappurisa)* maintains his equipoise firmly like the column of Indra *(indrakhila*-a symbol of firmness) at the ancient city gate.

Yet another angle to view this concept of equipoise would be from the angle of male and female duality. The unsplit character endowed with full equipoise should have both male and female qualities in equal measure without any imbalance in favour of either aspect. This constitutes an important characteristic of *samādhi* (concentration) as understood in Buddhism.

Equipoise could still more succinctly be defined as the perfect balance between the head and heart (intellect and emotion) of the religieux. see UPEKKHĀ.

A. G. S. Kariyawasam

ERA, BUDDHIST. The main tradition for the passing away *(parinibbāna)* with which the Buddhist Era starts is that of the Southern Buddhists. It is found first in the Sri Lankan chronicles, the *Dīpavaṃsa* and the *Mahāvaṃsa* as well as the historical introduction of the *Samantapāsādikā*, Buddhaghosa's Commentary on the *Vinaya*

Pitaka, the two first-named separated by about a century from each other, with the Commentary intervening. The calculation is based on the lists of kings and the lengths of their reigns according to the Buddhist traditions of India (including Sarvāstivādins) and Sri Lanka. According to recent critical opinion, the *Mahāvamsa* was probably written about the 6th century A.C. The chronology current in Burma and Siam closely follows that for the event in Sri Lanka. This date is reckoned from the *parinibbāna* (death) of the Buddha in the middle of 544 B.C. The first year of the Buddhist Era computed from these traditions is 543 B.C.

The traditions of the Jains, whose last *tīrthaṅkara* Mahāvira was a contemporary of the Buddha, are a secondary source. They give chiefly 527 B.C. as the tradition for Mahāvira's death. But this figure is not consistent, as 468, 467 and several others are also current. Based mainly on a list of kings and dynasties who are supposed to have reigned between 528 and 58 B.C., the list is regarded by some scholars as absolutely worthless, confusing, as it does the rulers of Ujjain and Magadha and other kingdoms. On this tradition the *parinibbāna* of the Buddha must be post-dated from the reckoning of the Southern Buddhists, which found its strength in Sri Lanka, the texts themselves stating that Mahāvira had predeceased the Buddha. But the Jain date is contradictory and unreliable as a basis of calculation.

The tradition of the Northern Buddhists is linked with the Chinese *Dotted Record* which is discussed below.

These are the chief chronological points in regard to the initial year of the Buddhist Era. The others will be noted in passing.

It must be noted that the research done in India particularly in Asoka and his Inscriptions, as well as in connection with the Greek invasions of India, has been a very large factor in computing dates. The Buddhist records, whether in texts or monastic annals in Sri Lanka have provided the first definite statement of an interval between two events without which no starting point would have been possible. The Purānic and the Jain are the principal Indian traditions. The Northern tradition is led by the Sarvāstivādins.

543 B.C.

Strictly speaking, the traditional year falls within 544-543 B.C., according to the present system of dating.

At what stage did the tradition arise in Sri Lanka? The earliest mention of an interval of time between two memorable events of interest to Buddhists occurs in the Pali *Dīpavaṃsa*. This interval is 218 years between the *parinibbāna* of the Buddha and the *abhiseka* of Asoka.

The *Dīpavaṃsa* was a compilation, perhaps by several authors, and its material was added from time to time. Although the events chronicled by the finished work do not go beyond the time of Mahāsena (275-310 A.C.), the work itself is considered as likely to belong to a period not later than the fourth century A.C.

The *Dīpavaṃsa* is actually a redaction of the material which had been found in "an older work, a sort of chronicle, of the history of the island from its legendary beginnings onwards" (Geiger) This older work, known as *Aṭṭhakathā-Mahāvaṃsa*, had been written in Old Sinhalese prose. It probably came down to the arrival of Mahinda in the first year of king Devānampiya Tissa and appears to have existed before the *Vinayaṭṭhakathā* was written in the fifth century A.C. Two eminent critical authorities accept that the Sinhalese *Aṭṭhakatha* are the same as those styled *Porāṇas* and the ancient commentary entitled *Porāṇaṭṭhakathā*. Reasons have recently been given to support that the *Dīpavaṃsa* originally was not based on the Sinhalese works on which depended the *Sāmantapāsādikā* and the *Mahāvaṃsa* and that it clearly belonged to an earlier stratum of tradition, undoubtedly the earliest form.

Samantapāsādikā, the historical introduction of which was based on the *Dīpavaṃsa*, the author completing the work and adding to it with statements which could have been directly drawn from a Sri Lankan source, the Sinhalese *Aṭṭhakathā*. Whilst Buddhaghosa's work was completed in 427 A.C. which was the penultimate regnal year of Mahanāma, the *Aṭṭhakatha* were written down in the reign of Vaṭṭagāmani (first century B.C.).

In addition to the above, Sri Lanka has preserved a succession of *theras* from Upali, the Buddha's contemporary, to Mahinda. This list which was taken from "the old *Mahāvaṃsa*, in Sinhalese prose with Pali verses, on which our Pali *Dīpavaṃsa* and the *Mahāvaṃsa* are based," (Adikaram) is preserved in the *Parivāra*. It plays an important part in the chronological system on which the *Dīpavaṃsa* and the *Mahāvaṃsa* are based. Its interest is due to a [illegible] chronological connection between the histories [illegible] India. It is not indicated that [illegible] authentic, falling as they do within the [illegible] of Indo-Sri Lankan history. But that [illegible] originated in India itself cannot be [illegible].

When these circumstances [illegible] collectively considered, the indication is that the traditional interval of 218 years may also be traced to India. Strictly speaking, there is no Indian evidence for it. But there seems to be nothing demonstrable against the probability that these earliest of Sri Lankan chronological references and of the succession of *theras* have emanated from India, from which country the religion was introduced to Sri Lanka.

The year in which Mahinda arrived was the first year of Devanampiya Tissa who according to Sri Lankan

chronology, was consecrated 236 years after the passing away of the Buddha. This figure is thus seen to be merely a continuation of the traditional reckoning. The traditional reckoning found its earliest external confirmatory synchronism in the fifth century A.C. In the monograph on Sri Lanka relating the history of the Soung dynasty in *Pieu-Tien*, an embassy from Sri Lankan king styled Ts'a-li Mo-ho-nan, is recorded as having been received in the fifth year of Iuen-kia which scholars have taken as 428 A.C. The Sri Lankan king has been identified with Mahānāma (406-428 A.C.) who was the only Sri Lankan king by that name. The embassy could be dated to 428 A.C., only if the traditional date of 543 B.C. for the *parinibbāna* of the Buddha were accepted.

Another Chinese record provides an Indo-Sri Lankan synchronism when it mentions a request of Sirimeghavanna to the Indian emperor Samudragupta for permission to erect a monastery at Buddhagaya for pilgrim monks from Sri Lanka. The regnal years of the two rulers fall, however, within both of the periods calculated from 543 or 483 B.C. for the passing away of the Buddha. These synchronisms are suplemented by at least three others.

The first Chinese synchronism, however, provides irrefutable proof that in fifth century Sri Lanka the year of the Buddha's *parinibbāna* was reckoned as 543 B.C., whether or not the actual event took place in that year.

483 B.C.

This is the most widely known date. Its chief advocates for Sri Lanka have been Geiger and Paranavitana who discussed it exhaustively in the Introduction to the English translations of *Mahāvamsa* and of *Cūlavamsa* (Pt. II), and in the *Epigraphia Żeylanica* Vol. III respectively. The stand taken by them led them to the belief that the Sri Lankan chroniclers manipulated the dates in the regnal years of Sri Lankan kings, which rendered a period of 60 years that needed to be explained. This adjustment was tentatively (e.g. from Devanampiya Tissa to Elara) traced back to certain periods which they considered vague, so that when the "excess" was deducted from 543 B.C., the 483 B.C. was reached. They also held the view that there was, in Sri Lanka the traces of an era reckoned from 483 B.C.

This view that Sri Lanka shows traces of the use of an era starting with 483 B.C., has since been completely rejected. As shown in the discussion on 543 B.C., it is certainly clear that 483 B.C., is incompatible with the Chinese synchronism of 428 A.C.

The consecration of Asoka took place, according to the earliest Sri Lankan sources, in the 219th year after the *parinibbāna* of the Buddha. Reckoned from 543 B.C. this would fall in 324 B.C. Asoka was preceded by his father Bindusāra who in turn ruled after his father, Chandragupta, the founder of the Maurya dynasty. The traditions of India, Sri Lanka and Burma completely agree on the length of Chandragupta's reign to have been 24 years. But to that of Bindusāra the Indian Puranic tradition assigns 25, and the others 28 - so that there is a difference of 3 years. We may take it that Chandragupta, reckoned from 543 B.C., came to the throne in 382 B.C. (Purānic : 379 B.C.).

Here there appears to be a difficulty. The names of certain Greek kings appear in some of Asoka's rock-edicts, more particularly at Girnar (XIII-r-e), and their regnal years have been considered and fairly fixed from Greek and Roman sources. The Greek king Seleucus Nikator, who invaded India after the death in 323 B.C. of Alexander the Great, was halted by the Indian king "Sandrakottos of Palimbothra" with whom he made a treaty. "Sandrakottos of Palimbothra" was identified as Chandragupta of Pataliputra, that is, Asoka's grandfather. The date of the treaty has been fixed as 304 B.C., again the according to Greek and Roman chronology. Chandragupta would have ascended the throne between the 323 and 304 B.C. being the points of time indicated between the death of Alexander the Great and the treaty with Seleucus Nikator. Asoka's consecration depends on that of Chandragupta and the latter can hardly be placed, according to this reckoning later that 320 B.C. (Purānic: 317 B.C.). The upper limit for Chandragupta's accession being the death of Alexander the Great, and the lower being the Purānic date, (i.e. between 323 and 317 B.C.), a working date of 320 B.C. has been accordingly accepted for this founder of the Maurya dynasty. This would bring down by 60 years the date of the consecration of Asoka (which took place four years after he had mounted the throne) and place the event in 264 B.C. (Purānic: 261 B.C.). Thus there is greater reason to incline towards 483 B.C. than to 543 B.C. as the year of the Buddha's *parinibbāna*.

It will be seen that the dating above arrived at rest on the primary assumption that the Greek and Roman chronology is, more or less fixed fairly securely. But a reputed Indian authority on the Calendar opined that the Olympian era of the ancient Greeks and the era of foundation of Rome are artificial eras, whose beginnings are shrouded in mystery.

In the face of this it would be unscientific to use Greek and Roman classical chronology as our measures.

The Sarvastivādin Tradition :

Against the interval of 218 years adopted in the Sri Lankan tradition, between the Buddha's *parinibbāna* and the consecration of Asoka, the Sarvastivādin tradition, as reflected in *Avadāna śataka* (repeated in the *Divyāvadāna)*, attributes 100 years. This school of

thought, too, is of the Hīnayāna and the tradition was taken over to the Chinese from the Sanskrit and thereafter to the Tibetan which repeats it. Besides the difference in the length of the interval, the season in which the Buddha's *parinibbāna* took place is also variantly described, the Sri Lankan sources calling it Vaiśākha (May-June) and the others implying the months of December-January, following which seems to be supported by the botanical evidence of the off-season flowering of the *shorea robusta (sāla)* trees by the death-couch.

If the Northern tradition, be its origin an Indian source, were aligned to 543 B.C., we should get 662 B.C. as the year of the Buddha's *parinibbāna* occurred so far back in time as 662 B.C. As a matter of fact, the trend is in the opposite direction, to place it conservatively later. Therefore 662 B.C. should not be seriously considered. For the other two dates to be admissible it must be shown that the Sarvāstivādin tradition excels the Sri Lankan tradition, which has yet to be demostrated. On the other hand it is generally accepted that the Sarvāstivādin tradition is not canonical, whilst the other manifestly is; and it has been stated (in some instances, at any rate) that "the Pali version of the school of the Theravādins proves itself to be *the most faithful preserver* of an earlier tradition" (E. Waldschmidt), an opinion to which Hermann Oldenberg had earlier tended after his examination of the *Vinaya Pitaka.* Furthermore the figure 100 is mentioned, in these two Sarvāstivādin books and their Tibetan translation, in connection with a pseudo-prophecy, which is also its context in the *Dīpavamsa,* where the same figure is specified or implied in the earlier portion. It is necessary, however, to note that the figure was ignored in Sri Lanka if not rejected, when plain and simple chronological statements came to be categorically made in regard to events as such, so that the Sri Lankan tradition persisted in the figure 218 in its subsequent literature, and did not go by 100.

The same reasoning can be applied to 501 B.C. But against 365 B.C. a further objection might be made. This date is less than half a century prior to the death of Alexander the Great on the supposition that the Greek dates are final. It is difficult, therefore, to be rid of the impression that it is too "modern", comparatively-speaking, too close to certain "historic" events by Greek and Roman reckoning. At any rate this date requires the basic assumption that the Northern sources are preferable to the Sri Lankan which is not warranted by the results of critical scholarship.

The incompatibility of the *season* of the Buddha's *parinibbāna* is not vital to the argument. The clear-cut issue is of the year of the event. All the early sources being merely compilations by different people at different times from different material, it is easy enough to explain away such immaterial points in the absence of irrefutable evidence to the contrary. This is particularly the case when it seems that there was a manifest desire to place the Buddha's *parinibbāna,* birth and Enlightenment to the same seasons, that is Vaiśākha. (May-June) to fix attention on an inconsequential detail is to lose the sense of proportion.

We may thus conclude that there is less reason to attach ourselves to the Sarvāstivādin tradition which, translated into our system of chronology, would place the *parinibbāna* of the Buddha to B.C. 662 or 501 or 365. The round figure 100, which gives rise to these dates, is more artificial and suspicious than the odd 218 found in the Sri Lankan sources which were derived from the Pali. It is also well to remember that the scholars who removed sixty years from the regnal years of certain early Sri Lankan kings in order to arrive at 483 B.C., were led to do so by the roundness of the figures given to the lengths of their reigns which figures they held to be specious. If their attitude is justified, it should be equally applicable to the Sarvāstivādin figure of 100. It is also pertinent to consider the supposition that the Sarvāstivādins confused Asoka with Kālāsoka.

Other Principal Dates

Among the three best known of other dates which have been offered by scholars, both Eastern and Western, are 485, 486 and 487 B.C. This sequence is obviously based on the Chinese *Dotted Record* about which a few words are necessary.

After the Vinaya recital at the First Council *(saṅgīti),* which was held on July 15th following the Buddha's *parinibbāna* Upāli signed the closure of the assembly by placing a dot. The succeeding disciples added to this, with one dot for each year. Sanghabhadra, "who is said to have been a *samana* of the Western region, a name often used for "India" of course including Sri Lanka (Takakusu) was China in 489 A.C. He is said to have asked the *samana* Kung-ku why the marking had not been continued from that year, after which it is claimed to have been kept up till 535 A.C. Sanghabhadra, who had the *Samantapāsādikā* translated into Chinese, placed a dot in 489 A.C. to mark the end of his labour. There was then a total of 975 dots, which would give 486 B.C. for the year of the Buddha's *parinibbāna.* This is the note current in the *Shushotenki* (The Dotted by Many Disciples).

Now in regard to the year of the *saṅgīti* there are two opinions, one that it took place in the year of the *parinibbāna* and the other in the year following – as accepted by Ta-t' ang-hsi-yu-chi. "Sanghabhadra's date of the Buddha, B.C. 486, was not quite unknown to the Buddhist writers in China, but was never considered as authoritative" (Takakusu). Authoritative opinion has been expressed that it was most unlikely that it was free from error seeing that the marking had extended over a period of nearly one thousand years.

It is interesting to note that one form of the Khotan tradition places Asoka 250 years after the *parinibbāna* of Sri Lankan one.

The years 949, 463, 386 and 383 B.C., too, are sometimes assigned, but they have no scientific basic and are interesting only to show the differences of opinion which exist in regard dins or Tibetans and is suprisingly close to to an important event.

Conclusion

In the early discussions the year adopted was 477 B.C. It was based on an erroneous reckoning of the date of Chandragupta's accession as 315 B.C.

It will be seen from the foregoing that there is a greater degree of agreement among scholars than there had been some decades ago. In fact, should 483 B.C. be accepted, the differences of opinion is mainly in the range of some two or three years. Nevertheless, this is no ground for accepting the year 483 B.C.

In fine, all that can be presently stated is that each major date is beset with own difficulties. There is no consensus of opinion, because unimpeachable evidence is wanting, that the *parinibbāna* of the Buddha occurred in such and such a year. In the present state of knowledge it would appear that we shall have to revert to 543 B.C. as, at least, a sign-post. It may be mentioned as a matter of record, that the year 2500 Buddha Jayanti), calculated from 543 B.C. as marking the *parinibbāna* of the Buddha and commencement of the Buddhist Era, was inaugurated on Vaiśākha Day (May–23rd/24th 1956) in all Theravada countries with wide celebrations. The Buddhist groups in Western lands, as well as most Mahayana lands, participated in them in deference to the early traditional date.

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D. T. Devendra

Chinese Traditions The question of the date of the Buddha's *parinirvāṇa* has been engaging the attention of the Buddhists in China ever since its official introduction into that country in 67 A.C. Owing to the multiplex variant traditions in India and abroad, it is rather a difficult task to arrive at a suitable solution acceptable to all. This was keenly felt even at the time of Hsüang Tsang when he made the following observation:

"All the Buddhist schools (in India) have their own versions concerning the Buddha's *parinirvāna*. Some say (1) Now it is more than 1,200 years after the *parinirvāna* (2) Others say it is over 1,300 years. (3) The third group says it is over 1,500 years and (4) Yet another group maintains that over 9,00 years but less than 1,000." (*Hsi-yu-chi*, Ch. 6.)

This *His-yu-chi* or *'The record of the Western Regions'* of Hsüan Tsang was completed in 647 A.C. On the basis

of the foregoing passage, the following dates may be constructed:

1. 553 B.C.
2. 653 B.C.
3. 853 B.C.
4. 353 B.C.

Naturally the figures illustrated above will not mean that any of them is the actual date of the event. It would, however, show roughly a range of difference of 1000 to 400 years. As Hsüan Tsang found it difficult to unravel these intricacies he did not recommend these dates.

However, in the 5th century, other Buddhists in China tried to work out the dates on definite lines, on the basis of early Indian and Sinhala traditions. Three such attempts are given below:

I. 1086 B.C. This is from the *Travels of Fa Hsien.* Fa Hsien informs us that he spent 15 years abroad from the time when he commenced his historical journey in 399 A.C. until he returned to China in 413 A.C. He paid a visit to Sri Lanka in 411 A.C. and remained there for two years. While in the Island he witnessed a grand and pompous procession of the Tooth Relic in Anuradhapura and heard the statement from the official announcer to the effect that:

"It is the 1497 year after the *parinirvāna* of the Buddha." On the basis of this announcement, we arrive at 1086 B.C. as the year in which the Buddha passed away. Considering the later Sinhala tradition of 544 B.C. the *parinirvāna* of the Buddha must have taken place 542 years earlier. This, however, does not appear to be the popular tradition in Sri Lanka in the 5th century A.C. after the arrival of Buddhagosha. It also does not belong to the Chinese tradition, because the earliest Chinese date ever mentioned in this connection is 949 B.C. as it was recorded in the *Chow-shu-yi-chi.*

II. 636 B.C. In the 8th chapter of *Kwang-hung-ming-chi* or *An enlarged collection of writings for the porpagation of Buddhism* collected by Tao Hsuan in 664 A.C. (*Nanjio,* No. 1481) we find a treatise entitled *Erh-chiao-lun* or *On the two Religions* by Shih-Tan-An of the T'ang Dynasty. It is in this treatise, that the author made the following statement concerning the date of the Buddha's *parinirvāna*:

"Moreover, according to the reckoning of Kumārajiva and the Pillar Inscription of (Aśoka), we find that they agree with the description of Chun Chiu that Tathāgata was born in 715 B.C. and passed away in 636 B.C.

This tradition indicates that the *parinirvāna* of the Buddha took place 92 years earlier than the prevalent Sinhala tradition.

III. 349 B.C. A remark attached to the end of the *Buddha-parinirvāna Sūtra,* a Sanskrit text translated by P'o-fa-tsu (290-306 A.C. *Nanjio,* No. 552) gives the following calculation:

"From the time of the *parinirvāna* of the Buddha upto 538 A.C. it is a total of 887 years, 7 months and 11 days." Subtracting 538 from 887, we arrive at 349 B.C. It is obvious that some one in 538 A.C. made this observation by following a certain tradition, the source of which is not clearly mentioned.

The difference among the three foregoing dates, from one to the other chronologically, is about three to four hundred years. Apparently they worked out their results from independent sources based on varient traditions. Unfortunately, in most of the cases, we are not provided with the percise information as to the method of reckoning and the authorities from which they drew their conclusions. The year 636 B.C. as the date of the Buddha's *parinirvāna* is comparatively a little clear in its position, because it claims that it is based on the reckoning of Kumārajiva who went to China in 401 A.C. and the Pillar Inscription of Asoka. If we think that 1086 B.C. is placed too far back in time and 349 B.C. is lacking the support of any historical or inscriptional evidence, should we say that 636 B.C. may represent one of the early Indian popular traditions which is independent of either the Sinhala or the Sarvāstivādin reckoning?

Minor mistakes in reckoning in the *Dotted Record*

Many years ago the present writer pointed out the minor mistakes in calculating[1] the date of the Buddha's *parinirvāna* as found in the *Dotted Record.* In the Chinese *Tripitaka* there are two literary works concerning this document. One is *Ch'u-san-tsang-chi-ch'i* or *A collection of the records of translations of the Tripiṭaka* compiled by Sheng You in 520 A.C. (*Nanjio* No. 1476), and the other *Li-tai-san-pao-ch'i* or *A record concerning the Triratnas in successive dynasties* by Fee Chang-Fang in 597 A.D. (*Nanjio* No. 1504). The former provides us with the following information:

"In the tenth year of Yung Ming (492 A.C.) of the Ch'i Dynasty (479-501 A.C.) a *bhikṣu* (of Nanking) by the name Tsing Hsiu learnt that Saṅghabhadra together with Sheng Wei had translated the *Samantapāsādikā* into Chinese in 18 chapters at Canton. He was anxious to see the work (and copy it), because it was not yet available in

[1] "An investigation into the date of the Buddha's *parinirvāna*" (in Chinese) by Pachow. *Hai-Tsao-Yin,* Vol. 18, No. 10, 1937.

the capital. In the 5th month of the same year (viz., 492 A.C.) *Sanghabhadra* returned to the south.[2] He (Tsing Hsiu) went to Canton and copied the newly translated *Vinaya commentary* and brought it back with him to Nanking in the 4th month of the 11th year of Yung Ming (493 A.D.). He paid homage to the text by worshiping and reciting it and also tried to make more copies of the same. In the 15th of the 7th month (in the same year) after the end of the observance of *vassa,* he looked at the years after the passing away of the Buddha, and placed a dot in the presence of the assembly. Imagining that this was done annually (by former sages), he was deeply moved and tears came to his eyes." (*Nanjio* No. 1476 ch. 11). This description gives us sufficient ground to comprehend that firstly the *Dotted Record* tradition is closely associated with the translation of *Samantapāsādikā* which we know, was composed in Sri Lanka by Buddhagosha and later made available in other South-East Asian countries including Burma and Siam, and secondly that Bhikṣu Tsing Hsiu was fully aware of the number of years as represented by dots, after the *parinirvāṇa* of the Buddha. But unfortunately the number of dots was not mentioned in the foregoing passage.

We now come to consider the second work. The same event mentioned above has been amplified with inaccurate details and inexcusable mistakes in dates. For instance, Fee Chang-Fang changed the 11th year (493 A.C.) of Yung Ming into the 7th year (489 A.C.) and forgot that the *Ch'u-san-tsang-chi-ch'i* from which he had drawn materials was compossed 77 years earlier than his own work. Further, he put Saṅghabhadra in the place of Bhiksu Tsing Hsiu to mark the last dot in the *Dotted Record* and presented not to know that Saṅghabhadra had returned to his homeland in the south in the 5th month of the same year (493 A.D.) which was much prior to the concluding ceremonies of the *vassa.* Under such circumstances, naturally Saṅghabhadra could not have possibly put down the last dot in the said *Record.* The only point that is worth our consideration in this document is the mentioning of the 975 dots ending in 493 A.C. as already stated 489 A.C. is a mistake. Accordingly, 482 B.C. is the date of the Buddha's *parinirvāṇa* which is the corrected version of 486 B.C. as reckoned by Takakusu.

In introducing the *Dotted Record of many sages* Takakusu failed to refer to *Ch'u-san-tsang-chi-ch'i* but only drew his materials from the *Li-tai-san-pao-ch'i* of Fee Chang-Fang which is definitely an inferior compilation both in authenticity and accuracy. The translation of the said *Record* made by Takakusu is not an excellent one and several places therein need correction, especially the sentence.[4] "The ascetic Chau, the marking till 535 A.D. when there were 1020 dots". The original text never said that Chau, the ascetic continued to put more dots, but it simply says that he used to calculate the total number of years from the last dot in 489 A.C. upto 535 A.C. and thereby he arrived at a total of 1028 years.

The Sinhala Tradition and the Chinese Travellers

The authenticity of the Sinhala tradition of 483 B.C. or 543 B.C. will mainly depend on whether Asoka was consecrated in the 219th year after the *parinirvāṇa* of the Buddha and the mission of Mahinda and Saṅghamittā to Sri Lanka. Many scholars have expressed their views either in favour of 483 B.C. or 543 B.C. However, from the records of the Chinese travellers, it appears that there was a general belief among the Buddhists in India during the 5th and the 7th century A.C. that Asoka had reigned about 100 years after the *parinirvāṇa* of the Buddha. As they came from China and were in no way partial to any particular Buddhist sect at that time, the difference of tradition as registered in their writings should be treated with due attention.

To begin with, we would like to see whether anything is mentioned by them about Mahinda's mission to Sri Lanka and the bringing of the Bo-sapling from India. In the 11th chapter of Hsüan Tsang's *Hsi-yu-ch'i,* referring to the Sinhala Country, he says:

"Previously this country was devoted to the worship of deities. In the first 100 years after the *parinirvāṇa* of the Buddha, Mahinda, the young brother of King Asoka who had renounced the world and attained the six supernatural powers, came to the Island by air and propagated the Saddharma of the Blessed One..."

In the Travels of Fa Hsien, there is a description about the Bo-tree which was 200 feet in height at Anuradhapura. This tree, according to the author, was grown from a seed acquired from India by an envoy of a former king. He did not say anything about the mission of Mahinda and Saṅghamittā. Both the *Mahāvamsa* and *Samantapāsādikā* agree with the recording of Hsüan Tsang with regard to Mahinda's mission but they differ in the interval between the Buddha's *parinirvāṇa* and the consecration of Asoka. Moreover the relationship between Mahinda and Asoka is also stated differently. This difference of date is a gap of about 100 years.

2. It may be that his native land is in the South seas.
3. Under the title of *Samantapāsādika* in his Collection, he says: *Refer to Ch'u-san-tsang-chi-ch'i.*
4. See *JRAS.* p. 436-437. 1896.

The Northern Tradition

The interval of 100 years between the *parinirvāna* of the Buddha and the consecration of Asóka as found in the Sarvāstivādin or Northern tradition has been ignored by the early Buddhist scholars. As a result only a very few scholars, like E. J. Thomas, recognizes the importance of this tradition. These scholars, on the basis of materials collected from both the Southern and Northern traditions, have argued reasonably well. Regarding the number of years assigned to Indian Kings mentioned in the *Mahāvamsa,* they suspected the authenticity of the Sisunāga dynasty, because that name is not found in the Jaina tradition and the *Aśokāvadāna* list of kings.[5] It is found in the Puranic list, but he (Sisunāga) ruled some 136 years before Bimbisāra, a contemporary of the Buddha. The pali choronicles place Sisunāga in such a position which is three kings after Bimbisāra and four kings before Aśoka. Commenting on this, Rhys Davids was of the opinion that the Sisunāga Dynasty was inserted in its present place in the chronicles in order to fill up the 218 years.[6] If such is the case, the trustworthiness of the Pali chronology would require further careful consideration. Besides, E. J. Thomas points out that in the *Dipavamsa* (I. 24-27) we have the shorter tradition of the interval of 118 years instead if 218 years, though it is told in the form of a prophecy. However, if we admit that the *Dipavamsa* was composed earlier and has preserved more ancient material than that of the *Mahāvamsa,* we should not, at this stage, accept the tradition of the one and reject that of the other without further thorough investigation.

Regarding the question whether the Sarvāstivādin tradition is based on canonical literature, the answer is in the affirmative. To supplement what seems a mere pseudo-prophecy as found in the *Avadāna-śataka, Divyāvadāna* and the *Aśokāvadāna (Nanjio* Nos. 1343 and 1344), I would like to add one more text viz., *Astādaśanikāya-Sāstra* by Vaśumitra, translated into Chinese by Paramārtha in 557-569 A.C. (*Nanjio* No. 1284). This *Sāstra* is principally concerned with the origin of the 18 Buddhist Schools in India. At the beginning of the text it is said:

"When it was one hundred and sixteen (116) years after the *parinirvāna* of the Buddha, in the city of Pātaliputra, Aśoka became king of Jambudvipa and was universally recognized."

Vaśumitra, the author of this work, as we know, was a contemporary of Kaniska and both were closely associated with the 4th Buddhist Council held in Kashmir. The date of Kaniska's accession to the Kushāna throne, according to the majority of scholars, was 78 A.D. If that be the case, then, we may say, we have the earliest definite information concerning the date of the Buddha's *parinirvāna* , and that, too, came from the pen of no less an eminent celebrity than Vaśumitra himself. In a way, we may say, it may excel the later compositions such as the *Mahāvamsa* and *Samantapāsādikā,* because the works of Buddhagosha and Mahānāma were composed in the 5th century A.C. It is likely that Vaśumitra possessed more authentic traditions as he was comparatively closer to the event of the Buddha's death. Thus, if we accept 270 B.C. as the date of Aśoka's consecration (B. M. Barua: *Aśoka and his Inscriptions* p.7) and 116 years as the interval between this event and the passing away of the Buddha, we then arrive at 386 B.C. which would be the date of the Buddha's *parinirvāna.*

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W. Pachow

EROTICS(1) in early Buddhist art and sculpture. As an expression of art, erotics is found right from the very beginning of art and sculpture in India.

Such early depictions of erotic themes in art are found, in sculpture especially, of the Buddhist religious monuments at Sāñci, Bharhut, Buddhagayā and Amarāvati, which date from the last few centuries of the pre-Christian millenium. These themes were closely and more elaborately followed by the artists of Gandhāra, Mathurā, Nāgarjunakonda, Ajantā, Bhaja, Ellora etc., in India and in other countries of the same period and later on.

5. W. Geiger: Table of Indian Kings in the Introduction to *Mahāvamsa.*
6. *B.C. Law Volume,* Part II, p.19.

The medium for such erotic expressions in the field of art and sculpture was, very often, the nude, or the semi-nude female figure or the traditional 'Mithuna', the amatory couple, sometimes wrongly identified as donor couples; bacchanalian scenes and scenes from secular incidents, too, were interwoven along with the main theme. The abundance of such figures displaying voluptuous, sensuous postures, which could strictly be termed erotic, in the early friezes and carvings in the round and in paintings, speak of a very early tradition of symbolic representation in art.[1] The intrinsic quality of this art, at such places like Sāñci, etc., is realistic and sensuous, and this is only more evident in the case of dryads-yakṣis, nāginis and devatās: such expressions or erotic themes in the sphere of early Buddhist Art and Sculpture seem to have appeared innumerably.

The identification of these works with Buddhism or to attribute them to Buddhist sources was found difficult to scholars too, who had done research in the field. This is expressive in the words of A. K. Coomaraswamy who comments, "if we recognise in this very sensuousness with which the art is saturated, a true religious feeling, then it is religious on a plane far removed from that of the aristocratic philosophy of the Upaniṣads and Buddhism.[2]

Several scholars and art critics have found that erotic scenes have taken such prominent places in these early works of art, that there is scarcely a single female figure represented in them without erotic suggestion of some kind, implied or explicitly expressed and emphasised.[3]

These highly sensuous expressions of the female nude or semi-nude figure and the amatory couple which include 'mithuna' and bacchanalian couples in the art of early Buddhist monuments could never be taken as being originated by the Buddhists. On the contrary these expressions in the art speak of an early or rather very early Indian tradition of the vegetative fertility cult which goes parallel with the mother-goddess cult. Traits of early origins for such cults are clearly found in the pre-Aryan civilizations of the Indus-valley, ancient Sumer, Egypt and in the Mesapotamian region.[4]

The early sculptors and artists of the Buddhist period who were responsible in carving out these figures which we term erotic, had only followed an earlier tradition and utilized it for giving expression to Buddhist themes.

Thus it had become a medium of the artist narrator, of describing Buddhist legends, and to interpolate with symbolic representations to give more colour and ornamentation to his narrative.

The *mithuna* couple, bacchanalian scenes, the birth of Lakṣmi-Śrī from the lotus, commonly termed Gaja-lakṣmi later, the Śālabhañjika dryads (the girl leaning against a tree causing it to blossom by the very touch of her feet), Yakṣis, Apsarases, Devatās, found in the Sāñci *torana* carvings and in the architraves of Bhārhut, Buddhagayā, , Amarāvati, Nāgarjunakoṇḍa etc., all comprise to form the influence of the early symbolic representation of religious art coupled with the cult of fertility, on the Buddhist narrator who had utilised the medium of art for his expression.

These religious symbols are endowed with an almost incredible life force. They are ever nascent. In the words of Heinrich Zimmer, "they outlive eras and declines of civilisations. New generations are fascinated by them and they migrate to distant regions from Mesapotamia, for example to Cambodia, ignoring silently the lapse of time. They can remain alive from the third millenium B.C. to the second millenium A.D. They are the receptacles, ever ready to receive and hold the essence of a new meaning" (H. Zimmer, op. cit. p. 66f).

1. (A. K. Coomaraswamy - La Sculpture de Bodhgaya, Plates XIV, XVII, XXXII, XXXIV, XXXVIII, LIII, LV; Rajendralal Mitra, *Buddhagayā,* Plates XII, XXXVII, XLVIII, p.158 f.; V. A. Smith, *A History of Fine Art in India and Ceylon,* p. 32f. Plates: 16E, 27, 28, 29, 38, 44a, 46, 67A, B, 68A, 69, 71, 72, 73B, 74, H. Zimmer, *The Art of Indian Asia,* Plates, 8, 15, 36A, 74, 75; D. T. Devendra, *Classical Sinhalese Sculpture,* Plates 49, 50, 64, 66. Benjamin Rowland, *The Art and Architecture of India,* Plates 17, 92; *History of Ceylon,* University of Ceylon Publication Volume I, Part II, Plate XLIII; A. H. Longhurst, *The Buddhist Antiquities of Nāgārjunakoṇḍa,* Memoirs of the Archaeological Survey of India, No. 54, Plates XXVII onwards; Albert Skira, *Painting of India* pp. 25f. 36; A. K. Coomaraswamy, *History of Indian and Indonesian Art,* figures 73, 74, 75, 283; H. Zimmer, op. cit. p.128; James Fergusson, *Tree and Serpent Worship,* pp. 153, 197f, Plates XXVII, LXII, LXIX; Louis Fredric, *The Art of India,* Plate 33, p.52).

2. *History of Indian and Indonesian Art* p.36.

3. H. Goetz, *India,* Art of the World Series, pp. 96f; A. K. Coomaraswamy, op. cit. pp.64f; Brian Rhys, *Erotic Sculpture of India,* pp. 10f; H. Zimmer, op. cit. p.128).

4. Benjamin Rowland, op. cit. Plates 2, 3, 4A; Sir John Marshal, *Mohenjodaro and the Indus Civilization,* Plates XLIV, XLV; E. Mackey, *The Indus Civilisation,* plate I; Stuart Piggot, *Pre-Historic India,* plate 8).

These female figures expressing erotic gestures and amatory couples found in the early phase of Buddhist art are to be regarded both as expressions of auspicious emblems of vegetative fertility as well as contrivances of the narrator to depict scenes from the Buddha legend with animation (A. K. Coomaraswamy, op. cit. p.36). Thus, art found in these early erotic themes, is not created or inspired by Buddhism, but is early Indian art adapted to edyfying ends, and therewith retaining its own intrinsic qualities.

A change of attitude was apparent in the later phases of Buddhist art where erotic themes dealt with the fertility cult or the vegetative symbolism was shrouded with more elaboration and mysticism. This was seen with the emergence of Tantric Buddhism in Bengal. Orissa and in other places or western India. With the rise of Mahāyāna and later the iconic representation of the Buddha by about the beginning of the Christian era Buddhist art and sculpture, too, had taken new trends of development.

Little prior to this drasitc change of the esoterism of Tantrayāna the expressibe capacity of the artist was used further for elaboration rather than on representing the symbolism. The main impact is made by the subtle and detailed interpretation of the animate surface of the figure. The Gupta, later Amarāvati, Mathura, Nāgārjunakonda, Ajantā, Ellorā, Bhaja etc. scenes of female dryads and amatory couples show examples of these traits.[5]

In the field of painting, too, these traits are evident. The Ajantā cave frescoes exhibit the development of painting in parallelism with that of sculpture, especially in regard to erotic themes. This is also noticeable in the paintings of Buddhist shrines found in the Gandhāra area of North Western India.[6]

During the period of the imperial glory of the Gupta civilisation, in the few centuries that followed the Christian era, Indian Art had reached its summit of development. But here it was difficult to seperate the influencing traits of the early cults closely welded with art. It is noteworthy that, the art of most of the Theravāda countries which followed closely the patterns set by Indian predecessors, was not so thickly saturated with erotic themes. A good example for this could be had from the Buddhist art of Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Kampuchea and Jāva. The most, if not the only erotic theme boldly exhibited in early Art in Sri Lanka is the amatory couple from Isurumuniya. But compared to his Indian counterpart the Sri Lankan sculptor shows much restraint in depicting sensual union of the male and female, rather than exhibiting his skill in bringing out a masterpice in sculpture, as if the puritanism of Theravāda elders was placing a checking hand on him.[7] This could also be a result of the sectarian development of Buddhism, without being much influenced by the various cults and concepts, prehistoric or otherwise, of the mainland India. The same could be told of the Buddhist Art of Myanmar, Thailand, Kampuchea and Java, where foreign Indian influences could not have superseded the predominent concepts of the local artist. In frieze carvings at Barabudur, Ananda temple, the themes which provided much opportunity to the Indian artists to display their skill in depicting erotic scenes, were handled with much restraint. These carvings lack the sensuality but are expressive enough of serenity.[8]

It is only with the advancement of later Tāntric beliefs that Buddhist Art, too, was further saturated with mysticism as seen in the works that date from the Pāla period (8th century A.C.). The patterns established during these periods, which were shrouded with Tāntrism, both of the Buddhists and Hindus, were to inspire the works of Nepalese art even reaching Tibet and China through Nepal. (H. Zimmer, op. cit. p. 127f). The representation in art of the Union of Prajñāpāramitā as Śakti with the male counterpart (Ādi Buddha or Bodhisattva) was never found in the early phases of Buddhist Art in the same expressive manner of the union of the male and the female.[9] The Tāntric examples could not be evaluated with the suggestive symbolism of the earlier erotic themes in Buddhist Art, although as, Heinrich Zimmer puts it, "It could be something that had emerged

5. *The Way of the Buddha,* Government of Indian Publication p.49, 54; Brian Rhys, *Erotic Sculpture of India,* p.29; B. D. Mahajan, *Ajanta, Ellora and Aurangabad Caves,* plates XXII, XXIX, XLVII, LIII, LIV; V. A. Smith, op. cit. plates, 44A, 46, 67A, B, 68A, 71, 72B, 74).

6. A. K. Coomaraswamy, op. cit. fig. 283, plates 67A, B, 68A, 87f, 88A; V. A. Smith op. cit. plates 87f, 88a; Madanjeet Singh, *The Cave Paintings of Ajanta,* plates 20, 27.

7. *History of Ceylon,* Vol. I., Part I, University of Ceylon, Publication XXV A; D. T. Devendra, op. cit. fig. 64.

8. *The Way of the Buddha,* Govt. of India Publication, p. 49; Dietrich Seckel, *The Art of Buddhism,* plate 17.

9. K. Antoinette, *Tibetan Religious Art,* frontispiece, p. 60, 62, *The Way of the Buddha,* op. cit., p.97, p. 208; H. Zimmer, *Myths and Symbols in Indian Art and Civilization* pp. 99f.

from the depth of an age - long popular tradition going back to primitive times" (op. cit. p.130). Erotic themes and expressions in art and sculp'ure of Tāntric Buddhism have to be evaluated on the basis if the underlying philosophy of each piece of art which may vary from place to place and from period to period of the respective Tāntric school of thought.

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EROTICS(2) in Buddhist literature, Traces of erotic themes in the literature of the Rgvedic period could be considered as sole survivals of such expressions which preceded the Buddhist era and as such Buddhist literature.

These early erotic themes of Vedic literature are found in the legend of Yama and Yami.[1]

These erotic themes of the Vedic era which ante-dated the beginning of Buddhist literature in India, however, had no relation to any literary expressions or themes in Buddhist literature, unlike in the field of sculpture where pre-Buddhistic ideas have been absorbed by the Buddhists.

Moreover, erotics as a part of Indian literature had to play a greater role later, when poets and critics compiled treatises on rhetorics, demarcating rules and establishing concepts to be followed by the literati. Hence, in the concept of *Rasa* as *Rasavāda* of the Indian poets, erotics *(Sṛṅgāra)* was considered an integral part of literary expression. Thus, in the later classical period *(Sṛṅgāra* comes to play a prominent role in Indian literature. Outside such usage of erotic themes or expressions, in the early canonical texts, too, traces of erotic themes are found. But these themes were specifically meant for edifying and enlightening purposes. Hence these early examples of erotic themes, as found in the Buddhist canon, have to be considered not as expressions to illustrate the Indian poetic concept of *Sṛṅgāra* or erotic sentiment. Hence, in these examples from the canonical texts the erotic theme is a flimsy, fragmentary part of a more predominant theme set for the edification of laymen. Such an expression is the episode of Subhā Theri.[2]

Here the Buddhist narrator puts in the mouth of the libertine, eager to seduce the theri Subhā, expressions laden with passion and erotic suggestions "Young art thou, maiden..... cast off that yellow raiment and come! in the blossoming woodland...seek we our pleasure. Filled with incense of blossoms the trees waft sweetness. See, the spring's at the prime, the season of happiness! Come with me then to the flowering woodland, and seek we our pleasure....Thou like a gold-wrought statue, like nymph in celestial garden, movest, O peerless creature- Radiant would shine thy loveliness. Robed in raiment of beauty, diaphanous gear of Benares, I would live but to serve thee, and thou would'st abide in the woodland. Dearer and sweeter to me than art thou in the world is no creature; thou with the languid and slow-moving eyes of an elf of the forest... If thou wilt list to me come where the joys of the sheltered life wait thee... Eyes hast thou like the gazelle's like an elf's in the heart of the mountains.... 'Tis those eyes of thee, sight of which feedeth the depth of my passion... Shrined in the dazzling, immaculate face as in calyx of lotus.' Tis those eyes of thee, sight of which feedeth the strength of my passion... Though thou be far from me how could I ever forget thee, O maiden! thee of the long drawn eyelashes, thee of the eyes so miraculous? Dearer to me than those orbs is nought O thou witching-eyed fairy."[3]

Even in the attempt of the three temptresses, the daughters of Māra, to infatuate the Buddha, there is a semblance of erotic portrayal. This particular episode is, however, erotically depicted in the carvings and paintings

1 *Rg.-veda.* X, 10 Puruvas and Urvasi (ibid. x, 95).

2. *Thig. vv.* 370-99; *Thig. A.* 245f.

3. *Psalms of the Early Buddhists,* translated by Mrs. Rhys Davids, pp. 150ff.

in many Buddhist shrines dating from the earliest times. The text gives a description as to how the three daughters of Māra approached the Buddha in diversified forms in their attempt to allure him, and it concludes as follows - "If we had approached after this fashion any recluse or brahmin who had not extirpated lust, either his heart would have cleft asunder, or hot blood would have flowed from his mouth or he would become crazy, or would lose his mental balance.[5] In this episode, too, the narrator of the Pali canon has confined the erotic theme to an edifying end as usual.

It is only with the emergence of the classical period of Indian literature that erotics play a predominant role as a part of literary expression under *Sṛṅgāra,*the Indian concept of passionate love depicted by the poet or artist.[6] But unfortunately no examples of works by Buddhist writers of repute could be had belonging to this golden era of Indian literature which had its beginning in the third or fourth century A.C. and saw its efflorescence in the Gupta period.

As if to compensate for this, in the works of the Buddhist Sanskrit poet Aśvaghosa, we find the concept of ***Sṛṅgāra*** being used as a medium of poetic expression. Aśvaghosa belongs to the period which preceded the classical age of Sanskrit literature. In his two major works ***Buddhacarita*** and *Saundarānandakāvya* he follows the traditional concept of the usage of *Sṛṅgāra* or erotic sentiment in embellishing certain episodes having themes of passionate love and amatory behaviour.

However, this famous Buddhist poet who set standards which were followed by almost all later Sanskrit poets of repute, had never hesitated to use his major theme, as in the case of the Pali canon, towards and edifying purpose.

In his ***'Saundarānanda'*** Aśvaghosa had to depict the amatory love between Nanda and Sundarī, which is also the major theme of the story. But the poet contrives to depict passionate scenes only in select instances.[7] Almost all these verses abound with extreme erotic ideas, as for example in describing Sundarī - in Canto IV - "A very lotus pond in the shape of a woman, with her laughter for the swans, her eyes for the bees and her swelling breasts for the uprising lotus buds" (*v* 4).

Again in the same canto the dalliance of the two lovers "The twain dallied blindly together, as if they were a target for the god of love and Rati, or a nest to hold delight and joy of vessels for pleasure and satisfaction." (*v.* 8)

"The pair attracted each other mutually, with their eyes engaged solely in gazing at each other, with their minds intent solely on each others conversation and with their body-paint rubbed off by their mutual embraces." (*v.*9)

"The pair brought ecstasy to each other with the increase of their mutual passion and in the intervals of exhaustion they sportively intoxicated each other by way of mutual refreshment" (*v.*11).

"She clasped him with her arms, so that the strings of pearls swung loose from her breasts, and raised him up...." (*v.*19).

"Should you, however, delay longer, I shall inflict a grievous punishment on you, as you lie asleep, I shall repeatedly waken you by beating you with my breasts and shall refuse to speak to you." (*v.*35).

In describing the divine damsels of Indra's paradise Aśvaghosa further excells the erotic sentiment in canto X.

"They *(apsarases)* were ever young, ever busied in love alone and enjoyed jointly by those who have earned merit; celestial beings, union with them was no sin..." (*v.* 36)

"Then he (Nanda) followed their celestial forms and graceful movements with his mind and with eyes full of excitement as if thirst for their embraces had engendered passion in him" (*v.*40).

"He longed to quench that thirst (passion) with the draught of the *apsarases,* for he was afflicted by the despair which held him of possessing them. Confused with desire, that chariot of the mind, whose steeds are the restless senses, he could not control himself" (*v.* 41).

In his *Buddhacarita,* too, Aśvaghosa does not hesitate to interpolate expressions of erotic themes. This he does in order to make his work a complete masterpiece, a *'Mahākāvya',* an epic poem, according to every criterion of Indian poetics.

In canto V, Aśvaghosa describes how Śuddhodana was making arrangements to have all the allurements of the senses constantly prescribed to the prince in as varied and attractive forms as possible: "The youth was continuously engirt by beautiful young women attired and decorated in such fascinating a manner as human imagination could devise, with the sole purpose of keeping him downed in a vortex of pleasure and enjoyment."[8]

4. Rajendralal Mitra, ***Buddha Gaya*** pl. II.
5. *S.* I, 124 f; *A.* V, 46; ***DhA.*** III, 195f; *Lal.* 490 (378).
6. Sṛṅgāra-erotic sentiment, is one of the eight or ten Rasas of Indian poetry.
7. e.g., canto IV, verses, 4, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 19, 35, 36, 37, 38, 40, 41.
8. ***Buddhacarita,*** translated by K. M. Joglekar, p. 7; see also *Canto* V, verses 46, 50, 55.

Apart from the works of Aśvaghosa there are hardly any other examples from secular literature of the Buddhists in the earliest period that could be considered of any value for the study of erotics in Buddhist literature.

In conclusion it could be noted in the study of erotics in Buddhist literature, that just as in the case of Buddhist sculpture and painting erotic or sensual themes were utilised primarily for symbolic representation of the fertility-fecundity cults, likewise in Buddhist literature of the earliest phase, too, of both religious and secular origin, sensual themes were utilised for the primary aim of edifying ends.

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ESCHATOLOGY. This term in its theological sense, which is its primary meaning, denotes the theory or science (logos) of the ends *(eschaton).* These ends according to Christian theology are the four last things namely, death, judgement, heaven and hell. Besides, in this rather individualistic sense that denotes the destiny that awaits each individual after death, the term eschatology is sometimes used in a wider meaning to connote the end of the world and the destiny that follows, specially the destiny that befalls man. (cf. *Encyclopaedia of Philosophy* ed. Paul Edwards, London, Vol. 3 & 4, p. 48; *Shorter Oxford English Dictionary,* 3rd ed. 1970 s.v. Eschatology; *ERE.* Vol. V, p. 187f.). Both these concepts are found in Buddhism and the term eschatology used in Buddhist literature, therefore, covers both these aspects.

The earliest beginnings of eschatological ideas in the Indian religious thought are traceable to the *Ṛgveda.* These incipient references do not convey clearly what the Vedic Indian conception of death was or what they considered to be the destiny of the dead. From the available scanty references it is seen that to the Ṛgvedic Aryans death connoted some sort of a fall into a dark abyss. It is also seen from Rgvedic hymns that this is a fate that they abhored and dreaded. Hence, the sole attempt of the Ṛgvedic Aryans was to keep away from this dreaded fate. This is the reason for their constant aspiration of longevity *(dīrghāyutva; Ṛv.* X, 62, 2) or stated in a more poetic manner, to live for a 'hundred autumns' *(śaradaḥ śataṃ Ṛv.* I, 98, 9; X, 18, 10). This was merely a postponement of an awful fate and therefore, at a later stage they are seen to aspire for immortality *(amṛtatva)* which they thought possible to attain in the kingdom of Yama, the lord of the dead.

It is seen that to attain immortality in the kingdom of Yama one had to be born there, and in this seems to be latent the earliest traces of the idea of rebirth in some sphere.

The eschatological ideas of the Vedic Indians underwent certain important changes as a result of the development of ethical and moral ideas. Once ethics became an important aspect of an individual's life such an individual's after-life came to be conceived as closely correlated to his ethical behaviour in this world. This led to the belief in a happy after-death destiny to the virtuous.

The average Vedic Indian seems to have believed, as reflected in the *Atharvaveda* V, 6, 11; XVIII, 464), that the deceased passed into the next world with the whole body and limbs *(sarva tanuḥ sāṅgaḥ)* and enjoyed the same pleasures he used to enjoy in this world. The speculative philosophical view is a little more complicated. According to it the path that led to immortality is called the path of gods *(devayāna).* The very virtuous who were destined for this path, reached the goal and enjoyed immortality. On the analogy of this was formed another path called the 'Path of the fathers or the departed ones' *(pitṛyāna)* which had as its destination a state where pleasures and enjoyments were qualitatively and quantitatively less than in the state reached through *devayāna.* Those who were destined to follow the *pitṛyāna* could remain in the world of *pitṛs* only as long as their merit lasted. Once the merit got exhausted they had to return to the earth the very same way. This is a very important eschatological development because this seems to reflect the earliest traces of the belief in rebirth in this world.

Besides these two bournes which were meant for the virtuous of varying degrees, the Vedic Aryans conceived of a unhappy bourne reserved for the wicked (see A. A. Macdonell, *The Vedic Mythology,* Varanasi (India), 1963, pp. 167, 169). This third bourne i.e. the hell, comes into prominence in the *Atharvaveda* and the *Upaniṣads.* Still later in the *Brāhmaṇas,* the *Purāṇas* and the Epics one finds graphic descriptions of both heaven and hell, the destinies that await the virtuous and the wicked. Other than these major bournes belief in birth in animal kingdom, birth among demons and lower spirits etc. also formed a part of the early Indian eschatological views.

As a result of the development of these eschatological beliefs which posit both good and bad bournes as destinies awaiting individuals, the primary concern of the average individual became the attainment of a happy rebirth. The religious teachings that prevailed laid down certain specific means through which one could attain this desired goal. For example, the early Vedic tradition put forward sacrifice as the most effective means to achieve this end. The efficacy of sacred scriptures and even knowledge were considered as suitable means to achieve a happy after-life. Some non-Vedic *śramaṇa* traditions held self-mortification as the most dependable path. From all these what is apparent is that there was a

belief prevalent that if one so desired one could manipulate and mould one's destiny after death.

Thus it is apparent that by the time of the rise of Buddhism in India there were fairly developed eschatological views, most of which were absorbed by Buddhism with necessary modifications. According to Buddhism death is the termination of a single phase of life which is only a small fraction of the beginingless samsāric process. Saṃsāra being a continuous process, death is inevitably followed by birth. The Buddha himself is said to have verified with his higher knowledge *(abhiññā* q.v.) or divine-eye *(dibbacakkhu,* q.v.) the fact of rebirth and how beings fare after death according to their actions *(kamma).* Thus it is seen that the Buddha did not blindly adopt the prevailing eschatological beliefs, but did so only on personal verification (*D.*I, p. 82; III, p.111).

Buddhism speaks of five bournes or courses of existence *(gati,* q.v.) that awaits an individual after his death. These are birth in hells, animal kingdom, ghost-realm, human world and heavenly worlds. Of these the first three are considered bad bournes *(duggati* q.v), whereas the next two are considered to be good ones. A worldling *(puthujjana)* becomes destined to one of these bournes in consequence of his actions *(kamma).* A stream-entrant *(sotāpanna* q.v.) is exempted from birth in hells, animal kingdom, in ghost-realms or in such other miserable states (*A.* IV, p.405). An *arahant* (q.v.) who has put an end to rebirth is not subject to be born in any of these destinies and his state after death is not knowable.

Though birth in heaven does not appear to have formed a part of the scheme of spiritual salvation presented in early Buddhism it did attract the attention of the masses as a worthy destiny, and sometimes even as an ideal to be posed in popular Buddhism. Thus the usual aspirations of the Buddhist masses happened to be the enjoyment of heavenly bliss till the time of attainment of final release (Nibbāna). With the hope of being heirs to such a destiny the Buddhists have become more bent on acquiring and piling up merit. Popular Buddhist literature abound in stories presented solely to inspire the devotees, illustrating the fulfilment of such meritorious aspirations. Popular Buddhism appears to have freely drawn from the prevalent brahmanic literature to enrich its own popular eschatological ideas of good and bad destinies that await beings after death. This process has been in operation from very early times as evident from references found in canonical literature. The *Aṅguttaranikāya (A.* I, p.138) presents one such graphic description about the after-life fate of those who lead immoral lives. Such an individual after death is born in the purgatory. The wardens of the purgatory seize him by both arms and bring him before Yama, the Lord of Death, saying that he had no respect for mother and father, recluses and brahmins. He showed no diference to the elders of his clan. Let your Majesty inflict due punishment on him." Then it describes how Yama very minutely questions him and makes him realize how he, through his own negligence, has become an heir to this destiny. Once the guilt on the part of the deceased is thus established the wardens of the purgatory mete out due corporal punishment to him. The *Petavatthu* and *Vimānavatthu* too abound in stories narrating the destinies of those who had led corrupt lives. Stories describing happy destinies gained by those who had led virtuous lives, too, are frequently met with in Buddhist literature. The *Jātaka* book contains numerous such stories (*J.* I, p. 198ff.; cf. *Vin.* II, p.118; *DhpA.* I, p. 263ff. etc.). What is significant here is the emphasis placed on the correlation between one's action (both good and bad) in this life and in the destiny that awaits him after death.

As already pointed out the origin of the belief in such a correlation is traceable to the late Vedic period. In Buddhism, which primarily is an ethical teaching, this correlation found greater emphasis. And this emphasis was further enhanced by the Buddhist teaching which upholds the supemacy of man. As Buddhism considers man to be his own master who is solely responsible for his purity as well as impurity - both in this life and in the next- it strongly advocates the view that one could mould in a desired manner the after life destiny that awaits one. Hence Buddhism discarded the then prevalent eschatological views which were mostly influenced by theistic, fatalistic and deterministic religious teachings. Instead it not only showed the way for one's present life enabling one to attain final deliverance in this life itself but also put forward an eschatological doctrine that inspired individuals to shape their future lives, as well.

As already pointed out, when used in the wider sense the term eschatology means the end of the world and the destiny that awaits man. It is seen that cosmological theories regarding the involution *(saṃvaṭṭa)* and evolution *(vivaṭṭa)* of the world have nothing purely Buddhistic in them, and they by no means form part of the fundamental teachings of the Buddha. On the contrary the Buddha explicitly declard them as having no direct relevance to the primary question in which he was interested, namely, the problem of suffering and freedom from it.

However, it is evident that though these cosmological theories are of no doctrinal significance they are primarily based on the Buddhist teaching of impermanence. According to Buddhism everythimg is in a state of flux, ever changing from one thing to another in accordance with a causally conditioned process, and hence according to the Buddhist explanation, the universe is a result of a regular cyclic process of involution and evolution occurring at the end of cosmic eras *(kappa,* q.v.).

Thousand years before the involution is due divine messengers called Lokabyūhā appear in the world in a state of great distress and urgency and proclaim the impending destruction of the universe and warn the beings to practise virtue (*J.* I p.47). Then in the course of time all beings other than those whose roots of merit are completely destroyed are born in higher worlds which are not yet destined to be destroyed. Those beings who are suffering in hells of the universe whose destruction is imminent are reborn in some other hells whose destruction is not yet due. Subsequently the whole universe gets destroyed a number of times over by water, fire and wind, and the whole universe is reduced to utter chaos. The time for the evolution of the universe seems to coincide with the exhaustion of the merit of those beings who are born in higher worlds. Their merit being exhausted they are reborn successively in a descending order in the lower region finally reaching the earth and populating it (see *ERE.* V. p.187; see further KAPPA).

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ESOTERISM. The term is very loosely used by present day writers. It is quite often used by them, though not correctly, as a synonym for mysticism. Therefore, in order to give an idication to the reader about the matter that would come within the purview of this article it is necessary to state the sense in which the term is considered herein. The Oxford English Dictionary explains the term esoteric, as "designed for, or appropriate to an inner circle of disciples; communicated to, or intelligible by, the initiated only." Thus, esoterism is the holding of doctrines meant for an inner circle. The same dictionary explains the term esoteric Buddhism as "a body of theosophical doctrine handed down by secret tradition among the initiated." It is in this sense that the term esoterism is considered in this article.

Writers also use this term to denote later phases of Buddhism such as Mantrayāna, Sahajayāna which are collectively referred to as Tantrism. Tantric Buddhism contains features that make it fit to be called esoterism. Besides its teachings which are meant exclusively for the initiated, it also incorporates *mantras, mandalas,* rites of initiation, propitiation of deities and such other features all of which are of an esoteric nature.

Though modern scholars agree in calling these later phases of Buddhism esoterism, their opinion differs with regard to the question whether there is esoterism in early Theravāda Buddhism (see T. W. Rhys Davids, *Buddhism, Its History and Literature,* pp. 207 f.; cp. R. Kimura, *Hinayāna and Mahāyāna and the Origin of Mahāyāna,* University of Calcutta, 1927, pp. 9, 16, 29, 49, 55 etc.). Rhys Davids is of opinion that it were the Mahāyānists, with the sole intention of fathering on the Buddha teachings different from those which he actually propagated, who first alleged the presence of esoterism in early Theravāda. On the other hand Kimura contends that esoterism is an intrinsic feature in early Theravāda Buddhism.[1] He says that when the Buddha attained enlightenment he realised the truth of the universe which could be presented from two points of view. One is the truth of the physical nature of the universe and the other the reality behind it. Kimura calls these the phenomenological perception and the ontological or introspectional perception respectively. He further adds that the religious and the philosophical conditions of the time permitted the Buddha to preach publicly the truth based on phenomenological perception, and that, his ontological doctrines were left in the hands of his disciples to be manifested when the time became ripe for it. As evidence he cites that before delivering a discourse the Buddha was always in the habit of considering certain factors pertaining to his listeners and preaching what was most suited for the occasion. To strengthen this point Kimura cites the Nikāya reference which describes the Buddha as being endowed with five particular qualities. There it is said that, the arahant, the fully enlightened one, knows what is good *(atthaññū),* knows what is true *(dhammaññū),* knows measures *(mattaññū),* knows time *(kālaññū)* and knows the assemblage *(parisaññū: A.* III, p.143). The canonical reference to the Buddha's hestitation to preach the truth he realised is also considered by Kimura as indicative of the fact that the Buddha did not preach about the ontological perception. Finally, Kimura concludes that the Buddha preached those ontological doctrines in an esoteric garb to his advanced disciples.

Kimura's opinion is more or less the same as the Mahāyāna view on this question. The evidence put forward by Kimura to substantiate his view is not convincing. On the one hand he relies very much on evidence found in later Mahāyāna texts, and on the other hand he misinterprets certain canonical references, in support of his view, treating them out of context. By doing this he also overlooks glaring evidence which directly go against his view-point.

Primarily the assumption that the Buddha preached two types of truth, the phenomenological and the ontological, is not corroborated by early Buddhist texts. Such

1. See also B. Bhattacharyya: *An Introduction to Buddhist Esoterism,* pp. 18ff. It is a fact that some salient features in Tantrism can be traced to early Theravāda Buddhism. But, none of these were looked upon as being essential features of early Theravāda doctrine.

a position was assumed by the Mahāyānists to attribute their teachings to the Buddha for sake of authority.[2]

It is a fact that certain canonical references (*M.* I, p.167 f.; *Vin.* I, 4 f.) reveal that the Buddha hesitated to preach the doctrine at the outset. Kimura lays much stress on this as well as on similar references oċcurring in later Mahāyāna texts to prove that after his hesitation the Buddha preached only the phenomenological doctrines and that it was later that he peached the ontological doctrines to his advanced disciples. Though the Pali references record the Buddha's hesitation they do not even cast a slight hint to show that the Buddha withheld from preaching, from the beginning, the truth he realised by attaining enlightenment.

The Nikāyas do not contain any evidence to show that esoterism formed a feature in early Theravāda Buddhism. On the contrary they reveal that one of its most marked features is its exoteric nature. From numerous discourses found in the Nikāyas it is evident that the Buddha spoke quite openly on all matters he chose to speak on. He elaborately explained all subtle points in his teachings by using parables, similies and other kinds of figures of speech. He used these devices not to present his teachings in an esoteric garb as it was done in Tantrism but to present his teachings in the simplest form so that all could grasp them easily. Buddhism does not preach blind faith. It is qualified as *ehipassika,* inviting to 'come and see', thus opening its portals to all who are willing to inquire. There is no evidence to show that the Buddha's teaching was limited to a special privileged group. It was the Buddha, who for the first time in the religious history of India, admitted into the order members of different social status and preached to them all alike, irrespective of caste, birth and such other social barriers that up to then deprived a certain section of society of the right to hear the religious teachings which were treated as the secrets of a previleged few.

The Buddha's teaching was not even limited to those who entered the Order. On the contrary the Buddha emphatically said that there were laymen and women leading family lives, who followed his teachings and attained high spiritual states (*M.* I, 490 f.). The Pali canon refers to a number of laymen and women who attained arahantship. The Buddha did not look upon his disciples as a privileged class or a inner circle who alone had access to his teachings.

The Buddha's sole aim was to propagate the truth he discovered for the good of the many. It is with this aim in view that he set rolling the wheel of the doctrine and sent out his disciples to teach the doctrine to others. Addressing the first sixty arhant disciples the Buddha said: "Tour, monks, for the blessing of the many folk, happiness of the many folk, out of compassion for the world, for the welfare, the blessing and the happiness of devas and men. Let not two of you go by the same way. Monks, teach the Dhamma which is lovely at the beginning, lovely in the middle and lovely at the ending. Explain with spirit and letter the noble life completely fulfilled and wholly pure. There are beings with little dust in their eyes who, not hearing the Dhamma, are decaying; but if they are learners of the Dhamma they will grow. And, I, monks, will go along to Uruvelā to the camp township in order to teach the Dhamma" (*Vin.* I, 20).

This passage is significant in that it shows that the Buddha's intention was to teach for the wellbeing of the many and that the Buddha, from the beginning of his carrier as a religious teacher, did not limit his teaching to an inner circle but aimed at teaching as many as possible. This spirit he cherished throughout his life. There are numerous references to show how he went out of his way to preach to the people. Even on his death bed preached and converted Subhadda. Till death overcame him he discoursed to Ānanda on numerous doctrinal matters. And in his final advice he told Ānanda, quite emphatically, that he has no closed fist of a teacher and that he has preached the truth without making any distinction between exoteric *(anantaraṃ)* and esoteric *(abāhiraṃ)* doctrine (*D.* II, p.100, cf. *DA.* p.547 f.). This statement attributed to the Buddha is quite in keeping with his character as revealed in the Nikāyas.

It is a fact that the early Pali texts qualify the Buddha as knowing the good, the doctrine, the measure, the time and the assemblage. But it is not correct to hold this as evidence in support of the view that knowing all these and realising that the religious and philosophical conditions of the time were not conducive to impart his higher teachings the Buddha preached only the phenomenological doctrines. The fallacy of such a view becomes obvious, when the religious and philosophical history of the time is considered.

Round about the 6th and 5th centuries B.C. a deep intellectual stir was felt throughout many parts of the world including India. In India the effects of this intellectual awakening is seen in the rise of a new set of free-thinkers who broke away from orthodox Brahmanism. The *Upanisads* record the philosophical speculations of one section of this band. Besides the Upaniṣadic thinkers there were others, such as wanderers *(parivrājaka)*, śramaṇas and so on, all whose aim was the attainment of final liberation from the evil of life. The Buddha, too, was one such free thinker. Further, the

2. Even later Tantric works are attributed to the Buddha himself for the same purpose. Thus the *Guhyasamāja* says that the Buddha refrained from communicating Tantras because the people were not prepared to receive such doctrines(p.87).

Magadha region which formed the centre of the religious activites of the Buddha was comparatively less brahmanised than Kuru and Pañcāla. The people of Magadha, therefore, were less antagonistic towards new doctrines which went against orthodox Brahmanism. Therefore, it is incorrect to hold that the unsuitable religious and philosophical conditions of the time prevented the Buddha from preaching his higher teachings.

It is a fact, as Kimura suggests, that the Buddha followed different modes of preaching suited for the occasion, time, assembly etc. This he did out of mere necessity. All were not equally mentally mature or of favourable disposition to receive his teachings at once. Those whom he considered as mature enough and able to think freely, to them he preached his doctrine directly. To others, who were attached to Brahmanism and other schools of thought and, therefore prejudiced in mind, he discoursed 'in due order' *(ānupubbikathā)* first preparing their minds to receive his teachings and then delivering his doctrine.

Buddhism though influenced by contemporary thoughts and beliefs was a new doctrine, a new way of life. Therefore, before preaching these new ideas, the Buddha had to rouse faith in the minds of the listeners for, without this initial faith one could not pursue along this new line of thinking. Even when preaching to the *pañcavaggiyas*, his former associates, he had to make them accept the fact that he had attained enlightenment. Therefore, the Buddha by considering various factors such as the time, assembly and so on, adopted different modes of preaching which deemed most suited for particular occasions. To the *pañcavaggiyas*, whose power of comprehension was known to him, he preached directly without much preamble. But before preaching to the Jatilas, who were under the misconception that they were arahants endowed with supernatural powers, the Buddha had to resort to his supernatural powers in order to kindle faith in their minds. When discoursing to Pokkharasādi, an orthodox brāhmin, the Buddha, before preaching on the Four Noble Truths spoke to him of generosity, of right conduct, on heaven, on the dangers, the vanity, and the defilement of lust and on advantages of renunciation. And when the Buddha saw that Pokkharasādi had become prepared, soft-hearted, unprejudiced, exultant and believing in heart, then he preached the doctrine of the Four Noble Truths.[3] There is no evidence in early literature to show that after his preamble on general subjects he refrained from preaching his doctrine.

Besides this initial mental preparation brought about in the manner discribed above there was no need for one to receive any initiation by means of a formal rite or a ceremony which made one belong to the exclusive group who are qualified to receive the higher teaching.

Inspite of all these exoteric characteristics, the doctrine of the Buddha came to be divided into two as exoteric and esoteric. When and how this division took place is not known exactly. It is clear that this division had become an accepted fact by the 3rd century A.C. for, Nāgārjuna speaks of this. Nāgārjuna says in his *Prajñāpāramitā śāstra* that, "there are two kinds of Buddhism: one is esoteric *(guhya)* and another is exoteric *(vyakta)*. In the esoteric doctrine which he preached for only bodhisatvas, it has been said that it is only the bodhisattvas that attain reality which is beyond birth and death. In the exoteric doctrine it has been preached by him that all *arahats* are *puṇya-kṣetras*"(fields of merit: as quoted by Kimura, op. cit. p. 57). It is evident that this is not an arbitrary division made by Nāgārjuna himself. He seems to have followed the earlier Mahāyāna tradition which seems to contain the germs of this division. The *Saddharma puṇḍarīka Sūtra* says that the intentional speech *(sandhā-bhāṣyam)* of Tathāgatas are difficult to be understood, because they explain laws that have causes in themselves, they do so by means of skilfulness by the display of knowledge..... and suggestions..... None but a Tathāgata can impart to a Tathāgata those laws which a Tathāgata knows. All laws are taught by the Tathāgata, and by him alone; no one but he knows all laws, what they are, how they are..." *(Sdmp.* pp. 28-9). Nāgārjuna's assertion of the two divisions appears to be based on this sort of statement found in abundance in Mahāyāna texts. The causes that led to such a tradition are not obvious. But a close scrutiny of the early texts and subsequent religious developments show the features that prompted the Mahāyānists to bring about such a division in the Buddha's doctrine and also the gradual process which resulted in Tantrism, which is generally referred to as esoteric Buddhism.

Probably it was with the rise of the Mahāsāṅghikas that certain features, which later formed the most essential characteristics of esoteric Buddhism came into the forefront. The Mahāsāṅghikas broke away from the orthodox Theravādins at a very early date, about a century after the Buddha's demise. Though the reason for the schism is given as the disagreement that arose between the orthodox monks and the Vajjian monks regarding the ten points of discipline, it is quite apparent that there were reasons other than this. The new doctrinal developments that came into the forefront soon after the schism hint at other causes that led to it. The origin of the Mahāsāṅghikas appears to be partly due to the result of incorporating popular ideas into Buddhism.[4] Though

3. The Buddha quite often introduced his teaching by means of this graduated sermon *(ānupubbikathā)*, for it was found to be very effective in kindling faith in the minds of brāhmans who formed the bulk of his converts.

4. See S. Dutt : *The Buddha and Five After-centuries*, London 1957, pp. 132f.

early Theravāda is not completely devoid of such ideas, they did not acquire any significance at the time as means of attaining the ultimate goal. With the formation of the Mahāsaṅghika school the popular features found in Theravāda were given prominence and basing on these more popular features were introduced into Buddhism from outside. This is seen from the great significance attached to *mantras* and *dhāraṇis* in the Mahāsaṅghika school. The efficacy of *mantras* in warding off dangers, calamities, illnesses and so on was accepted by the early Theravāda Buddhism. In the Nikāyas there are suttas used for such purposes (e.g. *D.* III, 194 ff.). The *Majjhima Nikāya* records how the Buddha caused Angulimāla to relieve a woman of her labour pains by means of an act of truth *(saccakiriyā)*.[5] Probably basing on these, the Mahāsaṅghikas developed a special collection of *mantaras* and *dhāraṇis* under the title *Dhāraṇī Piṭaka*.[6] Another important concept originated by the Mahāsaṅghikas and which became a salient feature in Tantrism is the docetic theory regarding the Buddha's personality. By idolising the Buddha, they had to bring in the bodhisattva concept and with this came in the concepts of *caryās, bhūmis, bodhicitta* and so on.

Numerous schools came into existence about two centuries after the Buddha. The *Kathāvatthu* records the existence of twelve different schools with various subdivisions. These divisions resulted in the growth of two seperate schools which later came to be known as Hinayāna and Mahāyāna.[7] The innovations brought in by the Mahāsaṅghikas were taken up by the Mahāyānists. They formulated new doctrines based thereon, which were quite different from those of the Theravāda. This resulted in the change of the final goal. The Theravādins aimed at attaining arahantship while the Mahāyānists aimed at attaining Buddhahood. With this change the bodhisattva concept, as well as other concepts affiliated to it, gained much importance. The bodhisattvas were looked upon as saviours of all humanity. To accomplish this purpose the teaching had to be brought down to the popular level and this necessitated the incorporation of popular elements. In this way *mantras, dhāraṇis*, gods, goddesses, various rites, rituals and practices became essential features of Buddhism.

With the development of Yogācāra these features attained greater significance. This school of Buddhism emphasised the importance of *Yoga* as the most effective means of attaining enlightenment. The importance attached to *vijñāna* (consciousness) and its cultivation through *yoga*, brought in several esoteric developments in Buddhism. The *mantras, dhāraṇis* and also *maṇḍalas* and *mudrā*, assumed special siginificance to the *yogin*. Most probably it was among these *Yogācārins* that esoterism or Tantrism originated as a separate cult. Once esoterism came to be established as a cult, it was found necessary to restrict its teachings, rites and rituals to a small group of initiates. To maintain its continuity it was also necessary to introduce the institution of master and pupil (*guru* and *cela*). To preserve its secret nature a particular type of language called *sandhā-bhāṣā*[8] (intentional speech) was used. This phase of Buddhism is a mixture of philosophical ideas of different Mahāyāna schools, popular religious beliefs and practices that were prevalent at the time (for further details see TANTRISM.

Bibliography: B. Bhattacharyya, *An Introduction to Buddhist Esoterism*, Oxford University Press, 1932; S. B. Das Gupta, *Obscure Religious Cults*, Calcutta, 2nd ed. 1962; *An Introduction to Tantric Buddhism*, University of Calcutta, 1958; R. Kimura, *Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna and the Origin of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, University of Calcutta, 1927; E. J. Thomas, *History of Buddhist Thought*, London, 1933, pp. 230ff.; Lama Anagarika Govinda, *Foundations of Tibetan Mysticism*, London, 1959.

S. K. Nanayakkara

ESP. See EXTRA-SENSORY-PERCEPTION

ESSENCE in its widest sense is that by which a thing is what it is. In other words, it is the very nature of a thing, and not a mere mode of existence. Any direct knowledge will not give a full comprehension of such reality, which has been given various names. The term 'essence' is from the Latin verb *'esse'*, to be; the term 'reality' is derived from the Latin noun *'res'* the thing, meaning the thing in itself (Kant's *'das Ding an sich'*); the term 'nature' is connected with the Latin verb *'nasci'*, to be born, and

5. *M.* II, p. 100 ff. The early Theravāda Buddhism accepted the efficacy of protective charms *(paritta)* such as the ***Ratana Sutta***.
6. This is also called *Vidhyādhara Piṭaka*. The *Mañjuśrimulakalpa* which probably belongs to the 1st century A.C., too, contains numerous *dhāraṇis mantras, maṇḍalas* and *mudrās*.
7. The term Hīnayāna denote the orthodox school of Buddhism better known as Theravāda, while the term Mahāyāna denotes later schools such as Mādhyamika, Yogācāra etc.
8. See *IHQ.* IV, 1928 pp. 267ff.; P. C. Bagchi : *Studies in Tantra*, pp. 27ff. The Mahāyānic texts (ex. *Sdmp.* p.28) suggest that the Buddha preached in *sandhā-bhāṣā*. A stray reference, for example *v.* 294 in the *Dhammapada*, does not suffice to establish that the Buddha, too, used such an enigmatical language when preaching (see Lama Anagarika Govinda, *Foundations of Tibetan Mysticism*. pp. 101 f).

therefore indicates the condition or composition of a thing without subsequent external influences or modifications; the term 'quiddity' is formed from an artificial Latin noun *'quidditas'*, based on the interrogative pronoun *'quid'*, 'what?'

The essence, therefore, is the answer to the question: what is the natural state of a thing in itself? In Oriental philosophy this is referred to in Pali and Sanskrit as *'tathatā*, that is the 'thus-ness' or 'such-ness', the true nature or state of things. The Buddha refers to himself always as the Tathāgata, the one who has gone into the real nature of things, who has come at the essence of things *(tathā + āgata)*[1]

The search for truth which is the basic quest of philosophy is doomed to fail from the very outset when a definition of truth is set up in advance. The method and the goal of search vary with the objects and theories of the many schools of thought who modulate the truth according to their principles, whether monistic, dualistic or pantheistic, idealistic or materialistic, etc. Whenever truth is made an objective goal it becomes a predetermined objective which is not likely to be the thing in itself, the real truth.

And so the search for the essence is not to be a search for a substance hidden among and covered over by phenomena.

Essence is the constant and necessary nature of a thing as contrasted with its accidents. Frequently the term is used with the same meaning as 'substance'. 'Substance', however, is the entity which underlies *(sub-stare)* the properties or phenomena of a thing. The confusion can be traced to Aristotle resulting from his doctrine, conceiving substance as the essential qualities of a thing, distinguished only from their essence by the fact that they exist, a confusion between the logical subject and that which remains permanent throughout accidental changes. It was again Aristotle who first made the distinction between matter and form, for it is the philosophical conception of matter which marks the metaphysics of Aristotle. Matter, for him, is the undifferentiated element, unknowable in itself, but determinable by form through which it becomes knowable and even sensible. These terms, 'matter' and 'form', have found a place also in Kantian philosophy, where 'form' constitues the rational and intelligible elements of cognition of 'matter' as the 'thing-in-itself.'

Unfortunately, writers have sometimes used these very terms in translating the Pali terms *nāma* and *rūpa* whereby *rūpa*, the material element, is presented as the 'form' given to matter by the mind *(nāma)*, which gives a 'nam' *(nāma)* to matter.

The essence, the nature, the thus-ness *(tathatā)* is the actuality, the true *(tatha)* condition of a thing. And thus, as the nature of all things is conditioned and impermanent, impermanence and conditioned existence form the essence of every component.

Essence, therefore, is the abstract nature of a thing in existence, whether such existence is logical, ontological or metaphysical, being or becoming. This had led to a philosophical distinction between essence and existence, various schools giving their varied speculations, but mostly agreeing in considering 'essence' as the abstract counterpart to the concrete entity in existence. Whereas existence, whether actual or potential, real or functional, substantial or phenomenal, is merely an affirmation of what is already, 'essence' is the very nature, construction, composition, causation. Essence, therefore, is not merely related to existence, as potentiality to actuality, for in the process of existence which is becoming, there is the nature, the essence of that process. On the other hand, the essence of a thing, of a process, etc. can be thought of, and therefore exists logically, even without that thing or process being or becoming in existence, physically.

When the Buddha gave his solemn utterances that all component things are impermanent *(sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā)* and that all component things are conflicting *(sabbe saṅkhārā dukkhā)*, he gave the essential nature of a complex. Such essence has no physical existence, yet is actual as the only reality, the only truth *(tathatā)*; and as such it is absolute, for its existence does not depend on relationship; it is always true, even if there were no existence, no components, no complexes. Only its actuality, i.e., its existence, in the process of becoming is dependent on the fact of composition *(saṅkhāra)*.

It is then the essence of all component things to be decomposable, but this impermanent nature (which is the essence) is in itself permanent, because it is the nature of essence to be unchangeable. Hence truth, Nibbāna, or whatever name may be given to the absolute, is permanent, is non-complex, because it is the essence itself, but it is never to be thought of as a metaphysical entity *(sabbe dhammā anattā)*.

And that is the difference between the essence and the substance, although, loosely used, they appear sometimes as synonyms. For, a substance is a definite entity which is the basis of the dependent phenomena. A substance cannot be thought of without its properties, qualities, or phenomena, and it does not have, therefore, even a

1. He who has won (through to the) truth: C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *Dha.* trsl. 1099, n. 2. One who has come at the real truth: Chalmers, *JRAS.* 1898, pp. 103–15. Buddhaghosa has eight other interpretations, most of them rather fanciful.

logical separate, independent existence. In the teaching of the Buddha on *anatta* it is totally denied, and in the developed teaching of *śūnya* the voidness of everything is pursued to its furthest logical conclusions.

Essence, on the other hand, always remains an abstract mental concept and exists only as such. Therefore, we may rightly speak of the essence of the Buddha's teaching being his doctrine of the unsubstantiality of everything, including Nibbāna.

The unconditioned nature *(tathatā-asaṃskṛta-dharma)* is called by Vasubandhu "the transcendental essence of everything and it is termed 'suchness' because its essential nature is real and eternal; but it is beyond reach of human language; it is indefinable" (Yamakami Sōgen, *systems of Buddhist Thought* p.229, Calcutta 1912). The essential nature or suchness is unconditioned, because it does not stand in need of the assistance of any agency. In fact if it cannot manifest itself, it is because it is obscured in the presence of conditions. Hence only in the elimination of conditions the true nature or essence can be discerned. And if in this process of elimination the core proves to be an empty shell, then emptiness *(śūnya)* will have to be accepted as the essence of all things, and unsubstantiality *(anattā)* as the essence of all phenomena *(dhamma)*.

The process adopted by the Buddha to arrive at the essence is the process of analysis *(vibhajja)*. The individual, the self, which is an empirical fact from which all investigation must of necessity take an origin, is thus analysed as a physico-psychical component, in which the body with its component parts and the mind with its sensations, perceptions, ideations and thoughts prove to be mere passing events and phenomena without a substance, without a permanent entity. The passing or changing nature of all events is their essential nature and that is based on the unsubstantiality of all. This unsubstantiality, therfore, constitutes the ultimate nature, the essence of all things and events or components, even of the one uncomposed and absolute Nirvāṇa. And this teaching of unsubstantiality *(anattā, śūnyatā)* is the essence of the teaching of the Buddha, its real nature, not to be found in any religious system which has the search and salvation of a soul as its goal.

H. G. A. van Zeyst

ESUKĀRI SUTTA. This stutta occurring in the *Majjhima-nikāya* (*M.* II, p. 177 ff) throws light on the Brahmanic theory that divides the society into four castes and also clearly reflects the position taken up by the Buddha regarding this theory. The sutta shows how the brahmins by positing four types of waiting upon *(pari-cāriya)* and four types of personal wealth *(sandhāna)*, symbolic of the assigned professions, attempts to establish their claim to superiority above the rest of the society. The Buddha points out that these theories are proclaimed by the brahmins without popular consent and the approval of the true religious men. It is by force, the Buddha says that they attempt to enforce these views just as one forces on a poor, needy, destitute man a morsel of meat which he did not want, saving "You must eat this meat and you must as well pay a price for it."

In this sutta the Buddha elaborates his teaching that it is neither birth, nor complexion nor wealth that decides one's position in the society. According to the Buddha these criteria of birth, designation and wealth are of no consequence in this matter and are mere conventions. The criterion that should be applied in deciding one's position in the society, according to the Buddha, is one's actions, behaviour.

To further establish his position of total rejection of the brahmanic theory of caste and the superiority of brahmins, the Buddha convincingly argues that irrespective of these caste divisions all are equally capable of attaining spiritual development. See further CASTE, EGALITARIANISM, EQUALITY.

S. K. Nanayakkara

ETADAGGA VAGGA, the 14th chapter of the *Eka-nipāta* of the *Aṅguttara-nikāya* (*A.* I, pp-23-26). The importance of this chapter lies in the fact that it contains a list of the Buddha's disciples *(bhikkhus, bhikkhunīs, upāsakas* and *upāsikās)* who have attained distinction above the rest in some respect or the other. In all, eighty such spheres of distinctions are referred to and names of seventy-four disciples who have attained pre-eminence in these eighty spheres are enumerated.

Of these seventy-four disciples Culla-Panthaka and Subhūti are credited with pre-eminence in two spheres each, while Ānanda is credited with pre-eminence in five spheres. Forty-one of these seventy-four are *bhikkhus*, thirteen are *bhikkhunīs*, ten are *upāsakas* and ten are *upāsikās*.

All the aspects in which these disciples have attained pre-eminence are not connected with spiritual development. Some are connected with personal characteristics, some are indicative of the seniority in the Order or the superiority of social status of the particular disciple involved and some denote sublime spiritual attainments or virtuous conduct of the disciples concerned.

Most of the seventy-four disciples named in the list are familiar figures who are often met with in Buddhist literature. The whole list as such appears to be a late compilation made-up by putting together material found scattered in the Canon. The following are the names of the disciples and the particular spheres in which they have attained pre-eminence.

Bhikkhus

(1) Aññākondañña foremost among disciples of long standing *(rattaññunam).*[1]

(2) Sāriputta foremost among disciples of great wisdom *(mahāpaññānam).*

(3) Mahā-Moggallāna . . . of supernormal powers *(iddhimantānam).*

(4) Mahā-Kassapa . . . . . . who upheld strict observance of ascetic practices *(dhutavādānam).*

(5) Anuruddha . . . . who are clairovoyant *(dibbacakkhukānam).*

(6) Bhaddiya Kāligodhāputta . . . . of aristocratic birth *(uccākulikānam).*[2]

(7) Lankuntaka Bhaddiya . . . . . who are of sweet voice *(mañjussarānam).*

(8) Pindola Bhāradvāja . . . . who are lion-roarers *(sihanādikānam).*[3]

(9) Punna-Mantāniputta . . . . who are Dhamma-preachers *(dhammakathikānam).*

(10) Mahā-Kaccāna . . . . . who are capable of expounding in analytical detail what is said in brief *(sankhittena bhāsitassa vitthārena attham vibhajantānam).*

(11) Culla-Pantaka (i) . . . . of those capable of creating mind-made forms *(manomayam kāyam).* (ii) . . . . . . of those skilled in expanding mind *(ceto-vivatta-kusalānam).*

(12) Mahā-Panthaka . . . . of those capable of expansion of perception *(saññā-vivatta-kusalānam).*[5]

(13) Subhūti (i) . . . of those who lived in seclusion *(aranavihārinam),* (ii) . . . . of those worthy of gifts *(dakkhineyyānam).*

(14) Revata Khadiravaniya . . . . . of those who are forest-dwellers *(araññikānam).*[6]

(15) Kankhā-Revata . . . . of meditative power *(jhāyinam).*

(16) Sona-Kolivisa . . . . . who have put forth effort *(āraddha-viriyānam).*

(17) Sona-Kutikanna . . . . of clear utterence *(kalyāna-vākkaranānam).*

(18) Sivali . . . . who are recipients of gifts *(lābhinam).*

(19) Vakkali . . . . who are of implicit faith *(saddhādhimuttānam).*

(20) Rāhula . . . . who are anxious for training *(sikkhākāmānam).*

(21) Ratthapāla . . . . . who have entered the order through faith *(saddhāpabbajitānam).*

(22) Kunda-Dhana . . . . . . who are first to receive food-tickets *(pathamam salākam ganhamtānam).*

(23) Vangisa . . . . those who are of ready wit *(patibhānavantānam).*

(24) Upasena Vangantaputta . . . who are pleasant in all respects *(samantapāsādikānam).*

(25) Dabba Mallaputta . . . . . who assign quarters *(senāsanapaññāpakānam).*

(26) Pilindavaccha . . . . who are dear to *devas* *(devatānam piyamanāpānam).*

(27) Bāhiya Dāruciriya . . . . . who are capable of comprehending the truth instantly *(khippābhiññānam).*

(28) Kumāra-Kassapa . . . . those who are eloquent *(cittakathikānam).*

(29) Mahākotthita . . . . . . those who are clever in logical analysis *(patisambhidāppattānam).*

(30) Ananda

(i) . . . . those who are well learned *(bahussutānam).*

(ii) . . . . possessing retentive memory *(satimantānam).*

(iii) . . of good behaviour *(gatimantānam).*

(iv) . . . who are resolute *(dhitimantānam).*

(v) . . personal attendants *(upatthakānam).*

(31) Uruvela Kassapa . . . . of large followings *(mahāparisānam).*

(32) Kāludāyin . . . . good at appeasing families *(kulappasādakānam).*

(33) Bakkula . . . of good health *(appabādhānam).*

(34) Sobhita . . . . . . who are able to recall past eixstences *(pubbenivāsam anusarantānam).*

1. This inevitably has to be so because he was the first to be admitted to the Order and hence the most senior.
2. Birth, whether it is aristocratic or otherwise, is of no consequence in the bhikkhu Order. This being so why the aristocratic birth of this particular disciple is highlighted is difficult to understand. The commentary (*AA*. p. 193) says that he is the foremost in this respect because he happened to be the son of the most senior sakyan lady of her time. Besides, he had been king for five hundred successive births and this too qualify him for pre-eminence in this respect.
3. What exactly is the significance of this qualification is not quite clear. The commentary (*AA*. p. 196) seems to suggest that he was full of self assurance and, therefore, always ready to make a claim for his ability and proficiency.
4. Sāriputta too admired this ability of Punna-Mantāniputta (*AA*. p. 204).
5. These two were brothers, one an expert in *rūpa-jjhāna,* the other in *arūpa-jjhāna.*
6. *araññika* is an aspect of *dhutanga* (q.v.) of which Mahā-Kassapa is said to be the foremost.

(35) Upāli .... who are proficient in Vinaya *(vinayadharānam)*.
(36) Nanda ..... who advise bhikkhunis *(bhikkhun' ovādakānam)*.
(37) Nanda ...... who guard the faculties of senses *(indriyesuguttadvāranam)*.
(38) Mahā-Kappina .... who advise bhikkhus *(bhikkhu ovādakānam)*.
(39) Sāgata ... who are proficient at contemplation of the heat-element *(tejo-dhātu-kusalānam)*.
(40) Rādha .... who are impromptu speakers *(patibhāneyyakānam)*.
(41) Mogharāja .. who are wearers of coarse robes *(lūkhacivara dharānam)*.

Bhikkhunis

(42) Mahāpajāpati Gotamī foremost among *bhikkhunis* of long standing.
(43) Khemā .... of great wisdom.
(44) Uppalavannā ...... of supernormal powers.
(45) Patācārā ...... who are proficient in Vinaya.
(46) Dhammadinnā ... who are dhamma-preachers.
(47) Nandā .... of meditation power.
(48) Sonā .... who have put forth effort.
(49) Sakulā .... who are clairvoyant.
(50) Bhaddā Kundalakesā .... who are capable of comprehending the truth instantly.
(51) Bhaddā Kapilāni .... who are able to recall past existences.
(52) Bhaddā Kaccānā .... who have attained great super-normal powers *(mahābhiññappattānam)*.[7]
(53) Kisāgotami ..... who are wearers of coarse-robes.
(54) Sigālamātā ...... who are of implicit faith.[8]

Upāsakas:– lay male followers

(55) Tapassu-Bhallika ...... who first took refuge (in the Buddha and Dhamma).
(56) Sudattha, the householder Anāthapindika .... who are donors *(dāyakānam)*.
(57) Citta, the householder of Macchikāsanda ..... who are dhamma teachers.
(58) Hatthaka of Ālavi .... who obtain large following by the four modes of treatment *(catūhi sangahavatthūhi[9] parisam sanganhantānam)*.
(59) Mahānāma, the Sakyan .... those who offer choicy alms *(panitadāyakānam)*.
(60) Ugga, the householder ..... those who offer desirable gifts *(manāpadāyakānam)*.
(61) Uggata, the householder ... who attend on the sangha *(sanghupatthākānam)*.
(62) Sūra Ambattha ... of those having faith born of understanding *(aveccappasāda)*.
(63) Jivaka Komārabacca .. who are liked by the people *(puggalappasannānam)*.
(64) Nakulapitā, the householder .... who are faithful *(vissāsakānam)*.

Upāsikā:– lay female followers

(65) Sujātā, daughter of senānī, ... first to take refuge.
(66) Visākhā, Migāra's mother .... of donors.
(67) Khujjuttarā .... of those who are well learned *(bahussutānam)*.[10]
(68) Sāmāvati .... of those who possess the sub-lime quality of loving-kindness *(mettā)*.[11]
(69) Uttarā, mother of Nanda, ... of meditative power.
(70) Suppāvāsā of the Koliyan ... those who offer choicy alms.
(71) Suppiyā .. who nurse the sick *(gilānupatthākinam)*.[12]
(72) Kātiyāni ...... of those having faith born of understanding.
(73) Nakulamātā .... who are faithful.
(74) Kāli, the lay follower of Kuraraghara ... who develops faith through hearsay itself. *(anussavappasannānam)*.[13*]

Besides this list of seventy-four disciples of the Buddha who have reached excellence in certain respects there is,

7. There is no parallel to this in the *bhikkhu* list. The commentary says that during the time of a particular Buddha only four posess such powers i.e. the power of recollecting events up to a period of hundred thousand aeons *(kappa)* and one *asamkeyya*. The four who possessed such power during the time of Buddha Gotama are his two chief disciples, Bakkula Thera and Bhaddā Kaccāna Theri (*AA*. p. 377).
8. Twelve out of these *bhikkhunis* have exact counter-parts among the *bhikkhus* as is shown in the above list.
9. The four are liberality *(dāna)* pleasant speech *(piyavacana)*, good behaviour *(atthacariyā)* and equality *(samānattatā)*.
10. Her exact counterpart is not found in the *bhikkhuni* list. In the bhikkhu list Ananda is said to be foremost in this respect.
11. No counter part of Sāmavati is found in either the *bhikkhu* or *bhikkhuni* lists.
12. She too has no parallel.
13. She too has no parallel. The Commentary (AA. I, 458) narrating her story tells how she developed confidence in the Buddha, the Dhamma and the Sangha by over hearing a discussion, in praise of the Triple Gem, between Sātagira and Hemavata. It should however be noted that Buddhism does not encourage faith based merely on hearsay (see *Kālāma Sutta, A.* I, p. 188 ff).

* The *Manorathapūranī*(*AA*. I, p. 124 ff) deals elaborately on each of these disciples giving their previous lives and also narrating events that conduced to their high attainments. The *Gradual Sayings* (I, p. 16 ff.) in its footnotes makes interesting observations on them and their attainments. The *DPPN*. also gives detailed biographical sketches of these monks. Cf also *S*. II, pp. 155 f; 235f.

coming down from a comparatively early period, perhaps as a commentarial tradition, another list of disciples that gives the names of those who are categorized as the 'Great Disciples' *(mahāsāvaka=mahā-śrāvaka)*. The *Dhammapada commentary, (DhpA.* II, p. 93) referes to these 'Great Disciples'. So does the *Divyāvadāna* (p. 489). *Saddharmapuṇḍarika Sūtra* (chp. 1) shows that this listing originated in the Indian Buddhist tradition itself. The *Viduddhimagga* fix their number at eighty and refer to the whole group as *asitimahāsāvaka.*[14]

The concept of eighty great disciples is fairly common in the Sri Lankan Buddhist tradition. The *Dharmapradipikāva,*[15] a Sinhala text belonging to the medieval period, enumerates a list of great disciples. But this list fall short of the number eighty. According to this text all these 'Great Disciples' have aspired for this position for a period of one hundred thousand[16] aeons and the Buddha himself has proclaimed them as 'Great Disciples' of his. Further each of these disciples has a following of five hundred bhikkhus.

This list in the *Dharmapradipikāva* contains only the names of *bhikkhus,*[17] thus giving a very narrow interpretation to the term *sāvaka*. Many of the names of the forty-one bhikkhus listed in the *Etadaggavagga* are included in this list of 'Great Disciples'. Conspicuous by omission are the names of Upāli, Kāludāyi Bāhiya dāruciriya and one of the Soṇa *theras.*

A complete list of the 'Eighty Great Disciples' is found in the modern Sinhala text called *'Sinhala Śrāvaka Caritaya.*[18] This list repeats in the identical order all the forty-one names of bhikkhūs occurring in the *Etadagga vagga* and add another thirty-nine names to complete the fixed number eighty. The following is the listing as found therein.

1. Aññā-Koṇḍnañña
2. Sāriputta
3. Moggallāna
4. Mahā-Kassapa
5. Anuruddha
6. Bhaddiya (1)
7. Lakuntaka Bhaddiya
8. Piṇḍola Bhāradvāja
10. Mahā-Kaccāna
11. Culla-Panthaka
12. Mahā-Panthaka
13. Subhūti
14. Khadiravāniya-Revata (1)
15. Kaṅkhā Revata (2)
16. Kolivisa Soṇa (1)
17. Kuṭikaṇṇa Soṇa (2)
18. Sivali
19. Vakkali
20. Rāhula
21. Raṭṭhapāla
22. Kuṇḍadhana
23. Vangisa
24. Upasena
25. Dabba
26. Pilindavaccha
27. Bāhiya-Dāruciriya
28. Kumāra-Kassapa
29. Mahā-Koṭṭhita
30. Ānanda
31. Uruvela-Kassapa
32. Kāludāyi
33. Bakkula
34. Sobhita
35. Upāli
36. Nandaka
37. Nanda (1)
38. Mahā-Kappina
39. Sāgata
40. Rādha
41. Mogharāja
42. Bhaddiya (2)
43. Vappa
44. Mahānāma
45. Assaji
46. Kimbila
47. Bhagu
48. Cunda
49. Nala

14. The number of great disciples does not seem to be fixed in the Sanskrit tradition. The *Sdmp.* names twenty-six of them and adds, 'and others' which clearly indicates the number is larger. It is interesting also to note that in this particular instance Ananda is not included among the *mahā-śrāvakas* but singled out and mentioned as a trainee *(śaiksa)*. In the Sanskrit tradition there is also a list of Mahāśrāvikās 'Great Female Disciples'. For further reference see *BHS.* s.v. mahāśrāvaka.

15. See *Dharmapradipikāva* ed. by Baddegama Vimalavamsa thero, publ. of M. D. Gunasena & Co., Colombo, 2nd ed. 1936, p. 303.

16. The *Visuddhajanavilāsini (ApA.* p. 142) too mention this fact. However, it says that the aspiration of the two chief-disciples extends up to one *asaṅkheyya* and one hundred, thousand aeons, whereas the aspiration of the 'Eighty Disciples' extend up to one hundred thousand aeons. The context seems to suggest that the two chief-disciples *(aggasāvaka)* were excluded from the group of 'Eighty Great Disciples'.

17. There seems to be a separate list of 'Great Female Disciples' or *bhikkhunis* as seen from the references in the *BHS.*

18. This book was written by Ratmalane Piyaratana Sthavira and published in 1931.

50. Seludāyi
51. Bhaddāli
52. Todeyya
53. Kappa
54. Jatukaṇṇa
55. Posala[19]
56. Puṇṇaka
57. Dhotaka
58. Nanda (2)
59. Ajita
60. Tissa Metteya
61. Metteyya
62. Upasivaka
63. Hemaka
64. Bhaddiavudha
65. Udaya
66. Piṅgiya
67. Meghiya
68. Channa
69. Upavāna
70. Bhaddaji
71. Yasa
72. Lakkhana
73. Gavampati
74. Puṇṇaji
75. Nadī-Kassapa
76. Aṅgulimāla
77. Gayā-Kassapa
78. Acela-Kassapa
79. Sabhiya
80. Sakuludāyi[20]

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ETERNALISM, a doctrine which believes in a beginningless and incessant existence, infinite both in past and future. This doctrine is rarely found in the full strength of application, but is usually restricted to infinite existence in the future, i.e., immortality, or infinite duration in time. This limitation of eternal existence to the future only has two grounds: a physical ground which sees and experiences the relative beginning and the arising of things around, and a psychological ground which refuses to accept the cessation of existence centred round the I-concept.

Yet, logically there should be no greater difficulty in accepting an eternal existence in the past without creation, than an eternal continuation at least of a 'soul' in the future. The refusal to accept the former and the insistence on the latter at the same time show already the weak ground on which these dogmas of creation and immortality are founded.

One solution has been tried by the concept of 'eternal generation' which, however, is usually confined to the theological view in Christianity of the continuous process of generation of the Son of the Father, opposing the emanation of the same according to the Gnostic view.

Schellings's definition of eternity as 'existence outside time' and Hegel's 'absolute timelessness' point to an enduring and changeless essence without relation to beginning, creation, succession or cessation.

The idea of eternity is, therefore, a negative concept which the imagination endeavours to picture by removing the limits of experience. But, however far the limits are pushed back and forward, no concept is possible without limitation and hence eternity will remain for ever beyond experience and it must of necessity be non-actual.

All arguments to prove the existence of eternity either in God or in the soul are but verbal gymnastics and can easily be turned into proofs of the very opposite. E.g., the proof from the law of causation does not lead to an eternal uncaused cause, for that 'concept' would upset the very law of causation which is quoted in support.

On the other hand, the refutation of eternalism or absolute eternal existence does not necessarily lead to an absolute origination or spontaneous self-creation. For there is the Buddha's solution of dependent origination or evolution which does not require an eternal entity to exist as a first cause, but allows for individual origination from pre-existing conditions without an absolute and ultimate origin. In this sense, eternity is a fact, because no beginning in the absolute sense is discernible, but it is an eternal process of evolution and involution, i.e., of constant change, of a permanent impermanence, however paradoxical that may sound.

In this eternal process there is bound to recur a recombination of forces with a cyclical recurrence which has given ground to the doctrine of saṃsāra, in which even the teaching of the Buddha will recur and disapear, without continued existence of a soul, whether *ātama* or *paramātma.*

Plato's eternal ideas, Aristotle's eternal forms and Whitehead's eternal objects are but qualitative characteristics of actuality, incompatible with the very nature of actuality. Action is essentially change, and if there be anything of the nature of eternity in action, it must be that of eternal change.

19. The *Dharmapradipikāva* give Pesala as a var. reading.
20. See also the article "Asūmahasavvo" by Henpitagedera Ñāṇāvāsa Sthavira in the *Sinhala Viśvakoṣaya* (publ. by the Dept. of Cultural Affairs, Sri Lanka, 1965) Vol. 2, pp. 327–329.

Eternalism is as old as man's desire for continued existence *(bhava-taṇhā)* and already during the time of the Buddha a school of philosophy was found who had made this thesis of eternalism the basic tenet of their views *(sassata-diṭṭhi).* It was this doctrine which Acela-Kassapa, Kassapa, the unclothed, discussed with the Buddha at Rajagha (*S.* II, p.20) who pointed out that the view that it is one and the same person who acts and who experiences the results, which is the doctrine of 'suffering self-wrought' *(sayaṃkataṃ dukkhaṃ),* amounts to the eternalist theory. This theory is further expanded as the belief that this is the self *(so attā),* this is the world *(so loko),* this I shall become hereafter *(so pecca bhavissāmi),* permanent *(nicco),* everlasting *(dhuvo),* eternal *(sassato)* and not subject to change *aviparināma-dhammo* : *S.* III, p.98). But this view itself is a compound mental formation *(saṅkhāra)* which is conditioned. "By what is it caused, from what is it born, by what is it produced? *(kiṃnidāna, kiṃsamudayā, kiṃjātikā, kiṃpabhavā).* Nourished by feeling, born of contact with ignorance, there arises craving, which produces this mental formation" (ibid. p.96).

The *Brahmajāla Suttanta (D.* I, p. 13ff) distinguishes four kinds of Eternalists who on different grounds proclaim that both the soul and the world are eternal, and partial Eternalists who maintain that the soul and the world are partly eternal and partly not (ibid. pp. 17 ff.). But the *Sampasādaniya Suttanta (D.* III, pp. 107-10) has selected only three classes of Eternalists for reference, who have in common their belief, based on rememberance of previous lives.

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ETERNITY in general would mean everlasting existence or endless duration of time. But such a conception implies conditionality and relativity and therefore subject to temporal change. This sense of everlasting existence could be permitted only in the sense that the conditioned world with all its vicissitudes goes on indefinitely in what is called saṃsāra as expressed in the statement 'because of its uninterrupted continuity it is called saṃsāra:' *(abbocchinnaṃ vaṭṭamānaṃ saṃsāro'ti pavuccati: Vism.* p. 544).

In Buddhism, however, the term eternity could be applied for a deeper concept to mean the timelessness inherent in the unconditioned state of Nibbāna, the Buddhist Absolute. It is the Timeless Reality transcending the limits of temporal duration. It is Eternity as opposed to Time, as the Absolute is opposed to Relativity or Conditionality. Thus the concept of eternity, in this sense expresses the transcendental nature of Nibbāna in the temporal aspect. Nibbāna as a state where everything worldly has been transcended is transcendental regarding not only time and space but as regards consciousness as well and accordingly it is impossible to conceive of it *(anārammaṇa: Ud.* 80). Consciousness also, like all component things, is a conditioned phenomenon and is not self-existent. While all conditioned thinking is characterised by these three dimensions of time, space and consciousness,[1] when the human mind achieves Nibbānic liberation it attains to a condition where all these are transcended, thereby becoming supra-mundane. Here all conceptualisations also become unconditioned and hence totally free from all the limitations of time space, and the individualised mind. Hence it is called transcendental or unconditioned in contrast to the mundane or the conditioned. This franscendental Reality cannot be practically experiened until the mind achieves liberation and attains to the unconditioned state *(visaṃkhāragataṃ cittaṃ).* This is clearly demonstrated in our own experience when we know that all our imaginations are always limited in time and space. All our attempts to imagine without these limits fail. It is only with the liberation of the mind that these limitations vanish.

As the subject under discussion is eternity let us leave out the psychical and the spatial aspects and confine courselves to the temporal aspect and observe how Nibbāna becomes eternity in this realm as a state independent of all time conditions.

These observations can be substantiated with statements of the Buddha found in the Nikāya texts. One such instance that may be quoted here is the well-known statement in the *Kevaḍḍa sutta (D.* I, 223) where eternity as understood in Buddhism is clearly implied when the consciousness of the released saint is described as "indemonstrable, limitless, completely lucid, wherein the four great elements water, earth, fire and wind find no foothold, where all dualities like long and short, small and large, good and bad etc. as well as mind and matter completely cease."[2] This is a good description of the transcendental state wherein the eternal nature of Nibbāna is clearly indicated. A similar statement complementary to this is found *Udāna* (p. 80) where this unconditioned state is referred to as an *āyatana* "wherein

1. See the *Atthasālini* p. 57 verse: *samaye niddisi cittaṃ cittena samayaṃ muni* (Through Time the sage described the mind and through mind he described Time).
2. *viññāṇaṃ anidassanaṃ-anantaṃ sabbato pabhaṃ-etthā āpo ca paṭhavī tejo vāyo na gādhati, ettha dīghañca rassañca-aṇuṃ thūlaṃ subhāsubhaṃ, ettha nāmañ ca rūpañ ca-asesaṃ uparujjhati viññāṇassa nirodhena-ettha etaṃ uparujjhati: D.* I, 223.

neither this world nor the the other, neither the sun nor the moon, neither going nor coming neither stability nor motion nor birth are found and which is unsupported, non-existant and not capable of being conceived that itself is the end of suffering."[3] This *āyatana* is further described as unborn *(ajāta)*, unbecome *(abhūta)*, unmade *(akata)* and unconditioned *(asaṅkhata)*, explouring the supra-mundane nature of this which is accordingly beyond time. All this could be summed up in the statement "nothing mundane is wholly freed from time and everything supra-mundane is totally free from time."

Our experience shows that all our thinking processes are inevitably intervowen with the three dimensions of mind, space and time. When the mind, as the thinking agent, achieves freedom from all worldly bondage it breaks asunder all limitations and becomes unlimited or infinite *(ananta)* as described in the *Kevaddha sutta* stanza quoted above. Here the term *ananta* signifies its complete freedom in not being confined by the limited personality of an individual. It denotes the spatial aspect of Nibbāna. It is infinite in space it is infinite in time as well. Such a condition as free from all spatial, temporal and psychological limitations and also from all change is sternal and thus Nibbāna can quite logically be described as the Bliss of Eternity. It is in this sense that the Buddha is described as "unlimited in space" *(anantagocara: Dhp. v.* 180).

In the Buddha's teaching of the Law of Conditionality implied in the Formula of Conditioned genesis *(Paticca-samuppāda)* it is seen how the ordinary world continues incessantly, according to a certain rhythm as it were, in an unbroken series of causal co-relations. Here the passage of time comes to be identified with change. The nature of ordinary consciousness *((viññāna))* is most obvious here. Once this consciousness ceases with the cessation of becoming *(bhavanirodha)* the process ceases and Eternity is realised.

An important aspect of this realisation of Eternity is how the particular individual that achieves it releases himself from the mundane world. It should be clear from what has been said so far that the individual as the subject cannot think of the external world as the object without the help of consciousness as the medium of thought. And with the attainment of the freedom of Nibbāna, which is free from all relations, the subjective objective duality ceases to operate and such a person's thinking becomes free from all bonds to the objective world. Thus the world ceases to exist for him who has accordingly attained to the state of permanent freedom as Eternity.

Viewing the problem from another angle based on these considerations one can understand how Nibbāna is a state free form change. As change means the passage of time a state free from change is a state free from the effects of time and hence Eternal.

The concepts of beginning, end, change, duration etc. involving time are all part of the conditioned world, for Eternity, like Infinity has neither beginning nor end. The person who has realised Nibbāna is free from birth, decay, death and all change. To him "who was freedom through the cessation of consciousness and the destruction of craving the liberation of mind is like the extinction of a lamp (*A.* I, 236)". Thus the released person experiences a state of permanency *(nicca)* as opposed to the worldly state of impermanence *(anicca)*. Because of its changeless or eternal nature *(dhuva, nicca)* it is the state of highest happiness *(paramasukha)*. An other epithet of Nibbāna that aptly describes this eternal nature as *accuta* (immovable) is when Nibbāna is described as *accutaṃ ṭhānaṃ (Dhp.* 225).

Time ceases to be a perishable commodity with arhants unlike in the case of ordinary mortals because the former have transcended it and "exist" out of time as it were. All the negative definitions of Nibbāna quoted above negate the time-ridden worlds replacing it with a permanent, changeless, stable and eternal state. Very often Nibbāna is referred to as eternal bliss but it would be more correct to describe the Eternity of Nibbāna itself as bliss. Being a state beyond time it is true freedom and security from all unhappiness.

The foregoing account shows that Eternity as Nibbāna is an entirely timeless state in that it transcends it while, it may be said, including it as well. Eternity in this sense is the state of Reality undetermined by any of the limitations of ordinary human experience and hence above Time. It may also be described as the timeless ultimate Reality underlying the phenomenal world. The finite world exists in the conditioned sense *(saṅkhata)* and Eternity is thus the timeless Absolute. As such this state is not subject to ageing or any form of change. The Buddha could accordingly be described as an intermediary between Eternity and Time and after his *parinibbāna* he merges into Eternity which is expressed in early Buddhist texts by such phrases as *brahmabhūta, dhammabhūta, parinibbuta* etc. The Buddha principle is eternal like the Dhamma and this eternal Buddha is immanent in human beings in varying degrees of manifestiation. It is the personification of this eternal Buddha principle that has led to the belief in an eternal Buddha among some Mahayana schools like the Nichiren in Japan.

In the *Udāna* passage quoted above it is stated that in this eternal state the sun and the moon do not exist *(na ubho candimasuriya)*. It is common knowledge that in

3. *nāyaṃ loko na paraloko ubho candimasuriyā, tadahaṃ bhikkhave neva āgatiṃ vadāmi na gatiṃ na ṭhitiṃ na cutiṃ na upattiṃ, appatiṭṭhaṃ appavattaṃ anārammaṇaṃ eva taṃ ese'va'nto dukkhassā'ti.*

our ordinary affairs Time is measured by the movement of these two heavenly bodies and any state where these two do not have their influence must be above Time and hence Eternal without beginnings and ends.

In Buddhism there is no permanent 'soul' that passes from the temporal to the timeless realm. Once a person completely over comes his ego-consciousness *(sakkāya-diṭṭhi)*, his consciousness *((viññāṇa),)*, as the medium of repeated birth, ceases to function *(nirujjhati)* and becomes un-established *(appatiṭṭhita: S.* I, 122) and the individuality also ceases to exist as a separate entity. When this happens the individual realises Nibbānic freedom thereby becoming one with the realm of infinity and eternity. It is the realisation of saving knowledge or gnosis *((pariññā: M.* I, p.4)) leading to complete freedom and Enlightenment. By freeing himself from the round of repeated births and deaths the individual becomes one with Eternity.

A. G. S. Kariyawasam

ETHICS. 1. Place of ethics in Buddhism: Ethics is generally understood as the inquiry into the evaluation of human conduct, behaviour, goals, dispositions, intentions, ways of life and institutions. The ethics of a particular community, cultural group or a religious system can be empirically studied by following the methods of social science to discover what in fact are its values and why those values have come into being. Ethics also signifies a mode of philosophical inquiry which attempts to answer certain general questions about the meaning of moral terms and the criteria of moral evaluation. In contemporary philosophy a distinction is made between two approaches to philosophical ethics. The first is viewed as a normative inquiry which attempts to determine the distinctions between right and wrong, good and bad and ought not in relation to the moral evaluation of human action. The second approach is viewed as an analytical and logical exercise called meta-ethics attempting to clarify the meaning of moral words, analyze moral concepts and describe the logical status of moral utterances. Although the ethical content of the Buddhist doctrine cannot be classified strictly according to the above distincitons, viewed from all these perspectives, Buddhist thought can be said to contain much that is ethically significant.

The Buddhist scriptures do not contain treatises exclusively devoted to systematic philosophical inquiry into ethics comparable with philosophical works of the early Greeks such as the Nichomachean Ethics of Aristotle. But interest in ethical questions seems to be a pervasive character in all of the Buddha's teachings. It is possible to reconstruct a complete moral system out of the material scattered in the most authentic scriptural sources of Buddhism. The Buddha's teaching did not pay attention to theoretical intricacies which contemporary philosophers with an academic interest would want to inquire into. Such interest was secondary to the achievement of practical results. As a consequence of this attitude there is no attempt to pursue philosophical issues with the strictness, regour and argumentative zeal which is characteristic of the Western philosophical tradition. Nevertheless there are certain positions taken in the Buddhist tradition which are worth the attention of those interested in the study of ethics.

Buddhism can be viewed as a system of thought that has made a lasting and significant contribution in the history of moral thinking. Both in its origin and in its later development ethical concerns have played a central role in Buddhism. Buddhism consists of a rich moral vocabulary, a distinct normative basis for moral action, doctrines that are of great significance to the moral philosopher and those interested in the development of moral ideas. In the history of Indian thought, Buddhism evidently assumed the role of a moral reform movement, directing its moral critique against the superstitions and rituals of both the śramaṇa and brāhmaṇa traditions of the fifth century B.C. The scriptures preserved under the *Suttapiṭaka* of the Theravada pali canon, which have parallels in the scriptures of other Asian Buddhist scriptural traditions preserved in languages such as Chinese and Tibetan can be viewed as the most authentic sources for the reconstruction of the ethical doctrines of Buddhism.

Among the Buddhist doctrines one can distinguish between what contemporary philosophers call descriptive statements and evaluative statements. The fundamental tenets of the Buddhist ethical system are closely linked to the Buddhist world view and its theory of reality. The way of life that Buddhism prescribes is derived from its beliefs about the nature of man, the nature of the universe and the nature of human destiny. These beliefs can be considered as the factual content of the Buddhist teachings, with the qualification that 'factual' is used here to include those 'facts' established by the methods of knowing accepted in Buddhism. The Buddhist scriptures also contain certain evaluative and practical utterances involving the appraisal of human actions, behaviour, practices, modes of life, and enjoining people to adopt certain modes of behaviour, cultivate certain mental dispositions and aim at certain specific ends in life. It is these latter statements that constitute the content of Buddhist ethics.

According to the Buddhist claim, the ultimate goal of Buddhism consists of an attainment which has three principal and interrelated aspects. First, it is the attainment of emancipation *(vimutti)*, which from the individual's point of view, has the consequence of delivering a

person from a condition of suffering or unsatisfactoriness. Secondly, it is the attainment of a kind of understanding or insight which in itself has an ethical value. This insight is called right knowledge *(sammāñāna)*, wisdom *(paññā)*, , the knowledge and insight into things as they have come to be *(yatābhūtañānadassana)*, the knowledge of the desturction of the influxes or cankers *(asavakkhayañāna)*. Thirdly it is the attainment of moral perfection, a moral transformation of personality which entitles one to be described as an arahant (q.v.). The freedom from suffering, the insight and the perfection are concomitant or simultaneous attainments. It is the ultimate attainment consisting of these three aspects that Buddhism describes as the attainment of Nibbāna.

One becomes a Buddha by discovering and revealing the path to the atainment of this goal. The most praiseworthy individuals, apart from the Buddha are those who have attained the same goal of perfection by following the instructions of the Buddha contained in his teaching *(dhamma)*. According to the Buddhist teachings, those who attain the goal of arahanthood can do no wrong. They are the most qualified to guide lesser moral beings on the path of morality.

Nibbāna the *summum bonum* of Buddhism has an ethical significance. For it is represented as a kind of moral perfection. There have been attempts on the part of some recent scholars to misinterpret the role of morality within Buddhism due mainly to a mistaken understanding of the meanings of some ethical terms in Buddhism. One such misinterpretation which has passed unchallenged for a considerable time is the view expressed by S. Tachiabana, in his *Ethics of Buddhism.* According to Tachibana, the enlightened person in Buddhism is 'beyond good and evil'. He believes that according to both the Buddhist doctrine and the teaching of the Upanishads, the highest spiritual attainment is above moral distinctions.

> According to the idea set forth in the Upanishads knowledge exempts the knower from both good and evil and emancipates him altogether from the region of moral distinctions... The omnipotent Upanishadic knowledge elevates the knower beyond the range of ethical, aesthetical and logical distinctions.[1]
>
> The Bhikkhu, the Brāhmana, the Buddha *(satthā, muni)* are said to be free from such distinctions as good and evil, pleasantness and unpleasantness, purity and impurity and so on.... When one reaches this state of culture, distinctive ideas will be absolutely abolished... He has reached the mental condition where there is no consciousness of moral, aesthetical or logical distinction; the relative ideas therefore of good and evil, pleasure and pain, agreeableness and disagreeableness, right and wrong are all annihilated for him.[2]

Tachibana's assertions imply that the highest goal of Buddhism is amoral and suggests that it only has a personal and mystical significance. Contrary to Tachibana's belief the evidence in the Buddhist scriptures shows that the ultimate knowledge admitted in Buddhism has a moral purpose. It is the kind of knowledge that puts an end to the evil dispositions that are deep-rooted in the human mind.

It is difficult to see what Tachibana means by saying that the perfected saint in Buddhism transcends all moral distinctions. If he means that the Buddha was indifferent to all moral distinctions after becoming enlightened, he is quite wrong. For it was after his enlightenment that he did confidently assert the distinctions between what is good and bad, right and wrong, and spent the rest of his life instructing others about these distinctions. The Buddha criticized some of his contemporaries for adopting a sceptical attitude towards moral questions. Tachibana's view, which has been reaffirmed by a number of other scholars on Buddhism is a consequence of an erroneous rendering of Pali terms.[3]

2. Principal Ethical Terms *Kusala* and *Puñña* : There are several instances in the Pali canon where it is asserted that the enlightened person transcends both *puñña* and *pāpa*. It is on the authority of these instances that scholars have held the view that the ultimate requirement in Buddhism is to transcend good and evil. However, this view is misleading unless the actual significance of the Buddhist evaluative terms is understood in the context of their use. Most scholars have rendered the terms *puñña* and *pāpa* into English as 'good' and 'bad' without any qualification. *Puñña* and *pāpa* were terms used both in the Buddhist and pre-Buddhist Indian traditions to evaluate human behaviour. But it is to be noted that Buddhism used another pair of terms, which in their original usage in the Buddhist tradition evidently conveyed a meaning that could be distinguished from that conveyed by *puñña* and *pāpa*. These were the terms *kusala* and *akusala* which came to be the primary terms of moral evaluation in Buddhism. These two terms

1. S. Tachibana, *Ethics of Buddhism*, (Colombo, 1943) p. 37-38.
2. *Ibid.* p. 38-39.
3. A. W. P. Guruge, "Some Problems in Buddhist Ethics", *Añjali O. H. de A. Wijesekera Fecilitation, Volume*, ed. J. Tilakasiri (Colombo, 1970), p. 5; Gunapala Dharmasiri, *A Buddhist Critique of the Christian Concept of God*, (Colombo, 1974), p. 106.

were rarely used in moral contexts in the pre-Buddhist scriptural traditions.[4]

The term *puñña* has been generally used in the Pali scriptural tradition to denote that which benefits the person who is intent on bettering his future state of existence without renouncing the pleasures of household life. The significance of the terms *puñña* and *pāpa* cannot be understood except in the context of the Buddhist doctrines of *kamma* and *saṃsāra*. This sense of *puñña* as a word in the evaluative language of Buddhism has been inherited from the earlier Brāhmanic usage of the term although the Buddha's view was considerably different from the Brāhmanical view regarding what constituted *puñña*.

Acts of *puñña* in Buddhism are looked upon as those deeds which have the tendency to promote a person's happiness in the future life. *Puñña* helps a person to be reborn in a pleasant form of existence *(sugati)*, whereas *pāpa* leads to regression in the samsaric cycle. It is believed that those who have an abundance of *puñña* are reborn in heavenly spheres of existence, while those who have an abundance of *pāpa* are reborn in woeful states of existence *(niraya)*. Acts of social welfare, such as planting of pleasure groves and forests, making of bridges, wells and drinking places for the welfare of the public are said to increase *puñña*, and consequently, to lead the person who performs such deeds to rebirth in heavenly spheres. (*S*. I, p. 33) All mortals are said to take a new birth according to their *puñña* or *pāpa* deeds.(ibid. p.197) The *Dhammapada* says that a person who has done *puñña* delights both here and hereafter, and that he is intensely delighted when he goes to a pleasant state of existence. (*Dhp. v.* 18) In the *Sakkapañha sutta* Pañcasikha wishes that be reaps whatever *puñña* he has done in relation to the steadfast arahants (saints) in sensuous enjoyment with the one whom he loved.(*D*. II, p. 266)

An examination of the terms *kusala* and *akusala* in the Pali canonical scriptures shows that there is a noteworthy difference in their meaning when compared with that of the terms *puñña* and *pāpa*. The term *Kusala* appears to have been used more frequently in the evaluation of action leading to the higher spiritual goal of Buddhism. The *Aṅguttara-nikāya* which uses evaluative language in characterizing the specific modes of behaviour and conditions of mind which conduce to the attainment of the ultimate goal of Buddhism, omits the term *Puñña* but includes the term *kusala*. (*A. V.* p. 240ff; p. 273ff). A person endowed with ten qualities is called one who is endowed with *kusala*. *(M.* II, p. 28f). These qualities are the ones directly connected with the attainment of Nibbāna. The Buddha asserts that the practices that are *kusala* gradually lead a person to the highest state, meaning the attainment of Nibbāna. The *kusala* states are sometimes enumerated as the four bases of mindfulness *(cattāro-satipaṭṭhānā)* the four modes of right endeavour *(cattāro sammappadhāna)*, the four bases of psychic power *(cattāro-iddhipādā)*, the five faculties *(pañcindriyāni)*, the five powers *(pañcabalāni)*, the seven factors of enlightenment *(sattabojjhaṅga)* and the Eightfold Path *(ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo: D. III, p. 102)*. In the same context it is said that the highest *kusala* state is the final freedom of mind and freedom through wisdom which one attains by the elimination of all mental impurities. Nibbāna, the highest spiritual attainment of Buddhism is the condition in which greed *(lobha)*, malice *(dosa)* and ignorance or confusion *(moha)* are said to be absent. Greed, malice and ignorance are described as *akusala* while the absence of them is described as *kusala*. *Kusala*, unlike *Puñña* is not to be discarded, but to be cultivated. The Buddha is said to have reflected on the fact that he himself abandoned the numerous evil and unwholesome qualities and attained perfection in the numerous *kusala* qualities (*Ud*. p. 66). The Buddha was venerated for possessing morally good qualities. He is referred to as one who cultivated that which ought to be cultivated and eliminated that which ought to be elimenated, which may be understood among other things as a reference to his cultivation of *kusala* and elimination of *akusala*. In the context of answering certain questions asked by king Pasenadi of Kosala, Ānanda, one of the chief disciples of the Buddha, says that the Buddha is one who has discarded all states that are *akusala* and possessed of states which are *kusala*(*M*. II, p.116).

The use of these principal evaluative terms in the Pali scriptures clearly shows that acts of *Puñña* were conceived in Buddhism as deeds of positive merit which bring about, as their consequence, enjoyments of a sensuous kind. *Kusala* on the other hand emphasised the non-sensuous spiritual bliss, which results from it. *Kusala* culminates in the eradication of the defilements of *lobha* (greed), *dosa* (malice) and *moha* (ignorance). The term that was invariably used in specifying the good actions which lead to the spiritual bliss of Nibbāna was *kusala*, whereas the term more frequently used for specifying the good actions which lead to sensuous enjoyment and happiness in *saṃsāra* was *puñña*. Perhaps this explains why the Buddha and his disciples assign a somewhat lower status to *puñña*. Thus when the Buddha hears the warning sounded by Uttaradevaputta:

Life to its doom is led.
Our years are few.

4. See discussion of this in P. D. Premasiri, Interpretation of Two Principal Ethical Terms in Early Buddhism, *Sri Lanka Journal of the Humanities*, Volume 2, Number 1, June 1976.

For us led to decay no shelters stand.
Who so doth contemplate this fear of death.
Let him so act that merits *(puññāni)* bring him bliss.

He expresses his lack of concern for *puñña* and says:
....Let him reject the bait of all the worlds,
Let him aspire after the final peace.[5]

Expressing a similar attitude Raṭṭhapāla who wished to renounce the pleasures of the household life refuses to agree with his parents when he is urged by them in the following words:

Come Raṭṭhapāla, eat and drink and amuse yourself,
You can enjoy diverting yourself with sense pleasures, and performing *puñña* deeds (*M.* II, p. 57)

From the above consideration it is reasonable to conclude that Buddhism used the terms *kusala* and *puñña* with distinctive meanings. Both terms had an evaluative function. *Puñña* in its canonical use generally signified the actions which were believed to be conducive to a happy consequnece to the agent in a future existence *(bhava)*. The enlightened person transcends the level of *puñña* , for he loses all interest in egocentric motives for action. *Kusala,* on the other hand, was generally believed to be those qualities conducive to spiritual bliss culminating in the attainment of the highest bliss of Nibbāna which leaves no room for the fruition of any *puñña* or *pāpa* actions. Although an enlightened person puts away both *puñña* and *pāpa* he remains to be the very embodiment of *kusala.* Tachibana's assertion that for the enlightened person the relative ideas of good and evil,.... right and wrong are all annihilated is a very misleading way of presenting the role that morality plays in Buddhism. The Buddha is described in the Pali canonical scriptures as one who had insight into what was good and bad. The goodness of the actions of enlightened persons is believed to follow spontaneously from the inner transformation that occurs in the culmination of the spiritual path. Such persons do not face the moral struggle that the unenlightened have to face due to the conflict between what is known to be the right thing to do and the inclination to do the wrong thing. For all egocentric impulses have been eradicated by the enlightened person.

The belief that the attainment of the supreme goal of Buddhism involves the transcendence of moral distinctions can result in losing sight of the fact that there is a close relation between the ultimate spiritual goal of Buddhism and the moral life itself. To be enlightened is not to be indifferent to moral concerns. From the Buddhist point of view, it is in the enlightened state that a person can be of the greatest service to mankind. It is an enlightened person who is fully moral, who does not suffer from moral weakness. For it is who has completely gained control over the psychological impulses that drive someone to the kind of behaviour that could be characterised as unwholesome or immoral. To attain Nibbāna is to effect a radical transformation of a person's dispositions. It is to eliminate the unwholesome dispositions and to cultivate the wholesome ones. This results in the transformation of a person who is prone to evil into a person who is capable of acting morally in a spontaneous manner. The enlightened person does not lose, after enlightenment, the moral qualities he has cultivated in his long endeavour to perfect himself. Such *kusala* qualities as mindfulness, compassion and wisdom become part of his nature. Nibbāna was conceived in the Buddhist tradition not merely as a transformation or personality of such a kind that one becomes oneself liberated from suffering. Under such a transformation of personality one also ceases to be instrumental in producing suffering to others because one has overcome one's own moral depravity. Buddhism maintains that it is persons who are free from moral depravity that can be of the greatest service to all mankind. It is after the Buddha found that there were sixty disciple who had attained the same degree of moral perfection that he himself attained, that he urged them to wander for the welfare of all rational beings. (*Vin.* I, p. 21). Buddhism recognises a close tie between morality and genuine social commitment.

3. **Ethical Values of Buddhism:** It is evident that in the Buddhist scheme of moral values Nibbāna is the highest level of moral perfection that a person can attain. It is in relation to this attainment that Buddhism attached moral significance to all other human concerns. The attainment of Nibbāna is supposed to be the immediate or remote goal of every Buddhist layman and monk. The life described as the holy or the higher life *(brahmacariya)* was to be lived under the direction of the Buddha to attain this goal. (*M.* I, p. 148). Early Buddhism did not attempt to characterize Nibbāna metaphysically. It laid great emphasis on the experiential characteristics of the attainment describing it in ethical and psychological terms. Nibbāna was conceived as a positively blissful condition attainable in this life itself. However, later forms of Buddhism seem to have been influenced by the absolutistic and transcendentalist views stemming from the metaphysical schools of Indian philosophy, resulting in an undue emphasis on the metaphysical aspects of Nibbāna, and undermining its ethical significance.

In the evaluation of persons, one who has attained the goal of Nibbāna is judged to be the most praiseworthy person. Such a person is to be commended as one who is fully endowed with *kusala.* The Buddha says:

5. *The Book of the Kindred Sayings,* Part I, p. 79.

A kṣatriya is (said to be) the highest by those who trace back their ancestry. But among gods and men, he (the arahant) who is endowed with knowledge and conduct is the highest. (*D.* I, p. 99).

In another instance the Buddha says:

Out of these four castes, whoever is a monk, who is an arahant, who has eradicated the cankers, is fully trained and accomplished, who has laid down the burden, is freed through right knowledge, he amongst them is reckoned as the highest in terms of righteousness and not in terms of unrighteousness (*D.* III, p. 83).

The *Dhammapada* refers to the arahant as the highest being because he has attained the highest goal of Nibbāna. (*Dhp. v.* 97). It is said that as far as the abodes of living beings extend, as far as the end of the realm of becoming, the arahants are the highest, the supreme beings in the universe. (*S.* III. p. 83). The Buddha is considered as the highest being ever to be born among living beings. This value is attached to him due to his being the founder of the supreme goal of Nibbāna and the most competent person to guide others towards that goal.[6]

Buddhism values the truths, understanding and realization of which ensure the attainment of Nibbāna, as the 'noble truths' *(ariyasaccāni).* The path to the attainment of it is called the noble path *(ariyamagga).* Each item of the Noble Eightfold Path is prefixed with ***sammā*** meaning 'right'.

According to the Buddha, all that is morally evil is reducible to the three character traits, greed *(lobha),* malice *(dosa)* and delusion *(moha).* When the Buddha is asked to declare in brief what *akusala* is, he mentions these three psychological states. (*M.* I, p. 489). These three are considered as primary dispositions which result in diverse kinds of moral evil. The numerous patterns of bodily, verbal and mental behaviour characterized in Buddhism as ***akusala*** are said to be the natural expression of these dispositions.

There are several variant forms of presenting these basic unwholesome dispositions sometimes elaborated into more numerous categories of psychological disposition. The canonical scriptures sometimes mention five hindarances to the attainment of Nibbāna as a heap of ***akusala***. They are (1) the intense urge for sensuous gratification *(kāmacchanda),* (2) maliciousness *(vyāpāda),* (3) sloth and torpour *(thinamiddha).* (4) flurry and worry *(uddhaccakukkucca)* and (5) doubt *(vicikicchā).* The last three have a specific reference to the Buddhist path of action leading to the supreme attainment. If one is overcome by laziness, instability of mind and recurrent doubt about the efficacy of the path to lead one to Nibbāna they become hindrances, and therefore ***akusala,*** from the Buddhist standpoint. On the other hand the four bases of mindfulness *(cattāro satipatthāna)* are considered as a heap of *kusala.* (*S.* V., p. 145). The unwholesome dispositions are sometimes enumerated as varieties of *āsava* (influxes or cankers) and *anusaya* (dormant evil tendencies of the mind). The *Dhammadāyāda Sutta* and the *Sallekha Sutta* of the *Majjhima nikāya* enumerate long lists of evil dispositions, the latter mentioning also the virtues which are the exact opposite of each evil disposition. (*M.* I, p. 15f; p. 40f). These scriptural references contain material which is of great importance from the point of view of moral psychology.

According to Buddhism, evil disposition are manifested through the activity of the body, word and the mind. The evils manifested in bodily behaviour are (1) killing, associated with various forms of violent behaviour involving bodily injury to other living beings, (2) stealing, involving the violation of the property rights of another to satisfy one's own greed and selfish instincts and (3) unchastity, involving the wrong indulgence in sensuous pleasures specially relating to one's sexual life. The evils manifested in verbal behaviour are (1) flase speech, (2) harsh or unpleasant speech expression of anger and ill will, (3) slanderous speech intended at the creation of dissension and conflict between people, and (4) gossip or frivolous talk which serves no meaningful or useful purpose. The evil manifested in mental activity are (1) thoughts of intense greed, (2) thoughts of ill will and (3) wrong or mistaken beliefs harmful to one's moral life. These constitute the standard list of ten ***akusala*** enumerated in the Buddhist canonical scriptures. The moral precepts and practices that Buddhism prescribes are meant to get rid of the above negative forms of behaviour and replace them with compassionate action. Moral living consists, according to Buddhism, primarily in the abstention from the above ***akusala***.

What Budhism has formulated as the Noble Eightfold Path and alternatively as the threefold scheme of training consists of the practical method by which the behavioural expressions as well as the deep-rooted dispositions of those moral evils are to be eradicated. The Buddha described the Noble Eightfold Path as his practical Middle Way avoiding the two extreme ways of life known to him. One extreme was the immoderate indulgence in sensuous pleasures practiced by the common folk who did not see the possibility of any happiness beyond the limits of sensuous existence *(kāmasukhallikānuyoga)* and the other was the path of self mortification practiced

6. ***Bhagavā hi bahuno janassa ariye naye patitthāpetāyadidam kalyānadhammatāya kusaladhammatāya*** (*S.* V. p. 66).

by ascetics who willfully inflicted intense pain on their bodies in order to redeem their souls *(attakilamathānuyoga)*.

3.1 **The Eightfold Path** : The Noble Eightfold Path of the Buddha can be viewed as the quintessence of the Buddhist ethical doctrine. The first item of this path, right view *(sammādiṭṭhi)* draws attention to the ideological basis necessary for a satisfactory outlook on life. Although Buddhism does not encourage a dogmatic ideological stance *(diṭṭhi)* and such a stance is often morally condemned, a right view is believed to be pragmatically necessary for moral progress. Buddhism seems to hold that ideology is the basis for most significant aspects of human behaviour. The right type of ideology is at the base of all right forms of human behaviour. Buddhism viewed the primary importance of a wholesome ideology as a basis for the transformation of the character of not only the individual but also of man-made social organisations and institutions. An ideological approach to life which involves a total denial of moral responsibility and free will, and of the efficacy of willful human effort and initiative in morally transforming oneself is condemned in Buddhism. Forms of strict determinism and fatalism *(niyativāda)* on the one hand and forms of strict indeterminism *(ahetuappaccayavāda* or *adhiccasamuppannavāda)* on the other, were seen by the Buddha as damaging to the ethical life of man. He rejected the belief in theistic predestination, the view that all human experience is determined by the will of a supreme God *(issaranimmānahetu)*, and the belief in karmic determinism according to which all human experience is determined by past karma *(pubbekatahetu)*. The strict determinism of Makkhaligosāla, a well known contemporary of the Buddha, was considered by him to be very damaging to the moral aspirations of mankind in that it persuaded people to subscribe to an attitude of absolute inaction *(akiriya)*. A materialistic or nihilistic world view, rejecting the efficacy of the moral and spiritual life in improving the lot of mankind and denying the good or evil consequences of volitionally performed action and the reality of personal survival after death, is considered in Buddhism as a false view.

In the sphere of ideology, especially in that which affects the moral life of man, the Buddha thought that there were two extremes in existence. (1) The doctrine of eternalism *(sassatavāda)* asserted that there is an enduring entity which is the supreme essence of everything. The Buddha rejected this view at both the microcosmic as well as the macrocosmic levels. The Buddha rejected the notion of a permanent self *(atta)*, as the under lying object of all experience. He explained the nature of personality in terms of the doctrine of relations *(paticcasamuppāda)*. According to this doctrine, there can be no independent essence in anything including our own selves. Everything is conditioned by, and is related to other things. The religious doctrine of self-mortification appears to have been supported by the belief that the self is immortal and that it could speedily be redeemed from its entanglement with the body if the body is tormented. The Buddha considered the belief that there is an enduring substance in one's personality *(sakkāyadiṭṭhi)* as a root cause of evil that has to be eliminated. Buddhism traces egoism, selfishness and limited sympathies of men to the notion of *attā* which erects a barrier between the self and the other.

According to the doctrine of annihilationism *(ucchedavāda)* associated with materialism, all continuity and personal identity after death is denied. This doctrine is believed in Buddhism to lead to a lack of a sense of moral responsibility during a person's present existence. The common outcome of such a belief is an extremely materialistic and sensualist approach to life. The Buddha considered the belief in personal survival after death and the law of *kamma* as conducive to progress in the moral life, for human beings can be motivated to lead a moral life only if they can be urged to act on considerations of enlightened self-interest, especially in the initial stages of their moral progress. The doctrine of annihilationism *(ucchedavāda)* does not encourage a person who thinks in purely prudential terms to lead a morally balmeless life.

Sammāsaṅkappa (right thought), the second factor in the Eightfold Path, consists of thoughts free from lustful attachment or greed or thoughts associated with renunciation *(nekkhamma-saṅkappa)*, thoughts free from malevolence or hatred *(avyāpādasaṅkappa)* and thoughts free from violent intention *(avihiṃsāsaṅkappa)*. According to Buddhism, such thoughts form the psychological basis of benevolent moral action. Actions which are socially harmful spring from cherishing the opposite kind of thoughts.

Right speech *(sammāvācā)* consists first of the avoidance of flase speech *(musāvāda)* and the cultivation of truthfulness and trustworthiness. Secondly, it involves the avoidance of slanderous speech *(pisunāvācā)* intent on causing dissension among people and the cultivation of speech which promotes amity among those who are divided and strengthens the bonds of those who are already united in bonds of friendship. Thirdly, it involves the avoidance of harsh speech *(pharusāvācā)* and the cultivation of speech which is pleasant, lovely and delightful to hear. Fourthly, it consists of abstention from frivolous or vain talk *(samphappalāpa)* and the cultivation of meaningful, purposeful, useful and timely speech.

The fourth item in the Eightfold Path, right action *(sammākammanta)* involves abstention from wrongful

bodily action and the cultivation of right modes of bodily behaviour. It recomends first of all abstention from injury to life, abstention from violence and acts of terrorism, the laying aside of all weapons used to cause injury to living beings and the positive cultivation of a mind full of love and compassion leading to compassionate action. Secondly, it recommends abstention from theft and fraudulent behaviour and the cultivation of honesty. Thirdly, it involves abstention from unchastity and wrongful gratification of sensuous desires, especially with respect to sexual behaviour.

The fifth item of the path, right livelihood *(sammā-ājiva)* emphasizes the necessity to adopt a morally acceptable means of livelihood avoiding those occupations which might be materially rewarding but morally reprehensible. Engaging in any occupation which may result in harmful social consequences is considered in Buddhism as wrong means of livelihood *(micchā ājiva)*. The lay followers of the Buddha are expected to avoid trading in weapons, animals, flesh, intoxicants and poisons (*A*. III, p.208). In the case of the Buddhist monk, conditions for right livelihood are much more stringent than those for the layman. Right livelihood for the monk is determined by the consideration that his life should be in conformity to a life of detachment and renunciation.[7]

The sixth item of the path, right effort *(sammāvāyāma)* recommends constant vigilance over one's character, and determination and effort to prevent the growth of evil dispositions, to cultivate wholesome dispositions, and to stabilize the wholesome dispositions of character already acquired. The moral agent constantly confronts inner conflict in choosing between what he considers to be the right thing to do and what passions, emotions, and inclinations prompt him to do. Right effort is considered in Buddhism to be a vital factor necessary for the triumph of the moral will over the baser emotions.

The seventh factor in the path, right mindfulness *(sammāsati)* is the attention that keeps watch over the mind and prevents evil thoughts entering it. It guides all aspects of mental, verbal and bodily behaviour giving them the right moral direction. It may be described as the alertness necessary to observe and check evil tendencies. Since Buddhism, especially in its early form did not accept a saviour who could save man from sin, and stressed the importance of human effort and will, mindfulness is a quality which has to be systematically cultivated. Special metods of mental culture *(bhāvanā)* are recommended to achieve this end. A special training is believed to be necessary to mindful. For the nature of the mind is to be swayed by the passions leading a person to act without being mindful of what one is doing.

The eighth factor of the path, right concentration *(sammāsamādhi)* stands for the clear, composed and unconfounded mental condition which conduces to the dawning of wisdom resulting in the final elimination of all evil dispositions and culminating in the perfection of moral character. In this connection too, effective methods of mental training are recommended in Buddhism. Mental composure, cultivated through effort and mindfulness is believed to be effective in purging the mind of unwholesome dispositions.

3.2 The Scheme of Threefold Training : An alternative formulation of the Buddhist scheme of moral development is presented in the form of three progressive and mutually dependent factors of moral training. They are *sīla*, consisting of moral practices involving the conscious and voluntary transformation of one's patterns of bodily and verbal behaviour, *samādhi*, the development of mental composure and *paññā*, the cultivation of the insight that leads to moral perfection. *Sīla* is believed to be the foundation on which the other two stages in the path are to be developed. This formulation of the path reveals not only the pragmatic character of Buddhism, but also the psychological insights on which the practical aspects of the Buddhist moral system are based. The Buddha speaks of the path to spiritual perfection, or the attainment of Nibbāna as a graduated one leading systematically from one step to the other. The perfection of *sīla* is recognised as the foundation or the basis of all spiritual endeavour. An intelligent man is supposed to establish himself in *sīla* and develop his mind *(cittta)* and cultivate wisdom *(paññā)*. It is such a person who is said to be able to disentagle the tangles of evil.(*A. V.* p. 66).

If the entire Buddhist spiritual training is understood as an attempt to transform the moral nature of man, *sīla* can be considered as the beginning of this conscious and deliberate process of self transformation. Besides the foremost place of *sīla* in the threefold scheme of training, it occupies a prominent place among other list of spiritual qualities recommended in Buddhism. It is the first of seven stages of purification *(satta visuddhi)* and the second of the ten perfections of a person aspiring to become a Buddha *(bodhisatta-pārami)*. The cultivation of *sīla* consists of an attempt to change our patterns of behaviour in such a way that it will ultimately lead to a radical transformation of our dispositional traits. The Pali scriptures enumerates *sīla* in great detail in relation to the spiritual stations and aims of a person. The Buddhist community is traditionally divided into two broad classes as (1) the *bhikkhu* community and (2) the lay community *(gihi)* depending on the seriousness with

7. See *Brahmajāla Sutta* of the *Dīgha nikāya* for a detailed description of what constitutes right livelihood for the *bhikkhu*. *D*. I, p ff.

which the goal of emancipation is sought. Buddhism started as a movement of liberaton seekers. It was a spiritual movement of those who were already disenchanted with the ordinary pleasures of the world and were seeking for something believed to be higher. A life of renunciation of the ordinary sensuous pleasures was considered to be a primary requirement if one's immediate goal was to attain moral perfection.

Pabbajjā (going forth from the life of the household) was considered in the early Buddhist tradition to be both a symbolic and an actual break away from the life of sense pleasures. One was expected to shave off the hair and beard, don yellow robes and leave all household ties and possissions and enter into the life a *bhikkhu*. The Buddha considered household life as a hindrance, as an encumberance to the practice of the higher life in its complete purity. The Buddhist scriptures often mention the conviction expressed by listeners to the Buddha's message that it is difficult to lead the higher life prescribed in Buddhism in its complete purity while living in the household. If immediate progress is intended one is expected to join the *bhikkusangha*. However, Buddhism never held that the fruits of the Buddhist path cannot be reaped by people who lived a household life.

The most exhaustive list of *sīla* is presented for the moral guidance of the monk. Perfection in these *sīla* is said to be one basic reason why the Buddha is praiseworthy. (*D.I*, p. 9ff). The foremost *sīla* are those meant to restrain a person from performing those deeds which Buddhism includes under the ten *akusala* mentioned earlier. The more elaborate *sīla* mentioned in relation to the life of the *bhikkhu* characterises the life of renunciation which a Buddhist monk is expected to live. The monk's life is also expected to be governed by a set of institutional rules called *sikkhāpada*, enumerated in the Buddhist canonical literature known as *Vinaya*, the books of discipline. These rules came to be recited by the Buddhist community of monks at fortnightly meetings of the *uposatha* to ensure the moral purity of their conduct and remedial action was taken if any member of the community was found to be guilty of any transgression. The moral quality of the *bhikkhu* who observed these rules was expressed in terms of the description *pātimokkha saṃvara saṃvuto* (one restrained according to the rules of *pātimokkha)*. In the commentarial tradition of the Theravāda this aspect of a *bhikkhu's* morality was called *pātimokkha-saṃvarasīla*. The function of the *pātimokkha* rules of the *Vinaya* was to restrain the bodily and verbal behaviour of the *bhikkhu* with a certain degree of legal coercion exercised by the collective authority of the *bhikkhu* community. The Buddhist lay community does not come within such an institutionalised and coercive type of moral code. In the case of the Buddhist lay person *sīla* usually consists of five abstentions, namely, abstention from killing, stealing, unchastity, false speech and the taking of intoxicating drinks. However the lay person is encouraged to extend the range of *sīla* practice at least when occasion permits by observing additional precepts which apply to the *bhikkhu* community. The ultimate aim of the *bhikkhu* as well as the lay person in the practice of *sīla* is to lay the foundation for moral perfection by cultivating new patterns of bodily and verbal behaviour.

The *sīla, samādhi, paññā* scheme of moral perfection is based on a certain psychological theory about the levels at which immoral traits of the mind function. According to Buddhism immoral behaviour can be explained at a more fundamental level by reference to its deeper psychological roots. Buddhism gives a very important place to paychology in its ethical system. The progressive path of *sīla, samādhi,* and *paññā* is intended to be a systematic way of tackling the problem of moral evil with deep psychological insight. Immorality in overt human behaviour is, according to Buddhism, only a manifestation at the surface level, of man's deep rooted evil dispositions. Buddhism speaks of the existence and activity of moral evil at three different levels. At the most deep-rooted level they are dormant or dispositional traits *(anusaya)*. Even a person who does not exhibit violent behaviour at a particular moment in his life has the tendency to do so when he meets with a certain situation. This is because he has not overcome the disposition to behave in evil ways. The second level at which moral evil functions is the one at which there is a mere excitenment of feeling and emotion. One often feels the turbulence, discomfort and heat of anger and passion without letting such feeling boil over in the form of observable overt behaviour. Buddhism refers to this psychological level as *(pariyuṭṭhāna)*. It is at the third level that evil is manifested in the form of overt action through word and deep leading to the transgression of the moral norms of society *(vītikkama)*. It is at this level that human action has a great deal of social significance. The function of *sīla* is to deal with immorality at the progress level at which it manifests itself. Immorality become more tangible at this level than at the concealed levels of the mind. Hence Buddhism advises a person to make *sīla* the starting point of moral progress. One is not expected to move from one stage of the path to the other only after attaining absolute perfection in each preceding stage. They are to be cultivated concurrently. The cannoncial teaching maintains that the fruitfulness of each succeeding stage depends on the degree of perfection attained in each preceding stage. Mental composure which attains growth through wholesome prac-

tice (*sīla*) and wisdom (*paññā*) which attains growth through mental composure are said to be very fruitful.

Akusala deeds of body and speech proceed from unwholesome tendencies which are deep-rooted in our minds. These deep-rooted tendencies in turn are the consequence of certain repeated patterns of behaviour. Any single action performed has the tendency to be repeated and to be gradually built into a general pattern of behaviour. Particular acts of body and speech feed the unwholesome dispoistions and evil traits that are already deep-rooted in our minds, and strengthening them. Practice of *sīla* is a method by which a person could be vigilant about his overt behaviour through abstention and conscious self-control, and the practice of the opposite type of actions, so that transformation occurs at the grossest and most tangible level of one's personality. The function of *samādhi* is to deal directly with evil at the more subtle level of the human mind. In *samādhi* there is an attempt to bring about one pointedness and composure of the mind to prevent the excitement of the unwholesome emotions. Here, one takes full conscious control of one's mental activity and fixes the mind through voluntary effort on a single object determined at one's will. The four *jhāna* described in Buddhism exemplify the character of *samādhi*. By means of *samādhi* certain unwholesome emotions are eliminated from the mind, at least temporarily, and certain wholesome emotions such as compassion, mindfulness and equanimity are cultivated.

Paññā is believed to deal with moral evil at the very source. *Paññā* is the understanding that eradicates all evil tendencies in such a way that they are not born again. In its most elevated sense it is emancipating knowledge. It is when this knowledge dawns that one can confidently declare, "What ought to be done has been done, and the goal of the higher life has been accomplished." At this stage occurs, what in Buddhist terms is called the eradication of *āsava* (*āsavakkhaya*). The *āsava* persist as long as there is ignorance about the nature of things. The Buddha says that the *āsava* are conditioned by ignorance (*avijjā samudayā āsava samudayo*). The ignorance that has to be overcome in order to put an end to the *āsava* is the mistaken belief that empirical things including one's own personality have permanence (*nicca*), that they are productive of happiness (*sukha*) and that they contain an enduring substance or can be owned by an enduring substance (*atta*). Everything that exists has to be understood as a thing that "has come to be" due to a variety of causes and conditions. Things that have the nature of arising and existing due to interdependence and interrelation of causes have the nature of disintegrating and ceasing to exist when the causes and conditions are removed (*yaṃ kiñci samudayadhammaṃ sabbaṃtaṃ nirodhadhammaṃ*). When this insight becomes firmly established, unwholesome dispositions are cut off at the root. The Buddhist position can be compared with the Socratic view that immorality is due to lack of knowledge. However, the knowledge required in Buddhism is not of abstract forms to be apprehended by the intellect as suggested by Plato, but knowledge of the conditioned nature of all empirical phenomena. The practice of *sīla* is a preparatory stage for the attainment of the final emancipating knowledge. The kind of conduct mentioned under *sīla* does not require any voluntary effort after the final emancipating knowledge has been attained. Buddhism speaks of the person who is in the process of fulfilling the requirements of the path as a trainee (*sekha*) and one who has fulfilled all the requirements, a person who needs no further moral training as an *asekha*.

3.3 Positive Virtues : The entire process of training that a seeker of the Buddhist goal is required to fulfill can be seen as an attempt to eliminate unwholesome dispositions (*akusala dhamma*) and to cultivate wholesome dispositions (*kusala dhamma*). The Buddhist path emphasises not only abstention from certain activities that are prompted by evil dispositions but also the cultivation of positive acts which strengthen the wholesome dispositions. Among the positive virtues recognised in Buddhism love or compassion can be considered to be the foremost. The concept of *brahmavihāra* (q.v.) which is a cardinal concept of Buddhist ethics, consists of three positive virtues which, can be comprehended under the concept of love. They are *mettā* (q.v. friendliness), *karuṇā* (q.v. sympathy) and *muditā* (q.v. sympathetic joy). These virtues oppose the evil traits of mind such as hatred, malice, envy, jealousy, vengeance etc. Buddhism considered non-injury to all sentient beings as a cardinal virtue. *Mettā, karuṇā and muditā* should be strengthened as primary dispositions through constant cultivation. *Brahmavihāra* are recommended as an effective basis for meditative cultivation of wholesome mental dispositions. According to the Buddha, superior beings like those living in the *brahmā* spheres of existence, have these qualities, and it is as a consequence of cultivating them that beings can attain birth in those spheres of existence. (*D.* I, p. 235ff).

The positive virtue of *mettā* is incorporated into the first *sīla* under abstention from killing and the cultivation of a compassionate mind towards all living beings. The first *sīla* is intended to restrain a person from indulging in action which proceeds from the absence of compassion and insensitivity to the pain of another sentient being. The observance of this *sīla* requires not only self restraint but also the conscious cultivation of a compassionate heart. Killing and various forms of vio-

lence proceed from the fact that the virtue of compassion has not attained maturity in a person's mind. Compassion in Buddhism does not operate within restrictions or limits. Love is to be extended to all living beings that feel pain and possess the instinct or desire to survive. Buddhism does not confine compassion only to that shown towards human beings, but extends it to all living beings having consciousness and feeling pain. In cultivating compassion the Buddhist is expected to extend his thoughts of love with a mind free from enmity, in all directions encompassing within him thoughts of friendliness, sympathy and sympathetic joy, to all beings great and small. No limit should be recognised regarding the extent to which this boundless compassion should pervade. According to the *Metta Sutta* one is required to universalize the kind of love a mother has towards her one and only child. The *Metta Sutta* says:

> Whatever living beings there be: feeble or strong, tall, stout or medium, short, small or large, without exception, seen or unseen, those dwelling far or near, those who are born or those who are to be born, may all beings be happy!
>
> Let none decieve another, nor despise any person whatsoever in any place. Let one not wish any harm to another out of anger or ill-will.
>
> Just as a mother would protect her only child at the risk of her own life, even so, let one cultivate a boundless heart of compassion towards all beings. Let one's thoughts of boundless compassion pervade the whole world: above, below and across without any obstruction, without any hatred, without any enmity.
>
> Whether one stands, walks, sits or lies down, as long as one is awake, one should develop this mindfulness. This is the noblest living here(*Sn. v.* 146 ff).

Buddhist *mettā* stands for an attitude of friendliness, a loving kindness which is boundless and all-encompassing, not limited by the common bonds of attachment familiar in narrowly defined human relationships such as those of family, race religon etc. Hatred is, according to Buddhism, an unwholesome trait that creates suffering to the person who possesses it as well as to members of the society which he or she inhabits and with whom he or she interacts. Genuine acts of social welfare and benevolence can proceed from an individual only if that person has cultivated the virtue of *mettā*. According to the Buddha one who sustains a loving mind even for the duration of a moment does something which is of great consequence (*A.* I. p. 113).

Buddhism does not advocate the conquest of hatred through hatred. Instead the Buddha, both in theory and practice, emphasised the need to conquer hatred through love. According to the *Dhammapada:*

> Hatred can never be appeased in this world through hatred. But it is appeased by means of non-hatred. This is an eternal law.(*Dhp. v.* 5).

In the same work, the Buddha recommends that a more worthy as well as an efficacious way of winning over persons who are envious, greedy and untruthful is treating them with love, generosity and truthfulness.-(ibid. *v.*223). Love is considered as an extremely important social virtue. The Buddha's advice to his disciples was to live merged together in their minds through mutual love like water and milk mixing together. (*M.*I, p.207) Love is not to be restricted merely to the-thoughts. It is to be cultivated at the level of thought so that it will find expression at the level of behaviour. According to Buddhism, a person's overt behaviour is always the most objective test for his inner nature.-Those who practice love in a living community can live so harmoniously that they could feel that even though they are different in bodies, they are one in mind. Each one in such a community takes care of the other person as if he is his own person.

The Buddha's advice to his disciples was to adhere to his instruction regarding love even in the most extreme circumstances in which one may be tempted to react with hatred. Once, in instructing his disciples the Buddha insists that their training in the practice of compassion should be such that they would not have acted in accordance with his instructions if they were to express the slightest irritation or anger even if wily robbers were to get hold of them and cut them limb by limb with a double handled saw (*M* I, p.129). This moral had been sincerely adhered to by the early disciples of Buddha, and it had proved very fruitful in their mission of establishing men from various cultures in the path of righteousness.[8] Another Buddhist virtue that has a close relationship to *mettā* is *khanti* (forbearance q.v.). It is given as the sixth perfection of the Bodhisatta. Forbearance is called the greatest form of religious austerity *(khanti paramaṃ tapo).*

Karuṇā is defined as sympathy that arises in a good person when that person becomes aware of the suffering of others. As the Theravāda commentator defines *karuṇā;* "when there is suffering in others it causes good people's hearts to be moved." "It has the characteristic of devotion to removing the suffering of others" (*Vism. (PTS)* I, p 318).

8. See the story of Punna who is reported to have transformed the violent people Sunāparanta through *mettā*. (*M.* III, p. 267 f).

Muditā is to be cultivated as an antidote to jealousy. It is understood as sympathetic joy. This means the ability to feel happy and joyful at the success of another.

It is clear that the first three *brahmavihāra* are related to the notion of love. But a question might arise regarding *upekkhā*, the fourth one. *Upekkhā* is also one of the perfections of a Bodhisatta. It is recognised as the most noteworthy psychological factor in the rapturous state of the fourth *jhāna*. The role of *upekkhā* in Buddhism has sometimes been misconceived. A common translation of *upekkhā* has been "indiference". But indifference denotes some attitude which we would normally consider to be unethical. Those who understand the fourth item of the *brahmavihārā* as indifference try to interpret Buddhism as an ethical system which ultimately transcends wholesome dispositions like love. It is true that Buddhism is a path of spirituality which emphasizes detachment. This detachment, however, does not imply an indifference towards the social environment. Buddhism is merely warning us that love should not degrade itself into partiality, personal attachment and suffering. Love must be universal, and in such love partiality cannot enter. *Upekkhā* stands not for indifference but for impartiality. It also implies from the angle of the individual who cultivates these virtues, a balance of mind. Love of the more mundane and circumscribed variety involves suffering. That kind of love can easily turn into hatred. *Upekkhā* is equanimity, a mental state in which one is unruffled by gain or loss, fame or infame, praise or blame etc. *upekkhā* does not amount to a liquidation or denial of love in the wholesome sense in which love is admitted in-Buddhism. *Upekkhā* helps a person to love but yet be detached. Buddhism strongly recommends the cultivation of all these four *brahmavihāra* to become god-like in one's character.

The next set of socially significant moral virtues to be cultivated by a Buddhist are called *sangahavatthu* (q.v. bases of benevolence). The *sanghhavatthu* may be conceived as the behavioural expression of the *branmavihāra*. The *brahmavihāra* stress the conscious cultivation of love and equanimity or impartiality at the mental level. The *sangahavatthu* recommend their cultivation at the behavioural level. Buddhism believes that there is a mutual process of feed-back and interaction between the purely inner mental or thought plane and the overt, behavioural or action plane, and most of the moral practices recommended in Buddhism are based on this belief.

The first *sangahavatthu* is *dāna* (q.v. charity). It occurs as the first perfection of the *Bodhisatta*. The literal meaning of the term is "giving". The sacrifice of a-personal possession for the benefit of others, whatever the possession may be, material wealth, knowledge, expertise or labour is considered in Buddhism as *dāna*. The dissemination of the *dhamma* is considered as the greatest *dāna (sabbadānaṃ dhammadānaṃ jināti: Dhp. v.* 354) for it is a gift that was considered to be most beneficial to the recipient. *Dāna* has acquired a special ritualistic significance in Buddhist communities and sometimes is narrowly conceived as the gift made by laymen to the community of monks. Traditionally, such gifts are considered as productive of great merit. The higher the spiritual attainment of the individual the greater is the *puñña* acquired by a person who donates any material requisite to a spiritually elevated person. However, the ethically more significant concept of *dāna* in Buddhism stands for a virtue which has a much wider connotation. *Dāna* is considered as the best antidote for the unwholesome character traits such as greed, miserliness, selfishness, malice and lack of concern for the welfare and well being of others. It is one mode of the practical expression of *mettā*.

The four modes of evil speech mentioned under the abstentions required under *sīla*, namely, false speech, harsh speech, slanderous speech and frivolous speech can all be seen as opposed to *piyavacana*. *Piyavacana* stands for the cultivation of good speech. One ought to speak pleasant words conducive to the promotion of harmonious social relationships. It also makes the individual who practices this virtue a loveable and socially acceptable person.

Atthacariyā stands for conduct that conduces to the well being of others. It means service for the welfare of others. *Samānattatā*, the fourth *sangahavatthu* stands for equal respect for all or non-discriminatory behaviour. Moral action is to be guided by the sentiment that other persons are the same as my own person. *Samāna* means equal or 'same' and *attatā* means 'personhood'. In moral contexts the Buddha often appeals to the fact that other beings are persons like ourselves having similar feelings, instincts and interests in persuading us to avoid actions which might be harmful to others. Other beings like to live just as we do. Other beings do not like if they are harmed just as much as we do not like to be harmed. So we must avoid harm to others. *Samānattatā* involves a sense of equality when dealing with other human beings. It is a virtue which calls upon us to respect the rights of other living beings. According to the Buddha, these four bases of benevolent action are like the lynch pin of the chariot of society. Without these society cannot progress or even sustain itself.

There are a number of other supporting virtues which are believed to be useful in the maintenance of those already mentioned and these are considered to be no less important in the moral life of a person than the former. Effort *(viriya)*, heedfulness *(appamāda)*, initiative *(parakkama)*, firmness *(thāma)* and will or determination *(adhitthāna)* in one's adherence to moral principles, are

considered as extremely important virtues. Whatever is conducive to the elimination of egotistic inclinations and greedy disposition is considered to be a virtue. Hence gratitude *kataññutā)* is rated as a very important virtue. Frugality *(appicchatā)*, contentment *(santutthi)* and meekness *(sorata, nivāta, sovacassatā)* are also esteemed virtues. Learning or listening to moral teachings *(dhammasavana, bāhusacca)*, association with persons having moral knowledge and insight *(panditānam sevanā)* and discussion of the good *dhamma* with knowledgeable persons *(dhammasākacchā)* are highly recommended. Faith and confidence in a spiritual teacher in whom one can have a reasoned confidence *(ākaravati saddhā)* is considered as important. *Saddhā* (confidence) in the Buddha, the *dhamma* and the *sangha* (the spiritual community established by the Buddha) is considered as a mark of a virtuous person.

4. Rational Foundations of Buddhist Ethics : Buddhism not only recommends certain courses of moral action and behaviour, but also seeks to support these moral judgements and prescriptions with some consistent process of reasoning. In the early canonical scriptures of Buddhism there are several noteworthy instances which exemplify the principal modes of Buddhist reasoning on moral questions. The most important of these instances is the dialogue referred to in the *Kālāma Sutta*, (*A.* I, p. 189). When the Buddha visited the community of people known as Kesaputtiyā Kālāmā, they complained that they receive widely divergent moral advice from different sages who visit them. They pointed out that they were at a loss to determine how they should behave because the moral advice they had received from various teachers was mutually contradictory. "How", they asked the Buddha, "are we to determine what is really good and really bad when various teachers assert diverse opinions on these matters?" The Buddha answered that their doubts were justified under such circumstances and went on to give an autonomous criterion of morality which he thought would help them to leave aside authoritarian moral codes and determine, in accordance with their own reason, what is really right or wrong. In this instance the Buddha rejects as many as ten grounds on which moral decisions were generally made. This dialogue has a significance from the point of view of moral epistomology. The ten grounds rejected were: *(1) anussava, (2) paramparā, (3) pitakasampadā, (4) itikira,* and *(5) samano no garu,* which stand for revelation and authority of some kind; *(6) takkahetu, (7) nayahetu, (8) ākāraparivitakka* and *(9) bhabbarūpatā*, all of which suggest some form of argumentative or speculative reasoning and *(10) ditthinijjhānakkhanti*, suggesting a personal prejudice of some kind.

The Buddha told the Kālāmas that there is a way in which they could know by themselves what is right and wrong.

> Now what do you think, Kālāmas, when greed arises within a man, does it arise to his benefit or harm?
>
> To his harm, Sir.
>
> Now Kālāmas, when a man is greedy, is overcome by greed, when his mind is completely swayed by greed, does he not kill a living creature, take what is not given, commit adultery, tell lies, and induce others too to commit deeds that would conduce to disadvantage and unhappiness for a long time?
>
> He does, Sir.

The Buddha made the same remarks with reference to malice and delusion. The Kālāmas finally admit that greed, hatred and ignorance are the traits that are *akusala* (morally bad) and that ought to be avoided *(sāvajja)*. They also admit that they are the traits that are censured by the wise and that to act from those traits of character involve ill and suffering.

The *Kālāma Sutta* is philosophically signigicant in that it draws attention to the possibility of independent inquiry into moral questions. Moral philosophy begins when people question their existing moral rules. The Buddha is instructing the Kālāmas not to depend on moral authorities, but to make their own autonomous judgement on moral questions. However, in using their judgement in coming to autonomous moral decisions, the Buddha assumes that there are grounds that rational beings in general need to consider. They are required to pay attention to the happiness or unhappiness produced by the course of conduct that they decide to follow.

Another instance which clarifies the Buddhist method of moral reasoning is found in the *Bāhitika Sutta* of the *Majjhima nikāya*. *(M.* II, p. 114). Here, Ānanda, a renowned disciple of the Buddha is interviewed by a king named Pasenadi Kosala. The question raised by the King concerns the rational criterion necessary for making a distinction between praiseworthy and blameworthy behaviour. Ānanda is asked, what bodily, verbal and mental conduct is censured by spiritually elevated persons *(samana brāhmana)* and wise men *(viññū)*. Initially Ānanda answers that they censure behaviour which is *akusala*. The king wishes to push his question further, for, to say that some type of behaviour is *akusala* is to censure it, and it does not answer to his satisfaction why it is censurable. The king asks Ānanda, what type of conduct is *akusala*. Ānanda answers that it is the type of conduct that ought to be avoided. This answer, too, does not satisfy the king, for the answer is still within the

sphere of the 'ought'. On being questioned further, Ānanda finally defines *akusala* behaviour as that which involves injury or harm *(savyāpajjha)*. It is further explained as behaviour which has harmful consequences to the agent as well as others who could be affected by the agent's action. The suggestion made is that in determining right and wrong one has to look into the actual or possible consequences of the action in relation to the agent and those affected by the deed.

The same criterion is presented in the *Ambalatthikārāhulovāda Sutta* of the *Majjhima nikaya*. (*M.* I, 415). According to this discourse of the Buddha, whenever one wishes to do an action by body, speech or thought, one would consider the action in terms of consequences. Before an action is done one can consider the type of action that one is going to do and its tendency to lead to certain consequences. In this case one has to depend on past experience, experience of his own and of the large majority of mankind. In a world governed by causal regularities human action also enters into the causal nexus. Leaving aside the question of human choice, whether it is free or determined, it is possible to observe that a certain type of action has the regular tendency to produce a certain consequence. So before deciding to act in a certain situation, the Buddha advises his disciples to reflect on the likely consequence of the action. Checking on the consequence is recommended as a necessary requirement for the moral agent before, while and after performing an action. If any action found to lead to harmful consequences to oneself, to others and to both, that is, harmful consequences in gerneral it is to be determined to be an *akusala* action. If it is found to have the opposite consequence of promoting one's own happiness and welfare and the happiness and welfare of others it is to be determined to be *kusala* action. From the above instances it becomes evident that Buddhism consistently held that moral commendation needed justification in terms of the consequence of whatever is commended. Buddhist ethics can therefore be said to be advocating a consequentialist approach in moral reasoning.

The Buddhist consequentialist approach draws attention to the immediate as well as the long term consequences of action in determining what actions ought to be and ought not to be done. There is also a strong prudential basis for the Buddhist evaluation of action, especially when action is evaluated in terms of their kammic consequence. The Buddha refers to several ways in which the consequence of action could be harmful to the agent. (1) In performing a certain type of action one's own self may sometimes censure it *(attāpi attānam upavadati)*. This involves the admission of some form of moral conscience. (2) If one does something that meets with the common disapprobation of the persons considered to be the wise ones in the society in which one lives *(anuvicca viññū garahanti)* one may suffer loss of favour within one's own community. (3) There could also be laws in community which prohibit the performance of certain deeds considered to be morally reprehensible with penalities attached to the violation of those laws. But the harmfulness of the consequences proceeding from these sources does not appear to hold universally. Feelings of guilt may not be regular accompaniments of certain specific types of behaviour. Whether one feels guilty or one balmes oneself for doing something bad depends largely on one's own conditioning regarding moral attitudes. So are social and legal sanctions. It is not universally the case that all societies and all legal systems condemn or prescribe penalities for the same type of behaviour. We can easily imagine societies in which certain acts which the Buddha considered *akusuala* are not socially disapproved, and consequently, no social sanctions in the form of legal penalities or social censure of the fellow members of the community would follow. However, the further consequence which the Buddha draws attention to is considered as involving an observed causal regularity in nature not dependent upon human conventions. This concerns the phenomenon of *kamma*. There is, according to Buddhism, a causal regularity between actions and their consequence which goes even beyond one lifetime of the individual. This is a claim which distinguishes Buddhism from the moral attitude usually associated with scientific humanism. Like the recognition in theistic religions of a world order created and governed by a supreme God, Buddhism has the recognition of an order of sentient existence governed by the law of *kamma*. This is a Buddhist affirmation about the nature of reality. We have seen that Buddhism gives foremost importance to consequences of behaviour in making moral distinctions. Belief in the process of rebecoming *(punabbhava)* is considered in Buddhism to be important to motivate people to behave morally. This is because self-interest determines to a great extent the way human beings behave. Denial of some form of survival after death, which is assoicated with the doctrine of annihilationism, is considered in Buddhism to lead to an irresponsible attitude in a person's moral life.

In determining the worth of human action in terms of consequences, Buddhism pays attention to two principal considerations. It raises the questions: (1) Is the contemplated action directly or remotely connected with Nibbāna? (2) Does it improve one's position in *samsāric* existence? It is in connection with the second consideration that the doctrine of *kamma* becomes relevant to Buddhist ethics.

Buddhism claims that *kamma* is a "verifiable" law. K. N. Jayatilleke believes that it is a doctrine derived as an inductive inference on the basis of the data of extra-

sensory perception.[9] It is said in the Pali canonical texts that the decease and survival of beings *(sattānam cutūpapāto)* is to be verified by a kind of supercognitive faculty *(abhiññā)* called *dibbacakkhu* (q.v. clarivoyance). A person possessing the faculty of clairvoyance is said to be capable of seeing the occurrence of rebirth of beings in accordance with their good or evil conduct. It is this correlation between good character and a happy consequence and bad character and an unhappy consequence that came to be held as the *kammic* correlation in Buddhism. This correlation is admitted as a regularity of nature, and to be unlike the three former types of sanctions depending on individual whim or social convention.

One principal sense in which *kamma* is understood in Buddhism is as volitional action producing a particular disposition in the mind of the individual agent. The physical force generated by volitional action is judged to have the quality of being either *puññā/kusala* or *pāpa/akusala* depending on whether it has a felicific consequence or a painful consequence respectively. In some canonical sources the notion of *kamma* is presented as a psychological law of conditioning which determines a person's desitny. In the *Kukkuravatika Sutta*, for instance, the Buddha explains the workings of *kamma* in a way somewhat different from the way it is understood in the popular eschatological teachings. According to the popular conception of *kamma*, it is believed to be a mysterious kind of law, according to which someone who performs a good or bad action reaps a reward or punishment closely resembling the action performed. This somewhat mechanical connection between action and result is ignored in the *Kukkuravatika Sutta*. Instead the Buddha speaks of *kamma* as the process of generating certain types of psychological dispositions, through one's bodily, verbal and mental conduct. If the dispositions so generated are of a harmful and injurious type, one is likely to choose an environment where harmful and injurious activity is predominant. In choosing such an environment on becomes subject to painful experiences which involve injurious activity(*M.* I, p. 389f).

Kamma is believed to be one of the significant causes that determines a person's material as well as spiritual well-being when considered from the point of view of the long range consequnces of action. According to the doctrines of *kamma* and *saṃsāra* an individual's future becoming is dependent on his character. If one indulges in certain patterns of conduct which may be thought to be to his advantage from a short term point of view, they will have an inevitable effect on his character which would, on the one hand, make him remote from the goal of Nibbāna and, on the other hand, bring about undersirable consequences in his *saṃsāric* existence. Any pattern of conduct having the tendency to harm others, is said to degrade the agent spiritually and estrange him from Nibbāna. It also brings about suffering in his future existence as a consequence of the character traits that he himself has cultivated. Positive action intended at bringing about the happiness or the alleviation of the suffering of others, such as charity *(dāna)*, generosity *(cāga)* as well as preventing the unhappiness of others by abstaining from injury, is said to draw the agent closer to the spiritual perfection culminating in Nibbāna. It also assures the agent a pleasant birth in *saṃsāra* free from a predominance of painful experience.

The doctrine of *kamma* and Nibbāna are essential elements of the Buddhist theory of the nature of reality. The doctrines of *kamma*, Nibbāna and *saṃsāra* as they were understood in Buddhism, were doctrines rejected by the materialists of the Buddha's day. The *Apaṇṇaka Sutta* of the *Majjhima nikāya* shows that there were other thinkers during his time who did not accept the doctrines of Nibbāan, *kamma* and *saṃsāra*. Since Buddhist morality is theoretically founded on these doctrines which are accepted as factual, there is bound to be a difference in the moral beliefs of anyone who rejects them and yet accepts the principle that whatever conduces to happiness is good. There surely is little empirical evidence to show that the consequences of action described as *akusala* will be bad for the agent in his immediate existence, when the consequences are looked at purely in terms of the material conditions of happiness, no matter what happens to his inner character. The Buddha himself expressly rejects the view that everyone who conducts oneself badly in this life, suffers the consequences of it in this life itself. He points out that the king's soldiers who win bordering lands for him by committing many muders and atrocities receive great material benefits, while others, of course, who commit crimes against the laws of the state are duly punished.(*S.* IV. p.343f). Considered in terms of purely material gains, therefore, the Buddha agrees that at least in some cases those who conduct themselves in an immoral manner do not experience unhappiness in this life itself. He admitted that they do experience happiness *(sukhaṃ somanassaṃ)*. However, the Buddha admitted that a person who is free from greed, hatred and delusion, contented and possessed of detachment, wisdom and compassion is the happiest person even in this immediate life. The immoral man will, in accordance with *kamma* experience unhappiness sooner or later.

9. K. N. Jayatilleke, *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*, (George Allen and Unwin Ltd. London 1963) p. 459 ff.

One principal pattern of moral reasoning represented in the Buddhist doctrine can be formulated as follows:

> Action A conduces to the happiness of the agent as well as those affected by the action. Therefore action A is good, praiseworthy, and actions exactly similar to that ought to be done.

This is not the only pattern of practical moral decision making that is advocated in the Pali canonical scriptures. If Buddhism had based its moral evaluations entirely on the happiness criterion it would have been open to the usual objections raised against utilitarian systems of morality. But Buddhism admits another pattern of moral reasoning which leaves no room for such objections. This pattern of moral reasoning conforms to what is generally known as the Golden Rule in ethics. The Pali Nikāyas present it in the following form:

> I do not want X to be done unto me.
> Other beings too who are like myself in this respect do not want X done unto them.
> I ought not to do unto others what I do not like to be done unto myself.
> Therefore I ought not to do X.

According to the *Dhammapada* there are somethings that one does not like to be done unto oneself, such as to be killed, tortured or subjected to any bodily or mental pain (*Dhp.* vv. 129–131). The seven virtues of abstaining from killing, stealing, adultery, false speech, slanderous speech, harsh speech and vain and frivolous talk are explained on the basis of this Golden Rule pattern of moral reasoning. As the *Samyutta nikāya* puts it:

> Here a noble disciple reflects thus: I like to live. I do not like die. I desire happiness and dislike unhappiness. Suppose someone should kill me, since I like to live and do not like to die it would not be pleasing and delightful to me. Suppose I too should kill another who likes to live and does not like to die, who desires happiness and does not desire unhappiness it would not be pleasing and delightful to that other person as well. What is not pleasant and delightful to me is not pleasant and delightful to the other person either. How could I inflict upon another that which is not pleasant and not delightful to me? Having reflected in this manner, he (the noble disciple) on his own refrains from killing, and encourages others too to refrain from killing, and speaks in praise of refraining from killing. In this manner, his bodily conduct becomes pure in three ways (*S.* V, p.354)

If one raises the question of formal validity with respect of such reasoning it is easy to see that it is not formally valid. To reason in moral matters is, according to Buddhism, not to conform to rules of formal validity. It is to give a good, or commonly acceptable reason for one's judgement.

An examination of the Buddhist ethical system shows that in Buddhism morality is not understood as conformity to the commandments of a supreme moral law giver. The character of an authoritarian moral system is not found in Buddhism. There is a sense in which Buddhism can be said to have admitted moral autonomy in that it leaves room for the moral agent to solve his own moral problems by his own intelligent analysis of a moral situation. However,, this freedom granted in Buddhism does not allow a moral agent to make his moral commitments according to his whims and fancies. There are facts about human nature and criteria which any rational moral agent should be conscious of when he is making his own moral decisions. The morality of an act is not to be determined on the basis of conformity to the commands of a moral authority. One can claim to be a moral authority only if one makes the appropriate moral judgements. The Buddha is to be venerated as a moral authority and his advice is to be taken seriously because of the knowledge he has of right and wrong. He cannot make anything right by a mere act of commanding its rightness. The Buddha's understanding of morality is claimed to be linked to his understanding of human nature and the human predicament. This is an understanding which is shared by all enlightened beings who are entitled to an equal claim to the knowledge and insight into moral truths.

5. Morality and happiness: The concept of happiness plays a central role in the Buddhist ethical system. For conduciveness to happiness is a principal criterion used in Buddhism to determine what is right or wrong. There are many philosophers who raise objections against basing morality on happiness on the ground that happiness is an extremely indeterminate concept. It is argued that statements about what constitutes happiness themselves turn out to be evaluative statements and that therefore the use of happiness as a criterion turns out to be a circular procedure. It is widely held that judjements regarding what constitutes happiness are themselves subjective, relativistic, attitudinal, emotive or prescriptive as much as moral judgements are. Buddhism appears to have taken a different position on this issue. Buddhism holds that people can be mistaken in their judgements about what constitutes happiness. It was the Buddha'a position that most unenlightened ordinary beings are deluded in thinking that the life of sense pleasures constitues happiness. The Buddha says that there is disagreement between the persons having the noble insight and others who do not have it on what constitues happiness (*S.* IV, p. 127).

According to Buddhism, *avijjā*, (ignorance) is inability to understand what *dukkha* (q.v.) really is. One who mistakes *sukha* for *dukkha* or vice versa is said to suffer from perverted perception, perverted views and perverted mind. (*A.* II, p. 52). *Dukkha*, according to Buddhism,

is said to be one of the three fundamental characteristics of samsāric existence. It is the persistence of a certain psychological attitude towards the impermanent things of the world that, according to Buddhism, leads to *dukkha*. When the disturbing passions and the ceaseless thirst for the possession and enjoyment of impermanent things is completely gotten rid of, there occurs the happiness which Buddhism called the happiness of Nibbāna. The Buddha's attempt was to bring a change in the human attitude which leads to *dukkha* stemming from contact with the impermanent things of the world. *Dukkha* is causally conditioned. The elimination of the causes of *dukkha* leads to the cessation of it. The psychological factors which cause unhappiness in this life, are precisely the factors that bring about a continued series of existence in *samsāra*. The Buddhist view is that samsāric existence brings along with it a whole mass of *dukkha*, which in the formulation of the four noble truths is described as follows:

> Birth is *dukkha*, decay is *dukkha*, sickness is*dukkha*, death is *dukkha*, association with those that one does not like is *dukkha*, seperation from the beloved is *dukkha*, in brief the five aggregates of grasping are *dukkha*. (*S.* V., p. 421).

According to Buddhism, the life of sense pleasures consists of three aspects, all of which, a realistic assessment of human experience should not fail to take into account. Objects of sense produce delight *(assāda)*. But they also have harmful consequences *(ādinava)*. Pleasures at the level of sensuality can be transcended and a higher level of happiness can be attianed. This is called *nissarana* or freedom from the harmful consequences of the lower pleasures. With reference to the common pleasures of sense the Buddha says that they consist of little delight and much unhappiness and anxiety *(appassādā kāmā ...... bahudukkhā bahūpāyāsa ādinavo ettha bhiyyo. M.*I, p. 132). Unenlightened beings are said to suffer constantly from psychological distress, which is even more painful than physical sickness. It is, according to the Buddha, when a person attains Nibbāna, that he or she becomes perfectly happy. The Buddha does not agree with the common assumption that happiness can be found only in sensuous enjoyment. Speaking from his experience of the higher states of mental culture, the Buddha affirms that in the states of consciousness attained in the highest states of *jhāna* (q.v. meditative rapture) there is the possibility of experiencing far superior levels of happiness. (*S.* IV. p. 225f).

Although sensuous things can be productive of enjoyment, viewed from a wider perspective and taking into consideration their long range consequences, they are viewed as undesirable. The Buddha believes that a comprehensive understanding of the nature of sense pleasures and the realisation of a happiness which transcends the meager happiness which is found in sensuous delight makes an enlightened person to take a different view of the nature of sense pleasures. From the enlightened perspective of the Buddha it is claimed that the enjoyment of the pleasures of a sensuous kind is comparable to the infant's play with dirt (*A.* V, p. 203).

The relevance of happiness or well being to moral evaluation is clearly recognised in Buddhism. But the Buddhist position regarding what constitutes real happiness is based on its views about the nature of man and the human predicament. Consequently, although any secular morality may appeal to hedonic criteria for the moral justification of action, disagreement between the Buddhist position and the secular position is likely to occur on substantive moral issues due to the disparity that may exist regarding questions about the nature of happiness.

The Buddhist attempt can be seen as one of integrating an ideal of individual salvation with the concept of moral living. An objection that some critics of Buddhist morality have levelled against it is that its morality is reducible to an individualism which violates the very notion of morality. One who aspires for the goal of Nibbāna is viewed as a person who leaves all commitment to society and leads a life of solitude. He is not one who mingles with society and uses his energy and ability to improve society. In brief, the accusation is that Buddhism preaches some path of enlightened self interest and thereby falls short of a universally acceptable moral ideal. It is to be admitted that in Buddhism there is constant emphasis on the attainment of the individual's well-being or happiness. However, in most instances where moral concepts like *kusala* are explained in terms of happines or well-being the Buddha's considerations are universalistic.

The Buddha speaks of four types of persons:

(i) Persons who engage neither in the pursuit of their own well-being nor in the pursuit of the well-being of others.
(ii) Persons who are engaged in the pursuit of the well-being of others, but not in the pursuit of the well-being of themselves.
(iii) Persons who are engaged in the pursuit of the well-being of themselves, but not in the pursuit of the well-being of others.
(iv) Persons who are engaged in the pursuit of the well-being of themselves as well as that of others (*A.* II, p. 95).

The Buddha's evaluation of the four types of persons is important in determining the Buddhist stand on egoism and altruism. He considers the first type of person as the most inferior. What may appear to be puzzling is the Buddha's evaluation that the second type of person is

inferior to the third. Understandably, the fourth is judged to be the best. Why is it that the third type of person is judged to be better than the second? The *Dhammapada* too, one of the principal texts presenting Buddhist moral ideas, maintains: "One should not abandon the well-being of oneself for the well-being of another." (*Dhp. v*, 166). Can this statement be correctly interpretted as one valuing self-interest more than altruism? The answer to this can be found in the *Sallekha Sutta* of the *Majjhima nikāya*. Here, addressing a person called Cunda, the Buddha says:

> It is not possible, Cunda for him who is stuck in the mud to pull out another who is stuck in the mud. But Cunda, it is possible for one who is himself not stuck in the mud to pull out another who is stuck in the mud. (*M.* I, p. 45).

The important message of the Buddha contained in this statement is that those who suffer from moral depravity, and who are not at peace with themselves are incapable of serving society in any useful or meaningful manner. The most sublime and exalted form of service to society can be rendered only by people who have perfected their understanding and moral character. From the Buddhist point of view the Buddha and his disciples who attained moral perfection are such persons. According to Buddhism the most effective manner in which one can serve society is by harmonizing the goal of one's personal spiritual life with social action. One's own happiness depends on the degree to which one diligently cultivates one's own inner purity. A wise man does not intend to harm himself, others or both; he intends his own good, the good of others, the good of both and the good of the entire universe. (*A.* II, p. 179). The welfare of oneself and the welfare of others depend equally on what kind of person one is. If one is greedy, envious, selfish, and deluded, one's behaviour will do no good either to oneself or to the rest of humanity. The Buddha says:

> Monks whether one wants to see that one's own good or the good of others, or the good of both should be brought about it is necessary to cultivate one's character diligently. (*S.* II, p. 29).

> Monks, one who takes care of oneself takes care of others, and one who takes care of others takes care of oneself. How monks, is it that one who takes care of oneself takes care of others? It is by moral training, moral culture, and moral development. And how, monks, one who takes care of others takes care of oneself. It is by forbearance, by harmlessness, by good will and compassion. (*ibid.* V, p. 169).

The point made here is that a person who is cultivating himself spiritually is by that very reason taking care of others. For spiritual cultivation involves elimination of greed, hatred and delusion and all other unwholesome states of mind which find expression in man's social behaviour, through acts such as violence, stealing, unchastity, false speech etc. Spiritual cultivation involves not only self-restraint and abstention from evil but also positive action which finds expression through compassionate deeds. This explains why, contrary to the opinion expressed by some critics that Buddhism is an escapist ideal, a self centred attempt for individual salvation, Buddhism became a missionary religion that worked with great zeal in establishing people in the path of righteousness. This was considered to be the major role of the Buddhist monk and especially of the Buddhist saint. It is with this purpose in mind that the practice of begging meals from house to house was adopted by the Buddhist spiritual community.

The Buddha considered morally and spiritually elevated beings to be a necessary component of society as they are the most qualified to give moral direction to society. Although the Buddha and the Buddhist saints renounced the material bonds with society, they did not abandon society. The perfected person is expected to live in society, like the lotus flower which grows in the muddy water and rises and stays untainted above the level of the muddy water.

Buddhism as a moral teaching insists that there must be a firm and secure moral foundation for all social action, including the regular performance of one's allotted social role under a given system of social orgnisation. People need to resolve their inner conflicts in order to live in peace with society. When an increasingly larger number of people having no mental composure, no moral discipline, take up positions that require the fulfilment of certain social roles that effect the community at large, they produce more harm than good. Even those who are overtly committed to social action are in need of some basic understanding of their own moral nature.

6. Morality, Knowledge and Truth:- A question that has drawn considerable attention of philosophers in recent moral philosophy is whether distinctively ethical judgements can be known to be true or false. Contemporary ethical theories that admit the possibility of ethical knowledge are called congnitivist theories, and those theories that deny its possibility are called noncognitivist ones. Viewed in terms of the congnitivist/noncognitivist distinction Buddhism is obviously cognitivist in its approach to moral issues. Buddhism asserts the view that we can know what is morally right and wrong, and good and bad. According to the Buddha, to have a right view is to understand the distinction between good and bad. "Killing is bad" is for Buddhism, a valid ethical judgement to which all rational people must give their assent. A person is said to be ignorant and deluded if he or she does not know the difference between a right action and a wrong action (*A.* III, p. 165).

Ethical noncognitivism in recent moral philosophy is a result of the development of an empiricist epistemology. According to empiricist epistemology genuine knowledge can be obtained only by means of empirical observation. Only matters of fact can be empirically observed. Distinctively ethical judgements do not state facts: they are species of evaluative utterances. Contemporary meta-ethical analyses draw a rigid distinction between factual and evaluative statements. While factual statements are said to be capable of being established by empirical observations, evaluative judgements are reduced to expressions of emotion or to prescriptive utterances devoid of any truth value.[10] Noncognitivist analyses of ethical judgements reduce them to a variety of non-rational discourse. They take the position that any fundamental major premise can serve as a premise for a moral argument. These analyses imply forms of relativism which deny the universal validity of moral judgements. Buddhism takes the position that although factual reasons are relevant to moral conclusions, any arbitrary fact cannot be adduced as a reason for a moral judgement. There are, as we have already seen, two main criteria admitted in Buddhism for the purpose of restricting the range of facts that can be adduced for or against a moral judgement. They are: (1) the tendency of what is morally evaluated to promote the general well-being (utility) and (2) a consideration of fairness or the application of the Golden Rule. The function of the moral agent is to balance these two criteria intelligently in some situations where they may seem to yield conflicting judgements. The implication of the Buddhist view is that rational men can achieve a high degree of moral consensus and discover a common core of moral values if they adhere to these two criteria.

In the consistent application of the two above mentioned criteria for the evaluation of human behaviour Buddhism offered a notable moral critique of the pre-Buddhist religious values. Buddhism always stressed the importance of the inner purity of man. According to Buddhism human happiness, whether at the individual level or at the societal level depends on the inner purity and moral development of the individuals constituting a society. Buddhism emphasizes the importance of self reliance for the development of this inner purity. In its early form, Buddhism does not have the characteristics of a religion of grace. It repeatedly emphasizes individual effort. Even a Buddha can only be helpful as a good friend *(kalyānamitta)* and a guide having a beneficial influence. The Buddha says: "You need to make an effort yourselves, for the Buddha only show you the way". (*Dhp. v.* 276). He also insists: "Be islands unto thyself, be refuges unto thyself, do not take another as your refuge". (*D.* II, p. 100). Faith in the Buddha in the form of confidence in him is said to be important as a starting point, but the higher spiritual attainments are not dependent on faith. One's claim to have realised the ultimate goal of Buddhism can be a genuine claim only if one is in a position to say without basing oneself on faith alone *(aññatra saddhāya)* that one has realised it. It is due to this self reliant approach of Buddhism that in its early stages it rejected all ritual with a mystical significant as superstition.

The Budhist moral critique was directed against the practices of the two principal religious and philosophical traditions of the day which were known as the Brāhmaṇa and the Śramaṇa traditions. Brahmanical practices were criticized for their involvement with sacrificial ritual resulting in injury to animal life, reflecting insensitivity to the pain of other sentient beings, and Śramaṇa practices were criticized for their involvement with meaningless vows and penances resulting in the afflictions of the body. The body, in the Buddhist opinion, ought to be kept in best possible health even as an aid for developing the spiritual potential of man. In Buddhism there is deliberate punning on the words Śramaṇa and Brāhmaṇa with a view to give a moral redefinition of these terms. A Brāhmaṇa is redefined in Buddhism as one who has rid himself of moral evil *(bāhita pāpattā brāhmaṇo)* and a Śramaṇa is redefined as one who has calmed down the evil dispositions *(samita pāpattā samaṇo)*. (*Dhp.* III, p. 84).

The significance of Buddhism as a moral reform movement in the context of its contemporary Brāhmaṇa and Śramaṇa traditions is amply demonstrated in the following canonical passage:

> That, Kassapa, is a common saying in the world that the life of a Samana and of a Brāhmaṇa is hard to lead. But if the hardness, the very great hardness, of that life depended merely on this asceticism, on the carrying out of any or all of those practices you have detailed, then it would not be fitting to say that the life of the Samana, or the Brāhmaṇa, was hard to lead. It would be quite possible for a householder, or for the son of a householder, or for any one, down to the slave girl who carries the water-gar, to say: "Let me now go naked, let me become of low habits," and so on through all the items of those three lists of yours. But since, Kassapa, quite apart from these matters, quite apart from all kinds of penance, the life is hard, very hard to lead; therefore is it that it is fitting to say: "How hard must Samaṇaship be to gain, how hard must Brāhmaṇaship be!" For from the time, O Kassapa, when a Bhikkhu has cultivated the heart of

10. G. J. Warnock, *Contemprary Moral Philosophy,* (Macmillan, St. Martin's Press, 1967).

love that knows no anger, that knows no ill-will from the time when, by the destruction of the deadly intoxications (the lusts of the flesh, the lust after future life, and the defilements of delusion and ignorance), he dwells in that emancipation of heart, in that emancipation of mind, that is free from those intoxications, and that he, while yet in this visible world, has come to realize and know — from that time, O Kassapa, is in that the Bhikkhu is called a Samaṇa, is called a Brāhmaṇa.[11]

Buddhism rejected the view that purity results from clinging to various vows and rituals *(sīlabbata-parāmāsa)* having no connection with the transformation of a person's inner mental nature. Bathing in sacred rivers, keeping to rituals of fasting and adhering to various kinds of taboos in connection with food, going about naked, wearing one's hair in a particular way or dressing oneself in a specified manner, performing various sacrificial rites in the forest praying to super-human deities, have no value at all if a person who performs all these rituals and keeps all these vows has not eliminated the greed and ill-will in his or her heart and not cultivated a compassionate mind.

7. **Ethical Norms specially applicable to the Lay Buddhists:** The Buddhist community is traditionally regarded as consisting of all the disciples of the Buddha who express confidence in the Buddha, his teaching *(dhamma)* and the spiritual community *(saṅgha)* established by the Buddha. The identity of the Buddhist lay person in the Buddhist community is established through the express pronouncement by him or her of the undertaking that he or she takes the Buddha, the *dhamma* and the *saṅgha* as the refuge. Lay persons are referred to in the canonical tradition as householders who enjoy the pleasures of sense *(gihī kāma bhogino)*. Buddhism considers the lay person as one leading a household family life, engaged in activity productive of material pleasures and comforts. The Pali canonical scriptures contain many moral teachings which are specially directed to this lay Buddhist community. It was expressly admitted that the perfect life of *brahmacariya* is difficult to be lived by the lay person. However, the possibility of higher spiritual attainments by lay persons was not denied. Although the Buddha did not attempt to regulate all aspects of life in lay society, he expounded a very valuable moral teaching in the interests of the lay community. He taught a basic morality which helps the lay person to lead a satisfactory, contented, useful and harmonious community life.

The Buddha's moral teachings for the lay community were determined to a large extent by the world view consisting of the *kamma* and rebirth doctrines. However, the doctrine of *kamma* has not resulted in preoccupation with life after death. Buddhism repeatedly emphasizes that its ethical teachings are for the conquest of this world as well as the world hereafter *(ihalokavijayāya, paralokavijayāya)*. One needs to be victorious in this world as well as the next world. As far as the well-being of the lay person in this immediate life is concerned Buddhism pays much attention to the material welfare as well. Even the doctrine of *kamma* taught that a considerable portion of actions performed by the individual produce results in this immediate life itself *(diṭṭhadhammavedanīya)*.

The layman is also considered to be capable of attaining the highest goal of Buddhism if he cultivated the threefold training or the eightfold path to its fullest perfection. But household life and its responsibilities are considered as an encumbrance to fulfil the requirements of the higher spiritual life. Therefore, depending on the aims and interests of the lay person who does not intend to give up the pleasures of sense altogether, the Buddha gave valuable moral guidance to make that kind of life a success to the higher stages of spiritual training. If the lay person's life is not properly guided, Buddhism maintained that there is a possibility of regression into states of existence from which liberation would be very difficult. (*A.* III, p. 353).

The Buddhist teaching takes into account two main aspects of the life of the lay community: (i) the economic life; (2) the spiritual or moral life. Buddhist moral teachings are intended to strike a good balance between these two aspects. The greatest objection of Buddhism is against disregarding the moral aspect of life in favour of economic or material considerations. Moral values are considered in the Buddha's teaching as overriding values. They should not be subservient to any other values, economic, political or aesthetic. Moral value is considered in Buddhism as the supreme value of all human beings. It is not to be sacrificed in the interests of any other value.

The sense of realism characteristic of the Buddhist teaching does not encourage people to disregard entirely the economic and material aspects of human living. Buddhism does not praise poverty, although it praises contentment and detachment towards wealth. Buddhism views poverty as an evil not only because people can suffer as individuals in poverty, but also because poverty brings about social instability and the general deterioration of moral standards of a society. It could bring about social upheavels, rebellions, catastrophic wars and, even eventually, the total destruction of human civilization.[12]

11. S. B. B. Vol. 2, p. 234.
12. The *Cakkavattisīhanāda Sutta* (*D.* III. 58 ff.) and the ***Kūṭadanta Sutta*** (*D.* I. p. 127 ff) contain the Buddha's teaching that poverty could be one of the major causes of moral degeneration.

The Pali canon refers to a person called Dīghajānu who requests the Buddha:

> Lord, we householders are immersed in the round of pleasure; we are cumbered with bed-mate and sons; we delight in the muslims from Benares and in sandalwood; we deck ourselves with flowers, with garlands and cosmetics; we enjoy the use of both silver and gold. Lord, to such as us, let the Exalted One also teach Dhamma, teach the things which will be conducive to our advantage and happiness here on earth and to our advantage and happiness in the world to come.[13]

In response to this request, the Buddha speaks of four achievements which are conducive to happiness in this life: (1) *Utthānasampadā* (achievement in effort); (2) *Ārakkhasampadā* (achievement in variness); (3) *Kalyānamittatā* (having noble friends) and (4) *Samajīvikatā* (balanced living). Explaining *Utthānasampadā*, the Buddha says that it is the honest effort needed to earn one's living. One must be energetic and not given to laziness. By whatever occupation one earns one's living one must be energetic, tireless, of an inquiring turn of mind and capable of organising and carrying out one's work systemetically and efficiently. Secondly, one should see that the wealth one has earned is duly protected *(ārakkhasampadā)*. The third requirements refers to good company *(kalyānamittatā)*. The human tendency is to imitate, and to be influenced by, others around oneself. So the Buddha recommends that wherever a householder dwells he should associate with people who are virtuous, who are faithful, charitable and wise. One should attempt to emulate the character of noble friends. Fourthly, speaking of the balanced life *(samajīvikatā)*, the Buddha recommends that one should neither be unduly extravagant nor unduly miserly in one's living. A proper balance in one's handling of the economic aspect of life is very important for satisfactory living. One should handle one's earnings in such a way that one's expenditure does not exceed one's income. The Buddha points out four channels through which amassed wealth could flow away without being put into proper use: (1) looseness with women, (2) addiction to intoxicating drinks, (3) gambling and (4) companionship with evil minded people. The *Sigālovāda Sutta* gives a detailed analysis of the types of friends that one might encounter, distinguishing between those who are noble and vicious (*D.* III, p. 184 f). The Buddha recommended that a lay person should avoid these forms of conduct. Such conduct is considered in Buddhism to be ruinous to one's material as well as spiritual welfare.

Speaking of the spiritual aspect of a person's life which is specially important in promoting the welfare of one's life hereafter, the Buddha speaks of four principle achievements (1) *Saddhāsampadā* (faith in the spiritual path of the Buddha); (2) *Sīlasampadā* (cultivation of good practices like abstention from the five basic evils of a lay person's life, killing, stealing, unchastity, lying and the taking of intoxicating drinks; (3) *Cāgasampadā* (charitable action) which involves living with a mind freed from the stain of avarice and a person's readiness to share one's earnings with others; (4) *Paññāsampadā*, living wisely, cultivating detachment, reflecting the transient and fluxional nature of everyting (*A.* IV, p. 283 f).

The Buddha speaks of four kinds of happiness that a lay person can attain. They are (1) the happiness of possessing abundunt wealth *(atthisukha)*, (2) the happiness of enjoying one's wealth making oneself, one's family, and one's friends and relatives happy *(bhogasukha)*, (3) the happiness of not being in debt *(ananasukha)* and (4) the happiness of living a righteous life *(anavajjasukha:* *A.* II, p. 69). Out of these four types of happiness the last one is said to be the most important. All material wealth should be earned by righteous means, without indulging in wrong means of livelihood *(micchājiva)*, without exploiting others to one's own personal advantage, or causing pain and suffering to other sentient beings. One who does not have the vision to improve oneself in material wealth nor to improve oneself morally is compared to a totally blind person, while one who has the vision to produce only material wealth disregarding the moral basis of one's economic life is compared to a single eyed person. One who is comparable to the person having unimpared vision in both eyes is one who is capable of improving oneself both materially and morally. (*A.* I, pp. 128–129).

The *Sigālovāda Sutta* and the *Parābhava Sutta* contain detailed expositions of moral virtues that the lay person ought to cultivate and evil ways of living he ought to avoid both in his own interest and in the interest of the society. In the former is given an important social ethic which appears to have universal validity, consisting of the mutual performance of duties. It shows how people's rights are to be safeguarded by the mutual performance of duties. The moral prescriptions in this sutta concern the duty bound relationships between parents and children, husbands and wives, teachers and pupils, lay community and the spiritual community. The emphasis here is on one's obligations. In fact Buddhism lacks an equivalent for the term "right" when used in the sense of a claim. Probably, Buddhism approached the problem of social injustice by emphasizing people's mutual duties instead of emphasizing "rights" in the sense of claims, due to its insistence on a philosophy of detachment and egolessness.

13. *Book of the Gradual Sayings* by R. M. Hare (P. T. S.) Vol. IV, p. 187.

The family is considered in Buddhism as a social unit within which many Buddhist values can be put into practice, thereby achieving a considerable degree of spiritual progress. The institution of the family provides the lay person with the opportunity of satisfying one of the strongest of the urges for sensuous gratification within a social setting which promotes a responsible and dutiful relationship of mutual love and respect. The ideal recommended for lay persons in Buddhism in the sphere of sexual morality is the satisfaction of the sexual urge in a wholesome and lasting relationship between persons of the opposite sexes brought together by mutual love. Parental love and care which grows naturally within the family unit is to be consciously cultivated. Sexual relationship should not be degraded into a self centred pursuit of pleasure seeking. Parental care and love that children receive within the family is considered to be extremely important for the moral and psychological development of children. Buddhism considers parents to be worthy of respect. Caring for one's old and disabled parents is an important virtue for the children. The parents ought to be responsible for the moral and material well-being of the children in their formative years of growth. The parent-child relationship recommended in Buddhism is meant to promote a mutual sense of security to both parents and children. It is a similar relationship of mutuality of respect in the performance of certain essential duties that is expected in Buddhism between teachers and pupils.

There is evidence that Buddhism attempted to have a distinct moral impact on society through a critique of existing social and political institutions. The Brahmanical value system was rejected by the Buddha by denying that the worth of a human being depends on his birth or caste. Buddhism maintained that the greatest man is one who is endowed with knowledge and ethical conduct (*vijjācaraṇasampanno so seṭṭho devamānuse: D.* I, p. 99). The Brāhmanical myth of creation which led to the belief that caste distinctions are divinely ordained is replaced in Buddhism with its evolutionary account of the world, society and social institutions.[14] In presenting this evolutionary account, Buddhism attempts to uphold its ethical stand by showing that attachment or craving is the cause of regression from an excellent to a baser condition of human life. Buddhism maintains that the moral development of those exercising the highest authority in society such as the rulers (kings in the context of the widely prevalent monarchical order of society in which the Buddha preached) and administrators, is a prime requirement for a stable, harmonious and just society. When those exercising authority at the higher levels of society are morally corrupt, it affects the entire moral fabric of society. Buddhism maintains that immorality of the rulers can ultimately affect even the regularities of nature. (*A.* II, p. 74f). Rulers are called upon to abide by the ten virtues of rulership *(dasarājadhamma)* which are derived from the moral ideals of Buddhism. The *dasarājadhamma* are enumerated as *dāna* (giving), *sīla* (moral practice), *pariccāga* (liberality), *ajjava* (straightness), *maddava* (gentleness), *tapa* (restraint), *akkodha* (non-anger), *avihiṃsā* (non-injury), *khanti* (forbearance) and *avirodhanā* (non-opposition). Although the widely prevalent political order of the time in which the Buddha preached was monarchical in structure, Buddhism attempted to show that in its origin kingship was necessitated by a societal need to serve the interests of the people. According to the Buddhist myth of Genesis, which relates the origin and evolution of society, the first king is said to have been elected by the people *(mahājanena sammato: D.* III, p. 80 f.). The ideal monarchical structure recommended in Buddhism is described under the Buddhist notion of the universal monarch *(cakkavattirāja)* who conquers territory not by the might of arms but by means of moral principles *(adaṇḍena asatthena dhammena abhivijiya).* A *cakkavatti* (q.v.) ruler is said to be guided by principles of justice *(dhamma).* The five moral precepts *(pañcasīla)* are held to be the moral basis on which the conduct of a *cakkavatti* ruler is governed. The Buddhist ideal of a stable and harmonious lay society built on the foundations of a sound spiritual and moral culture and a just and equitable economic order is presented through the *cakkavatti* ideal of kingship.

8. **The Arahant and the Bodhisattva Ideals:-** The moral and spiritual ideals of Buddhism have sometimes been conceived as consisting of two distinct ones called the Arahant and the Bodhisattva ideals. This distinction is based on the Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna distinction which came into being in the historical development of the Buddhist tradition. The early Buddhist teaching emphasised the importance of self-reliance in the spiritual journey towards moral perfection. The Buddha was considered as a guide or a teacher, being the discoverer, the pioneer in the attainment of supreme enlightenment *(pathamābhisambuddho).* In Theravāda and other schools of Buddhism which came to be called the schools of Hīnayāna the emphasis was on the goal of Arhantship. Arahantship assures a person of final Nibbāna, and one who attains this goal was believed to have accomplished what ought to be accomplished by way of moral and spiritual transformation. It was also believed that it can and ought to be attained in this lifetime itself. However, due to certain psychological needs, such as the need for external supports to overcome moral weakness, and the difficulty that the ordinary laymen found in responding to the call of immediate renunciation of all

14. See the Buddhist story of Genesis in *D.* III.80 ff.

worldly things, the doctrine of vicarious salvation appears to have taken the place of the earlier doctrine of individual moral initiative and self-reliance. The result was the development of a somewhat novel doctrine which came to be known as the Bodhisattva ideal. The concept of a Bodhisatta originated from the early teachings of Buddhism connected with *kamma* and rebirth. It was believed that in order to become a Buddha a person's individual stream of consciousness has to be perfected over an incalculable series of rebirths acquiring the store of *puñña* necessary for such an attainment. It was not viewed as an attainment realised in one lifetime but a gradual spiritual evolution through many lifetimes, effected by the fulfilment of the perfections *(pārami)* of a Bodhisatta. The Theravāda tradition too admitted this as a superior spiritual ideal to be pursued but does not insist that it ought to be pursued by everyone. The *Jātaka* literature, admitted into the corpus of the Theravāda scriptures, put forward a distinct moral ideal which could be followed by the Buddhist believer if he aspires to become a Buddha like Gotama at some future time in saṃsāric rebirth. The Mahāyānists insisted that liberation can and must be attained only by means of the Bodhisattva ideal. This distinction came to be interpreted later in ethical terms, the Arahant ideal being identified with an egoistic pursuit of individual liberation, and the Bodhisattva ideal being identified with an altruistic and a morally superior one. Early Buddhist teachings did not make a distinction between the character of the enlightenment attained by following the Noble Path of Buddhism. Enlightenment was generally referred to as *sambodhi,* and what was emphasised was the urgent need to reach this goal as early as possible. The perfection of the arahant was considered to equip him with the steadfastness and strength of moral character necessary for disinterested service to society. This is made clear in the Buddha's call to the first sixty Arahants, indicating that they were equally capable of service to society as he himself was, for they were free from all bonds both human and divine *(mutto .... sabbapāsehi ye dibbe ye ca mānuse).*

The presence of a Buddha, a discoverer of the Path, was considered as a great advantage to others, for they could follow the Buddha's instructions and attain the goal of enlightenment in their lifetime itself. However, within the Theravāda tradition itself a certain dichotomy came to be admitted which justified the Mahāyānist contention that the Bodhisattva ideal is morally superior to the Arahant ideal. Mahāyāna Buddhism transformed to a great extent the metaphysical foundations of Buddhist morality and gave a new religious character to it. Yet the core of moral values in the Mahāyāna are not different from those admitted in the so-called Hīnayāna schools of Buddhism.

A striking feature of the Buddhist tradition is the richness of its ethical content. Its ethical content is established on the foundations of a theory of reality which is claimed to be based on a higher from of cognition *(abhiññā).* The Buddhist teachings consist of moral values which have a universal application. The supreme virtues of Buddhism can be summed up in negative terms as the absence of greed, malice and ignorance, and in positive terms as the perfection of compassion and wisdom. In practical terms it is an ethics of self transformation. In formal terms Buddhist ethics appear to contain some features common to consequentialist and utilitarian theories of ethics. However the recognition of the Golden Rule as one principal criterion to be used in moral decision making frees the Buddhist ethical system from the usual objections that can be raised against a purely utilitarian system. In the context of Indian thought Buddhism made a major contribution to Indian ethics as a moral reform movement.

P. D. Premasiri

ETIOLOGY (Var. Aetiology), the doctrine of causes or the scientific investigation of causes of things, has a central bearing on Buddhism, which is fundamentally a religious philosophy founded on an etiological basis. As a system of thought and action it actually begins and develops on such a basis.

The main aim of the Buddha's teaching is to offer a practical solution to the problem of human suffering. If the suffering of man is to be overcome and eliminated the first requisite would be the investigation and analysis of its causes. Once this is fulfilled a method has to be devised to remove these causes, for, with the removal of a cause its effect too becomes removed. And this was exactly what Gautama Buddha achieved. Accordingly, the system he presented to the world revolves round this etiological principle of cause and its effect.

The principle involved here could be symbolically presented as an abstract formula thus:

Whenever A (cause) is present B (effect) is also present.
Whenever A (cause) is absent B (effect) is also absent.

The main cause of human suffering, according to Buddhism, is craving *(taṇhā).* The removal of this cause in its entirety *(asesa-virāga-nirodha S.* V. p.421) sets man free from his inherent bondage to existence and consequent suffering. This was the main message the Buddha presented to the world in his first sermon the ***Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta*** *(Vin.* I, p. 10ff; *S.* V, p. 420ff) through the doctrine of the Four Noble Truths.

That etiology occupies a central place in the Buddhist system as is also proved by the many synonyms such as *hetu, paccaya, samudaya, nidāna, kāraṇa* etc. used to mean 'cause' in Buddhist literature and hence Buddhism can safely be defined as an etiological system aimed at the eradication of human suffering based on a highly practical methodology. This etiological law as it operates in relation to the existential predicament of living beings is presented as a general theory in Buddhism through the celebrated theory of Conditioned Genisis *(paṭicca-samuppāda)*. This theory, which is a analysis of the human person in his existential process, presents the Buddhist theory of man's genesis and continuity in saṃsāra as a psycho-physical entity through a series of twelve links or *nidānas.*

According to this etiological analysis human suffering in all its aspects is traced back to ignorance of the true facts about samsāric existence *(avijjā)* due to which there comes about all forms of psycho-physical formations collectively designated as *saṅkhāra* in the world as all such formations are conditionally produced *(saṅkhata)*. Hence the first phase of this twelve-phased formula is a very general expression of the existential condition of the world based on the etiological law of cause and effect or conditionality of all phenomena. In the second phase the formula is applied to the genesis of the living being as an individual entity when it is said that these *saṅkhāras* cause the production of consciousness *(viññāṇa)* which is followed by the psycho-physical entity called the individual *(nāma-rūpa)*. This becomes responsible for its next stage of the six sense organs *(saḷāyatana)* which in turn cause contact with the objective world *(phassa)* resulting in felling *(vedanā)*. This causes the next stage of craving *(taṇhā)* in its innumerable forms thereby becoming the cause of grasping *(upādāna)*. This becomes the cause of existential becoming *(bhava)* which results in birth *(jāti)* in the world thereby causing an entire mass of suffering *(dukkha-khandha)* to appear which is charactericized by every form of human suffering such as disease, decay, death etc. etc.

This is the progressive operation of this etiological formula wherein the cause produces the effect which in turn becomes the cause of the succeeding phase. The process continues cyclically with repeated birth and death. In its regressive or reverse operation it comes to mean that through the cessation of ignroance *(avijjā-nirodha)* there results the cessation of *saṅkhāra* and in this manner the twelve *nidānas* disappear one by one thereby bringing about the complete release of the individual from the bonds and sufferings of the cycle of repeated birth and death (*Vin.* I, p. 1ff).

It has been sometimes observed quite correctly that this formula is meant to strengthen the Truths regarding the origin of suffering and its cessation (H. Oldenberg, *Buddha,* p. 224). However, in reality, the formula contains all the four Truths by implication. It is seen that the first two Truths (suffering and its cause: *dukkha* and *samudaya*) are directly admitted in the progressive operation of the twelve links. The third Truth of the cessation of suffering *(dukkha-nirodha)* is admitted in its regressive operation when it is said that the cessation of one cause leads to the cessation of the succeeding cause. The fourth Truth of the Path leading to the cessation of suffering *(magga)* is implied in the assertion of cessation in the regressive process.

That the Buddha's main concern was the eradication of human suffering and that his approach to this problem was primarily etiological is clearly borne out by the foregoing discussion. In further collaboration of that point one may refer to the off-quoted stanza preached by vernerable Assaji in his summing up of the Buddha's teaching to Upatissa (later Sāriputta) which runs as follows:

ye dhammā hetuppabhavā
tesaṃ hetuṃ tathāgato āha
tesañca yo nirodho
evaṃvādī mahāsamaṇo (*Vin.* I, p. 40).

"Those things which proceed from a cause, of these the Truthfinder has told the cause.
And that which is their stopping – the great recluse has such a doctrine (trsl. I. B. Horner, *The Book of the Discipline* IV. p. 54).

Here the two polar concepts of causal genesis and cessation (genesis of man's suffering and its cessation) have been very succinctly juxtaposed. The observation made by that great admirer of the Buddha, King Pasenadi of Kosala, also may be quoted here: "The Blessed One speaks like an etiologist: *heturūpaṃ bhagavā saheturūpaṃ Bhagavā āha (M.* II, p. 127-30).

From this etiological theory there emerges another cardinal doctrine that Buddhism has accepted as a basic component of its soteriology. This is the tenet that "Whatever that is conditionally arisen is inevitably subject to cessation" *(yaṃ kiñci samudayadhammaṃ sabbaṃ taṃ nirodhadhammaṃ: Vin.* I, p. 11; *M.* I, p.380; *D.* II, p. 288).

The Buddhist doctrine of soteriology maintains that the practical realisation of this truth personally is tantamount to obtaining super-knowledge. This is attested historically by the very first instance of venerable Koṇḍañña whose insight into the Truth after listening to the Buddha's first sermon, is described by the Buddha himself as having attained the higher vision or the initial step towards saving knowledge, which is designated as the Eye of Truth *(dhammacakkhu: Vin.* I, p. 11) The unique feature of the Buddhist system is that the possi-

bility of this realisation is constantly asserted quite optimistically as its final aim, which is freedom from all bondage and suffering characterised by repeated birth, decay, disease, death etc. etc.

The foregoing discussion shows that in Buddhism etiology is not a problem as in other systems but is a means for the solution of the ultimate problem of man. Buddhism also becomes unique in this respect as in its attempt at solving this vexed problem. It not only discovered the nature of the inert causal power of all the psycho-physical phenomena of the universe, but also discovered the strategy of exploiting this power to solve the problem. Through this strategy it also laid bare the secrets of the universe and of the human mind. Also through this discovery the path of immortallity was found out and proclaimed for man as declared by the Buddha just after enlightenment when he said "Open are the doors to immortallity let those who have ears develop confidence *(apārutā amatassa dvārā: ye sotavantā pamuñcantusaddhaṃ: Vin.* I, p. 7).

The abstract etiological formula that a cause produces an effect and when the cause is removed the effect also disappears, being a universal phenominon, is applicable to any given case. For instance, the Buddha himself applies it to the Four Noble Truths when he says that human suffering has to be removed by removing its cause which is craving (*S.* V. p. 421). Or elsewhere (*M.* I, p. 190) sense-cognition is defined on this principle when it is stated that it is caused by the simulataneous presense of three factors which are the particular sense-organ, the relevant sense-object and appropriate sensory impact. For instance, in the case of visual contact it would be the eye, the form and the eye – contact. The absence of one of the causes makes it impossible to have the particular sense-cognition.

Sometimes effect may be brought about by the causative function of a number of causes as in the case of sense-cognition just quoted. The conditionality of all phenomena thus becomes an established doctrine in Buddhism. This conditionality *(idappaccayatā: M.*I. p. 167; *Vin.* I, p. 5; *D.* II, p. 36 etc.) when applied to normal existential life also comes to mean that it is the result of conditions generated by the individual himself, for it is the individual who is responsible for his volitional *(kammic)* activites which become causative for the condition wherein he finds himself. This implies the most intelligent attitude to life in the light of the Buddha's teaching as it also offers the possibility of release from it in the cessation of this causal conditioning *(nirodha)* as was shown in the regressive operation of the *paṭicca-samuppāda* series.

Conditionality as operative in all types of situations is enumerated and explained in the last book of the *Abhidhamma Piṭaka,* the *Paṭṭhāna* under the term PACCAYA (s.v.) See also CAUSALITY, PAṬICCA-SAMUPPĀDA.

A. G. S. Kariyawasam

EULOGY Skt. *praśasti* from *pra* + *śaṃsati,* Pali, *pasattha,* Tib. *bstod pa* to praise, laud extol or commend. Eulogy is high praise, in the form of speech or writing in commendation of the qualities or characteristics of an object, event or person, living or dead. The practice of eulogising has come down to us from the earliest times when people thought that praise and invocations addressed to gods etc. would lead to the fulfilment of their desires. Thus it is possible for us to conjecture that the idea underlying the term eulogy is quite akin to the invocation. The Pali Nikāyas and the later Buddhist texts contain a large number of eulogies of the holy Triple Gem (Buddha, Dhamma, Saṅgha) and of various objects such as sacred mountains etc.. Some of the eulogies seem to have been uttered in the presence of the Buddha himself by various persons.

King Pasenadi Kosala having paid deep respect to the Buddha says "Reverened Sir, for me there is a logical consequence of the Lord's *Dhamma.* The fully self-awakened one is the Lord, well taught is *Dhamma* by the Lord, the Lord's Order of disciples fares along well". *(The Middle Length Sayings,* trs. by Horner, I. B.; London, 1957; II, p. 303). Kumāra Kassapa Thera in extolling the virtues of the Buddha and the Dhamma says in the *Theragāthā (v.* 201)

"All hail the Buddhas, and all hail the Norms.
Hail the blest system by our Master wrought
wherein he that doth hear may (be enrolled and) come
to realise a Norm like ours."

(Pslams of the Early Buddhists; trs. by Mrs. Rhys Davids; London, 1951; p.149). Although the *Samantakūṭavaṇṇanā* of the Vedeha Thera of Sri Lanka, written in the 13th century (Ed. Godakumbura, C. E.; London, 1958) contains twenty two verses devoted to eulogise the Samanala Rock (Srī Pāda or Adam's Peak in modern use) it gives pride of place to the life-story of the Bodhisatta Siddhatta upto the Enlightenment and in this work is found at the beginning of the text, a heart-throbbing eulogy of the Triad as follows (ibid. *vv.* 1-3-:

satatavitatakittiṃ dhasta – kandappadappaṃ
tibhavahitavidhānaṃ sabbalokekaketuṃ
amita matimanagghaṃ santidaṃ Merusāraṃ
Sugataṃ ahaṃ udāraṃ rupasāraṃ namāmi.

(I worship that excellent figure, the noble well-gone one whose fame is spread always everywhere, who has

destroyed the pride of Cupid, who has been beneficial in the three states of existences, and who is like a single banner unto the whole world, who is endowed with incalculable wisdom, tranquilled and strong like the Mount Meru).

Hataduritatusāram mohapankopatāpam
manakamalavikāsam jantunam sesakānam
kumatikumudanāsam Buddha - Pubbācalaggā
uditamahamudāram dhammabhānum namāmi

(I worship the Sun of the Doctrine arisen from the Buddha of the Eastern mountain, which has destroyed all the evil and has dried up the mud of infatuation, which has made the lotus of the minds of all beings to blossom forth and has destroyed the *kumudu* flowers of wrong views.

Sakalavimalasilam dhūtapāpārijālam
suranaramahaniyam pāhuneyyāhuneyyam
ujupathapatipannam puññakhettam janānam
ganamahamabhivande sāradam sādarena

(I salute with affection the entire Order of the Sangha endowed with unstained virtue, who have driven away the enemy of evil, who are praised by both men and gods, who are worthy of hospitality and of offerings, who live uprightly, who constitute the field of merit of the people.

The self-introduction by the Buddha to Cūla Sakuludāyi Thera (*M.* II, p. 38) referring to himself in the following manner, such as, the perfected one *(araham)*, fully Self-awakened one *(sammāsambuddho)*, endowed with right knowledge and conduct *(vijjācarana sampanno)*, well-gone *(sugato)*, knower of the worlds *(lokavidū)* incomparable *(anuttaro)*, charioteer of men to be tamed *(purisadamma-sārathi)*. *Teacher of the devas and men (sattā-devamanussānam) the Awakened One (Buddho)* the Lord *(Bhagavā)*, would have been the basis for the phrase frequently used by the generality of Buddhists the world over, to eulogise the Buddha. It runs as follows *"Itipi so Bhagavā araham Sammāsambuddho vijjācaranasampanno sugato lokavidū anuttaro purisadamma sārathi satthā devamanussānam Buddho Bhagavāti."* At the end of the discourse Sakuludāyi Thera is said to have mentioned "It is excellent Reverned Sir...... It is as if....., one might set upright what had been upset, or might disclose what was covered, or point out the way to one who had gone astray, or might bring an oil-lamp into the darkness so that those with vision might see material shapes even so in many a *figure is the Dhamma* made clear by the Lord *(abhikkhantam bhante; abhikkhantam bhante seyyathāpi bhante nikkujjitam vā ukkujjeyya, paticchannam vā vivareyya, mūlhasa vā maggamā-cikkheyya, andhakāre vā telapajjotamdhāreyya cakkhumanto rupāni dakkhintiti; evamevam bhagavatā anekappariyāyena dhamma pakāsito* : loc. cit.). While explaining to the bhikkhus how he had acquired supernormal qualities, Melajina Thera eulogises the Buddha as all-knowing *(sabbaññū)*, invincible (*aparājita*), caravan leader *(satthavāha)*, mighty hero *(mahāvira)* driver of men, peerless and grand, *(sārathinamvaruttama; Thag. v.* 132). Thera Jenta eulogisess the Buddha as the guide, Leader supreme, the perless chief among mankind and shining like the sun followed by the Order of *bhikkus (ibid. v.* 426). The Thera Kāludāyin expresses, the view that the Buddha is a hero who lifts the lustrous purity seven generations past wherever he be born, and he is vastly wise *(bhūripañña)* and is the god of gods *(devadevo)* and in the word of truth he is really a Seer (*Thag. v.* 533). Further he says *'pitu-pitā mayham tuvamsi Sakka, dhammename Gotama Ayyako siti (ibid. v.* 536).

"And father of my father art thou, Sakiyan,
To me thou Gotamid, art grandsire in the Norm";

Mrs. Rhys Davids, op. cit. p. 251). An excellent eulogy of the Buddha has been made in the *Nāgopama Sutta (A.* III, p. 344 ff.) by the Thera Udāyin when people started to praise the elephant Seta of King Pasenadi of Kosala.

Once brahmin named Sela wishing to enter the Order of the Buddha eulogised him thus: "Thou art the Buddha, our Teacher, the mighty Seer who subdued Māra *(Mārābhibhū)*, who has purged all the evil tendencies, helped the people to cross (the flood of life's eternal sea), who has transcended every cause of birth and shattered every sense - pleasure *(āsava)* and who like a lion banished every source of fear and dread *(pahinabhayabheravo;* ibid. *vv.* 839-840).

A good many eulogies of the Buddha have been sung by the Theris as well. Thus the story of Vasitthi who was pacified by the Buddha at the loss of her child by preaching his doctrine, eulogised the Buddha in the following manner. I saw him as he went in Mithilā, Great Tamer of untamed hearts, the Buddha, the Banisher of fear *(adantānam demetāram- Sambuddham akutohayam; Thig. v.* 135). Theri Sujātā refers to the Buddha as the light of the world *(loka pajjotam;* ibid. *v.* 148). Theri Mahāpajāpati Gotami refers to him as the dispeller of the burden of our ill *(dukkhakkhandham byapānudi;* ibid. *v.* 162). Further she says that the Buddha, being the worthiest of all beings, has released her and every being that hath life from all ill and sorrow *(yo mam dukkhā pamocesi aññañcabahukam janam;* ibid. *v.* 157). According to Theri Cālā Buddha is incomparable among men *(appatipuggala:* ibid. *v.* 185), and Theri Upacālā says that the Buddha is wholly wake and invincible. (ibid. *v.* 191). In Patācārā's view, the Buddha was the Guide of men who have to be restrained *(purisadamma sārathi;* ibid. v. 216). On seeing the arrival of the Buddha Sundari's mother says to Sundari:

"Passa Sundarā Satthāraṃ
hemavantaṃ harittacaṃ
adantānaṃ dametāraṃ
Sambuddhaṃ akutobhayaṃ"

(See Sundari, the Master fair in hue, His countenance as fine gold clear and bright, Him who is All-enlightened, Buddha, Best Tamer of untamed, never tasting fear (*Thig.* v. 333).

Upāli Sutta of the *Majjhima nikāya (M.* I, p. 371 ff) records the events that led to the conversion of Upāli, the householder after listening to whose eulogies his teacher, Niganthanātaputta, vomitted hot-blood and died then and there. He referred to the Buddha as wise *(dhīra)*, whose confusion is gone *(vigatamoha)*, whose mental barrenness is split asunder *(pabhinnakhila)*, who has won to victory *(vijitavijaya)*, who is without ill *(anigha)*, who is of very even mind *(susamacitta)*, and who is of grown moral habit *(vaddhasīla)*. *He is of lovely wisdom (sādhupañña)*, is stainless *(vimala)*, is without doubts *(akathaṅkatha)*, rejoicing *(tusita)*, and has renounced the material things of the world *(vantalokāmisa)*, he who is of joyful sympathy *(muditā)* who is a recluse *(katasamana)* a human being *(manuja)* who is sure *(asamsaya)*, skilled *(kusala)* driver of passions *(venayika)*, an excellent charioteer *(sarathi-vara)*, incomparable *(anuttara)*, shining *(ruciradhamma)*, doubtless *(nikkaṅkha)*, bringing light *(pabhāsakara)*, braking pride *(mānacchida)*, a hero *(vira)*, *the noblest of men (nisabha)*, immesurable *(appsmeya)*, deep *(gambhīra)*, won to knowledge *(monappatta)*, bringer of security *(khemaṅkara)*, knower *(veda)*, self-controlled *(samvutta)*, freed *(muta)*, supreme *(nāga)*, has destroyed the fetters *(khina-saṃyojana)* speaks amiably *(patimantaka)* purified *(dhona)* one whose flag is laid down*(pannadhaja)*, passionless *(vitarāga)* tamed *(danta)*, without mental impediments *(nippapñca)*, of three-fold wisdom *(tevijja)*, Brahma-attained *(Brahmapatta)*, skilled in the lines *(padaka)*, tranquilled *(passaddha)*, whose self is developed *(bhāvitatta)*, attained the attainable *(pattipatta)*, the expounder *(veyyākarana)* the one with recollection *(satimato)*, gifted with insight *(vipassi)*, attained to mastery *(vasippata)*, gone to the highest *(sammaggata)*, the meditator *(jhāyi)*, inwardly unobstructed *(anaugatantara)*, cleansed *(suddha)*, unattached *(asita)*, unaiming *(appahīna)* aloof *(pavivita)*, the attainer of the highest *(aggappatta)*, crossed over *(tinna)*, helper across *(tārayanta)*, of great wisdom *(mahā-(tinna)*, helper across *(tārayanta)*, of great wisdom *(mahāpañña)* confident *(visārada)* accomplished *(vitadhuma)*, the best of persons *(uttamapuggala)*, beyond measure *(atula)* and attained to the height of glory *(yasaggappatta)* etc. In eulogising the Buddha Sakka says, "I worship Him who has destroyed the dart of craving, the peerless Buddha, the mighty hero, the kinsman the sun *(ādicca-bandhu)*, Enlightened One, the Supreme Teacher, who could not be compared with any other in the worlds of gods and men (*D.* II, pp. 287ff).

Matrceta's *Śatapañcaśataka* (ed. Shackleton Bailey, Cambridge, 1951, *vv.* 1-150) which is widely popular in many Buddhist countries, presents an eulogy of the Buddha in twelve sections namely, the praise of causes *(hetustava)*, of incomparability *(nirūpamastava)*, of wonders *(adbhūtastava)*, of form *(rūpastava)*, of pity *(karunāstava)*, of speech *(vacanastava)*, of teaching *(śasansatava)*, of the benefits he confers on the world *(pranidhistava)*, of guidance *(mārgāvatārastava)*, of hardships he bore *(duskarastava)*, of skill *(kauśalastava)* and of freedom from debt *(anrnyastava)*.

In praise of causes the Buddha is said to be a friend of strangers, a kinsmen without a family tie, who has given his own flesh without expecting any gratification. It is not from the fear of the evil way *(durgatibhayāt)*, nor seeking after the durable way *(abhiprārthayatā)*, but from mere purity of heart he has made righteousness his habit. It is mentioned at one place "Lord, that pity which regardless of pain though cut in pieces you often showed even to murderous beings, that seed of full Enlightenment, your jewel of mind, you know its esence, O Brave One. The rest are far therefrom" (ibid. p.155).

"yad rujānirapekṣasyā
cchidyamānasya tesakṛt
vadhakeṣv api sattveṣu
kāruṇyam abhavat prabho:
samyaksambodhibījasya
cittaratnasya tasya te
tvam eva vira sārajño
dūre tasyetaro jana" (ibid. *vv.* 18-19).

The Buddha is said to have fostered energy *(virya)* which was superhuman. By striving for three incalculable periods of time he has gained the supreme place.

Eulogising his way of incomparability *(nirūpama)*, Buddha is described as having attained pre-eminence in the world not by envying the distinguished, not despising the lowly and not competing with equals, but through his devotion to the causes of virtue and not to their results. It is said of the Buddha thus:

"Tathātmā pracayaṃ nītas
tvayā sucaritair yathā
puṇyāyatanatām prāptāny
api pādarājaṃsi te" (ibid. *v.* 29)

"You raised yourself to such a height by good actions that even the dust of your feet became a receptacle of merit." The author says that the virtues accumulated by the Buddha have been accumulated by no other person. Further he says, that the darkness of ignorance is stunned by the light of Buddha's knowledge. He is being compared to the jewel of the law, by gaining which he became pre-eminent.

Regarding the praises of the Buddha's wonders *(adbhuta)*, the author mentions that the Buddha's victory over Māra is trivial but his vast slaughter of impurities accomplished that same night after conquering Māra is really wonderful. His victory over the false believers *(tīrthaka)* is also considered as a wonder. Further the author says "what praise could be found for you who has no revulsion or inclination towards both *arahants* or *tīrthakas*". He is said to have had no attachment to virtues or virtuous. Buddha's form is said to please the eye of him who has seen it a hundred times as well as of him who views it for the first time, both alike.

In the praise of compassion *(karuṇā)* it is mentioned that the Buddha was held so long in *saṃsāra* knowing its evils so well by the great compassion he had for others.

In eulogising the Buddha's speech *(vacana)* the author says that it was wholly sweet; when necessary it was somewhat otherwise, but every word of his was well said, because it achieved its purpose. The words coming out of his mouth have been compared to the nectar flowing from the ocean, and to a rain-cloud laying the dust of passion and the sun thrusting aside the darkness of ignorance. His speech is said to be free of falsehood, of confusion and it is easily understood.

His words are said to cheer the afflicted, strike terror into the heedless, alarm the lovers of pleasure, please the wise, strengthen the intelligent, and dispel the darkness of the slow-witted. In author's word:

> *"apakarṣati dṛṣṭibhyo*
> *nirvāṇaṃ upakarṣati*
> *doṣān niṣkaranti guṇān*
> *vākayaṃ to'bhipravarṣti"* (ibid. *v.*79)

"Your sayings draw men away from false opinions, draw them to nirvāṇa, draw out their faults and rain down virtues".

In discussing the praise of teaching *(śāsana)* it is said:

> *"ekāyanaṃ sukhopāyaṃ*
> *svanubandhi niratyayaṃ*
> *ādimadhyantakalyāṇaṃ*
> *tava nānyasya śāsanaṃ* (ibid. *v.* 82)

"Your teaching is the only path pleasant in method, good in result, free from moral fault, fair in beginning, middle and end. "Buddha's teaching is said to have brought fear to all the *tīrthakas*, agony to Māra and cheer to gods and men.

In eulogising the vow *(praṇidhi)* of the Buddha, it is stated:

> *"śravaṇaṃ tarpayati te*
> *prasādayati darśanaṃ*
> *vacanaṃ hlādyati te*
> *vimocayati śāsanaṃ* (ibid. *v.* 92).

"To hear you brings satisfaction, to see you brings tranquility, your speech refreshes and your teaching liberates". Further it is said that his birth rejoices the people; growth delights them, activity benefits them and ceasing destroys them. Buddha has been compared to a lake of merit, pure through perfect conduct, calm through perfect meditation and unshakable through perfect wisdom. He is said to be the refuge of those who fear existence, the resource of those who desire release. He is charming, because blameless, lovely for excellence of speech and form, wealth-bringing from the accomplishment of every aim and propitious because of the receptacle of his virtues.

In eulogising his guidance *(margāvatāra)*, the Buddha is said to be one who admonishes the stubborn, bridles the headstrong, sets straight the crooked, urges on the slow-paced, and puts under the yoke the tamed etc. He had pity for the afflicted, good-will towards the happy, compassion for those in calamity, benevolence to all, affection even to the hostile, tenderness even to the fierce and granted all hospitality to all inspite of their birth, age, caste, place or time.

Praising the ardous *(duṣkara)* deeds of the Buddha, the author mentions that he has even partaken insipid food, has been without food, trod tough paths, slept on mud trampled by cattle and for the sake of those who were to be trained he has even undertaken service attended by insult and changed his dress and speech. He acted as a friend intent on good towards an enemy intent on ill and overcome the revilers by patience, the malicious by blessing, the slanderers by truth and the injurious by kindness.

When speaking about the skills *(kauśala)*, it is mentioned that as a result of the Buddha's skill in expedients the harsh became gentle, the niggard bountiful, the cruel tender-hearted, and he brought about tranquillity of the senses in Nanda, humilty in Mānastabdha and mercy in Aṅgulimāla. Sometimes he is said to have not spoken when questioned, spoken after having accosted them and

spoken later after arousing their desire well knowing the time and the moods of various people. It is thus said of the Buddha, that he first applied the law like dye on a lean garment, having first produced mental health by precepts of charity and so forth, for it is said:

"Pūrvaṃ dānakathādyābhiś
cetasyutpādya saṃsthavaṃ
tatodharmo gatamale
vastre raṅga ivarpitaḥ" (ibid. v. 128). Further is it said that the Buddha tried to rescue the miserable world from the dreadful hell of *saṃsāra.*

In Matraceta's last praise of the Buddha dealing with the Buddha's freedom from debt *(anṛṇya)* he says, that even those who have attained *parinirvāna* are not free from debt to the Buddha. He is said to have toiled for the sake of others, made the heedless heedful, declared the destruction of sins, laid open the delusion of Māra, told the evil nature of *saṃsāra* and showed them the region free from fear. For a long time the Buddha promoted his Doctrine on earth out of compassion for the world, brought up many worthy disciples able to help the three worlds. Buddha is said to have declared at one place thus "my Body of the Law and my Body of Form, both exist for others' sake *(parārthav eva me dharmarūpā kāyuity;* ibid. v. 145). On this statement the author says that the Buddha has attained *parinirvāṇa* after having transformed his Body of Law in its entirety to the virtuous and having split his Body of Form into tiny fragments.

The following verse uttered by the Buddha to Thera Dhammika has the flavour of an eulogy of the Dhamma:

"Dhammo have rakkhati dhammcārim
dhammo sucinno sukhamāvahāti:
esānisaṃso dhamme sucinne
na duggatiṃ gacchati dhammacārī (Thag. v. 303).

Dhamma protects him, who practices it and happiness comes to him who lives accordingly. This will be the reward to him who lives according to the Dhamma and such a person would never go to a miserable state.

An apt example of an eulogy of the Order of bhikkus could be traced in the *Dhammacetiya Sutta (M.* II, pp. 118 ff.) where king Pasenadi, while having a conversation with the Buddha says "I, Reverend Sir, see monks here faring a perfectly fulfilled *(āpānakitikaṃ),* perfectly purfied *(paripunnaṃ parisuddhaṃ)* Brahma-faring *(brahmacariyaṃ),* all their lives long until their last breath *(yāvajīvaṃ).* I... see monks here living on friendly terms *(samagge)* and harmonious *(sammodamāne)* not quarrelling *(avivādamāne),* like milk and water blending *(khīrodakībhūto)* regarding one another with the eye of effection *(aññamaññaṃ piyacakkhūhi: The Middle Length Sayings* Vol. II, Trs. Horner, I. B., London, 1957, p.303).

It is not only of the Triad, but also of the leading disciples of the Buddha such as Sāriputta, Moggallāna and Kassapa, one comes across of eulogies in the Buddhist texts. The *Anupada Sutta (M.* III, pp. 25ff), is one long eulogy of Sāriputta by the Buddha. It ideals with a praise of his learning and understanding and discusses at length how a disciple like Sāriputta has risen to mastery and perfection in noble virtue, noble concentration, noble perception and noble deliverence. Buddha is said to have told the bhikkhus that Sāriputta was proficient of great wisdom *(mahāpañño),* wide wisdom *(puthu)* bright wisdom *(hāsu)* swift wisdom *(javana),* acute wisdom *(tikkha)* and piercing wisdom *(nibbedhika).* For half a month Sāriputta is said to have had uniterrupted insight *(anupadadhammavipassanaṃ)* into things and thereby attained arahantship (*MA.* IV, p.86). Buddha-describes the various stages as to how through Sāriputta's zealous practice he attained to this stage of life. He is said to have attained to mastery going beyond the Ariyan moral habit *(ariyasmin sīlasmin),* Ariyan concentration *(samādhisṁ)* Ariyan wisdom *(paññāya)* and Ariyan freedom *(vimuttiyā).* Buddha mentions further that Sāriputta is the Lord's own son *(Bhagavato putto),* born of his mouth *(mukhato jāto),* born of Dhamma *(dhammajo),* formed by Dhamma (dhammanimitto) and heir to Dhamma *(dhammadāyādo),*not an heir to material things *(no āmisadāyado).* In his own words the Buddha says *"Sāriputto bhikkhave, Tathāgatena anuttaraṃ dhammacakkaṃ pavattitaṃ sammadeva anuppavateti"* (ibid. p. 29); "Sāriputta, monks roll on rightly the incomparable wheel of Dhamma set rolling by the Tathāgata). An eulogy of Moggallāna was sung by a celestial-nymph who was in her previous birth a Candāli, who at the request of Moggallāna, having worshipped the Buddha, was born in this manner. She refers to Moggallāna in the following way, "Mighty one of great majesty, I pay homage to you who are canker free *(khīnāsavaṃ),* stainless *(vigatarajaṃ),* imperturbable *(anejaṃ)* and who is seated in solitude alone in the forest (*Vva.* p. 107).

While praising the virtues of Kassapa Thera Bhadda Kapilāni Theri states:

"Son of the Buddha and heir is he,
Great Kassapa, master of self, serene
The vision of far, bygone days is his,
Ay, heaven and hell no secrets hold for him.
Death too of rebirth hath he won, and else
A seer is he of mystic lore profound.
By these three arms (three wisdoms)
Of learning doth he stand
Thrice-wise, among gods and men elect sublime"

(*Pslams of the Early Buddhists*, Trs. Mrs. Rhys Davids, London, 1948, p. 49, *vv.* 63, 64).

A large number of eulogies are also found in the Tibetan *Tripitaka* as well. These eulogies are mainly of the Bodhisattavas, gods and goddesses such as Avalokiteśvara, Mañjughoṣa, Tārā, Vajravarāhī etc. (*Tm.* Nos. 2739; 2712; 1693; 1603).

Indumati Karunaratne

EUTHANASIA (mercy killing or aid in dying) is the administration of easy and quiet death, solely on humanitarian considerations, specially on terminally ill individuals who are undergoing great pain and suffering. Generally a doctor or such a qualified person is supposed to administer euthanasia, and the means adopted for this is expected to be merciful. Sometimes euthanasia is administered with the consent of the individual who is suffering, and in such instances it is referred to as voluntary euthanasia. Euthanasia has the characteristics of a positive act involving inducement of death, whereas the act of refraining from needlessly prolonging, by medical means, the life of a person whose death is imminent, seem to be a rather negative aspect of euthanasia.

This brief explanation clearly distinguishes euthanasia from both intentional murder and willful suicide, for, on the one hand it is devoid of murderous intention and on the other it has to be administered by another, or one has to be assisted in dying. Hence enthanasia is sometimes referred to as assisted suicide. It is also clear that administration of euthanasia involves intention as an element and, however humanitarian this intention is, it has deprivation of life of another (even with his consent) as its consequence. Hence euthanasia lends itself liable to both ethical evaluation of secular as well as religious ethicists and legal judgement of jurists.

It is seen that in the early stages the propriety of administering euthanasia had been a problem mainly confined to medical ethics. At present, however, due to a number of reasons, this problem has overstepped the boundaries of medical ethics and spilled over into the area of general ethics, generating much public interest. This is so mainly in Western countries, specially in the United States, where numerous organizations such as 'Americans Against the Human Suffering,' 'International Anti-euthanasia Task Force,' have been formed to represent interests for and against euthanasia.

A general survey of the problem of euthanasia reveals that it is being viewed mainly from three different perspectives. There is one group which is in favour of euthanasia while there is another totally opposed to it. A third group that adopts somewhat an intermediate attitude between these extremes holds the view that the law, at least, should adopt a neutral approach.

Those who are in favour of euthanasia and support its morality are influenced by the sympathy towards those who are suffering. They are impelled by humanitarian reasons. They argue that no one has a moral right to prolong needless, protracted pain of terminally ill patients who are destined to be in 'permanent vegetative state' for the rest of their lives. They insist that the patient or his doctor should be allowed to decide whether such a patient's life should be mercifully terminated. It is cruel, they opine, to prevent sufferers from getting a quick, easy death, and that it is nothing but proper that wishes, aspirations and interests of every human being ought to be taken into account by every other human being who has dealings with him.

As against these humanitarian pleas the opponents of euthanasia adduce arguments based partly on religious and partly on pragmatic grounds. Basing their arguments mainly on Christian theology they point out that life belongs to God alone and that it is not permissilble for any one, in his own authority to terminate it. Regarding the suffering undergone by the terminally ill they point out that some suffering is necessary to make amends for the sins of life, and that the God knows how much suffering each man deserves. According to their view suffering is a means of spiritual growth and, hence not an absolute evil.

Those who oppose euthanasia for pragmatic reasons give vent to some very justifiable apprehensions regarding the possible abusing of euthanasia. They envisage situations where patients might be forced to undergo euthanasia. They also point out the possibility of a patient consenting to or a doctor requesting for euthanasia for a illness diagnose as terminal which subsequently turns out to be wrong. Further they are apprehensive of doctors who are professionals, themselves turning out to be hired killers, running clinics set-up solely for the administration of euthanasia. These fears have increased due to the fast decline in social values, loosening of family and social bonds, spiraling cost of medical care and maintaining disabled and old persons. (See *The Encyclopeadia of Philosophy*, Ed. Paul Edward, Macmillan Publishing Co., 1967, Vol, 8, pp. 43, 44; *ERE.* q.v. euthanasia).

The few who adopt the intermediate position are also prompted by humanitarian reasons and advocate legal non-interference on this issue.

What it the Buddhist attitude on a vexed problem of this nature? Like almost all other major religions Buddhi-

sm too does not condone any act that results in the deprivation of life of any living being. This is more so with with regard to cases involving deprivation of life of human beings, and specially when the act is performed with intention or awareness of the ensuing result i.e. the deprivation of life. It arrives at this ethical standpoint of abstention from killing on reasons completely different from those relied on by Christianity. Buddhism, unlike Christianity, does not believe in a supreme God and, therefore, does not accept the view that God has supreme dominion over life. It proceeds from the basic, practical assumption that life is most dear to all and that every one has a fundamental right to enjoy a fear-free life. To guarantee this fundamental right it has enjoined a precept which admonishes its followers to abstain from destroying life. To facilitate the practice of this precept Buddhism encourages the cultivation of non-violence ***(ahiṃsā)*** and compassion ***(karuṇā)*** towards all beings.

Besides, Buddhism does not consider individuals to be separate, non-related solitary entities in a society. Individuals are units of an integrated whole, related to each other, inter-acting and influencing each other, dependant an each other and bound to each other by varied family and social bonds creating duties and obligation. Therefore any matter that pertains to life as well as death of an individual has family and social repurcussions. Hence deprivation of life of an individual naturally has wide social dimensions. Thus it is natural for Buddhism not to condone any act that involves deprivation of life irrespective of the motive behind it.

Though one could easily see the justification for not condoning euthanasia, one may wonder whether a religion that promotes the well-being of all and inculcates compassion towards all could possibly favour the prolongation of pain and suffering of terminally ill persons. In response to such a querry one could, besides citing pragmatic reasons such as the non-infallibility of medical diagnosis, the possibility of administering euthanasia against the wish of the patient etc., also adduce religious reasons which clarify and explain the Buddhist standpoint on this issue.

According to Buddhism the whole saṃsaric existence is suffering ***(dukkha)*** of which illness ***(vyādhi)*** is only one aspect. Death is only a violent break in this continuous saṃsāric process, and brings about only a temporary end to suffering which is bound to recur with the next birth. There is no assurance that the next birth or the ones that follow will be free of such terminal illnesses. Therefore, an attempt to put a total end to suffering by deprivation of life is futile for, it is only a temporary remedy, a remedy which might sometimes prove to be unwarranted.

Instead Buddhism suggests a different remedy. It encourages the inculcation of a realistic attitude to the problem of life. When one truly understands that life is subject to all type of suffering and that life is impermanent, one will be able to develop an attitude of enlightened detachment which will enable one to remain without being unduly purturbed by the mass of suffering including grave illnesses one has to undergo during the life span.

Against this explanation one could pause the question whether a terminally ill person could view life and his suffering in this enlightened perspective? All terminally ill persons are not mentally 'dead'. Even the mental state of a person who is virtually in a 'vegitative state' is not exactly known. If such a person's mental faculties function then he could be made to reflect about his condition on these lines enabling him to come to terms with it. What is more relevant herein is the fact that if a person had through-out his life developed such a realistic approach to the problem of life he would not be driven to a state of utter despair compelling him to consent to or request for euthanasia. An everage person who has no realistic vision of things will in all probability prefer euthanasia to suffering. Apparently such an attitude is unBuddhistic, for such an attitude is the result of lack of true understanding of the problem.

The rejection of euthanasia as a remedy to ameliorate suffering does not mean that Buddhism is adopting a non-humanitarian attitude towards the terminally ill. It rejects this because it is futile, unrealistic, harmful and involves deprivation of life. In rejecting euthanasia Buddhism does not advocate also the abandaning of the patient. On the contrary it admonishes all those who are concerned with the patient to show him kindness, compassion, to nurse and care for him tenderly making him feel wanted.

One may point out that it is highly authoritation on the part of the society to prevent a terminally ill person from requesting for quick, easy death. This may sound a reasonable argument when considering the fact that Buddhism upholds the principle that one is one's own master and that one has the freedom of choice. But a close analysis of the issue will make it clear that such arguments are ill-founded. Primarily, as shown earlier, such request and consent for euthanasia itself is totally unBuddhistic, and are based on lack of a true vision of the problems of life. Besides, a persons in such a state cannot by any means be competent to decide on such a vital issue. He is making a decision in favour of euthanasia because he is lacking a true vision of the problem. Due to this ignorance of his he is unable to thoroughly reflect on the problem and, therefore, arrives at this decision only being goaded by one of the evil courses of actions or biases (***agati*** q.v.) i.e. impulse ***(chanda)*** animosity ***(dosa)*** fear ***(bhaya)*** or ignorance ***(moha)***. He may be impelled through frustration; his pain and suffering may be such

that he develop an animosity towards his ownself and others and this might prompt him to take such an unrealistic attitude. Similarly the impelling cause may be fear or total ignorance. Such a decision is arrived not by thorough reflection *(yoniso manasikāra)* but through the dictates of the above mentioned biases. This applies also to those others who take decisions on behalf of the terminally ill patients. Though those who decide are convinced that they are arriving at such a decision after evaluating the problem objectly, the fact remains that their out-look is subjective; though they sincerely feel that they are acting under the dictates of moral rectitude they are really being motivated by personal interest.

This Buddhist attitude is not one adopted in vaccum nor applied only in the abstract. Incidents approximating euthanasia are referred to in Buddhist texts such as the *Vinaya Piṭaka* (II, p. 68 ff). One such incident refers to a case of mass euthanasia. Some monks who after developing contemplation on the impurity of the body became so ashamed of their bodies that they became completely disgusted with life. They were not physcially ill but mentally upset that they could not bear to live any longer. Life was a misery for them and so they deprived one another of life *(aññamaññam pi jīvitā voropenti).* Some even approached a sham recluse called Migalandika, whom the text describes as a hireling for a bowl and robe, and induced him to deprive them of their lives. This is neither murder nor suicide but a form of euthanasia though the means adopted may not have been merciful. As the victim monks as well as the who administered euthanasia were aware of the consequence that was to follow this lend itself to ethical judgement. When the matter was referred to the Buddha he declared: 'Whatever monk should intentionally deprive a human of life or should look about so as to be his knife bringer (i.e. one who is instrumental in deprivation of life) he is also one who is defeated *(pārājikā)*, he is not in communion *(asaṃvāsa)*.

The same text (*Vin.* II, p. 73 f.) records another incident where the group of six miscreant monks *(chabbaggiyā)* with the corrupt motive of enjoying the pleasure of the company of a woman induces her husband who was ill to deprive himself of his life. To achieve this they praise death as against evil, difficult life that was being led by him. Convinced by these inducements the ill husband takes detrimental food etc., and, brings about his own death.

This is more a case of voluntery euthanasia than simple suicide. The victim does not directly commit suicide but brings about gradual and somewhat easy death on himself and this he does with awareness.

Regarding this Buddha says: Whatever monk should intentionally deprive a human being of his life or should look about so as to be his knife-bringer, or should praise the beauty of death, or should incite (anyone) to death saying, 'Hello there, my man, of what use to you is this evil difficult life', or should deliberately and purposely *(iticittamano cittasaṅkappo)* in various ways praise the beauty of death or should incite anyone to death he also is one who is defeated *(pārājika)*, he is one who is not in communion (*asaṃvāsa*).

The same source records another instance which comes still closer to a case of euthanasia. This refers to some monks who out of compassion *(kāruññena)* induce an gravely ill monk to give up his life. Unlike in previous instances in this particular case their intention is purely humanitarian, to help a colleague of theirs to put an end to his suffering. But even this humanitarian act of inducement, as it results in deprivation of life, is categorized as an act involving defeat *(pārājika).* This clearly illustrates the Buddhist criterion adopted to evaluate the ethical quality of an action. Motivation alone is not the criterion. Consequence *(vipāka)* of an action too is equally important in such an evaluation.

All instances cited herein are from the *Vinaya* and involving monks. Yet it could be safely surmised that this is the general Buddhist attitude to the question of euthanasia whether it involves clergy or lay and whatever is the motive behind it. This illustrates also the Buddhist position that humanitarianism and deprivation of life do not go hand in hand.

S. K. Nanayakkara

EVAM ME SUTAṂ, meaning, thus have I heard, is a stereotyped formula usually occurring at the beginning of a sutta. It is generally held that this formula was introduced by the recitor who rehearsed the suttas at the first council. Tradition regards Ānanda, the treasurer of the Dhamma *(Dhamma-bhaṇḍāgārika)*, to be the recitor of the *Sutta Piṭaka* at the first council and attributes this formula to him (*DA.* I, 26ff).

But J. Filliozat does not endorse this traditional view. He suggests that this formula seems to originate from the compiler who is supposed to have written down suttas at the council where it was recited. Further, he rejects the traditional view-point on the ground that this formula would fit badly in the words of the recitor who was a witness of the events, who spoke of himself as an eye-witness, and not as having heard *(L'inde classioue,* II, p. 333). Though his suggestion is not quite improbable the evidence he cites in support of his suggestion as well as the ground on which he rejects the traditional view-point are not convincing.

In the first place it is extremely doubtful whether scribes were present at any one of the councils. If the recitor was an eye-witness of the events, as Filliozat thinks, he should have been the person who recited the suttas at the first council, namely Ānanda. It is quite evident that Ānanda was not present on all occasions when the Buddha preached. One of the conditions on which Ānanda agreed to serve the Buddha as his permanent attendant was that the Buddha should repeat to him any discourse delivered in his absence. This strengthens the view that he was not an eye-witnes of all events, and therefore, it is possible that Ānanda may have used this formula, at least, when introducing such suttas.

Even if he was an eye-witness there is no reason why he could not have used this formula. Though the description of the proceedings of the first council does not throw much light on the manner in which the rehearsing of the Dhamma was done, it is quite probable that besides answering the questions regarding the place and the persons to whom the particular suttas were preached, Ānanda must have recited the suttas as he had heard them from the Buddha. In doing this Ānanda was not merely detailing a series of events he had witnessed, but reproducing *verbatim* what he had heard from the Buddha. Therefore, it is quite likely that he began the recitation of the suttas by using this introductory formula. This also makes it clear why only the Dhamma was introduced with this formula and not the Vinaya which was rehearsed in the same council. Unlike doctrinal discourses delivered at different places matters of discipline were discussed in assemblies convened by the Buddha himself and, Upāli, being the chief repository of the Vinaya *(vinaya agganikkhitto)*, may have been present in these assemblies. Thus, in the first council Upāli was speaking as an eye-witness, and therefore, may not have felt the necessity of using this particular formula.

It is also probable that Ānanda prefaced his recitation with the formula *evam me sutam* in order to attach authority to the Dhamma he was rehearsing for, the only authority he could cite was the fact that he had heard it from the Buddha himself. On this point the reply given by Purāna to monks when they requested him to submit himself to the chanting is note worthy. Purāna said "well chanted by the elders are Dhamma and Vinaya. But in the way that I heard it in the Buddha's presence, that I recieved it in his presence, in that same way will I bear it in mind" *(yath'eva mayā bhagavato sammukhā sutaṃ, sammukhā paṭiggahitaṃ tath'evāhaṃ dhāressāmi: Vin.* II, 290). The Dhamma, regarded as the only refuge after the *parinibbāna* of the Buddha, had to be rehearsed authoritatively. The task of rehearsing the Dhamma fell upon Ānanda who had been a learner *(sekha)* until the day of the council. Therefore, it is still probable that he cited the fact he had heard it from the Buddha himself.

It is not known exactly what suttas were rehearsed in the first council. Tradition as well as textual evidence show that the *Sutta Pitaka*, as we have it now, has been subject to much editing. It may be that the editors, either in keeping with the general pattern followed in the first recital or for the purpose of citing authority, prefixed the formula, *evaṃ me sutaṃ* to suttas in general and this is why even the suttas delivered by Ānanda on his own initiative are prefaced with this formula (*M.* I, 513). However, it should be noted that there are some suttas without this formula.

The Sanskrit Buddhist sūtras seem to have followed the general pattern of Pali suttas in prefixing the formula *evaṃ mayā śrutaṃ*. This formula is found in both Mahāyāna and Tantric sūtras.

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EVIL. See GOOD AND EVIL.

EVOLUTION is a term which, in general, means unfolding, opening out, sequence or development. It has applications in one or more of the above senses in fields like mathematics, chemistry, cosmology, biology and the social sciences. In biology the term evolution refers to the development of the living organisms, particularly as outlined in the Darwinian Theory of Evolution; in cosmology to the origin and the development of Earth and the heavenly bodies; in chemistry to the evolution of different chemical elements and compounds since the origin of the universe. The evolution of society and social structures and organisations come under social evolution. The psychological aspects of evolution are two fold: the evolution of psyche from biological or other bases and the role of psychological factors in evolution. The present article will deal with biological, cosmological and chemical evolution as well as the relevant social scientific and psychological aspects of evolution. In each of the above areas, evolution has two related but distinct aspects: the origins, and the evolution since the origins.

The article will first outline the Darwinian Theory of evolution, indicating the ideas of evolution in the West which preceded it, and development of the Darwinian view up to contemporary times, leading to what could be called neo-Darwinism. This will also touch on the relevant ideas of cosmology and chemical evolution and finally on the spill-over to the sociological and the psychological evolution. It will next touch on criticisms of Darwinian Theory on religion and philosophy in the West. The article will then go on to views of evolutionary

theory in Chinese and Indian systems paving the way to outline a view of evolution seen in the Buddhist literature.

A comparative study of modern views and the Buddhist account will conclude the article.

History of the Idea of Evolution in the West: The way life originated on Earth had been viewed in the West in two major ways: spontaneous generation of life from matter; creation (by God). Both these views could accommodate the spontaneous generation or creation of a few species (of organisms) and their evolution into other species later on. For once generated or created, pro-creation could guarantee the continuity of the same species and there is room for other species to evolve from the original species. But a theory of creation, in particular, could also take the view that all the different species in existence were created. Christians for example, believe in the creation of all species by God, and this view implies the absoluteness of the species. Aristotle seemed to have believed in spontaneous generation, but whether he believed in a process of evolution is not clear.

The idea of evolution of species - that is, the development of one species from another - seems to have occurred to some naturalists in the post-renaissance Europe. Swedish naturalist Carolus Linnaeus (1707-78); French naturalists Comte de Buffon (1707-88) and Chevalier de Lamarch (1744-1820); German poet Goethe (1749-1832); English scientist and poet Erasmus Darwin (1731-1802 - Charles' grandfather); are some of the early contributors to this view.

At the very beginning of the nineteenth century, in 1801, Lamarck published his views and developed them in his subsquent works. In these he held that all speices, including man, descended from other species. In the first half of the nineteenth century many others held or discussed a view of evolution of species (see, for example, the Historical Sketch which Darwin gives at the beginning of his *The Origin of Species*) but it had little acceptance until the mid-nineteenth century. Then, in July 1858, both Alfred Russell Wallace (1823-1913) and Charles Robert Darwin (1809-82) gave addresses to the Linnean Society in London enunciating the principle of natural selection as the basis of the evolution of species. And Darwin, after an year's hectic writing, published his classic, *The Origin of Species* by means of Natural Selection or the Preservation of Favoured Race in the Struggle for Life, a work that condensed findings of research for over 20 years, in 1859, and since then, Darwin's Theory of Evolution has been the paradigm in biological science.

Darwinism and Neo-Darwinism: *The Origin of Species,* not only provided a body of evidence that existing plants and animals cannot have been created in their present forms and that these must have evolved by gradual transformation of earlier forms, but also established a principle or mechanism by which this transformation would take place, viz: natural selection. This principle maintained that species produce large numbers of progeny, and in the struggle for existence, those members of the species more adaptable to the environment or the conditions of life, i.e., those who could cope with the environment better, survived and the others perished.

Although Darwinsin gained ground during the second half of the nineteenth century, it came in for a lot of criticism by biologists during the first quarter of the twentieth century. Some thought the principle of adaptation was teleological, others criticized it as too materialistic and not taking sufficient notice of will and other psychological factors; the geneticists thought mutation was responsible for positive evolutionary change and assigned to natural selection only the negative role of getting rid of unsuccessful variants.

But these objections petered out. Once it was shown that acquired characters were not inherited, psychological factors like will were discounted. Large mutations-errors in self copying are rare and the blending of heredity due to crossing and the regressive character of mutants as explained by the "particulate theory" of inheritance were considered to solve the problems that Darwinism faced. "Neo-Darwinism, as we may call the modern theory of gradual transformation (of species) operated by natural selection acting on a Mendelian genetic outfit of self-reproducing and self-varying genes is fully accepted by the great majority of the students of evolution." (Sir Julian Huxley in Introduction to the Mentor edition of the *The Origin of Species,* 1958, p. XV).

Chemical and Cosmological Evolution: Darwinism postulated that living organisms on Earth first evolved from matter-probably in the seas and these organisms grew in complexity by evolution through billions of years. The origin of life from matter leads to the question of chemical evolution which made life possible and this in turn takes one to the problem of the origin and the evolution of the universe itself. The view of cosmological and inorganic evolution that the contemporary scientists favour could be outlined in the following terms.

The Big Bang Theory of the origin of the universe (at least the phase of universe that we are in) hypothesizes that when the universe had its origin about 15 billion years ago all the matter and energy in the universe was created by the huge explosion of a primordial "atom" which had all matter in a physically singular state. Soon after, the whole of matter was a dense high temperature plasma consisting of particles and anti-particles and radiation. The plasma expanded leading to the formation of the nuclei of the simplest and the lightest elements,

hydrogen and helium, resulting in clouds of atoms of hydrogen and helium. Gravitational forces made these clouds collapse into lumps of matter leading to the formation of nebulae, galaxies and stars. The stars burn converting hydrogen and helium into heavier elements including nitrogen, oxygen and carbon. Ageing stars collapse and blow off their outer shells spraying the elements thus formed into space and gravity again pulls them together leading to the formation of other stars and planets.Earth is a planet which was thus formed, circling about the Sun, nearly five billion years ago. Earth, as it formed, was a volcanic mass and there was no life on it. The solar radiation, lightning, and volcanic activity on Earth led to the formation of chemical compounds, once Earth's surface cooled and sufficient water was formed. This chemical bonding led to the formation of amino acids, the building blocks of proteins, and organic compounds like adenine, which, with other nucleotides, go into the construction of DNA, which stores hereditary information, and RNA, the worker that makes proteins in accordance with the DNA instructions. The process led to the formation of a chemical combination which could make copies of itself. This ability of organic compounds to reproduce is, in a sense, the first form of life.

The first living being is thought to have been a uni-cell organism-bacteria or blue green algae — living in the spread of oceans that covered most of the Earth at the time. Life is considered to have begun on Earth over 4.5 billion years ago. It then evolved, passing through the ages of reptiles and dinosaurs, and gradually, life conquered land and air. Dinosaurs ruled the Earth for 100 million years and with their extinction mammals emerged. About some 5 million years ago, the pre-humans or hominids would have appeared, after they diverged (or evolved) from the great African apes. One hominid species made it to the Homo Sapiens – the modern man.

Psycho-Social Evolution: Scientists now extra-polate Darwinian evolution to cover the psycho-social or the human sector, in addition to the biological and the inorganic sector considered earlier. As inorganic evolution led to biological evolution, the latter, in the line leading to man, developed an organization of awarness to a level at which experience could be stored in the individual and transmitted to later generations. This initiated the psychosocial phase of evolution. It produced laws, philosophies, machines, works of art and science. The human phase is the phase of self-reproducing mind. The evolution in this phase is the evolution of different cultures which comprise of social organization, agricultural and industrial techniques, values and ideals and so on. Cultural evolution also has a selective mechanism — psycho-social selection — but unlike biological natural selection which operates blindly, psycho-social selection always has an awareness of aim or purpose and the principles of psycho-social selection also evolve with evolution. Increasingly the aim is getting away from mere survival or complexity of organization or control over environment and reaching towards fuller realization of the potentialities of the human species.

Critics of Darwinism: Majority of the scientists today consider that neo-Darwinism has genetic, palaeontological, morphological, phylogenetic and other evidence in favour of it. But Darwinism had critics from its very inception, and as was seen, through to its development to neo-Darwinism. Its materialistic, reductionst and "evolution by chance" approach has been criticized, and the mechanism it outlines has been considered to be inadequate to account for evolution by some scientists.

Panspermia Theory: While Darwinism maintains that life on Earth originated here, versions of panspermia theory — the view that life originally reached Earth from outer space — have come up for centuries. In contemporary times, two distinguished astronomers Fred Hoyle and Chandra Wickremasinghe have attempted to revive it. The position argued for by them is that, periodically, sperms from outer space reach the Earth. Orginally life had to reach Earth by way of these sperms, although evolution on Earth could have led to developed species. Since some of the ideas of these two scientists would be of interest for the discussion later in this article, a few quotations which exemplify their position is put down here.

> "The advantage of looking to the whole universe (for the creation of life) is that it offers a staggering range of possibilities which are not available here on Earth. For one thing it offers the possibility of high intelligence within the universe that is not God. It offers many levels of intelligence rising upwards from ourselves.
>
> ...Genes are to be regarded as Cosmic. They arrive at the Earth as DNA or RNA, either as fully fledged cells, viruses, viroids or simply as separated fragments of genetic material. The genes are ready to function when they arrive.
>
> ...Large stores of genetic material became frozen and so preserved indefinitely in the outer regions of the solar system during the early days when our system was formed about 4.6 billion years ago.
>
> ...The genes ride around the galaxy on the pressure of light waves from the stars... (Genetic material is of exactly the right size to ride on the light waves of stars.)" (Hoyle, F. and Wickremasinghe, N. C., *Evolution from Space,* London, J. M. Dent & Sons, 1981).

Christianity and Darwinism. The origin of life from matter, and then the evolution of life into complex forms leading to man was such a revolutionary concept that the Christian Church in Europe found it difficult to accede to it, although some Christians, both Protestant and Catholic, welcomed it. The idea of creation by God was, at least apparently, at stake. Clergymen like Bishop Wilberforce (1805–73) opposed it. Although the Catholic Church could depend on their authority than on the literal Biblical texts, Papacy indirectly condemned the idea of Evolution in the Syllabus of Errors issued by Pope Pius IX in 1864. The Christians had to reconcile their faith with evolution or reject evolution. Some attempted reconciliation. But "The irreconciliables of both parties -the one *rejecting* Darwinism because it demeaned religion, the other *embracing* Darwinism because it demeaned religion — were as comtemptuous of the efforts of the reconcilers as they were hostile to each other. Huxley, engaged in debate with the elusive Gladstone, finally protested, "There must be some position from which the reconcilers of science and Genesis will not retreat". The God of reconcilers too often resembled that of Coleridge: "A something — nothing — everything which does all of which we know." (Gertrude Himmelfarb, "Darwinism, Religion and Morality" in *Rise of Science in Relation to Society,* ed. L. M. Marsak, Macmillan, New York 1964).

Christian theologians and philosophers in contemporary times have moved to reconcile science with their faith. Two basic aproaches could be seen in these attempts. One could be called the non-cognitivist, neo-Wittgensteinian approach. It gives up literal sense to theological or religious expressions and deny the application of truth-value or existence claims to statements in religion. For these statements are claimed to be in a realm different from that of empirical science. Further, they deny any absolute sense of the term 'existence.' The other approach attempts at reconciling science and religion and in this instance, Christianity and Evolution. "A century after the publication of the *The Origin of Species* Catholics were able to assert with impunity the entire teachings of Darwin, even on the development of man, provided only that they did not tamper with the divine origin of soul (since Darwin did not speak of a 'soul' this was no great hardship)" writes Himmelfarb. (op. cit. p. 92). Teilhard de Chardin's writings, for example, reconcile Christian theology and Evolution. Chardin thinks in terms of cosmic, and not only a biological evolution, and that in principle agrees with the scientific view. He thinks that God is immanent, evolution is orthogenetic and it will, in the future, culminate in a universal consciousness evolved through love, at what he calls point Omega. Thus, for him God is the pole towards which man in tending, by a convergence of evolution.

Modern Western Philosophy and Evolution: Evolutionary ideas have had immense impact on thinking in general. Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) who defended Darwin's hypothesis was influenced by it and employed its arguments in his philosophy and developed an evolutionary theory of ethics. In Henri Bergson's philosophy which is a vitalistic doctrine, there is an original life force that has passed from preceding generations of beings to the succeeding ones by way of developed individual organisms. Creative Evolution, as he calls this process, conserves this life force in every line of evolution of living beings, creating numerous varities of species, and dividing itself again and again. But the evolution is not moving towards any fixed end. Intuition plays a large role in the activity of living beings in Bergson's philosophy and any teleology, if at all operative, can only be immanent in this conception.

Evolution and Eastern Thought: The idea of evolution is not alien to Eastern thought. Ancient Chinese writings give striking accounts of organic evolution. There are accounts of seeds becoming duckweed which become lichen and somewhere up this process, butterflies and insects evolve. Still further up the line birds, the leopard and the horse emerge and finally from the horse man is produced. The universe, and everything in it is generated or evolved by the interaction of Yin and Yang (the female and the male principles).

Of the Indian religions and systems of philosophy the Vedic system has a doctrine of evolution from spirit (and not from matter). The *Upanisads* speak of the evolution of the world out of *Ātman.* Thus the *Taittarīya Upaniṣad* says that *ākāśa* (space) came out of *Ātman,* air out of space, fire out of air, water out of fire and earth out of water. Plants came out of earth, food out of plants and man out of food. This does not explain, however, how man came from food or the origin of the other living species.

The Cārvāka - materialists believed that life and mind arose when material particles got together and formed structures. Jainism maintains that the world is eternal and undergo sequence of six ages, good or bad, but not periodic creation and destruction.

The Buddhist View: There is no doubt that Buddhism has absorbed some of the mythology of the Indian systems but the Buddhist literature alone, among the Indian religions, provides an account which could be considered an account of cosmological, inorganic, biological and social evolution. Though it is not unambiguous, in some ways at least it superficially resembles the current scientific accounts of the aspects of evolution.

Before this account in Buddhist literature is outlined, it is best that another account, sometimes labelled the

Buddhist account of the formation of the world is mentioned briefly and disposed of. This is the doctrine of *paticca samuppāda* (dependent origination) which consists of twelve conditions stated in sequence, from *avijjā* to *jarā-marana*. It has been considered as giving the world-process, and in that sense, as an account of the 'rising and passing away' of the world. Although the preceding conditions give rise to the succeeding conditions listed in the sequence, it can hardly be considered an evolutionary process in the sense that we have been considering. It outlines an intriguing psychological evolution of being, man and the world but it would be outside the confines of this article to discuss it.

It is the account of the development of the world given mainly in the *Aggañña Sutta* that calls for our attention here.

The cosmic, inorganic, organic and psychological evolution seem to be somewhat contemporaneous and inter-linked in the *Aggñña Sutta* account. It begins at the stage of the destruction of the earlier "world". The world undergoes two stages: a stage of evolution, and a stage of collapse and destruction. The former is called the *vivattamāna* stage and the latter the *samvattamāna* stage. When at the end of the *samvattamāna* stage the world undergoes desturction, many beings from this world are born in the *Ābhassara (Brahma)* abode (world). These beings ar born spontaneously in the *Ābhassara* abode, being bor of mind, and are happy and they dwell in the skies wit luminous bodies. They are of a pleasant and a disciplined nature, and they exist in this state for a very long period. After this period, the world (of the human beings) which had undergone destruction begins to be formed again. Then the beings in the *Ābhassara* world leave it and are reborn in the world (of human beings). Even in this world they are born spontaneously and are born of mind, and live more or less in the way they did when they dwelt in the skies.

At this inception of the (human) world, everything (including the outer space) is in a fluid state, and darkness reigns. The Sun, the Moon and the stars are not visible. There is no (distinction between) night and day. There are no fortnights, no seasonal differences, and no distinctions between years. There is no differentiation into sexes (as male and female). Every one is a living being, and a living being only.

After a long period, the (nourishing) earth evolves out of the (fluid or) watery material. The way the earth forms is analogous to the coagulation of milk on the surface when boiling milk cools. The earth as it formed was coloured and had a pleasant odour. It was also tasteful.

A being which had much greed scraped the earth with his finger and tasted it out of curiosity. This made him greedy for it. Other beings followed suit. They started eating lumps of earth. It made them lose their radiance. Once their body radiance was lost, the Sun and the Moon appeared and then the stars, and in consequence day and night and months and years came to be reckoned. The world was thus 'reborn'.

The beings continued consuming the earth; and then differences in their body complexions appeared. The fair complexioned looked down upon the dark ones and this unabated pride made the earth crust vanish. Once the earth crust vanished there appeared a soft soil with mushrooms. The beings started eating mushrooms, and again, the pride of the fair-complexioned led to the vanishing of mushrooms. Creepers (by the name of *badālatā*) then appeared. As the beings continued to consume these creepers, their bodies got coarse and they lost much of their earlier fine complexion. The creepers vanished and the paddy plant appeared. The beings continued to consume rice which appeared naturally on uncultivated land and their bodies grew coarser. Then the male and female features appeared on their bodies. The males and females felt mutual attraction and this ended in a sexual intercourse. This was considered as degrading and abominable by others who started throwing stones etc., at those who indulged in sexual intercourse and were not allowed to enter the habitats of others for months. Since beings wanted to indulge in intercourse for longer periods under cover they began to put up houses.

Some people started bringing in paddy necessary for more than one meal and storing them. The natural growth of paddy dwindled and people divided the land between them so that each could reap the paddy in his lot and his lot only. Then thefts of paddy took place and the populace congregated and appointed a chieftain to enforce law. That is the beginning of the *mahā-sammata* (elected or approved by the congregation of people) rule. Subsequently these chieftains became *khattiya*, the term deriving its meaning from *khetta* (paddy fields), and still later kingship evolved from this process.

Some groups gave up immoral or inferior practices, took to a mendicant's life, practised *dhyāna* and they became *brāhmana*. Others continued with agriculture and merchandise, and they were called the *vessa* (or merchant class). Those who had rough *(raudra)* appearance etc., were termed the *sudda*. But all these are, after all, the same people.

In the setting of the *Aggañña Sutta*, where two Brahmin disciples of the Buddha, one of them Vāsettha by name, tells the Buddha of the conceit of the Brahmins, and their contemptuous talk about the people who leave the Brahmin order. It is clear that the Buddha is narrating to them how life and society evolved, in order to show them that the Brahmins' contention that they sprung from the mouth of the Brahmā and are a super class is

mistaken. Indeed the sutta ends with the account which gives the "evolution" of the four *vanna* or the castes, and at one stage in the sutta, *māna* (pride) in *vaṇṇa* (complexion) is what makes the mushrooms and creepers vanish. Four other 'immoral' factors bring about changes in the physical body, the environment, and the society; the first is *taṇhā* or greed, and the second is *kāma rāga* sexual desire and intercourse, the third is laziness and the tendency to hoard food, and the fourth, theft. While these elements have their own significance, it is undeniable that this sutta gives at least some speculation on the cosmic, biological and social evolution and this is fully worth our attention.

It is sometimes held that the *Aggañña Sutta* was perhaps a later addition to the *Dīgha Nikāya.* But the view that beings leave this world when it collapses and reach the *Abhassara* abode and come back when the world originates again occurs elsewhere in the Nikāyas, including the *Brahmajāla Sutta.* In any case Buddhaghosa himself records the account in the *Aggañña Sutta* in his *Visuddhimagga,* and it certainly is a Buddhist account.

Buddhist Views and the Contemporary Views: A comparison of the accounts in Buddhism and the contemporary views would bring out the salient features of the Buddhist viewpoint and some possible criticisms of Darwinism from the Buddhist and other standpoints.

At the very outset one has to ask whether the notion of this world *(ayaṃ loko)* in the *Aggañña Sutta* refer to what we would today call the universe. In examining this question we should remind ourselves that the Buddha and the Buddhists had a correct view of the immensity of the world systems although the Buddha observed silence on the question of finitude or infinitude of the universe. In the *Visuddhimagga* it is said:

> "On the following day the Blessed One stood on the Summit of Sineru and surveyed the eastward world elements. Many thousand world spheres were visible to him as clearly as a single plain. And as the eastward world element, so too he saw the westward, the northward and southward world elements." (Path of Purification, tr. Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli, R. Semage, Colombo, p. 429).

There is reference to different levels of *loka dhātu* in the *Aṅguttara Nikāya*; the *Sahassi Cūlanikā loka dhātu* (Thousand-fold Minor World System), *Dvisahassi Majjhimikā loka dhātu* (Two thousand-fold Middle Sized World System), *Dasa sahassi loka dhātu* (Ten thousand-fold World System), *Sata sahassi loka dhātu* (Hundred Thousand-fold World System) and so on. There are references to the shape of these world systems as well. One well known term for a world sysem is *cakkavāḷa* (wheel). The Buddhist conception of space and time is immense, and these world systems are comparable with the conception of nebulae and galaxies in modern astronomy.

That the term *loko* is used in a number of senses in Buddhism is clear. Thus, *atthi paro loko* means there is a next world in the sense of a person's existence after death. However, this type of meaning is not directly relevant for us here. But in the *avyākata* (unanswered) question on finitude of the world referred to earlier *loko* has to be taken as the universe, as *loko* in any limited sense will not be meaningful there. If the *ayaṃ loko* in the *Aggañña Sutta* is taken as the universe itself, the account of *Saṃand Vivaṭṭamāna loka* given there has the ring of the model of the oscillating universe in modern cosmology. The oscillating theory could accept the Big Bang, but suggests that it is repetitive. The matter flying out from the exploding primordial 'atom' to form the galaxies will fly out far away according to the Big Bang Theory. The oscillating theory accepts the fact that the universe is expanding now but it holds that this expansion will not go on indefinitely, it will cease. At some point the force of explosion will spend itself, and then gravity will take over and the universe will begin to contract back to the primordial form again. This process would repeat.

Indeed a passage in the *Visuddhimagga* has almost the tone of this account:

> "But in the case of many aeons of world contraction etc., it should be understood that the aeon of world construction is an aeon of diminution and the aeon of world expansion is an aeon of increase. Herein, what supercedes the contraction is included in the contraction since it is rooted in it, and so too what supercedes the expansion is included in the expansion .... Bhikkhus, there are four incalculables of the aeon. What four? The contraction, what supercedes the contraction, the expansion, what supercedes the expansion." *Visuddhimagga,* trs. Ñāṇamoli, p. 455).

Indeed the *Visuddhimagga* passage seems to say that the forces which lead to this contraction and expansion are inherent in the system itself — although incalculable.

Oscillating theory of the universe is not favoured by the scientists today, one argument against it being that the density of matter is too negligible to check the outward expansion of the universe. In spite of the fact that the tone of the Buddhist account resembles the account in the oscillating theory, the sense of expansion and contraction in the oscillating theory is slightly different from that of *vivaṭṭamāna* and *saṃvaṭṭamāna* as the terms occur in *Aggañña Sutta.* refers to the separating out of Sun, Moon, Stars etc.

but not to 'expansion'. *Saṃvattamāna* refers to destruction by fire (or water or air) and not exactly to 'contraction.' This discrepancy vanishes, if *ayaṃ loko* is understood not as the universe, but as part of the universe - something like the Solar System or the Milky Way. The passages quoted above, amply suggests that *ayaṃ loko* refers to only the part of the universe where man is. If the destruction of the whole universe is meant it is not possible for beings to be born in the *Ābhassara* abode. The passages quoted earlier, suggests that *Ābhassara* is best understood as a part of another world-system. Although *Ābhassara* is elsewhere mentioned as a *Brahma lika*, once this is stripped of the mythological element, it falls into place as another part of the universe. Indeed, the *Visuddhimagga* indicates that *Abhassara* also come under this process of generation and destruction.

"Herein, there are three kinds of contraction: contraction due to water, ... due to fire, and .... due to air ..... when the aeon contracts owing to fire, all below the *Ābhassara* (Brahmā World) is burnt up ... when it contracts owing to water, it is also dissolved by water up to the *Subhakinha* (Brahmā world) ...." (- *Visuddhimagga*, trs. Ñānamoli p. 455).

Given this interpretation, the *vivattamāna* and *saṃvattamāna* could be understood as referring to the evolution and destruction of, say, a limited part of the universe, like the Solar System or the Milky Way.

There is evidence that the Buddhists were aware that parts of the universe are ever dying and other parts are ever being born. *Garland Sūtra* in Mahāyāna states that 'some world-systems remain but for one *kalpa*, while others for hundred, thousands or infinity of aeons.' It also states, "Many worlds are new or are decaying. While many others soon will cease to be". (See Davis, F. M., "Buddhism and Cosmology" in *Buddhism and Science;* ed. Keerthisinghe, B. P., Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1984).

These ideas tally quite well with modern cosmology which upholds the creation and destruction of systems of stars. While the *Aggañña Sutta* seems to be describing the formation and destruction of the something like the Solar System the *Visuddhimagga* account indicates that larger areas of the universe could undergo destruction and reformation. That the Buddhist account did not take up the question of the origin or destruction of the whole universe is understandable, as the Buddha observes silence on the questions of finitude/infinitude, eternity/non-eternity of the universe although later Buddhism considered the universe as infinite. Referring to the *Sattasuriya Sutta*, the *Visuddhimagga* says that seven suns will appear and 'burn' the world. Now in regard to our Solar System as well as other systems, modern astronomy holds that first an increase in the energy of the suns takes place and then the suns die out absorbing their planets in the process. Consider the following *Visuddhimagga* (trs. Ñānamoli, p. 458) passage:

"After that, at the end of a long period, a seventh sun appears. And when that has appeared, the whole world-sphere together with hundred thousand million other world-spheres catches fire.... As long as any formed thing (formation) the size of an atom still exists it does not go out, but it goes out when all formed things have been consumed. And like the flame that burns the ghee and oil it leaves no ash."

These ideas have some analogy with the contemporary accounts of possible ways of the end of the universe.

"...in the evolutionary cosmologies, the present dark and relatively empty universe is doomed to greater darkness, and emptiness. If the cosmos must for ever expand the glory of the early universe has departed for ever, an eternal future lies gripped in a frozen state of meaningless death. But if expansion is followed eventually by collapse, the future is obscured by an eschatological shroud.... as time passes more and more galaxies will be seen approaching... either dying or dead.... in a universe that is catastrophically collapsing. As the end approaches, first the galaxies and then the stars are crushed into each other in a cataclysaic inferno, in which ultimately the collapsing cosmos reverts to the primeval chaos of the Big Bang. Whether the universe rises again phoenix-like is not known." (*Encyclopaedia Brittanica*, Volume 18, pp. 1002 ff.)

Consider similarly, *Visuddhimagga* (p.458) on the evolution of this *loka*.

"The upper space is now all one with the lower space in a vast gloomy darkness. Then at the end of a long period a great cloud arises... Then the winds (forces) beneath and all around that water rise up and contract it and around it, like water drops on a lotus leaf. How do they compact the great mass of water? By making gaps; for the wind makes gaps in it here and there....... As it sinks, the (lower) Brahmā World reapears in its place, and divine worlds reappear......"

As water can be understood to stand for fluidity and if one compares this with the modern account of formation of galaxies, stars, etc., from the 'cloud', as was outlined earlier in this article, the analogy between this passage and the modern view is striking.

The *Aggañña Sutta* account also hints at the evolution of plant life - when it says that at the beginning there was

water and then land, tben mushrooms, then creepers and so on until paddy appeared.

The important question of the origin and evolution of life in this Buddhist tract deserves close analysis. The account certainly is not the most clear and consistent. It seems to telescope certain developments, and inter-twine others, in addition to use of metaphor and an admixture of Indian mythology. The account could be based on speculation, and it is sometimes archaic, but the surprising thing is that in spirit and outline there is no deñying that it compares favourably with the ideas of biological evolution in contemporary science. Moreover, this account is claimed to be based on the knowledge gained through *abhiññā* (higher means of knowledge) of the Buddha.

One troublesome question is the nature of the beings *(sattā)* that come to be as the world begins to evolve. It is suggested by the description that these are something like uni-cellular beings — like the genes which "ride around the galaxy on the pressure of light waves" which Hoyle and Wickremasinghe speak of. But they are also bits of 'minds'. Here again one is taken back to the Hoyle-Wickremasinghe thesis, that higher intelligences operate in outer space in, say, the *Abhassara Brahma* abode, in the context of the Buddhist account. But the Buddhist account certainly does not depend on these higher intelligences in the outer space for its theory of life, for these beings were here on Earth before it was destroyed and it is the force of *kamma* which brings them back to Earth. There is nothing in the Buddhist account which prevents life originating here on Earth. It stands to reason that these beings with no sexual differentiation are a 'primitive' organism like bacteria but, on the other hand, not only the "born of mind" aspect of them, but many other characteristics of their nature and behaviour already make them appear as human beings. Metaphor is obliterating much of the story. Indeed the transition of these non-sex differentiated beings to human beings is sudden and telescoped. For soon after the two sexes appear some of them indulge in sexual intercouse and others, their moral sense hurt, throw stones at those who thus "misbehave."

The main difference between the Darwinism account of evolution of life and that in the *Agaññā Sutta* is psychological, or psycho-ethical, in a number of ways. Darwinian evolution begins with matter, and mind or mental powers develop as a result of evolution. In the *Aggañña Sutta*, life begins with beings equipped with, "mental" powers. Darwinian evolution has no real driving force or factor - no cause behind it. The distinguishing feature of life is ability to reproduce, and reproduction of the species — the continuance of the species — is the primary factor there, and it lends a hand to natural selection to operate. In the Buddhist account, it is the *tanhā* (greed) which at the beginning makes the beings consume earth, and *māna* (pride) which later make their bodies coarser, make the earlier plants vanish and finally lead to sexual differentiation, sexual urge and intercourse, and this last is a "fall" looked down upon by others. Thus the mind and emotions play a role in this evolution. In a recent Buddhist critique of Darwinian evolution, the urge for *sukha* in the sense of sensual satiation, and not the reproduction of types, is argued to be the force behind evolution, writes the author of the critique,

> "What we have... is an urge at furthering our sensory frontiers, a sensory evolution..." (Weerasinghe, R. M., *A Cosmic Struggle*,New York, Vantage Press, 1984, p.39). He reminds the reader of Buddha's statement in the *Samyutta Nikāya*, "By attachment to body, bretheren, consciousness, if it gets a standing, may persist, with body for its object, with body for its platform, seeking means of enjoyment, it may come by growth, increase, abundance" (p.69) and emphasizes the "individualistic basis" of evolution as against the basis of "propagation of species."

Indeed one major cirticism of Darwinism has been that it is a materialistic reductionism, which leaves no room for mental factors until at least the stage of evolution of social phenomena. Darwinian evolution also carries with it a sense of progress or development of complexity with evolution, though not orthogenesis. The Buddhist account incorporates psychological and ethical factors as involved in the evolutionary forces and, while evolution suggests the common origin and equality of all human beings, it is seen to be a fellow traveller of morally undersirable elements.

Finally, we turn to the evolution of society and social structures outlined in the *Aggañña Sutta*. The account there is naturalistic and, at least the report of the selection of leaders based on popular acceptance which ultimately leads to the *Mahā sammata* kings, rings true. One main interpretation of the evolution of the caste system is that the occupations or activities of different groups was the basis of the division of community into different castes, and the *Aggañña Sutta* account seems to subscribe to this view.

R. D. Gunaratne

EXALTED ONE. See BUDDHA.

EXCOMMUNICATION, act of expelling from communion, a word used with particular reference to the expulsion of a member from the Christian Church; it means the deprivation of Church privileges. One of the meanings attached to the word communion is "body of people who profess one faith, who unite in religious serivce." According to this usage, the word communion means all the faithful, both the clergy and the laity; all of them are members of the Church. The Church could excommunicate any of its members who is found to be undesirable; a member, for example, who holds heretical views.

Where Buddhism is concerned, the word communion has to be understood on a different level. Unlike Christianity, Buddhism is not an organised religion. There is no organisation, centralised or otherwise, which is vested with powers to deal with all the faithful; nor is it correct to use the word communion with reference to all followers of the Buddha. We can speak, if at all, of a Buddhist communion only with reference to the members of the clergy, called he *bhikkhu*-and *bhikkhunī-saṅgha,* the Order or community of monks and nuns. The lay disciples are not included.

Provision is made in the *Vinaya Piṭaka* as to how the Saṅgha may take disciplinary action against its undesirable members. It is natural that any community would have to expel any of its unworthy members. Here again there is no organisation to carry out these ecclesiastical acts. Any member of the Order could participate in performing these acts. Minium numbers of monks required for carrying out these acts are laid down. A quorum depends on the significance of the act. While the quorum for certain acts is four, for the others it is twenty, called the *catuvagga-* or the *visativagga-bhikkhu-saṅgha,* the group of four monks or that of twenty monks. These groups represent the entire Saṅgha in performing their respective eclesiastical acts. Any flawless member of the Order is entitled to membership of these groups. They have the authority to deal with any member of the Order; but not with the lay disciples. The only action the Saṅgha could take against an undesirable layman is to refuse to accept his food, called the *pattanikkujjana,* i.e., turn the alms-bowl upside down.

The Saṅgha, as was pointed out, is empowered to take disciplinary action against its guilty members. It can deprive them of certain rights and privileges enjoyed by flawless members. The nature of the punishment depends on the gravity of the offence committed. A monk, for instance, who brings families into disrepute *(kula-dūsaka)* shall be banished from the locality where the offence is committed. A monk who does not see or remedy an offence committed by him shall be suspended. But these punishments do not amount to excommunication. Suspension *(ukkhepanā)* is the most rigourous punishment imposed on a member of the Saṅgha. A monk undergoing that punishment loses almost all the priviliges he was entitled to as a member of the Saṅgha; but he does not thereby lose his recluseship; he is still a monk. One of the conditions attached to this punishment is that the one undergoing that punishment should not wear the costume of laymen. Once he fulfils the conditions attached to it, the punishment is revoked (*Vin.* II, p. 21 ff). One of the rights denied to a suspended monk is living under one roof, together with othermonks (*Vin.* ? p. 22) but the *Mahāvagga (Vin.* I, p. 97-8) allows the restoration *(osāraṇā)* of a monk even if he has left the Order, because he was suspended, provided he corrects himself; if he does not he may be suspended again, if the Order is unanimous on this point; if it is not, there is no offence for him in eating *(sambhoga)* or being in communion *(saṃvāsa)* with the Saṅgha.

There are offences some of which are punishable with conditional excommunication and some with permanent excommunication. The criterion by which a monk is excommunicated is the ability or otherwise of the guilty monk to progress in the Saṅgha, i.e., to attain spiritual and transcendental states such as *jhāna, samāpatti, magga,* and *phala.* If the offence committed negates this ability, the monk is permantly excommunicated; if the offence is remediable, the excommunication is conditional.

The Pali term used in the *Vinaya Piṭaka* with reference to excommunication is *nāsanā,* meaning "causing destruction." The *Samantapāsādikā* explains the term by giving three kinds of *nāsanā,* namely, (1) *Saṃvāsa nāsanā,* denial of the right to live together, (2) *liṅga-nāsanā,* denial of characteristics and (3) *daṇḍakamma-nāsanā,* excommunication as a punishment (*VinA.* IV, pp. 870-1). The first is identified with suspension, *(ukkhepanā)* which does not amount to real excommunication. The second is permanent excommunication and the third, conditional excommunication.

Excommunication of Novices:

Let us take the third kind of excommunication first; as a punishment this seems to be meant for novices called *sāmaṇeras* or *samaṇuddesas.* It is carried out by a proclamation which reads as follows "From today, novice, the Buddha can neither be referred to as your teacher nor can that be yours of which other novices get the chance, namely, the laying down to sleep for two or three nights with monks; get away with you, depart." As a concrete example, the case of the novice Kaṇḍaka is cited; he was excommunicated for holding a pernicious view *(pāpakaṃ diṭṭhigataṃ)* that misrepresented the Buddha (*Vin.* IV, pp. 138-9). First the novice who holds the pernicious view should be advised to renounce it; if he still persists, he should be excommunicated with the declaration given above. This is not a final excommuni-

cation. It is something like suspension, for, the moment the novice abandons his pernicious view and intimates to the Saṅgha his willingness to be corrected, he could be reinstated.

There are ten offences for which a novice shall be permanently excommunicated *(liṅga-nāsanā)*, namely, (1) killing, (2) theft, (3) unchastity (4) falsehood, (5) drinking liquor, (6) speaking evil of the Buddha, (7) of the Dhamma, (8) of the Saṅgha, (9) heresy and (10) seduction of nuns (*Vin.* I, p. 85).

The first five are the first five of the ten precepts *(dasa-sikkhāpada)* for novices. The breach of any one of these five precepts results in the novice losing his recluseship, only the characteristics of a recluse, namely, the yellow robe and the shaven head remain. The *Samantapāsādikā* expressly states that such a novice should be eliminated (*VinA.* V, p. 1014). If the novice breaks one of them by mistake and immediately seeks correction by the Saṅgha, he shall not be excommunicated but is given the threefold refuge which means reinstatement (ibid). The other five precepts are not so grave and the breach of them does not require excommunication (*VinA.* V, p. 1015).

If a novice speaks evil of the Buddha, the Dhamma or the Saṅgha he should be advised not to do that; if he obeys, it is well and good; if he does not he should be excommunicated. This procedure applies to the heretic novice too. Heresy here means such wrong views as eternalism *(sasata-diṭṭhi)* or annihilationism *(uccheda-diṭṭhi)*. If the novice gives up his heresy when advised, there is no excommunication, if he persists he shall be excommunicated (*VinA.* V. p. 1015).

Unchastity, the third offence in this context, consists of seduction of nuns. A distinction is made on the ground that the unchaste novice could be reinstated if he regrets his offence and seeks immediately readmission, whereas the seducer of a nun shall never be readmitted. Seduction of a nun is considered more sinful than sexual intercourse with or seduction of a lay worman (*VinA.* V. p. 1015).

Excommunication of full-fledged Monks:

There are eleven persons who should not be given higher ordination *(upasampadā)*; if they have already been given, they should be permanently excommunicated. They are (1) eunuch *(paṇḍaka)*, (2) hermaphrodite *(ubhatobyañjanaka)*, (3) matricide *(mātughātaka)*, (4) patricide *(pitughātaka)*, (5) killer of an arahant *(arahantaghātaka)*, (6) one who has maliciously caused Tathāgata to bleed, *(lohituppādaka)*, (7) schismatic *(saṅgha-bhedaka)*, (8) imposter *(theyya-saṃvāsaka)*, (9) renegade *(titthiyapakkantaka)*, (10) seducer of nuns *(bhikkhunidūsaka)* and (11) the "beast" *(tiracchāna-gata)* (*Vin.* I, 88ff). They are either moral wrecks or/and by nature incapable of improvement, or scoundrels who have no genuine desire to improve or those who have deliberately given up the course of training for improvement. All of them share the common factor of inability to improve, i.e., to attain spiritual and transcendental states; hence they are called impossible persons *(abhabba-puggala)*.

The eunuch is denied membership of the Order; and if one is already admitted, he has to be excommunicated. The reason given is that an eunuch monk has misbehaved himself; he had tried to induce young monks to pollute themselves which he failed but succeeded in inducing some laymen. The reason is not quite convincing unless we accept that the eunuchs are, by nature, of that behaviour. There were some male and female members of the Order who behaved similarly. Guilty members were no doubt dealt with individually not on ground of sex, but on ground of offences committed. Here, in the case of eunuchs, the criterion was sex; ruling was that no eunuch-guilty or not guilty-shall be ordained; and all eunuchs —guilty or not guilty - who are already members of the Order shall be excommunicated. The *Samantapāsādikā* says that the eunuchs are by nature, overwhelmed with passions unquenched; they always try to find somebody with whom to quench their passions (*VinA.* V, pp. 991-2).

The case of hermaphrodite is quite understandable. The reason given in the *Mahāvagga* for excommunicating the hermaphrodite is the same, i.e., misbehaviour; it is said that a hermaphrodite-monk has seduced others and got others to seduce him. As they possess both the male and the female organs, they could not be admitted either to the order of monks or to that of nuns. Unlike women who demanded and succeeded in getting a separate Order established for themselves, the hermaphrodites form too negligible a fraction of the population as to have a separate Order established for themselves. Even if a separate Order had been established for them, the purpose would have been lost, because such an Order would have consisted of both sexes.

The case of the "beast" is apparantly peculiar. How can a beast possibly enter the Order? It is reported that a serpent *(nāga)* with supernormal powers, with the intention of freeing himself from that existence and of being reborn as a human being, had entered the Order in the guise of a human being. The situation demanded his excommunication for two reasons. In the first place a *(nāga)* could not make progress in the Sāsana; his being a monk, therefore, would have served no purpose. And secondly, his presence in the Saṅgha created certain difficulties. The *nāgas* could not perform certain of their bodily functions, such as sleeping, except in their true form: the form of a snake. A monk who was living together with the snake-monk saw him sleep and was frightened. It was that monk who reported the matter to the Buddha who

gave the above ruling. The *Samantapāsādikā* says that "beast" in this context means *nāgas, supaṇṇas* and even *devas* including Sakka (*VinA.* V, p. 1022).

Five persons who have committed the five heinous sins (*ānantariya-kamma*), namely matricide, patricide, the killing of an arahant, causing the Tathāgata to bleed and bringing about schisms in the Saṅgha are regarded as moral wrecks who cannot progress in the *Sāsana*, and are certain to be reborn in the Avici as soon as they die. The imposter has no genuine desire for progress in the Sāsana whereas the renegade is the one who has given up the course of training in the Sāsana.

The last person is the seducer of a nun. Seduction of a nun is as grave a sin as the five heinous crimes. What has been said about the novice (*Sāmaṇera*) who has seduced a nun applies to the full ordained monks (*upasampanna*) as well. Although the seduction of a nun amounts to the first *pārājikā* offence as far as an *upasampanna* monk is concerned, it is given as a separate item on the ground that seduction of a nun is much more heinous than the seduction of or sexual intercourse with a lay woman.

Sexual intercourse (*methuna-dhamma*), is of course, one of the *pārājikā* (q.v) offences that would disqualify a monk for membership in the Saṅgha. Any member who commits a *pārājikā* offence is considered automatically excommunicated. The Pali term used in this connection is *asaṃvāsa*, meaning "not in communion".

The *pārājikās* are explained as taboo (*akaraṇīyaṃ*) to monks (*Vin.* I, p. 96), as causes that require complete severance of connections with the Saṅgha (*chejja-vatthu, Vin.* III, p. 109). The monk who commits one become a non-recluse (*assamaṇa*), not a son of the Sākyan (*asakya-puttiya*), even as a man with his head cut off could not live, or as a withered leaf, freed from its stalk, could not become green again, or as a stone broken in half could not be put together again, or as a palmyra palm cut off at the crown could not grow (*Vin.* I, p. 96). The fact that a monk or a nun who has committed a *pārājikā* offence has to be excommunicated is expressly stated in the detailed explanation of the first *pārājikā*, the word *nāsetabba*, "should be excommunicated", is used in this connection (*Vin.* III, pp. 29 ff).

There is also the verb *nissāreti*, meaning "to cause to go away, to send away." The *Saṅghādisesa* (q.v.) offences for nuns are associated with the word *nissāraṇīyaṃ* and the phrase *nissāraṇīyaṃ saṅghādisesaṃ* meaning "an offence entailing a formal meeting of the Order (*saṅghādisesa*) involving being sent away" (*nissāraṇīyaṃ*). The phrase "involving being sent away" does not at all imply that the offending nun is to be sent away from the Order for good, to be excommunicated. It would seem to mean that she would be sent away for the time being, probably because admonition, although it had been tried, had failed, and that during this time she would cease to be regarded as a full member of the Order. The Order imposes the *mānatta* (q.v.) discipline for her offence, sends her back to the beginning of her probationary course (*parivāsa*) as nun, not as probationer, and then it rehabilitates (*abbhāna*) her. This definition of *saṅghādisesa* is identical with the monks' *saṅghādhisesa*. Lapse in full membership is of a temporary nature and lasting only a fortnight (*Vin.* IV, p. 242). *Nissāraṇīya* "involving being sent away", adds nothing new to the penalty. It is not something extra to the *saṅghādisesa*.

The verb *nissāreti*, "sends away", is used in another context as well. The Order "sends away" its offending members by five ecclesiastical acts, rebuke (*tajjanīya*°), of reconcilliation (*patisāranīya*°), of guidance (*nissaya*°) and of suspension (*ukkhepanīya*°). These are penalties imposing certain disabilities, by which the penalised monk or nun does not lose his or her membership of the Saṅgha; the penalties are not irrevocable and do not amount to excommunication. The verb *nissāreti* is used with an implied opposition to *osāreti*, to be restored (*Vin.* I, p. 322; *VinA.* V, p. 1147).

The Vinaya is more strict with nuns than with monks. The number of offences for nuns is greater than those for monks. There are eight *pārājikā* offences for nuns whereas there are only four for monks. In some cases, what is *pārājikā* for nuns is only a *saṅghādisesa* for monks. This strictness is evident also in the matter of excommunication. The nun *Mettiyā*, for instance, was excommunicated for making a false charge against Dabba Mallaputta, saying that the latter had seduced her. But the monks who instigated her to do so were dealt with accordingly, but were not excommunicated (*Vin.* II, p. 79; III, p. 162). It is only a *saṅghādisesa* offence for a monk to make a false charge of *pārājikā* against another monk (*Vin.* III, p. 163). The excommunication of Mettiyā adds one more disqualification which would require the excommunication of nuns. The other disqualifications, namely committing *pārājikā* offences and being an eunuch etc. are common to both monks and nuns.

It would be clear from the foregoing discussion that the Pali terms used with reference to excommunication of a member from the Buddhist Order is *asaṃvāsa* and *nasāna*. The term *asaṃvāsa* does not imply the active aspect of excommunication. It is used with reference to a member who has committed a *pārājikā* offence and it is considered that he has lost or destroyed by himself his right to be in communion. The term *nāsanā* has three applications; one is suspension of an *upasampanna* monk, the second is conditional excommunication of a novice as punishment and the third the permanent excommunication of monks, both *sāmaṇera* and *upasampanna*, who do not possess the potentiality to pro-

gress in the *sasana*. While there are ecclesiastical acts for imposing other penalities, such as suspension, there are no such acts to be performed or procedures to be followed in excommunicating. The Buddha has simply ordered the Saṅgha to excommunicate *(nāsetu* or *nāsetabba)* its undesirable members. There is only one indication, however, that could be considered a method by which a guilty monk may be excommunicated. It occurs in the commentary to the *Pātimokkha,* called the *Kaṅkhāvitaraṇī* (p. 155), in its explanation of the seven methods to be adopted in settling legal disputes *(adhikaraṇasamatha)* that have arisen among the members of the Saṅgha. This particular method which is termed "the act for the decision for specific depravity" *(tassapāpiyyasikā, Vin.* IV, p. 207), is to be employed against a monk who "having denied an offence acknowledged it; having acknowledged it denied it; who shelved the question by asking another question, and told a deliberate lie" (*Vin.* II, p. 85). The *Kaṅkhāvitaraṇī* says that by this method is meant the excommunication *(nāsanā)* of the monk, if he has committed a *pārājikā* offence, or his possible restoration *(osāraṇā)* if the offence was a lesser one. But this method does not apply to the other cases of excommunication. It has also been pointed out that the term *nissāraṇā* (from verb *nissāreti*), although it means "sending away" does not amount to excommunication.

Upali Karunaratna

EXCULPATION. See ADHIKARAṆA SAMATHA.

EXEGESIS. See AṬṬHAKATHĀ, COMMENTARIES.

EXERTION *(padhāna, vāyāma, viriya)* means the exercise of great effort for the achievement of Englightenment and complete freedom from conditioned existence which is the *summum bonum* of the Buddhist way of life. In other words, it is the unswerving struggle and endeavour to solve the problem of suffering *(dukkha),* once and for all.

The world at large is generally given over to the enjoyment of sensual pleasures *(kāmabhogino: Vin.* I. pp. 203, 287; *D.* III, p. 124) as it is the ordinary way of the world which is "lacking, unsatisfied and enslaved by craving" *(ūno loko atitto taṇhādāso: M.* II, p. 68) based on the ignorance *(Avijjā; s. v.)* of the true facts of life. The attractions of the sense - objects and the consequent involvement in their acquisition and injoyment prolongs the conditioned existence of man which is invariably accompanied with suffering *(dukkha)* in its diverse forms such as birth *(jāti)* illness, *(vyādhi)* old-age *(jarā),* death *(maraṇa)* fear, stress, anxiety, etc. etc. for which there is no lasting solution other than the achievement of full freedom as taught in Buddhism. That alone is the conquest of all sorrow *(dukkha-nirodha: M.* I, pp. 195; II, p. 10 etc.) in the real sense of the term. The Buddha has compared the entire gamut of sense-attractions to a flowing stream *(sota)* and man's succumbing to them as moving downstream along with flow *(anusotagāmī : . A.* II, pp. 5, 6). He recommends moving upstream in the opposite direction against the current *(paṭisotagāmī: , S.* I, p. 136; *A.* II, p. 6) by not giving into them indiscriminately but to become the master of oneself so that one can ultimately escape their temptations altogether by realising the unconditioned state of Nirvāna, free from all sorrow *(dukkhakkhaya: M.* I, p. 93; II, p. 217). This simile clearly shows that the Buddhist concept of exertion is negatively the effort to avoid all that prolongs saṃsāra and positively the effort to develop all that brings one towards the freedom of Nirvāṇa.

It is through continued exertion that this can be achieved. How this should be done is synoptically expressed in a verse recited by the Buddha in reply to the query of a certain deity (*S.* I, p. 13) and which also is the verse with which Buddhaghosa opens his celebrated thesis, the *Visuddhimagga.* The verse runs as follows:

> *sīle patiṭṭhāya naro sapañño*
> *cittaṃ paññañ ca bhāvayaṃ*
> *ātāpī nipako bhikkhū*
> *so imaṃ vijaṭaye jaṭaṃ* (*S.*I, p. 113 *Vism.* p. 1).

In English this would be:

> When a wise man firmly established in virtue
> Develops his mind and understanding;
> Then as a *bhikkhu,* ardent and sagacious,
> He succeeds in disentangling this tangle.
> (Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli's translation slightly altered).

The negative aspect of this exertion fundamentally comprises of the disciplinary morality concerning the restraint of the sense-attractions *(indriya-saṃvara-sīla)* while the positive aspect consists of the cultivation of various ethical and intellectual qualities such as mindfulness *(sati),* mental concentration *(samādhi),* wisdom *(paññā),* etc. that promote the development of character leading to perfection and release. These negative and positive aspects of *sīla* should be the basis upon which one has to establish oneself before one undertakes the practice of religious exertion.

One well-known and early formulation of this concept of exertion is what is known as the Four Right Efforts *(cattāro sammappadhānā: M.* II, p. 11; *S.* V, p. 244; *A.* II, pp. 15–256), the correct practice of which is said to be

unfailingly bent towards Nirvanic freedom just as the river Ganges flows towards the East (*S.* V. pp. 244 f). These are: (i) avoiding the arising of evil and unskilled states of mind that have not yet arisen. (ii) abandoning those that have already arisen. (iii) production of good and wholesome states of mind not yet arisen and (iv) the development and bringing into perfection the good and wholesome states already arisen.

The person who undertakes exerting himself according to this method is described as exercising will *(chandam janeti),* putting forth effort *(vāyamati),* beginning to make exertion *(viriyam ārabhati)* and applying and exerting his mind *(cittam pagganhāti padahati* loc. cit.). It is implied that this formula be applied in all the fields of one's activity so that one's mental verbal and physical activities promote one's welfare instead of obstructing or retarding it. Such a person's activities become Nibbāna-oriented and always of service to oneself and to others as those of the ideal Bodhisattva (s.v.). It is action based on right views *(sammā-ditthi),* the first constituent of the Noble Eightfold Path.

The restraint of the senses referred to earlier is the basis on which the first two aspects of this four-fold formula are founded. It is a process of clearing oneself of all moral impurities *(kilesa)* with reference to all the three periods of time past, present and future. By the practise of these two aspects one not only clears the past but safeguards the future as well.

Elsewhere (*A.* II, p.16) in a detailed account of how the first of these exertions (designated here as *samvarapadhāna)* or the exertion of restraint is to be practised it is said that when a person who practises this restraint sees an attractive physhcal form with his eyes he does not become entranced by its general features nor by its details. Owing to the fact that "evil and unprofitable states of mind like covetousness and dejection" *(abhijjhā domanassā pāpakā akusalā dhammā)* might flow in upon one who dwells with his eye-faculty uncontrolled or unguarded, he applies himself to such control and sets guard over the eye-faculty thereby achieving success in its control. This same formula he applies to all the six faculties (6th being the mind: *mana*) and thus exerting himself in their control until the proper discipline with regard to them becomes his second nature as it were.

The second type of exertion is here (*A.* II, p. 16) designated as the "exertion of abandoning" *(pahāna-padhāna)* and is explained as the giving up of all forms of unwholesome and evil thinking consisting of sensual thoughts *(kāma-vitakka),* malevolent thoughts *(vyāpāda vitakka)* and cruel thoughts *(vihimsā-vitakka).* In order to emphasise the need for its continued and relentless practice for the achievement of complete success the text uses several synonymous verbs expressive of this idea of fighting against such evil thoughts. Accordingly the practiser tolerates not *(nādhivasati),* renounces *(pajahati),* dispels *(vinodeti),* gets rid of *(vyantikaroti)* and destroys *(anabhāvam gameti)* them. The commentary (*AA.* III, p. 19) correctly describes this kind of exertion as the effort generated *(uppanna-viriya)* to perform each of the four forms of exertion.

The third form of exertion, which is positive in character, is called the exertion to develop *(bhāvanā padhāna),* the factors to be developed being the seven constituents of wisdom *(Bojjhanga s.v.)* which are mindfulness *(sati),* investigation of the doctrine *(dhamma-vicaya), energy (viriya),* zest *(pīti),* tranquillity *(passaddhi),* mental concentration *(samādhi)* and equanimity *(upekkhā).*

The fourth type is called the exertion to watch ever *(anurakkhanā-padhāna)* which is aimed at safeguarding the stages of mental concentration that one has already attained. If one were not vigilant enough one may lose the meditation object and relapse into a lower stage. The idea is that whatever spiritual progress one has achieved should not be allowed to relapse until one reaches the goal of final release in the complete cessation of suffering *(khayam dukkhassa: A.* II, p. 19), from where there is no relapse. This cannot be done without exertion that is continuous and persevering. An important term that is used in this context is *ātāpi* which is quite relevent and meaningful in relation to this concept of exertion. It is an adjectival form meaning zealous or strenuous in the sense that religious exertion expected in Buddhism should be continuously maintained till the final goal is reached (Cp. the opening stanza of the *Visuddhimagga* quoted earlier).

The conquest of the evil side of man cannot be successfully achieved unless the *religieux* exerts himself on the basis of this four-fold formula (*A.* II, pp. 256-7) which is quite a practical working hypotheses for him. No weak-hearted person can do this with success and accordingly the person who undertakes this responsibility has to summon all available courage and exert himself with the highest degree of steadfastness possible for man (cp. *āraddhaviriyena thāmavatā purisathāmena, purisaviriyena, purisaparakkamena purisadhorahyena; D.* III, p. 113; *M.* I, p. 481; *S.* II, p. 28). If one were not to exert oneself in this manner one would not realise the Truth. *(no ce tam padaheyya nayidam saccam anupāpuneyya: M.* II, p. 174).

Confidence *(saddhā),* good health *(appābādha),* sincerity of purpose *(asatha),* energy *(viriya)* and wisdom *(paññā)* are given as five factors constituting religious exertion *(padhāniyanga: A.* III, pp. 65-7). Therefore it cannot succeed with the man who has little wisdom

(*duppaññassa na padhānaṃ ijjhati* : *AA.* III, pp. 258). Being a personal struggle with one's own lower nature the best place for its practice would be the forest groves (*A.* IV, p. 355). The best available instance of this kind of supreme struggle is the bodhisatta Gotama's six-year struggle in quest of full Enlightenment. In the *Padhāna Sutta (Sn.* v. 425-49) occurs a dialogue between the Buddha (just before his Enlightenment) and Māra (s.v.), The Evil One, wherein the former defends his supreme struggle against the latter's words of discouragement. The bodhisatta described himself as performing religious exertion on the banks of the river Nerañjarā with the firm resolution of winning the state of feedom from all exertion *(yogakkhema)* ultimately. Māra tried to discourage him further by describing the path the bodhisatta had adopted as "rough, difficult and hard to attain" *(duggo maggo padhānāya-dukkaro durabhisambhavo* : *Sn.*: *v.* 429). The bodhisatta's reply was that as he was equipped with confidence, courage and wisdom he would continue the struggle undaunted and expressed his firm resolution further as follows: "While dries the blood, my bile and phlegm dry up. While wasthes the flesh mind, more seren becomes, steadier awareness, wisdom, mind-intent (*Sn.* v. 434; Hare's translation). A statement very much similar is also found in a stock passage found in the Pali Nikāyas expressing the same theme "Come what may, let skin and bone and sinew but remain, let flesh and blood dry up within my body, until is won what may be won by strength of man, by toil of man, by pains of man, there will be no stay in energy" (*M.* I, p. 481; *S.* II, p. 28; *A.* IV, p. 190). Similar ideas concerning religious exertion are found in the Buddhist Sanskrit work *Lalitavistara* (*Lal. BST.* p. 211).

Exertion in this sense is represented in the Noble Eightfold Path as its 6th constituent, right effort *(sammā vāyāma)*, which is defined as cutting-off illness, as having the characteristic of striving: it obviates unskilled states and is manifested as the abandoning of the wrong kind of exertion (*Vism.* XVI, p. 81). Its continued practie is the only way for the realisation of the Buddhist ideal *(sadattha)* culminating the wearied journey of saṃsāra (see also ENDEAVOUR, PADHĀNA).

A. G. S. Kariyawasam

EXORCISM. See DEMONOLOGY

EXPEDIENCY is a word commonly used to render into English the coined Sanskrit term ***upāya-kauśalya*** > ***Pali:*** *upāya-kosalla)* which literally means skilfulness in expendients or means. The *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtta* devotes one whole chapter (chp. 2) to this subject. Kern who translated the *Sdmp.* into English, rendered the title of the 2nd chapter *Upāya-karśalya* merely as 'Skilfulness'. In a note he explained it further 'able management, diplomacy' (*SBE,* XXI, p. 31 fn1).

The Buddha, according to his own admission, was neither a traditionalist *(anussāvika)* nor a rationlist metaphysician *(takki vīmaṃsī)* but an experientialist whose teachings are based on personal higher knowledge *(sāmaṃyeva dhammaṃ abhiññāya* ... *M.* II, p. 211). This reveals that Buddha was of a different mould than most of his renowned contemporaries. His approach being new, his teaching too contained many novel features. In fact the truth he realized is described by the Buddha himself as not heard of before *(pubbe ananussutesu: S.* II, p. 11). A perusal of his teaching makes it clear that his central philosophy which is known as *paṭiccasamuppāda* (q.v. see also CAUSALITY) is a totally new doctrine and also that his social philosophy goes against the basic traditional teachings of the brahmins.

The Buddha with his novel approach to the predicament of man and his place in the universe, however, had to contend mostly with a tradition-bound audience of varying degrees of mental proficiency and different religious inclinations. Therefore to put across his novel views effectively in a way intelligible and acceptable to his audience he had to evolve devices that suited the listners' mental level, the occasion on which such discourses were given, the religious ideologies which they dearly cherished and so on. The Buddha's immense success as a teacher and the rapid spread of he Dhamma within a comparatively short period, were undoubtedly due to the Buddha's unique ability of using appropriate expedients. His biography abounds in episodes and anecdotes that graphically illustrate this unique ability of his. The conversion of Nanda — his half-brother — by employing an effective expedient is quite illustrative of this feature.

Nanda entered the order reluctanly, purely in order to please the Buddha. Such being the case he was totally disinterested in the monastic life. All the time he was pining for his fiancee, Janapadakalyāṇī Nandā, whom he had to leave behind on the day he was to marry her. The Buddha realized that Nanda's mind had to be weaned away from Nandā if he were to be made interested in monkhood. Accordingly, one day the Buddha is said to have taken Nanda to the Himalayas and shown him the charred remains of a female monkey. The Buddha very casually is said to have asked Nanda whether Janapadakalyāṇī was more beautiful than that. Nanda had quickly replied in the affirmative. Then the Buddha is said to have taken Nanda to Tāvatiṃsa heaven and shown him charming divine damsels living there.

Once again in replying to a question of the Buddha Nanda had admitted that these divine damsels were far more charming than Nandā, and even volunteered to compare Nandā with the charred remains of the female monkey. The Buddha noticing the mild change of heart on Nanda's part, had taken the opportunity to wean away Nanda's mind from Nandā. The Buddha promised Nanda to obtain one of those divine damsels as his wife if he properly lived the monastic life. Nanda accepted the bargain and kept to his part of the promise. At the fulfilment of the promise, however, he was no more interested in worldly attractions. So he went up to the Buddha and absolved him from fulfilling his part of the promise. Similar episodes illustrating the Buddha's ability in the use of expedients to help others, are found scattered in Theravāda texts.

In Mahāyāna where the altruistic qualities of the Buddha find greater emphisis his use of expedients to guide sentient beings and help them to cross the ocean of saṃsāra is given more prominence than in Theravāda. See further UPĀYA-KAUŚALYA.

S. K. Nanayakkara

EXPERIENCE. The entire message of Buddhism can be summarised as a statement of the analysis of human experience and a means of going beyond. For, by observing with mindfulness *(sati)* the component parts of human experience, the Buddha was able to analyse the human personality, and realise its true nature and a means of escaping therefrom. For a concise treatment of the subject of experience this essay is devided into 4 headings as follows:

1. Sense-experience of an ordinary worldling
2. Progressive experiences of the trainee
3. The liberative experience
4. Sense-experience of a liberated being.

1. Sense-experience of an ordinary worldling:

The *Madhupiṇḍika Sutta (M.* I, p. 111) records in detail the process of sense perception of an ordinary worldling *(puthujjana)*. It states: "Depending on the eye and material objects there arises visual consciousness *(cakkhuviññāna)*. The coming together of these three is contact *(phassa)*. As a result of contact there arise feelings/sensations *(vedanā)*. What one feels oneperceives/recognises; what one perceives one reasons about; what one reasons about one proliferates conceptually *(taṃ papañceti)*. What one proliferates conceptually, due to that, concepts characterised by the prolific tendency assail him in regard to material objects cognisable by the eye belonging to the past, future and present *(yaṃ papañceti tatonidānaṃ papañcasaññāsaṅkhā samudācaranti atītānāgatapaccuppannesu cakkhuviññeyyesu rūpesu)*. 'There are three phases in this process of sense perception. Phase I is characterised by an impersonal note and it ends with *vedanā*. It seems to be a process of automatic activity taking place because of the presence of sense receptors and sense objects. Phase II which displays deliberate activity ends with *taṃ papañceti*. Here the perceiver plays an active part in the process of perception. Phase III is characterised by the passivity of the perceiver and concepts start assailing him. The man who was grammatically the subject of the statement in phase II has become the object in Phase III.

Thus the untrained ordinary man is dominated by his sense experience and therefore the senses are called *indriyas* in Pali meaning lords/masters. As a result of being pulled in various directions by sense faculties man is very much confused and tensed. This confusion is beautiflly illustrated in the *Chapāṇa Sutta (S.* IV, p. 198) with an eloquent simile. According to this simile six animals having different habits and diverse fields of action are tied together in one firm knot. The six animals are a snake that tries to creep into an ant hill, a crocodile that tries to run to water, a bird that tries to fly in the sky, a dog that tries to run to a village, a fox that tries to flee to a cemetary and a monkey that tries to escape to a forest. These animals are constantly struggling to reach their respective habitats. Similarly the six sense faculties are seeking gratification in their own spheres and the man who has no control over his senses becomes terribly confused.

Pleasureable sense experience has craving as its latent tendency, unpleasant sense experience has aversion as its latent tendency and neutral sense experience has ignorance as its latent tendency (*M.* I, p. 303). As such sense experience normally generates unwholesome motivational roots.

Sensations/feelings *(vedanā)* demarcate the body from the rest of the environment and give the body the sense of self. For, the *Khandhasaṃyutta* (*S.* III, p. 46) says: "when the untrained worldling is impressed by a sensation born of contact with ignorance, the idea 'I am', occurs to him, the idea "I am this (body)", occurs to him" *(avijjāsamphassajena vedayitena phutthassa assutavato puthujjanassa asmītipissa hoti, ayaṃ aham asmīti' pissa hoti)*.

Looking at the congnitive experience of man from another perspective Buddhism maintains that the human mind is obscured by five hindrances *(nīvaraṇa)* of emotional and cognitive biases. They are desire for sensuality, anger, indolence, worry and perplexity. Their capacity to obscure the true nature of sense experience is illustrated by the water simile (*S.* V, pp. 121-124). The five hindranes are compared to coloured water, boiling

water, moss-covered water, turbulent water and muddy water placed in darkness respectively. Under all these circumstances water fails to give the true picture of a thing reflected thereon. Similarly the mind overpowered by these hindrances fails to understand the true nature of experiences that come within its ambit.

Buddhism teaches the methodical elimination of man's confusion and ignorance, and a way of understanding human experience as it really is by the practice of moral habits *(sīla)* and a graduated process of mental culture *(samādhi/bhāvanā)*. The landmarks in the experience of this course of training are explained in the suttas.

2. Progressive experiences of the Trainee

According to the *Sāmaññaphala Sutta* (*D.* I, p.70 ff) the unblemished cultivation of moral habits generates the pleasure/happiness of leading a blameless life *(anavajja-sukha)*. The next step in the process of training is the restraint of the senses and that brings the experience of uncontaminated pleasure/happiness *(avyāsekasukha)*. What is meant by this seems to be the pleasure derived from being free from the dictates of sense faculties. The subsequent steps in the course of training bring the experiences of mindfulness *(sati)*, clear comprehension *(sampajañña)* and contentment *(santuṭṭhi)*.

When the five *nīvaraṇas* subside the disciple experiences a great sense of relief and this sense of relief is illustrated with five meaningful similes. It is as (a) when a businessman pays off the capital loan and makes a handsome profit in his business, (b) when a patient recovers after a prolonged serious illness, (c) when a prisoner is released from prison, (d) when a slave is freed from slavery, and (e) when a man lost in a fearful desert is rescued and brought to safety.

With this sense of relief great delight *(pāmojja)* and joy *(pīti)* arise, and the joyous mind gets concentrated. The mind thus concentrated develops *jhānas*, and the *Sāmaññaphala Sutta* gives a glimpse into these meditational experiences through the medium of illustrative similes. In the first *jhāna* the meditator experiences joy and pleasure/happiness (bliss) born of the seclusion from sense pleasures *(vivekjam pītisukham)*. Furthermore he fills, permeates, saturates and suffuses his entire body with this *vivekajapītisukha*. This blissful physical experience is compared to the coolness of moisture that permeates through and through a wet ball of bath powder, and it is said that no part of the meditator's body remains untouched by this bliss. In the second *jhāna* he experiences joy and bliss born of concentration *(samādhi-jam pītisukham)*, and he, as before, fills, permeates, saturates and suffuses his entire body with this *samādhi-japītisukha*. Just as in a large pond filled to the brim with cool waters welling from underground springs, where no part of the pond remains untouched by the cool waters, the meditator's body gets completely pervaded with this bliss. In the third *jhāna* there is a similar experience with joyless bliss *(nippītikasukha)* and the body is compared to a lotus blossom submerged in the water, no part of which remains untouched by the cool waters. In the fourth *jhāna* the pure bright mind pervades the entire body and the simile compares the experience of this *jhānic* state to the entire body being covered with a pure white cloth from head to foot.

3. The Liberative experience

After the fourth *jhāna* it is possible to direct the mind for the attainment of higher supernormal knowledges *(abhiññā)* such as the ability to perform miracles *(iddhi-vidha)*, divine ear *(dibbasota)*, thought-reading *(ceto-pariyañāṇa)*, retrocognition *(pubbenivāsānussatiñāṇa)*, clairvoyance with the special ability to see the working of *kamma* when beings are reborn *(cutūpapātañāṇa)* and the knowledge of the destruction of defilements *(āsavak-khayañāṇa)*. The first three attainments are not essential for liberation while the last named is a *sine qua non*. Some *arahants* have all six supernomal cognitive experiences *(chaḷabhiññā)*, while others have only the last three *(tevijjā)*, or only the very last *(paññāvimuttā)*. There are still others who are proficient in the *rūpa* and *arūpa jhānas* as well and they are called *ubhatobhāgavimuttā* (*S.* I, p. 191).

When the adept discovers the four noble truths through his own personal experience his mind gets released from the intoxicants of sensuality, continued existence and ignorance. In freedom he gets the cognitive experience that he is freed, and he comprehends that birth is destroyed, the higher life has been successfully led, done is what has to be done, and that there is no more of this worldly existence (*D.* I, p. 84 etc.). Liberation is a supramundane experience which is achieved in this very life itself *(diṭṭh'eva dhamme sayam abhiññā sacchikatvā viharati)* and it is such a blissful experience that some arahants are reported to have enjoyed this bliss of emancipation *(vimuttisukha)* for seven continuous days without changing posture *(Vijayā Therigāthā, Thig. v.* 169 ff).

In the *Māgandiya Sutta* (*M.* I, p. 504) the Buddha says that he experiences such bliss apart from sense pleasures and unwholesome states, bliss which surpasses even divine pleasures, that he does not wish for lower forms of (sense) pleasures and does not find delight in them.

4. Sense experience of the liberated being

The contact *(phassa)* a liberated being make with the external world seems to be qualitatively different from the contact an ordinary *puthujjana* makes.

According to the advice given to Bāhiya Dāruciriya (*Udāna*, p. 8), a liberated being is trained in such a way

that there is only seeing in what is seen, only hearing in what is heard, only sensing in what is cognised. His sense experience seems to be such that be does not establish contact with the external world, and this conjecture seems to be substantiated by the statement that destruction of fetters is far removed from those who are steeped in contact with the world *(tesam phassaparetānam ...āra saṃyojanakkhayo, Sn.* v. 736). The *Uppādasaṃyutta (S.* III, p. 230) states that the arising and persistence of sense contact is the cause for the appearance of old age and death *(cakkhusamphassassa uppādo thiti ...manosamphassassa uppādo thiti jarāmaraṇassa pātubhāvo).* Another significant statement is that contact (with the external world) is established dependent on *upadhi.* How can contact be established for one who is free from *upadhi*? *(Phusanti phassā upadhiṃ paticca, nirupadhiṃ kena phuseyyuṃ phassā, Udāna,* p. 12). According to the *Anguttara nikāya* (*A.* II, p. 161) one becomes an arahant with the cessation of conceptual proliferations, when there is complete cessation of the six faculties of sense contact and detachment therefrom *(channaṃ phassāyatanānaṃ asesavirāganirodhā papañcanirodho papañcūpasamo 'ti).* Similarly a liberated being's experience of sensatons/feelings *(vedanā)* too seems to be qualitatively different from that of the *puthujjana.*

There are two types of sensations which the ordinary man experiences, they are physical and mental *(kāyikā ca cetasikā, S.* IV, p. 231). The impact of these two types of sensations on the individual is explained with the help of a simile. A man experiences pain when he is shot with one arrow, he experiences greater pain when he is shot with a second arrow. The first arrow is the physical pain and the second arrow is the mental pain (of fear and anxiety as when an immature child is slightly wounded). By adding the mental component the untrained ordinary man doubles the pain he has to endure (*S.* IV, p. 208). In contrast the liberated being experiences only physical pain and not the mental counterpart *(so ekaṃ vedanaṃ vediyati kāyikaṃ na cetasikaṃ, S.* IV, p. 209). The statement that *dukkha* does not arise when there is complete cessation of *vedanā* and detachment therefrom *(vedanānaṃ asesavirāganirodhā natthi dukkhassa sambhavo, Sn.* p. 143) becomes meaningful when it is understood that the mental component of sensation becomes extinct with the attainment of arahantship.

Thus it is clear that the sense experience of the liberated being as portrayed in the Pali Canon is qualitatively different from the sense experience expressed by the terms *phassa* and *vedanā* of the ordinary worldling. (See PHASSA and VEDANĀ)..

Lily de Silva

EXPIATION AND ATONEMENT. See ATONEMENT.

EXPULSION. See PABBĀJANĪYA KAMMA.

EXTINCTION. See UCCHEDAVĀDA.

EXTRA-SENSORY-PERCEPTION (ESP) is perception beyond the range of known sensory processes, and it extends beyond the range of normal perception through time, space and plane of experience. The belief in the possibility of this type of extra-sensory-perception has been prevalent in India from very early times. Earliest traces of this belief are found in the *Vedas* wherein paranormal powers are ascribed to conative and cognitive abilities of the individual.[1] In the *Upaniṣads* this belief is further developed, but the emphasis shifted from the perception of visual empirical objects to perception of spiritual 'things.' Thus, the *Upaniṣads* such as *Katha* and *Muṇḍaka* clearly state that the *Ātman* cannot be perceived through the normal sensory process. The *Katha* (ii, 3, 9) says that the *Ātman* cannot be perceived with eyes *(na cakṣuṣā paśyate kaścinnainaṃ),* while the *Muṇḍaka* (iii, 1, 8) declares that the *Ātman* is not grasped *(gṛhyate)* by the eye *(cakṣuṣā),* by speech *(vācā),* by other sensory-organs *(nānyair devaiḥ),* by austerity *(tapasā)* or by work *(karmaṇā).* Again both these *Upaniṣads* agree that the *Ātman* cannot be attained *(labhyo)* by instruction *(pravacanena),* intellectual power *(medhyā)* or by much learning *(bahunā śrutena: Katha,* i, 2, 23; *Muṇḍaka,* iii, 2, 3), implying thereby the use of extra-sensory powers or faculties to perceive the *Ātman.* These *Upaniṣads* basically accept that this form of extra-sensory perception is attained through meditational practices. Thus, the *Katha* (ii, 3, 9) says that the *Ātman* which does not come within the range of normal vision is apprehended by heart *(hṛdā),* by thought *(manīṣā)* and by mind *(manasā).* While in the *Katha* (i, 2, 20) it is stated

1. On this aspect see O. H. de A. Wijesekera, Upanishadic Terms for Sense Functions, *UCR.* Oct. Vol. 1 & 2, pp. 14-24.

that the *Ātman* is seen through the tranquillity of mind and senses *(dhātuh prasāda)*, the *Mundaka* (iii, 1, 8) says that this is possible through the purification of knowledge *(jñānaprasāda)* by the practice of meditation. However, it should be noted that the *Upanisads*, while accepting meditational practices as the immediate source of the production of extrasensory-perception, emphatically declare that its ultimate source is the grace of *Ātman (Katha,* i, 2, 23; *Mundaka*, iii, 2, 3). The acceptance of the belief in extra-sensory-perceptive ability by the Jainas is based on their acceptance of a permanent, intrinsically omniscient self *(jiva)*. Buddhism also accepted this ability of extra-sensory-perception, but it differed in content and source of origin from the parallel Upanisadic and Jaina beliefs. It is evident that according to Buddhism this ability, if not an inborn quality of an individual,[2] is attained only through jhānic practices. Being an atheistic religion Buddhism completely rejects the idea of grace of an external power. Its basic teaching on soul-lessness *(anattā*, q.v.) refutes the Jaina idea of *Jiva*, and hence the basis of the Buddhist conception of the ESP ability is different from that held by the Jainas and the Upanisadic teachers.

It is, perhaps, in Buddhism that the ability of extra-sensory-perception comes to be dealt with systematically and elaborately. Buddhist epistemology accepts, besides normal perception, a mode of perception which is beyond the range of the known sensory-processes. This particular ability is generally connoted by the Pali term *abhiññā* (q.v.) in one of its numerous shades of meanings. According to the Buddhist theory of knowledge *abhiññā* in this sense is a means of direct knowledge. Buddhist texts refer to 'things' *(dhamma)* that are to be acquired and perceived through *abhiññā (abhiññāsacchikaranīyā dhammā: A.* III, pp. 17-19). In the *Pāyāsi Sutta* (*D.* II, p. 328) it is clearly stated that the other world *(paraloka)* cannot be perceived *(na datthabbo)* with the physical-eye *(mamsa-cakkhu)* but has to be perceived with the divine-eye *(dibba-cakkhu,* q.v.). Textual evidence shows that the qualifying terms *dibba* meaning 'divine' and *atikkanta mānusaka* meaning 'surpassing the human' are invariably prefixed to describe and differentiate this mode of extra-sensory-perception from normal perception (cf. *D.* I, pp. 82f., 162; II, p. 288). From textual evidence it also seem that words such as *dittha, dassana, adakkhi*, usually connoting the sense of normal perception, are also used to convey the sense of extra-sensory perception (cf. *It.* p. 58). The *Niddesa* (I, p. 323) commenting on the term *adakkhi* suggests that it could convey the sense of seeing with telepathic knowledge *(paracitta-ñāna)*, retrocognitive knowledge *(pubbenivāsānussatiñāna)*, human-eye *(mamsa cakkhu)* or divine eye *(dibba-cakkhu)*. Verbs such as *passati* and *pajānāti* meaning seeing and knowing are also frequently used to bring out the meaning of extra-sensory-perception (cf. *D.* I, pp. 82, 162; *M.* I, p. 7). The term *dassana* meaning 'perception' and particluarly the term *ñāndassana* are also used in the wider sense to include both sensory and extra-sensory perception.[3]

As mentioned earlier the closest Pali equivalent for ESP is *abhiññā*. Under this term are included six items,[4] and these are *iddhividha* (psychokinesis), *dibbasota* (divine-ear or clairaudiance), *cetopariyāyañāna* (telepathy), *pubbenivāsānussatiñāna* (retrocognition), *dibbacakkhu* (divine-eye or clairvoyance) and *āsavānamkhayañāna* (knowledge relating to the extinction of defilements). These items are of two main kinds. The first item *iddhividha* connotes a psychokinetic power, and hence, it does not strictly fall within the category of extra-sensory-perception. It is more a branch of parapsychology which includes both psychokinesis and ESP. The sixth item *āsavānamkhaya ñāna* is an important technical term in Buddhist psychology connoting the realization as well as the internalization of the fact of the extinction of all defilements of samsāric existence. This in other words is the *summum bonum* of Buddhism. Hence, *āsavānamkhayañāna*, too, is not strictly a form of *ESP* in the sense it is found used in modern writings on the subject. The remaining four items, clairaudiance, telepathy, retrocognition and clairvoyance, it is apparent, directly come within the definition of ESP.

Dibba-sota or clairaudiance, according to Buddhist texts, is the paranormal power of hearing and discerning sounds both human and divine which are not audible to the auditory organ (*D.* III, p. 38; *M.* I, p. 502). *Cetopariyāyañāna* (i.e. telepathy) according to Buddhist textual description is thought or mind-reading, than thought-transference (*D.* I, pp. 80, 213). The *Anguttaranikāya* (I, pp. 170, 171) states that one can know another's mind through the process known as *ādesanāpātihāriya*. Therein it is also explained how this could be accomplished either through the normal or paranormal process. *Pubbenivāsānussati-ñāna*, generally rendered as retrocognition, is the paranormal ability to recall one's manifold past existences. *Dibba-cakkhu* i.e. clairvoyance or divine-eye, in the wider sense of the term, is the

2 Cf. the case of Vipassi (*D.* II, p. 20). However, such instances are not numerous, and in the case of Vipassi his ESP ability (clairvoyance in this instance) is said to be the product of his former good deeds.

3 See K. N. Jayatilleke, *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*, London, 1963, p. 431 f.

4 These six items will be dealt separately under the respective head-words. See also *Adhiññā*.

paranormal ability to see things which are beyond the range of the physical eye. The *Dīgha-nikāya* (II, p. 20) says that prince Vipassī was endowed with this paranormal power and that he could see a distance of one *yojana* all round whether during the night and day. In his case this ability was the result of his former good deeds. The Arahant Anuruddha who had deliberately developed this ability was ranked formemost among those disciples of the Buddha who were endowed with *dibbacakkhu* (*A.* I, p. 23). The Buddha utilized this ability to discern contemporaneous events (*M.* I, p. 170; *A.* III, p. 336). In its limited functional sense *dibbacakkhu* also connotes the paranormal ability of seeing the decease and rebirth of beings, which ability along with *pubbenivāsānussati-ñāṇa* and *āsavānaṃkhaya-ñāṇa (tisso vijja)* are basically essential for the attainment of final release.

This ability of knowing the decease and rebirth of beings is also known by the functional name *cutūpapātañāṇa*, knowledge regarding decease and rebirth. Allied to this is the paranormal perception of the working of *kamma*. This, the texts categorise as a separate faculty known as the 'knowledge as to how beings fare according to their deeds' *(yathākammūpaga-ñāṇa; Vism.* p. 358; cf. *Compendium of Philosophy).* The power of prophesing or precognition *(anāgataṃsa-ñāṇa)*, too, is an aspect of clairvoyance, and this is regarded as the special ability of the Buddha (*Compendium of Philosophy*, p. 63).

An analysis of the four *abhiññās* shows that these could be broadly divided into two groups with clairaudiance *(dibba-sota)* on the one side and the three remaining faculties on the other. It is clear that functionally telepathy *(cetopariya-ñāṇa)* has much in common with clairvoyance and this fact has been observed by later exegetical writers (cf. *Vism.* p. 344). As observed earlier the knowledge regarding the decease and rebirth of beings *(sattānaṃ cutūpapātañāṇa)* connotes only an aspect of clairvoyance *(dibba-cakkhu)* deliberately developed and directed to a particular sphere and with a specific purpose. Such an analysis also brings to light that there are three sense-faculties *(indriya)* namely the mind, the eye and the ear, that serve as bases for the functioning of these paranormal abilities. From Buddhist textual evidence it is seen that the ear and the eye become helpful only at the early stages of the development of the ESP abilities, and of these, too, the ear, as the physical basis of clairaudience *(dibba-sota)*, plays only a very minor role. It is the faculty of the mind developed through meditational practices that is of paramount importance.

Early Buddhism as well as the contemporaneous Indian religious tradition accepted the position that the mind could be raised to a high level of development through meditational practices whereby it acquires the ability of perceiving things that are beyond the range of normal sense organs through space, time and plane of experience. Even in the Vedic period the mind was considered to possess latent paranormal ability of seeing and knowing. The *Upaniṣads* treat the mind as the sense *par excellence*. The *Chāndogya* (viii, 12, 5) refers to the mind as the divine-eye *(daivaṃ cakṣuḥ)*. Budhist texts uphold the view that mind has telepathic powers, and this is evident from the Buddhist Textual description of *cetopariyañāṇa*. And moreover, according to Buddhist texts, it is the mind that is directed to see things which are not within the range of normal perception as well as events connected with former births of oneself and of others (cf. *M.* I, p. 296; *A.* V. p. 3). Hence, it is reasonable to assume that the paranormal ability connected by the term *dibba-cakkhu* as well as *dibbasota* refers to this ESP ability of the mind. Exegetical description of *dibbacakkhu* found in such texts as the *Visuddhimagga* strengthens this assumption. Therein (*Vism.* p. 357) the *dibba-cakkhu* is explained as, 'It is an eye in the sense of seeing. Also it is an eye since it is like an eye in its performance of an eye's function.' Further the same source (p. 362) describes it as the eye of knowledge *(ñāṇacakkhu)*. The *Milindapañha* (p. 153) calls it the eye produced by contemplation *(bhāvanāmayacakkhu)* whereas the *Paṭisambhidāmagga* (I, p. 115) refers to it simply as *paññā*.

It appears that, according to Buddhism, the mind is said to possess latent paranormal ability of seeing and knowing. This power is made inoperative by the five defilements *(pañcanivaraṇa)* which cripple the mind and weaken wisedom (*M.* I, pp. 181, 270, 276, 521; *D.* I, p. 76, cf. *A.* I, pp. 254, 255). Therefore, in order to activate and bring to surface this latent ESP ability one has to rid the mind of these defilemnts. This is possible only through mind-culture which sharpens wisdom *(paññā)*, and this involves practice of virtue *(sīla)*, the Buddhist view being that wisdom and virtue go had in hand (*D.* I, p. 124; cf. *A.* I, p. 102). When freed from these defilements the mind becomes suitable for further development through meditational practices that tranquil the mind *(samathabhāvanā*, cf. *MA.* III, p. 202). When one reaches the fourth jhanic state or its equivalent (cf. *M.* I, p. 494) through these meditational practices one's mind becomes concentrated, pure, cleansed, free from blemishes, purged of adventitious defilements, supple, pliant, steady and unpurturbed (*D.* I, p. 76; *A.* III, pp. 16,17). Even at this state of development of the mind the latent ESP. abilities do not automatically become operative. It is only if one desires *(sace ākaṅkhati, A.* III, p. 17) that one could deliberately turn and direct one's mind to utilise ESP abilities.

It is evident from the foregoing discussion that according to the Indian view, specially as it is found enunciated in Buddhist texts, ESP is an ability probably

latent in the mind, and that sense-faculties such as the eye and the ear are of limited use in the development of this ability. While accepting that in rare instances this latent ability becomes automatically manifest as a result of former good deeds of the possessor of ESP, Buddhism as a general principle, accepts the position that one has to put forth deliberate, conscious and methodical effort for its fruition.

As seen above the mind has the potential to perceive things beyond the range of normal perception. This potentiality is suppressed and stifled by an overgrowth of five obstacles or defilements *(pañca-nivarana).* These are covetousness *(abhijjhā), ill-will (vyāpāda),* sloth and torpor *(thina-middha),* restlessness and scruples *(uddhacca-kukkucca)* and sceptical doubt *(vicikicchā).* The initial step in the process of the development of ESP is the eradication of these mind-crippling obstacles. This is to be accomplished by culturing the mind through jhanic practices. From the fact that ESP is primarily a product pertaining to jhanic consciousness it is evident that, according to the Buddhist view, it is not a mere human ability. The Buddhist texts themselves refer to it as a super-human achievement *(uttarimanussadhamma),* and in content it is more a spiritual attainment than a miraculous feat. The purpose of achieving ESP ability also is spiritual, and the Buddha clearly lays down an injunction prohibiting the disciples from making public display of this super-human ability (*Vin.* II, p. 110). The *Mahāli Sutta* (*D.* I, p. 155) emphatically points out that the Buddha's teaching is not meant for the 'mere' attainment of this super-human power.

Buddhism, while accepting the possibility of developing ESP ability, pointedly states that it should be developed for the sole purpose of obtaining, direct knowledge about phenomena *(dhammā)* which are beyond the reach of normal perception, which knowledge conduces to the attainment of release from the vortex of birth and death *(samsāra).* It is specifically in this context that Buddhism, when speaking of ESP, lays emphasis on *sattānam-cutūpapātha-ñāna* and *pubbenivāsānussati-ñāna,* which are both aspects of *dibbacakkhu,* for these are helpful in obtaining *āsavānamkhaya-ñāna.* Hence these three knowledges *(tisso vijjā)* are said to contribute to the attainment of Enlightenment leading to final release.

On the other hand there seems to be evidence which point to the possibility of reaching final liberation through what is referred to as 'the way of wisdom' *(paññā-vimutta),* wherein one does nor appear to make use of these ESP faculties (*S.* II. pp. 119f). In the Commentaries (*SA.* II. pp. 126f.) the distinction between these two methods is explained by saying that while the former pursues the path to liberation *via* the *jhānas,* the latter is the method of direct intuition *(sukkhavipassaka)* which has little need of *jhāna (nijjhānaka).* The latter perhaps assumes an advanced stage of religious development inherited from previous life or lives on which the achievements of this life are founded.

S. K. Nanayakkara

FABLES. The opinions of scholars with regard to the structure and character of the fable are different to a considerable extent. The *Oxford English Dictionary* gives the term a number of meanings such as: a fictitious narrative, a foolish or a ridiculous story, a short story devised to convey some useful lesson, a plot of a play or a poem. L. Magnus, *(Dictionary of European Literature,* London, p. 154) defines the fable as a short comic tale in verse in which it is an almost invariable condition that the subjects shall be drawn from common life and shall imitate nature in its physical, if not in its moral and psychological manifestations. The *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (IX, p. 21) considers the fable and the apologue to be similar, and says that a fable in its genuine state is a narrative in which beings, irrational and sometimes inanimate, feign to act and speak with human interest and passion for the purpose of moral instruction. In *A Readers' Guide to Literary Terms* (Karl Beckson and Arthur Ganz, p. 66) it is said that the characters in a fable are often animals but not invariably so. And it is further stated that a fable should contain a moral and that it can be composed either in prose or in verse.[1] A definition of the term as it is generally understood at present is found in the *Standard Dictionary of Folk-lore-Mythology and Legend* (Funk and Magnalls Company, New York, I, p.361). There it is said that a fable is an animal tale with a moral.

However, from the definitions cited above, it can be surmised that a fable is a short narrative either in prose or in verse intended for moral instruction and that its characters are often animals.

The didactic nature of the contents is a marked feature of the fable. Yet this cannot be considered as a criterion which distinguishes a fable from other types of literature. Almost all stories found in Buddhist literature have as their main purpose the pointing out of a moral. Yet all such stories are not considered to be fables. Of the vast number of Buddhist tales a certain group, whose main characters are animals, are categorised as fables. Therefore, Buddhist tales intended for moral instruction,

1 Normally Buddhist fables are in a mixture of prose and verse and only rarely are they completely in verse (see No. Jataka No. 430.

with their main characters as animals, are here considered as fables. Yet there remains another group of tales in which animals and human beings take part. Such tales, too, due to the presence of animals as characters are here treated as fables.

Nothing definite can be said about the origin of the fable literature. Some are of opinion that the fables are of Semitic origin *(The Standard Dictionary of Folklore Mythology and legend,* Funk and Wagnalls Company; *loc. cit.). The Encyclopaedia of Britannica* (loc. cit.) suggests that the fables of India and Greece are derived from the beast fables of savages. It is probable that the fables, as we have them now, are a development of the animal tale which is one of the earliesst features of folk-lore. These animal tales in the beginning may have been completely devoid of any kind of moral instruction and may have been mere explanatory stories, as for example a story related in order to explain why the crow is black, why the peacock is beautiful and so on. Later these very tales may have been used to inculcate a moral lesson for human beings or to satirize their conduct. When and who changed these early explanatory animal tales into didactic fables cannot be exactly known. It can be conjectured that this change was effected by a people who belonged to a sophisticated culture than primitive folk-culture. The structure of the fable itself reveals developed literary traits which are alien to the genuine and the earliest forms of folk-lore.

The origin of the fable literature in India, too, has not yet been conclusively established. The popular Buddhist belief is that all fables, more precisely all tales, found in Buddhist texts, specially the *jātaka,* are the inventions of the Buddha. It is said that on numerous occasions the Buddha, in order to explain and comment on events that took place among the Saṅgha, narrated stories containing similar events said to have occurred in the past. It is a well accepted notion among the Buddhists that the Buddha could visualize experiences of an innumerable number of previous births of his own as well as of others. The stories he narrated are regarded as illustrating these previous experiences. The Buddha narrated these in order to impart a moral lesson to the Saṅgha. But, this popular belief which attributes the authorship of all these stories to the Buddha cannot hold ground when examined closely. It is quite possible that the Buddha himself invented quite a number of stories. Beside those stories there are a large number of tales, specially fables, which the Buddha seems to have drawn from the popular literature. One such fable is the ***Baka Jātaka*** (No. 38). There is nothing Buddhistic in this story except for the presence of a tree-deity who is identified with the Bodhisatta. It is quite apparent that the character of the tree-deity has no place in the main story and that he had been introduced at a later stage to give this fable, which in essence is not Buddhistic, a Buddhistic garb. There are quite a number of fables which have nothing particularly Buddhistic about them but are used to impart Buddhist moral teachings by giving them a Buddhistic appearance. The ***Kharadiya jātaka*** (No. 15), the ***Vipallatthamiga-jātaka*** (No. 16), the ***Munika jātaka*** (No. 30), the ***Vānarinda jātaka*** (No. 57) and ***Kakkata jātaka*** (No. 267) are a few of the fables that the Buddha and his disciples might have drawn from a common mass of floating fable literature.

The lives led by the Indians of the first millenium B.C. strongly suggest the possibility of the existence of animal tales at a very early date. The lives of the early Indians were very closely connected with nature. Therefore, they had the opportunity to observe the similarities and differences between the working of nature and their own lives. Especially the animals, both domisticated and wild, must have drawn their attention and they must have observed certain characteristics which are peculiar to them and still other characteristics which are common to men and beasts. They may have invented simple tales to explain these characteristics and probably the fables of a later date have developed from these. However, this is a mere conjecture and there is no textual evidence to prove this. It is not at all surprising to find that in India folk-lore did not find a place in the earliest literature, namely the Vedic literature, which on the whole is representative of the thoughts and beliefs of brāhmin priests.

Yet, there is textual evidence to show that the Indians, from very early times, were keen observers of nature. Thus in the *Rg Veda* (vii, 102) occurs an analogy in which the croaking of frogs is compared with the chanting of hymns by brāhmin priests. From very early times they were not hesitant to attribute certain human characteristics to animals. The *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (i, 12) mentions how the dogs searched for a leader to obtain food for them. In the same *Upaniṣad* it is mentioned how Raikva's attention was drawn by the remarks made by the two flamingoes (iv, 1) and again how the sage Satyakāma was instructed by a bull, a flamingo and finally by an aquatic animal (v, 7).

The earliest textual reference to fables is found in the Epics. M. Winternitz *(History of Indian Literature,* I, p. 405 ff.) has cited numerous fables that occur in the *Mahābhārata.* Here the fable is used for the purpose of instruction. If fables had not been current among the people as a medium of instruction and moral teaching it would not have been used for that purpose in the Epics. Among the numerous fables that occur in this Epic are the tales about the bird which laid golden eggs; about the birds being united, were able to fly away carrying the fowler's net and when disunited fell into the hands of the

fowler; about the hypocritical cat which feigned to practise severe austerities and devoured the unsuspecting mice, and also about the hypocritical flamingo which ate the birds' eggs. All these fables reappear in later literature. Yet, as *Mahābhārata* is full of interpolations and as its exact date is not known these references do not help one in fixing a date for the existence of the fable as a medium of instruction. Proverbial expressions found in Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* which is assigned to about 150 B.C. too suggest the existence of a developed fable literature (A. B. Keith, *A History of Sanskrit Literature*, p.243). However, the most important evidence for the existence of fables is the monumental evidence of Bhārhut. The jātakas which are sculptured in deep bas-relief on the railings of Bhārhut provide undisputable evidence for the existence of the fable as a medium of instruction at the end of the 3rd century B.C.

Though the fable was prevalent, before the time of the Buddha, as a medium of instruction on worldly wisdom and morality, undoubtedly it was the Buddha who first used the fable, on a very wide scale, as an effective medium of instruction on worldly wisdom, morality and above all on religious matters. It is quite well known that the Buddha in order to make his new doctrinal teachings clear and lucid to the listeners very often employed old phraseology and concepts with which they were well acquainted. In the same way, in order to present in a simple manner his teachings on karma, rebirth and such other topics he used fables and other types of tales which he could freely draw upon from current literature. The Indians were by nature very fond of listening to stories. This must have given the Buddha a further impetus to make use of these taless which he had already found to be a very effective medium of instructing the masses. The fact that the Buddha often used apologues and fables and even analogies drawn from animal life in the course of his discourses to explain difficult points is quite clear from numerous occurrences in canonical texts other than the *jātaka* (see *M.* I, 334; *A.* I, 162; IV, 138; *S.* I, 124; IV, 145, 148; *Vin.* II, 161).

The adaptation of the fable for the purpose of moral instruction and elucidation of difficult points in the doctrine was made still easier by the Buddhist teachings on rebirth. This doctrine of rebirth made it possible to transfer any extant fable into a Jātaka by the mere identification of the main characters of a fable with the previous lives of the Buddha and his disciples, or by introducing a completely new character and identifying him with a previous birth of the Buddha, as for example the Tree-deity in the *Baka Jātaka* (No. 38). In such instances the bodhisatta plays the role par excellence as the illustrator of the cultivation of various virtues. These numerous fables which the Buddha drew upon from the popular literature of that time are found to occur in the *jātaka*. Not only the Buddha, but also his eminent disciples may have followed the example of the master.[2] This, very probably, is the cause for the vast number of tales in Buddhist literature. Afterwards, the brahmins, too, followed the example set by the Buddha. While the Buddha employed these popular tales mainly as a medium of teaching his doctrine, the brahmins used the very same tales to impart worldly wisdom and it is at the hands of the latter that the fable developed into a very effective means of imparting knowledge with regard to the principles of state craft, polity, diplomacy and in general with regard to all aspects of practical life. When the Sanskrit language began to reassert itself in the latter part of the 2nd century A.C. as the court language, the brahmin teachers, to whom was entrusted the education of princes, felt the need of text books which taught the young princes the management of political and public affairs. To satisfy this need they copiously drew material from Buddhist tales and by stripping off the Buddhistic garb of those tales used them to serve their purpose. This is the reason why the very same tales occur in both Buddhist and brahmanic literature. The *Pañcatantra, the Tantrākhyāyikā*, the *Hitopadeśa* and a host of other collections of fables came into existence to satisfy this need. The tales that occur in these books show to what extent they are indebted to the Buddhist literature, and at the same time they also reveal the popularity the fable had gained by that time.

The very fables that appear in Buddhist texts reappear not only in Sanskrit literature but also in western literature. This is due to the fact that most of the fables prevalent in the west are of Indian origin and that they were introduced to the west by the Arabs. By about the middle of the 6th century A.C., the *Pañcatantra* or to be more precise the *Proto- Pañcatantra* was rendered into Pahlavi, the Persian language. The translator was Barzōe or Berzuyeh, the physician of Chosru Anosharwān (Khosru Nushirvan, 531-79 A.C.), the king of Persia. This translation was named after the two characters Karaṭaka and Damanaka who appear in the original version. By about 570 A.C., the Pahlavi translation was rendered into old Syriac by one Būd. An Arabic version of the Pahlavi rendering was made by Abdallah ibn Almokaffa of the court of Khalif Almansur (754-75 A.C.), under the title *Kalilah wa Dimnah*. It was this Arabic version which helped the Indian fable to migrate into the west.

2. *Vin.* I, 188 seems to suggest that some monks of strict discipline were against the practice of narrating stories. Yet there is enough evidence in canonical texts to show that the Buddha himself used analogies, fables etc. in his discourses.

By about 1080 A.C. a Jew named Symeon Seth translated this Arabic text into Greek. In 1250 A.C. another Jew named Rabbi Joel rendered the Arabic text into Hebrew. Between 1263-78 A.C. this Hebrew version was rendered into Latin by Johannes Capua and this was printed and published in 1480 A.C. under the title *Directorium Vitae Humanae*. From the Latin were made the German translation entitled *Das Buch der Byspel der alten Wysen* by Anthonius von Pforr, and the Italian renderings by Firenzuola (1548 A.C.) and A.F. Doni (1552 A.C.). These were retranslated into French and English before the end of the 16th century.

After the conquest of Spain by the Mohammedans, Arabic literature found its way to Spain and as early as 1289 A.C. The Arabic Book of Fables was translated into Spanish under the title *Calila é Dymna*, and another version appeared in 1493 A.C.

One of the most important Latin versions was made by Baldo somewhere in the 14th century under the title *Aesopus Alter*. This is important because here the fables are attributed to the traditional Greek fabulist, Aesop and thence these fables of Indian origin came to be regarded as inventions of Aesop.

However, Jean De La Fontaine's (1621-95 A.C.) collection of fables in French is the most well known of all such collections. La Fountaine in his introduction to the seventh book of fables says that he owes the largest portion of the fables to an Indian sage named Pilpay, which is considered by modern scholars to be a corrupt form, through the Arabic, of Sanskrit Vidyāpati which could have been a honorific title of the Indian who collected the fables. La Fountaine's collection of fables seems to have been influenced by numerous versions such as the Greek, Italian and early French versions. The work that appears to have influenced him most is the French version that was published in 1644 under the title *'Livre des Lumie²res, ou la Conduite des Rois, composi par le Sage Pilpay, Indian* by David Sahid of Ispahan. This itself is a French version of the *Anvāri Suhaili* of Hussain ben Ali, an enlarged version of Nasrallāh's rendering of Abdallah ibn Almokaff's work.

Aesop, to whom the fables of the west are commonly attributed, is believed to have lived somewhere between 620 and 560 B.C. and he is said to be the slave of Iadmon of Samos. The place of his birth is uncertain though some consider him to be a native of Asia minor (see J. J. Shipley, *The Dictionary of World Literature*, New York). If this is correct there is some possibility of his coming into contact with the Indian fable, for there could have been contact among countries like India, Persia, Syria and Asia Minor under the domination of Archaemenid Persians whose dominion spread from the Indus to the southern frontiers of Egypt.

Aesop is several times mentioned in Greek classical literature. Plato says that Socrates spent his imprisonment turning the stories of Aesop into verse. Aristophanes refers to him. Aristotle quotes some of his stories (see, *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, under Aesop). It is probable that Aesop did not commit his fables to writing, and even if he did, they are now lost. The collection made by Demetrius of Phalerum (345-283 B.C.) is also lost. The earliest collection now extant is that of Babrius who turnéd the fables into choliambics in the early part of the 3rd century A.C. This was discovered by Mynas at Mt. Athos in 1824 A.C. There is every possibility for Barbrius to have become acquainted with the Indian fables. From the end of the 4th century B.C. there were frequent journeys between Greek dominions in the East and adjoining parts of India which were then Buddhist. After the invasion of India by Alexander the Great, numerous Buddhist tales must have reached Greece. The Greeks may also have brought with them a few isolated tales prevalent in their country. There is every possibility of their carrying home a larger number of fables than the number they introduced to India. Thus, the poetical versions of fables preserved in Babrius' collection could be of Buddhist origin. The fables of Babrius are said to have been translated to Latin by Phaedrus probably in the 4th century A.C. In the 14th century Planudes, a monk from Constantinople, wrote a work which he called a collection of Aesop's fables. It is quite apparent that by this time the Indian fables were current in the west, for the first Greek version appeared in 1080 A.C. and Planudes must have copiously drawn material from numerous versions that appeared before his time. Thus, it is evident that the fables commonly attributed to Aesop in fact are of Indian origin.

Just as the Buddhist did, so did the Christians too, use thesse tales for the purpose of moral instruction. The *Gesta Romanorum*, a Latin collection of tales compiled about the end of the 13th or the beginning of the 14th century, which is largely indebted to Buddhist sources, was profusely used for this purpose.

Buddhist tales were also carried to the eastern parts of Europe such as Russia and Hungary by the Mongolians under Genghis Khan. In these countries these tales underwent certain changes. Yet these changes do not completely conceal their Indian origin.

The *Jātaka* is the repository of Buddhist fables. The fables that are found in it show the depth of insight of those who closely observed animal life and employed animal characteristics and behaviour to inculcate a moral lesson for the human beings. They noticed a close resemblance between human life and animal life and this made it easy for them to attribute human characteristics such as speech to animals. When inventing fables they

humanized the animals so completely that the animals lost their natural traits. This was possible because animals formed a part and parcel of their own day to day life. In the fables of the west, of course, though animals act as human beings, usually they retain their natural traits. This, too, hints at the secondary nature of the fables of the west.

The power of observation of the early Indian fabulists is shown by the clever selection of animals whose intrinsic traits were quite in keeping with the human characteristics attributed to them. A vast range of animals appear as characters in the fables. Of the wild animals the most frequently mentioned are the elephant, the lion, the tiger, the bear, the monkey, the jackal, the stag, the deer and the doe. Occasionally the snake and the mongoose are referred to (see jātaka No. 165). Among the domesticated animals the frequently mentioned are the ass, the horse, the ox, the pig and even the dog. (see jātaka No. 27). Even the cat is not overlooked for, the *Babbu jātaka* (No. 137) relates how the cat was outwitted by the mouse. The *Munika jātaka* (No. 30) is a tale about the ox who in vain envied the fatted pig which was being well fed only to be killed at the end (see also No. 286).

Birds, too, are often employed as main characters in fables. The peacock, the swan, the woodpecker, and the parrot are mentioned often. The owl is also referred to though rarely (Jātaka No. 226). The partridge and the quail are often mentioned. The *Vattaka jātaka* (No. 118) narrates how a quail, when caught by a fowler, starved until it was so emanciated that people refused to buy it. The *Sakunagghi jātaka* (No. 168) relates how a quail beat a falcon by keeping to its own ground. The crow and the crane appear in a number of fables. Even the fish, the otter, the tortoise and the crocodile did not escape the sharp eyes of the Indian fabulist.

From among the numerous animals, the fabulists have selected a few to whom are attributed particular modes of conduct which appear to be the most prominent features of their characters. Thus, dignity and cleanliness is a marked quality of the lion. The *Sūkara jātaka* (No. 153) illustrates how a lion through dignity and cleanliness refuses to fight a boar besmeared with filth but instead wishes to accept defeat. The crow is often mentioned for its greediness (see Non. 42, 204, 275, 395, 434). The jackal's prominent quality is cunning (see, Nos. 128, 129, 400), and foolishness and haughtiness are attributes of the monkey (see Nos. 46, 176, 268, 178, 404). The hare is known for its timidity *(Daddabha jātaka,* No. 322). Often, good qualities such as gentleness and self-sacrifice are attributed to the deer and the swan (see Nos. 12, 533). Yet, these animals are not represented as stereotyped characters, for, the Indian fabulists have not failed to observe also the diversity that prevails among animals of the same kind as among different individuals. Thus, the crows are known also for their unity (see No. 46). The jackal is not always bent on harming others. Though in one place (No. 397) it is narrated how a lion is enticed by a jackal, in another place (No. 157) it is narrated how a lion is saved by a jackal. They are not always successful in outwitting others for they themselves are at times outwitted (see No. 437) and at times they meet with destruction due to their vain pride (No. 143). All the monkeys are neither foolish nor naughty. At timess monkeys act very wisely (see Nos. 20, 177) and outwit crocodiles (see Nos. 57, 208). The *Mahākapi jātaka* (No. 407) narrates how a monkey acts in an exalted manner and saves the lives of the rest.

Buddhist fables are mainly meant to illustrate the evil results of excessive passion, attachment, greed, vain conceit, and such other human weaknesses. Thus, a lion dies because of his love for a doe (No. 93); a young jackal meets with untimely death because of his love for a lioness (No. 152). Because of excessive attachment to his dwelling place a tortise is destroyed (No. 178). Greed is the cause of great misery. Numerous fables illustrate the fate that befalls the greedy crows (Nos. 42, 274, 395, 434). Through vain conceit a jackal brings about its own destruction (No.143); a similar fate befalls the beetle which challenges the elephant (No. 227). The *Viraka jātaka* (No. 204) relates how a crow met with its death as a result of vain conceit. Talkativenseess is another common human weakness that brings about evil consequences. The *Kacchapa jātaka* (No. 215) narrates how a tortise died through being unable to guard its mouth. In the *Kokalika jātaka* (No. 331) there is a short fable about a young cuckoo which by uttering a cry at the improper time was attacked by the crows. The *Sihacamma jātaka* (No. 189) narrates how the ass dressed in lionskin betrays itself by its bray (see also Nos. 172, 188). The *Nacca jātaka* (No. 32) is meant to illustrate the loss that accrues to a person who is devoid of any sense of shame and fear of censure.

There are a number of fables which illustrate the value of true friends. The *Mahā-ukkusa jātaka* (No. 486) relates how a lion, a tortise and an osprey jointly strived to save the young hawks. The *Kurunga-miga Jātaka (No. 206)* narrates how a deer was saved by a tortoise and a woodpecker from a hunter's trap. The *Abhinha jātaka* (No. 27) shows the close and affectionate friendship that existed between an elephant and a dog. Numerous are the fables employed to illustrate the proverbial saying that unity is strength. One of the fables shows how the quails when united fly off carrying the fowler's net and when disunited fell into the hands of the fowler (see No. 33). The *Rukkha-dhamma jātaka* (No. 74) too, points out the same moral. But the characters in it are inanimate objects, namely trees. Presumably, it is in order to include this type of tales under the category of fables that the

definition of fable in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (loc. cit), says that a fable can have beings irrational and inanimate as its characters.

Interesting are the fables which extol the acts of self-sacrifice carried out by animals. They are so forcefully narrated that they become quite capable of influencing the minds of the devout Buddhist. The *Nigrodha-miga jātaka* (No. 12) is an extremely touching fable of this kind. Not only the deer, but a fish (No. 73) and a monkey (407), too, strive to save their kinsfolk at the risk of their own lives.

The fable meant to expose and ridicule the impostors and hypocrites are, also, equally interesting. The *Makkaṭa jātaka* (No. 173; see also 250) relates the tale of a monkey that clothed itself in ascetic garb and tried to enter a hut in order to save itself from the biting cold. The *Biḷāra jātaka* (No. 128) is a much more interesting fable about a jackal which presented to be a saint for the sole purpose of devouring the rats. The *Aggika jātaka* (No. 129) is a similar fable which not only ridicules the imposters but also satirizes the brahmin ascetics. The fable about the ass in lionskin also shows the miserable fate that befalls an imposter (No. 189; see also *Baka jataka* No. 38).

There are a number of fables in which both animals and men appear as characters. A number of these are more like fairy tales with marvellous and fanciful incidents normally not found in fables (see Nos. 73, 241, 438, 482, 516). Of these some are solely for the purpose of exposing the evil nature of human beings. This is accomplished by contrasting the vile nature of man with the good qualities found in beasts. The *Sīlavanāga jātaka* (No. 72) is about an ungrateful man who seeks to harm the kind elephant that once saved his life. The *Saccaṅkira jātaka* (No. 73) illustrates in contrast the gratitude of a snake, a rat and a parrot and the ingratitude of a prince. The *Tittira jātaka* exposes the vile nature of men and extols the good nature of beasts.

Buddhist literature is rich in fables. Yet all fables are not equally interesting nor are they aptly used. There are a number of fables which do not have much of a story value. (See for example Nos. 75, 173, 250, 430). The aptness of the fable selected seems to have depended mostly on the power of discrimination of the person who used the fable. The Buddha as well as his disciples largely drew material from the fable literature current at the time. The fables thus drawn were not always used to inculcate the moral lessons they really attempt to teach. The *Baka jātaka* (No. 38) proves this fact. This jātaka is related to illustrate the previous birth of a monk who was an expert in robe-tailoring and who used to cheat others by exchanging with them robes made of rags for brand new cloth. The *Baka jātaka* is an interesting fable meant for the purpose of exposing the imposter who seeks to earn one's living by pretending to be a saint. There is hardly any similarity between the conduct of the monk's life and that of his previous birth.

Some of the fables are repeated, sometimes with slight modification s. (see, Nos. 44, 45; 128, 129; 172, 188; 173, 250; 30, 286; 294, 295). Whether these modifications are the work of Buddhist monks is not quite clear. The modifications brought about are so insignificant and uninteresting that they do not, however, reveal the ingenuity of the modificators.

As mentioned earlier fables do occur in other parts of the Canon. In most of these occurrences the dividing line between the fable and parable is not quite clear. The *Cariyāpiṭaka*, the last book of the *Khuddaka Nikāya*, contains a number of fables perhaps adopted from the *jātaka* collection. These are purposely narrated to illustrate the cultivation of *pāramitā* (perfection) by the bodhisattva. Though the didactic value of these fables are not totally lost other sentiments such as homour, pathos etc. are not properly expressed. Hence their ability to rouse feelings in the reader is drastically reduced. (See also ANALOGIES; JĀTAKA).

Bibliography: Besides the works referred to in the body of the article see also, T. W. Rhys Davids, *Buddhist Birth Stories; Collected Works of Max Müller*, IV, pp. 413-89. F. Edgerton, *The Panchatantra Reconstructed*, II; Theodor Benfey, *Pantschatantra* I., F. Anton Van Schiefner and W. R. S. Ralston, *Tibetan Tales*, London, 1882.

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FACULTIES. The word faculty along with terms such as controlling power, controlling force or principle is used to render into English the Pali (and also Sanskrit) word *indriya*.[1] This word has the following different applications: (a) with references to sense perceptibility; (b) with reference to objective aspects of form and matter (kind, characteristic, determining principle, sign, mark and so on; (c) with reference to mood of sensation; (d)

1. See C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *Buddhist Psychological Ethics*, pp. 111 fn. 2, 198, 228; *Compendium of Philosophy*, the *PTS.* trsl. of the *Abhidhamatthasaṅgaha*, p. 175ff. and *BD. svv.* Faculties and Indriya.

with reference to moral power or motives controlling actions and (e) with reference to cognition and insight[2]. These faculties which are twenty two in number are either physical or mental or both physical and mental.

(1) Eye *(cakkhu)*, (2) Ear *(sota)*, (3) Nose *(ghāna)*, (4) Tongue *(jivhā)* and, (5) Body *(kāya)* are categorised as sensorial faculties and collectively referred to as the five sense faculties *(pañcindirya)*. To this is sometimes added the (6) Mind *(mano)* making it a group of six. (7) Femininity *(itthindriya)* and (8) Masculinity *(purisindriya)* refer to the nature of sexual characteristic of the body. (9) Life or Vitality *(jīvitindriya)* may be either physical or mental, a doctrinal development peculiar to Theravāda Buddhism. (10) Pleasure *(Sukh-°)*, (11) Pain *(dukkh-°)*, (12) Joy *(somanassa-°)*, (13) Grief *(domanassa-°)*, (14) hedonic indifference *(upekkh-°)* are grouped under the category of moods of seasation. (15) Faith *(saddh-°)*, (16) Energy *(viriy-°)*, (17) mindfulness *(sat-°)*, (18) Concentration *(samadh-°)*, (19) wisdom *(paññ-°)*, are five spiritual faculties distinguished from the corresponding group of five powers *(pañcabala)*, that represent the firmness of these five spiritual faculties (see BALA). (20) the thought, I shall come to know the unknown *(anaññātañ-ñassāmiti-°)*, (21) gnosis *(añño)* finally (22) one who knows *(aññātarv-°)* are described as three super mundane faculties; no. 20 arising at the moment of entering the path of a stream entrant *(sotāpatti-magga)*; no. 21 arising on reaching the fruition of *sotāpatti* stage and the last, the faculty no. 22 arising at the attainment of arahantship.

The following is a discussion of the five spiritual faculties. (For more details on faculties see INDRIYA, SENSE ORGANS). The group of five moral faculties or powers (i.e. Nos. 15-19 above) emerging from the emotional and intellectual life of a person are to be utilised for the regulation of the religious life of a Buddhist. These in due course acquire sufficient strength *(bala)* to bring about the attainment of the goal of nirvāṇa which is intended by such a course of living.

These five faculties are confidence or faith *(saddhā)*, energy *(viriya)*, mindfulness *(sati)*, concentration *(samādhi)* and wisdom *(paññā)*. In the canonical literature (e.g. *D.* II, p. 120; *S.* III, pp. 96; 153; *A.* IV, 203; *Ps.* II, 86 etc.) they very often occur as the fourth of seven groups of 37 factors that lead to Enlightenment or *bodhi (bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā)*, which is the *sumum bonum* of all Buddhist training. As these 37 factors comprise the vital elements of the Buddha's teaching as admitted by the Buddha himself when he refers to them as the "Dhamma preached comprehensively by him" (*S.* III, p.96), they have been correctly designated by the technical term *bodhipakkhiyā dhammā* (q.v.) in later literature. And it is from the point of view of these requisites of Enlightenment that the five faculties also assume significance in the ethical life of the Buddhist. Accordingly, their mention in scriptures is very often in the context of these 37 (e.g. *S.* III, 153; 365 fn.; *A.* IV, 203 etc.) which are compared to gems in the ocean of the Buddhist system of training *(dhamma-vinaya)* propounded by the Buddha (*A.* IV, 203). And their announcement, exposition, classification etc. are declared as the most excellent kind of preaching *(desanā-maṇḍa Ps.* II, 86).

The role played by each of these five faculties in Buddhist psychological ethics is explained in the *Indriya Saṃyutta* of the *Saṃyutta nikāya* (*S.* V, 196). According to this explanation the first faculty, viz. *saddhā*, should be understood and evaluated fundamentally from the point of view of the four constituents of stream winning *(catusu sotāpattiyaṅgesu)* which are (as given at *S.* III, p. 69 fn.): unswerving faith *(aveccappasāda)* in (i) the Buddha, (ii) Dhamma, (iii) Saṅgha and (iv) the possession of the virtues loved by the nobles ones *(ariyakantehi silehi samannāgato hoti)*. This means that unshakable confidence in the Buddhist method of salvation constitutes one of the characteristics of one's entry into the path of salvation *(sotāpatti)*. In other words, when a person gains the conviction that the Buddhist method is the only comprehensive solution to the problem of existence, there arises in him a firm confidence about its efficacy resulting in the unswerving faith in the teacher, in his message and in the lives of those who lived accordingly i.e., the Buddha, Dhamma and the Saṅgha. This gives him a clear and a steady mind, not allowing it to seek other systems of thought to guide him. It is important to note that without this kind of *saddhā* the mind of man inclines not towards wholesome activity *(kusala-kamma)* for, its natural tendency is to seek sensual enjoyment and not for its control and sublimation. Thus, as a result of this confidence, he lives a life of ethical purity which is the fourth characteristic mentioned above. By way of further clarification the commentary (*SA.* III, 233) explains that the faculty of confidence *(saddhindriya)*, which has clarity of intent as its main characteristic *(adhimokkhalakkhaṇaṃ saddhindriyaṃ)* assumes seniority and the leading role *(jeṭṭhakaṃ hoti pubbaṅgamaṃ)* in bringing about the fourfold characteristics associated with stream-entry *(sotāpatti)*. This means that in acquiring the four characteristics of stream-entry the faculty of *sadhā* reigns supreme. The other four *indriyas* are associated with it *(sesāni tadanvayāni honti:* ibid.). A more general definition of this faculty as given in the sutta that follows (*S.* V, 1964) is that it is the unwavering confidence in the

2. See *PED.* s.v. Indriya.

Buddha who possesses the nine celebrated qualities enumerated in the formula *"itipi so bhagavā..."*

The second faculty of energy *(viriya)* has been defined in relation to the four right efforts *(cattāro sammappadhānā)* which summarily represent the kind of effort expected from one who follows the Buddhist method of salvation. (For details see EXERTION). These four are (i) preventing the arising of evil and unskilled states of mind that have not yet arisen; (ii) abandoning those unskilled states of mind that have already arisen; (iii) production of good and wholesome states of mind that have not yet arisen and (iv) the development and bringing into perfection the good and wholesome states of mind that have already arisen (*M.* II, 11; *S.* V, 244 etc.). Exertion is given as the main characteristic of this faculty *(pagghalakkhaṇam viriyindriyaṃ: SA.* III, 233), which in the fourfold cultivation just enumerated, assumes senoirity and the leading role *(jeṭṭhakam hoti pubbaṅgamam)*. This faculty represents the disappearance of sloth and torpor and the appearance of enthusiasm and vigour. It should operate both physically and mentally. A more general definition of this faculty given in the same *Saṃyutta (S.* V, 195 f.) explains it as the disciple's relentless effort for the elimination of the unskilled states *(akusalānam dhammānaṃ pahānāya)* and for the development of the skilled states *(kusalānam dhammānaṃ upasampadāya)*.

The faculty of mindfulness *(sati-indriya)* assumes the predominant role in the four-fold application of mindfulness *(cattāro satipaṭṭhānā)* which represents the entire mind culture expected in Buddhism. These four consist of the development of mindfulness regarding (i) the body, (ii) feelings, (iii) mind and (iv) mind-objects. It is through the constant practice and development of these four that the unsettled nature and turbulence of the mind can be dispelled and correct insight developed. These four are given as waiting upon *(upaṭṭhāna)* the *religeux* in his religious exercises (*SA.* III, 233) assuming the leading role in his attempts at gaining mindfulness. This faculty too is more generally defined as the possession of the highest achievement regarding mindfulness *(paramena satinepakkena)* including the ability to remember and recall to his mind what he had said and done even long ago (*S.* V. 196 f).

The fourth faculty, that of concentration, which dispels the destractions of the mind, assumes the predominant role in the practice of the four trances *(jhāna)* through which eight forms (i.e., stages) of emancipation equanimity *(Vimokkha s.v.)* are stated to be attainable. Mental calmness equanimity *(avikkhepa)* is given as the main characteristic of this faculty, which in realising those eight stages of emancipation through the *jhānas*, assumes the leading role in the sphere of all forms of right concentration *(sammā samādhi)*. The general definition applied to this faculty (*S.* V. 196 f) is that it is the concentration of one's mind *(cittassa ekaggataṃ)* obtained through relinquishing the object of thought *(vossagga-ārammanam karitvā)* for the purpose of attaining the goal of Nibbāna (Nibbānārammaṇaṃ katvā *SA.* III. p. 234.).

The fifth faculty, that of wisdom, forms the pre ..i-nant factor in the realisation of the Four Noble Truths thereby assuming the leading role in understanding the Truth. It dispels confusion and lethargy. This faculty is defined also as the endowment of noble insight which is capable of tracing the process of coming into being and passing away and which is penetrating and leading to the perfect destruction of sorrow *(udayatthagāminiyā paññāya samannāgato ariyāya nibbedhikāya sammā dukkhakkhayagāminiyā, S.* V., 197).

The commentory (*SA.* III, 233) says that this distribution of faculties in the different psycho-ethical categories shows the supremacy of each faculty over its own field, during a particular phase of religious development. One whose religious endeavours are controlled and guided by these faculties continuously is bound to achieve the goal of Buddhist religious life by achieving release and Enlightenment, because his activities would be Nibbāna-oriented. By cultivating and making much of these *(bhāvitattā, bahulīkatattā)* the *religeux* can achieve release in this very life by putting an end to his influxes *(āsava: S.* V. 203; 220 etc.). By their development he can declare gnosis *(aññam vyākaroti)* giving vent to the famous declaration "destroyed is rebirth, lived is the higher life, done is what should be done, there is no further tendencies to bring me back to saṃsāra *(khīṇā jāti, vusitaṃ brahmacariyaṃ kataṃ karaṇīyaṃ nāparaṃ itthattāyā' ti pajānāmi S.* V. pp. 222; 224). Diligence *(appamāda)* is given as the one condition *(ekadhamma)* being established in which these faculties could become well-developed *(subhāvita: S.* V. 232). Therefore one should be extremely diligent regarding their continuous development if the desired results are to be obtained. They invariably lead to the state of Deathlessness, to tranquility and Englightenment *(upasama* and *sambodhi* ibid.). One can achieve that unique freedom from all bonds *(anuttaraṃ yogakehmaṃ)* through such cultivation (ibid. 234). In the succeeding suttas of the *Saṃyutta-nikāya* this same idea of the attainment of emancipation through their practice is expressed in various ways i.e. as leading to the abondoning of fetters *(saṃyojana)*, to the destruction of the influxes *(āsava)* etc. Their cultivation is invariably bound to lead to nibbāna like the flow of the river Ganges towards the East (ibid. 239).

It would be useful to make reference to a few of the epithets that occur frequently in the stock descriptions of

faculties as found in the Nikāyas. One such frequent combination is "associated with detachment *(viveka-nissita)*, with dispassion *(virāga)* with cessation *(nirodho)* and ending in renunciation *(vossagga-parināmi)*. It is important to note that these epithets express the general characteristics of Buddhist religious practice, applicable in many other contexts of similar nature e.g. five powers *(bala)*, seven factors of Enlightenment *(bojjhangas)* s.v. the Eightfold Path etc. (ibid).

The development of the five faculties is never barren of results. The earnest student achieves complete or partial success depending on the degree of his efforts (*S.* V. p. 200 f.). And it is also said (cf. p. 202) that he in whom these controlling faculties are totally absent is called "an outsider, one of the manifold (> one among the worldlings; *bāhirako puthujjanapakkhe thito)*" implying that such a person's religious development is at zero.

In a discourse attributed to Sāriputta and approved by the Buddha (ibid. pp. 225 f.), it is shown how in the case of the energetic disciple the development of one faculty leads on to that of the next. Accordingly, when the disciple has *saddhā* he naturally makes an effort to free himself from all unwholesome tendencies in him *(akusalānam dhammānam pahānāya)* and to develop the wholesome tendencies *(kusalānam dhammānam upasampadāya)*. Endowed thus with *saddhā* and *viriya* he comes to possess the highest maturity of mindfulness *(paramena satinepakkena)* that is capable of recollecting even what was said and done long long ago. This is followed by concentration *(samādhi)* giving rise to insight *(paññā)* enabling him to see all the facts about existence and emancipation in their true nature.

Those who have not realised them through personal experience have to have faith in others as regards their validity. But once all the five are fully developed and personally realised in practice, the *religeux* feels that those teachings *(dhammā)* which he had known from others earlier are now known to him through personal experience. The discourse No. 53 (ibid. p.229) also makes a distinction between intellectual perception and personal realisation of the faculties by allocating the former kind of knowledge to the learner *(sekha)* and the latter kind to the adept *(asekha)*. As their personal realisation takes one above the world they are called transcendental teachings *(lokuttarā dhammā: Ps.* I, p. 660) which the Tathāgata has preached for the good of the world (*D.* II, p.120).

Just as a hen cannot produce chickens out of her eggs merely by wishing that chicks should come out of them but has to hatch them well, in the same way the *religeux* has to engage himself diligently in their development for the achievement of the desired aim. A mere wish that his mind be freed from the influxes *(āsava)* will not produce results (*S.* III, p. 153; *A.* IV, p.125 f.).

The degree and the speed of a person's success in the realisation of the ideal depends on the severity of his defilements and the keenness of his faculties (*Vism.* p.87). The person whose defilements are acute *(tibba-kilesa)* and the faculties dull *(mudundriya)* spiritual progress *(patipadā)* is difficult to achieve *(dukkhā)* and direct knowledge sluggish *(dandhā ca abhiññā)* but if his faculties are sharp direct knowledge would be swift. Even if his defilements are not so acute he would take a long and difficult period to realise the aim if the faculties are not sharp. This shows that if the faculties are sharp his success is assured whatever be the degree of the severity of his defilements.

An important feature regarding this doctrine of faculties in the necessity of maintaining a balance among them *(indriyasamattapatipādana: Vism.* p. 129 f.). A single faculty should not be allowed to be specially strong at the expense of another. For instance, if *saddhā* becomes strong and the others weak these others would be unable to perform their functions properly. Therefore it should be modified so that the *religeux* would not become overcome with devotion as was the case with venerable Vakkali who remained passionately devoted to the Buddha without making the requisite religious efforts.

It is also said (ibid. p. 129f.) that the balancing of *saddhā* with *paññā* and *samādhi* with *viriya* are of special importance. One strong in *saddhā* and weak in *paññā* could possess his *saddhā* uncritically and groundlessly. One strong in *paññā* and weak in *saddhā* could become a cunning individual and be difficult of curing "like a person suffering from a disease caused by medicine." It is by balancing the two *(ubhinnam samatāya)* that legitimate *saddhā* could be developed. It is also said that when *samādhi* is strong and *viriya* weak there results laziness *(kossajja)* and when *viriya* is strong with weak *samādhi* there results agitation or excitenment *(uddhacca)*. It is by balancing the two that true absorption *(appanā)* is possible. It is further stated that in all these instances strong mindfulness *(sati)* is essential for it protects the mind from lapsing into agitation, idleness etc. It regulates and controls the mind without allowing it to go astray. Therefore it is desirable in all instances as a seasoning of salt in sauces or as a prime minister in all king's business for it has been declared as applicable everywhere *(sabbatthika)* by the Tathāgata.

Although the five faculties are treated together, the faculty of *paññā*, as the underlying principle or the psychological ultimate of every form of knowledge, naturally gains precedence over the others. Thus the Buddha says (*S.* V. p. 222) that by the development of this one faculty one can declare gnosis by making the famous declaration "destroyed is rebirth...." etc. referred to earlier. In such a person the other four faculties are established as a matter of course. The faculty of *paññā* is

regarded as chief of all the 37 Factors of Enlightenment just as the lion is regarded as the king of beasts (*S.* V. p. 227 f.). This faculty is also referred to as (ibid. p. 228 f.), noble insight *(ariyañāna)* in the sense of the intuitive vision that the Buddhist theory of salvation is the only ultimate solution to the problem of life. Once this knowledge has arisen the other four faculties automatically become established. *Ariya-ñāna* in this sense is compared to the peak or the ridge pole or the main beam *(kūta)* that makes the twin roof-beams *(gopānasi)* of a gabled house *(kūtāgāra)* stable (ibid.). Like the *kūta* that holds the entire roof intact it is the *ariya-ñāna* that promotes the disciple's progress along the correct path. Though all the five faculties are factors *(padāni)* that conduce to Enlightenment *(bodhi)*, the faculty of *paññā* is reckoned chief among them *(tesaṃ aggaṃ)* as the elephant's foot print is the largest among the footprints of all the jungle creatures (ibid. p. 231) or as the red-sandalwood *(lohita-candana)* is regarded as the best of trees in India (ibid p. 237)

It should be mentioned here that these same five faculties are also treated as powers *(bala)* among the 37 Factors of Engligħtenment. This dual reckoning of the same set of psychological states is done by treating them from two different angles. By the time these faculties acquire the necessary strength *(iddhiyo)* to overpower and eradicate their opposites, viz. fickleness of faith, inertia, lack of mental alertness and concentration, and lack of judgement and discernment *(assaddhiya – kosajja – pamāda – vikkhepa sammohanaṃ abhibhavanato... Vism.* p. 679) and also be not overpowered by them *(assaddhiyādihi ca anabhibhavaniyato akampiyatthena balaṃ...* ibid.) they come to be called *bala (tasmā pañcíddhiyāni balāni ti vuccanti,* ibid.). In this manner the five *balas* are related to the five faculties (*SA.* III, 247). They are in fact, presented as having a reciprocal relationship. It is important to mention here that the Buddha himself explains this, reckoning by means of a simile (*S.* V, p. 219f.). If a river, flowing towards the East has an island in the middle the waters to the Eastern and the Western sides of the island are treated as those of a single river while those on the Norther and Southern sides are regarded as those of two streams.

This concept of moral faculties is found in the Buddhist Sanskrit tradition as well (*Mhvyut.* 976 ff. *Sutrāl XV, iii, 55, Dhsmg.* 47). Their significance as means to Enlightenment is admitted in the *Lalitavistara* (*Lal.* p. 24) where they are enumerated in a list of Doctrines that help one to gain admission into "the light of the Doctrine' *(Dharmālokamukha).*

A. G. S. Kariyawasam

FA-HSIEN. The information furnished by Fa-hsien in his travel account entitled, *'A Record of the Buddhist Countries'* occupies a unique place as a source for the study of Buddhist history in the countries he visited during his arduous journey to India and back home to China. It also gives us valuable information on social, economic, cultural, administrative, geographical and climatic conditions of the countries which he visited. In all he had visited thirty countries. Fa-hsien approached the task of writing his travel accounts without making value judgements; his main purpose was to report what he saw and heard.

Fa-hsien was not the first traveller to visit India in search of Buddhist teachings. Buddhism was introduced into China, according to Chinese historical tradition, during the reign of Emperor Ming (A.C. 58-75) of the later Han dynasty.[1] Trade routes which connected East Asia with the west helped promote Buddhist missionary activities from very early times. The evangelizing zeal with which dedicated Indian monks propagated Buddhism in the east caused ripples in Chinese religious life. One reason was undoubtedly, the missionary activities of King Kanishka. The movement of pilgrims from the second century A.C. between India and China resulted in the introduction of the canonical works to China. In the earliest phase, most of the canonical works reached China through the Central Asian kingdoms and not directly from India. In fact, the spread of Buddhism to Central Asia took place during the reign of Emperor Asoka (272-232 B.C.).[2]

The Chinese monks who were intent on studying Buddhism thoroughly were not content with the number of works available at the time. This made them go to India in search of more books. The Chinese monks also felt the need for additional monastic rules for the reason that the disciplinary conduct among them was not satisfactory. Monastic discipline deteriorated as the Buddhist monks in China kept on increasing in number thereby posing fresh issues.[3]

Fa-hsien whose secular name was Kung entered the Order at the age of three. He was a native of Wu-yang

1. *A Record of the Buddhist Countries*, translated from the Chinese by Li Yung-hsi, Peking, 1957, Foreword, p.6 (abbreviated hereafter as *RBC*)
2. *RBC.* p. 5f.
3. Ibid. p. 7f.

country in the prefecture of P'ing-Yang. It is said that he was ailing badly whenever he was at home and kept good health whenever he was at the monastery. Thus he seldom went back home. After the death of his parents, when he reached maturity at the age of twenty, he received the Higher Ordination.[4]

Fa-hsien was extremely mindful of the disciplinary conduct of Buddhist monks in China. Incompleteness of the Chinese translations of the *Vinaya Pitaka*, however, stood in the way of preparing a complete code of disciplinary rules and it was to fill this gap that he resolved to risk the journey full of adventure to India. The main purpose of his journey was to search for the complete collection of the *Vinaya Pitaka.*[5]

Incredible though it may appear Fa-hsien was sixty-five years of age when he launched upon his project. He was seventy-nine years at the completion of his mission. He set out from Ch'ang-an in Central China in A.C. 399 during the reign of Emperor An of the Tsin dynasty accompanied by four colleagues Hui-ching, Tao-cheng, Hui-ying and Hui-Wei.[6] As will appear in the sequel, another group of five pilgrims joined the first group later.[7] (See Pl. X).

"Fa-hsien carried through for the faith's sake, a supremely dangerous expedition, in the glow of which the journeys of St. Paul melt into insignificance."[8] He practically walked from Central China across the Gobi desert, Khōtan, Pāmir plateau and over Hindu Kush to India and also to Sri Lanka. On his voyage back he met with even worse experiences and reached his destination after many hair breadth escapes.[9]

Having set out Chang-an in Central China Fa-hsien and his party traversed a long route before they reached the garrison town of Changyeh. Due to political unrest in Changyeh the roads were impassable. The pilgrims could not have gone ahead but for the kind intervention of the king of that city. Here they met the second group of pilgrims comprising Chih-yen, Hui-chien, Seng Shao, Pao-yun and Seng-Ching who, it is said, shared with the first group one common purpose. The party of ten pilgrims went together up to Tun-huang at the end of the Great Wall and Fa-hsien with four others went ahead leaving the rest behind.[10]

Fa-hsien describes the difficulties encountered in the journey, particularly, in crossing the desert of Gobi thus: "In this desert there are a great many evil spirits and also hot winds; those who encounter them perish to a man. There are neither birds above nor beasts below. Gazing on all sides, as far as the eye can reach in order to mark the track, no guidance is to be obtained save from the rotting bones of dead men which point the way." After travelling seventeen days covering a distance of one thousand and five hundred *li* they reached Shan Shan (Shen-shen) to the south of Lop Nor and then Kara Shahr (Agni). Monks in both places belonged to the Lesser Vehicle and there were four thousand of them in each. Both laity and the clergy practised religion in somewhat modified form. In Kara Shahr monks followed religious observances so strictly that the monks from China were either not disposed to accept such rites or were not permitted to take part in those rites. Fa-hsien was entertained there for over two months by a Chinese monk until he was rejoined by Pao-yun and the others. Pilgrims got the impression that the people of Kara Shahr were lacking in courtesy and were mean in their treatment of strangers. Here some members of the party went back towards Turfan in search of funds. Fa-hsien and the rest being provided with the necessary means were able to proceed on their journey towards the southwest.[12]

Again after a month's tedious journey they reached Khotān, a rich and prosperous country in Central Asia. All the inhabitants there were Buddhists and most of the monks belonged to the Greater Vehicle. The monks who were several tens of thousands in number were friendly and provided lodgings and other facilities for the guest monks. Fa-hsien was highly impressed by the demeanour of the monks who assembled to partake of their meals. They are described in the following manner: "When they enter the refectory their demeanour is grave and ceremonious; they sit down in regular order; they all keep silence; they make no clatter with their bowls..."[13]

4. An unpublished article on Fa-hsien; *RBC.* p. 8
5. *RBC.* p.7
6. Ibid. pp. 8, 15
7. See note 10 below.
8. *The Travels of Fa-hsien,* Re-translated by J.A. Giles, Varanasi/Delhi, 1972, Introduction, p.v. (abbreviated hereafter as *TF.*)
9. Ibid, p.v.
10. *RBC.* p. 15
11. *TF.* p.2. The distance of one *Li* equals one fifth of a mile.
12. Ibid. p. 2. *RBC.* p. 16. According to *RBC.* p. 17 Chih-yen, Hui-Chien and Hui-wei returned to Karashahr (Karashar) to procure necessities whereas *TF.* p.3 says that they went to Turfan.
13. *TF.* p. 4

Hui-ching, Tao-chen and Hui-ta went ahead to Kashgar (Khalcha) as Fa-hsien and others remained behind for three months to see a procession called the image procession. Fourteen large monasteries each in its turn celebrated the procession for fourteen days, one after the other, the opening ceremony being celebrated by the Gōmati vihāra. The most striking feature of the image procession was a four wheeled car in the shape of a moveable palace as found in the processions of Hindu temples in India even upto present times. The procession began on the first of the fourth month and ended on the fourteenth.[14]

After the processions were over Seng-shao set out with a Tartar Buddhist towards Kashmir. Fa-hsien accompanied by some of his colleagues went on to Karghalik (Chakula) where there were more than one thousand monks mostly belonging to the Greater Vehicle. They spent the summer retreat at a place called Tash Kurghan and then reached Kashgar (Khalcha) in the middle of the Pamirs, where they met Hui-ching and others who had set out in advance. There were more than one thousand monks belonging to Hīnayāna in Kashgar. The king of that country held an assembly called the Great Five year Assembly (Pañcavarsha) to which monks were invited from all quarters.[15] In the seventh century, Ywang Chwang saw such assemblies being held in North India under the patronage of King Harshawardhana.[16] An important item of this ceremony was the offering of cloth and of all kinds of jewels and such things as needed by monks: some of these offerings were later redeemed from them.[17] Giving annual tithes to monks was another custom which prevailed in Kashgar. In much the same way offerings were made to monks in the Middle Kingdom as well as in Sri lanka.[18] Fa-hsien refers to various relics of the Buddha in and outside India. One of these was the Buddha's stone spittoon which the Kashgar Buddhists had come to possess. This country also has a *stūpa* built enshrining one of Buddha's teeth.[19]

As a pilgrim dedicated to the promotion of Buddhism one could expect Fa-hsien to record only religious conditions in the countries he visited. It is interesting to note that his attention was drawn also to secular aspects of diverse nature. With regard to the vegetation in Kashgar he says that except for bamboo, pomegranate and sugar cane, the other plants differ from those of China. No grain other than wheat would ripen there. People living east of the hills in Kashgar dressed like those in China except that they wore felt and serge.[20]

Dangers that could befall the people traversing the Pamir range from Kashgar towards India are described by Fa-hsien thus: "There are also venomous dragons which, when incensed, breaths out pestilential wind, rain and snow or cause most fearful sand storms. Not one man in ten thousand can escape from these with his life."[21] This description appears to be the personification of nature's cruelties.

Amidst dangers, the pilgrims managed to reach Darada on the borders of India. Monks there studied Hīnayāna Buddhism. Fa-hsien saw an image of the Maitreya Bodhisattva eighty feet high and eighty feet broad at the base. According to Fa-hsien Buddhism spread east after the setting up of that image which took place 300 or 350 years after the *parinirvāna* of the Buddha.[22] From that point again the journey was a difficult one. The party journeyed on for fifteen days over a precipitious and dangerous road. "The side of the mountain being like a stone wall ten thousand feet in height. On nearing the edge, the eye becomes confused and wishing to advance the foot finds no resting place." The next barrier was the river Indus which they crossed with a suspension bridge of ropes.[23]

The country which they reached after crossing the Indus was Udyāna which, according to Fa-hsien, was the northermost point of India. All the inhabitants there spoke the language of Central India which they called the Middle Kingdom.[24] The laymen's clothes and food were

14. *TF.* p. 5
15. *RBC.* pp. 20-22; *TF.* p. 7
16. Majundar, RC. The *Classical Age*, Bombay 7, 1962, p. 118
17. *TF.* p.7, *RBC.* p. 21; In India and Sri Lanka too the custom prevailed in ancient times.
18. *TF.* p. 8. It is interesting to compare annual tithes referred to here with emoluments called *vasag* occurring in the ninth and tenth century inscriptions in Sri Lanka *(EZ.* Vol.1, p. 91; Ibid. Vol. III, p. 191; Vol. V, pt. 2, p.165; Gunawardhane, R.A.L.H. *Robe and Plough,* Arizona, 1974, pp.148-151)
19. *RBC.* pp. 21f.; TF. p.8
20. *RBC.* p. 22
21. Ibid. p. 22
22. Ibid. p. 23f
23. *TF.* p. 9f.
24. *TF.* p. 11. The use of the regional name, Central India by Fa-hsien is confusing. In recent historical writings the name is used to denote Avanti and its adjoining countries. But in one context Fa-hsien's Central India or the Middle Kingdom lay on the route taken by him between Mathura and Sankasya. This Central India forms part of the Madhyadeśa *Aitereya Brāhmana* (III-14; IA. X. p.110). In another context Fa-hsein locates Central India in the territory in which Pātaliputra is situated.

like those in the Middle Kingdom. There were about five hundred monasteries *(saṅghārāmas)* of the Hinayāna school. A guest monk is entertained there only for three days and thereafter he had to find a place for himself. While Hui-ching, Tao-chen and Hui-ta went on ahead to the country of Nagarahara, Fa-hsien and others remained behind for the summer retreat.[25]

Setting out from Udyāna the pilgrims reached Suvastu and then Gandhāra and Taksaśilā. Hinayāna Buddhism flourished in those countries. All these countries were associated with the former existences of the Gotama Buddha and *stūpas* had been built in honour of his revered qualities.

Upon his arrival in Purushapura (Peshawar) Fa-hsien was highly impressed by the *stūpa* built there by King Kanishka. None of the *stūpas* and temples that he had seen on his way could compare with this *stūpa* in magnificence and stateliness. Fa-hsien relates an episode according to which the King of Sakas (Ephtalites) invaded Purushapura in order to carry off the Buddha's almsbowl which was found there, but he did not succeed.[26] Having stayed in Purushapura as long as they wished Hui-ching, Jui-ta and Tao-cheng went ahead to Nagarahara. Then, Hui-ta joined Pao-yun and Seng-Ching to return home. Hui-ying[27] died in Buddha's Bowl monastery. Fa-hsien proceeded alone to the temple of Buddha's Skull.

The city of Hilo was unique in as much as it possessed the Buddha's skull, a relic not mentioned in any other source. The skull is pale yellow, about four inches across and has a lofty cranium. The king of the city had appointed eight men of noble families, each with a seal, to seal the temple in order to safeguard the relic. The king, the lay devotees and also the elders attended to their duties or household affairs after making their offerings to the Skull.[28]

The city of Nagarahara (Jelālābad) and its adjoining areas within one *yojana*[29] of the city claim to have possessed certain relics, some of which are not much known. They were the pewter topped staff of the Buddha, his robe, hair and nails. Devotees believed that when the robe was taken out and offerings made to it heavy rains fell in times of drought.

The Tooth relic in Sri Lanka also is believed by the faithful to possess such powers.[30]

Half a *yojana* south of the city of Nagarahara is a cave in which the Buddha is said to have left his shadow which looked exactly like the Buddha at a distance of ten paces or so. It is also believed that a *stūpa* near the cave had been built by the Buddha and his disciples as a model for future *stūpas*. [31] The historicity of these, however, remains to be established.

Setting forth from Nagarahara Fa-hsien and his two companions went southward across the Little Snowy Mountains (Safed Koh) in bitter cold. Being unable to bear the cold Hui-ching breathed his last. Fa-hsien caressed him lamenting bitterly and cried saying, "You have failed in your purpose. Yet such is fate." Fa-hsien and Tao-cheng, the only companion of the former group, from that point onward, went ahead visiting the countries, Lakki (Afghanistan), Harana (Falana or Banni) and Uchcha (Bhida in Panjab). Except in Harana where there were three thousand Hinayāna monks, the other two countries had monks of both vehicles. The local people were so amazed to see monks from distant China who had come so far in search of Buddhism.[32]

The next important centre visited by Fa-hsien was Mathurā. On the way to Mathurā he saw a large number of monasteries with some ten thousand monks. In Mathurā itself there were about three thousand monks with twenty monasteries situated on either side of the river Jumna.[33]

Fa-hsien's account on the Middle Kingdom, which according to him lay south of Mathurā,[34] shows that of the countries he had visited that country was the most agreeable with regard to climate, living conditions of the inhabitants, their religious upbringing, administration etc. The climate was temperate without frost or snow. The inhabitants were rich and contented. Kings governed the country without recourse to capital punishment. The

25. *RBC.* p. 25
26. Ibid. pp. 25-28; *TF.* pp. 12-14
27. *TF.* p. 15. According to *RBC.* p. 29 the person who died in the monastery of Buddha's Bowl was Hui-ching. This evidently is an error. Both *RBC* and *TF.* tell us that Hui-ching actually died later when crossing the Little Snowy Mountains (*RBC.* p.33; *TF.* p.19).
28. *RBC.* p. 29f.
29. Ibid. p. 31f. The exact length of a *yojana* is hard to determine. It is equated to 4 gāvuta and it could range from 5 miles to 16 miles.
30. Ray, H. C. and Paranavitana, S. *University of Ceylon, History of Ceylon*, Colombo, 1960, p. 762
31. *RBC.* p. 32
32. Ibid. p. 32f.
33. Ibid. p. 34
34. Ibid. p. 34

people of this country kill no living creatures, drink no wine nor eat onion or garlic. Mention is also made of the use of "cowries" as a medium of exchange.

As for the Buddhist monks Fa-hsien says that from the very days of the Buddha kings and other devotees provided monks with beds and beddings, gardens, fields as well as husbandmen and cattle. Lands were donated by title deeds which none dared to annul.[35]

Guest monks were treated in keeping with the *Vinaya* rules. When a guest monk came to a monastery resident monks used to welcome him; carry his robes and alms-bowl for him. They also used to bring water to wash his feet and oil to anoint them. Facilities for lodgings were provided in accordance with his seniority.[36]

Stūpas built in honour of the two chief disciples, Sāriputra (Pali, Sāriputta) and Maudgalīputra (Pali, Moggallāna) and also of Ānanda are mentioned together with other *stūpas* built in honour of the three-fold division of the Canon, the *Abhidhamma*, the *Vinaya* and the *Sūtras*. Another interesting reference is made to the staging of religious drama. One play had as its theme Sāriputra's going to the Buddha to ask for ordination. Similar plays were staged to characterise Maudgalīputra and Kāśyapa. By Kāśyapa is probably meant Mahā Kāśyapa.

Even more interesting was a ritual pratice performed by nuns and novices. They made offerings respectfully at the *stūpas* built in honour of the elders Ānanda and Rāhula. Similarly the teachers of each of the three divisions of the Canon made offerings at the *stūpas* built in honour of the *Abhidhamma*, the *Vinaya*, and the *Sūtras* each to the *stūpa* pertaining to his speciality. The followers of the Mahāyāna school made their offerings to the Saints, Prajñā Pāramitā, Mañjuśrī and Avalōkiteśvara.

As shown above the custom of monks receiving annual tithes prevailed in other countries such as Kashgar. According to Fa-hsien the custom prevailed also in the Middle Kingdom. It is interesting to note that even Brahmins offered robes and other requisites to monks. A special feature of the occasion was that monks made offerings to one another.[37]

Fa-hsien locates Saṁkasya to the south east of the Middle Kingdom the place where the Buddha is said to have descended from the Trayastriṁśat (Tāvatiṁsa) heaven after preaching the Law to his mother for three months. This place appears to have been closely associated with the Buddha, for according to Fa-hsien, several monuments had been built in his honour there. Here about one thousand monks and nuns studied both Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna.[38]

Fa-hsien mentions the city of Kānyakubja (Kanoj), the village Hari (Arijakavana) and the country of Vaiśākha (Visākha or Ajudhya) as important centres of Buddhism. Reference to Buddha's willow chewing stick and its growth to a height of seven feet in the country of Vaiśākha has a special significance. What is important here is that the Buddha had used a willow chewing stick to clean his teeth just like other ordinary monks.[39]

When Fa-hsien visited the city of Śrāvasti in the country of Kosala the city had been sparsely populated but its glory was still there. Among the religious monuments such as the Jetavana monastery found at Śrāvasti two *stūpas* had been built to commemorate Aṅgulimāla; (q.v.) one *stūpa* being built at the site of his conversion by the Buddha and the other at the site of his cremation. Among other *stūpas* one was at the site of the murder of courtesan Sundarī and another on the spot where the Buddha debated with the teachers of ninety-six heretical sects.[40] Carving of the first Buddha image is attributed to King Prasenajit (Pasenadi). The king in his eagerness to see the likeness of the Buddha when he was away in Trayastriṁśat Heaven for ninety days carved an image of the Buddha. The authenticity of this is questioned by modern critics. On arriving at the Jetavana Retreat where the Buddha spent twenty-five rainy season, the greatest number of rains residences he lived in one single monastery, Fa-hsien and his companion were immersed in deep thought. As they gazed at the places in which the Buddha once lived, but where he was no longer to be seen, they were deeply moved.[41]

According to Fa-hsien Devadatta's followers made offerings to three former Buddhas except the Sākyamuni Buddha. This indicated the continuance of Devadatta's religious movement even up to the fifth century A.C. That the worship of former Buddhas had been a popular cult in many other places in India is also revealed by Fa-hsien.[42]

35. Ibid. p. 34. In Sri Lanka too land grants were made in medieval times in the samy way.
36. Ibid. p. 35f
37. Ibid. p. 36f.
38. Ibid. pp. 37-41
39. Ibid. p. 42f; *TF.* p. 29.
40. Ibid. pp. 43-47. According to the Theravāda Canon, there were only sixty two views.
41. Ibid. pp. 44-46
42. Ibid. p. 49

At the time of Fa-hsien's visit Kapilavāstu looked completely deserted except for a few monks and a few dozen families of the laity. Among the ruins of the palace of King Suddhodana was an image of the prince's mother showing the prince riding a white elephant coming to enter his mother's womb. Several *stūpas* had been erected to mark important events of the Buddha's life before and after his enlightenment. Fa-hsien also names the four places which are always pre-determined for Buddhas: where the Buddhas shall attain Budddhahood, where they shall begin to preach, where they expound the Law and refute heretics and where they shall descend from the Trayastriṁśat Heaven.[43]

A monastery situated in Rāmagrāma five *yojanas* east of Buddha's birth place is reminiscent of the forest called Pārileyyavana where the Buddha is said to have been attended on by an elephant and a monkey. It is said that a herd of elephants used to water the ground and offer flowers at the monastery there. A monk who visited the place stepped down to the rank of a *sāmaṇera* and performed all the duties connected with the monastery. The position of abbot at that monastery, as a matter of fact, was held by a *sāmaṇera* thereafter.[44]

Fa-hsien locates the spot on which the Buddha entered *Parinirvāna* to the north of the city of Kuśinagara (Kusinārā). *Stūpas* had been erected at the sites where Subhadda, the last disciple of the Buddha entered the Order and where the Buddha's coffin received homage for seven days. Even this city had been almost deserted with only a few monks and laymen as its inhabitants.[45]

Fa-hsien refers to a number of important sites in Vaiśāli. Such for instance are the venue of the Second Council and the site of the Cāpāla cetiya (pagoda of Discarded Arms) at which the Buddha made the pronouncement that he would enter *parinirvāna* three months later. With regard to the cause that led to the Second Council, he agrees with the ten points advanced by the Southern school.[46]

A story not found in Pali literature concerns elder Ānanda's passing away. King Ajātaśatru followed Ānanda up to the confluence of five rivers, five *yojanas* east of Vaiśāli. Licchavis were on the other side of the river expecting his arrival on that side. If Ānanda chose to enter *parinirvāna* on this bank or the other bank it would have led to a clash between the two parties. In order to avoid an impending clash between them Ānanda entered *parinirvāna* by burning himself in the middle of the river by entering the element of fire *(tejodhātu)*. The two kings on either bank apportioned the relics in two halves and built *stūpas* over them.[47]

Fa-hsien saw the ruins of the royal palace of Emperor Asoka in the city of Pātaliputra. A Brahmin called Rādhasvāmi who belonged to the Mahāyāna school and who had mastered all the knowledge of his day did much to propagate Buddhism and it was due to his efforts that heretics were kept in abeyance. There were about six or seven hundred monks of both vehicles whose behaviour was most decorous and orderly.[48]

Pātaliputra was, according to Fa-hsien, the largest city in the whole of Middle Kingdom.[49] The people there were rich and prosperous. Every year they held an image procession on the eighth day of the second month. A four wheeled car (chariot) decorated like a pagoda was taken in the procession. On each of the four sides of the car was a seated Buddha image attended by standing Bodhisattvas. About twenty such cars were paraded, each decked out in a different way. Mention is made also of charitable hospitals and a temple of Buddha's Foot Print in Pātaliputra.[50]

The redemption of gifts made to the sangha prevailed in Nagarahara and also in Sri Lanka. Probably Asoka set the precedent for the practice. Fa-hsien tells us that King Asoka offered Jambudvipa to monks from all parts of the world and then redeemed it again with silver on three occasions.[51]

In a valley surrounded by five hills was Girivraja the old city of King Bimbisāra. Important sites are mentioned in the following fashion: "This is where Sāriputra and Maudgaliputra first met Aśvajit (Assaji), where Nirgrantha made a fiery pit and prepared poisoned rice for Buddha, and where King Ajātaśatru gave wine to a black elephant in order to injure Buddha."[52] Even this city had been without inhabitants when Fa-hsien was there.

43. *RBC.* pp. 49-51
44. Ibid. p. 52f.
45. Ibid. p. 54
46. Ibid. p. 57; TF. pp. 42-44
47. *RBC.* p. 57f.
48. Ibid. p. 58f.
49. Ibid. p. 60f.
50. Ibid. p. 61
51. Ibid. p. 61
52. Ibid. p. 62f.

There were several hundreds of caves including that of the Buddha in the Gṛdhrakūta Mountain. Fa-hsien claims to have seen the stone which Devadatta rolled down the precipice causing injury to Buddha's toe. Among the ruins of the old city were the cave of Sataparna (Sattapanniguhā) where five hundred monks recited the scriptures after the Buddha's *Parinirvāna*, the cave of Devadatta and the black-rock on which a monk was about to commit suicide.[53]

The city of Gayā had been virtually deserted during the fifth century. Prince Siddhārtha lived as an ascetic in the vicinity of Gayā. Of the seven weeks during which the Buddha enjoyed the bliss of emancipation after his enlightenment referred to in the post canonical literature,[54] five are mentioned by Fa-hsien. They are (1) His fixed gaze at the Bodhi-tree (2) His walking from east to west under the Bodhi-tree (3) the *devas* making offerings to the Buddha on a terrace adorned with seven precious things (4) the blind dragon Mudalinda's coiling around the Buddha and (5) Buddha's sitting on a square rock facing east under a *nyagrodha* tree when Sahāpati (Sahampati) Brahma came to invite him. At the site of Buddha's Enlightenment there were three monasteries maintained by devotees. Monks living there adhered to monastic rules with meticulous care.[55]

Asoka's conversion to the Buddhist Faith is attributed by Fa-hsien to the exposition of the Law by an *arahant* who was about to be punished by the keeper of Asoka's Hell. A legend had it that Asoka caused a hell to be built for punishing criminals.[56] This may be a veiled allusion to Asoka's being cruel at the beginning of his reign and his change of policy later on in his reign.

King Asoka used to go to the Bodhi-tree under which he repented his sins and observed the eight precepts. Asoka's observing a strict religious life referred to in his Minor Rock Edict I may point to the same.[57] However, his queen Asandhimittā being jealous that the king visited the Bodhi-tree often employed a man to fell the tree. It is said that the king found a device to restore the tree and again it grew to a height of hundred feet.[58]

Travelling westward along the Ganges Fa-hsien and his only companion reached Vārāṇasi in the country of Kāsi. Tracing the history of the Deer Park Retreat Fa-hsien also narrates how Kaundanya (Kondañña) and his four companions criticised the Buddha as he was approaching them and how they could not abide by their agreement not to receive him in the usual manner as he was approaching nearer and nearer. He also locates the spot on which the Buddha delivered his first sermon.[59]

The next important place which Fa-hsien visited was Kauśāmbi. The Garden of Ghoshira (Ghositārāma) is mentioned as a monastery in which the Buddha lived for some time. Most of the monks in Kauśāmbi study Hīnayāna Buddhism. Although Fa-hsien describes the Dakkhiṇa and the Pārvati monastery there as a remarkable achievement of stone masonry he only reproduces what had been related to him by the people of that country.[60]

Fa-hsien, with his companion, came back to Pātaliputra once again and with that they had completed their tour in North India. However, Fa-hsien's main purpose of obtaining a complete code of *Vinaya* rules could not be achieved from any place in North India as there were no written books. Therefore, he had to go to Central India where in a Mahāyāna monastery he was able to obtain a copy of the collection of *Vinaya* rules. Both Li Yung, as well as Giles have translated Fa-hsien's Chinese original into English to convey the meaning shown above.[61] Nevertheless, the use of the regional name Central India in the above passage gives rise to confusion. Fa-hsien tells us elsewhere that people of Udyāna, the northern most country in India, called Central India the "Middle Kingdom."[62] Thus, it appears that what was known to the people of Udyāna as the Middle Kingdom was known to Fa-hsien as Central India.

Fa-hsien's contention that he had to go to Central India for obtaining a complete code of Vinaya rules appears misleading for he has given us the impression that he had already been to that region. The country he reached after Mathurā was the Middle Kingdom. Again the account, just following that dealing with the books obtained, says that Tao-cheng was reluctant to go back to China as he was so impressed by the disciplinary conduct of the monks in the Middle Kingdom or Central India where they were living at the time of copying the texts. It

53. Ibid. p. 63f.
54. *Samantapāsādikā*, part, I, ed. Baddegama Piyaratana Thera, *SHB*. Colombo, 1929. pp. 714-719
55. *RBC*. pp. 66-68
56. Ibid. p. 69f.
57. *Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum*, Vol. I, E. Hultzsch, Delhi, 1969, pp. 166, 167; *The Indian Antiquary*, Vol. XX, Fleet JR, and Temple, RC, Delhi, 1985, p. 234f.
58. *RBC*. p.71
59. Ibid. p. 72f.
60. Ibid. p. 74f.
61. Ibid. p. 76; *TF*. p.64
62. *TF*. p. 11; RBC. p. 25

appears that the names, Central India and Middle Kingdom used here differ from those referred to earlier by Fa-hsien himself.

Something has gone wrong somewhere, perhaps in the English translations or even in the Chinese original. Fa-hsien had been extremely careful to mention the time, distance, direction etc. when he went from one place to another. In this context he merely says that he went to a monastery in Central India to obtain a copy of the complete *Vinaya* collection. Absence of the usual statistical data in this particular instance leaves us in doubt as to whether he actually went to any place in what he earlier called Central India or the Middle Kingdom after his return to Pāṭaliputra.[63]

According to Fa-hsien the copy of the ***Mahāsāṅghika Vinaya*** which he obtained had been handed down in the Jetavana Retreat.[64] Does it, then, follow that Fa-hsien obtained the relevant text from the Jetavana Retreat in Sāvatthi which he had visited on his way towards east? But he does not claim that he obtained a copy from the Jetavana Retreat either. It is possible that although the relevant text had been handed down in the Jetavana Retreat its copies were also available in later times in distant parts of India.

Fa-hsien's journey to Champā could offer some clue to the question under review. He went to two important countries in Eastern India before he completed his tour in India. He went first to Champā and then to Tamluk.[65] Champā was eighteen *yojanas* to the east of the place from which he had set out after copying the *Vinaya* texts.[66] The distance and the direction tallies with Pāṭali putra from where he had not gone to any place prior to his going to Champā. It may, therefore be surmised that he actually obtained copies of the *Vinaya* and other texts from some monastery in Pāṭaliputra itself.

Whichever be the place or the monastery from which the books were obtained there were six scriptures in all. (1) Rules of the Mahāsāṅghika (2) *Sarvāstivāda vinaya* in about 7000 verses (3) *Saṁyuktābhidharma - hrdaya śāstra or Abhidharma* in about 6000 verses (4) *Nirvāna sūtra* or *Yen sūtra* in 2500 verses (5) *Vaipulya - parinirvāṇa sūtra* in about 5000 verses and (6) the Commentaries of the Mahāsāṅghika school. Fa-hsien spent three years in studying written and spoken Sanskrit and in copying those books. As mentioned above Tao-cheng remained behind in the Mahāyāna monastery being reluctant to go back to China[67] Fa-hsien went ahead with determination until his main objective was achieved.

From Champā, Fa-hsien, went to Tamluk, a renowned centre of Buddhism. He stayed two years in Tamluk copying *sūtras* and drawing images of the Buddha and then set sail for Siṁhala (Sri Lanka)[68]

Fa-hsien describes the size, the climate and the products of the country including pearls and gems. The king's share in pearls and precious stones was three-tenths. He says that this island became a large kingdom owing to the attraction of merchants from other countries who came in large numbers.

At the time of his visit the Abhayagiri monastery was in its hey-day. There were five thousand monks there. Fa-hsien tells us that the splendour and magnificence of an image of jade, some twenty feet high, defied description. Having seen a white silk fan offered to the image by a Chinese merchant his eyes were filled with tears. Possibly, this reference is to the Samādhi Statue which is within the precincts of the Abhaygiri monastery. Fa-hsien also refers to the Tooth Relic temple and the exhibition of the Tooth Relic in the middle of the third month at the Abhayagiri monastery. An interesting allusion is made to store-houses of monks which were filled with precious stones and jewels. The description of a monastery on a hill forty li to the east with two thousand resident monks is evidently about the Mihintale. In the Mahāvihāra monastery there lived three thousand monks. Fa-hsien had seen a funeral ceremony of an arahant who belonged to the Mahāvihāra. Fa-hsien stayed two years in Sri Lanka and obtained a copy of the Rules of the Mahiśāsakas. He also procured a copy each of the ***Dirghāgama*** the ***Saṁyuktāgama*** and the ***Sannipāta*** all of which were in Sanskrit and were new to China.[69]

On his voyage back across the unfathomable ocean full of dangers his chances of reaching the home country appeared remote. On the way he stayed five months in a country called Yavadvipa (Java)[70] where there were very few Buddhists. The next stage became even worse. In the midst of heavy rains whilst the provisions were exhausted,

63. CP. *TF.* p.20f.; ***RBC.*** p.34f.
64. *RBC.* p. 76
65. Tamluk is located by Fa-hsien to the east of Champā; In fact, it is situated to the South of that city.
66. *RBC.* p.77
67. *TF* p. 14; *RBC.* p.76
68. *RBC.* p. 77
69. Ibid. pp. 78-87 - Sannipāta is rendered into English as a collection of extracts from the Canon on p.76 of *TF.*
70. Bapat, P.V. *2500 Years of **Buddhism***, New Delhi, 1956, p. 261
71. *RBC.* pp. 87-92.

the pilot chartered a wrong course. But, despite everything, Fa-hsien may have heaved a sigh of relief when he knew that he had set foot on the Southern shore of Laoshan in Changkuang prefecture in China[71] and reached his journey's end.

Conclusion: Fa-hsien's travel accounts deal with nearly thirty countries. These accounts provide us with valuable information on religious as well as other aspects covering a wide variety of subjects.

We are greatly indebted to Fa-hsien for the knowledge of certain beliefs, customs, cults ceremonials etc. prevailing in the countries he visited. He provides us with information on the Elder Ānanda's *parinirvāna* through Fire Meditation *(tejokasina)* in the middle of a river, the custom of building [illegible] in honour of the three chief divisions of the Canon, paying homage to *stūpas* built in honour of Ānanda and Rāhula respectively by nuns and novices as their favourite objects of homage as is customary in the Middle Kingdom, the participation of Brahmins in Buddhist religious affairs in and outside the Middle Kingdon, certain articles used by the Buddha such as the stone spittoon (at Kashgar) and the pewter-topped staff (at Nagarahara) and the relative strength of the *bhikkhu* population of the Abhayagiri and the Mahāvihāra in Sri Lanka. Much of this information is rare, and some are not found in other sources.

Specific reference made to the two vehicles and their numerical strength in the countries visited by him shows that in his day the Lesser Vehicle had spread more widely than the Greater Vehicle.

Fa-hsien also draws our attention to the decline in glory of some renowned centres of Buddhism during the fifth century. He says that at the time of his visit Kapilavāstu, Rājagrha, Srāvasti and Gayā were virtually deserted and abandoned. To what extent, the heretical movement, alluded to by Fa-hsien, was responsible for bringing about this decline needs further investigation.

The perseverence, undaunted courage and determination of Fa-hsien were not shared by most members of his party. Three members of the party, Hui-ta, Pao-Yen and Seng-Ching went back to China without fulfilling their objectives. Some members parted with the main group to visit places of their own choice.

Unifortunately for Fa-hsien, two members, Hui-Ying and Hui-Ching died on the way. Tao-cheng accompanied Fa-hsien upto Pātaliputra and decided never to return home. The party which originally included ten members was reduced to one. It was only Fa-hsien who carried out the mission undaunted until the achievement of his objectives.

Yatadolawatte Dhammavisuddhi Thera

FAIRY-TALES. Although the term fairy-tale is used to refer to tales about fairies it is also generally used in a much broader sense to include tales which have nothing to do with fairies but which are highly improbable and fanciful. The writers in English who attempted to translate the German term 'mächen' or the Swedish term 'saga' seem to have generally used the term fairy-tale. In current usage a large number of wonder-tales, which have neither fairies nor such beings who have fairy traits, are referred to as fairy-tales.

The question regarding the origin of the fairy-tale has not yet been fully investigated and therefore, nothing definite can be said about it. It is quite apparent that the fairy tale was an integral part of the early folk-lore. Scholars have come across a collection of Egyptian fairy-tales which they places in the 13th century B.C. *(Standard Dictionary of Folk-Mythology and Legend,* pp. 365 ff. Funk and Wagnalls Co. New York). The researches carried out so far by eminent scholars do not make it possible to pin-point any particular country or a limited region as the original home of fairy-tales. It is extremely doubtful whether any particular country can ever be named as the original home of fairy-tales. There are a few centres of dissemination of fairy-tales, the major ones being India, Greece and Western Europe. In other centres like Asia Minor and Eastern and Nothern Europe there are new tales alongside those that have come from outside. Therefore, any attempt to trace all the tales or at least all the major fairly-tale motifs to a particular region, either in the East or in the west is bound to be futile.

India is quite well known as a repertory of fairy-tales. The relating of tales has been a regular feature in early Indian society. The Vedic literature reveals not only the existence of legends and fairy-tales but also religious ceremonies in which the telling of tales formed an intergral part. Besides these wonder tales that were prevalent among the elite priesthood there must have been similar tales current among the masses. Some of these seem to appear in the epics.

Certain tales that appear in Buddhist literature, too, can be classed under the category of fairy-tales when the term is taken in its broader sense. The Buddha and his disciples used fables, narratives and other types of tales

71. *RBC.* pp. 87-92.

which they drew upon from folk-lore. These tales are found in the *Jātaka* book which is the main repertory of Buddhist stories. A close scrutiny of the tales found in it reveals that the fairy-tale was not the favourite medium of instruction restorted to by Buddhist monks. Fairy-tales that appear in Buddhist texts, mainly in the *Jātaka,* the *Cariyā-pitaka* and the *Jātaka-Mālā* are on the whole neither so numerous no so well developed as the fables that are found in them. The structure of the fairy-tale which is generally devoid of a didactic nature, did not quite suit the purpose for which the tales were used by Buddhist monks. However, they have, with some measure of success, used the fairy-tale just as they did use the fable, for moral instruction and the elucidation of difficult points in the doctrine.

In those Buddhist tales that can be classified as fairy tales, fairies are conspicuous by their absence. The characters that appear frequently in these tales are man-eating goblins, demons, ogres and ogresses, supernatural animals such as garudas, nāgas and kinnaras. Although some of these have fairy-traits they cannot be identified as fairies. Buddhist literature and beliefs do not reveal the existence of a group of beings who can be called fairies as they are known to the west. Those that come very close to fairies are the tree-deities *(rukkha-devatā), nymphs (acchara,* Skt. *apsaras)* and divine-damsels *(deva-dhitā).* Sometimes gods, specially Sakka, assume human and animal forms and play roles typical of those played by fairies in western fairy-tales. Not only supernatural beings and animals but even magic objects are present in these fairy-tales.

There are certain fables which are more like fairy-tales. The tales in which animals and men appear as characters are full of fanciful and incredible happenings. In one of these there appears a learned partridge that instructs young pupils on various sciences (No. 438); in another, a wonderful deer which saves a man from drowning (*J.* No. 483) and in still another tale a great monkey that rescues a man who has lost his way in the thick jungle (*J.* No. 516). Nurmerous other animals which surpass human beings in virtuous qualities, too, appear in them. Many of these animal cum fairy-tales are narrated to expose the vile nature of men.

Apart from these are a number of other fairy-tales in the *Jātaka.* But when compared with the well-known fairy-tales that appear in later Sanskrit collection of wonder tales such as the *Kathāsaritsāgara* or the *Vetālapañcavimśati* or even with those that are prevalent outside India, many of these Buddhist fairy-tales fail to fall into that category. Though almost all the popular fairy-tale motifs are found to exist in Buddhist fairy-tales they have not received the literary treatment their counterparts in Sanskrit literature as well as in literature outside India seem to have generally received.

The Buddhist monks used fairy-tales merely as illustrations in their instruction and generally they do not seem to have used their imagination to enrich the tale. Instead, their sole aim was to impregnate the tale with ethical and moral instruction and this resulted in suppressing the fairy-tale motifs that were present in them. The *Vidhura-pandta Jātaka* (No. 545) has all fairy-tale motifs that are capable of elevating it to the standard of a fascinating fairy-tale. But on the one hand these motifs are not developed enough and presented in a manner capable of rousing the curiosity of the listner or the reader and transferring him into a world of fancy; and on the other, these motifs are overshadowed and pushed into the background by lengthy sermons and didactic sayings introduced into the body of the tale for the purose of moral instruction and elucidation of doctrinal points. The *Bhūridatta Jātaka* (No. 543), too, suffers in the same manner. When considered as a fairy-tale and not as a jātaka it, too, contains a great deal of irrelevant details which do not by any means help to enrich the story. Besides using this as a medium of moral instruction, the preacher also has attempted to use it to criticise brahmanic beliefs and dogmas. A number of tales such as the *Mahāsutasoma Jātaka* (No. 537) and the *Devadhamma Jātaka* (No. 6) have suffered in the same manner.

There are a few tales which can be grouped under the category of fairy-tales merely because they are based on popular fairy-tale motifs. The *Samiddhi Jātaka* (No. 167) is one such tale. It is the tale of a fairy *(devadhitā)* who tries to win the heart of a handsome, young asectic. The love between fairies and men is a very common theme in fairy-tales of the East and the West. But this Buddhist fairy-tale falls far short of the standard of the average fairy-tale with a similar theme. This story seems to be a creation of a Buddhist monk and does not in any way reveal the ingenuity of the author. The *Samiddhi Jātaka* is related with reference to an extremely pious Elder who has forsaken worldly pleasures, love, even that of a fairy, is an obstacle to his goal. The preacher who tried to explain the exemplary character of this Elder by means of a tale had to be within certain limits when doing so. He had to invent a tale which explained the Elder's present experience with the help of a similar past experience of his. The extremely pious character of the Elder concerned and the uneventful incident in the present life of the Elder prevented the preacher from inventing a fascinating fairy-tale, by setting up restrictions to his imagination. Moreover, a fascinating fairy-tale was not the main concern of the Buddhist preacher. Much less interesting are the tales regarding tree-deities. They have no value as stories (see Nos. 109, 311, 465).

However, the *Jātaka* book is not completely devoid of interesting fairy-tales. The *Telapattha Jātaka* (No. 96) is one such interesting tale. It relates the story of a prince who wins a kingdom by resisting the fascinations of an enchanting ogress. The tale is made more interesting by relating the fate that befalls the king who falls prey to the temptations of the ogress. The *Dadhivāhana Jātaka* (No. 186) is an extremely enchanting fairy-tale that can be compared favourably with any fairy-tale of that type. It is a typical specimen of the type of wonder tales that centre round magical objects. It narrates the extraordinary manner in which the hero acquires the magic objects and uses them to win a kingdom.

Three ascetics received from Sakka, who had been their brother in the previous birth, three magic object namely, a razor which could be used as a razor or as an axe; a drum which when beaten on one side drove away elephants and when beaten on the other made friends of them; and a bowl from which a stream of curd flowed at its will. At that time in an island far away lived a wild boar that possessed a gem which enabled its possessor to travel through the air. A ship wrecked sailor from Kāsi, who happened to come to this island, stealthily took possession of this gem. He travelled to the Himālayas through the air. There he saw the three ascetics with magic objects. In exchange for the gem he obtained the magic razor by which he killed the ascetic and recovered his gem. Having obtained the other two magic objects he finally waged war against the king of Benares whom he defeated with the aid of the magic objects. He completely destroyed all his enemies by drowning them in a river of curd produced by his magic bowl and ultimately ascended the throne. The other episode has been appended merely to transfer this popular fairy-tale into a jātaka (see T.W. Rhys Davids, *Buddhist Birth Stories* I, pp. xvi-xxii). The knowledge of animal speech is widely used as a fairy-tale motif in the east and the west. One of the earliest tales which uses this motif is the *Kharaputta Jātaka* (No. 386 for varients of this story see Benfey in *Orient and Occident*, II, pp. 133 ff. and also the second story in the Arabian Nights).

Once Senaka, king of Benares, saved a Nāga-king from death and in gratitude the latter gave the king a Nāga maiden to minister to him. One day the king found the Nāga maiden making love to a water snake, and struck her. She went and reported to the Nāga-king that she had been ill-treated. Enraged at this the Nāga-king sent his attendants to destory Senaka. However, when the truth was revealed the Nāga-king confessed his error to Senaka and in order to make amends taught him a charm which gave him the knowledge of all sounds. He also advised the king not to divulge this charm to any one else for that would cause his death. One day Senaka's queen discovering the supernatural knowledge possessed by her husband entreated him to teach her the charm even at the cost of his life. Being unable to dissuade the queen he finally decided to teach her the charm. Just at that moment the Bodhisatta who was born as Sakka assumed the form of a goat and conversed with his wife who had assumed the form of a she-goat about the stupidity of the king, in the presence of the king. Ultimately Sakka taught Senaka a device by which the latter was able to prevent the queen from inquiring about the charm.

This, too, seems to have been borrowed by the Buddhists from a popular fairy-tale of the time. The introduction of Sakka, who is indentified with the Bodhisatta, was solely for the purpose of transferring this into a *Jātaka*.

In the *Cullapaduma Jātaka* (No. 193) neither fairies nor goblins appear. Yet, the incidents involved, specially the miraculous escape of Cullapaduma, are so fascinating that it can be classed as an interesting fairy-tale. It is one of the few fairy-tales that have been aptly used in the *Jātaka* for moral instruction without impairing the story.

Some of the tales about shipwrecked mariners and their adventures are quite fascinating. The *Valāhassa Jātaka* (No. 196) is one such tale. It relates the adventures of some shipwrecked mariners who were cast ashore near a city of man-eating she-goblings. Some of the sailors who were unable to resist being fascinated by the she-goblins fell prey to them and others who resisted them were saved by a supernatural horse which flew off carrying the sailors (see *Divy.* pp. 120 and 524 ff. and *Karanp. 52. cp. also J.* No. 463).

The *Catudvāra Jātaka* (No. 439) is another tale that related the incredible things that happened to Mittavindaka who by accident landed in an island where the inhabitants enjoy divine bliss for seven days and inexplicable woe for another seven days. In typical fairy-tale style it further narrates how Mittavindaka sailed to several other similar islands and how he finally reached the Ussāda-hell. Then it narrates in very graphic manner how he undergoes punishment for his excessive covetousness.

One of the most interesting fairy-tales of this category that appears in the *Jātaka* is the *Losaka Jātaka* (No. 41). The incidents are so well-woven and the presentation is so lively that it is capable of rousing the curiosity of the listener or reader and transferring him temporarily to a world of fancy. It relates the story of a monk who as a result of his jealousy and greed is first born in hell and then as an orge, a dog and finally as a begger. But in that birth he brings so much of ill-luck to his family that his parents are forced to drive him away. He goes off and settles down among some other folk to whom also he

brings ill-luck. He is driven away once again. Ultimately he decides to sail and embarks a ship. In mid-ocean he is cast overboard as his fellow sailors consider him to be a source of misfortune. He, clambering on to a raft, lands in several islands similar to those mentioned in the previous tale. Eventually be comes to an ogre-island where he seizes the leg of an ogress which had the shape of a she-goat. As soon as he lays his hand on the she-goat, she kicks him so hard that he is at once thrown back to Benares where he falls among the king's herd of goats. There he is taken to be a thief and condemned to death. Not deviating from the typical style of fairy-tales which ends on a happy note, he is recognised and rescued at the last moment.

The *Samugga Jātaka* (No. 436) is another fairy-tale that reminds the reader of the giants that are so common in Eastern and Western fairy-tales. It narrates how a man-eating demon falls in love with a mortal woman and in order to safegurad her puts her in a box which he swallows. The woman, by some device induces a man to enter the box and without the knowledge of the demon enjoys his love while being in the belly of the demon. There is nothing Buddhistic in these fairy-tales. They are used in the *Jātaka* merely because they proved to be an effective medium of instruction.

There are a number of tales that have as their theme the union between human and super-natural beings. The *Samugga Jātaka* mentioned earlier as well as the *Padakusalamānava Jātaka* (No. 432) relate the union between yakkhas and human beings. The *Bhūridatta Jātaka* (No. 543) tells about the union between Nāgas and human beings. The *Kākāti Jātaka* (No. 32) and *Sussandi Jātaka* (No. 360) relate how Garuda kings kidnap women and enjoy their company. Human children are brought up by an ogress (see *Jayaddisa Jātaka*, No. 513). But very rarely does any of these tales rise to the standard of a fascinating fairy-tale.

There are also a number of tales that describe encounters between princes and man-eating demons (see Nos. 155, 347, 398, 537). In these the prince, who is identified as the Bodhisatta, always emerges victorius at the end. These man-eating demons are never subdued by use of strength or weapons but by the use of superior wit and preaching about the 'godlike' way *(deva-dhamma)*. Even prince Pañcāvudha (see *Pañcāvuda Jātaka* No. 55) who first attempts to over-power the demon by attacking him with weapons finally resorts to preaching. This Buddhist attitude which considers the power of intelligence and virtue as stronger than that of weapons or bodily strength seems to have been a major cause for the absence of adventurous episodes in Buddhist fairy-tales.

Some of the Buddhist fairy-tales have parallels in fairy-tale literature outside India (see *Arabian Nights; Gesta Romanorum; Benfey*, loc. cit.). This parallelism is partly due to the migration of the fairy-tales along with the migration of the Indian fables. Besides this, the general causes that brought about the dissemination of fables of the East and West seem to have effected the spread of fairy-tales also. Just as tales were carried elsewhere from India a good number of tales must have reached India from outside. This is quite probable in the case of mariners' fairy-tales which relate the adventures of shipwrecked mariners in mysterous islands inhabited by man-eating ogresses and goblins. However, it is not possible, with the information available at present, to determine exactly the result of this reciprocal influence (see, FABLES: JATAKA).

S. K. Nanayakkara

FAITH. The Pali equivalent of the word faith is *saddhā*, but all the connotations of the English word faith do not apply to *saddhā*. It is also important to note that *saddhā* is not assigned the same value in Buddhism as faith is in Christianity.[1] Another set of words that is sometimes translated as faith is *pasāda/pasanna/pasīdati*; it is decidedly very different from faith and occupies a much higher status than *saddhā* as a positive religious emotion.[2] *sadhā* also has the connotation of "credulity"[3].

Suttas record in stereotype language how people express faith after listening to the Buddha. Those who wish to become only lay followers generally say: It is excellent revered Sir, it is excellent. The *dhamma* has been made so clear in various methods that it is like setting upright what has been set upside down, it is like disclosing what has been concealed, it is like pointing out the way to one who has lost his way, and it is like bringing an oil-lamp in the darkness so that those with eyes might be able to see material objects. Now I take as refuge, revered Sir, the Exalted One, the *dhamma* and the Order of monks. May the Exalted One consider me from this

1. Edith Ludowyk-Gyomroi, "The Valuation of Saddhā in Early Buddhist Texts," *University of Ceylon Review*, Vol. 2, No. 2, October 1947, pp. 32-49.
2. Edith Ludowyk-Gyomroi, "Note on the Interpretation of "pasīdati" *University of Ceylon Review*, Vol. I, No. One, April 1943, pp. 74-81.
   Also see for more details on faith: K. N. Jayatilleke, *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*, George Allan and Unwin Ltd., London, 1963, pp. 381-401.
3. Cf. *Ye sotavanto pamuñcantu saddham Vin.* I, p. 5; *M.* I, p. 169

day as a lay follower who has taken refuge for life. (*D.* I, p. 85).

A person who decides to become a monk is said to generally reflect with confidence *(saddhā)* in the Buddha that the household life is cramped and confined, it is a path of defilement. The homeless life is open and free. It is not easy for one who leads a household life to live the higher life with absolute fulfilment, and absolute purity like a polished conch-shell. Having gained confidence in this manner he requests the Buddha for ordination (*M.*I, 179, 267, 344). The *Nidānasaṃyutta*[4] states that one gains confidence in the Buddha when one sees that life is full of suffering. In the *Bodhirājakumāra sutta* (*M.* II, p. 94), the Buddha shows with the help of a simile that just as much as one has to learn the art of riding an elephant and handling the good by reposing faith/confidence/-trust in the teacher, this *Dhamma* too has to be mastered with faith/confidence/trust in the teacher and his Enlightenemnt. There *saddhā* is reckoned as one of the five factors contributing to spiritual striving *(padhāniyaṅgāni).* In the *Kītāgiri Sutta*[5] the Buddha says that a monk who lives with faith, conducting himself according to the instructions of the teacher finds growth and strength in the dispensation. According to the *Alagaddūpama Sutta* (*M.* I, p. 142) those who have mere faith in the Buddha, mere affection for him are destined to be reborn in heaven. As mere faith too is beneficial for the welfare of a human being the Buddha takes care not to prod too much those who lead the higher life with mere faith, as they might lose even the little faith they have and that would not be for their well being. Just as friends and relations should protect the eye of a person who has only one eye, care should be taken to safeguard the faith of those who fare on with just faith only (*M.* I, p. 444).

Occasionally *pema* and *pasāda* are used synonymously with *saddhā* (*A.*III, p.326; *M.* I, p. 142), but *pema* also has a connotations of decidedly inferior value.[6] *Puggalappasāda* or faith in a personal sense is said to have evil consequences as an individual can be moved to anger if the person of his admiration is found fault with, or to depression if the person concerned goes away or dies (*A.* III, p. 270). Vakkali was a monk who entertained faith in a personal sense towards the Buddha. He gained much satisfaction by admiring the Buddha and the Buddha admonished him saying: What is the use of gazing at this rotten body of mine. He who sees the *Dhamma* sees me, he who sees me sees the *Dhamma* (*S.* III, p. 120). It is said that faith itself was an impediment for Vakkali to attain arahantship *(ThagA.* II, p. 148).

The Buddha does not expect blind faith from his disciples. In the *Caṅki Sutta (M.* II, p. 179) he criticises the faith which brahmins have towards the *Vedas* and calls it *amūlikā saddhā,* groundless faith. He compares the brahmanic tradition to a procession of blind men as none in the entire tradition can claim to have seen or known about the qualities of Brahman with whom they aspire to attain companionship. In the *Tevijja Sutta (D.*I, p. 241) the futility of the brahmanic attitude is illustrated with the simile of a man who professes love for a ravishing beauty *(janapadakalyāṇi)* whom he has never seen and does not know at all.

In the *Kālāma Sutta (D.* I, p. 189) the Buddha explains in details the open-mindedness which a person should bear in listening to the propositions put forward by another as true. He admonishes that one should not accept the statements of another as true on grounds of revelation, tradition, hearsay, scriptural authority, logic, inference, superficial observation, agreement with one's own accepted views, plausibility or the prestige value of the teacher. This does not mean that the statements should be rejected straight away, but that their truth and utility values should be weighed impartially. One should be guided by one's own experience, the attitude of the wise and the consequences resulting from the acceptance of those views. When one is personally satisfied that these views are true and useful one may accept them provisionally. This provisional acceptance is called *saccānurakkhana* in the *Caṅki sutta, (M.* II, p. 171) as one is in a position to safeguard the truth with such an attitude. Thus the type of *saddhā* that the Buddha expects from his disciples is a non-committed open-mindedness, a willingness to try out his message. If when he tries out he finds the teaching useful and true his faith gets more firmly established.

In the *Vīmaṃsaka Sutta (M.* I, p. 318) the Buddha says that his disciples should not take his claim to enlightenment at face value. Those who do not have the ability to read the thoughts of another, should examine him with regard to those patterns of behaviour observable through visual and auditory faculties. When observing him for a long time if they find no corrupt conduct, nor a mixture of good and evil qualities, and they find only virtuous conduct they can come to the conclusion that the Buddha is truly enlightened. We do find recorded in the Pali Canon such and similar observations made by eminent members of the society. The *Brahmāyu Sutta (M.* II, p. 135) records that the young man Uttara followed the Buddha for seven months investigating the Buddha's

4. *S.* II, p. 31- *dukkhūpanisā saddhā*
5. *M.* I, p. 480- *rumhaniyam satthusānam hoti ojavantam*
6. *A.* II, p. 213 - *pemā doso jāyati; Dhp.* v. 213; *pemato jāyati soko*

conduct to see whether the fame that has spread about him is justified or not. In the *Dhammacetiya Sutta (M.* III, p. 120 ff.) King Pasenadi Kosala makes a number of observations on the strength of which he comes to the conclusion that the Buddha is fully enlightened, the Dhamma is well expounded by the Buddha, and the Sangha is well set on the path (to liberation).

In the *Canki Sutta (M.* II, p. 172 f.) the Buddha says that disciples should examine to see if the Buddha is reaching out of selfish motives *(lobhaniyehi dhammehi),* malicious motives *(dosaniyehi dhammehi)* or from delusive tendencies *(monahiyehi dhammehi);* whether he claims to know and see when in fact he does not know and see. If they find that his physical and verbal conduct does not betray such evil motives, that the Dhamma he teaches appears to be profound, excelent and appealing to the wise, and it is such that it could not be preached by one having base, evil motives, then the disciples should repose faith in him.

Thus the Buddha encourages critical examination of himself and his teachings and the *saddha* he expects from his disciples is an enlightened confidence/trust in the teacher which motivates him to take the teaching seriously and put forth strenuous effort to practise accordingly. This confidence/trust is said to be of great benefit to the beginner *(saddhā bahukārā;* (*M.* II, p. 176).

The word *saddhā* is sometimes used in the sense of self-confidence too. According to the *Ariyapariyesana Sutta (M.* I, p. 164) the recluse Gotama who learnt about the meditation level attained by Ālāra Kālāma reflected thus: It is not only Ālāra Kālāma who has *saddhā,* I too have *saddhā,* it is not only Ālāra Kālāma who has *viriya... sati...samādhi* and *paññā,* I too have them. Thus he resolved to practise meditation and achieve the same spiritual level which Ālāra Kālāma had attained. Here the context shows that recluse Gotama meant self-confidence by *saddhā* and not faith in Ālāra Kālāma. In the *Padhāna Sutta (Sn. v.* 432) the Bodhisatta, in reply to Māra, says: *atthi saddhā tato viriyam.* This means that he has confidence in himself from which he derives energy to go on with spiritual striving. The *Anguttara nikāya (A.* III, p. 9) enumerates five *tathāgatabalāni* endowed with which the Buddha claims a position of eminence among men *(āsabham thānam)* and proclaims his teachings with the fearlessness of a lion *(sihanādam nadati).* The first of these is *saddhābala* and it necessarily has to be power born of self-confidence. Thus it is clear from the ideas contained in the Pali Canon that the concept of *saddhā* in Buddhism contains an element of self-confidence too.

Saddhā, faith in the teacher seems to get deepened into *pasāda,* intellectual appreciation/conviction as one progresses with better understanding of the *dhamma.* Thus the *Madhupindika Sutta (M.* I, p. 114) states that when one investigates the *dhamma* with intelligence one experiences joy *(attamanatam)* and intellectual satisfaction *(cetaso pasādam). Pasāda* also means clarity of mind as the same word is also used in association with the transparent clarity of limpid water. According to the *Anguttara nikāya (A.* I, p. 211) when a disciple ponders over his own qualities such as *saddhā, sila, suta, cāga,* and *paññā* he experiences clarity of mind/intellectual appreciation *(cittam pasidati).* This generates delight *(pāmujjam)* which causes the elimination of defilements. Thus faith deepens with spiritual progress and paves the way to mental purity.

There are five spiritual faculties *(pañc'indriyāni (S.* V, p. 193f.) of which the faculty of faith *(sadh'indriya)* is the first. This faculty seems to comprise a combination of faith in the Buddha, Dhamma, Sangha and self-confidence. Just as much as confidence in the teacher is essential, confidence in one's own ability and strength of character is a *sine qua non* to carry through the arduous task of conquering temptations and gaining self-mastery. This *saddh'indriya* grows into a power, *saddhābala (M.* II, pp. 11-12). Perhaps the stabilised form of *saddhābala* is called *ākāravati saddhā* which is translated by K. N. Jayatilleke (K. N. Jayatilleke, op. cit. p. 393) as rational faith. The *Vimamsaka Sutta (M.* I, p. 320) explains how this rational faith grows in a disciple in the following words: As the Buddha gradually preaches the Dhamma progressing further and further, going from excellence to excellence, explaining dark and bright qualities with their counterparts, one gains insight into the Dhamma with higher knowledge and achieves fulfilment in one aspect of the Dhamma. Then intellectual appreciation/conviction dawns on him that the Buddha is fully enlightened, the Dhamma is well expounded by the Buddha and the Sangha is well set on the path (to liberation). One who reposes faith in the Buddha in this manner, with these words and phrases, has his faith well rooted and established. This is called rational faith *(ākāravati saddhā)* which is rooted in insight, firm and irremovable by any recluse, brahmin, deity, Māra, God or anyone in the world.

Because *ākāravati saddhā* is described as *dassanamūlikā,* rooted in insight, one may conjecture that it is the same as *aveccappasāda,* for, as K. N. Jayatilleke (K. N. Jayatilleke, op. cit. p. 386) points out *aveccappasāda* can be translated as appreciation based on understanding. According to the *Sotāpatti Samyutta (S.* V, p. 343) *aveccappasāda* in the Buddha, Dhamma and Sangha coupled with noble moral virtue conducive to concentration are the characteristics of a stream winner.

Saddhā, pasāda, ākāravati saddhā and *aveccappasāda* are different degrees of the same religious emotion of faith. It starts with an open-minded willingness to try out

the teachings and it culminates in a deep-rooted unshakable conviction. But *paññā* (wisdom) is far superior to even the highest level of faith as it is *paññā* which guarantees full liberation finally. The fact that *saddhā* is the initial virtue which activates the process of spiritual development, and that *paññā* is the culmination of that process seems to be evident from lists of virtues mentioned in the Pali Canon as requirements for liberation. In these enumerations it cannot be a coincidence that *saddhā* is mentioned as the first member while *paññā* is mentioned as the last. The following lists have been collected by K. N. Jayatilleke: (K. N. Jayatilleke, op. cit. 396).

1. *Saddhā, sīla, suta, cāga, paññā* (*A.* II, p. 66, III, pp. 6, 44, 181; *Itv.* pp. 270, 271, 284, 288; *M.* I, p. 465, II, p. 180, III, p. 99).
2. *Saddhā, viriya, sati, samādhi, paññā,* (*M.* I, p. 164, III, p. 99; *S.* V, p. 193 ff.)
3. *Saddhā, sīla, cāga, paññā, paṭibhāna,* (*A.* V, p. 96)
4. *Saddho, appābādho, asaṭho, āraddhaviriyo, paññavā,* (*M.* II, p. 128).
5. *Saddho, hirimā, ottappī, akodhano, paññavā* (*S.* IV, p. 243).
6. *Saddhā, hiri, ottappa, viriya, paññā* (*A.* III, pp. 4, 9).
7. *Saddhā, āraddhaviriya, upaṭṭhitasati, samāhita, paññavā* (*A.* VI, pp. 329, 333, 335).
8. *Saddho, hirimā, ottappī, bahussuta, āraddhaviriya, upaṭṭhitasati, paññavā, M.* III, p. 23; *A.* II, p. 218; IV, pp. 23, 38).
9. *Saddho, sīlavā, bahussuto, paṭisallīno, āraddhaviriyo, satimā, paññavā,* (*A.* IV, p. 185).
10. *Saddhā, sīlavā, bahussuta, suvaca, kalyāṇamitta, āraddhaviriya, upaṭṭhitasati, appiccha, sammādiṭṭhika* (*A.* V, pp. 153, 154).

It is also noteworthy that *saddhā* does not form a part in the *ariya aṭṭhaṅgika magga,* perhaps for the simple reason that it only initiates the path. Nor is it one of the *bojjhaṅgas.* The conversation of Citta gahapati with Nigantha Nātaputta (*S.* IV, p. 298) also reveals the superiorty of *paññā* over *saddhā.* Citta says he does not merely believe that there is a *jhāna* where *vitakka* and *vicāra* cease, but he knows it as a fact through experience as he too can attain to these *jhānas* whenever he wishes.

The *Aṅguttara nikāya* (*A.* V, p. 23) mentions ten spiritually advanced individuals who are worthy of honour and who are described as fields of merit, in descending order. They are *Sammāsambuddha, paccekasambuddha, ubhatobhāgavimutta, paññāvimutta, kāyasakkhi, diṭṭhippatta, saddhāvimutta, dhammānusāri, saddhānusāri* and *gotrabhū.* There is no doubt that the first four personages in this list are fully liberated. Elsewhere (*A.* I, p. 118) the question of who is superior of the next three, viz. *kāyasakkhi, diṭṭhippatta* and *saddhāvimutta* is discussed. *Kāyasakkhi,* one who has physical proof, has *samādhindriya* best developed. *Diṭṭhippatta,* one who has acquired right view, has *paññindriya* best developed. *Saddhāvimutta,* one who has attained (a certain degree of) liberation through faith, has *saddhindriya* best developed. When the Buddha is asked the question as to who is the best among these three, the Buddha explained that it is not possible to give a categorical answer to that question, as any one of these persons may be a *sakadāgāmi, anāgāmi* or one on the path to arahantship. As such, all seem to have passed the stage of *sotāpatti.* The *Kiṭāgiri Sutta* (*M.* I, p. 478) clearly states the spiritual attainments of the *saddhāvimutta.* He is one who has not physically experienced those non-material peaceful deliverances which transcend materiality. He has, with wisdom, seen and destroyed some *āsvas* (influxes). His faith in the Buddha is fixed, deep rooted and established. Such a person is called one liberated through faith. But he has some more to accomplish through diligence. According to the *Alagaddūpama Sutta* (*M.* I, p. 142) all those who are led by the *dhamma* and *saddhā* are heading towards enlightenment (*ye te bhikkhū dhammānusārino saddhānusārino sabbe te sambodhiparāyaṇā*).

When full liberation is attained finally *saddhā* is replaced by *paññā*; an *arahant* is therefore described as one devoid of faith (*assaddho: Dhp. v.* 92). It is only an *arahant* who can claim highest knowledge (*Paññā*) without relying on faith. (*S.* IV, p. 138).

Lily De Silva

FALLACIES. See LOGIC

FALSE-SPEECH, referred to in Pali as *musāvāda,* is categorised as a form of abuse of speech or ignoble usage of language (*anariya-vohāra, DA.* III, p. 891) under which category is included also malicious-speech (*pisunā-vācā*), harsh-speech (*pharusā-vācā*) and monsensical babble (*samphappalāpa: D.* III, p. 232; *DA.* III, p. 1025). Indulgence in false-speech is regarded as an evil habit harmful to both the individual and the society (*D.* III, p. 92), and abstention from it is listed as the fourth of the five precepts. For monks it is said to be a form of misconduct that requires expiation (*Vin.* IV, p. 2ff.)

Commentarial tradition gives a very comprehensive definition about false-speech by treating it under the wider concept of deception. Therefore, though false speech is basically a particular form of conduct or

behaviour pertaining to speech *(bhassa-samācāra: D.* III, p. 106) it is pointed out that in this wider connotation it includes verbal acts as well as physical acts or gestures carried out with the intention of deceiving others (*DA.* I, p. 72). Thus it is seen that the emphasis is on intention than on the mode of performance of the act.

This intention is the intention to deceive by distortion of facts *(atthabhañjana: DA.* I, 72, cf. *DhpA.* III, p. 356). It is this intention that distinguishes false speech from other types of abuse of speech. This deception by using false-speech could be carried out by representing what is non-existent and unreal as existent and real or by denying what one has seen, heard, sensed and conceived or else by affirming what one has not seen, heard, sensed or conceived as seen etc.

This is considered such a basic evil that the Buddha himself says, ".... of anyone for whom, there is no shame at intentional lying *(sampajāna musāvāda)* of him I say that there is no evil he cannot do" (*M.* I, p. 415). See MUSĀVĀDA, PAÑCASILA, PRECEPTS.

S. K. Nanayakkara

FAMILY. Buddhist literary sources furnish considerable information on the social conditions that prevailed in India in the 6th Century B.C. These sources provide evidence to show that, of the numerous social institutions that functioned at the time, the family formed the basic unit of the social fabric. In Pali texts the family is generally denoted by the term *kula* which also has other nuances of meaning attached to it (see KULA). The family unit denoted by the term *kula* is not a nuclear family consisting of man, his wife and their unmarried children, but a sort of an extended family consisting of a man, his parents, his wife and children, daughters-in-law (if there are married sons), his sisters and perhaps other dependent close relatives. But this 'family' unit is different from the 'household' unit, also denoted by the term *kula*, which was more expansive in membership. The 'household' unit included even slaves, and household servantss. it is seen that the concept of the 'household' unit was based on the idea of 'living together', whereas the family emphasised 'kinship'.

Apparently the man and the wife formed the pivot round which the family grew. It was a patriarchal society and, therefore, the man occupied the prime position in the family, and as such be was generally referred to as *Kulapati (A.* I, p. 152; III, p. 44). His superiority is a fact taken for granted and in keeping with his superior position in the family, he is addressed by the wife as *ayyaputta*, or more commonly, as *sāmi* (lord, chief). The term used to refer to the wife is *bhariya,* literally meaning one who is supported, and perhaps at an earlier period purposely used to connote her subordinate position in the family to *bhatta (bhatta* the breadwinner: *D.* III, p. 190). But by the 6th century B.C. this connotation seems to have lost its original significance, for the role of the wife by then had undergone considerable change. Besides the term *bhariya*, terms *dārā* (masc.) *kalatra* (neut.) or even *pajāpati* are applied to the wife.

As polygamy prevailed constant references to co-wives *(sapatti, sabhariyā)* are found in texts (D. II, pp. 45, 239, 245, 330; *M.* II, p. 64; *A.* IV, p. 120; *Thig. v.* 225). Numerous episodes show that the state of a co-wife was not an enviable one (*Thig. v.* 216; *ThigA.* 178). That the state of a co-wife is regarded as a state of misery is seen from the *Samyutta nikāya (S.* IV, p. 249) which says that a woman who has no merit to her credit will not be able to avoid falling into the state of a co-wife. The meanings of hostility and rivalry connoted by the term *sapatta* are indicative of the hostile relationships that existed among co-wives. Though polygamy was yet in vogue it is, however, noticeable that the social and economic changes that were rapidly taking place in the 6th century B.C. were creating an environment helpful for monogamy to replace polygamy (*A.* III, pp. 57 ff. 295 ff.; *Vin.* I, p. 216f; 240f. III, p. 17).

The husband-wife relationship was commonly based on mutual respect, trust, understanding and co-operation. This ideal relationship is epitomized by Nakulapitā and Nakulamatā, the ideal of husband and wife. (A. III, p. 295 ff.). The *Sigālovāda Sutta (D.* III, p. 190) lays down guidelines that are conducive to nurture this relationship. It says, "In five ways should a wife as western quarter be ministered to by her husband: by respect, by courtesy, by faithfulness, by handing over authority to her, providing her with ornaments." Respect *(sammānana)* and courtesy *(avimānana)* were considered essential features in this relationship indicating that a wife should not be looked down upon as inferior in status in the family structure. Buddhism constantly enjoins that the wife should be regarded as co-partner in the family unit. To put this into practice the *Sigālovāda Sutta* advises that a husband should hand over authority which the commentary very lucidly explains as authority in household affairs (*DA.* III, p. 955). It is generally thought that fidelity is a quality expected more from the wife than the husband and the chaste wife is held in high esteem. But from this it is clearly seen that the husband too should be faithful if the family unit is to survive without getting disintegrated.

When a wife is so treated, the *Sigālovāda Sutta* says that she would reciprocate by performing her duties well, by showing hospitality to the kin of her husband and hers, by being faithful, by carefully managing his well-

earned wealth and by skilfully and diligently discharging all her duties as lady of the house.

In all family affaris she enjoyed equal status with her husband. In fact a wife was expected to deputise her husband in all family affairs. In this regard she had to shoulder added responsibilities. It is said she should even gain proficiency in industry and business carried on by her husband so that she could efficiently deputise him when the need arises. It appearss that a wife had to shoulder comparatively a greater share of responsibility in family affairs than the husband whose main function was that of a breadwinner. Even in creating an emotional environment that conducive to closer family bonds the wife was expected to play a pivotal role. Thus she is expected to rise earlier than the husband and retire last to bed. She should willingly help him, carry out his wishes and speak to him in an affable manner. She should adapt herself to the thinking pattern and habits of her husband by getting used to honour, revere and respect all whom her husband respects such as his parents and religious men. This means that she should, for the well-being and happiness of the family, totally merge with the husband and even adopt his religious faith if she, by chance, happened to belong to a different faith. It is she who held the responsibility of managing the slaves and servants, caring equally for both sick and able, distributing their requirements according to their needs. She was expected not only to be able to get the work done but also to know the work herself so that she could well supervise the workmen. Besides, whe was expected to manage the family affairs efficiently and at the same time see that her husbands' wealth is not wasted (*A.* III, p. 36ff.).

A husband's addiction to liquor, gambling and women are common failings that contributed to bring about the ruination of a family (*Sn.* *v.* 106). Similarly, bad-tempered and ill-mannered wives, too, are said to cause disharmony and disunity in the family. The Buddha addressing Sujātā, a very hot-tempered and ill-mannered daughter-in-law of Anāthapiṇḍika, enumerates seven types of wives some of whom promote family wellbeing and some others the ruin of the family. Some are praiseworthy, others are not. To the latter type belong the *vadhaka* (lit. the torturous type) who are pitiless, corrupt, and neglect the husband and spend their time with paramours. So are the *cora* (thief type) who rob the husbands of their wealth thus causing family downfall. The *ayya* (bossy type) are those who dominate and behave lazily, engaged in gossiping and high-spending. All these three types are disapproved. Then there are those falling into the category of *mātu* (motherly type) who are compassionate towards their husbands and care for them as a mother would do for her only child. The *bhaginī* (sister tpye) wives respect their husbands as younger sisters would respect their seniors. Those wives who are gentle like friends fall in to the category of *sakhī* (friendly type). The last and which appears to be the most approved type is the *dāsī.* To this category belong the wives who are submissive, obedient and patient even to the extent of tolerating, for the sake of family wellbing, ill-treatment by the husband, (*A.* IV, 92f.).

The greatest ambition of a wife was to bear children, especially sons who would continue the family lineage and perform other obligations expected of them (*S.* IV, p. 249). The religious, social and economic conditions of the time favoured more the birth of sons than that of daughters. The state of the mind of a father to whose family a daughter is born is clearly reflected in the behaviour of king Pasenadi Kosala who on hearing that his consort had given birth to a daughter, rushes to the Buddha for consolation. In this instance the Buddha offers some consolation saying that even a daughter might prove to be adorable if she happens to live up to expectations (*S.* I, p. 86).

A son was considered a necessity for a family. It is a son who could continue the lineage, and who could perform the *śrāddha* ceremony for departed parents observing the appropriate rituals. The theory of succession operated on the line of males and so did property devolution. All these factors contributed to enhance the position of the son over and above that of the daughter in the family.

The *Sigālovāda Sutta* clearly lays down how the son-parent relationship should be regulated to facilitate family welfare. "In five ways a son should minister to his parents *(mātā-pitaro paccupaṭṭhātabbā)* as the eastern quarter: Once supported by them I will now be their support, I will perform duties due to them, I will safeguard the lineage, I will succeed to my inheritance, I will perform the religious rituals due to the departed ones." (*D.* III, p. 189).

The parents are said to reciprocate in the following manner: restrain the son from vice, set him on the virtuous path, train him in various crafts, contract a suitable marriage, and at the proper time hand over his inheritance.

This manner of reciprocal treatment helped to foster the natural bond that exists between sons and parents. The Buddhist texts abound in episodes illustrating grateful, obedient sons who looked after and cared for the parents in their old age. Naturally all families did not follow these guidliness and Buddhist texts themselves record instances of sons ill-treating their aged parents (*M.* II, 50 f.; 185 f. *S.* I, pp. 176f., 181; *Vin.* I, p. 272). Though sons were preferred for certain reasons the parents showed equal affection to all children irrespective of sex differences. Among the children it is the feeling of brotherhood and sisterhood that led to the smooth functioning of their interpersonal relations. Seniority in

age was of great importance and it is seen that the eldest son *(jeṭṭhaputta)* was considered second in importance only to the parents, and in crucial decision making, second only to the father. Though various forms of marriage were prevalent, in ordinary circumstances it was the duty of the parents to contract suitable marriages for their children, and as such parental consent was usually necessary for marriage. This must have been strictly so with regard to the marriage of daughters who are generally considered as being in the custody of parents, brothers or any other older relative. (*A.* IV, p. 264). The daughters after marriage *(vivāha)* left the parental home and took up residence with their husband while the sons after their marriage *(āvāha)*, remained in the family with their wives. The two are differentiated: *vivāha* being called ***kaññādāna***, 'giving away of a maiden' and *āvāha*, ***kaññāgahana***, acceptance of a maiden (*SnA.* p. 448).

Even at that time the in-law relationship seem to have been a much strained one, often that between the mother-in-law and the daughter-in-law, and consequently of the husband too who naturally took the side of his mother in such conflicts. As the family is based on kinship, there appears to have been a tendency to consider the daughter-in-law as being an outsider in the family. Therefore, she had the added responsibility of making a deliberate and sustained effort to help the smooth functioning of this tricky relationship between herself and the in-laws, especially that with the mother-in-law *(sassu)*. The adjectival form *sassu-devā* (one who considers the mother-in-law as a divinity) speaks eloquently of the role of the daughter-in-law in the placation of her mother-in-law.

It is possible that besides these members the family sometimes included within its fold such close relatives as paternal uncles and aunts (if they happened to remain unmarried). As the general norm of conduct that regulated the varied relationships between different members of a family was based on the honour and respect to elders, these members though they were on the periphery of the family proper, were treated with due honour and respect. Strict adherence to this regulative norm is made evident by honour, respect and affection shown to grand-parents, and also by the particular terms used to indicate their relationship. The grand-parents were thus referred to as ***pitāmaha*** and ***mātā-maha*** or ***ayyaka*** and ***ayyakā*** indicating their relative seniority and the high esteem in which they were held. (*Vin.* II, p. 169, *S.* I, p. 97; *J.* III, p. 155; IV, p. 146; VI, p. 196.

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FASTING. Fasting is generally looked upon as a purificatory or propitiatory ritual and sometimes even as a penitential act. This is mainly so with religions that recognise the dichotomy of body and soul, the body regarded as evil in opposition to the soul which is considered pure. It is held that the mortification of the body by starvation is an effective means of purifying it.

Buddhisms not only rejects such a belief in a soul but also denounces self-mortification which includes fasting as one of its aspects - practised by Brahmins, Jains and followers of several ājivaka sects as 'painful, ignoble and harmful' *dukkho anariyo anattahasamhito: S.* V. p. 421. In fact it is through personal experience that the Buddha arrived at this conclusion, for he observed different forms of fasting while he was engaged in various forms of self-mortification *(attakilamathānuyoga)*, during six years of his striving *(padhāna)*. To begin with he totally abstained from taking any food for a considerable period of time *(sabbaso āhārupacchedāya paṭipajji)*. As this proved to be futile he began to take food in small quantities, drop by drop *(thokaṃ thokaṃ āhāraṃ āhāresiṃ pasataṃ pasataṃ)*, yet starving the body by not providing it with the normal nourishment it required. This account of the bodhisattva's self-mortification found in the *Mahāsaccaka Sutta (M.* I, p. 245 f.) describes in detail how fasting adversely affected his body, emaciating it, draining out all strength from him, and consequently obstructing his attempts at mental and spiritual culture.

The *Jātakanidāna (J.* I, p. 80) records another occasion on which the Buddha totally abstained from taking food. Therein it is said that during the seven weeks after his attainment of enlightenment the Buddha did not partake of any food. Apparently this is neither an act of penance nor a propitiatory ritual. The text itself gives the reason for his abstention. It says that during this period the Buddha was experiencing the bliss of jhānas, of the path and fruition of the path and, therefore, there was no need for any food, nor was there any necessity for ablution and normal tending of the body.[1]

While fasting as an act of self-mortification, penance or propitiation is not accepted, Buddhism lays much emphasis on moderation in food *(bhojane mattaññutā:*

1. *Etth'antare n'eva mukhadovanaṃ na sarīrapaṭijagganaṃ na āhārakiccaṃ ahosi, jhānasukhena, maggasukhena phalasukhen'-eva ca vītināmesi (Vin.* I, p. 80).

A.I. p. 114; *S*.II. p. 218). While this practice is recommended for all, bhikkhus are specifically advised to strictly adhere to this practice, for it is said that religious life cannot be successfully led without such adherence (*A*. IV, p. 166).

The practice of *bhojane mattaññutā* is explained as taking food thoughtfully and prudently, knowing that it is not for sport nor for indulgence, personal charm and adornment but merely for support and upkeep of the body, to allay pangs of hunger, to help the observance of religious life, knowing that "in this way I shall dispel the former pangs of hunger and not allow new pangs to arise, I shall keep my self going, blameless and at ease" (*A*. I, 114). Herein it is clearly stated that pangs of hunger hinders the pursuit of the religious life and therefore should be allayed.

The *Visuddhimagga* makes a very detailed and analytical study of this practice and shows how immoderate eating leads to boredom, sloth and torpor and also invite the censure of the wise (*Vism*. p. 31 ff.). Further, it cites also an utterance of Sāriputta Thera occuring in the *Theragāthā* (*Thag*. vv. 982–82), where he says that a bhikkhu should 'go about' with a belly not filled to the full (*ūna-udara*) but with room for four or five mouthfuls more.

Canonical evidence shows that at the early stages of the inception of the *bhikkhu sāsana* there were no accepted norms regularising the food habits of the bhikkhus. They ate as and when they wished (see *M*. I, 124, 438, 448 ff.). The Buddha found this habit extremely unsatisfactory, for numerous reasons. As pointed out before, the Buddha knew that immoderate eating causes sloth and torpor thereby obstructing the practice of religious life (*brahma cariya*). The bhikkhus incurred the censure of the wise for eating at all odd hours. Besides, this habit induced the bhikkhūs to go in search of alms at unseemly hours, exposing them to numerous perils and risks (see *Latukikopama Sutta*, *M*. I, p. 448). Very often this habit compelled the monks to cook their own food at night, for it was difficult to go begging for alms in the night.[2] For these and numerous other reasons the Buddha found it necessary to regulate the food habits of the bhikkhus.

This he did first by himself setting an example and advising the monks to follow suit. Thus in the *Brahmajāla Sutta* (*D*. I, p.5) he declares that he refrains from taking food at improper hours (*vikālabhojana pativiratā*), that he abstains from taking meals at night (*rattūparata*) and that he subsists on a single meal a day ((*eka-bhattika*)[3] On another occasion recorded in the *Kakacūpama Sutta* (*M*. I. p. 124) the Buddha says that he is in the habit of taking one meal a day, *aham kho bhikkhave ekāsana bhojanam bhuñjāmi*.[4] The Buddha explains that as a result of this habit he experiences good health, buoyancy and strength and also comfortable living.

Thus it is seen that the Buddha's objective was to encourage and train monks to subsist on a single meal a day (see *M*. I, pp. 437, 448, 473; II. pp. 91, 125, 141; *D*. I, pp. 5, 204; II, p. 72 etc.).

Apparently the Buddha's restrictions of food habits did not find favour with all the bhikkhus. Such advice caused much heart-burn even among those bhikkhus who looked up to the Buddha with veneration. They however, reluctantly followed the Buddha's advice (*M*. I, p. 447, cf. p. 474). There may have been many who ignored it. Thus when practice and precept failed and public criticism mounted, the Buddha had to prescribe a Vinaya rule on the matter. Therefore it was laid down that 'whatever monk should eat or partake of solid food (*khādanāyam*)[5] soft food (*bhojaniyam*) at the wrong time (*vikāla*) there is an offence of expiation (*āpatti*, *Vin*. IV, p. 85).

Obviously this is a very broad rule. It does not specify the meals to be taken at the proper time. Interpretation depends on the definition given to term *vikāla*-bhojana.[6] In *Vinaya* itself it is defined as (once) afternoon has passed (and) until sunrise" (*Vin*. IV, p. 86). This shows that according to the *Vinaya* the bhikkhus were permitted to partake of any hard or soft food only between sunrise and noon. This definition considered along with other references cited above where the Buddha

2. *Yā kāci bhante saṅkhātiyo sabbā te rattim, appā divā*, (*M*. I, p. 448.)

3. The *Sumangala vilāsini* (*DA*. I. p.77) defining *eka-bhattika* says that there are two kinds of meals, the breakfast (*pātarāsa bhatta*) and supper (*sāyamāsa-bhatta*). Of these breakfast is the meal that is permitted to be taken up to noon time. The other, that is supper, is the meal taken in between after mid day and dawn. And the commentator's observations reflect an obvious relaxation of the rule, that even if one were to eat ten times before noon he falls into the category of *eka-bhattika*.

4. The *Papañcasūdani* (*MA*. II, p. 97) explains *ekāsana-bhojana* as one morning meal (*ekam pure bhatta-bhojanam*) which according to the context appear to mean a meal taken before noon has passed. In this instance too it is said that even if one were to eat seven times in between sunrise and noon he will come under the category of *ekāsana-bhojana*. Thus the terms *eka-bhattika* and *ekāsana-bhojana* refer to one and the same practice.

5. See *VinA*. p. 832f. for what the solid foods are; cf the *Book of Discipline*, pt. 2, p.366, fn. 112.

6. The term *vikāla* has different shades of meaning depending on the context in which it is used.

says that he observes the practice of *eka-bhattika* or *ekāsana-bhojana* and that he refrains from taking a meals at night *(rattūparata)*[7] strengthen the above view that the forenoon meal is the only recommended meal for bhikkhus. This forenoon meal is also referred to as the *pātarāsa bhatta* which sometimes is mistakenly considered as another meal taken before the forenoon meal. This confusion is perhaps due to the English rendering of the term *pātarāsa* as 'breakfast' which is suggestive of a morning meal, besides the forenoon meal. Only the drinking of *yāgu* (gruel or conjey) was allowed before the forenoon meal (*Vin.* I, p. 46; II, p. 223).

In a somewhat similar context the *Sumangala vilāsini* *(DA.* I, p.77) defines the term *vikālabhojana* as" (once) afternoon has passed (and) until sun-set" *(atikkante majjhantike yāva suriyatthagamanā),* which definition is contrary to the one given in the *Vinaya.*

A plausible explanation of this contradiction is that the commentator in this particular instance was dealing only with the period between post-noon and sun-set, for he deals with post-dawn and pre-noon as well as post-sunset and pre-dawn periods when defining *eka-bhattika* and *rattūparata* practices respectively. As such he may have restricted *"vikāla"* in this particular instance to the time between post-noon and sunset.

The problem of what exactly is meant by 'wrong time for partaking of food' *(vikāla bhojana)* is made a little more complicated by a reference made to "wrong time for partaking of food during day" *(divā vikāla bhojana)* and "wrong time for partaking of food at night" *(ratti-vikāla bhojana).* Such a reference is found in the *Latukikopama Sutta* (*M.* I, p. 448). This two-fold division is mentioned in the commentory on the *Kitāgiri Sutta (MA.* III, p. 186). Therein the commentator states that the Buddha enjoined these restrictions on partaking of food in stages. It is pointed out that the Buddha first directed his attention at regulating wrong food habits pertaining to day time and that this is found in the *Bhaddāli Sutta* and subsequently in the Kitāgiri Sutta he dealt with the practice of eating at wrong times during the night.

The rule concerning *divā-vikāla bhojana* is clearly against eating at "wrong times" during the day-light hours while *rattūparata* categorically prohibits eating during any part of the night.

Whatever the position was, it is quite clear that the Buddha favoured the practice of having one meal a day, that is, the pre-noon meal, and this practice was not considered as an act of fasting but as a mode of regulating and moderating the food habits of bhikkus to help them successfully practise the religious life.

The view that fasting is an important Buddhist practice appears to have gained ground due to the misconception of the true significance of the Buddhist *uposatha* observation. The *uposatha* which the Buddhists adopted from the theory prevailing in the brahmanic practice of *'upa-vasatha'* – in which fasting formed an important feature – was given a new twist with greater emphasis on the observance of moral precepts and the recitation of the *Pātimokkha* (q.v.). But many early Western writers on Buddhism, though they have noted the change in the manner the *uposatha* is observed in Buddhism, have been in the habit of referring to it as 'fast day' (see *ERE V.* p. 837; *PED. s.v. upavasati).* J. A. MacCulloch writing on 'fasting' observes that, 'monks must eat but one meal, at mid-day, and nothing after it; they must fast on the days of the near and full-moon (a derivative from Brāhamanism), giving themselves also to public confession, and hearing of the law. A fast with confession of sins four times a month (sic) is now more usual the *uposatha* days, which the laity are invited to observe" (*ERE.* V. p. 764). This kind of mis-statements and incorrect views have been responsible for the belief that fasting forms an important feature of Buddhist religious practices. see further UPOSATHA.

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FATALISM. See DETERMINISM and INDETERMINISM.

FATE. See DETERMINISM and INDETERMINISM.

FEAR, is referred to in Pali in diverse terms such as *bhaya, bhiru, bhiti, uttāsa, bherava, chambhitatta, lomahamsa* etc. The term *bhaya* derives from the Pali root $\sqrt{bhi}$ > bhāyati to fear. Fear generally arises as a response to a danger which is of a specific nature. It is a perceptual emotion felt on the awareness of an object or recognition of a situation of some definite kind and connected directly with the perception of the object. Fear in its most general sense means anticipation or expectation of harm, peril, disaster or pain as hope is the anticipation of good.

Fear could be categorised into various degrees. Timidity, the general character or temperament from which fear is likely to spring may be regarded as a mild form of fear. Astonishment is slightly a stronger form of fear. Embarassment and shyness are social forms of the same emotion. Anxiety, another degree of fear is used for a reaction to a danger which is not clearly seen. Terror is usually

7. *Ratti bhojanam ratti. Tato uparatoti rattūparato. DA.* I. p. 77.

employed for more extreme and sudden onsets of fear and horror, for the deepest degree to which the emotion of fear attains.

Fear arises from one's conscience which is the result of the known. Knowledge is having ideas of things and persons. People have fear of losing things and persons near and dear to them. Fear exists so long as there is accumulation of the known. The common variety of fear comes through identification. So long as one is conscious of the 'ego' there is the continuance of fear. The Buddha says there is a more basic type of anxiety due to our deep rooted attachment to the ego. These emerge from the nature of the basic human conditions. Something while being pleasant is tied up with anxiety, as one is afraid to lose it. Buddha traces this predilection of 'anxious man' to grasp the basic truth of egolessness, which is the key to understand any form of anxiety. The belief in 'I' and 'Mine', though it gives a superficial feeling of security is the cause of fear and worry. In the highest form of courage, fear still persists as an element; there is at least the consciousness of the transitoriness of everything that is worldly and therefore the anticipation of danger.

Fear is one of the many emotions arising in the minds of any living being, both in the human and the animal worlds. An emotion occurs generally, when an object is considered as something attractive or repulsive. The general tendency is that people while impelling themselves towards the suitable objects, move away from the harmful objects through fear. This specific emotion of fear has been discussed by the Buddha on very many occassions.

There are various types of situations which cause fear. Fear is often caused by strong desires such as endearment *(piya)*, affection *(pema)* attachment *(rati)*, lust *(kāma)* and craving *(tanhā; Dhp. vv.* 212-216). To those people whose minds are devoid of such desires fear does not occur, strong desires and attachment to either persons or things cause fear. The desire for power, lust, jealousy and pride are intimately related to the emergence of fear. In the *Bhayabherava Sutta* (discourse of fear and dread; *M.* I, p. 16 ff.) the Buddha says that purely objective conditions can cause fear in a recluse who has gone to the forest. Such a recluse whose heart is filled with desire and longing, who is restless, witless and drivelling becomes frightened at the rustling of fallen leaves, by wind or a breaking of a twig by an animal. According to the Buddha, fear arises in those people whose minds are full of lust *(chanda)*, ill-will *(dosa)* and foolishness *(moha)*. In the *Dussīla Sutta* of the *Sotāpatti Samyutta (S.* V, p. 386) venerable Ānanda declares to Anāthapindika that terror, trembleing and fear of death, as to what may be bereafter, come upon the uneducated when they think of their disloyalty to the Buddha, Dhamma and Sangha.

The emotion of fear appears to be utilized in Buddhism both as a deterrent force as well as a stimulating one. In the psycho-ethical spheres, taking up fear as - deterrant... the *Anguttara Nikaya*, (II, p.121) refers to four kinds of fears: fear of self-reproach *(attānuvādabhaya)* where one blames oneself for committing an evil; fear of others reproach *(parānuvādabhaya)*, where one having committed an evil would fear that others would speak about it and he would feel uncomfortable in the company of others, fear of the stick *(dandabhaya)* where he sees the punishments given to the others by the king and he would dread the idea of himself being punished in the same manner. The fourth kind of fear is the fear of degradation in the life after, of being born in the misrable existences after death. In this context these fears lead a person to abandon the practice of evil conduct in body, speech and thought and to develop the practice of good conduct. These different types of fear create in a man a lively sense of moral dread and shame *(hiri-ottappa)* which prevents a person from taking to an evil life and creates a basis of personal and social responsibility and a civic sense, for this sense shame *(hiri)* and fear *(ottappa)* could be referred to as virtues which regulate the moral order in the world. Dread and shame is a positive and a healthy sense which must be cultivated and developed by everyone, because one who lacks in these positive emotions lacks conscience. When a person's conscientiousness and fear of blame are lacking, the control of senses, moral practice *(sila)*, right concentration *(sammā-samādhi)*, knowledge and vision *(ñanadassana)*, aversion, dispassion and detachment *(nibbidāvirāga)* have no basis of growth and development. The stimulant aspect of fear is well explained by the Buddha in the following manner. The bhikkhu who delights in heedfulness and is fully aware of the dangers of heedlessness, advances like fire burning all fetters great and small, *Appamādarato bhikkhu pamāda bhayadassivā, saññojanam anum thūlam daham aggiva gacchati (Dhp. v.* 31).

According to the Buddhist commentarial literature the term '*bhikkhu*' has been defined as one who sees fear in the chain of births and deaths *(samsāre bhayam ikkhatī'ti bhikkhu)*. Cultivating faith in the Triad and having gained right concentration by following the noble-eightfold-path *(ariyatthangikamagga)* these bhikkhus attain arahantship at which stage they shun all fear and hence they are called *'akutobhaya'* (with no fear from anywhere; *S.* I, p.192; *Thg.* I, *v.* 510). The Buddhas and the Pacceka Buddhas also belong to the same category. They have gained full confidence in themselves and thereby have shunned all the fears in the cycle of birth and death. In the Buddhist Nikāyas Buddha is referred to as the dispeller *(apanuditā)* of the dread *(ubbega)*, panic *(uttāsa)* and fear *(bhaya; D.* III, p.148). Absence of fear is the hall-mark of a fully developed character. The Buddhas

and the arahants are described as being *abhayappatta, khemappatta* and *vesārajjappatta.*

Fear has the nature of creating diverse psychological problems in an individual. This could sometimes drive a person mad. An overdose of fear, if instilled into a person, could be disastrous and would change his entire character. An apt example could be brought out from Buddhist literature where let alone the laymen even bhikkhus have given up their entire career, because of too much fear. While preaching the *Aggikkhandhopama Sutta* to the bhikkhus, at the sight of a blazing fire the Buddha declared to them, that it were better for a man to take shelter in, embrace and lie down upon the raging flames than to live in the guise of a bhikkhu enjoying the alms of the faithful while being guilty of evil-conduct (*A.* IV, p. 128 f). It is said that while this sutta was being preached sixty monks vomitted hot blood, sixty left the Order in diffidence and sixty others became arahants (*ibid.* p.135). This is a clear instance where enlarged vision of fear, while acting as a stimulant on one group of persons had a crippling and deadening effect on another.

Fear of birth *(jāti)* and death *(maraṇa)* are two other forms of fear which are being often discussed in the Buddhist books. The fear of death is in the nature of psychological pain and this has been discussed even by the western scholars who are mere moral philosophers. According to Olson 'Although death may be precipitated by painful disease, death itself is perfectly painless loss of consciousness, no more to be feared than falling asleep. Death terrorizes us not because we fear it as painful, but we are unwilling to lose consciousness permanently." *(Encyclopaedia of Phyilosophy:* Vol. 2, p.308). The idea of concentration on death *(maraṇānussati)* which is a favourite topic of meditation in Buddhism, is quite akin to the idea expressed by Senaca of the Stoics who says "to overcome the fear of death, we must think of it constanly. The important thing is to think of it in the proper manner, reminding ourselves that we are but parts of nature" (ibid. p.308). Heidegger and Sartre like most existentialists urge us to cultivate the awareness of death as a means of heightening our sense of life. According to the former the awareness of death confers upon a man, a sense of his own individuality (*ibid.* p.309). In Buddhism, the conscious and wilful awareness of death serves as a stimulant and promoter of the ethical life. In the awareness of death, get through your activities in life as though your head were ablaze', says the *Saṃyutta nikāya* (I, p. 108).

Fear could be both advantageous and disadvantageous in one's life. It has been proclaimed by the Buddha, that whosoever does not transgress the Dhamma overcoming lust, ill-will, fear and foolishness, his fame would become perfect and full. If on the other hand, he were to transgress the Dhamma his fame would be destroyed (*D.* III, p. 182). It is mentioned in the *Dhammapada* (*v.* 258), that a person does not become learned merely because he talks too much. But he who is secure, without hate and fear is called learned. Buddha has declared that whosoever follows the Dhamma, does no evil; who has no desire, ill-will and fear is reborn in heaven while the one who is the opposite is born in hell (*A.* II, p.15). Those who see fear in what is not to be feared and see no fear in the fearsome embrace flase views and go to miserable existences (*Dhp. v.* 317).

The Buddha is said to have admonished his followers as to the ways and means of getting rid of fear. He says in the *Dhajagga Sutta*: should any fear arises in the mind of a monk he should recall to mind the excellences of the Buddha, of the Dhamma or the Saṅgha and peace would come to him. (*S.* I, p. 218ff.). Further he says he whose mind is not soaked (by lust), he who is not afflicted (by hatred), he who has transcended both good and evil, for such a vigilant one there is no fear (*Dhp. v.* 39). The Buddha's advice to his followers was that, if we are keen to get rid of fear we must cut down the forest (of the passions) from which arises fear.

Vanaṃ chindatha mā rakkhaṃ vanato jāyati bhayaṃ
chetvā vanañ ca vanathañ ca nibbanā hotha bhikkhave.
(*Dhp. v.* 283)

Although the utterences of the Buddha were 'be ye an island of refuge unto yourselves O bhikkhus and do not take refuge in others" *(attadīpā viharatha bhikkhave attasaraṇā anaññasaraṇā)*, the average Buddhist immersed in worldly life, sought refuge in outside agencies, sometimes to overcome various fears which constantly assailed him. It is mentioned in the *Dhammapada* "men driven by fear go to many a refuge, to mountains and to forests, to sacred trees and shrines."

The Buddhist monks who were eager to cater to their needs started chanting the benedictory verses *(paritta).* The very meaning of this term, protection or ward-rune make it obvious that people always live in fear. A layman invites the bhikkhus by saying "May you chant the benedictory verses, so that it would bring us fortune and dispel all our fears."

In the course of chanting these verses the bhikkhus say "May all fears be overcome and may there be no danger, but long life". One of these verses reveals that people were even afraid of evil and inauspicious things such as unpleasant cries of birds, bad planetary combinations bad dreams etc. and these fears they believed could be destroyed by the power of the Buddha, Dhamma and Saṅgha.

Fear on the whole is destructive to the individual and it paralyzes activity and debases the quality of thought. All

strain, doubt, hesitation, worry mental and to some extent physical fatigue, fall away when the thought of 'self' has been banished. The result would be, that it would increase not only the happiness, but also the efficiency, courage and confidence of the individual.

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Indumathie Karunaratne

FEELING. See VEDANĀ.

FEMALE PRINCIPLE (in Buddhist thought). The dual nature of the human being as the male and the female with their physical as well as intellectual and emotional differences is a fact that has to be admitted in any system of human thought. The problem of life is more or less the problem of the relationship between the two aspects of life, the male and the female, as symbolised by man and woman respectively in the phenomenal world. The teaching of Gotama being a practical solution to the problem of life's conflicts, the question as regards the place he has accorded to the sexual polarity of man in his teaching is an important one.

In early Buddhism as handed down in the Pali literature of the Theravādins the comprehensive term *brahmacariya* (pure life) covers the entire content of the noble life as understood by Gotama. The most important feature of this higher life was the sexual purity of the practiser. It meant chaste living. See BRAHMACARIYA.

From one point of view it can be said that man, symbolising the male principle of the universe, represents the active side of life while the woman, symbolising the female principle of the universe, represents the passive side of life. In other words they symbolise the positive and the negative aspects respectively of one life-principle. But the two symbols cannot be torn asunder from each other. Their apparent separation in the empirical world is only a relative truth *(sammuti sacca)* or an illusion *(māyā)* or a mere actuality. In an absolute sense there is no duality and the realisation of this non-duality is the purpose of the religious life. In the world of actuality it is the combination of these two representatives of life-force that produces the individual and in the absolute sense it is the separation of the one from the other that creates the sexual duality in the world of actuality. Whether we view it from the absolute or from the relative point of view, it becomes clear that the male has his female nature and the female has her male nature within their own psycho-physical organisations. The fundamental difference is that in the male the active qualities predominate while in the female passive qualities are preponderant. In other words in every man his femininity is present within him, while in every woman her masculinity is present within her. The purpose of the religious life is the realisation of this unity in the apparent duality. If any man were able to bring about a perfect balance between the male and the female natures within him, he would become a complete man who has transcended sexual duality. This applies to the woman as well. This, in short, is the meaning of the observances of chastity as a road to perfection as taught by Gotama Buddha under the term *brahmacariya.* This is the reason why sexual offences (i.e., like the first *pārājika* offence involving expulsion) are said to make a bhikkhu fall away from the pure life he is expected to follow. A bhikkhu who has had sexual intercourse with a woman ceases to be noble *(ariya).* A man who undertakes to lead the pure life honestly must try to realise the unity of the male and the female qualities that are within him. For him there is no man or woman other than himself. This holds true for the woman as well. In a way the realisation of the perfect union of man and woman within oneself is the true "sexual union" for him or her. This kind of union, appropriately designated as *yoga* in Indian philosophy, instead of tying one down to *samsāra* releases one from it. It is a psycho-physical meditational process aimed at realising the non-dual state of the individual. It is the complete sublimation, but in no way the suppression of carnal desires. This is the philosophical truth based on which Buddhism upholds monogamous sexual relations between man and woman. A person who can sublimate his sexual desires this way by seeking union with the male and female qualities within onelself would be extremely rare. One way of attaining arahanship would be the perfection of personality this way. The sexual attraction between the two sexes is something that is extremely difficult to regulate. let alone transcend it. This mutual attraction itself is the result of the necessity and the deisre on the part of man and woman for union. But mere seuxal union never offers a solution to the problem. Instead it increases problems in many ways. The truth is that so long as a man or woman has not completed his or her own self by realising the unity of the two sexes within oneself one has either to give in to the desires or suppress them. The true union between man and woman is something that transcends carnal appetite *(rāga)* and the realisation of this kind of transcendent love is the purpose of true love between the male and the female. The Greek conception of Platonic love is some-

thing analogous to this.[1] It is the union with the Eternal Female, the *mahāmudrā*.

It is possible either to suppress sexual desire or to put an end to such desires by pandering to them. From the Buddhist point of view both these methods will increase one's *dukkha* and in psychological language the victims of both these tendencies are split-personalities. He who suppresses his desire is bound to become a mental patient or a pervert and the one who panders to every desire would end up as a physical and mental wreck. Satisfying the flesh in the latter way comes within the extreme of self-indulgence *(kāmasukhallikānuyoga)*, while the killing of all desires by suppression is the other extreme, designated as self-mortification *(attakilamathānuyoga)*. For the achievement of true *yoga* both these extremes have to be avoided and that is the purpose of the Buddhist way of life.

While the term *brahmacariya* in early Buddhism taught this path to perfection by sublimating the sexual desires, in the later phase of Buddhism generally designated as Tantrism the question is looked from a different angle. In early Buddhism, as could be gathered from the *pitakas*, the concept of the female principle is not treated as a separate topic. Not even the male principle has been a serious topic of study for those thinkers of Gotama's calibre. This might have been due to the fact that the intellectual environment of the Buddha's time was one in which the problems or life were viewed from other angles, at least in Buddhist circles. In general, certain sections of society seem to have believed in the sublimation of sex and the achievement of *yoga* through a life of chastity and this is the main theme of the piṭakas, too.

When one considers the relative aspects of early and later Buddhism, as designated by the terms Hinayāna and Mahāyāna, one can see that the idea of the female principle has been given more significance in later Buddhism in contrast to the place given to it in the early teaching. In early Buddhism, with the Buddha as the central figure, the male principle is more emphasised than its counterpart. The Buddha's personality predominates in the entire teaching and he being a male, those who preserved the Theravāda tradition seem to have overlooked the significance of the female aspect of existence. In the Theravāda tradition the Buddha himself came to be treated as an ascetic who transcended the world, to be worshipped and revered, rather than as a practical man who had perfected his character both in theory and in practice. There was more theory than practice and the Theravāda monks more or less became intellectual recluses divorced from the practicalities of life. But to counterbalance this there developed what is commonly called the Bodhisattva-ideal which attached equal importance to both theory and practice. Those who advocated this ideal treated the Buddha not as an escapist ascetic but as a practical and a perfect man. If Buddha is the symbol of such perfection of the male principle, why cannot there be a similar symbol of perfection of the female principle, these later Buddhists seem to have argued. It is true that there was no historical female Buddha on record. But the female side of life also could achieve perfection and enlightenment. The Buddha, as a male, has achieved perfect equilibrium between the male and female aspects of life by transcending sexual duality. And if the Buddha symbolises this rare phenomenon as a man there can easily be a symbol representing the female achieveing the same perfection. This resulted in the concept of the personalised *Prajñāpāramitā*, depicted as a female symbolising the perfection of wisdom, and which is one of the most important concepts of the Mahāyāna. Just as the Buddha, as a metaphysical concept, symbolises the possibility of man's achievement of perfection in the male form, it symbolises the same possibility in the female form. Both are above the mundane differences of sex. Sophia of the Christian Gnostics and Sarasvati of the Hindus are two other well-known concepts analogous to this Buddhist ideas of *Prajñāpāramitā*.

As it was pointed out earlier, original Buddhism pays little attention to female deities, although the gods referred to are numerous. Whatever might have been the reasons for this, Buddhist India seems to have paid less attention to female deities than to the male ones. This same trend of thought is reflected in the early Buddhist literature of the Pali Canon, too. Hardly any place is given to female deities and as such it is natural that there was no possibility for a concept like that of *Prajñāpāramitā* to develop in it. The practice of worshipping a goddess, which might have been a salient feature among the pre-Aryan Indians of the Indus Valley, seems to have greatly diminished in Vedic times and lost its significance in Buddhist India. But, with the development of the Mahāyāna, the worship of goddesses, influenced also by the Sakti cult of the Hindus, gradually assumed significance in Buddhism. There were two sides to this development which can roughly be assigned to the 7th century A.C. Both aspects are to be seen in what is popularly known as Tantric Buddhism. One line of

1 For discussion of some of the Eastern and Western themes dealing with the male and the female principles see the article "*The Mysteries of Woman in East and West*," by Julius Evola, in *EAST and WEST*, new series, Vol. 9, No. 4, December 1958, pp. 349 ff.

development was in the direction of popular religion, wherein magical practices such as *mantras mandalas, mudrās* were given a place. It was in this same form of religion that at times erotic excesses were also resorted to. As can be judged from certain statements in texts like the *Guhyasamāja-tantra,* the symbolic meaning of the realisation of perfect wisdom seems to have been forgotten and a kind of magical Buddhism invented.[2] The idea of *Prajñāpāramitā* was the other line of development, where pure wisdom was regarded as a chaste and unapproachable goddess, transcending all sexual differences and as such regarded as the female counterpart of the Buddha. In this concept wherein the Buddha and Prajñāpāramitā are regarded as symbols of perfection of the male and of the female principles of life, respectively, the two terms perfection and enlightenment have become synonymous. Unlike ordinary gods and goddesses who emphasise, by their bi-sexuality the polarity of the male and the female principles, the two concepts of Buddha and of the Prajñāpāramitā both reveal the ecstatic state of undifferentiated sex, the "original man and woman" as it were, in their undivided (Pali: *asaṅkhata* Sk. *asṃskṛta)* state of non-duality.

In Buddhism this concept has nothing to do with the practice of worshipping a goddess as a symbol of the creative energy of the universe in a divine form as in Śaktism. The Hindu concept of Śakti symbolises the creative power of the universe in female form whereas in Buddhism Prajñāpāramitā symbolises perfect wisdom, which by implication is tantamount to release, too, because she represents the female aspect of the Buddha. Hindu Śakti corresponds to the female aspect not of the Buddha, but of Śiva as a personal god. The following words of Lama Anagarika Govinda[3] may be quoted in this respect: "....Buddhist Tantrism is not Śaktism. The concept of Śakti, of divine power, of the creative female aspect of the highest god (Śiva) or his emanations does not play any role in Buddhism. While in the Hindu Tantras the concept of power *(śakti)* forms the focus of interest, the central idea of Tantric Buddhism is prajñā: knowledge, wisdom."

"To the Buddhist *Śakti* is *māyā*, the very power that creates illusion, from which only *prajñā* can liberate us...." Elsewhere (p. 100) he further says "...even those Buddhist Tantras which build their symbolism upon the polarity of the male and the female, *never* represent the female principle as *śakti,* but always as its contrary, namely *prajñā* (wisdom), *vidyā* (knowledge) or *mudrā* (the spiritual attitude of unification, the realisation of *Śūnyatā).* Herewith they reject the basic idea of Śaktism and its world-creating eroticism."

It is this kind of perfect and undifferentiated union of the male and the female principles that is portrayed in Tibetan art as *yab-yum* or *yuganaddha.* The visual artist could not portray this all-important idea of *yoga* without showing man and woman in an embrace of eternal union. In such portrayals the figures are not sexual beings and "even their aspect of union is undoubtedly associated with the highest spiritual reality in the process of enlightenment so that associations with the realm of physical sexuality are completely ignored" (ibid. p.101). It is by taking these figures on their face-value as sexual beings that they are very often interpreted as crude eroticism or religious blasphemy. Sexual attraction between the male and the female merely for the flesh is due to the absence of *samādhi* within the individuals concerned. The union of the two in a transcendental sense means the sublimation of all base emotions and the Buddha and *Prajñāpāramitā* symbolise the acme of this sublimation in the male and the female, respectively. In that state there is no *rāga, dveṣa* or *moha* no *avidyā* and no *tṛṣṇā.*[4] It is the state of becoming one with the highest *(brahmabhūta).*

Philosophically it would be quite correct to say that the struggle of man centres round his perennial attempt at achieving perfect union with the second part of his split personality, the female. It is the same from the point of view of the female too. If this union is achieved perfectly in a transcendental sense as so far discussed the struggle ceases with the cessation of the conflict between the two principles. Sexual differences between the male and the female are obtained only in the world of relativity *(saṃsāra)* and the existence of such differences is only a relative truth *(saṃvṛti-satya).* One who transcends this state of duality realises the absolute *(paramārtha),* the ultimate state of integration, where no duality whatsoever exists. It is the uncreated state *(asaṃskṛta-dhātu)* of the void *(śūnyatā)* which is aptly described by Govinda (ibid. pp. 97-8) in the following words: "The becoming conscious of this *śūnyatā* (Tib. *Stoṅ-pa-ñid)* is *prajñā* (Tib. *ses-rab):* highest knowledge. The realisation of this highest knowledge is enlightenment *(bodhi;* Tib: *byang-chub), i.e., if prajñā* (or *śūnyatā),* the passive, all-embracing female principle, from which everything recedes, is united with the dynamic male principle of active universal love and compassion, which represents

2. See Lama Anagarika Govinda's remarks on this in his *Foundations of Tibetan Mysticism,* pp. 101-2.
3. Ibid. p.96
4. According to the *Aggañña Suttanta (D.* III. 80 ff.), which offers a Buddhist theory of evolution, it is with the gradual increase of *tanhā* that bixesuality appears in beings until which time they were self-born.

the means *(upāya;* Tib. *Thabs)* for the realization of *prajñā* and *śūnyatā*, then perfect Buddhahood is attained. Because intellect without feeling, knowledge without love, reason without compassion, leads to pure negation, to rigidity, to spiritual death, to mere vacuity, while feeling without reason, love without knowledge (blind love), compassion without understanding, leads to confusion and dissolution. But where both sides are united, where the great synthesis of heart and head, feeling and intellect, highest love and deepest knowledge have taken place, there completeness is re-established, perfect Enlightenment is attained.

"The process of Enlightenment is therefore represented by the most obvious, the most human and at the same time the most universal symbol imaginable: the union of male and female in the ecstasy of love-in which the active element *(upāya)* is representd as a male, the passive *(prajñā)* by a female figure-in contrast to the Hindu Tantras, in which the female aspect is represented as *śakti,* i.e., as the active principle, and the male aspect as Śiva, as the pure state of divine consciousness, of 'being', i.e., as the passive principle, the 'resting in its own nature.'.

"In Buddhist symbolism the knower (Buddha) becomes one with his knowledge *(prajñā)*, just as man and wife become one in the embrace of love, and this becoming one is highest, indescribable happiness *(mahāsukha:* Tib: *bde-mchog).* The *Dhyāni-Buddhas* (i.e., the ideal Buddhas visualized in meditaion) and *Dhyāni-Bodhisattvas* as embodiments of the active urge of enlightenment, which finds its expression in *upāya,* the all-embracing love and compassion, are therefore represented in the embrace of their *prajñā*, symbolized by a female deity, the embodiment of highest knowledge".

It is in this way that the attinment of Nirvāṇa, the unconditioned state, as the state of absolute beauty, has to be explained from the standpoint of the sexual polarity of the male and the female principles, which, of course, is a mere incident of universal polarity.

A. G. S. Kariyawasam

FESTIVALS, by definition are feast days (< Latin *festivalis;* cf. also Tibetan *dus-ston,* 'feast time') traceable to the primitive communal repast, at times orgiastic (cf. Teutnic *öl,* 'ale'), held specially after a successful hunt. Sumptuous feasting was, during later times, supplemented with music, dancing and other forms of merry-making (with 'merry' Christmas being an yet current conception) and even of offering and sacrifice, necessitating the particular day or days being accepted as holidays with the advancement of civilization.

Festivals, initially were consciously aimed at fertility (hence the offerings and life-sacrifices) which were specially meant to appease a super-human or extra-human power (gods and demons) and the acceptance of physical attributes (such as fire, water, shells, fruits, leaves, animals, colours, gestures etc.) to represent associated concepts and forces. Further, the apparent migration of the sun and the phases of the moon that were found to have a significant bearing on human activities (and even the movement of other stars and planets, during later stages of civilization) began to guide the periodicity of festive events. During this long process diverse rituals came to be formalized.

A moral philosophy such as Buddhism, rational and objective, with an emphasis on self-reliance for spiritual release and with the exposition of the Doctrine and meditations as the only two forms of religious exercise, does not hold activities of this description (of which sensual gratification and forms of worship appear to be the key note) with any degree of importance in its essential teachings. Nevertheless, in the course of the transformation of this philosophy into a popular religion, roots of which process are traceable to the life-time of the Buddha himself, such accretions were natural and inevitable.

The earliest such rite was the *uposatha* held on important days of the lunar calendar, the new-moon and the full-moon days, corresponding to the *pūrṇa māsa* and the *darśa* of the Vedic Aryans who held the *soma* festival of *upavasatha* in honour of the moon. The *bhikkhus* gathered to proclaim and learn the new doctrine leading to the increase of their own numbers, and to recite the *pātimokkha* from which function the sick only could keep away. With the elapse of a short period of time the two intermediate quarter-moon days were added to make the number of *uposatha* days four per month.

The lay devotees too participated by closing their places of work and stopping normal day-to-day activities, wearing clean clothes, and by observing the moral precepts.

The *vassa* or the rains retreat came to be observed by the monks as a three-month stay-in period during the rainy season, starting on the full-moon day of *Asaḷha* (June-July) on the recommendation of the Buddha himself. This retreat was made use of by the monks, particularly to instruct in the *dhamma* the lay followers who made more frequent visits to the *vihāras.* On the termination of the *vassa (pavāraṇa)*, was held the *kathina* ceremony at which a ceremonial *kaṭhina* robe was presented to the Sangha

Of greater significance as a festivity and as one that positively marks the growth of Buddhist ritual is the recitation of the *Ratana Sutta* and the sprinkling of water

sanctified thereby carried in the Buddha's alms bowl along the streets of Vesāli when this city was stricken by the three-fold calamities of famine, pestilence and demoniac influence. The Buddha entrusted this magical task to his disciple Ānanda, and with the speedy appearance of the anticipated results the citizens constructed a beautifully decorated, perfumed and canopied assembly-hall in which the Buddha, the monks, royalty and the people took appropriate seats. The Buddha himself preached the *Ratana Sutta* for seven consecutive days, and recommended the performance of this ritual in the event of a future occurrence of such calamities, making use of the customary folk-ritualistic paraphernalia (*KhpA*. p. 164).

The desire on the part of the adherents to honour and worship worthy personages and sacred sites (which naturally lends to rituals and festivals) is manifest in the founding of *cetiyas*. In these monuments were enshrined the ashes of eminent persons such as the Buddha, Paccekabuddhas, Arahants and Cakravarti (universal) rulers. This was sanctioned by the Buddha Himself (*D.* I, p. 142; *S.* II, pp. 583-4) when he approved the construction of *cetiyas* containing the relics of a few of his leading disciples (*DhpA.* III, p. 83; V. II, p. 554). After the Buddha's *parinibbāna* the three-fold *cetiyas-sārīrika, pāribhogika* and *uddesika* (enshrining bodily relics articles used by Him and objects signifying Him, respectively) were constructed. Homage to them through simple ritualistic activities such as salutation, circum-ambulation, strewing sand, offering of flowers naturally followed, and they were regarded as meritorious acts (DhpA. III, p. 83, 251, 448). There is no doubt that early Buddhists visited these monuments especially on *uposatha* days, as referred to earlier, and held small and large scale religious festivals during the three centuries that preceded Aśoka (3rd century B.C.). In the course of his revivalistic activities, Aśoka himself recommended through the Girnar Edicts the performance of *divyānirupāni* 'heavenly shows', consisting of the display of chariots of gods etc. in place of the usual items (some even bacchanalian and erotic) of the customary *samaja* (i.e. *samajja*) festival (Hultzsch. 1925. 1 & 6). There is also no doubt that he held appropriate festivals of offering and devotion at the numerous religious institutions that he founded.

These practices took firm root in Sri Lanka consequent to the introduction of Buddhism to the island (in the 3rd century B.C.) by the Arahant Mahinda, son of Aśoka. With this mission came not only the Doctrine but also the forms of outward observance; and those of the latter pertaining to the early phase of Sri Lankan Buddhism, no doubt, conformed to the Indian pattern itself.

The process of the growth of ritual and ceremony in Sri Lankan Buddhism and their formalization as festivals is well reflected in the Pali commentaries, the chronicles such as the *Dīpavaṃsa* and *Mahāvaṃsa*, contemporary Sinhala epigraphic records and Pali and Sinhala literary works of later times. Evidently the requirement on the part of the devotees for something tangible to worship (as referred to above) led to the acceptance of the three forms of *cetiyas* as appropriate for the purpose.

Dome-shaped and pinnacled constructions called *stūpa* (Skt.) *thūpa* (Pl) and *dāgäb* (Sin.), and even *cetiya* itself (Skt. *caitya*, Sin. *säya*) were founded to enshrine *sārīrika* relics (such as bits of bone) and *pāribhogika* relics (such as robes) whilst the *bodhi* trees (ficus religiosa) and images of the Buddha were considered as being of the *uddesika* category. In addition to the *tisaraṇa*-the formula for seeking refuge in the Buddha, the *Dhamma* and the *Saṅgha*, and the precepts *(sikkhāpada)*, stanzas *(gāthā)* to be recited at the rituals of worship were also composed. All these requisites of worship, at least in their early forms, together with the *parittas (sutta* discourses such as the *Ratana Sutta* already referred to used as ward-runes) were known in Sri Lanka during the life time of the Arahant Mahinda himself.

The events connected with the introduction of Buddhism to Sri Lanka themselves appear to have constituted a festival-and that under royal patronage. The entry of the mission headed by the Arahant Mahinda to the capital at Anurādhapura to be welcomed reverently by the king, the gift of alms to them, the gathering of a vast concourse of the city people to see the *theras*, the decorated halls, the preaching of the discourses *(suttas)* at gathering of noble women in the Nandana Garden, the gifting of the Mahāmegha Park to the brotherhood of monks, the admission of a host of lay people to the Order, the pin-pointing of locations for edifices for the sacred *bodhi* tree, alms-hall, refectory, tanks etc., the conversion of hosts of people inclusive of members of the royalty to the new faith, the adornment of the city etc. for a period of seven days (*Mhv.* Ch. XIV - XV) would certainly have been invested with an air of unprecedented festivity.

Such festivals of a non-periodic nature, but relevant to a given occasion certainly took place during the recorded period of well over two millenia of Sri Lankan history, and are, as may be expected, too numerous to mention. They were mostly religious, such as those held to consecrate a *cetiya* or *stūpa* *(Maricavatti: Mhv.* Ch. XXVI, *Mahāthūpa: ibid.* XXIX - XXXI) or a *vihāra* (Lohapāsāda: *ibid.* Ch. XXVII), or held in honour of the *bodhi* tree during the 12the year of a king's reign (*ibid.* Ch. XIX, XXXIV, *v.* 59 and XXXVIII. *v.* 57), an image of the Buddha (*ibid.* Ch. 100 *vv. 185)*, the alms-bowl relic *(ibid.* Ch. 74, *vv.* 147, 167, Ch. 89, *vv.* 17, Ch. 90, *v.* 75), the hair relic (*ibid.* Ch. 39, *v.* 51, Ch. 50, *v.* 71), or the commemoration of a venerable arahant. The Mahinda

festival held by king Dhātusena (5th century A.C.) for instance, was marked by the setting up of an effigy of the sage at the place where his body was cremated, and making costly offerings (*ibid.* Ch. XXXVIII, *v.* 58).

The annual Buddhist festival with the longest history appears to be *Vesak (Vaiśākha* or *Vesākha)* falling on the full-moon day of May, celebrated to mark the triple events of the birth, the attainment to Enlightenment (Buddhahood) and the demise *(parinibbāna)* of the Buddha. It is possible that this festival was held in Sri Lanka from the earliest years of Buddhism in the island though the earliest reference to it in the *Mahāvamsa* (Ch. XXXII, *v.* 35) pertains to the reign of king Dutthagāmani (101-77 B.C.) who is reported to have celebrated it 24 times. King Bhātiya (38-67 A.C.) and King Vasabha (127-171 A.C.) celebrated it 28 and 44 times respectively and five more kings - Vohāraka Tissa (3rd century A.C.) Gothābhaya (4th century A.C.) Jettha Tissa (4th century A.C.) Dalla Moggallāna (7th century A.C.) and Sena II (9th century A.C.) are reported to have organised *Vesak* festivals. By the 4th century A.C. the celebration of this festival had become an established tradition - *cārittānugatam (Mhv.* Cha. XXXVI, *vv.* 40, 109, 130; Ch. XLIV, *v.* 46, LI, *v.* 84), when kings made offerings of robes to monks and food and clothing to the poor.

The British rulers who occupied the island in 1815, in their pursuit of a policy aimed at the impoverishment of its indigenous culture withdrew the holiday facility which the Buddhists enjoyed on this sacred day, but during the Buddhist revivalist trend pioneered by Colonel H. S. Olcott, the American theosophist of the last quarter of the 19th century, the *Vesak* holiday was restored in 1885.

The festival as held at the present day displays several popular characteristics: ritual observances in temples with more devotees participating than on any other holy day with considerable members in pure white attire observing the eight precepts *(ata-sil)*, the offering of food and drink at temporary alms-halls *(dan-säl)* to devotees and sight-seers, the lighting at night of rows of coconut oil lamps and paper lanterns of various sizes and shapes, some fantastic (even in the shape of jet-planes and space rockets), some with delicate and intricate workmanship, the enactment of street corner dramas depicting the Jātaka stories and episodes from life of the Buddha and the history of Buddhism in Sri Lanka, the erection of elaborate archways (pandal or *torana*), some even over 50 feet in height with art panels depicting scenes from the Jātakas or the life of the Buddha, with the moving patterns of electric lights (producing at times a garish effect on the eye), the construction of tableaux depicting scenes as above and even of hells, the singing of devotional songs by troups of girls and boys, temple processions carrying flags, flowers images of the Buddha etc. The custom of sending beautifully printed *'Vesak* cards' each with a Sinhala verse conveying the 'sentiments of the season', to relations and friends, now well rooted, is of comparatively recent origin. Large happy crowds may be seen, specially in the bigger towns and cities, travelling in vehicles and on foot to see the "sights of *Vesak*". This visual aspect may prevail nightly for a few days after the full-moon, in the cities.

Vesak in Sri Lanka is primarily a season of piety, with quiet merriment in short attendance. This is a festival celebrated in all southern Buddhist countries in particular. In Thailand, the *Vaishāka Pūjā* is marked specially by the decoration of temples and homes, the offering of alms and the release of captive birds and fish *(ERE)*. Similar devotional activities are performed in Burma and other South East Asian lands. In Japan where several Buddhist sects flourish, the birth of the Buddha is celebrated on the 8th of April when a festival called *Hana matsuri* (q.v.), 'flower festival' at which, among other observances, children dance before images of the Buddha, is held. In Tibet, *Vaishāka* is celebrated specially to commemorate Padmasambhava - the eighth century founder of Lamaism and the reformer Tsongkhapa (14th - 15th century A.C.). Lamas refrain from food, and lead the laity in acts of piety *(ERE)*.

In Nepal where a strong Buddhist-Hindu syncretism is evident, the Bahiravajātrā festival is celebrated during the holy month of May *(Vesak)*. It is marked by dancing and the sacrifice of buffaloes *(ERE)*.

All Buddhist communities living in non-Buddhist lands of all the continents gather at their *vihāras* or Buddhist centres to perform acts of piety and devotion on this day. The offering of oil lamps, flowers and incense before an image of the Buddha, the deliverance of a religious discourse by a monk and the lighting of paper lanterns (as in Sri Lanka) are the items of this celebration.

A Sri Lankan relic-festival *(dhātu-utsava)* that has persisted for the last 15 centuries almost uninterrupted is that connected with the Tooth Relic of the Buddha. The relic was brought to Sri Lanka in the 9th year of the reign of King Kirti Śri Meghavarna from Kālinga in India and was deposited in a special building at Anurādhapura. The king spent 90,000 *kahapanas* for a great festival in honour of the relic and decreed, that it should be conveyed ceremonially to the Abhayagiri Vihāra anually for public exposition (*Mhv.* Ch. 37, *vv.* 92-97; *Dhātuvamsa* 406). The Chinese traveller Fa hsien (q.v.) who visited Anurādhapura at the beginning of the 5th century A.C. records that this festival was held during the third month, and that both the monks and the laity made ready the processional path, decorated the lanes and by ways and gathered flowers and incense. On either side of the road were 500 splendid tableaux depicting scenes

from the Jātakas. Offerings were made en route and at the exhibition hall ceaselessly for ninety days. Fa hsien's compatriot Hieun Tsiang refers to the splendid mansion at Anurādhapura where the relic was housed during the rest of the year.

The Tooth Relic is the most precious of the bodily relics of the Buddha found in Sri Lanka and became the palladium of the royalty and the Sinhala people. Whenever the capital of the kingdom changed a new mansion was constructed for it in the chosen city where the annual festivities were maintained. In the face of the persecution by the Portugese during the latter half of the 16th century A.C. it was secretly conveyed to the hill country where it was enshrined in various places of safety and finally in the Temple of the Tooth – the *Daḷadā Māligāva* – at Kandy, where it remains until this day. The festival connected with it appears to have been performed, if on a low key, during the troubled times that ensued, to be resuscitated during the middle of the 18th century A.C.

The British, consequent to their occupation of the Hill Country, though they pledged to safeguard the 'religion of the Boodhoo', prohibited the performance of this festival (1815) in pursuance of their policy of eradicating the indigenous 'heathen' practices. A continuous drought intensifying after 1821, it is reported, took hold of the Hill Country for several ensuing years. As a last resort, on the request of the chiefs, the festival was revived in 1828. At the termination of the procession which brought the 7 day rites to a close, a mighty down-pour spilled the lake and flooded the streets of Kandy. This deluge that came to be called the *daḷadā vatura,* lit. 'inundation of the Tooth Relic', also washed away the bridges over the Mahavāli river at Peradeniya and Katugastota. Sir Edward Barnes – the Governor, decreed that the festival henceforth should be held for 14 days.

An important cultural feature associated with the festival of the Tooth Relic is its importance as a rain rite. It is interesting to note here that the 13th century Pali poem, the *Dāṭhāvaṃsa,* notes how a torrential downpour occurred on the occasion of the ceremony held by the King Śrī Meghavarna to receive the relic at the Meghagiri at Anuradhapura (310 A.C.):

Samsibbitam rajatarajjusatānukāri
dhārāsatehi vasudhambaramambudena
Sabbā disā jaladakūṭṭamahagghiyesu
dittātirajjupatipadīpaghaṭāvabhāsā: v. 371

(It appeared as though both the sky and the earth were enveloped in a hundred-fold resembling hundreds of silver threads. All directions were lit by hundreds of lamps of lightening that shone brilliantly from the great eaves of rain-clouds')

Note also the name of the *vihāra* above: Meghagiri, 'Rain or Cloud Mountain'.

The *Sinhala Daḷadā Vaṃśaya (vv.* 4-7) composed during the reign of King Parākrama Bāhu IV (1302-26 A.C.) notes the manner in which this monarch performed the festival of the Tooth in his capital city Kuruṇāgala, and decreed that 'the *daḷadā* (Tooth Relic) should be propitiated during periods of drought in this very manner: *väsi no vasanā kala da mema lesin daḷadā pūjā karavanu isā.*

The likely explanation of the origin of the conception lies in the fact that the doctrine of the Buddha is at times referred to as *dharma varṣā, dharma vṛṣṭi* and *daham vässa,* 'the rain of the Doctrine', and that His teeth came in contact *(sparśa)* with the 84,000 sections of the *dhamma (asūhāradahas dharmaskandha).* It is likely that this direct association would have led to the acceptance of the Tooth Relic as being invested with the magical powers of producing rain.

The idea persists today as it did at least during the 13th, 14th and the 19th centuries.

Sri Lankan Buddhists also hold the full-moon day of *Poson (Jeṭṭha,* May-June) with a sanctity second only to the full moon day of Vesak. It was, indeed, the day on which the Arahant Mahinda visited Mihintalē bringing in the Word of the Buddha, which is sufficient reason for the venerable *arahant* himself, to be regarded as *anubudu* – 'the deputy Buddha'. Celebrations are centred in the sacred city of Anurādhapura and Mihintalē itself where about a million devotees gather during the week, a considerable number to observe the eight precepts *(aṭa sil)* mainly in the grove around the famous *samādhi buddha* image at Abhayagiri. For miles over all the routes (inclusive of the railway) leading to Anurādhapura and Mihintalē and at these two centres as well, alms halls *(dansäl)* supply food and drink to all those that seek them, specially on the two days that mark the full-moon. Most pilgrims rest on the vast open spaces where the many religious and historical sites are situated.

Another holy city where the *Poson* festival is held is Tissamahārāma in South-East Sri Lanka where, too, the religious institutions founded during the pre-Christian times were closely associated with the capital city of the ancient principality of Rohaṇa.

It is also interesting to note that King Duṭṭhagāmaṇī (161-37 B.C.) whose birthplace was this capital city, held water-festival in a village called Pajjota or Posona in the month of *Jeṭṭha (Mhv.* Ch. XXV, *v.* 51) and that his equally celebrated ancestor, the King Devānampiyatissa (250-10 B.C.) also held one – a *salila kīla* in the same month about a century earlier. *(Mhv T. p. 329). Jeṭṭhamūla*

nakkhatta, as it appears, was a festival held in the month of *jettha* in Sri Lanka dating from the pre-Christian times and which took a Buddhist complexion after the introduction of that religion to the island.

The following month - *Āsalha* or *Äsala* is a month of widespread festivity in Sri Lanka, for it is the month of celebrations held in honour of specially the various deities whose shrines are located in different parts of the island, some of them in close association with Buddhist temples.

At Kataragama on the South-East is located the main shrine of the syncretic deity (generally referred to as Kataragama Devi) - mahāsena (or Mahasen) of the Buddhist Sinhala people and Skanda or Subramaniar of the Hindus. It is situated within the precincts of the Buddhist Vihāra, with the Kiri Vehera, one of the largest and earliest *stūpas* of the island. The deity is conceived as possessing six faces and twelve hands, has a peacock as his chariot *(vāhana)*, and red is his symbolic colour. Both Buddhist and Hindu devotees participate actively in the festival. Bathing in the holy river - Mänik Ganga, offerings of victuals, red garlands, lamps, incense and even money and votive objects to the deity along with solicitations of worldly welfare, the cracking of coconuts, rhythmic dances with the *kāvādi* - shoulder arcs adorned with peacock feathers. A self-infliction of bodily tortures (mainly by the Hindus), the fulfilment of vows on the realization of a desired objective, prayers marked with shouts of *'harō harā'*, fire-walking and a series of processions the last of which ends with the 'water-cutting' *(diyakäpima)* in the Mänik Ganga constitute the festival proceedings along with the usual Buddhist rites (inclusive of the *atasil* performed at the *vihāra*, the shrines and the *kiri Vehera)*.

Devinuvara - the southern most tip of the island, is also known on account of its fame to another syncretic deity. Originally the divinity was Utpalavarna (-vanna) or Upulvan - 'he of the colour of the blue lotus', a local deity who consequent to the 15the century came to be identified with Visnu - the blue coloured god of the Vedic pantheon. The shrine *(devālaya)* is located alongside the Buddhist *Vihāra* as at Kataragama. Rites are limited to the usual offerings, prayers, vows and appeals for worldly welfare, offerings of flowers, incense and victuals, the cracking of coconuts and processions. On the final evening formalized traditional ritual dancing - the *devatotra*, *(<devastotra)* starts to terminate a few hours after sunrise the following day. There is also fire-walking. Even after the cessation of religious ceremonies a grand fair continues in the open space adjacent to the shrines. A deva dana - a feast of rice and peas cooked in jaggery and honey brings the festivities to a close.

It is customary for people for many miles around to light *pān päl* - traditional clay lamps set in cylindrical baskets woven of tender coconut leaf set facing the direction of Devinuvara, specially on the final day of the festival. The citizens have theirs turned towards the shrine and have them lit for more days.

A festival in honour of Saman - the Great Buddhist deity of the holy mountain, Samantakūta or Samanala (Adam's Peak) takes place in the Sabaragamuwa Maha Saman Devālaya at Ratnapura. Usual festival rites are performed with a grand procession *(perahära)* where traditional dancing peculiar to the area *(Sabaragamu nätum)*, and large effigies (of cane and cloth called *Maha ba(m)bā* with two faces turned to the front and rear) may be seen. The festival ends with the water-cutting in the Kalu Ganga.

A festival in honour of the same deity is held at the Alutnuvara Devālaya off Māvanälla on the road to Kandy. It is usually held immediately before the Kandy *perahära* is held.

The month of *Asalla* also sees the festivities performed in honour of the folk deity, Devol, all of whose shrines are located by the sea on the South West coast of the island (as at Unavatuna, Dodanduva and Ambalangoda), with the principal one at Sinigama - an islet off the coast near Hikkaduva. A procession, a ritual dance performance and a fire-walking bring the activities to a close.

Another Sri Lankan festival that finds literary mention is the Giribhandda Pūjā performed at Cetiyagiri (Mihintalē) by King Mahā Dāthika Mahānāga (7-19 A.C.). According to the *Mahāvamsa* (Ch. XXXIV, *vv.* 75-84) a road with four gate-ways was made ready around the mountain with shops *(āpana)*, on either side and decorated with flags, arches and triumphal gates *(dhajaggikatorana)*, lit with chains of lamps *(dīpamāla)*. Mimic dances, songs and music *(natanaccāni gitāni vāditāni)* were commanded. The approach road from the Kadamba river was laid with carpets *(attharana)*, and great largess *(mahādānam)* was distributed at the four gates, and gifts and alms at eight places to twenty four thousand *bhikkhus*. Eight golden drums were beaten and prison penalities were remitted. Chains of lamps were hoisted over the whole island, and over the waters of the ocean within a distance of *yojana* around.

The later work *Pūjāvaliya* (725) elaborating on the performance in the ocean, says that platforms were erected on the canoes staioned compactly and that 24,000 monks were assembled (on to them).

This *Pūjāsamāgama* ('assembly of offering') held to mark the consecration of a *stūpa*, though centred around

the Mihintalē Hill (located seven miles to the east of Anurādhapura), appears to have been held on a national scale.

There is no evidence of any sort to the repetition of this festival.

A great festival to celebrate the preaching of a *sutta* called *Ariyavamsa* has been noted in several literary sources. The *Mahāvamsa* (Ch. XXXVI, *v.* 38) records that the *Ariyavamsa* was preached at several places in the island during the reign of King Vohārika Tissa (209-31 A.C.) for which he established the supply of alms. Two centuries later, according to the Tōnigal Inscription (*EZ.* III, 177), a person named Dēva made a grant in paddy and seeds, the interest from which was to be utilized for this festival held in a *vihāra* nearby. Two inscriptions of the 5th centuries (*EZ.* III, 250-51) too refer to grants in money for the same ceremony which also finds mention in the *Anguttara Atthakathā* (385-86) and the *Rasavāhinī* (II, 4, 183, 190), the second of which refers to it as a periodical festival held half-yearly or annually at certain *vihāras*. According to the Tōnigala Inscription it was held in the month of *Nikini* (Aug. Sept.). The reciters of this sermon, the *Ariyavamsa - Bhānakas* appear to have been greatly honoured as authorities in the *dhamma*.

The *Ariyavamsa* was a sermon on the essence of the qualities of a *bhikkhu* on which depended the perpetuation of the *sāsana*.

The preaching of *Ariyavamsa* is not altogether unknown to Sri Lanka of the present day, though it is not accompanied with any festivity.

Another festival that is mentioned in the *Mahāvamsa* is the *Gangārohana* held by King Upatissa II (5th century A.C.) when the island was afflicted by famine and disease. The monks cited the example of the Buddha causing the recitation of the *Ratana Sutta* at Vesāli when this city was similarly afflicted, and the Venerable Ānanda sprinkling the charmed water on the city streets. Thereupon the king had an image of the Buddha wrought in gold, and placing His stone bowl filled with water in the hands placed it on a chariot. A large retinue of the *sangha* followed the chariot chanting the *Ratana Sutta* and sprinkling the charmed water on the streets of the city of Anurādhapura one whole night. The king too accompanied them. A great alms-giving was also organised. The rains came, and the king decreed that the ceremony should be performed if ever such distress re-visited the island (*Mhv.* Ch. XXXVII *vv.* 189-98).

It is likely that the ceremonies performed by Sena II (9th century) in the event of an epidemic (at which an image of the sage Ānanda took the place of that of the Buddha) when he even had the *Ratana Sutta* inscribed on gold plates (*Mhv.* 51, *vv.* 79-81), and by Kassapa V (10th century) in the event of a plague and bad harvest were in the tradition of this very festival.

An evolved custom (which may be now regarded as a magical rain-rite) has persisted in Sri Lanka up to the present times in the chanting of many *parittas* (i.e. inclusive of the *Ratana Sutta*) continuously for a w[illegible] or even a fortnight in the event of such distress at reg[illegible]nal level.

The construction of a large hall *(pirit maduva)* at an open spot, and of a beautifully ornamented enclosure *(pirit mandapa)*, generally eight-sided, in the center, the conferment of alms to monks, the partaking and the sprinkling of charmed water *(pirit pän)*, processions, decorations, the beat of drums, a vast concourse of participants, devotees etc. are the popular features of this *gam pirit* festival.

A significant character of all these festivals is that they are guided by the lunar calendar and that they culminate on the night of the full moon of a given month, and that even if one is held in honour of a deity, it tends to take a Buddhist complexion because a super-human being honoured by the Sinhala Buddhists is regarded as one who holds the Buddha in the highest honour.

Other full-moon days too are festival days in general when devotees gather in temples in unusual numbers for various religious activities: the observance of the five precepts *(pañca sīla or pansil)*, the offering of lamps, flowers, incense and food to the Buddha (the *buddha-pūjā)* in the morning, at pre-noon and in the evening, the general offering of such items at the *stūpas* and *bodhi* trees, the observance of the eight precepts *(sil* or *ata sil)*, the offering of the mid-day meal *(dāna)* and light refreshments *(gilāna paccaya* or *gilanpasa)* after the noon to monks and *sil* devotees and the listening to sermons, in the main. On the full-moon day of *Durutu* (January) the *vihāra* at Kälaniya (near Colombo) is the venue of the main festival, because the Buddha is said to have sanctified this place by His visit on this particular lunar day. The *vihāra* at Kōttē - the fifteenth century capital city (also near Colombo) holds its special festival almost con-currently. A modern *vihāra* in Colombo - the Gangārāma, has of late become the special devotional center on the full-moon day of *Navam* (Ferbruary). Mahiyangana on the interior lowlands on the East is another sacred site which also is said to have been visited by the Buddha, and holds its annual festival on the full-moon day of *Vap* (September). *Unduvap* - the full-moon day of December, is celebrated island-wide in honour of the *theri* Sanghamittā - the Ven. Mahinda's sister *arahant* who brought the sapling of the Sacred Bodhi Tree (at Gayā) to Anurādhapura 23 centuries ago.

The usual observances at these sacred places are enriched by one or more *perahäras* – religious processions, marked by the customary pageantry: the *Navam perahära* of the Gangārāma is a display of the traditional dances of all the Buddhist 'cultural regions' (the Kandyan Hills, the S. W. interior lowlands of Sabaragamuva and the Southern and S. Western coastal area) of the island; and that at Mahiyangana includes ritualistic items of the Väddās – the now disappearing tribesmen of Sri Lanka.

Vinie Vitharana

FETTERS. The search for Truth, for realisation, emancipation and enlightenment assumes in most people the form of a positive quest. They even personify the object of their search, which becomes a pursuit of God or the Absolute. Though great spiritual men have declared that "the kingdom of God is within thee", the search becomes a pursuit of an objectified imagination. But a "running after" is also a running-away, an escape. In this pursuit however, and not before, man feels that he is fettered, and his longing to be free, in order to become united with the object of his spiritual desire, becomes stronger. Feeling his impotency to break those chains with which he is fettered – whence he knows not – he tries to obtain help from outside. But in relying upon outside help he goes further and further away from the "kingdom" within, and he merely makes new bonds which tie him down even stronger than before.

It is only the man who searches within that feels the weight of his fetters. There are millions who percieve no bond whatever and feel themselves free in the gratification of their sense-desires. Still, their very search for ever greater satisfaction of the sense proves the emptiness of their lives, which are bound by the gross chains of the flesh.

True freedom, real emancipation, cannot be had by running away with the fetters, with which we are shackled nor by amusing ourselves within the prison walls, nor by clinging to them, but by breaking those fetters and prison walls, which have been forged by tradition, covention, society and religion. To break these fetters we must know them, realise that they are fetters and not supports. When this is understood, it produces pure action *(kriyā)*, i.e. not action *(kamma)* which produces reaction *(vipāka)*, as such action itself is a reaction to an environment which we have not understood. And this pure action without purposeful striving will break the spell of delusion, the fetters which keep us bound.

Delusion is intensified by the abuse of language. Sarcastically it has been said, that words are used to hide our thoughts. If we mean one thing, but we say something else, it can only lead to greater confusion. In the following pages words like "mind" and "cause" have not been used, except in connection with the views of others, because there is nothing corresponding to these sounds. "Mind" is the act of thinking, which may be more or less perfect in awareness, but remains action nevertheless. Mind in the sense of something which can think, is non-existent. Similarly "cause" in the ultimate sense does not exist outside the faith of the pious believer in God. Hence preference is given to expressions like "condition". It would have been good, if words like "I" and "Self" could have been omitted, for they too represent a non-existing entity; but their avoidance would cripple the language so much that speaking and writing would become impossible.

According to Buddhism there are ten fetters that bind beings to the saṃsāric existence. The texts enumerate them as follows: *sakkāya diṭṭhi, vicikicchā, silabbata parāmāsa, kāmarāga, vyāpāda, rūparāga, arūparāga, Māna, uddhacca, avijjā*. The first five of these are called the 'lower fetters' *(orambhāgiya-saṃyojana)* as they bind beings to the sensuous world. The latter five, 'higher fetters' *(uddhambhāgiya saṃyojana)* because they bind beings to fine material and immaterial worlds. These fetters are gradually got rid of with the attainment of four spiritual stages (see SAṂYOJANA).

1. Conception of an Ego-entity *(sakkāya-diṭṭhi)*. The most formidable fetter is not the "I" consciousness or the consciousness of self, but the delusion of self. The consciousness of self would be the awareness of the real nature of ourselves. This is extremely rare, as we are mostly aware only of certain reactions which the environment has caused. Frequently we are not even aware that we react at all, and our actions amount to little more than mechanical responses to certain stimuli. This, of course, can never lead to the understanding of reality for as long as the current thoughts cannot detach themselves and are merely products of the environment, one cannot have a detached view, one but form a part of the mechanistic process of the universe, which one sees from inside, moving with and moved by the current of events without individuality, without the consciousness of self. It is the absence of such consciousness which produces this fetter of misconception of individuality.

The mechanistic world-view does not consider the mind as something separate from matter, and in this the Materialists are quite right. But are they not going too far, when they try to reduce mental reaction to the simple level of chemical reactions? Certainly, matter and material objects form conditions on which depends the arising of thoughts. Again, the grey matter of the brain together with the nervous system form the necessary

instruments by which man thinks. And yet, all these materials brought together artificially, i.e. outside a living organism, do not produce thought.

It is with the recognition of these facts that the theory of annihilationism *(uccheda-vāda)* is rejected. But many, while freeing themselves from the rigid bonds which reduce man to a machine, have run away too far, have gone to the very opposite, which is the fetter of minconception of individuality as a separate I-entity. It is this glorified "self" which becomes a spiritual soul endowed with everlasting life *(sassata-vāda,* q.v.). It is the delusion of self.

And how does consciousness become "self" - delusion? Thoughts arise dependent on contact with sense objects. The impressions of the environment on the senses produce reactions in the individual. Repeated reactions are differentiated and classified in different groups according to some common characteristics, in which process many particulars are overlooked, so that finally a sensation is judged as acceptable or not, i.e. agreeable or disagreeable. Subsequent events are similarly judged, compared, registered, by which process the faculty of memory is born.

Memory is thus a retention of past experiences. But those past experiences have been retained only partly to make classification possible. In other words, what the memory has learned from experience is extremely imperfect and entirely based on reactions to a changing environment which was not understood, which was accepted because it was agreeable, or rejected because it was disagreeable. The registration of these reactions, based on half understood untruths, forms the standard by which new experiences are judged and classified. Thus it happens that no event is judged purely on its own merits, for it is always measured according to the old standard. Every new thought is thus guided by past thoughts, conveyed in a direction particular to that individual, shaped and moulded until finally, tendencies are fixed and one's character stereotyped.

In this process of fixation of character is born a sense of separateness which causes all inner limitations and isolations which form so many bonds and fetters, preventing growth and movement. Where consciousness of self would see a process of action, ever becoming and always new, there the delusion of self, sees a separation, permanent individualism, creating a "self" or a "soul" which is not only the recipient but also the custodian of all past experiences. The retention of past experiences prevents the full understanding of present and new experiences, while even the old ones have lost their value because they are dead and past and were never fully understood. And yet the understanding or rather the realisation of truth is only possible, if the individual process is understood. But as long as the reaction to the past prevents the full comprehension of the present, there cannot be true intelligence, though there may be knowledge.

Naturally, from this unnatural way of living in a dead past, from this lack of understanding the present environment, arises disharmony which is a conflict which only strengthens the opposition based on the delusion of self because this very conflict is classed as undersirable, i.e. not in harmony with the tendencies of "self". Thus the delusion of self as a separate, isolated, permanent entity, which looks at the environment with the hostile eyes wherewith a house-owner would view a nightly intruder, becomes stronger with each new experience, always withdrawing deeper and deeper into the self-protective shell of its dead past.

Where the delusion of self sees isolation and permanence in undividuality, there the consciousness of self sees an ever new becoming process of action. Where delusion of self lives on the past, consciousness of self lives on the present, - and is the present. True and full intelligence shows itself in the perfect action of the present moment, which solves the actual conflict - not by forcing it into the mould of past experiences, thereby killing the present, nor by projecting it through purposeful striving into a future not yet born - but by the understanding of "self" as a process of reaction to environment. It is the binding of one's individuality to the dictates of the environment, expressed as laws of society and convention, religious prohibitions and selfish fears, traditions, habits, and customs-it is the binding to the environment, which constitutes the fetter of the delusion of self, a fetter which can be broken only through the understanding of that environment of which the individual is a mere product. The understanding of "self" as a reaction makes it one with the ever changing environment, dissolves the delusion of its seperateness, dispels the misconception of opposites and thereby ends the conflict.

To seek a method of breaking this spell of self-delusion would amount to the forging of a new fetter. The only thing to do is to live completely in the present, to change over from reaction to action, so that every moment a new creation, not brought about by reactions like attraction or repulsion, but an independent action which alone is capable of giving true freedom and deliverence.

2. Perplexity *(vicikicchā).* The delusion of separateness, leads one naturally to perplexity, resulting from that dual world-view. Perplexity arises from not facing the problem wholly; it is a lack of reflection *(vicikicchita).* Most people either confront a problem with their intellect alone, without consulting their real feelings; or they are guided by their emotions, seperate

from their understanding. When one enters the conflict with the intellect alone, it becomes like a dissecting knife, analysing, criticising, dislocating, dismembering and even taking away the vital breath of life. Knowledge makes man cold and heartless. And a solution thus forced upon a problem can only have the effect of a psychological suppression which results in the bursting of the bund elsewhere.

None can afford to ignore his feelings and tendencies. But to be guided by emotions without understanding is even worse than calculated crime; it is raving madness; for emotions are blind and none can say where they may lead to.

Perplexity then is due to the fact that brain and heart are in conflict. Reason tries to find motives wherewith to describe itself, but the heart within feels the wrong and cries out in protest. If the heart predominates, evil inclinations might try to overcome the resistance of the knowledge of duty, and the conflict is felt as a violation of sacred rights. This takes place in the person who is intellectually convinced of the right course of action, who does not waver in agitation and worry *(uddhacca-kukkucca)*, but who feels the lack of strength to act accordingly. This lack of strength is only imaginative; it is due to the tendency to preserve energy, to a certain reluctance to let go completely. The approach is partial, either intellectual, or emotional, and in this vacilation perplexity increases, bewilderment which paralyses action, induces postponement and lets the golden opportunity pass by.

Undecisiveness is such a strong fetter because it is mental inertia, producing unwieldiness of thought, checking all initiative, blocking all progress. Though often cloaked as conservatism, it actually is fear for change, fear to break the routine established by religion and society, fear to differ from others, to appear eccentric. Thus people prefer to embrace a ready made religion which was probably good only for the original founder. People are rather carried away downstream, even if they suspect disaster in the end, than to work themselves across the flood. It is a lack of self- confidence, a secret desire for snug self-security and comfort, which makes man refuse to take risks, to be disturbed even.

All this is due to remembrance of past weaknesses, when trials were made, followed by failures. And thus, even if a new trial is made, it is with much hesitation and diffidence; a backdoor is kept open to return to old ways of living, either intellectually or emotionally, and the new situation is never met wholly. Remembrance of the past becomes a fetter on the movement of the present.

In perplexity we run away from discomfort to seek self-satisfaction elsewhere, not realising that "I" - consciousness is at the root of all sorrow and conflict, we run away from transiency to look for the eternal truth, not realising that the whole significance of truth is in the transient; we run away from suffering to find a possible cure through the help of others to whom we pray, not realising that none can help us but we ourselves; we run away from conflict in the hope that the imitation of others in authority can solve our problems, not realising that by turning to others the problems of duality is made only more complicated and perplexity intensified.

It is this doubt which makes us search for the truth, thereby always missing it. Our search for truth is but a trial to escape from conflict, but it is not a solution therof. It is this spirit of escapism which makes us study philosophies, practise systems of mind-control, follow codes of ethics, set up a standard of conduct, traditional, conventional, religious, or otherwise. In these, with "ostrich-policy", we take shelter so as not to see the conflict any more. We have even made for ourselves an idea of truth, and we strive for its attainment. That goal some call "God" or "Brahman", but others Enlightenment or Nirvāna. It is not the truth or its attainment we are disputing here, but the falsity of striving. Striving for a goal we do not know, is like searching for a thing which has not even entered the field of our imagination. But on the other hand, if the goal is known, we are in possession of the truth and searching becomes impossible. Thus all our striving is finally not for attainment but is a search for a shelter to find there comfort, consolation, an escape. As Nirvāna is independent from conditions *(asaṅkhata)* and cannot be produced *(akata)*, all striving must fail and only cause greater perplexity.

We search in the past by means of our memory, recalling previous experiences; and distilling them like some elixir of life, we form with them a standard of living, another prop to support us in our perplexity, wherewith to conform to our daily life. Or we try to penetrate the veil which hides the future, to build up securities in coming lives. Thus our belief in rebirth or our constant questioning of its possibility is but a disguised craving for self- continuance. Rebirth understood as a process of action and effect, of conditioning environment and resulting reaction, will leave no room for enquiries about other spheres, about salvation or damnation. But in perpexity thoughts are ready to follow any lead; they will accept any doctrine which holds out some hope for the future. Then one might think that perplexity has been overcome in faith. In reality those doubts have merely been suppressed. Thoughts are not allowed to run freely and intelligently their natural course; they are submitted to religious authority, and thus blind faith blocks the road to mental development and to the understanding of the truth.

Perplexity should not be confused with the skilful doubt which is even a factor to enlightenment *(samboj-*

jhanga), namely the spirit of enquiry, of investigation of the nature of things *(dhammavicaya).* Perplexity has a paralysing influence, but doubt spurs on to investigation, to fuller understanding. To reach the summit of knowing the truth of everything, we have to start at the bottom by doubting everything. Perplexity is scepticism, but doubt is agnosticism. Intolerant denial of every assumption itself becomes dogmatic; but active doubt will solve itself by deeper awareness of actuality. To escape from the bewilderment of perplexity people take their refuge in faith, in authority and in religions based thereon. They mould their lives on revelation which is the experience of somebody else. Thus perplexity is a formidable fetter, preventing intellectual freedom, for truth is intuition and realisation for oneself.

3. Attachment to Rites and Ritual (*sīlabbata-parāmāsa*). The long history of the human race is dominated by belief in and servitude to the supernatural. The speculations of the primitive man on the nature of strange forces around him have been replaced by theological arguments; the idol of roughly hewn stone has given room to the spirit of God; but the fear which created the one as the other remains the same throughout. Philosophers have divided themselves into the great camps of Materialism and Idealism, and the line of division remains the unknown nature. Even where we see atheistic systems of thought like the Sānkhya philosophy on which both Buddhism and Jainism largely drew, or schools of scepticism which flourished in Greece, in all of them we find a development in a direction not intended by their originator, notwithstanding the growth of experimental science and freedom of thought and expression.

Man is a social animal. His inborn herd-instinct makes him feel uneasy when alone, and this need for comfort and consolation has penetrated his mental as well as physical cosmos. For also in his way of thinking man fears to be alone and in the dark. His different religious systems are merely a reflection of this primitive need.

Few are those who dared to think independently, but in their lifetime they were not universally appreciated. Some, like Gotama the Buddha were harassed; others like Jesus were crucified or those like Socrates poisoned, or like Mohammed exiled. After their passing the scene changes, however. Then those who did not have the courage nor the intellect to think independently for themselves, found consolation in following them as their masters. Even though some like Gotama the Buddha expressly declared that everyone has to work out his own salvation himself, still thousands took and will continue to take the oportunity of seeking refuge in him, to rely upon his words without even trying to make those words live within their own lives.

This searching for mediators and comforters has become so essential to religion of any type that those original thinkers would hardly recognize themselves or their doctrine, if they would return to find their images worshipped and their instructions converted into dogmas. The creation of authority is a sign of weakness. But instead of trying to overcome that weakness by inner growth and development, man has made himself crutches on which he can lean, which will give him consolation in the sorrow of his own making, of his own delusion. It is mental weakness which induced man to make spiritual crutches. But weakness is no excuse, it is a defect; and defects are never essential. Religious systems, instead of helping man to grow, keep him down in infancy; instead of giving the truth, they offer a means to escape from actuality by concentrating on a future life. Postponement and evasion are the chief accusations to be levelled against organised religions. They postpone the duty of the present moment by making man live for the future, and thereby they evade the natural conflict, which torments every man who has not realised the truth. Instead of understanding sorrow, they merely point out an escape from sorrow into a supernatural bliss.

To obtain this bliss much effort is required, much assistance is needed too; and organisations, where this striving is done in common and where it is assisted by superior authority, cater for man's needs. In his desire for security man grasps at the opportunity, thus forging link by link the fetters of attachment to rites, rituals, ceremonies, dogmas, prayers, sacraments, offerings, sacrifices into a chain which no effort can break. For even methodical effort to free oneself is only a new bond, as the method itself becomes a new crutch of delusion, which is more relied on than freedom is sought.

The bondage in which we live is a mere delusion, a dream. And as long as we are in that dream-state no amount of energy will wake us up, for even that energy will be a delusion. The authority of persons, of dogmas, of religious performances, of the different paraphernalia of religion and devotion, has been set up for our own consolation, i.e. for the satisfaction of our selfishness, to give that sense of security which is a craving for continued existence, for permanence. Thus religions, at the cost of a certain amount of spiritual exercise confer heavenly bliss, forgive sins and provide a shortcut to perfection. But that shortcut is really a means of escape. Instead of going to our teacher Life, - even if life means sorrow, - we try to run away from sorrow, not realising that we cannot run away from life. Hence religions show another, a better, a supernatural life, and together with that the different means of attainment. Holy vows and ascetic practices *(sīla-vata)* are frequently observed for the purpose of acquiring merit. But that really means that the good action is not performed for its own goodness, but for the

sake of some underlying motive, e.g. to secure hevenly bliss. In that case, the act was not a pure action, was not a complete action, and therefore not a true action. It was an act of self-seeking, a search for security based on ignorance and born of fear. Such actions are only substitutes; and even if they produce the desired effect; that too will be a mere prolongation of the process of delusion. If an action is but a means towards an end, then that action itself has no value. An action is only pure and complete, if nothing further is expected, if that act is performed spontaneously, grown out of the full understanding of the circumstances, which called for such an action. Then there will be no limitation of time, no trying to escape from actuality, and in that full awareness will be the comprehension of reality.

As long as virtuous acts, religious practices, diciplinary regulations, methodical exercises are valued as means of acquiring merit, so long also will religions be commodities of commerce. Social service as a means of acquiring merit is not service of those in need, but an exploitation of them, as they are used as a means to profit ourselves. Prayer is an indirect admission of one's inferiority and submission. Uttering sacred words without understanding may have a psychological effect, but then they are not better than a drug which temporarily relieves the pain without curing the disease.

To frame one's conduct according to fixed rules may appear necessary in social life, but that is only in a society which does not understood itself. If life is understood fully, virtue will come automatically; a truly wise man is always a good man. Every moment of life is a fresh one with different conditions, and therefore a rule can never be applied to all similar cases. Ceremonies seem to be good for children, but is it not the duty of a teacher and a parent to see to it that the children grow up? A teaching which becomes a system (and this applies to all organised religions) is a dead authority, which can have no dealing with the living.

The delusion that good works suffice is a contagion *(parāmāsa)*, a moral corruption which affects the very roots of living in the true sense. Without the breaking of this fetter not even a beginning can be made to enter that stream of life's fulness *(sotāpatti)*, which flows out into the ocean of deliverance.

4. Excitement of Sensual Pleasure *(kāmacchanda)*. Of all the problems with which man is faced in this world, the social problem, which is the mutual relation between different sexes, is regarded as the most difficult one. Any problem will arise from a duality, i.e. a division of interests between brain and heart, between intellect and emotion. As long as the intellect sets up a standard to conform with, the natural feelings, which cannot be standardised, because they are reactions to an ever changing environment, will rise in revolt. A standard is something of the past, but reactions are present. Hence a constant conflict which is sorrow, shows every aspect of life as having two opposites.

Sex-relations too form a problem on account of the placing of sexes as opposites. But femininity *(itthindriya)* and masculinity *(purisindriya)* are expressed in many ways basides the generative organs. Some psycho-analysts have even maintained that a sex problem lies at the bottom of any mental problem. If the problem is a reaction, then sex itself forms the action. To solve the reactionary problem, one has to comprehend the action in its fulness.

Female activity is that which gives form to the formless, which develops, grows and multiplies. But in order to do that there must be the passive attitude of receiving and assimilating; and also the action of expressing. Thus female characteristics are submissiveness, docility humility, generosity, emotional reliability, and a lack of assertion.

Male activity on the other hand, is that which initiates, directs and intensifies. In this is shown the active attitude which gives strength to growth, guidance to sensation, reason to action. Thus male characteristics will be a feeling of superior importance, aggressiveness, rulership, pride, egotism, meanness, stinginess, but also rationality though it often leads to irrational deeds, when emotions are excluded.

From this analysis it will be seen that there is more of complement and interdependence than of opposition. Indeed, to be perfect the passive and active elements should not only be balanced, for that is still opposition, but they should so grow together as to form actually only one whole. To formulate a number of characteristics may simplify the understanding of a thing, but it can never correspond to actuality. For by doing so one arrests a continuous development at a particular point, and this narrows one's viewpoint to a cross-section, throwing light on the opposing halves, but failing to see the process as a whole. The process is like that of water in a river, naturally flowing down. Yet in its very action of flowing it is obstructed by itself in so far as the different particles cause a friction by their motion. Hence the reaction appears as a certain irregularity, a lack of harmony, owing to undercurrents, forming wavelets and eddies.

So it is with the characteristics of the sexes when taken apart. Then sensual pleasure becomes emotion without intelligence and that is passion, that is the beginning of conflict. What is usually understood by love, is a sensation of incompleteness. Without realising that this feeling of insufficiency is conditioned by an inner discontentment with the surroundings of daily life–without realising that this discontentment finds its origin in the

lack of understanding of life-sensations grow and stretch their feelers to find something to fill that emptiness. An image or an ideal is formed of what would complete the dificiency. According to this ideal a search is being made, and finally the ideal image is imposed on the selected object. It does not follow that the selection corresponds in full to the imagination. But as the senses seek their own satisfaction, they are more concerned with their need than with reality. Anyhow, love is based on selection, which means agreement with self.

And why is this selection made? Love is not outgoing, except for a few sentimental expressions; and therefore selection is made for obtaining the sole right of possession. If love were truly for the good of the other, unfaithfulness could never change that love into hate. But as things stand, a mere suspicion suffices to make all love fade. Love is greed for possession, and that exclusively. But a desire to possess limits the affection, and will never fill that sensation of emptiness.

Truth, on the other hand, knows no love which is partial; which is a selection, which is an expression of egoism. Truth knows no distinction of sexes, for Truth sees the completeness of life. Truth understands that the formless cannot exist without a form, that intelligence and feeling cannot be seperated without causing conflict, that life is only complete with head and heart united in one individual, that in a process of change, growth and evolution there is no real difference between giving and taking, that in the fulness of life there is only action without reaction, that in the completeness of understanding there are no opposites and hence no objects for love. Truth is not concerned with self and others; that is the sphere of delusion.

This may not appear as very practical; but if the world has no place for understanding, who is the loser? The world loves for a purpose, namely for the satisfaction of self. And thus the lust for sensual pleasure becomes an essential element in the emotional attitude of human lovers.

Is there then no altruistic love? As long as love is not altruistic, it is of course pure selfishness. And even when love is altruistic, it is far from perfect, because it is based on a delusive distincition which preserves the separation between self and others. The fact that the motives in the question of others' happiness are so much more complicated than in the case of our own personal interests, shows the presence of the conflict between opposites. Self-love comes spontaneously; it is pure craving. Love for our neighbours, however, does not come so naturally; it needs argument, which is a proof that the division is maintained. In the case of self-love we do not even percieve it as love. The hand brings food to the mouth; the eyes direct the feet on the path; but this is not love, it is the perfect, spontaneous harmony of nature.

A feeling akin to this natural harmony is sometimes experienced at the sight of suffering. It is not sexual love, but compassion, sympathy. Here a liking to help rises spontaneously. As long, however, as this feeling originates in the imagination, which pictures ourselves in that miserable state, compassion again would be self-love. Perfect sympathy feels the sorrow of all without distinction; it is not interested in the individual, but in the cause of suffering. As soon as a particular interest is evolved there must be selection, which is separation, isolation and selfishness. No sublimation of the sex-instinct will dissolve this fetter, but the realisation of the delusion of separation will make all distinctions disappear in the comprehension of the whole process, in which there are no integrating parts of a combination or union, but only different aspects of the fulness of life.

5. Aversion *(vyāpāda).* In common parlance we speak of love and hate as emotions, but they are more than that. An emotion is an excitement a passing phase, or as we called it earlier, a reaction. But love and hate – though they show themselves as reactions each time the beloved or hated object presents itself physically or mentally – are rather dispositions, i.e. mental attitudes which are the summing up of many reactions. It is again on dispositions that a character is based. Characters can be an irascible disposition which is well expressed by the word aversion *(vyāpada),* which indicates a turning away from *(vi-āpajjati).* It is a liability to experience emotions of disagreement between subject and object. This emotion may arise and pass off, but the disposition remains owing to the turned-off attitude. This disposition of aversion is due to the mental attitude, which as in the case of love is based on a distinction between self and others. Here too, it is a separation between the intellect and the heart. As a matter of fact, the two sentiments of love and hate, though appearing to the opposites, comprise so many idential parts, that this is already an indication of their common root. Though affection is only proper to love, and aversion to hate, still both attraction and repulsion are the results of an underlying instinctive fear with the "self" as object. The hope of exclusive possession, which is called love, is tinged with fear as much as the repelling instinct in hate. Fear common to both, is conditioned by ignorance; and here again we are back at the very root, viz. the delusion of self. Though love and hate have "others" as their direct object, it is really the "self" as a misunderstood delusion, which is at the bottom of these dispositions. Emotions, like reactions, come and go; characters can be changed and altered; but dispositions *are* when deluded, and without delusion they *are not.*

Most of what is called love is actually nothing but predilection, favouring one more than another. But that

necessarily results in the exclusion of others who are less favoured. A turning to one naturally comprises a turning away from another, who thereby becomes an object of aversion. Thus particular friendship easily evokes jealousy. It brings about the mistaken idea of exclusive rights, which are rooted not in the other, but in "self". As long as sympathy and antipathy, conversion and aversion, *turn* round the centre of self, they are only different in degree, like heat and cold, but not in kind. Both are expressions of selfishness. Agreement with self is love; disagreement with self becomes hate.

It will be seen that there is great conflict which man finds it difficult to solve in himself; and thus he projects himself outside himself as it were and fights his battle there; he wants to possess himself in others. Thus even aversion, or the reaction which is hate, is a kind of desire to thwart any harmful influence. It is a desire to destroy the opposing element, in order to eliminate that which is considered the cause of the conflict. The cause however does not lie in the object, but in the action of turning away. For by that action are created the opposities, which produced the conflict. To eliminate one party does not solve the problem; both parties must go. Then aversion will not become love, but it will become impossible.

But as long as "self" with its imagined exclusive rights of possession dominates the scene, jealousy and envy are bound to appear. Then it is discontent about the prosperity of others. It does not necessarily follow that one wishes for oneself the honour of the gain acquired by someone else. For it may be that one possesses already the object or the title, which was recently obtained by the other. Thus envy is not greed, but discontent and ill-will. It is the feeling that everyone must be the same and have the same, so that no one can put himself forward. Many times it poses as virtue in a demand for equality, or *esprit de corps*, social conscience, solidarity, etc.

Envy, however, may grow out into a certain satisfaction over the misfortune of someone else, even if that bad luck does not mean gain to oneself. This ill-will may become so active that it becomes cruelty, in the same way as love expresses itself in affection and tenderness. The pleasure derived from cruelty is called sadism. It is of course not the pain inflicted upon others, which is enjoyed, but the accompanying sexual excitement, produced by the success in mastering the object. In this impulsion the behaviour towards the object - whether in love or in hate - appears to be a matter of indifference, as long as mastery is obtained. If the object co-operates it is love; if co-operation is lacking it is hate.

Psychology may try to explain sentiments of hate and a disposition of aversion as primary, instinctive fear. Moralists may show means and methods to change hate into love. Rationalists may show the originating conditions of aversion is physical disharmony. All may try to overcome hate, some by war, others by love. But the true solution of this fetter is the solving of the distinction between subject and object.

Hate does not always need to have someone else for object; it may even turn against oneself. It seems strange that the self-preservative instinct can so forget itself, as to develop hate for onself. But the craving to destroy all objects which are a source of pain, appears sometimes stronger that the sense of loss suffered by the frustration of other desires, like the satisfaction of the needs of self-preservation. Ascetics seeing in their body a source of sin, have inflicted on themselves tortures which appear expressions of hate, but which gave them in reality immense satisfaction, so that they could smile happily in the midst of their self-inflicted mortifications. This pleasure, derived from imposing suffering on oneself, is called masochism.

Hate is a kind of hostility and its origin must be sought in conflicting desires. The antithesis of self and non-self forms the basis for the opposites of pleasure and pain. When self becomes identified with pleasure, non-self, i.e. the object, the other one, becomes identified with hate. Hence it follows that the disposition of hate has developed earlier than that of love. And it follows too that love only arises because of the pleasure it gives to self; and hate arises because of the satisfaction it gives through self assertion.

Therefore it is not the object of hate that should be eliminated, but the selfish action, which produced it. If one tries to overcome feelings of antipathy towards a certain person by sending out thoughts of loving kindness, one is merely heating the emotions, provoking reactions, which make pure action an impossibility. But when both hate and love are understood to be the outcome of false valuations, based on a misconception of self and others, this fetter will have been broken, not by a changed disposition, but by its vanishing in the face of true intelligence.

6. Craving for Form - ***(Rūparāga)*** lust for rūpa, 'World of form' i.e. rebirth in world of form. Fear and wonder in the crude intelligence of primitive man at the startling and irresistible phenomena in nature gave rise to the belief in the supernatural. By experimenting with the less fearful objects of perception and by succeeding in controlling them at least partly, fear decreased to make way for awe. And finally, even awe had to yield to science, which had only wonder and admiration for the still undiscovered regions of nature, without calling them supernatural. But

the primitive instincts in man, which form a part of his nature, cannot be conquered by science, for the mere reason that the child's intellect is not capable of understanding, when it comes in contact with those phenomena at the time of its greatest mental plasticity. Thus with the disappearnce of fear of nature man's belief in the supernatural did not disappear. And his imagination created the heavens according to the crude conceptions of his childhood.

Religion dominated this world and its politics in peace as well as in war. In our present day we still hear of priests blessing tanks before going into battle, kings are still crowned by bishops; justices open the assizes by prayer in church or temple. So religion will continue to dominate man's life to come.

Survival is always the main motive in any struggle. If a struggle is not successful in the present, there arises a natural hope to be more successful on a future occasion. This struggle for survival combined with the hope of success in the future thrown against a background of faith in the supernatural, is a sufficient explanation of man's desire for rebirth, even if his sensual passions have cooled down. To speak of a religious instinct and at the same time to subscribe to the theory of evolution, would force one to admit religious inclinations even in the animals. But religious feelings are not instinctive, not innate, and hence not natural and essential to man. Religious needs, growing out of the instinct of flight, couples with the emotion of fear, give a sufficient basis for religious feelings. Thus it will be seen that the parents of relgion are emotional fear married to the instinct to flee from danger which is always lurking in the unknown.

Indeed, religions are mainly a means of escaping from conflict. Conflict being actual and present, an escape is sought in the future. It is thus on the future that religions concentrate. A religion which would deny a future life is unthinkable. On the other hand, it would be too hard for many a relgionist even for those with an intellectual bent, to admit that religions are merely the outcome of an intrinsic desire to flee from danger, i.e. that they are purely means of escape. Hence a purposive psychology has been developed in which escape has been replaced by purposelful striving.

The seeking of a goal is an undeniable part played in the process of evolution; and the purely mechanistic viewpoint of a rigid law of cause and effect had to be modified and partly abandoned. Incentives and stimuli are acknowledged side by side with reflexes, so that causality has become conditionality, to allow for the personal element of striving. As this striving in man is largely responsible for man's success in the material world, any development resulting therefrom is now considered as progress. But it has been completely overlooked, that as soon as man has reached the goal of his striving he sets up a new goal, so that he remains a seeker for ever.

This is also seen in man's striving for the attainment of spiritual perfection. Even if he has overcome all craving for sensual pleasures *(kāmacchanda)*, his striving does not cease, but is sublimated, transposed to a higher sphere, where the gross carnal joys have been replaced by the refined sense of delight in form *(rūpa)* and beauty. Craving for form *(rūparāga)* may have transcended lustful desires, but it remains craving and desire. It may be a more refined craving, but as all craving is a bond, so this too is a strong fetter, stronger perhaps even than sensual pleasures for the very reason of its sublimation. The more subtle and refined the form of craving, the more difficult to recognise it and to uproot it.

In this sense of delight in beauty there will be some reconciliation, a synthesis of the lower sentiments of crude egoism and loftier expression of self-love. Though on a higher plane, felt as aesthetic admiration, it remains however egoism. It is not easy to recognise the fact that pleasure obtained from the contemplation of an ideal is not altogether objective, but is dependent on the harmony and just proportion between subject and object, so that the "ego" still occupies a place of honour. Thus a desire to be reborn in happy states which are free from the lust of the senses will appear very virtuous and praiseworthy. A striving to obtain those mental states of absorption *(jhāna)*, where thoughts are submerged in spiritual beauty and joy, may appear as true spirituality and perfection. In reality its only usefulness exists in the weakening of the different obstacles on the road to perfection.

Far from being perfections themselves, these mental states may or may not become helpful means thereto. If skilfully handled they may be a great help in the overcoming of the hindrances *(nīvaraṇa)*, but not more than that. If practised with attachment or sought for the purpose of spiritual delight, they will merely create new obstacles which may prove insurmountable, owing to their subtle and spiritual nature. A discursive tendency *(vitakka)* may easily become a speculative tendency, where higher truths are merely analysed for one's intellectual satisfaction, without being lived and realised. Sustained application of thought *(vicāra)* might develop into attachment to one's own opinion and become stubbornness. Rapture *(pīti)* is frequently inebriating to such an extent that further progress becomes impossible. The bliss of well-being *(sukha)* might create the spirit of self-contentment which produces stagnation. One-pointedness of thought *(citta-ekaggatā)* might still fail to see the real nature of the object and thus in the tranquility of the thought-process create the illusion of attainment,

which might be nothing but self-consciousness without having grasped the nature of self. Thus one might be free from sensations, but slave to emotions.

To escape from the fettering influences of the senses and then to be caught in the net of beauty and form by clinging to those delights is a change of prison, but no freedom. Whether one accepts these spheres of form as some kind of heaven in a different place, or as mental states in which the bodily senses do not predominate any more, makes very little difference. The fetter to get rid of consists in the attachment to these mental delights, in whatever environment they may be found.

7. **Craving** for the **Formless** ***(arūparāga).*** When all sense-pleasures are excluded and even desires for pure beauty have been overcome, there seems to be no further obstacle in the way of the seeker of truth. Thus a desire for virtue, for perfection, for wisdom, for truth, in short, desire for the formless *(arūparāga)* seems to be not only quite harmless, but even essential to a spiritual life. But even a desire for what is good, is still a desire and as such it must be a hindrance and a fetter. Desires for virtue, wisdom, or truth, can never lead to those goals, because as long as there is striving for the attainment of a goal, there is acquisitiveness which can only be based on self.

A change of physical desires into emotional desires cannot be called progress in perfection, for though the experiences have changed and have become more subtle, though the objects of desire have become more spiritual - desire is there all the same. Desire for virtue will never produe goodness, because only that which grows from an inner necessity can be called virtue.

Actions which are produced by striving are artificial, are not natural and cannot be called virtuous. It is a mistake to call nature evil and to practise virtue for the sake of overcoming evil; for that makes virtue a means towards a negative end, and the practice of virtue an incomplete action, or rather a reaction. Desire for wisdom may produce learning and knowledge, but not understanding, intelligence and insight. Desire for truth will emanate thoughts and scatter them in all directions, searching everywhere, but failing to concentrate and to realise the truth in one's own nature. Through gradual changes of the object of desire, truth will never be found. Increase in virtue and knowledge can never lead to final deliverance, for all ideas of change, of growth, of progress, preserve as their basis the idea of "self". It is the "I" which wants to acquire virtue, to grow in understanding and to come nearer to the truth. It is this separation of the truth. It is that element of craving, of I-ness, which forms the real fetter here, all the more difficult to overcome, because it is so cunningly concealed and camouflaged.

To unify the "mind" with unbounded space *(ākāsānañca)* is a delusion, for it brings the uncreated, unconditioned *(asaṅkhata)* within the limitations of thought. It merely leads to the ecstatic thought of infinite consciousness *(viññāṇānañca),* which soon will be realised as a delusion in the sphere of nothingness *(ākiñcaññāyatana).* No wonder that thoughts will become suspended, if even 'nothing' is taken as an object and a goal. Thought may cease to such an extent that even perception will become imperceptible *(n'eva-saññānāsaññā)* and is incapable of effective functioning. All this seems a growth in purity of thought. But in freedom there is no growth. It is, or it is not; and only when all fetters are broken, freedom is there in all its fulness. Whether a bird is tied to the earth with a thread of silk or with a chain of iron, it will not be able to fly, unless that bond is broken. It may be easter to break the silk thread, but unless it *is* broken, there is no freedom. Similarly, it may be easier to dispel the delusion of "nothing" than to break the spell of "self"; but as long as there is craving, be it only for the formless, there is no freedom possible.

Why then do people have craving for the formless, as there cannot be anything attracting them there? Because they have been disappointed by the world of form. Beauty proved to be impermenant and changing into its very opposite. Delights proved to be reactions to environment, and having realised that, another way of escape is tried instead of facing reality. But this escape can never lead to a solution. People are interested in life hereafter, they crave for rebirth in better spheres, because they do not know how to live in the present. Because they have never learned properly to live in the world of sense, desire arises for spheres of pure form. And because even pure form did not give the answer to their longings, they seek an escape in the formless and even in annihilation, if that were possible. This annihilation, however, they understand secretly as a removal of all obstacles, so that the pure "self" can continue to live for ever in unmarried conditions. The individual, limited "self" is admitted to be a delusion to get rid of. But instead, a universal soul, of which all that lives and breathes and moves, is only a manifested emanation; it forms a new delusion, a stronger fetter. That imagined world-soul, through which each man finds himself even in the smallest blade of grass with the cry: "That am I", has indeed done away with the separation of an isolated I-ness, but only to make way for a permanent universality in which the dynamic force of nature's process is viewed as a delusion. If truth is seen as a delusion, there then is a fetter indeed. Any delusion would be less serious than the one which sees the truth and turns away from it, mistaking it for untruth. Thus craving for the form-less *(arūparāga)* is through its very detachment from sense-pleasures and beauty an extremely

dangerous obstacle to freedom. It is this fetter which narrows man's outlook, so that he does not discover the truth within himself, but searches it elsewhere.

In craving for the formless, truth is made an object apart from the individual, who is viewed as the subject. The very methods employed to bring the subject nearer to the objective truth lead only to further estrangement and isolation, binding man to rebirth. But as continuation of life is wished for, this fetter is not understood as an obstacle, but becomes as ornament, a state of perfection, a mental state comparable only with the highest heavens. The objectification of truth makes it something external, worth striving for, worth running after, but in reality it forms a motive for escaping from the complexity of present problems. In the detachment from both sense and form is lessened also the opportunity to understnd the environment, which has form to which the senses react. To discard the form from the environment and to seek its real meaning in the formless, is to look for a substance under the phenomena, for eternity in time-concepts, for permanence in a changing process, for an everlasting universal soul in a cosmos, where unity is only one of action, interaction and reaction.

Yet in the transient sensations truth is more evident than in shelter of pure joy, where even suffering ceases to be a problem. For this reason, craving for rebirth - be it in the spheres of form or in the formless spheres-is even worse than craving for sensuous joy, because it is less actual. It needs the perfection of an Arahat to do away with this last vestige of possessiveness. A desire for rebirth with better opportunities is in reality an ill-disguised mental laziness, postponing the solution of the problem facing us here. He who craves for another life, is already dead to the present; but for him who lives in the present, which is eternally new because it is always beginning, the hereafter does not exist. Thus craving for a better life becomes a fetter to the present life, which not being under-stood fully, remains incomplete, and in its incompleteness produce a new conflict with false values, delusions and attachments, perpetuating ignorance and making the chance of deliverance ever more remote.

8. Conceit ***(māna).*** Even if self-delusion has been overcome and an individual is fully aware that personality is nothing but a process of action and reaction, conditioned by inner tendencies and outer environment, there may still remain a strong fetter of self-assertion or pride. For, though "self" be recognized as a fleeting process of change, it does not follow that all individual action must be understood as produced by universally common factors. Though a river is a constantly changing current of flowing water without any abiding substance, yet there are different rivers flowing in different directions. Similarly, while denying "self" as an abiding, permanent entity, one should not deny the differences between the changing phenomena of action and reaction, which are the conditions which produce self-delusion.

That consciousness of "self" can become the delusion of "self" was shown in the discussion on *Sakkāyadiṭṭhi* as due to living in the past, which binds present action to a past experience which is dead. Even when this is not done, the mere comparison between different processes of action may lead to an emotion of elation, when an opportunity offers itself to display one's skill. Then an ideal self will be set up, elaborated from past experiences, which showed in their failings the weaknesses of the actions of the moment. Self-respect represses those failings, remembering only successes which actually turned out well, or which might have been successes, if action had been more efficient. And thus an ideal standard is erected.

Conceit is a tendency of ostentatiously displaying, like a banner over all other flags, qualities one has or - perhaps more frequently-which one presumes to have. In this last case conceit will hide the proper motive of an act with pretension, simulation, deceit and hypocrisy. Its working is many times so subtle that the real motive remains hidden even to ourselves. Then material and personal interest will be disguised as a sense of duty or justice, the right of freedom, the progress of the nation, the safeguard of democracy, etc. Especially the leaders of nations at war are very prone to use similar catch-words to camouflage their less unselfish motives and to sublimate their murdeorus instincts. Manifestoes circulated during an election campaign are usually manifestations of conceit.

Conceit is an idealisation of the subject, which requires sublimation of primitive instincts and fundamental needs, which are not seen as defects, but as high perfection. This is an escape, a way out, by which the claims of nature can be conceded without having to be ideal light; and it measures everything by that ideal. Pride itself, which involves always contempt for another, is by utilitarianism and rationalism considered necessary and inherent in human nature. In the process of sublimation conceit is called the source of many virtues and talents, which only has to be directed to right things. Personal interests present objects to us only under those aspects which it is useful for us to perceive. This ego-centricity leads to the delusion of thinking ourselves to be indispensable, a focus of attention and the centre of society. Even anxiety to help others may easily be a subtle kind of conceit which tells us that we are better, financially, intellectually or spiritually, that nobody else will be able to give this help so efficiently; that we have more experience, a superior position, greater opportunities or stronger karmic tendencies. These subtle considerations may appear and

sometimes are partly true. It is exactly this basis of truth, though grossly exaggerated, which makes it so difficult to detect and still more difficult to loosen this fetter. Even when those self-reflections are correct, they are thoughts of possessiveness which is actually craving and clinging. Actions performed in this spirit may appear excellent like social service, preaching, teaching and nursing. But as long as their foundation is self-conceit, however subtle it may be, the effects will suffer thereby and the beneficiary will even be hurt without knowing the reason. Then it becomes a cruel exploitation of an apparently more favourable position. Then the help given to others feeds only our self-love, as it results from an anxiety to give or to share what had been acquired by intense craving to possess.

Subjectively conciet is a certainty and a conviction of righteousness which is fatal to development, because it produces self-contentment and stagnation. Certainty of one's capacity to attain leads to postponement. Certainty of righteousness is reliance on the past. And thus both miss the unique opportunity of the present. Thus arrogance and presumption seem to contain some kind of regret of having denounced the 'self' as a delusion at earlier stage. If once a delusion is understood as such thoughts cannot go back to it. And therefore another, more subtle view of 'self' is introduced under an ideal form, to replace the crude, almost material self, which was abandoned with the first fetter. The idea of a personal soul has been discarded, and its place is taken by whatever in our nature is impersonal, but still distinct from others. Qualities and capabilities are asserted in a bold attempt sometimes to balance inferiority. Therefore it is called conceit which says; I am *(asmi-māna)*.

Misconception of self *(sakkāya-diṭṭhi)* - conception of an ego-entity was based on a wrong interpretation of the environment by the senses. These produced reactions which developed the memory with its reliance on past experience and incompleteness of action in the present. It is never associated with false beliefs *(micchā-diṭṭhi)*, but has always a grain of truth in it from which it devlops. Most people are to some extent honest in their conceit, in so far as hypocrisy and pretension have become a second nature, hiding in the sub-conscious so well, that the real motives are actually unknown.

Now it may be understood that the isolation is 'self' - delusion was the surface-result of these unknown tendencies, worked upon by, and reacting to an environment which was not understood. Conceit on the other hand, as an idealisation of self, is less closely connected with perception and consciousness. It is frequently the necessity of giving up some object of attachment - which always quits with some part of self-which reinstates that self in a sublimed form. Religions especially abound in facts which show the truth of this statement. Like cannibals who ate the flesh of their victim if he had shown much courage, so that they might assimilate his fearlessness, so our modern, civilized faithful go to church to partake in holy communion of the flesh of the son of man.

The sublimation and idealisation of self, not projecting it in some form of existence or other, but establishing it in a super-relationship to others is so tenaciously holding on, that only the perfectly holy one is completely free from this fetter.

9. **Agitation** *(Uddhacca)*. Agitation is a lack of understanding of the environment as a constantly changing process in which we are not a fixed entity, but in which we change with and are changed by the different conditions which constitute life. Conflict arises when the world is seen as change and the self as static. In the friction which ensues we try to stop the changing events and cling to them. That struggle is the fetter of exitement which is a ceaseless effort to escape from conflict.

Exitement is a fickleness of character, a lack of balance, a disproportion of dispositions, absence of persistence and independence. Its arising is due to a high degree of susceptibility to the influence of pleasure and pain. In other words, agitation is the expression of sensitiveness, leading in turn to elation and depression. Fickleness shows shallowness of thought, high affectability and low intensity. Exitement is always emotional, and never intellectual, hence not a complete action. For where the intellect is excluded, an action can hardly be called human, it becomes an answer to a stimulus which resembles machine-work, unless the intellectual thought-process is able to control the blindfold process of the passions. Thus it becomes a fetter, preventing true action, and production mere reaction.

In a materialistic life agitation shows itself in eagerness to excel in learning, to succeed in business, to make progress in the world, and in short to out do others. It is the spirit of competition. In a spiritual life agitation shows itself in eagerness to attain perfection soon, in striving for spiritual virtues, in religious zeal to reform social conditions and wrongs of self and others, in employment of methods for spiritual development, in searching for truth by means of reading, learning, questioning and discussing the many problems, which different religions offer. In short, agitation is the intrinsically compelling force, which drives man on in his pursuit; it is the purpose which he sees in life that makes him strive for its attainment.

The purely mechanical world-view is untenable, for in the world of mechanics it is evident that no development takes place, where thought does not drive on to action. On the other hand it must be admitted that thought would not even arise, if not for the working of an external

world. In other words thoughts arise as a reaction. The environment acts as a stimulus. Hence, also the purely idealistic view point must be repudiated, that man is free to choose his own way. It is this delusion of freedom which blinds man with the fetter of agitation, which makes him strive after an ideal with means which are truly ends in themselves. It is the mistake of mixing up purpose and method, which is responsible for this delusion. A means is selected, a method is used for the purpose of attaining something better. But by doing so it is overlooked that neither the method nor the end exists already. If the end existed, striving would be superfluous. For, when travelling the object of the journey is not the goal, but the attainment of the object. If attainment is achieved, the journey thereto is impossible. The method or means does not exist either, but is being made every moment. And as every moment brings some new attainment the purpose of striving cannot be attained except in this present moment.

Planning with a purpose follows from the awareness of a need in a certain condition in which man imagines he might find himself before long. It is like a prediction of a moon-eclipse which is sure to take place, if meanwhile nothing has gone wrong with the sun. But some day something is sure to go wrong even with the sun, the heat of which is measurably decreasing. Thus these predictions based on calculations are reliable only up to a certain extent. How much less therefore will be the reliability of planning of incalculable thoughts.

This purposeful striving is a silent admission of one's imagined freedom of will. Free will is of course a gross delusion, for there is no will to be free, as 'will' like 'mind' is thought arising at the moment of contact, when choice is made possible. But even that choice is not free, as it is influenced and conditioned by the objects of choice. That is why agitation and planning ahead lead so many times to the disillusionment of a wrong choice, when reason was clouded by passion. Planning and purposeful striving are assertions of a separate self which can arrange things for itself and which can modify the environment. It is therefore a lack of understanding the fact that we are rather the ones who are shaped by environment.

To let oneself go without understanding like a piece of machinery, is the other extreme, which never leads to freedom though it does away with individualism. Freedom, and striving for freedom in the absolute sense, requires an absolute being to be free. This is self-delusion. Mechanistic views kill both individual and freedom. But the understanding of the environment leads to the understanding of the delusion produced by it. And that is freedom, because it breaks the fetter of purpose, which drives man on while keeping him bound like a slave. This understanding breaks down the barrier which isolates man from his world, and that is freedom.

But purposeful agitation is a striving in the spirit of possessiveness which can only produce more selfishness, isolation and delusion. For agitation insists on the introduction of a mediating factor which is similar to the employment of tools. This belongs to the region of reason and logic, and involves the desire of attainment as a kind of possessiveness. Religions have always failed as soon as they became organisations. For, organisations are based on methods which are of no value, unless they are an end in themselves. When this principle is reversed however, the goal is reached not by striving but by the setting aside of the obstacles, by the breaking down of prison-walls and fetters. To save a burning house there is only one thing to be done, viz. to extinguish the fire. This action is not concerned with the house but with the fire, which is the immediate obstacle. If that obstacle is overcome, the house is saved naturally.

That many people do not feel that driving force as a fetter, but see it rather as a perfection, is due to their narrow outlook confined to the pettiness of the treadmill which they work as a recreation from the loneliness of life which they dread. It is, however, the same desire for self-realisation which drives some into monasteries and caves, and many others into the whirlpool of the world.

Agitation can never lead to insight because it is a distraction of thought away from the present, and thus it stands opposed to mindfulness *(sati)*. Awareness does not know anything of a "mind", nor of matter in itself, but only of material qualities in so far as they come within the field of the senses and produce there a process of thought. Awareness, living in the present, without worry about the past, without agitation about the future, prevents a cleavage between matter and mind, which has led some to mechanistic laws which are self-subsisting and absolutely rigid, while it has led others to abstract speculations about the composition, spiritual or otherwise, of a mind like a soul, in idealistic conceptions.

The overcoming of the fetter of agitation must naturally lead to mental rest which is required for the understanding of the situation and the environment, which thus comes within the region of intelligence and insight.

10. Ignorance *(Avijjā)*. Most forms of ignorance, and certainly all ignorance which forms a fetter, is not a lack of knowledge, but insincerity of thinking. Fear to discover one's errors, fear that one's vanity might be hurt and fear to be obliged to change one's life, are at the root of all mental reservations which stand in the way of an open approach which alone can remove insincerity of thinking. Strong views are not a sign of wisdom, but frequently betray the presence of prejudices which have arisen from experiences in the past. They are therefore views based on the past without containing any understanding of the present. Ignorance is not a lack of

experience, but a lack of insight. This lack will mostly be produced by some personal bias; it will be therefore an artificially produced ignorance. People do not want to know, for knowledge is frequently inconvenient. And thus the fetter remains.

It needs indeed imense courage to live in integrity according to one's understanding. The "bliss of ignorance" and the "folly of wisdom" is more actual than the proverb might suggest. But if one really wishes to realise the truth, one must begin to be true to oneself. Wishful thinking must be replaced by absolute sincerity. Most religions however, though professing to lead to the truth merely show the road to happiness, and frequently truth is sacrificed for the sake of bliss. To overcome this obstacle of ignorance one has to begin with a complete preparedness to accept the truth without any reservation, whenever it may be, wherever it may lead.

The difficulty of the problem is: How shall we recognise the truth when it presents itself to us? Reason is not infallible, and hence the reliance on the authority of others grows almost naturally. But then, if personal reason can fail, there cannot be more security in the reason of others. Ignorance cannot be conquered by reasoning, because the field of ignorance is wider than that of logic. Life, sorrow and their conditions are not logical but facts. We cannot say that facts are illogical, but they are not based on logic. It is rather logic that is based on facts. And thus it happens that the realisation of the truth is something which is entirely individual and which cannot be proved to others. But there will be absolute certainty in the subject, while certain tests may reveal whether or not some degree of delusion in still remaining.

"The knowledge of deliverance will arise with deliverance". But if this knowledge is entirely subjective, may that not equally well be delusion? This might be so, if this knowledge of the truth would be a recognition. But this understanding is not theoretical or scientific knowledge; it is the actual clearing of all doubts, the actual overcoming of all obstacles. And that can be tested, for if the conditions of ignorance and its effects are still present, ignorance itself has not been expelled.

What is the condition and origin of ignorance? "A first beginning of ignorance is not discernible" and the very question about the origin of ignorance proves its existence. Ignorance has no first beginning, but it is beginning always, as it is a process. The not-understanding of the nature of a process which can have no beginning because it is not an entity, that is ignorance which is always new together with the process which is not understood. In the not-understanding of the environment all action becomes delusion of self. Thus all life which is not lived in the actual present is ignorance and the source of more delusion. The need and the desire to know the beginning of ignorance is ignorance itself, for it ignores the present. Thus it can easily be found out, whether all delusion has been dispersed, by finding out the interest which is taken in, and the place which is occupied in the thought-process by past, present and future.

The passage from ignorance to undrstanding is not one from mechanistic materialism to metaphysics; it is rather like the opening of a heavy curtain, not revealing something new which was hidden behind it, but admitting more light which enables one to see the objects in the room in a different light. The same world, the same environment, but valued anew.

The fetter of ignorance is the reason of life which is a process of grasping. It is in ignorance that the two factors of life, the objective world and the subjective self, are rooted. It is in ignorance that objective science and subjective self, are rooted. It is in ignorance that objective science and subjective faith are opposing one another. Ignorance is the laying hold of the world and of self in the wrong way. To overcome this ignorance can neither be done by conceiving the truth, for truth is not a conception, and conceptual thinking is still a thought with craving.

Ignorance is life with partial knowledge of it; truth is life with the full understanding thereof. And because ignorance allows one to live only partially, it produces sorrow. And because understanding makes one live fully it produces bliss. But that bliss is no happy feeling or sensation, not even mental satisfaction, but just the fulness, the completeness of life, the rest and equilibrium of perfection. It is the perfection of the opposites as the material from which our fetters themselves will have dissappeared with any striving or effort. In ignorance such perception becomes impossible, for in ignorance a solution is sought in past experiences or in future hope with agitation and craving as driving forces towards a goal. But suffering and life and all its problems are neither in the past nor in the future, and they will have therefore to be solved when they arise.

This can be done only by full awareness, by watching our activities and finding out their motives. Through integral awareness the truth of the present will become clear without trying to escape from the world or from life. Renunciation or possessions leads frequently to attachment to opinions and methods, which are self-made values. But in complete discernment of the values of the world and self, of their relation, of their non-opposition, will this process of ignorance be brought to an end.

The fetters themselves are a delusion. To become free is not so much a question of how to become free, how to break those fetters. The question rather is: Why am I

bound? If we try to break this fetter, it is only a process of more ignorance, for trying and striving are only other works for the process of obtaining, gaining, accumulating. The question: How to delude a delusion? must necessarily produce more delusion. The problem can only be solved by fully understanding ,theoretically and practically, the reason why we are deluded. This can only be answered, if we are fully aware, again theoretically and practically, of the fact *that* we are deluded. Theoretical knowledge by itself is ignorance. This awareness can only be in the present moment. Here and now therefore, in this present moment we have to face the problem and everyone carries his own key to the solution.

Life should not be a process of learning and accumulating. Life is meant to be lived, to be met in its fulness, every moment anew. The solution once known, must be put in practice. Then with the disappearance of ignorance will have gone also all sorrow, fear, doubt, craving, egoism, wrong views and all fetters; and that is bless everlasting, the final awakening to the Truth. See also SAṂYOJANA.

H. G. A. van Zeyst

FINE ART. Opinions differ as to which arts are to be regarded as fine arts, but it is generally agreed that the arts regarded as fine arts should appeal to one's sense of beauty. Thus painting, architecture and sculpture are considered to be fine arts to the exclusion of those that are merely utilitarian. This article will, therefore, confine itself to a consideration of the place of these three arts in Buddhism.

Poetry and drama are sometimes considered fine arts, but generally excluded. There are however some authorities that have made a case for excluding architecture from the fine arts. The heaviness of the materials employed in constructing buildings and the quantity of technical data necessary for planning of (construction) have led to the conclusion that architecture is hardly spontaneous, not easily appreciated and therefore, the product of the craftsman, (Bussagli, p. 7). All arts subserves the spiritual and material welfare of society. There was no concept of an art for art's sake (Coomaraswamy, (1956), p. 46). Indians including Buddhists, however, appear to have had a completely different view, recognizing no distinction between what is art as defined above and crafts which are of mere utilitarian value. In some instants Indians recognized sixty four kinds of artistic activity, including crafts, painting *(citra-karma)* occupying the thirty eighth place in this classification. These were all called *kalā*. There was also another classification according to which there were eighteen arts and crafts known as *śilpa*. Painting seems to be placed first among them. *(Jātaka Atuvā Gätapadaya* p. 27). In neither of these groupings does architecture or sculpture find a place, they may perhaps have been taken for granted as being of no particular significance.

Painting, sculpture or architecture was not considered as of special significance. They were all lumped together as *śilpa* or *kalā*. Training of elephants and horses, swordsmanship and archery were all considered as *śilpa* *(Samantapāsādikā, Bhikkhunivibhangavannanā,* X-1). There were among the *śilpins,* men of creative ability of an exceptionally high order *(Patibhānasampanna)* and they were recognised as such, *(Samantapāsādikā, Mahāvaggavannana,* VI, 40, p. 1103. The Hindu tradition that the artist *(śilpin)* is the intermediary who transmits the revelation of Viśvakarma, the divine artificer to society seems to have found acceptance among the Buddhists too. Art or *śilpa* includes the full spectrum of creative activity: ritual, skill, craft, the formative imagination and other similar faculties. Artists belonged to a caste or a field and were an integral part of the social order. There were no such persons as individual self-sufficient artists as in the West (Lanoy, p. 17).

In Buddhism the enjoyment of sensual pleasures is not encouraged and in respect of monks and also laymen observing eight precepts these pleasures are completely prohibited. Numerous instances are recorded in the Pali Canon, particularly in the *Vinaya* and the *Sutta Piṭaka* when the Buddha admonished monks against the use of anything with artistic or decorative features such as beds, chairs and other articles of furniture carrying decorative material. An instance is recorded in the *Senāsanakkhandhaka* of the *Vinayapitaka,* when the group of recalcitrant monks known as the *chabbaggiyā* were getting some figures of men and women painted in their dwelling. Devotees who visited the Vihāra grumbled and became uneasy in their minds when they saw these paintings saying that these six monks were behaving like ordinary laymen, taking delight in the pleasures of sense and complained to the Buddha regarding the conduct of the monks. The Buddha forthwith prohibited monks from getting *patibhāna citta* (imaginary forms) consisting of figures of men and women and even figures of animals, *(Cullavagga,* VI. 2,3). Commenting on this incident the *Samantapāsādikā* says that painting or causing to be painted figures of even animals down to the lowest earth worm was not permitted. It was not permissible for a monk, according to the commentary, even to ask a layman to make the figure of a janitor *(dvārapāla)* to be placed at the entrance to a vihāra, though monks were permitted to ask laymen to paint or make pictures of subjects from the *jātakas,*or occasions such as the *asadisa-dāna,* and other subjects leading to the creation in the minds of viewers aversion to sensual pleasure. Even

monks themselves, however, were permitted to paint subjects such as floral designs, *(Samantapāsadikā*, III, p. 1219). Monks were also prohibited from even touching a female figure, made of substances such as metal, ivory and clay. *(Samantapāsādikā,* II, p. 542). Thus it is clear that in its early stages, Buddhists imposed certain restrictions on the practice of painting and sculpture by monks and the use of objects of art and employing decorative art in articles used by monks and nuns alike. It has to be pointed out that these restrictions became necessary because monks and presumbly nuns as well were found engaging themselves in the practice of the fine arts and using the products of these arts in their daily life. Evidently no restrictions were placed on the use by monks of the products of architecture. In fact the *Vinaya* itself enjoins upon wisemen in the interests of their spiritual welfare to build delightful dwellings and cause learned monks to dwell in them, *(Cullavagga, Samantapāsādikā).* This relaxation perhaps may be explained by a possible argument that any building, unadorned by figures or paintings of human beings and animals were not considered capable of generating undesirable feelings of lust. But monks certainly did appreciate the desirability of well-proportioned dwellings of good design (*Sn. v.* 305). A mural painting coloured with yellow or pigment on the other hand would provoke in the mind of a Buddhist nun only an impressinon, in the mind, base and of no profit, *(Thig. v.* 392).

After the demise of the Buddha, as time passed on, the restricitions imposed on the fine arts, as described above were gradually relaxed. The orthodox view taken by the early Buddhists came to be tempered by the changing needs of the time. Besides, the Buddha's life and his dispensation and the legends that grew around his life were just waiting to be pictorially represented. Buddhism, according to Anesaki, offered three sources of artistic inspiration. The first was the conception of life implied in the Buddha's personality and proclaimed by his teachings. The second was consequence of these and consisted in the pious memory of the master, cherished among his followers and the third, also a corollary of the first, was the practice of dedication based on the idea of universal communion, (Dubash, p. 69, f.n. 1).

The invasion of the North Western part of India by Alexander the Great also served as an effective impetus to the almost unexpected upsurge of Buddhist art and architecture in India. Ideals, conventions and techniques employed by Greeks, Romans and even by Egyptians of old percolated into the Buddhist cultural scene in India, some of them by way of Persia. It took some time for these new influences to be blended into a new artistic tradition, which was translated into concrete form in the regions of the Maurya and Suṅga rulers in the period 270-177- B.C. The bas-reliefs in the railings of the stūpa of Bhārhut and those on some of the stūpas at Sāñci in Bhopal, India, have been executed with a zest and skill defying the restrictions formulated earlier in respect of figures of human being and animals. Sinuous figures of females in alluring poses appear in the sculptures found at these places and in the remains of the Amarāvati and other stūpas of the *Kistna* valley in South India. There seems to be, however, one restriction consistently observed in all these sculptures. No where in these sculptures has the Buddha or Prince Siddhārtha, been shown even where either should have been the central figure, the Buddha and the Prince being represented by some symbolic figure, such as a seat, a pair of feet, or an umbrella. This restriction seems to have been rendered invalid in the first century A.C. when the figure of the Buddha appears in Buddhist shrines not only in bas-reliefs but also as figures in the round as a sacred object to which homage could be paid by devotees. Sculptors and their patrons were not allowed to take liberties in the making of images of the Buddha. Strict adherence to certain rules was required of the artist in order to prevent them from indulging in personal.

It may be recalled that earlier homage could be paid to the Buddha by worshipping the relics of his physical body *(śārīrika)*, articles used by him such as his almsbowl *(pāribhogika)* and the Buddha as conceived in his mind by the devotee, *(uddesika)* *(J.* IV, 228). The Buddha could be conceived in a devotee's mind in some abstract form or in the form of a human being, the form depending on the individual. This was all the more reason why when the image of the Buddha came to be made strict rules had be laid down both in regard to physical features and proportions of the various parts of the body.

Perhaps it may not be simple coincidence that the invention of the Buddha image around first century A.C. was accompanied by a new trend in the system of Buddha teaching that had existed so far, called the Theravāda, the Tradition of the Elders. The Theravāda was a very strict orthodox system both in theory and practice. It needed to be popularised in its appeal to the people at large and those who came to accept this view separated themselves into the branch of Buddhism that has come to be known as the Mahāyāna. To the followers of Mahāyāna art became a handy tool to propagate their new faith among the people, a tool which had already been employed by the builders of Bhārhut, Sāñci and Amarāvati to good effect. In the hands of the Mahāyānists the simple Buddha of the Theravādins proliferated into an extensive pantheon with an equally wide literature written in Sanskrit. This pantheon consisted of a variety of Buddhas, such as Mānuṣi-Buddhas and Ādi-Buddhas and numerous Bodhisattvas, their female counterparts and a host of numerous godlings, each of them invested with distinctive characteristics.

It would have been, however, necessary to embody these distinctive characteristics together with the proportions of the different elements of a statue in some readily assimilable form so that individual artists would not deviate from what was well-established and approved by the pioneers in the field. Such a device would also ensure that this knowledge would pass down successive generations of painters and sculptors. At first these details may have been orally handed down and later converted into hand books on Iconography and Iconometry, but none of these seems to have survived. *Pratimānala-ksanam* may, perhaps, be an example of such a handbook of a later day, (J. N. Banerjea, pp. 381–413, and footnote 2 on p. 393).

It may also be recalled that the Pali Canon itself sometimes refers more of less incidentally to some of the characteristics of the Buddha's physical appearance. For instance the thirty two signs of a *mahāpurisa* are enumerated in the *Lakkhaṇa Sutta* of the *Dīgha nikāya*, though all these signs may have been accommodated in a Buddha image without producing some distorted form of the human body, (*D.* III, pp. 143-179).

It may perhaps be pointed out at this stage that painting could not be separated from sculpture, because all sculpture, free standing or in the form of relief sculpture as well the inside of temples, whether they be carved out of rock or structurally built, were painted over in appropriate colours. Ananda K. Coomaraswamy has pointed out that Indian literature: of all kinds and at all periods, at any rate after the Maurya makes incidental references to painting. He has further commented that it may be taken for granted that from a very early period, not only were sculptures and architectural details covered with their plaster and coloured, but that the flat walls of temples and palaces were decorated within and without with pictures or with painted wreaths and creepers," (A. K. Coomaraswamy, 1965, p. 87).

With the appearance of the Vajrayāna branch of the Mahāyāna in India around the eighth century Buddhist art had to accomodate more and more divinities in its already extensive pantheon. Hinduism was undergoing a revival about this time and Buddhism, particularly in the eastern part of India, imbibed Hindu Tantric-ideals together with Hindu deities. Meditation and various esoteric ritually played an important part in Tantrism and this necessitated the making of an unusually large number of different cult images of the deities that formed the Tantric pantheon, (R.D. Banerjea, p. 87).

Buddhist Tantrism also produced a series of *sādhanas*,- iconographic formulae to direct the making of the images of the various major and minor deities of the Tantric pantheon. It may be possible that at first these *sādhanas* were intended to serve as guidelines to the devotees when engaged in meditation to conceptualise the particular deities they wished to meditate upon, but when they found that the *sādhanas* were inadequate to serve the purpose for which they were intended, it became necessary to transform them into a concrete and tangible form as images, (R.D. Banerjea, pp. 87-100, for some *sādhanas*).

The painter, the sculptor and the architect do not appear to have occupied a respected position among Buddhists in ancient India. Their attitude towards the fine arts is explicably stated in the *Visuddhimagga*, a Pali Work of Buddhaghosa, the author of several Pali Commentaries, where it is said that living beings, on account of their love and devotion to the sensations excited by forms and the objects of sense, give high honour to painters musicians, perfumers, cooks etc. who furnish them with objects of sense. This view of arts and artists seems to be supported by the *Dasa-dhamma Sutta* of the *Aṅguttara nikāya (A.* V, p. 87f.) which declares that beauty is of no value to a Buddhist, neither the beauty of the body nor that which comes of dress, with the admonition that form, sound, taste, smell and touch intoxicate beings and that, therefore, yearning for these should be completely elиminted, (Anand, p. 82). The architect, *(vatthuvijjā-cariyo)* however, appears to have commanded some respect even from royalty because it is he who inspects land to select a place suitable for conversion into a city. *(Samantapāsādikā: Sutta-Vibhanga vaṇṇanā* 1.3).

The work of artists, i.e. painters, sculptors and architects, was not considered of any great significance, and except in a few instances their names have not been recorded anywhere. Nobody knows the names of the great sculptors who fashioned the great Buddha statues at Avukana and Räsvehera in Sri Lanka, nor the names of the painters who executed the famous pictures at Sigiri in Sri Lanka, or the authors of the paintings at Ajanta in India, though history has recorded for all to know, the name of the famous sculptor who executed the statue of Athena in the Parthinon in the fifth century B.C. His name was Phidias.

Inspite of the relatively unimportant place accorded to the artist in society in India probably as well as in neighbouring Buddhist countries, the artist was required to undergo a period of training under a suitable master as a trainee, *antevasi.* According to Tantric hand books on art, of around the twelfth century containing traditions of a very much earlier date, the artists before undertaking the making of an image was required to proceed to a solitary place, after purificatory ablutions and wearing newly washed garments. There, he should perform the 'seven-fold office,' beginning with the invocation of the hosts of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas in the open space before him, and the offering to them of real or imaginary flowers, and ending with a dedication of the merit

acquired to the welfare of all beings. Then he has to realize in thought the four infinite qualities of loving kindness *(mettā)*, compassion *(karunā)*, sympathetic joy *(muditā)* and equanimity *(upekkhā)*. He must then eliminate his personality-view and then invoke the divinity desired to be represented, and to attain identity with this divinity, which last condition was strictly enjoined. Complete comprehension was only possible when the consciousness is thus identified with an object of cognition. All this took place in the imagination. The divinity would then appear like a reflection or 'as a dream'. Very rarely indeed was any drawing made use of, even in the most complicated conceptions.

The principle personage is surrounded by disciple in the centre of a *mandala*. It was only when the mental image was thus defined that the artist began to mould or paint (Coomaraswamy (1927), pp. 51-53 and (1956) p. 56). The foregoing account of the procedure to be followed by an image maker obviously refers to practices of Mahāyānists, and the procedures followed by the followers of the Theravada would have been similar. In Sri Lanka even at the present day image makers follow a similarly complicated prodecure.

Like Hindu artists, Buddhist artists too sought inspiration from Viśvakarman, the god of arts and crafts. It is said in the *Mahāvamsa*, the Pali Chronicle recording the early history of Sri Lanka, that Viśvakarma was directed by Śakra the lord of the gods, to make bricks to build the Mahāthūpa, (Chapter XXVIII, 8-9).

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P.E.E. Fernando

FIRST CAUSE. This is a problem which is not directly connected with Buddhism, which in its doctrines of evolution and samsāra does not admit a "first", and which in its doctrines of conditionality and dependent origination has no place for an "absolute cause". But as in popular writings on comparative studies of religion this subject occurs frequently, it would be well to give here some brief explanation of its implications and the Buddhist standpoint in this respect.

A cause is that which produces an effect, and a first cause is that which produces an effect without having being produced itself. The production of an effect by an absolute cause is a self-contradictory concept, because there is no cause which is not related to its effect. If it is related, it cannot be absolute. If there is no effect, there is not question of a cause either. Hence there is an inherent contradiction between a cause and the absolute. And yet, to be a first cause, i.e., a cause which is not caused by something else, would necessitate an absolute state without origin.

The Buddhist viewpoint is that in an ever-changing process there can arise a phase of becoming, dependent on conditioned and changing phenomena. This process of change does not contain any substance or entity as the bearer of phenomena, and cannot, therefore, be considered as having a beginning, which is a static point in time. Therefore, the Buddha has said that the beginning of things cannot be known, not because of the enormous time-element which would be involved, but because of the inherent contradiction of a static starting point in a dynamic process of evolution. The process is the action and reaction of phenomena which are nonexistent in the absolute sense, but which are arising and ceasing constantly, arising from passing conditions and giving way to new conditions arising from them. In this sense, therefore, there is no absolute beginning, but the process is relatively beginning and ceasing all the time. Similarly, there is no first cause in the sense of an absolute creation, but a conditioned process which *has* neither beginning nor end, but which *is* beginning and ending always.

H. G. A. van Zeyst

FLAG, THE BUDDHIST, and emblem or symbol of the Buddhists of Sri Lanka (Ceylon), first publicly and ceremonially hoisted at Dipaduttarārama, Kotahena by Migettuwatte Gunananda Thera on the Vaishaka (Vesak) day which fell on 28th April, 1885 A.C. The Flag was an indirect result of the Buddhist revivalist movement of the second half of the nineteenth century which occurred in Sri Lanka as a result of a challenge to western missionary activities in the Island.

The idea of a Buddhist flag to symbolize the unity of the Buddhists and the triumph of the Buddhist revivalist

movement was conceived by the members of the Colombo Committee which organised the Vesak day celebrations in 1880. This Committee consisted of the following members; Hikkaduwe Sri Sumangala Thera (Chairman), Ven. Migettuwatte Gunananda Thera, Don Carolis Hewavitharana, Muhandiram, A. P. Dharmagunawardena, William de Abrew, Carolis Pujitha Gunawardena (Secretary), Charles A. de Silva, N. S. Fernando, Peter de Abrew and H. William Fernando.

In the words of Col. Henry Steele Olcott, "It was at this time that our Colombo colleagues had the happy thought of devising a flag which would be adopted by all Buddhist nations as the universal symbol of their faith. Our Colombo brothers had hit upon the quite original and unique idea of blending in the flag the six colours alleged to have been exhibited in the aura of the Buddha."

The Buddhist flag was born on 17th April, 1885, when it appeared for the first time in the "Sarasavi Sandaresa" newspaper of that day. The proclamation did not name the designer. However, it refers to designers. As K. H. M. Sumathipala observed, "Perhaps the idea of a flag came from one, the colours came from another and so on." The Buddhist Theosophical Society in its Centenary Volume in 1980 paid a tribute to Carolis Pujitha Gunawardena who was the Secretary of the Colombo Committee as the designer of the Buddhist Flag. In 1928, the journal "Sudanamina" referred to the same fact and identified the designer of the Buddhist Flag. Nevertheless, it is accepted that members of the Committee appointed to organise the Vesak celebrations in 1885 have been credited for the designing of the Buddhist Flag.

The Buddhist flag when published in 1885, consisted of six colours; viz. *nīla* (saphire-blue), *pīta* (golden yellow), *lohita* (crimson), *odāta* (white), *mañjestha* (scarlet), and *prabhāsvara* (mixture of these five, bright and resplendent). The origin of these colours is attributed to the six hued rays that emanated from the body of the Buddha forming a fathom long halo. According to Col. Olcott, these same colours were used in the standard of the Dalai Lama of Tibet. The shape of the flag was rectangular. (see also AURA).

Col. Olcott who was in India when the Buddhists of Sri Lanka celebrated the first Vesak holiday under the British returned to the island on 28th January, 1886. He saw the Buddhist flag for the first time at the Dīpaduttarārāma, Kotahena. Olcott records his first impressions of the Buddhist flag in the following manner; "As the Colombo Committee had sketched the flag, it was of the inconvenient shape of a ship's long streaming pennant which would be quite unsuitable for carrying in procession or fixing in homes." He then suggesed that it should be made of the usual shape and size of national flags and when a sample was made, it was unanimously approved by the superior monks. Accordingly, the amended Buddhist flag appeared in the "Sarasavi Sandaresa" on 8th April, 1886. This amended flag was hoisted on the Vesak day in 1886 in almost every temple and many dwelling houses in Sri Lanka.

The flag was introduced to Japan in 1889, by Anagarika Dharmapala and Col. Henry Steele Olcott and subsequently to Burma. It was officially accepted as the flag of the Buddhists all over the world on a request made by Late Professor G. P. Malalasekera and was adopted by the World Fellowship of Buddhists when they met in Colombo in 1950. It now occupies the status of an international Buddhist symbol. (see Pl. XI).

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K. D. G. Wimalaratne

FLAGS AND BANNERS. Usually flags are made of bunting or similar material of various shapes and colours and often marked with some kind of symbol. In keeping with their shape they are called by different names such as banners, standards, pennons and streamers. The common Pali terms are *dhaja* (Skt. *dhvaja*), *patāka* and *ketu.*

Flags originated, perhaps, from totemistic insignia of people of early cultures. Their primary usage has been to express identity, superiority, self-assertion or victory. From very early times, however, flags have been used for both secular and religious purposes.

There is literary evidence to show that flags are used in India for these purposes from very early times. The *Atharva-veda* refers to the sun-flag *(sūrya-ketu).* The *Mahābhārata* makes reference to the monkey-flag *(vānara-ketu).* While *Vṛṣabha-dhvaja* (the bull-flag) is used as an epithet of Siva, the god of love has the epithet *makara ketana* (see *ERE* II, p. 349).

Buddhist texts too contain abundance of references to flags being used both on secular and religious occasions.

Numerous references and found to use of flags in the battle field. The flag was the symbol of the chariot *(dhajorathassa paññānam),* for when the flag is seen at a distance it enables one to identify the king to whom the chariot belonged The flag was used not merely as a rallying point but also as a moral booster. The texts describes how in the legendary war between suras (the gods) and asurās (demons), fear among the followers of

gods vanished at the sight of the flag of Sakka and other leading gods. (*S.* I. pp. 42, 218 f; *SA.* I. p. 97; *J.* VI. p. 449).

The use of flags in celebration of important events too was common in India and texts make reference to such occasions. Thus, when Mahāmayā went to her parental home for confinement the road from Kapilavāstu to Devadaha was decorated with flags and banners (*J.* I., p. 32). *Vimānavatthu Atthakathā* mentions how a householder decorated a pavilion which he built to receive the Buddha and his disciples, with flags and banners (*VinA. p. 173). Apadāna* (I, p. 108 f) records instances where flags were used to honour the Bodhi-tree and the Buddha. It mentions two monks, one who honoured the Bodhi-tree of Padumuttara Buddha and another who paid homage to Tissa Buddha with flags. These two are aptly referred to as Dhaja-dāyaka-donors of flags.

The use of flags on secular and religious occasions is quite common in Sri Lanka. The *Mahāvamsa* (xxxi. *v.* 42f.) refers to one thousand and eight youths in festal array, carrying multi-coloured flags, accompanying King Dutthagāmani when he went for the enshrinement of relics in the Mahāthūpa. On the occasion of the grand festival called Giribhanda-pūjā, in the reign of King Mahādāthika Mahānāga (7-19 A.C.), the roads around the Cetiyapabbata were decorated with flags (*Mhv.* xxxiv, *v.* 76). The Sinhala *Bodhivamsaya* (p. 179 ff) says that flags were extensively used to decorate the path; both in India and Sri Lanka, on the occasion of the arrival of the branch of the Bodhi-tree, and that at the end of the ceremony the king appointed a leading householder to raise gold and silver banners to the Bodhi-tree. The same source records flags being used at ceremonies performed to mark the Buddha's descent from Tāvatimsa heaven after preaching the Abhidhamma and also on the occasion of planting the Ānandabodhi as well as when Mahāvihāra was dedicated to the Saṅgha by King Devānampiyatissa.

The fact that the use of flags in honouring the stūpas is an age old practice is seen by a representation found on the railings of the Bhārhut stūpa (cir. 2nd cen. B.C.). This representation depicts a stūpa with two streamers on either side of the *chattra.* On such occasions whether flags were used purely for decorative purposes or as votive objects is not quite clear. However, in Sri Lanka, even at present, flags are generally used as votive offerings to Bodhi-trees, Buddha statues and stūpas and this could be a practice that has its origin in very early times.

Flags are also used in religious processions and this is a very conspicuous feature in religious processions of Sri Lanka.

H. R. Perera.

FLOWERS. The use of flowers for purposes of personal adornment, decoration, veneration, etc. has been prevalent from very early time as a feature of various cultures of the world. This has been a very prominent feature in Indian Culture and in the cultures of other countries that came under the influence of Buddhism.

It is the fragrance and the natural beauty of flowers with their variegated hues and shapes that attracted the attention of the people. The earliest use of flowers appears to have been for personal adornment. Use of garlands and chaplets made of flowers has been a common feature among all societies. As the use of flowers spread they were used for decorative purposes on festive and other important occasions, to show veneration, respect and honour to those deserving such esteem and also as objects of votive offerings.

The practice of using flowers for personal adornment later developed into a much cherished feature of the members of the affluent classes. The wide prevalence of this practice in India by the time of the Buddha is evident from the references found in Buddhist texts to florists. (*mālakāra D.* I, p. 51) who provided flowers to a rich and well to do clientale (cf. also *Pv.* II, p.4). The demand was not only for flowers but also for other products made out of flowers; flower-pillows and cushions *(puppha-- cumbattaka mālagula)* flower parasols *(puppha-chatta)* etc. Flowers were used even to be spread on beds and couches to obtain a cool, soft, comforting effect. It is also seen that the richer classes of Indian society took pride in maintaining pleasure groves *(ujjāna)* planted with flowering trees and fruit trees. There were garden-keepers *(ujjāna-pālaka)* appointed to see to their proper maintenance and protection. (*J.* I, pp. 120, 149; II, 104, 105 etc.) The birth of the Bodhisattva as well as the Parinirvāna of the Buddha took place in a grove of Sāla (Shorea robusta) flowers.

The antiquity of the practice of offering flowers or garlands made of flowers as a gesture showing veneration, honour and respect is well attested in literature as well as sculptural representation. Though *mālā* (flowers or garlands made of flowers) is included among the items of gifts to the brahmins and *samanas (A.* IV, p. 239), it is clear that the *bhikkhus* were not expected to use flowers for adornment. Abstention from the use of *mālā*, scents, ointment etc. is one of the ten precepts undertakes by the bhikkhus (*Vin.* I, p. 83). The Buddha himself is said to have been one who abstained from the use of these (*D.* I. p.5). The precept as well as the Buddha's conduct in this regards shows that the use of flowers, perfumes etc. for personal adornment was not allowed for the bhikkhus. But this does not mean that the devotees were prevented from demonstrating their veneration and respect by offering flowers. The *Kāliṅgabodhi Jātaka (J.* IV, p.228)

says that the people were in the habit of coming to Jetavana carrying perfumes, garlands etc. to offer to the Budddha. From this Jātaka it could be surmised that once the Ānanda Bodhi was planted the devotees considered it as a symbolic representation of the Buddha, and in the absence of the Buddha, made their offerings to the Bodhi tree. The *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta (D.* I. p. 159) describes how the Mallas of Kusinārā took perfumes, garlands etc. and went to the Sāla Grove, where lay the remains of the Buddha, to pay homage and veneration. In Sāñci there are sculptural representation that depict the event of the attainment of Enlightenment at which celestial beings are depicted as offering garlands and trays full of flowers (see *The Way of the Buddha*, Govt. of India, 1956, p. 70, pl. 76). The event of the preaching of the *Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta* too is similarly depicted in sculpture at Bhārhut and Amarāvati. In these sculptures too celestial beings are represented as making offerings of flowers and garlands (see *EncyB'sm.* Vol. I, Pl. XXXIV, II, Pl. LXXVIII).

The *Apadāna* contains accounts of a number of arahants who in their previous births are said to have offered flowers to the former Buddhas. The Arahant Puppha cangotiya is said to have sprinkled flowers over Sikhi Buddha (*Ap.* I, p. 118). The Arahant Puppha-chattiya is said to have made a parasol of flowers which he held over Siddhattha Buddha (ibid. p. 264f). Another arahant Pupphathūpiya is said to have made a thūpa of flowers in honour of Vipassi Buddha (ibid. p. 155 f.). The arahant Pupphadhara is said to have held a canopy of flowers over Sikhi Buddha while arahant Pupphāsaniya made a flower seat for Siddhattha Buddha (ibid. pp. 244, 254). Such offering of flowers specially to the Buddha is considered an extremely meritorious act.

It is apparent that the offering of flowers to demonstrate respect and veneration is not a practice of Buddhist origin, but it goes back to further antiquity and adopted by the Buddhists. While adopting this popular practice the Buddhists, however, have given it a totally new dimension. While retaining its original objective of showing veneration they make use of it as an exercise in meditation. At the time of offering flowers the devotees are expected to contemplate on the impermanency of all phenomena, and to help such contemplation the flowers that are offered are used on objects of contemplation. The devotees are asked to contemplate on the withering of flowers and through that to reflect on the evanescent nature of everything. The stanza uttered on the occasion of offering flowers to the Buddha helps to achieve this objective..

Pūjemi buddhaṃ kusumen'ena
Puññena me'tena ca hotu mokkhaṃ
Pupphaṃ milāyāti yathā hi dhamme
Kāyo tathā yāti vināsabhāvaṃ
Vaṇṇa-gandha guṇopetaṃ etaṃ kusuma santatiṃ
Pūjayāmi munindassa siripādasaroruhe

With this flower I worship the Buddha
May the merit accrued therefrom bring about my freedom
Just as the flower withers away according to nature
Similarly the body, too, withers away
With this colourful fragrant garland of flowers I worship the lotus like feet of the Buddha.

Not only the Buddha but also the Bodhi tree (as a *pāribhogika cetiya*, a relic of personal use of the Buddha) and the thūpa (as a *sārīrika-cetiya* because it contains the bodily relics of the Buddha) too have become objects of such veneration.

In Buddhist countries, even at present, flowers are profusely used for the same purposes for which they were used in ancient times. These practices are very common in Sri Lanka, where devotees always make it a point to take flowers when they go to the temple to worship. Special daises called *'mal āsanas'* erected for the purpose of placing the floral offering, are found in all temples. These *mal āsanas* are found in the shrine room, at the thūpa and also near the bodhi-tree. The devotees after repeating the stanzas and contemplating in the said manner, place the flowers on the dais. Normally on full-moon days these *malāsanas* overflow with flowers offered by the devotees. On the occasions of Bodhi Pūjā, too, flowers are profusely used, devotees offering festoons and trays full of flowers.

Similarly flowers are used in other Buddhist countries. This is specially so in Japan where under the influence of Zen Buddhism offering of flowers has almost become cult. A special ceremony called the Hanamasturi is held on the 8th of April to celebrate the Birth of the Buddha.

The appreciation of the flowers in these countries is seen also from their extensive use in art and architecture, as well as reference to them in literature. Floral designs are a common feature in all forms of art. Buddhist literature abounds in similes connected with flowers (see *JPTS.* 1907, p. 123)

For the Buddhists the lotus seem to be of special significance as an object of votive offering, the subject of floral design, and also as a symbol of purity and emancipation. The Buddhists in Sri Lanka consider the offering of lotus flowers as a special offering. The lotus is a common subject of very intricate, decorative floral designs usually in temple art and architecture. The origin of the concept of the lotus as the symbol of purity and emancipation could be traced to a simile employed of the Buddha himself.

As recorded in the *Puppha Sutta* or the *Vaddha Sutta* of the *Samyutta Nikaya* (*S.* III, p. 138f) the Buddha compares himself to a lotus. He says, "Just as bretheren, a dark blue lotus or a white lotus, born in the water, come to full growth in the water, rises to the surface and stands unspollied by the water, even so, bretheren, the Tathāgatha (having been born in the world) having come to full growth in the world, passing beyond the world abides unspollied by the world (cf. *Kindred Sayings*, III, p. 118).

In passing it should be noticed that texts refer also to celestial flowers *(dibba puppha)*. Of these the frequently mentioned are the pāricchattaka (the coral tree, Erythrina Indica) which is said to be a flower of a tree growing in Indra's heaven (*Vin.* I, p. 30; *A.* IV, 117f) and Mandārava (the coral tree, Erythrina fulgens). The *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta* records that there was a shower of Mandārava flowers when the Buddha laid himself down between the twin Sāla trees jut prior to his Parinibbāna. (*D.* I, p.137).

S. K. Nanayakkara

FONDUKISTAN, a site of Buddhistic importance in Afghanistan, not very far from Bamiyan. It was a resting place along the route from Gandhāra to China through Central Asia at its westernmost terminus (Seckel, *Art of Buddhism,* Art of the World Series, London, 1964, pp. 62f.).

Buddhist finds from Fondukistan, are extremely few and have been discovered from the site of an isolated monastery, but they are of high artistic value. Among them is a terra-cotta bodhisattva figure assigned to the 7th century A.C. B. Rowland *(the Art and Architecture of India,* Great Britain, 1956, p. 103) in describing this figure states: "The perfect realization of this entirely relaxed and warmly voluptuous body, sunk in sensuous reverie, is as exquisite as anything to be found in the art of Gupta India. The modelling, in its definition of softness of flesh and precision of ornament, is only the final and entirely typical accomplishment of a tradition going back to the beginnings of Indian Art," C. Sivaramamurti *(2500 Years of Buddhism,* Govt. of India, 1956, p. 295) describes this and other bodhisattva figures from Fondukistan as wearing flowing garments on their youthful bodies which are so modelled as to suggest softness to the touch and being seemingly animated and having a rare grace that is seen in Gupta works of art of the corresponding period.

From Fondukistan has also been found a fragmentary Buddha which is also of interest both stylistically and iconographically. B. Rowland (loc. cit.) considers this figure as a reflexion of the Gupta style in several aspects. The head is a compromise between the dry, mask-like treatment of Gandhāra and the fullness of Kushan Buddhas and the hair is represented by snail-shell curls, following the orthodox Indian style. The robe is in the Gandhāran style but the bodily form is entirely Indian.

The most significant iconographical feature of this figure is the painted, jewel-studded chasuble that it wears over the monastic robes. The figure is also shown as wearing heavy ornaments.

These attributes, seemingly inappropriate for one who has renounced worldly riches are a symbolical device to indicate that this is the Buddha in his transcendent, glorified form, the apotheosis in which he reveals himself to the host of bodhisattvas. B. Rowland (loc. cit.) is of opinion that it is quite possible that statues of the Buddha, originally of Hinayāna were later transformed into Mahāyāna icons by being dressed up in actual jewels and garments.

It is also the opinion of C. Sivaramamurti (op. cit. p. 295) that this bejewelled Buddha from Fondukistan represents a compromise between the emperor and monk, perhaps an artistic representation of the prediction by astrologers of the possibilities of prince Siddhārtha becoming either a Buddha or a universal monarch.

This type of bejewelled Buddha is a special feature of Buddhist art from Fondukistan and it is presumed that the more common crowned Buddha in Pāla sculpture of later times was a replica of this earlier Fondukistan variety, the only significant difference between the two categories being that in the Fondukistan bejewelled Buddha the curls of hair are in the orthodox style whereas the Pāla figures have a crown. Figures of the bejewelled Buddha belonging to the period from 8th-12th century A.C. are also found in India, Tibet, Nepal and Indonesia (cp. also CROWNED BUDDHA). Seckel (op. cit. pp. 62f) observes that the close similarity of Fondukistan sculpture to the late Gupta art shows the influence of the latter on Fondukistan art and suggests with some probability a date not earlier than the 7th century to this site. They also provide evidence of the continuous stimulus afforded by India. According to B. Rowland (op. cit. p.79) Fondukistan is one of the centres where the final phase of Gandhāran art was continued at least as late as the 7th century A.C.

It is observed (B. Rowland, op. cit. p. 113) that sculptures of Kashmir of about the eighth century show a close resmblance to the terra-cotta figurines from Fondukistan. At Tumshuq, a site north of Khotan and east of Kashgar terra-cotta reliefs and individual figures are said to closely resemble those from Fondukistan (Seckel, op. cit. p. 66; Rowland, op. cit. p. 106).

The Fondukistan finds are among the most original products of this northwestern border area. Their subjects and types display the greatest variety of lively modelling.

The site was discovered at the beginning of the twentieth century in the course of expeditions undertaken by Aurel Stein, Albert Grunwedel, Albert von Le coq, Paul Pelliot and others. Most of the finds discovered by them are presently exhibited in the museums in London, Paris, Berlin and New Delhi (Seckel, op. cit. pp. 62f).

H. R. Perera

FOOD. Material or physical food *(kabaliṅkāra āhāra)*, being a primary need for life itself, constitutes the physical basis of all action. It is food that nourishes the eightfold corporeality namely the solid, liquid, heat, motion, colour, odour the taste and the nutrient essence (*Vism.* p. 341).

Food is divided into various categories. A basic categorization is into solid and gross food *(olārika)* and fine and equisite food *(sukhuma)*. *Khajja* and *bhojja* too appear to denote the same division. A further subdivision of this is *khajja, bhojja, leyya* (to be sipped) and *peyya* (to be drunk). What is eaten *(asita)*, drunk *(pīta)* chewed *(khāyita)* and what is tasted *(sayita)* also is a similar division.

From this it is clear that food, in the broader sense, constitute not only of what is eaten, but also of what is drunk. Hence the common term *(anna-pāna* (food and drink) could be taken as another term for food in general, though *pāna* by itself could mean water (cf. *Sn.v.* 485, 487)

The *Suttanipāta atthakathā* explains *anna* as gruel, rice etc. *(yāgubhattādi: SnA.* p. 378). In meaning, *anna-pāna* is similar to *anna-bhojana, bhojana* in this instance denoting soft or more liquid like food. (*Dhp. v.* 249, *T.* I, p.204).

While food is a basic necesslity of life, the Buddha points out that over eating leads to physical discomfort, ill-health and dulling of sense faculties. Thus, on one occasion the Buddha, observing King Pasenadi Kosala, who came to see him, breathing heavily and puffing after a heavy meal, uttered this stanza.

"To sons of men who ever mindful live
Measure observing in the food they take
All minished becomes the power of sense
Softly old age steals on, their days prolonged"

It is recorded that the King, when he heard this stanza, asked his nephew who was with him to memorize it and repeat it regularly at dinner time. This, it is said, helped the king to moderate his eating-habits and maintain his figure and health. (*S.* I, p.81; *Gradual sayings I*, p. 108).

Abstemiousness *(bhojane mattaññutā)* is much emphasised by the Buddha. He strongly recommended the monks to be moderate in eating. The Buddha explains that partaking of alms food should be neither for pastime, nor for indulgence, nor to become beautiful or handsome, but merely to maintain and support the body, to avoid harm and to assist noble life. (*A. I.* p. 114)

The Buddha uses food even as an object of meditation, which we call 'the reflection on the loathesomeness of food' *(āhare paṭikūlasaññā)*. In the practice of this meditation one has to resort to a solitary spot and reflect and review the repulsiveness of food in ten aspects. The process involved in this meditation is elaborately discussed in the *Visuddhimagga*, chapter xi. Further see ĀHĀRA, BHOJANA.

H. G. A. van Zeyst

FORBEARANCE. See KHANTI

FORFEITURE. See NISSAGGIYA PĀCITTIYA

FORM. See RŪPA

FOUR-FOLD ALTERNATIVES, *Catuṣkoṭi*, the four-fold alternatives occuring in Buddhist texts, has been variously referred to by writers as the Buddhist four-fold logic (Hoffman, 1982), the Buddhist teltralemma (Staal, 1976), the four-cornered negations in Indian Philosophy (Raju, 1953) and the Buddhist dialectic (Murti, 1955). *Catuṣkoṭi* statements occur both in early Buddhist and Mahāyāna writings. In particular, the *avyākata* questions, the questions on which the Buddha observed silence, occur in the form of *catuṣkoṭi* alternatives. For example, the following *catuṣkoṭi* is an *avyākata*.

The world is eternal
The world is not eternal
The world is both eternal and not eternal
The world is neither eternal nor not eternal (*Dīgha-nikāya* I, p. 13 ff. The fourth alternative is not seen there, but appears in later literature).

The origin and development, the logical form and its interpretation and the applications of *catuṣkoṭi* have

drawn the attention of the students of Buddhism time and again. The present article will deal with each of these three aspects.

The Origins of Catuṣkoṭi: Two other systems of statements current in India during and probably before Buddha's life time show striking similarities with *catuṣkoṭi* although these also are seen to differ from it in fundamental aspects. The two systems are the *syādvāda* of the Jains and the five-fold negations of the Sceptics.

The *saptabhaṅgi* or the seven-fold predication of the Jains, which gives expression to *syādvāda* or non-absolutism *(anekānta)*, could be illustrated by the following example.

i. The pot certainly *(eva)* exists in some respect *(syād)*.
ii. The pot certainly does not exist in some respect.
iii. The pot certainly exists and does not exist in some respect.
iv. The pot certainly is indescribable in some respect.
v. The pot certainly exists and is indescribable in some respect.
vi. The pot certainly does not exist and is indescribable in some respect.
vii. The pot certainly exists and does not exist and is indescribable in some respect.

The Ancient Indian Sceptics, some of whom also lived at the time of the Buddha and Jaina saints like Mahāvira (6th century B.C.) had a five-fold system of negation, in contrast with the seven-fold system of affirmation of the Jains. The five alternatives in this negation take the form:

i. I do not say so
ii. I do not say thus
iii. I do not say otherwise
iv. I do not say no
v. I do not say 'no, no'.

The *catuṣkoṭi*, the Jaina *santabhaṅgi* and the five-fold negations of the Sceptics seem to be three forms of aternative ways of predication which were in use at the time and these seem to have had some affinity. The first four alternatives of the *saptabhaṅgi* correspond closely to the four alternatives of the *catuṣkoṭi*. Again, it has been argued, for example, by K. N. Jayatilleke, (Jayatilleke, 1963, pp. 137-8) that the first four of the five-fold negations of the Sceptics could be viewed as the negations of the first four alternatives of the *catuṣkoṭi*. Moreover, Jayatilleke indicates there that except for the Sceptics' withholding of judgement on the basis of unknowability of any situation, the Jaina *saptabhaṅgi* and the Sceptics' negations seem to correspond to each other quite well.

Some scholars think that the Sceptic Sañjaya Bellaṭṭhiputta was the initiator of the four-fold predication or the *catuṣkoṭi* (Keith, 1923, p. 303, Staal, 1976, p. 124) as some statements ascribed to him appear in this four-fold form.

But Sañjaya's views are known only through Buddhist texts and it is possible that the Buddhists innovated and adopted this four-fold scheme and expressed the denials of the Sceptic Sañjaya in *catuṣkoṭi* form (Jayatilleke, 1963, p. 138).

The four alternatives in the *catuṣkoṭi* are very likely based on the different views about subjects such as the world, the soul, causation and moral life existent among the various groups at the time.

Alex Wayman, for example, has maintained that the views on causation in the *catuṣkoṭi* alternatives represent respectively the Sāmkya, the Iśvaravādin, the Nyāya Vaiśeska and Lokāyata views (Wayman, 1977, p. 11). And Jayatilleke too has expressed that the alternatives are drawn from the views in actual existence at the time (Jayatilleke, 1963, p. 344).

The Sceptics rejected the assertion of any of the four alternatives, as it was not-possible to know the truth of any of them. The Buddhists at times rejected all the four alternatives explicitly (*Kaccāyanagotta Sutta, S.* II, p. 16f.) and at times implicitly (Buddha's silence on *avyākata* questions) but they also accepted one (or more) eleternative(s) to be true in some cases.

Logical form and interpretation: Much of the interest in the *catuṣkoṭi* has been generated by the problematic nature of its logical form and its interpretation. If we take, for example, the *avyākata*.

i. The world is finite
ii. The world is infinite
iii. The world is both finite and infinite
iv. The world is neither finite nor infinite (*Dīgha nikāya* I pp. 22-3) it appears as though (i) the third alternative is self-contradictory and (ii) the fourth is equivalent to the third and hence is also self-contradictory, if the Laws of Excluded Middle and Double Negation are operative. This has led to much controversy and the views expressed on this could be summarised in the following manner.

(a) *Catuṣkoṭi* statements ignore the laws of thought and hence cannot be understood (Poussin, 1917, p. 111).
(b) *Catuṣkoṭi* statements are expressions of the Laws of Thought (Mrs. Rhy Davids, *ERE* Vol. 8, pp. 133 Barua, 1921, p. 47).
(c) *Catuṣkoṭi* statements constitute a mutually exclusive and together exhaustive disjunction which can be analysed in terms of a Boolean class algebra.

They are, to an extent, related to the Aristotellian A,E,I,O forms. *Catuṣkoṭi* also has a pedagogical use (Robinson, 1957, p. 303).

(d) *Catuṣkoṭi* statements constitute a mutually exclusive and together exhaustive disjunction. They can be analysed in terms either or both non-quantified and quantified propositions, and it constitutes a "two valued logic of four-alternatives" (Jayatilleke, 1963, p. 339).

(e) *Catuṣkoṭi* statements do not always exhibit consistent logical form. They must be understood by the purposes for which they were employed. There are threee kinds of *Catuṣkoṭi*:

i. a disjunctive system
ii. an instrument of meditation on causation
iii. an instrument of meditation on existence. It is a dialectic of negation which rejects reason and/or leads to truth (Wayman, 1977, pp. 4ff, 14 ff).

(f) *Catuṣkoṭi* is best regarded not as a statement, but as a pedagogical or therapeutic device. Yet, it is not to be considered an irrational system, for the irrationality is avoided when the predicate occurring in the alternatives is not taken in the same sense in all the alternatives. In the case of Nāgārjuna, he may have accepted some contradictions in his struggle with the limitations of language and the mind (Staal, 1976, p. 127).

(g) *Catuṣkoṭi* statements cease to have a contradictory character when the negations are interpreted not as ***pāryudāsa*** but as *prasajja pratiṣedha* (Matilal, 1971, p. 164).

(h) *Catuṣkoṭi* statements, in general, cannot be given any symbolic or logical representation (except in terms of intuitionistic logic, but this is irrelevant). The *catuṣkoṭi* merely shows that as long as one's own view is held to be ultimate one can never avoid dogmatism. The *catuṣkoṭi* is not a Buddhist logic; Buddhists are only its critics and they reject it. It is a dialectic which makes use of the fact that four positions are possible in regard to any statement. The *catuṣkoṭi* is applicable to metaphysical speculation only (Chi. 1974, pp. 295-98).

(i) *Catuṣkoṭi* is a dialectic which shows the conflict in reason (Murti, 1955, pp. 40-41).

It must be emphasized here that some of these comments have been made considering only the *catuṣkoṭi* occurring in early Buddhist literature, and some only those in Mādhyamika literature and a few considering both.

Of these views (a) and (b) have been shown to be implausible (Jayatilleke, 1963, pp. 333) and hardly need consideration; (g) too has been well contested (Staal, 1976, p. 126). The position in (h) that *catuṣkoṭi* cannot be given a symbolic or logical representation, has been contested by the present writer (Gunaratne, 1980). The rest of the views, viz. (c), (d), (e), (f) and (i) make one or more of the following points.

i. The *catuṣkoṭi* is a disjunctive system whose logical form could be studied.
ii. There is no irrrationality in the *catuṣkoṭi*-statements.
iii. The *catuṣkoṭi* has a dialectical aspect.
iv. It has a pedagogical aspect.

It is possible to substantiate (i) and (ii) by bringing out what could be considered the logical form of *catuṣkoṭi*. Richard Robinson and R. S. Y. Chi gave some formulations as representing the logical forms of the *catuṣkoṭi*, but since these writers themselves later on admitted weakneses in their formulations these need not be considered. Among others, K. N. Jayatilleke, in his papers and the books, formulated a number of quantified and non-quantified forms as giving the logical form of the alternatives in the *catuskoṭi* but these were also found to be not completely satisfactory (Gunaratne, 1980, pp. 216 ff.). The work of Robinson, Staal, Chi, Jayatilleke and many others brought out the view that the predicates in the different alternatives need not be and should not be taken in the same sense and the alternatives are best considered as contraries. The present writer, in a paper published in 1980, developed two key forms which could be considered as giving the logical form of *catuṣkoṭi* occurring in early Buddhism. The forms are in terms of class logic and the first form, meant for *catuṣkoṭi* with singular statements, is

(i) $X \ E \ A \cap \bar{B}$
(ii) $X \ E \ \bar{A} \cap B$
(iii) $X \ E \ A \cap B$
(iv) $X \ E \ \bar{A} \cap \bar{B}$

where 'E' stands for 'is a member of', $\cap$ for class product, X for an individual thing, say, the world and A, for example, the class for all things which have finite aspects and B, the class of all things which have infinite aspects and $\bar{A}$ and $\bar{B}$ are the complements of A and B respectively. On this notation the symbolization given above represents the four alternatives in the *catuṣkoṭi*.

The world is finite
The world is infinite
The world is finite and infinite
The world is neither finite nor infinite.

The symbolization will mean that the first alternative states that the world has finite aspects but no infinite aspects, the second that the world has infinite aspects but no finite aspects and the third that it has both finite and infinite aspects. The fourth alternative could mean that 'finite' and 'infinite' do not apply to any aspect of the

world. The symbolization gives a mutually exclusive and together exhaustive set of four statements for the four alternatives of the *catuṣkoṭi.*

For sentences which could be given an interpretation which turn the alternatives out to be universal propositions the following symbolization of the alternatives was given.

(i) $X \cap (A \cap \bar{B}) = 0$
(ii) $X \cap (\bar{A} \cap B) = 0$
(iii) $X \cap (A \cap B) = 0$
(iv) $X \cap (\bar{A} \cap \bar{B}) = 0$

This symbolization can represent *catuṣkoṭi* like

The soul is wholly happy
The soul is wholly unhappy
The soul is wholly happy and unhappy
The soul is neither happy nor unhappy

Which could be given a universal interpretation to read

All souls are wholly happy
All souls are wholly unhappy and so on.

X here is the class of all souls, A the class of all things with happy aspects and B the calss of all things with unhappy aspects and 'o' symbolizes the null class.

Here again we get a mutually exclusive and a together exhaustive set of statements. While "infinite" and "finite" thus turn out to just opposite in the earlier example, "happy" and "unhappy" are opposites in the last example.

These two forms, named α and β, could be made to apply to most of the *catuskoti* and these and a few other symbolizations outlined in that paper could provide the logical form of the *catuṣkoṭi* in early Buddhism.

F. J. Hoffman, in two more recent publications has given an interpretation which evades the contradictions in the third and fourth alternatives, on lines somewhat similar to that taken in the symbolizations given above, but without the formalizations given here and probably unaware of the same. Hoffman says, "I think they can be understood properly as existential statements *viz.*, there exists an X such that y obtains, there exists a X such that y does not obtain but z obtains, there exists an X such that y obtains (in part) and z obtains (in part), there exists an X such that neither y nor z obtains." (Hoffman, 1982, p. 333). Hoffman's approach seems correct, but a more comprehensive and a formalized solution was given in the present writer's earlier paper.

In view of the foregoing one is able to see that the *catuṣkoṭi* could be understood as a logically consistent, mutually exclusive and together exhaustive set of alternatives. The *catuṣkoṭi* thus is also a disjunctive system and at least in early Buddhism, the alternatives are not each true in turn from different standpoints as in the case of the Jaina *syādvāda.* But there are rare examples of *catuṣkoṭi* — where all four mutually exclusive alternatives are true and are together exhaustive. Such an example is the following:

Some persons are tormentors of themselves
(Yet) Some (other) pesons are tormentors of others
(Yet) Some (other) persons torment themselves and others
(Yet) Some (other) persons neither torment themselves nor torment others (*M.* I, p. 341).

It has been argued by the present writer that this *catuṣkoṭi* can be symbolized by form α (i.e., $X \to A \cap \bar{B}$ and so on, see Gunaratne 1980, pp. 226-7). It is clear that the Buddha considered that all the four alternatives of this disjunction are true at the same time, although the Buddha would have advocated that beings should try to attain the state described by the fourth alternative.

Catuṣkoṭi of Nāgārjuna and the Mādhyamika: The interest in the *catuṣkoṭi* was partly generated by their occurrence in Nāgārjuna's works. The Mādhyamika rejects almost all of the *catuṣkoṭi* but there is one exception, and this anomalous case will be taken up later on.

The way in which ***catuṣkoṭi*** occur in Nāgārjuna's works like the ***Mūlamādhyamika Kārikā*** has led some Western writers to ascribe an irrationality or a mysticism to it. "Because of its explicitness, the Buddhist *catuṣkoṭi*-appears to provide the strongest support for the view that Indian philosophies and religions tend to violate the principle of non-contradiction and are, in that strong sense, irrational. If the tetralemma, however, can be made good sense of by means of a simple and rational interpretation, it becomes much more hazardous to maintain the irrationalist interpretation of Indian thought and of oriental thought in general" writes Frits Staal (Staal, 1976, p. 130) who thinks that such irrationalist interpretations should be laid to rest.

There is evidence that Nāgārjuna did not deny any principles of logic (Robbinson, (1957) p. 307) and least of all the principle of non-contradiction. Indeed the full weight of the *reductio ad absurdum* arguments in the *Kārikā* rests on the invocation of that very principle. Whether the Mādhyamika rejected the Laws of Excluded Middle and/or Double Negation will be considered in the following.

The rationality of the Mādhyamika system has been defended in many ways. For example, Staal (1975, pp. 40-53) maintains its rationality on two grounds. One is that since the Mādhyamika negates all the *catuṣkoṭi* it is not accepting any contradictory statements occurring in the third and fourth lemmas and hence it is not irrational. The other ground is that, in Staal's contention, the Mādhyamika rejected the Laws of Excluded Middle and

Double Negation, so that the third and fourth lemmas thereby cease to be self-contradictory or equivalent. The first of these contentions has a problem in that there is at least one *catuṣkoṭi* which does not seem to be negated in the *Kārikā*. As well noted by Staal, Robinson and others, this is the verse,

Sarvaṃ tathyam na vā tathyam cātathyam eva ca
Naivātathyaṃ naiva tathyam etad buddhānuśāsanaṃ (Mūlamādhyamika Kārika XVIII. 8).

This verse has been variously translated. Robinson, for example, renders it as "everything is real or unreal or both real and unreal or neither real nor not unreal." This anomalous case, as already indicated, will be taken up later.

That the Mādhyamika rejected the Laws of Excluded Middle and Double Negation is, to say the least, controversial.

It is true that if these principles were rejected the third and fourth lemmas cease to be self-contradictory or equivalent. This has been well expounded and 'defended' by Murti (1955, pp. 146–48) and he is quoted here at length as the passage will also be useful for discussions later on in this article.

"Another line of objection may be adopted to confute the Mādyamika. When one alternative is rejected or accepted the other is *eo ipso* accepted or rejected, else the Law of the Excluded Middle would be violated. The Mādyamika flagrantly violates this law at every step; we find him cutting down all the laternatives that are, by canons of formal logic, both exclusive and exahustive. For instance, four alternatives are framed by him with regard to causation, but none is accepted; "Neither out of themselves not out of others, nor from both, nor at random have entities come into being anywhere." Is not the rejection of *satkāryavāda* (Identity of cause and effect) tantamount to accepting *asatkāryavāda*- (difference between cause and effect) this being the contradictory? Does not the rejection of motion entail the acceptance of rest this being its material contradictory? The Mādhyamika rejects both.

The Mādhyamika is not the only sinner in rejecting the Excluded Middle. Kant does not accept it when he formulates his antinomies and rejects both of them, e.g., "the world has a beginning in space and time" and "the world has no such beginning etc." Hegel himself does not recognize the Law; had he done so, he should have chosen either Being or Non-Being instead of seeking a third.

No logical flow is involved in not observing the Excluded Middle. If any one wants to vindicate this law, he must not only resolve the antinomies which a dialectic presents, but show that in rejecting one alternative, we do so by covertly accepting its contradictory or vice-versa."

All the same, Murti's (and Staal's) contention that Nāgārjuna (Mādhyamika) rejected the Principle of Excluded Middle seems implausible and it is not a contention necessary for the defence of the rationality of Nāgārjuna's system. The present writer's arguments (Gunaratne, 1986) indicate that Nāgārjuna not only accepts the Principle of Excluded Middle but he also seems to accept the Principle of Double Negation. Moreover, the rationality of the system is not touched by this situation.

It would be better to outline the main contention of the paper referred to (i.e. Gunaratne, 1986) to appreciate this position. It considers that it is best to view that *catuṣkoṭi*- in the *Mūlamādhayamika Kārikā* as having a two pronged interpretation; first, the early Buddhist one, symbolizable by forms α and β outlined earlier in this article; Second, a Nāgārjunian one, termed α_n and β_n, which are in a sense the limiting classes of the symbolizations α and β when the two classes A and B used in those symbolizations coalesce and reduce to one class, say, A.

This suggestion has two preliminary bases. First, it is important to emphasize that, for centuries, *catuṣkoṭi*-alternatives were *entertained* by the Indians and were not thought to be self-contradictory or causing logical problems. They were understood and interpreted to be such. (see e.g., Staal 1976, pp. 127-8). Nāgārjuna was well varsed in the early Buddhist literature and he well knew the interpretations which made these *catuṣkoṭi* be *entertained.* Consider a statement like '*Nirvāṇa* is both real and unreal.' We could symbolize this by α and in form X E A $\cap$ B where X is *Nirvāṇa,* A is the class of all things with real aspects and B is the class of all things with unreal aspects. This symbolization, as indicated earlier, corresponds to the early Buddhist interpretation.

Nāgārjuna entertains this early Buddhist position in the *Kārikā*, but he rejects this as self-contradictory. This is because *for him,* and in the case of more general type of predicate like 'real' that he considers-(like those in the *avyākata)* - the predicate has to be asserted of the whole subject. This is noted by Robinson (Robinson, 1967, p. 54) who says, "It is a striking feature of the *Stanzas* that all predicates seem to be asserted totally of the whole subject. Existential quantifications are denied because the discussion is concerned, not with the denial or affirmation of commonsense assertions such as "some fuel is burning, and some is not" but with the concepts of own being and essence. What pertains to part of an essence must of course pertain to the whole essence."

In early Buddhism the different or "opposite" characteristics or *dharma* marks were considered to be able to coexist in the same object. A situation of that nature has no room in Nāgārjuna's philosophy of relativism and *śūnyatā*. The minimum that is required for

Nāgārjuna's account seems not to be the strong position that there are different qualities in an object, then each of these qualities has to be one with the object through and through. This disallows contradictory predicates being predicated of the same thing.

Thus, although there can be two classes A and B, where A is the class of all things with real aspects and B is the class of all things with unreal aspects, the members of A and B will have to be different; that is, the same member cannot belong to both A and B. For the opposite will say that some objects have both "being real" and "being unreal" through and through or else have both of them as essences. That cannot be, for "real" and "unreal" cannot be in the same place at the same time. If the two predicates exist in one thing they have to be one with that thing and with each other. But how could "real" and "unreal" be one with each other? This is the basis on which Nāgārjuna says that *nirvāṇa* cannot represent the place of reality and nonreality simultaneously. .

This makes the two classes A and B mutually exclusive and "real" and "unreal" contrary predicates. It can now be argued that it is proper to consider the classes A and B corresponding to predicates like "real" and "unreal" as having been considered by Nāgārjuna to be together exhaustive as well.

What has to be shown is that "real" and "unreal" cannot be denied together of an object, according to Nāgārjuna. That would amount to showing that "not real" and "not unreal" could not be asserted of the same object. That this was Nāgārjuna's view is seen by the following considerations.

Nāgārjuna was aware that there is logical similarity between the third and the fourth alternatives. Thus, for example, in the case of the predicates "limited" and "nonlimited", he says : "If both the limited and the non-limited could be established (concomitantly) then, similarly, neither the limited nor the non-limited could also be established at will." (Inada, 1970, p. 171).

This clearly indicates that while limited and nonlimited could not be predicated together (as this leads to contradiction), "neither the limited nor the nonlimited" also could not be predicated of a thing (as this also leads to contradiction). For the argument, in effect, says that if you establish one contradiction (the third alternative), you could prove the other contradiction (the fourth alternative).

The argument is general enough, and this shows that,

(X is) real and (X is) unreal

as well as not (X is) real and not (X is) unreal

are contradictions, making "real" and 'unreal" contradictory predicates. This shows that A (the class of all objects with real aspects) and B (the class of all objects with unreal aspects) are mutually exclusive and together exhaustive. Thus B reduces to A, the complement of A.

That Nāgārjuna considered real and unreal as exhaustive of the universe of discourse is strikingly seen in verses 15 and 16, in the examination of *nirvāṇa*. Inada (1970) renders these verses as, the proposition that *nirvāṇa* is neither existence nor nonexistence could only be valid if and when the realms of existence and nonexistence are established.

If indeed *nirvāṇa* is asserted to be neither existence nor nonexistence, then by what means are the assertion to be known?

Verse 15 indicates that for the fourth alternative to be asserted in this instance, that there is a realm (that is, an area of discourse) outside the realms of existence (real) and nonexistence (nonreal) should be shown. Verse 16 says that there is no way of understanding the assertion that *nirvāṇa* in neither existence nor nonexistence. This indicates that Nāgārjuna considers this statement not to be referring to anything in the universe of discourse; that is, its "reference" is outside the universe of discourse. This position is very significant and illuminating when one takes into account the fact that of all things, *nirvāṇa* was, and is even today, considered to be one of the few concepts in Buddhism which Buddhists have "defined" or "understood" in terms of "neither existence nor non-existence" (Thomas, 1933, p. 121). Nāgārjuna refuses to understand this, since such a sentence, if seriously asserted, takes one beyond the universe of discourse, that is, beyond language. Of course, that is exactly what he meant to do – to lead the reader beyond language and to *paramārtha* or *nirvāṇa*. He is really killing two birds with this one shot. For on the one hand, he is showing the "closedness" of language and its inability to give meaning to *nirvāṇa* or *paramārtha*. On the other, he uses this argument to reject the fourth alternative. For the discussion, though purported to direct one to the *paramārtha* level, has to be maintained at the *saṃvṛti* level (to avoid paradox), as Nāgārjuna explicity acknowledges. That is why the contradiction (and the nonunderstandability) helps Nāgārjuna to reject it.

Thus for the purposes of Nāgārjuna's philosophy and his rejection of the alternatives, it is necessary to understand the "opposite" concepts in the alternatives as given by complementary classes. The forms of the *catuṣkoṭi* on this interpretation can be considered as limiting cases of α and β, where B is the complement of A, that is, $\bar{A}$. The two classes now become A and $\bar{A}$, and the form α_N corresponding to α will be

(i) $X E A \cap \bar{\bar{A}}$ (ii) $X E \bar{A} \cap \bar{A}$ (iii) $X E A \cap \bar{A}$ (iv) $X E \bar{A} \cap A$ which reduce to (i) $X E A$ (ii) $X E \bar{A}$ and (iii) and (iv) get rejected as these will say that $X E O$, whose O is the null class.

Thus, it is seem that Nāgārjuna does not reject the Law of Excluded Middle. Indeed he makes use of it. What he does is to point out that when one does not use it – as, for example, when one asserts *nirvāna* to be neither existence nor non-existence (i.e., suggestion of a third or middle position) that creates problems, as one is led to a situation which cannot be captured by language.

The analogy that Murti sees between Kant's rejection of both "world has a beginning in space and time" and "the world has no such beginning" and Nāgārjuna's position is misplaced. Kant shows the possibility of proving either of these hence their untenability as a result of this antinomy of pure reason. Nāgārjuna does not prove that the world is real or unreal, he rejects each of these, their conjunction and the conjunction of their negations. And he rejects each alternative separately. The rejection of the thrid alternative amounts to an acceptance of the Law of Non-contradiction and the rejection of the fourth to an acceptance of the Law of Excluded Middle.

The two-strand interpretation of the *catuskoti* of Nāgārjuna brings into focus the generally agreed fact that Nāgārjuna is criticizing and denying the plausibility of the early Buddhist position from the point of view of *śūnyatā* philosophy. One could also look at the *Kārikā* as a work where the *samvrti* truth is being included in the *paramārtha* truth by this technique (Gunaratne, 1986, p. 229).

There remains the question as to why Nāgārjuna did not reject the alternatives of the *catuskoti sarvam tattyam* and so on (*Mūlamādhyamika Kārikā*, XVIII, 8) quoted earlier. This verse gives the *samvrti* level assertions dialectically negating each preceding alternative. This is not the "truth" but this is the way of instruction of the Buddha leading one towards the *paramārtha*. That is why it is explicitly stated as *"etad buddhānuśasanam* (it is the instruction or advice of the Buddha). Gunaratne (1986 p. 234) and Kalupahana (1986, p. 269-70) have made this point and Robinson (1967) observes that this verse has a pedagogical value. Kalupahana considers this as "advice" ***(anuśasana)*** in regard to the manner in which speculation about "everything" can be resolved, namely, by demonstrating the inevitable contradictions in it (p. 270).

Interpretation of *Catuskoti: some problems:* Buddha's possible preference of the fourth alternative of the *catuskoti* in some cases has led to the misunderstanding that preferability of the fourth lemma could be a fairly general situation. Thus in the example "some persons torment themselves" and so on, the last alternative, "The person who neither torments himself nor torments others" seems preferable to the Buddhist. But this should not lead one to think that, for example, in the *catuskoti* relevant to the *Kaccayānagotta Sutta* in the *Samyutta-nikāya*, (II, p. 16f.) the fourth alternative "Everything (or the world) neither exists not does not exist"- is perferable, from the Buddhist point of view. One must also note that the acceptance of the fourth alternative could apparently look similar to the negation or rejection of the predicates making it difficult to distinguish between these two cases. And this impression of the fourth alternative was perhaps instrumental in the Mādhyamika's consideration of the *catuskoti* as a dialectic leading to *śūnyatā*. Sometimes Mādhyamika writings like that of Chandrakirti suggest that the fourth alternative e.g., 'Everything is neither real nor unreal' is at least a view of the enlightened or a view preferable to the other three. But here again, it is well to remember that the Mādhyamika reject almost all the *catuskoti* and all their alternatives.

There seems to be three main attitudes that the Buddha adopted towards the different *catuskoti*. One of them is the well-known silence in the case of *avyākata*. But he has given two verbal answers in other cases. The answer *na h'idam* ("It is not so") has been given in cases like, "It is the case that one attains the good by means of knowledge." It is the case that one attains the goal by means of conduct and so on, where, although the terms knowledge and conduct are applicable to what is being discussed, the positions are not comprehensively covered by them. Here the alternatives are *negated.* In *thapaniya pañha* or the cases in which the alternatives are *rejected,* the term used in answer is, *mā h'evam* ("do not say so"). In these the predicates seem to be not appicable to the subject at all or the subject class is empty.

Catuskoti as a dialectic: *Catuskoti* has often been considered a dialectic. It is seen that there is a "dialectical progresseion" in the four alternatives. In the first alternative a predicate is affirmed of the subject, in the second it is denied of the subject, in the third a sort of a synthesis or conjuction of the two is affirmed and in the fourth of the statements is denied. T.R.V. Murti considers that the dialelctic was born when the Buddha observed silence in regard to the *avyākata* questions (Murti, p. 40).

Murti says that the Buddha "was conscious of the interminable nature of the conflict (in reason), and resolves it by rising to other higher stand point of criticism" (p. 40). *Catuskoti* as a dialectical device was more in vogue in the Mādhyamika than in early Buddhism. Murti considers the Mādyamika philosophy originated by Nāgārjuna as a dialectical system. And Nāgārjuna used *catuskoti* extensively in this dialectical system, the four alternatives occuring again and again in the critiques of causality, *nirvāna*, and other topics examined by him in the *Mūla-Mādhyamika Kārikā* and the other works.

Catuskoti as a pedagogical, meditational and therapeutic device: *Catuskoti* has been an instrument in the instruc-

tion of the followers in the realization of the truths in Buddhism. It has been used for the attainment or rational realization and as a device in meditation. The dialectical progression of the statements by negation has thus been put to use, particularly in meditation on existence and causation (Wayman., 1977).

Therapeutic value of the four-fold scheme is associated with the pedagogical and the meditational. The absurdity of some of the Zen *Koans*, seem to echo the Nāgārjunian techniques and *catuṣkoṭic* utterances. Staal, commenting on *catuṣkoṭi* as a pedagogical and therapeutic device, says, many mantras, the *mahāvākyas* of the Upanisads and the *koans* of Zen Buddhism are precisely this. They are not intended to elucidate, but they may cause a sudden transformation in a person who is suitably prepared and who has an intense desire for spiritual illumination, Robinson, ... has suggested such an interpretation of the tetralemma....." (Staal, 1976, p.12).

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FOUR NOBLE TRUTHS. The Four Noble Truths are the four fundamental categorical statements, propositions or axioms *(ekaṃsikā dhammā)*[1] of the Buddha regarding the man's progress in his samsaric existence and the way out of it and, hence forms the essence of his teaching.[2] These four categorical statements are (i) There is *dukkha*.[3] (ii) There is its arising *(samudaya).* (iii) There is its cessation *(nirodha).* (iv) There is the way *(magga)* leading to its cessation. The Buddha's teaching on these four Truths form the theme of his first discourse, the *Dhammacakka ppavattana Sutta* (q.v. *S.* V. p. 420 f *Vin.* I, pp. 10f) delivered to his erstwhile companions, the *pañcavaggiya bhikkhus.* This Sutta refers to these axioms as 'Noble Truths' *(ariya sacca)* or the 'Four Noble Truths' *(cattāri ariyasaccāni).*[4] In the same Sutta the Buddha introduces these statements as a teaching not heard of

1. Buddha says that he has promulgated doctrines of which it is possible to make categorical assertions *(ekaṃsikā pi... mayā dhammā desitā)* and of which it is not possible to make categorical assertions *(anekaṃsikā pi.... mayā dhammā desitā).* To the former group belongs his teachings on the Four Noble Truths and to the latter his declaration on the *avyākatas,* the questions left unanswered. (*D.* I, p. 189ff). This teaching is also referred to as the *sāmukkaṃsikā dhammadesanā* (totally elevating teaching) as opposed to *ānupubbikathā* - the graduated discourse (*Vin.* I, p.18)

2. On many an occasion the Buddha has pointed out that his teaching is mainly concerned with *dukkha* and its cessation. He says, "As I did formally even now I preach about *dukkha* and the cessation of *dukkha* (*M.* I. p.140; *S.* III, p.119).

3. The Pali term *dukkha* has different shades of meanings and denotes a very complex concept. It is generally rendered into English as pain, ill, disease, unsatisfactoriness, conflict etc. as opposed to *domanassa* 'sorrow' which is exclusively mental. While some of these English terms are misleading, none of them brings out the exact meaning of the term *dukkha* which is both physical and mental. Therefore it is left untranslated. For a detail discussion see *DUKKHA*.

4. Both Buddhaghosa and Dhammapāla explain why these are referred to as *ariya* (noble). The general explanation they give is that each of these truths cause nobleness or that they are penetrated by noble ones and hence they are prefixed with the term *ariya* (*DA.* p.542, *AA.* II, p. 281; *Vism.* p. 495; *AA.* I, 85). See also K. R. Norman,'Why are the Four Noble Truths called Noble,' *Ananda, Essays in Honour of Ananda W. P. Guruge,* Colombo, Sri Lanka, 1990, p. 11 f.

before *(pubbe ananussuta)*, suggesting the novelty both of the analysis of the pedicament of man as well as of the proposed solution.

The *Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta* itself gives a brief description of the Four Noble Truths.[5] It runs as follows:

(i) The Noble Truth of dukkha *(dukkha ariya sacca)*: Birth is *Dukkha*, decay is *dukkha*, sickness is *dukkha*, death is *dukkha*, (like wise sorrow and grief, woe lamentation and despair are *dukkha*), association with things disliked, separation from things liked is also *dukkha*, not getting what we desire too is *dukkha*. In brief the five aggregates of grasping *(pañcupadānakkhandhā)* are *dukkha*. See DUKKHA.

(ii) The Noble Truth of the arising of *dukkha (dukkhasamudaya ariyacacca)*: It is that craving (*taṇhā* q.v.) leading to rebecoming bound up with passion and attachment, finding delight here and there namely (a) craving for sense pleasures *(kāma-taṇhā)* (b) craving for continuous becoming *(bhava-taṇhā)* and (c) craving for annihilation *(vibhava taṇhā)*.

(iii) The Noble Truth of the cessation of *dukkha (dukkha-nirodha ariyasacca)*: It is the complete cessation, with detachment, of that very craving, its forsaking, renunciation, and its utter dispassionate cessation.

(iv) The Noble Truth of the Path leading to the cessation of *dukkha (dukkha nirodha gāmini-patipadā ariyasacca)*: It is the Noble Eightfold Path *(ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo)* namely, (i) Right Understanding (ii) Right Thought (iii) Right Speech (iv) Right Action (v) Right Living (vi) Right Effort (vii) Right Mindfulness (viii) Right Concentration. See AṬṬHAṄGIKA MAGGA.

The thoroughness with which the Buddha analyses the predicament of man and prescribes a solution makes him eminently suitable for the epithet *bhisakka*[6] - the physician. There is much similarity between the method adopted in the science of medicine in India for diagnosis and treatment of patients and the method adopted by the Buddha is diagnosing and removings the ills that afflict man. Perhaps the Buddha's above-mentioned fourfold propositions are based on the prevalent system of medicine which also advocated a similar fourfold formula for the treatment of disease, namely *roga* (disease), *hetu* (cause) *nivṛtti* (cessation) and *sādhana* (administrat[illegible] of medicine to effect a cure). It is seen that the *dukkha-sacca* is a clear statement of a universal truth, the *dukkha* that man is subjected to in his saṃsāric existence (pathological). The *samudaya-sacca* traces and explains its cause (diagnostical). The *nirodha-sacca* brings into focus the existence of a cure and the possibility of curing (ideal). The *magga-sacca* lays down the remedy that should be adopted and strictly followed (prescriptive).

As axioms or propositions the Four Noble Truths are all of the same qualitative value and this is precisely why all four are designated as *ariya sacca*. Therefore they are not be treated on a hierarchical basis but to be considered as being co-ordinate and of logical sequence, and necessarily to be comprehended in combination.[7]

It is the comprehension of the Four Noble Truths that made the bodhisattva become a fully enlightened one, a Buddha. The Buddha himself says in the *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta (D.* II, p.90) that it is through not understanding the Four Noble Truths that we have had to wander so long in this weary path of *saṃsāra*. The enlightening impact he felt at the comprehension of the Four Noble Truths is clearly indicated by the Buddha's own description of his awakening to the unsatisfactory conditions of life and to a way to overcome it. He says, "..... there arose in me the vision, knowledge, wisdom and insight, and there arose (in me) light.[8] With the attaining of this knowledge his vision became straightened and clear enabling him to see things as they have come to be *(yathābhūta)*.

The tranquility and the internal peace he felt with the attainment of this knowledge was such that the Buddha spent a considerable period of time, seven long weeks according to the tradition, experiencing its ecstatic bliss

5. For a detailed description see *Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna Sutta (D.* II, 304 ff) and *Saccavibhaṅga Sutta (M.* III, p.248 ff).

6. *A.* IV, p.340; cf *A.* III, p. 238; Metaphorically the Buddha is regarded as the physician who cures man's suffering caused by numerous ills of life, and this subsequently resulted in the sobriquet, *Sallakatto anuttaro* the surgeon *par excellence*.

7. The *Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta (S.* V. p. 420 f) itself says that the *dukkha sacca* is to be comprehended *(pariññeyya)*, the *samudaya Sacca* (i.e. *taṇhā*) is to be given up *(pahātabba)*, the *nirodha-sacca* is to be realised *(sacchikātabba)* and the *magga-sacca* is to be cultivated *(bhāvetabba)*. These are different modes of actions and attitudes that are to be adopted with regard to these truths. But the comprehension of all four is of fundamental importance as it constitute the final knowledge.

8. "....... *cakkhuṃ udapādi, ñāṇaṃ udapādi, paññā udapādi, vijjā udapādi, aloko udapādi, Vin.* I, p. 11).

(*J.* I, p.80). As he himself became aware of the novelty and the abstruse nature of this new enlightening knowledge, he was initially a little hesitant to share it with others. However, on popular request and prompted by his compassion he overcame this initial hesitation[9] and, he ventured to communicate his experience and selected the ***pancavaggiya*** monks as his first audience. It is quite clear from textual evidences that the Buddha communicated this knowledge to the others because it is profitable, is concerned with the norm, pertains to the fundamentals of noble living and is conducive to disenchantment, to detachment, to cessation, to pacification, to insight, to enlightenment, and to nibbāna (*D.* I, p.189).

As pointed out before, the knowledge regarding the Four Noble Truths is referred to as *vijjā* (knowledge) opposed to ***avijjā*** (q.v. ignorance) that keeps man bound to the saṃsāric existence. The early Canonical texts themselves define *vijjā* as knowledge regarding the Four Noble Truths (*S.* V, p. 429) and *avijjā* as ignorance regarding these truths (*S.* II, p. 4, IV, p. 256). This knowledge is neither mere intellectual grasping of the Four Noble Truths nor mere acceptance of their validity on faith. These porpositions have to be seen and comprehended (*Sn. v.* 229).

The spiritual course that leads to this comprehension of the Four Noble Truths is discussed in numerous suttas. The Buddha has often declared that this final knowledge cannot be won at the very out set. It is to be attained by a gradual process of training, gradual mode of action, and pursuit of the path.[10] The *Ariyapariyesana Sutta (M.* I, p. 163 ff.) describes how the bodhisattva Siddhatta Gotama being aware of the unsatisfactoriness of his own life and the world around him, embarked upon the noble quest to find a way out of it. He subjected his ownself to a critical analysis using both the normal as well as the paranormal faculties of perception. This long process of the noble quest begins with the sublime corpus of moral practices *(ariyasīlakkhandha)* accompanied by restraint of the senses *(indriya-saṃvara)* followed by cultivation of mindfulness *(satisampajañña)*. Then one should clear one's mind of the five hindrances *(nīvaraṇa)*. Having attuned the mind thus, one should practice *jhānas*, the 'absorptions.' With the attainment of the fourth *jhāna* the mind becomes plaint and supple so that one becomes able to direct it to the development of higher knowledge *(abhiññā* q.v.).[11] Three types of this six fold higher knowledge namely, retrocognition *(pubbenivāsānussati ñāna* q.v.) clairvoyance *(dibbacakkhu* q.v.) and the knowledge of the destruction of defiling impulses *(āsavakkhaya ñāṇa* q.v.) help one to realise this final knowledge. It is really this last mentioned higher knowledge that directly enables one to verify the Four Noble Truths. When this higher knowledge is attained one's vision becomes so clear that one sees the Four Noble Truths as a man standing on the bank of a river with clear, serene, translucent water perceives the oyster and shell, gravel and pebbles and shoals of fish in it. (*D.* I, p. 84). When one thus knows and sees, one's mind gets emancipated from the inflowing impulses of sensuous gratification *(kāmāsava)*, of lust for life *(bhavāsava)* and of ignorance *(avijjāsava)*. When thus emancipated, there arises the knowledge that emancipation has been attained[12] and the adept understand that 'Birth has been destroyed. The Noble life has been led. What has to be done has been accomplished. There is nothing further for existence in this condition (i.e. saṃsara). Once birth *(jāti)* is put to an end the vicious circle of saṃsāric existence too is brought to an end. This is the end of *dukkha*, the attainment of which is the goal of Buddhism.

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9. The popular tradition says that it is Brahmā Sahampati who implored on the Buddha to preach his new found teaching (*J.* I, p.81).

10. *Nāham bhikkhave ādiken'eva aññārādhanaṃ vadāmi, api ca bhikkhave anupubba sikkhā, anupubba-kiriyā anupubba paṭipadā aññārādhanā hoti: M.* I, p. 479 f).

11. There are six such forms of higher knowledge of which the first three are not at all necessary for the attainment of this knowledge. The later three help its attainment.

12. *Vimuttasmiṃ vimuttaṃti ñāṇṃ hoti: D.* I, p.84.

FRANCE, BUDDHISM IN[1]

Early Notices: It was exactly three hundred years ago that the earliest known reference to Buddhism was made in a French book.[1] It was *Du Royaume de Siam* by Simon de la Boubere who was the Ambassador of Louis XIV to the Kingdom of Siam (presently Thailand) from 1687-1688). He gives an account of the monastic life with special reference to rules of Pātimokkha and the Vinaya in a section entitled in English translation as "an explication of the Patimouc or Text of the Vianc-the principal Maxims of the Talapoins of Siam". But it took almost two centuries before serious and sustained study of Buddhism took root in France.

The motivation for Buddhist studies came from the establishment of Chairs in Sanskrit and Chinese in 1814 and 1815 in the College de France. While Antoine-Leonard de Chézy was the first Professor of Sanskrit the corresponding distinction as regards Chinese went to Abel-Remusat. The Société Asiatique in Paris began the publication of the *Journal Asiatique* in 1822. Original texts with notes and translations came to be published, and with that France, though late by almost half a century when compared with Britain and little less when compared with Germany, launched itself into the field of Buddhist studies in earnest.

Pioneering Scholars. The greatest pioneer of Buddhist studies was Eugène Burnouf who was not only a student of de Chézy but also his successor as Professor of Sanskrit in College de France - a post he assumed in 1833. His *Essai sur le Pali* (1826) written in collaboration with Christian Lassen laid the foundation for the study of Pali and Theravāda Buddhism not only in France but also in the West as a whole. Burnouf's deep interest in Pali was further demonstrated by the translation of the Sri Lankan Chronicle, the *Mahāvaṃsa* into French. This work, however, was unpublished because arrangements were afoot in Britain to publish the text with an English translation. He had also begun to analyse the Pali manuscripts of Sri Lanka and commenced work on a Pali dictionary and grammar.

The discovery of invaluable Mahāyāna Sanskrit Buddhist manuscripts by B. H. Hodgson in Nepal and their distribution to institutions of learning in Calcutta, London, Oxford and Paris had an impact on Burnouf's research interests. He switched from Pali studies to Buddhist Sanskrit studies and his monumental translation of *Saddharmapuṇḍarika-Sūtra* was completed around 1840 and published in 1852. This happens to be the very first Buddhist work to appear in Western translation. Viggo Fausböll's translation of the Pali *Dhammapada* into Latin (the first Theravāda work to be translated into a European language) was published three years later. Also significant as a contribution of Burnouf is his substantial work on Buddhist history entitled *"L'introduction à l'histoire du Bouddhisme Indien"* (1844). This undoubtedly was a pioneering work in a field in which Western scholarship had just begun to take an interest.

A junior contemporary of Burnouf was Philippe Edouard Foucaux, Professor of Tibetan of the Bibliothéque Nationale. He edited *Lalitavistara* in Tibetan in 1847-48 and published its French translation in 1860 under the title *"Histoire du Bouddha Sākya Mouni"*. Six years later, he published a critical edition of the Sanskrit and Tibetan texts of *Praśnottararatnamālā*. A very important contribution of Foucaux to the understanding of Buddhism in the West was the study of Nirvāṇa. Jules Barthélémy Saint-Hilaire, as a virulent crittic of Buddhism, had written a series of articles to the *Journal des Savants* in 1854-55 attacking the Buddhist doctrine of Nirvāṇa as total annihilation. Jean-Baptiste Francois Obry, a student of de Chézy had argued against it in a comprehensive paper in 1856 entitled *"Du Nirvāna Indien ou de l'affranchissement de l'ame après la mort, selon les Brahmanes et les Bouddhistes"*. Foucaux came out with a strong support for Obry in his *"Doctrine des Bouddhistes sur le Nirvāna"*. Adopting a historical doxographical approach, he showed that Nirvāna was not nihilist in the pure doctrine of the Buddha even though later developments, which he termed "Buddhist metaphysics" introduced an element of nihilism.

Pali studies in France, which were eclipsed by Hodgson's discovery of Buddhist Sanskrit manuscripts in Nepal regained their lustre only when Paul Grimblot, French Consul in Sri Lanka from 1859 to 1865, collected a large number of Pali manuscripts and sent them to Paris. What Grimblot planned was to have them published in a *Bibliotheca Palica*. But he died before achieving it. Published later were his *Extraits du Paritta* (1871) and *Sept Suttas Palis* (1876). The latter comprised seven suttas from the Dīghanikāya.

Leon Feer, who succeeded Foucaux as Professor of Tibetan in 1864 in Bibliotheque Nationale and transferred with the Chair to L'Ecole des Langues Orientales the next year, was lecturer in Tibetan and Mongolian in College de France from 1869 until he joined the Manuscript

1. Parts of this article are based on notes and drafts found among the papers of Gunapala Malalasekera and O. H. de A. Wijesekera. The writer regrets that the authorship of these notes could not be traced. Verification and updating of the information has been done mainly with the help of writings of Russel Webb and invaluable information in his *"Buddhist Studies Review."*

department of Bibliothèque Nationale in 1872. For thirty years there, he became the most prolific editor of not only Tibetan and Mongolian Buddhist works but also those in Sanskrit and Pali. His extensive knowledge of Buddhist literature in many languages is best reflected in his articles in *Journal Asiatique* between 1866 and 1875 on Buddhist Studies, Jātakas, Sūtras, and Avadānas. In 1883 he published *"Fragments extraits du Kandjour"* and a translation of *Prajnāpāramitā-hrdaya-Sūtra. Avadānaśataka* was translated a few years later. He also edited the Tibetan version of Dhammapada. His monumental work in the last years of his life was the critical edition of *Samyutta-nikāya* in five volumes for the Pali Text Society. He also edited *"Pañcagati-Dipani"* which was published in the Journal of the Pali Text Society in 1884.

One of the most versatile French scholars of the nineteenth century was Auguste Barth whose prolific contributions of the period 1880-1900 to all branches of Indological studies are to be found in the five Volumes of *"Quarante ans d'Indiai. sme: Oeuvres de Auguste Barth"* published from 1914 to 1927. The monograph to receive the widest attention was *"Religions of India"* which was reprinted in India in 1889. As far as Buddhism was concerned, his knowledge was extensive. But unfortunately he could never overcome his many prejudices against Buddhism. In my *"From the Living Fountains of Buddhism"*, I have reproduced his caustic and provocative letters which he wrote to Ven. Alutgama Seelakkhandha Thera. He thought that the Buddha was not an authentic person. He denounced the Buddhist emphasis on detachment and renunciation. He ridiculed his contemporaries who promoted Buddhism and even challenged them as hypocrites. He would reject Buddhist Sanskrit works such as *Prajñāpāramitā* as "Nonsense". Despite all this negative attitude to Buddhism, his search for knowledge of its literature and philosophy was genuine and painstaking. The Sri Lankan Buddhist leader Anagarika Dharmapala, however, admired his work as splendid and called him "one of the most cautious and far-seeing orientalists."

Emile Charles Marie Senart was an equally versatile scholar in both Pali and Sanskrit. What distinguished him most from Barth was his very sympathetic attitude to Buddhism. In fact, one of the most widely and frequently quoted statements in defence of the authenticity of the Sri Lankan Chronicles is by Senart. Besides translating the Pali grammar of Kaccāyana, he made a study of the life of the Buddha in *"Essai sur la légende du Bouddha"* (1875). His magnum opus was the edition of the Buddhist Sanskrit work *Mahāvastu* in three volumes. Two other works of Senart which are yet consulted as authorities are *"Les Inscriptions de Piyadassi"* on Asokan Edicts (1881), *"Les Castes dans l'Inde"* (1896).

An account of the pioneering contributors to Buddhist Studies in France in the nineteenth century would not be complete without reference to the translation of the Mongolian Kasyapa Matanga's *Sutra of 42 Sections* by Gabet and Huc; Stainslas Julien's translation from Chinese of lost *Avadānas* (1859); Victor Gauvain's translation of Bishop Bigandet's most informative book on Burmese Buddhism entitled *"Vie ou Légende de Gaudama, le Bouddha des Birmans"* (1878) and Leon Wieger's monumental works on Chinese Buddhism: *"Bouddhisme Chinois:* I *Vinaya, Monachisme et discipline. Hinayana, véhicule inférieur* and II Les vies Chinoises du Bouddha" published in 1910 and 1913 respectively.

Sylvain Levy, who became Professor of Sanskrit in College de France in 1894, was undisputedly the greatest orientalist of the period. He travelled widely in Asia and discovered many new texts. What is most important in his contribution to Buddhist studies is the new line of emphasis he developed on the comparative study of texts of different sects and schools of Buddhism. He recognized the indispensability of utilizing source materials in Pali, Sanskrit, Tibetan and Chinese to establish the authenticity of the Buddhist Canon in each tradition. His earlier studies were on the works of Aśvaghosa such as *Buddhacarita* and *Sūtrālankāra*. In 1905 he explored the librairies of Nepal and published his famous book *"Le Nepal"*. He also made a critical study of *Divyāvadāna* and various recensions of the *Dhammapada*. His discoveries of fragments of Buddhist books in Kuchean and Tokharian languages brought to light the magnitude of the influence of Buddhism in Central Asia.

Sylvain Levy is remembered most gratefully for the admirable work be did on the Sanskrit texts of the Vijñānavāda school, which until his discovery had remained unknown. Asanga's *Mahāyānasūtrālankāra* expounding Mahāyāna Buddhism of the Yogācāra school was edited and translated into French. It was published in *"Bibliothéque de l'École des Hautes Etudes"* in 1907 and 1911. Vasubandhu's *Vimśatikakārikāprakarana* and its commentary were published as *"Vijñaptimātrasiddhi, deux traités de Vasubandhu"* (text and translation) in 1925. Sylvain Levy's lead in highlighting the evolution of the Yogācāra school was soon followed by a galaxy of students, whose researches showed conclusively that Yogācāra marked the final phase of the growth of Buddhist Philosophy in India.

Sylvain Levy collaborated with S. yamaguchi in editing the *Madhyantavibhangatikā* in 1934. Another of his collaborative efforts with a Japanese scholar (namely J. Takakusu) was the compilation of the initial fascicules of the *"Hobogrin"* an Encyclopaedia of Buddhism based on Chinese and Japanese materials. This massive intellectual venture has been continued steadily though slowly by

Paul Demieville and Hubert Durt. Sylvain Levy's multi-faceted contribution to Buddhism was further enhanced by his distinguished and devoted students among whom La Valle Poussin was indeed the most prolific and profound.

A Scholarly Tradition of Openness and Comprehensiveness The French tradition of Buddhist studies which began so auspiciously with a galaxy of pioneering scholars whose interests were wide-ranging continued into the twentieth century. Edouard Chavannes worked on the Chinese version of the *Jātaka,* which he published in French translation in three volumes under the title *Cinq Cent Contes et Apologues* (1910-1911). He followed it with a general work in 1921 entitled *Contes et Légendes du Bouddhiste Chinois.* The fourth volume of his Jātaka, including his linguistic and historical notes and appendices was published later in 1934. While Chavannes was a Sinologist, his contemporary Louis Finot was more versatile. His works ranged from the translation of *Milindapañha* from Pali to those of *Bodhicaryāvatāra* and *Rāstrapālapariprcchā* from Sanskrit. Concentrating on Buddhism in Indo-China, he published an introductory work called *Le Bouddhisme : son Origine, son Evolution* (Phnom Penh, 1928). Félix Lacote edited and translated the Sanskrit *Brhatkatāślokasamgraha* of Buddhasvāmin while Edouard Hubert translated from Chinese *Sūtrālankāra* and the Sarvāstivādin *Prātimoksasūtra.* The latter was republished in 1914 with the Chinese version of Kumārajiva.

To illustrate the widening interest in the way Buddhism is lived in traditionally Buddhist Countries, reference may be made to several French nationals who had undertaken in-depth studies not purely via library sources but through living experience in different social milieus. A most remarkable among them was Alexandra David-Neel who traversed Tibet in the guise of a lama and provided insightful information on a tradition which was little known. L'École d'Extreme-Orient established in Hanoi in 1900 provided an institutionalized basis for a similar approach. In this connection, the contribution of its Director, Georges Coedēs is particularly significant. His publications include *Les Etats hindouistes d'Indochine et Indonesie* (1948) and *Catalogue des manuscrits en pali laotienne et siamese provenant de la Thailande* (1966).

In Paris, Sorbonne and College de France maintained the highest standards of Buddhist research. Paul Mus, whose early studies were on the Buddhist Sanskrit text *Sadgatikāraka* of Dhārmika Subhūti, was director of studies at l'École Pratique des Hautes-Etudes. Paul Demieville, who was Professor of Chinese and Director of Buddhist Studies in Sorbonne, concentrated on the study of the late eighth century debate between Indian and Ch'an Buddhists and published in 1952 *Le Concile de Lhasa.* Already mentioned above was the role played by Demieville in continuing the preparation of Hobogrin. The more important of his writings have been published by J. Brill in two collections entitled *Choix d'Etudes Bouddhiques* and *Choix d'Etudes Sinologiques* (1973). Though primarily a Sanskrit or even more precisely Vedic scholar, Louis Renou contributed to Buddhist studies through his researches on Asokan inscriptions. He is also credited with an introductory work *Le Bouddhisme* (1953).

The most remarkable French Buddhist scholars of recent times had been Jean Filliozat, a student of Sylvain Levy, Alfred Foucher, Jules Bloch and Louis Renou – reflecting through this spectrum of intellectual experiences the most advanced traditions of scholarship. Succeeding Renou as Professor of the Languages and Literatures of India at College de France, Filliozat proved himself to be a versatile scholar and his contributions range from surveys and catalogues such as *Fragments du Vinaya des Sarvāstivādin* (with Horyu Kuño in 1938) and *Catalogue des Manuscrits sanskrits et tibétains de la Société Asiatique* (1941-42) to in-depth studies on Asokan inscriptions and specific philosophical and psychological concepts of Buddhism (e.g. "The psychological discoveries in Buddhism" – *University of Ceylon Review,* 1955 and Sur le domaine du Punya in *Lamotte Felicitation Volume* (1980). *L'Inde classique* II (1953) which he coedited with Louis Renou, provides a most comprehensive section on Buddhism. Filliozat functioned at the early stages of the Encyclopaedia of Buddhism as a consultant editor and among his contributions is the entry on Bstan-Hgur (1972).

A colleague of Filliozat and Renou in the production of *L'Inde Classique* II, Marcelle Lalou was a specialist in Tibetan studies. In 1930 she collaborated with Jean Przyluski (a Polish scholar working in France, whose work on the legends of Asoka is well known) in the preparation of *Bibliographie Bouddhique.* She compiled *Répertoire du Tanjur* (1933) and *Inventaire des manuscrits tibétains de Touenhouang* Vols. I-III (1939-61) and wrote an introductory work on *Les Religions du Tibet* (1957). Her predecessor as Director of Tibetan Studies in Sorbonne, Jacques Bacot wrote on Milarepa and Marpa: *Le poéte tibétain Milarepa* (1925) and *La vie de Marpa* (1937). In addition to editing historical records of Tunhuang, he published in 1962 *Introduction a L'histoire du Tibet.* Another specialist in Tibetan Buddhism, R. A. Stein is credited with two general works *Recherches sur l'épopée et la barole Tibet* (1959) and *La Civilisation tibétaine* (1962) The tradition of Tibetan studies was carried on further by Mme A. W. Macdonald as Director of Studies in Tibetan History and Philology in Sorbonne

and as Director or research in CNRS (Centre National de la recherche scientifique) and Ariane Spanien as Director of Studies in Tibetan History and Language in Sorbonne.

The exploration of Tuang-huang caves by Paul Pelliot had given a significant filip to a spectrum of Buddhist studies, generally referred to as Central Asian Studies. Robert Gauthiot and Pelliot had published *Le Sūtra des Causes et des Effets du Bien et du Mal* (three volumes, 1920, 1926, 1928). Hackin had worked on *Formulaire Sanskrit Tibetan du Xe Siècle* (1924). Bernard Pauly transcribed and reconstituted *Fragments Sanskrits de Haute-Asie* in six volumes from 1957 to 1965. While Marie-Robert Guignard edited *Catalogue des Manuscrits chinois de Touen-houang*(1970), Louis Hambis, reputed as the chief coordinator Central Asian Studies in France, published several illustrated volumes on Kucha, Tumchuq and Tun-huang (1965-1976). This work *Mission Paul Pelliot* has been continued by CNRS, Musée Guimet and others under the overall direction of André Bareau.

Contemporary Scholars: As acclaimed doyens of Buddhist studies in France, André Bareau and Jean Boisselier provide guidance and inspiration to a significant number of scholars who continue to maintain the momentum which Buddhist research had gained over the last century and a half. André Bareau, who is the Professor of Buddhist Studies in College de France, has been as versatile as he is prolific. Apart from his major work on the biography of the Buddha, i.e. *Recherches sur la Biographie du Bouddha dans les Sūtrapitaka et les Vinayapitaka Anciens* (1963, 1970, 1971) and several introductory works e.g. *Bouddha,* 1962; *Le Bouddhisme* in *Les Religions de l'Inde,* Vol. III, 1966; *En Suivant Bouddha,* (1965), his researches cover a wide range of philosophical and historical themes. Mention may be made of *L'Absolu en Philosophie Bouddhique, Evolution de la Notion d'Asamskrta* (1951) *Les Premiers Conciles Bouddhiques* (1955), *La Vie et l'Organisation des Communautés Bouddhiques Modernes de Ceylan* (1957); and : *Sur l'Origine des Pilliers dits d'Asoka, des Stupa et des Arbres Sacrés du Bouddhisme Primitif* (1974).

Jean Boisselier, who retired as the Professor of the History of Archaeology of South and South-east Asia, represents in his work the culmination of a deep and abiding interest which French scholars had displayed in the evolution of Buddhist art. His illustrious predecessors in this field had been H. Focillon (L'Art Bouddhique - 1921), A. Foucher *(L'Art Greco-Bouddhique du Gandhara,* 3 vols., 1905, 1922; *La vie du Bouddha d'après les texts et les monuments de l'Inde,* 1949) and J. Auboyer (with Foucher : *Les vies antérieures du Bouddha,* 1955). Boisselier supervised the conservation of Angkor Vat and engaged in field studies in several other locations in South India, Sri Lanka and Thailand. Among his major works are *La Sculpture en Thailande* (1974; translated into English as *The Heritage of Thai Sculpture,* Ceylon (Sri Lanka) in *Archaeologia Mundi,* 1979 and his substantial contribution to UNESCO's *The Image of the Buddha,* 1978.

Often encountered in scholarly circles are many other contemporary scholars such as Colette Caillat, Solange Thiery and the young Filliozats, Pierre-Sylvain and Jacqueline.

Even a brief survey of Buddhist studies in France such as this is not complete without reference to the interaction which French scholars have maintained with traditionally Buddhist countries. Buddhist studies in Cambodia and Laos were inspired and assisted for over two decades by Suzanne Karpeles, who in 1930 had the Buddhist Institutes of Cambodia and Laos established in Phnom Penh and Ventiane. She played a major role in the publication of the Tripitaka in Pali and Khmer. France had attracted several Sri Lankan Buddhist scholars, both religious and lay. Dorawaka Sumanaratana (now Leparge) was associated with the University of Lille where Jean Nadou, the author of *Les Bouddhistes Kasmiriens au Moyen Age* and *Le Bouddha* (both published in 1974) was the Professor of Indian Civilization. Walpola Rāhula was connected with Sorbonne for several decades. During this period, he published a French translation of Asaṅga's *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (1971). He is best known for his most sucessful introductory work l'Enseignement du Bouddha (What the Buddha Taught, 1961). Kosgoda Sobhita worked on *Le Cīvaraskandhaka du Vinayapitaka des Mūlasarvāstivādin* in Sorbonne while Mohan Wijayaratna, under the direction of Andre Bareau of College de France, published *Le Moine Bouddhiste selon les Textes du Theravāda* (1983) and also completed an analytical study of popular religious practices of Sri Lanka.

France has thus had a very competent and conscientious galaxy of pioneering Buddhist scholars to lay in academic circles a solid foundation for serious Buddhist studies. Their notable distinction is their catholicity as regards the study of the texts of different traditions of Buddhism in Pali, Sanskrit, Chinese, Tibetan, Mongolian, Kuchean and Tokharian. This catholicity made French Buddhist scholarship the most comprehensive and this breadth of coverage has made France even today the most convenient centre in the world for comparative study of the evolution of Buddhist philosophy with diverse lines of empbasis. This tradition continues unabated and the more recent luminaries have persisted in maintaining what has become the typical characteristic of Buddhist studies in France; namely, openness and comprehensiveness.

From Intellectual Pursuit to Spiritual Quest. Writing in 1902, Auguste Barth said, "In France, there is not a man of learning, having a true acquaintance with Buddhism, who may be said to be a Buddhist. There is, it is true, much talking about Buddhism; there are also many among us, who disbelieving the tenets of Christianity, make some show of a would-be Buddhist...... There are perhaps some Buddhists of a more serious type in Germany, a few also in England, and many more in America". In order to emphasize the distinction between Buddhist studies as an intellectual pursuit and Buddhist propaganda for spiritual purpose, he told a Sri Lankan scholar monk "your wants and our wants are not the same: yours are rather practical; ours are, before all, historico-critical". But with a growing cooperation and collaboration between scholars with intellectual aims and the clergy and scholars of traditionally Buddhist countries in Asia, such a water-tight compartmentalization had to be short-lived. When exactly the French began to take an interest in practising Buddhism in addition to or in lieu of studying it, the data available to us do not permit us to determine. But an event in 1928 serves as a convenient starting point.

In that year, the renowned Chinese missionary monk T'ai-Hsu, whom P.V. Bapat describes as "a great living force in the revival of Buddhism" visited France and delivered a lecture at the Musée Guimet in Paris. In the audience was Grace Constant Lounsbery, an American Army nurse who after the First World War had decided to settle down in France. Her interests aroused in the practice of Buddhism, she underwent training in meditation in Myanmar and Sri Lanka. Returning to Paris, she launched an association of like-minded students of Buddhism under the name *Les Amis du Bouddhisme* in January 1929. In the same year, Comtesse Prozor convened a Buddhist study circle in Nice. Of the two, *Les Amis du Bouddhisme* proved to be better organized, more broad-based and capable of attracting some of the scholars from Sorbonne and other centres.

Although the association had no sectarian bias and Mahāyāna was given due attention, its exclusive emphasis in practice was on Theravāda tradition. Several scholar-monks from Sri Lanka (i.e. Parawahera Vajirañāna and H. Nandasāra) held office or were associated in its activities. Suzanne Karpeles who was a leading light in the revival of Buddhism in Indo-China, found support for it in the East.

The most important contribution of *Les Amis du Boudddhisme* apart from popularizing meditation techniques, was to publish several basic texts for the use of the general reader: e.g. a prose translation of *Dhammapada* by R. and M. Maratray in 1931; *Buddhist Meditation* by Lounsbery in French and English and French translation of Nyānatiloka's *Word of the Buddha* by La Fuente in 1935. Its quarterly journal, *La Pensée Bouddhique,* edited by La Fuente was started in 1939.

Equally important were the Buddhist functions organized by *Les Amis,* (e.g. Vesākha and Fete de Metteyya) which provided opportunities to rally together Buddhist scholars, the gradually increasing number of French Buddhists and diplomats from traditionally Buddhist countries. In 1945, Gunapala Malalasekera was a guest of honour at, the Vesākha celebrations conducted at Musée de l'Homme. Lounsbery, according to Malalasekera, happened to be one of the earliest to be consulted by him on the foundation of the World Fellowship of Buddhists. She represented France at the inauguration of the WFB in Colombo in 1950 and was elected the Vice - President for Europe. In some of the subsequent General Conferences, Suzanne Karpeles represented France.

Les Amis du Bouddhisme declined and ceased to function effectively by the end of the 1960's in spite of the efforts of Nelly Kauffman and Paul Adam. Incidentally, Adam is, to the best of available information, the first French national to be ordained a Theravāda Bhikkhu. He entered the Sangha in India in 1953 with the name Aryadeva, in association with the Theosophical Society of France, brought in Hindu, Mahāyāna and Vajrayāna tendencies into its successor organization which is now called *La Société des Amis du Bouddhisme.*

The tradition of Lounsbery was maintained by her pupil Teisen Perusat Stork who embraced Buddhism in 1941 and took an active part in the propagation of Theravāda through study groups, classes and publications. In 1908, she was ordained in Soto Zen tradition and since 1972 has been associated with the work of the WFB through the *Centre Francais de l'Association Mondiale des Bouddhiques.* A prolific writer, her works include *Chants des Arahats de Jadis, Initiation au Bouddhisme* (a series of booklets translated from publications of the Buddhist Publication Society, Kandy) and the quarterly journal *Le Bodhisat.* Her *Le Bouddhisme,* published in 1986, is undoubtedly the most concise and readable French introduction to Buddhism and the history of its evolution. Stork established the *Temple Bouddhiste Zen* near Cannes in 1968.

Like Teisen Perusat Stork, several French Buddhists have moved from one Buddhist tradition to another. In the process it was usually Theravāda which first attracted them to Buddhism through its intellectual appeal. But progressively Zen and Vajrayāna, with their emphasis on meditation and, to some extent, symbolic ritual are found to be more satisfying. Besides, Zen and Vajrayāna traditions have been propagated in France by intensely dedicated and capable Masters whose example and living testimony have proved to be most inspiring.

Asian Buddhist Masters in France : Zen and Vajrayāna

One such master was Taisen Deshimaru of Japan who settled in France in 1967. A prolific writer, he had several important publications to his credit such as *Le Trésor de la Vrai Loi* (a commentary on the aphorisms of Master Dogen, the founder of Soto Zen), *Textes Sacrés du Zen* (2 volumes) and *Le Sūtra de la Grande Sagesse* (translation of Japanese *Prajñāpāramitāhṛdayasūtra).* Practical manuals and general works comprise *Vrai Zen, Zen et Cerveau, La Pratique du Zen* and his discourses in *Zen Informations.* He founded in 1970, l'Association Zen d'Europe, which since 1982, is known as L'Association Zen Internationale. It has established dojos or zasen centres in many parts of Europe and its Temple Zen de la Gendronnière accommodates upto 350 participants in retreats of long duration.

Among the collaborators of Taisen Deshimaru in France were Jolly (also known as Taigen) and Prajñānanda whose Mahāyāna Buddhist Zen Temple, constructed in 1963 and consecrated by Taisen Deshimaru in 1968, is reputed to be the first Zen Temple in Europe. Jolly edited a substantial quarterly journal *Sagesse* for a short time and a French translation of the Dhammapada was serialized. He also was associated with initiatives of Maurice Salen, who founded *Connaisance du Bouddhisme* in 1969 and Yannick Gauthier who in Mid-1970's formed the *Association Zen d'Occident.*

Also assoicated with Taisen Deshimaru was J.P. Schnetzler who continues to operate from Grenoble. Convincing writer on Buddhism and science, he continues to be a popular exponent of Buddhist meditation and has reached out to an innfluential circle of intellectuals and professionals. Another pupil to attain distinction is FranCois-Albert Viallet, the author of *Zen-l'Autre Versant.*

As could be expected, the popularity of Zen resulted in the proliferation of centres among which some rivalry and dissension cannot be entirely ruled out. But the service they render in the promotion of Buddhism in practice in France is indeed substantial. The most significant characteristic is that Zen organisations are headed, staffed and patronized mainly by French nationals unlike other Buddhist traditions which continue to involve and even depend on immigrants from Buddhist Asia. Among masters of the French Zen monastic system are Taikan Jyoji, the founder of the first Rinzai Zen monastry in France, Roland Rech and Philip Taiho.

The introduction of Tibetan Buddhism to France is a major contribution of Paul Arnold, who retired as President of the Chamber of the Court of Appeal. He had visited Butia Busty Lamasery in Darjeeling between 1959 and 1971 and received instructions from Kargypa teachers. At the end of a ten year effort, he established the first Tibetan Gelugpa meditation centre in France at Forts-les-Bancs in Ain in 1974. Lamas Géshé Rabten, Gonsar Tulku and Yonten Gyatso served in it as meditation masters.

With the increasing arrivals of learned and experienced Tibetan Lamas as exiles, Vajrayāna centres increased steadily and attracted substantial numbers of French enthusiasts. Lama Kalu Rinpoche founded *Kagyu Ling* in Toulon-sur-Arroux, among its resident teachers were Lamas Talo RInpoche and Sherab Dorje. A disciple of Lama Kalu, Lama Karma Gyourme directed *Kagyu Dzong* in Paris. Kargyupa centres had also been established in Aix-en-Provence and Saint Arroman.

As active as Lama Kalu Rinpoche was Lama Phende Rinpoche, head of Gnor-pas sect of the Sakyapa, who had been described as "a personality of great wisdom and exemplary faith." He established in 1973 a cultural association in Fresnes under the name Pratique du Bouddhisme Mahāyāna Tibetain and founded along with his wife Marie-Hélène Ahni the *E-Wan Phendé Ling* near Evreux in Normandie.

In two decades, the numbers both of the monasteries and meditation centres and of the adherents and practitioners of the different traditions of Tibetan Buddhism have increased in France to the extent that practically every region has a minimum of one or two very active centres with significant congregations and major centres are being planned and established on the most ambitious scale. For example, the current issue of Kunchab, the quarterly journal of l'Institut Tibtain announces programmes ranging from week-end meditation courses by Lama Kalu Rinpoché to long-term study programmes and elaborate rituals like Mahākāla in several centres in France. Likewise, Karme Dharma Chakra, which, among the different Buddhist communities, has been the first to receive the recognition of the French Government as a religious congregation, not only conducts as intensive programme of study, meditation and rites in its many centres in different regions but is planning to set up in Dordogne an extensive monastic complex called Dhagpo Kagyu Ling, under the direction of Lama Jigme Tsewang Rinpoche.

Like Zen, Vajrayāna, too, has a large following of French origin and most of them are professionals and intellectuals. Reference was already made to Paul Arnold's affiliation to Tibetan Buddhism. He was equally fervently associated with both Kargyupa and Zen as his most informative and interesting works show : (e.g. *Avec les Lamas Tibétains,* 1970 and *Le Zen et la Tradition Japonaise,* 1973. J.P. Schnetzler, who began with Zen in association with Taisen Deshimaru, played a major role in setting up Karma Migyur Ling as a centre of Tibetan studies in Montchardon. Jacques Martin, the President of the Buddhist Union of France affiliated to the Buddhist Union of Europe, is not only an ardent

adherent of Tibetan Buddhism but also a serious research student of its philosophy and traditions. This remarkable ecclecticism of French Buddhists has engendered closer cooperation and collaboration among the different traditions. On account of this significant fact, the original unity and the oneness of doctrinal content and emphasis, which is less noticed in Asia due to the isolated growth of each tradition, are best observed and appreciated in France.

Towards Universal Buddhism: French Initiative. A landmark in this spirit of intra-Buddhist cooperation has been the initiative of Paul Arnold who founded *La Tradition Bouddhiste* to represent all schools and sects of mainstream Buddhist thought. Arnold's home in Paris was the venue for its fortnightly meetings and meditation classes. A monthly Buletin, too, was published. The international conference he convened in December 1973 in collaboration with Nelly Kauffman brought together Theravāda, Zen and Tibetan traditions. In it, the French Buddhists were represented by Taisen Deshimaru, Phende Rinpoche, Anne Barry, Taisen Perusat Stork, J.P. Schnetzler, Didier Garanger, René Jolly and Maurice Salen. The immediate result of the conference was the founding of *La Communauté Bouddhique de France* with Paul Arnold as Chairman and Ahni Kauffmann, Stork, Jolly and Schnetzler as Vice-Chairmen. Another subsidiary result of this conference arose through a lecture tour which, Somboon Siddhiyāno, a Thai Bhikkhu who represented England, undertook in central France under the sponsorship of Michel Dufour. An attempt made by Dufour to cater for those interested in Theravāda led to the creation of the Pali Buddhist Union, through which Dufour continues to maintain his contact with Theravāda Buddhists.

Paul Arnold's indefatigable effort to enhance communication and cooperation among the growing Buddhist organisations and institutions not only in France but also in Europe produced the first European Buddhist congress in October 1975. It resulted in the formal establishment of the Buddhist Union of Europe of which Paul Arnold was the Founder-President.

Influx from traditionally Buddhist countries of South and South-East Asia. The escalation of the political upheaval in Indo-China and the eventual rise of Communist regimes after the Vietnam war had a significant impact on Buddhism in France–the third phase of what the writer in his studies calls the *Buddhist Diaspora* which began with the dispersal of Chinese Buddhists in 1949 and Tibetan Buddhists in 1959. The mid-1970's saw an unprecedented influx of refugees from the region and the majority were Buddhists. Those from Cambodia and Laos professed Theravāda while the Vietnamese Buddhists were for the most part adherents of Mahāyāna Ch'an tradition. Modest temples and monasteries were established in large numbers not only in and around Paris but in most of the major cities in France. A sizeable clergy from these countries and Thailand was available in each tradition to cater for the religious needs of a burgeoning immigrant population, who recognized in their Buddhist heritage an indispensable ingredient of their cultural identity. Their ranks were further strengthened by a few thousand Sinhala Buddhists from Sri Lanka, who too, were served by several young bhikkhus.

Within barely fifteen years, the progress made by these new Buddhist communities has been spectacular. The Sri Lankans, Cambodians and Laotians have been collaborating in maintaining their common Buddhist tradition and as a result of their dispersal throughout the country, have succeeded in resuscitating Theravada in France. It was for decades overshadowed by the French enthusiasm for Zen and Tibetan traditions.

It is, however, the Vietnamese Buddhist community which has attained a unique level of visibility and influence, even though unlike the Tibetan tradition, Ch'an has yet to attract significant numbers of French nationals. Three organizations which came into existence around the same time in mid-1970 were *Niem-Phat-Duong Khanh-Anh* founded by Thich Tri-Tinh; *Association Culturelle Bouddhique Linh-Son;* founded and directed by Thich Huyen-Vi and *Association Bouddhique Franco-Vietnamienne* of Thich Tam Chan. Many more have since arisen.

The most impressive is the record of Thich Huyen-Vi, whose movement is world-wide and basic concentration is on higher learning, research and training in Ch'an tradition on an admirable balance between academic and spiritual objectives. Himself a scholar of repute in Chinese and Pali, he supports several important international Buddhist activities which include the *Buddhist Studies Review* edited by Russell Webb and published from London. His original temple in Joinville-le-Pont has grown into a substantial monastery and his current efforts are concentrated on creating a large-scale Buddhist University - *(Dhammaville,* near Limoges in central France.

Thich Huyen-Vi's early collaborators in Association Culturelle Bouddhique Linh-Son have established their own monastries and pagodas in France. Special mention needs to be made of those founded by Thich Thien Dinh in Marseille, by Thich Minh Le in Sèvres, by Thich Minh Tam in Bagneux and by Thich Tanh Thiet in Lyon. Though none of the Theravāda institutions established by Cambodian, Laotian or Sri Lankan communities rivals these monasteries in grandeur, the efforts of Somdech Bou-kry Thera of Creil, Ajahn Boripart Thera

in Choisy-le-Roi, Chou Kim Chan Thera in Bagneux and Parawahera Candaratana Thera in Le Bourget merit recognition.

Buddhism in France today. The presence in France of Buddhism in its rich doctrinal diversity and of fervent Buddhists equally varied ethnically and linguistically is not only marked but often highlighted in exposés of French tolerance and cultural catholicity. France has always welcomed Buddhists. Léon de Rosny is quoted in 1890 as estimating the number of Buddhists in Paris as 30,000. In 1990. Jacques Martin, the President of the Buddhist Union of France, estimates the Buddhist population of France to be at least one million. Months of May and October witness colourful ceremonies of Vesakha, Kathina and *Fête des Morts* which attract media attention and wide participation.

Buddhism is no longer regarded an exotic or strange foreign importation. Its philosophical sophistication, ethical primacy and cultural heritage are widely known and recognised.

Paris has become the popular venue for periodical Buddhist conferences. In October 1988, for instance, the Third Congress of the Buddhist Union of Europe was held in UNESCO with the writer as the chairman. The International Association of Buddhist studies had decided to hold its Tenth International Conference again in UNESCO in July 1991.

The annual Vesākha celebration in the magnificent Buddhist temple in Bois de Vincennes, near Paris, with the participation of all Buddhist traditions and the presence of distinguished public figures in French administration and society reflects symbolically the place which France has acorded to Buddhism.

Ananda W. P. Guruge

FRATERNITY. The Saṅgha or the Buddhist Order is a fraternity in the sense of a religious institution governed by a code of discipline and moral conduct. With a history as far back as the 5th or 6th century B.C. the Buddhist fraternity may be regarded as one of the earliest such movements in the world, with perhaps the exception of pre-Buddhistic Indian ascetics known as *paribbājakas,* who were not developed communities or brotherhoods, but who excercised a considerably important influence on the formation of the former.

The Buddhist fraternity began as a band of wandering monks pledged to vows of celibacy and poverty like the Indian *paribbājakas;* its earliest origin is traced to the sixty-two arahant monks who gathered around the Buddha during the rains-residence immediately after his Enlightenment. These monks free from defilements like the Buddha himself, were exhorted thus: "Go ye, monks, and wander forth, for the good, the happiness, of the many, out of consideration for the world, for the well being the blessing and happiness of gods and men, preach ye the doctrine glorious in the beginning, in the middle and in the end......."

Thus was the first monastic fraternity established in Buddhist India, which later, with the increase of its members grew more and more complex, and finally developed into a large organisation, governed by the *Vinaya.* As a code of discipline the *Vinaya* was enacted after twenty years of the formation of the Order, and aside from its purely religious or monastic rules and principles, it constitutes also the legal and judicial framework in which the Buddhist fraternity is cast, and has its being as a monastic or social organisation.

Unlike the brotherhoods known to ancient Europe or the pre-Buddhistic Indian *paribbajākas, acelakas āji vikas, nigaṇṭhas* and others, the Buddhist brotherhood is governed by flexible rules and regulations compared to the rigorous practices of asceticism of the stoics and early semi-Christian Esenes. For Buddhism recognises the life of moderation, free from rigorous asceticism as the essential pre-requisite for attainment of Truth. Of the ancient division of the Buddhist fraternity into monks *(thera)* and nuns *(therī)* the latter has today ceased to function as an institution, whereas the division of the Buddhist fraternity into *ārāmika* (i.e., those living in monasteries, see *M.* II, p.5) and *āraññaka* (those living in forests or hermitages, *M.* I. 30; III. 30) is still a recognised division in present Buddhist fraternities. (see also DHURA)

Buddhist fraternities in the Theravāda countries like Ceylon, Burma, Thailand, Cambodia etc. adhere to the original teachings, allowing little modifcations either in esoteric teachings or monastic life. They seek to preserve the ancient tradition and life amidst modern changes. The countries of the North however, have undergone considerable secularisation, in their attempt to accommodate religious teachings and monastic life, in the social and economic changes of the modern world. Hence a difference in external monastic life and conduct of southern and northern Buddhist orders is conspicous, although most of the underlying basic teachings of the primitive doctrine remain preserved in all Buddhist fraternities of the world. See also, SANGHA.

Neville Gunaratna

FREEDOM

Free will: Some scholars have maintained that free will has no place in Buddhism. E.J. Thomas has stated that

"Buddhism does not appear to have solved the antinomy of free will, except by teaching without any subtlety that right action is a part of the Noble Path."[1] Walpola Rahula makes the following observations: "The question of free will has occupied an important place in western thought and philosophy. But according to conditioned Genesis, this question does not and cannot arise in Buddhist philosophy ... Not only is the so-called free will not free, but even the very idea of free will is not free from conditions."[2] G. P. Malalasekera also expresses the same view when he answers the question which he poses 'What does Buddhism have to say regarding free will? The question does not seem to have been asked of the Buddha, but, if he had been asked, he would probably have answered that the question does not arise or that it is inaccurately put. There can be no such thing as a free will outside the causal sequence which constitutes the process."[3] (See further FREE WILL).

As opposed to these scholars Trevor Ling maintains that "the Buddha's insistence on the real possibility of human choice and freedom of action, and his opposition to fatalism differentiate his teaching from that of the Ajivakas."[4] It is K. N. Jayatilleke who has investigated the problem in depth. After a searching study he comes to the conclusion that Buddhism asserted the reality of human freedom or free will without denying at the same time that this free will was conditioned but not wholly shaped or determined by factors which affected it. Freedom of choice is the very basis of Buddhist ethics. The very possibility of our refraining from evil and doing good, depends on the fact that our choices and decisions are not strictly and wholly determined and in this sense are free. Thus Buddhism upheld a theory of non-deterministic causal conditioning along with the doctrine of free will.[5]

The Buddhist theory of causal genesis *(paticca-samuppāda)* steers clear of the two extremes of strict determinism and indeterminism. In the *Devadaha Sutta*[6] the Buddha criticises *pubbekatakammahetu* which upholds the view that all our present experiences of pleasure and pain are entirely due to our past actions. If past actions entirely control our present experiences man has no chance of shaping his destiny. Another theory rejected by the Buddha is *issaranimmānahetu* which maintains that all our experiences are due to creation by God. If such were the case man cannot be held responsible for the good and evil that he does, because ultimately it is God who is responsible for everything in the universee. *Sangatibhāvahetu* is another rejected theory. It means that beings are destined to experience pleasure and pain due to fate. If such fatalism operates in the universe it is just not possible to make an end of suffering, and leading a religious life becomes meaningless. *Abhijātihetu,* the theory that holds that all experiences are due to hereditary physiological causes is also rejected by the Buddha.

Makkhali Gosāla[7] maintained that beings get defiled and purified without any cause or reason. Beings have no initiative, will or effort of their own. They experience pleasure and pain going through a process of deterministic natural evolution, divided as they are into six species. Criticising Makkhali Gosāla's theory of the absence of moral responsibility and free will the Buddha says that he is born for the woe of mankind.[8] Ajita Kesakambali was a materialist who denied moral causation altogether and upheld a theory of annihilation.[9] Another theory rejected by the Buddha is *adhicca-samuppannavāda*[10] or accidentalism, which denies causation altogether and maintains that events take place fortuitously. Perhaps *yadrcchāvāda,* do-as-yu-like is similar in effect to this view of accidentalism.

In the *Anguttara-nikāya*[11] the Buddha criticises those who hold *pubbekatahetuvāda, issaranimmānahetuvāda* and *ahetu-appaccaya-vāda.* He questions whether it could be the case that they indulge in misdeeds such as killing, stealing etc. on account of actions done in the past/because of creation by God/or without any apparent reason or cause. He argues that those who accept the position that everything happens as a result of past action/because of creation by God/or without any cause, would have neither the will *(chanda),* nor the initiative *(vāyāma)* to do something which should be done or not do something which should not be done.

Notes

1. E. J. Thomas, *The Life of Buddha,* London, 1956, p. 207
2. Walpola Rahula, *What the Buddha Taught,* Gordon Fraser, 1959, pp. 54, 55
3. G. P. Malalasekera, "The Status of the Individual in Theravada Buddhist Philosophy," in *The Status of the Individual in East and West,* ed. Charles A. Moore, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1968, p. 73
4. Trevor Ling, *The Buddha,* Penguin Books, 1976, p. 141
5. K. N. Jayatilleke, *Ethics in Buddhist Perspective,* Wheel No. 175/176 BPS, Kandy pp. 1-14
6. *M.* II, 222
7. *D.* I, 53, *DA.* I, 161
8. *A.* I, p. 286
9. *D.* I, p. 55
10. *D.* I, p. 28ff.
11. *A.* I, p. 173-175

When in fact, when in reality, they have no such idea as ought to do and ought not to do, they live in a state of bewilderment, with unguarded sense faculties, and they cannot individually have a pertinent claim to recluseship.

Buddhism rejects all theories which deny the doctrine of free will. The Buddhist theory of causation, *paticca-samuppāda* is opposed to all deterministic theories, as well as total indeterminism which denied causal correlations in nature altogether. Taking the middle path, steering clear of both these opposing extremes, the *paticcasmuppāda* maintains that human actions are *conditioned* but not *strictly determined* by the factors that affect it. Therefore, according to Buddhism, man has an element of free will which makes it possible for him to choose between alternatives.

Once a brahmin approached the Buddha[12] and said that he holds the view that man has no free will *(natthi attakāro, natthi parakāro)*. Then the Buddha asked him how he comes to such a view when he can, on his own accord, come forward or go back *(sayaṃ abhikkanto sayaṃ patikkanto)*. The Buddha goes on to explain that there is an element of initiative *(ārabbhadhātu)*, an element of exertion *(nikkamadhātu)*, an element of endeavour *(parakkamadhātu)*, an element of resistance *(thāmadhātu)*, an element of persistence *(thitidhātu)* and an element of volitional effort *(upakkamadhātu)* in man. Therefore it is obvious that man has the capability to choose between alternatives, there is free will on the part of himself *(attakāra)* and on the part of others *(parakāra)*.

In the *Ambalatthikā Rāhulovāda Sutta*[13] the Buddha exhorts that one should reflect before doing an action whether it is conducive to harm to oneself and others. One should carry out only those actions which neither harm oneself nor others. To cultivate *sammāvāyāma*,[14] right effort of the noble eightfold path one must stimulate the will and endeavour:

(a) not to allow evil states which have not yet arisen to arise anew,
(b) to eradicate the evil states which have already arisen,
(c) to encourage wholesome states which have not yet arisen,
(d) to proliferate wholesome states which have already arisen.

Because man has the freedom to choose his actions he is responsible for his deeds and he reaps what he sows.[15] Therefore the Buddha exhorts man to choose what is conducive to his own well-being and happiness and live as an island/lamp unto oneself, he must help himself, another cannot help him.[16]

The man who is given to evil habits loses much of his free will. One addicted to drugs or alcohol is a slave to his habit, he has no control over himself. Though he suffers a great deal physically and mentally because of his evil habit, he has no strength of character to shed the evil habit. He is not free to do so because he is conditioned to the extent of being unable to use the element of free will with which he, as a human being, is endowed. He is bound and fettered by his evil habits *(saññutto hoti)*. The *Aṅguttara-nikāya*[17] explains how a fetter *(saṃyojana)* is formed: One ponders over and entertains thoughts of those things which provoke exciting desire. As he does so craving arises in him. When he craves for those things he gets fettered *(saññutto hoti)*. This is what the Buddha calls a fetter *(saṃyojana)*.

Killing, stealing etc. are evil deeds *(akusala)* and they are prompted by unwholesome motivational roots *(akusalamūla)* such as lust *(rāga)*, hatred *(dosa)* and delusion *(moha)*.[18] It is significant that these motivational roots are said to circumscribe a man's freedom of action – *rāgo pamānakarano, doso pamānakarano, moho pamānakarano*.[19] The *Magga-saṃyutta*[20] states that covetousness *(abhijjhā)*, ill will *(byāpāda)*, adherence to rites and ritual *(silabbataparāmāsa)* and intellectual dogmatism *(idam-saccābhinivesa)* also constitute veritable bonds which control even physical action *(kāyagantha)*.

One who has no control over one's sense faculties also has very little freedom. Sense faculties are called *indriyāni* in Pali because they dominate *(indra* means lord) man so much. The *Chapāna-sutta* of the *Saḷāyatana saṃyutta*[21] illustrates the state of the untrained man with an eloquent simile. Six animals who have different habits and diverse fields of action are tied together in one firm knot. The animals are a snake which tries to creep into an anthill, a crocodile that tries to escape into water, a bird that struggles to fly in the sky, a dog that tries to run to a

12 [illegible] III, p. 337
13 [illegible], p. 415
14 S. V, p. 9
15 S. I, p. 227 Yadisam vapata bijam tādisam harate phalam
16 D. II, 100 [illegible] viharatha attasaranā
17 [illegible]
18 [illegible] I, p. 47
19 S. V, p. 2?7
20 S. V, 59 > D. III, p. 230
21 [illegible]

human settlement, a fox that tries to flee to a cemetery and a monkey that attempts to jump into a forest. Just as there is much turmoil with the activities of these different animals, the sense faculties of the untrained man are constantly trying to reach their respective fields of action. The man who has no control over his sense faculties is much confused. It is the man who has control over his sense faculties who is more free to choose between alternatives. For instance the man who has curbed his tongue can exercise his will and withstand the temptation for savoury food if eating it is harmful to his health. The man who has no control over his senses has hardly the freedom of choice as he is so much overpowered by his senses.

The *Mahāsaḷāyatanika Sutta*[22] explains in detail how man gets fettered by his sense faculties. He does not understand as it really is, the nature of the eye, the nature of visual objects, the nature of visual consciousness, the nature of visual contact, the nature of pleasurable, painful and neutral sensations that arise as a result of visual contact; without such realistic understanding he gets attached to the eye, visible objects, visual consciousness, visual contact, and the sensations that arise thereby. When he is attached *(sāratta)* he gets fettered *(saṃyutta)*. That means he loses much of his free will. Being deluded he lives seeing the pleasurable aspect of the visual experience and thereby his rebirth personality builds up *(āyatiṃ pañc' upādānakkhandhā upacayaṃ gacchanti)*. His physical and mental tensions *(darathā)* increase, physical and mental torments *(santāpā)* increase, and physical and mental fevers *(pariḷāhā)* increase. He experiences suffering *(dukkhā)* of both body and mind.

The *Mahātaṇhāsaṅkhaya Sutta*[23] explains the same truth when it states that the man who gets attracted and repelled by pleasant and unpleasant sense data respectively, has a mind that is limited *(parittacetaso)*, which means that his freedom of action is limited. On the other hand, the man who does not get attracted by pleasurable sense data and repelled by unpleasant sense data has a mind that is described as unlimited *(appamāṇacetaso)*.[24] Another method of developing a mind that is unlimited is by cultivating the sublime emotions of *mettā*, *karuṇā*, *muditā* and *upekkha* to suffuse all directions.[25]

Concepts expressing freedom of choice such as energy *(viriya)*, will *(chanda)*, effort *(vāyāma)*, perserverance *(ussāha)* and exertion *(ussolhi)*[26] play a prominent role in the Buddhist scheme of liberation. Man is advised to assert his freedom even by overpowering evil states of the mind just as a strong man would overpower a weak man.[27] One must try to take the mind under one's control *(cittaṃ vasaṃ vattati)* and not go under the control of the mind *(no ca cittassa vasena vattati)*.[28] The exemplary monk is the one who is never lax in the cultivation of virtue, who just does not entertain the idea of giving up (the upward struggle) and who perseveres to attain what has not yet been attained, to understand what has not yet been understood, to realise what has not yet been realised.[29]

The man who commits evil and indulges in sense pleasures is described as one who is going down the stream *(anusotagāmi)*,[30] like one who is drifted down by the stream.[31] He hardly uses his free will. Succumbing to natural inclinations[32] he gets completely entangled and fettered within and without.[33] The one who cultivates moral habits and restrains his senses is well on the path to freedom and is described as one going upstream *(paṭisotagāmi)*.[34] Subduing his physical sense faculties he develops spiritual faculties *(indriya* q.v.) such as *saddhā, viriya, sati, samādhi, paññā*.[35] When these spiritual faculties get further strengthened they become spiritual powers *(bala* q.v.) such as *saddhābala, viriyabala* etc.[36] Some of these powers are then developed to become factors of enlightenment *(bojjhaṅga* q.v.)[37] which bring about total unshakable liberation of mind *(akuppā cetovimutti)*. Thus it is possible to maintain that by exploiting the element of free will with which a man is

22. *M.* III, 287
23. *M.* I, p. 266
24. *M.* I, p. 270
25. *D.* I, pp. 250-251
26. *A.* IV, p. 320
27. *M.* I, pp. 120-121 – *cetasā cittaṃ abhiniggaṇhitabbaṃ abbhinippīḷetabbaṃ abhisantāpetabbaṃ*
28. *M.* I, p. 214
29. *A.* I, p. 243
30. *A.* II, p. 5
31. *It.* p. 114
32. *A.* III, p. 5 – *yebhuyyena sattā kāmesu palālitā*
33. *S.* I, p. 13 – *antojaṭā bahijaṭā jaṭāya jaṭitā pajā*
34. *A.* II, p. 5
35. *S.* V, p. 202; *M.* II, pp. 11-12
36. *S.* V, 219; *M.* II, pp. 11-12
37. *S.* V, p. 111; *M.* II, pp. 11-12

endowed he can work himself upwards to completely decondition himself from the factors that affect him and thus disjoin the chain of causation. He then has complete control over his mind *(cetovasippatta)*.[38] He is able to entertain whatever thoughts/intentions he wishes to entertain, he is equally capable of not entertaining whatever thoughts/intentions which he does not want to entertain. He has come to a state of unconditioned *(asankhata)*[39] freedom from bondage *(yogakkhema)*,[40] and that state is generally known as *nibbāna*.

Freedom of Thought: The *Kālāma Sutta*[41] is the best expression of the freedom of thought in Buddhism. There the Buddha admonished the Kālāmas not to accept a proposition as true on the criteria of revelation, tradition, hearsay, scriptural authority, logic, inference, superficial observation, agreement with one's accepted views, plausibility and the prestige-value of the teacher. One should accept only on grounds of personal conviction, and when the resultant consequences of such acceptance are seen to be useful in the light of experience. One is also advised to be guided by the attitude of the wise. The Buddha expects his teachings too to be subjected to the same investigations as those prescribed to the Kālāmas, and he describes his doctrine as inviting investigation and verification *(ehipassika)*. In the *Vimamsaka Sutta*[42] and the *Canki Sutta*[43] the Buddha invites his disciples to see whether his physical and verbal behaviour betrays the presence of any difilements such as greed, hatred and ignorance. In the *Brahmāyu Sutta*[44] we meet with the young man Uttara who says that he followed the Buddha like a shadow for seven months to verify the validity of the fame that had spread about the Buddha.

The Buddha warns that dogmatism *(idam saccābhiniveso)* is an intellectual fetter. The *Atthakavagga*[45] of the *Suttanipāta* too emphasises that obstinate clinging to views that this alone is true and all else in false is a hindrance to the acquistition of knowledge. *Ditth'upādāna*[46] or fanaticism is another name by which dogmatic adherence to views is introduced in the *Suttas*.

Buddhism recognises that there are deep rooted psychological biases which retard freedom of thought – *cetaso upakkilese paññāya dubbalikarane*.[47] The five *nivaranas* or mental hindrances, namely desire for sense pleasures *(kāmacchanda)*, ill-will *(byāpāda)*, sloth and torpor *(thinamiddha)*, restlessness and worry *(uddhaccakukkucca)* and doubt *(vicikicchā)* obscure the mind and hinder the arising of wisdom. The *Anguttara-nikāya*[48] explains in detail how the *nivaranas* obscure freedom of thought and the arising of wisdom. The function of the *nivaranas* is beautifully illustrated with a simile of water under five circumstances when it fails to show its depth and contents. Coloured water, boiling water, moss-covered water, turbulent water and muddy water in darkness respectively illustrate the obscuring nature of the *nivaranas*. For real intellectual freedom one must rid one's mind of these emotional and cognitive biases. In fact the very aim of the course of mental training in Buddhism is the creation of suitable conditions to allow the free arising of wisdom and that state is called *paññāvimutti*, freedom through wisdom.

Freedom of Expression: Buddhism encourages the free expression of ideas. Under the ideal *cakkavatti* rule philosophers and religious teachers are given righteous protection and patronage and the *cakkavatti* king is obliged to visit them from time to time to inquire about moral values, what is good, true and useful.[49] The Vajjians about whom the Buddha speaks in praise in the *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta*[50] are said to assemble in unity periodcally, evidently for discussing freely the affairs of the state and community problems. The Buddha says that they will continue to prosper so long as this institution of free discussion continues to function. It is recorded[51] that the Buddha has been against the idea of rendering the *buddhavacana* vedic metre i.e. Sanskrit, the language of the elite of the day. Instead he allowed the monks to learn the *dhamma* each in his/her own language perhaps because he believed that the mother tongue allows anybody to understand and express ideas better and

38. *A*. II, p. 36
39. *S*. IV, p. 359 ff.
40. *A*. II, p. 12
41. *A*. I, p. 188
42. *M*. I, p. 318
43. *M*. II, p. 172
44. *M*. II, p. 135
45. *Sn*. vv. 832, 780-787; 878 ff.
46. *D*. III, p. 230
47. *M*. I, p. 181
48. *A*. III, p. 63
49. *D*. III, p. 61
50. *D*. II, p. 74
51. *Vin*. II, p. 139

more freely. The Buddha speaks in praise of criticism where criticism in due; and it is equally important to speak in appreciation of those who deserve such appreciation.[52] The Buddha's attitude to criticism and praise is also noteworthy. In the *Brahmajāla Sutta*[53] the Buddha says that one should not get angry if another were to criticise one, for the simple reason that one will not be in a position to see whether the criticism is valid or not if one gets angry. Moreover anger is a moral danger to oneself. Nor should one be elated if someone praises, because elation prevents one from seeing whether those qualitiess for which one is praised are found in one or not. In the face of blame and praise one should maintain an equanimous attitude as self-correction, if necessary, becomes possible only then.

In desciplinary and eeclesiastical matters the Buddhist code of discipline requires that the *sangha* should be duly informed of the matters which need attention and all members are expected to express their views on the issues concerned.[54] This is a clear example of the freedom of expression that is guaranteed to all members of the community of monks.

Speech is one of the three modes of human activity, the other two being physical and mental activities. Four modes of speech, namely falsehood, verbal abuse, slander and gossip are recognised as unwholesome. In the *Abhayarājakumārasutta*[55] the Buddha says that only what is true and useful should be spoken, and that too at the proper time. There may be occasions when harsh language is uselful for disciplinary purposes, apart from such exceptional cicumstances one should train oneself to use words which are pleasant and polite. But if one does not have something true and useful to say, and if it is not the proper time even if one has, it is best to observe noble silence *(dhammī vā kathā ariyo vātunhībhāvo)*.[56]

Freedom of Worship: Buddhism is a very tolerant religious and it did not try to gain adherents by force or coercion. It spread peacefully in the world and it rarely came in conflict with other religious ideologies in countries where it spread. Its teachings consist of the nature of the world and man, man's place in the whole cosmic context, the problems man is faced with and a means of getting rid of those problems. It is specifically stated that these are explained as they really are *(yathābhūtam)*. At the Buddha had a total vision of reality he wqs able to teach man ways and means of ordering all aspects of life so that man could lead a well-integrated holistic life, in harmony with one another and with nature. Thus Buddhism is a full fledged philosophy of life. Buddhism accepts that there could be certain aspects of other religious and philosophies which are true and useful to man, though they may not answer all problems man is faced with in the cosmic context. Therefore Buddhism appreciated those true and useful aspects of other ideologies. Buddhism also refrainned from criticising and confronting other religions as far as possible, particularly if those views were not positively harmful to man and society. Generally it preferred to expound its own doctrine[57] in as great detail and as clarity as possible, without comparing and contrasting with other views unless pointedly questioned.[58] But wherever there were harmful views propagated, Buddhism made it a point to clearly expose the vanity and damage of such views and supported such arguments with sound reason, evidence and experiential facts.[59] Thus Buddhism adopted a very tolerant attitude to other religious and appreciated the value of what is called today freedom of worship. In the *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta* the Buddha speaks in praise of the Vajjan religious shrines called *Vajjicetiyāni,* and certainly they were not Buddhist institutions. But the Buddha says that so long as the Vajjis continue to patronise their places of worship and follow their religious customs they will prosper and not decline. This statement clearly shows the respectful nonpolemical attitude Buddhism adopted towards other religions.

King Asoka who was the greatest Buddhist king history has known and who was the monarch of a vast multi-religious country guaranteed the freedom of worship to all religious groups by proclamations made in his edicts (q.v.).

Lily de Silva

FREE WILL. The complexity and the ambiguity of the concept connoted by the expression free will have given rise to divergent views among philosophers from early times. It is even at present a matter of much contention. The added fact that the problem of free will could be approached from very different points of view (e.g. from

52. *A.* I, p. 89
53. *D.* I, p. 3
54. *Vin.* II, p. 80
55. *M.* I, pp. 394-395
56. *M.* I, p. 161
57. *D.* II, p. 151
58. *M.* III, p. 298 ff.
59. *M.* II, pp. 147-157.

that of a moral philosopher, jurist, theologian and so on) has further confounded the issues involved.[1]

There is no consensus among scholars even on the Buddhist position with regard to the question of free will. A reputed Buddhist scholar commenting on the phrase 'freedom of the will' observes. "....its use in the modern expositions only reflects an unstated wish to interpret Buddhist thought in terms of the categories of Western thought.[2] Though it is true that there is no exact equivalent of the expression 'free will' in the early suttas of the Pali Canon, and hence, the problem in its present form is not directly taken up for consideration, numerous important suttas in the early strata of the Canon provide definite evidence to establish the position that early Buddhism was not only aware of this problem but also had a clear point of view on it.

The expression 'free will' when taken in its often used sense denotes the unconstrained ability to do or act; the freedom to choose from alternative courses of action without restraint or or coercion; the unhindered capacity to make a conscious, deliberate decision or carry out the course of action which one chooses. However, this unconstrained ability does not mean absolute freedom, a form of absolute libertarianism. Freedom is a relative concept and in this particular context, especially when viewed from the Buddhist point of view, has a specific use as a moral and social concept. In addition to other influences social and moral values too, naturally demarcate the boundaries within which freedom should operate in a given instance. But it is not this type of influence that is envisaged when reference is made to constraints and hindrances. Even within these limitations the will has the right to exercise its option in selecting between two alternative courses of action. What the expression 'free will' connotes is that the choice is deliberate and is neither coerced nor pre-determined. Nevertheless, one could argue that though the choice is not pre-detrmined, it is, according to Buddhism, governed and directed by the self-centered will. Self-centeredness is the innate nature of the will, and hence the above argument holds true with regard to the function of the will of all those who have not cultivated and totally cleaned it of its defilements. But to consider the problem of free will in this manner is to elevate the issue to a supramundane level. However, when considered at a more mundane, empirical, pragmatic level it is seen that Buddhism accepts the operation of the free will, though it is not pointedly referred to in the Canonical texts by an expression that could be considered the exact equivalent of the expression free will.

Buddhism is primarily an ethical religion and, therefore, its approach to the problem of free will is from an ethical point of view. Consequently this approach narrows down the issues involved in the problem to a question of moral freedom namely, 'Is the will free to choose between good and bad?'

Many suttas contain discussions pertaining to the question of moral freedom, and in these suttas one finds not only the Buddha's point of view but also the view held by his contemporaries on this issue. As the Buddha's teaching on ethics is fundamentally related to his teaching on causality (q.v.), to get a clear idea of the Buddhist position on free will one has to study it in relation to causality.

The causal theories prevalent at that time could be broadly categorized as follows:

1. Self-causation *(sayaṃ kataṃ)*
2. External-causation *(paraṃ kataṃ)*
3. Combination of (1) and (2) *(sayaṃ kataṃ Paraṃ kataṃ)*
4. Non-causation *(ahetu-appaccaya, adhicca-samuppanna)*.

On different grounds the Buddha rejected all four above mentioned views. The Buddha rejected categorically the theory of self-causation because it is contrary to empirical evidence and, moreover, it violates the universal truth of change and impermanence by postulating a permanent self (*S.* II, p. 20; cf. *D.* III, p.138). The second view namely, external-causation was rejected mainly because it denied human exertion,[3] even in instances where human exertion is obviously present. Besides, divine-agency led to a belief in a Creator God, the fallacy of which belief was often exposed by the Buddha. While

1. See the articles on Free Will in the *ERE.* and the *Encyclopaedia Brittannica;* also see relevant articles in the *Encyclopeadia of Philosophy* Ed. Paul Edward, Macmillan and Free Press, 1967.

2. *See Ency. B'sm,* s.v. CENTANA. This article is reproduced in W. S. Karunaratne, *Buddhism, It's Religion and Philosophy* Pub. Buddhist Research Society, Singapore, 1988, p. 136. It is interesting to note that many scholars are divided on the issue as to whether Buddhism accepts free will. While (such reputed scholars as Berridale Keith *(Buddhist Philosophy,* pp. 166, 173, 175 etc.) and Mrs. C. A.F. Rhys Davids *(A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics,* p.l. xxxi) suggest that free will is not compatible with Buddhism, Tachibana *(Ethics of Buddhism,* p. 90ff) and Wijesekera *(Buddhism and the Moral Problem,* p. 11 f.) point out that Buddhism asserts free will.

3. Ajita Kesakambalin, Pakudha Kaccāyana, Pūrana Kassapa, and above all Makkhali Gosāla denied human exertion.

self-causation led to eternalism, external-causation led to annihilation, and both these extremes were denounced by the Buddha.

The third view closely approximates the Jains view on causality. As apparent it is a combination of the first two views, and the mere juxtaposition of two contrary views obviously does not make a single right view. And, moreover, the Jaina karma theory which emphasises *pubbekatahetuvāda*, that everything an individual experiences is due to his past kārma, is a form of Determinism. Such Determinisam, quite obviously, does not leave room for the operation of free will. The Buddha very emphatically criticized and rejected this view.

The theory of Non-causation which is attributed to Makkhali is the subject of severe Buddhist criticism. This is because it totally denies any form of human exertion. The Buddha rejected this view, too, demonstrating its inherent fallacy of pointing an external agency even in cases where individual responsibility is clearly manifest (*D.* I, p. 56).

It is against this background that the Buddhist position on free will should be viewed. As already mentioned Buddhist Canonical texts do not directly speak of free will. Therefore there is no parallel expression in the Pali language. However, these texts refer to the 'will' which according to Buddhism, plays a very important role in an individual's life here as well as in life hereafter. The word used to denote the 'will' is *cetanā* (q.v.), a verbal noun of *ceteti* meaning thinking in relation to action, connoting in its widest meaning the conative function of mentation which determines the entire thought process. Being the determinent factor of the psychic aspect of the individual it plays a very important role in the operation of ***kamma***. The will, however, like everything else is conditioned. Salient among the factors that condition the will are attachment ***(rāga)***, hatred ***(dosa)*** and delusion ***(moha)***. These conditioning factors undoubtedly influence the will when it makes any choice. Therefore, a choice made under such influences is certainly not free from biases.[4] But such a choice is neither imposed by an external agency as such (eg. a Creator God) nor predetermined (by fate). Though made by a conditioned will the choice is deliberate.

Buddhism very clearly says that in spite of its conditioned state the will is capable of choosing between what is morally good and what is morally bad. Buddhism also accepts the premise that if this ability is not present the purpose of living the religious-life *(bra[illegible]* [illegible] has freedom of the will from its bondage to [illegible] existence as its goal, becomes completely futile ([illegible] p. 260). Buddhism holds that all individuals possess [illegible] an ability and that it could be made to function [illegible]fully by those who genuinely strive and initiate [illegible] that direction.

It is because such an ability is accepted that Buddhism admonishes all to accomplish what is morally good and refrain from what is morally bad. There is no dispute about the fact that Buddhism accepts freedom of thought. Freedom of thought becomes quite meaningless if freedom to choose between two alternative courses of action is denied. The Buddhist condemnation of dogmatism (q.v.), too, provide substantial proof to establish the point that Buddhism accepts free will. Dogmatism could prevail only where there are constraints on free will and prohibition on investigation. Buddhism freely encourage investigation and inquiry.[5]

Buddhism not only admonishes its followers to choose a right course of action but also lays down criteria that help to make a choice between right and wrong.[6] Thus, if freedom is taken to mean freedom to choose between two alternative courses of action, between right and wrong courses of action, then, in spite of the conditioned state, the will is free to make such a choice.

The *Anguttara-nikāya* (III, pp. 337 f.) records an instance where a certain brahman questioned the Buddha regarding a problem mainly pertaining to 'agency', but throwing much light on the Buddhist position on free will. The brahman says that he holds the view that there is no self-agency ***(atta-kāra)*** or an external agency ***(para-kāra)*** – clearly a deterministic view and asks for the Buddha's views. The Buddha adopting expirical arguments points out the fallacy of this view and demonstrates the fact that individuals possess 'initiative' through which they could initiate action according to their choice. A number of terms is used to bring out this idea of 'initiative'. They are ***ārabbha*** (initiative, effort, inception of energy), ***nikkama*** (endurance, exertion), ***parakkama*** (striving, endeavour), *thāma* ([illegible]), *thiti* (persistence), and *upakkama* (undertaking). Though these terms are not directly indicative of the idea of free will, they, in one way or the other, connote the ability of voluntarily initiating action in accordance with one's choice of the course of action. Thus it is seen that Buddhism grants that an individual has the ability to

4. In the conception of free will as discussed herein these conditioning factors, attachment *(rāga)*, hatred *(dosa)* and delusion *(moha)* are not the ones regarded as constraints. According to Buddhism only an arahant's 'will' is free from these.

5. Cf. *Cānki (M.* II, p. 169) and *Vimamsaka (M.* I, p. 317) suttas.

6. See *Kālama Sutta (A.* I, p. 188 ff).

select between good and bad courses of action and also has the ability of voluntarily initiating action according to one's choice. Therefore it is seen that, though Buddhism does not directly deal with the problem of free will and hence there is no parallel expression, Buddhism from the earliest times has been aware of the concept and had formulated clear view on it.

Related to the problem of free will is the problem of moral responsibility. A theory of moral responsibility becomes tenable only with the assumption of a free will. Materialists and Ājivaka determinists who accepted Naturalism *(svabhāvavāda)*, among whom were Makkhali Gosāla, Ajitakesakambalin, Pūraṇa Kassapa and also Pukudha Kaccāyana, denied human exertion and its corollary free will, and consequently moral responsibility did not pose a problem for them. Mahavira, while accepting determinism, tried to accommodate moral responsibility. But in this he was not quite successful because his *pubbekatahetuvāda* postualted that everything one experiences is due to his past behaviour (see ***kamma***). This deterministic view of moral responsibility was severaly criticized by the Buddha.

According to Buddhism an action is said to be freely done when its immediate cause is the will or volition *(cetanā)* which is not coerced by any external factor. It is only for this type of action that one becomes morally responsible. No moral responsibility is attached to an individual who does an act without a conscious, deliberate will, or who does an act with a coerced will, over which coercion the individual has no control? This is why the (free) will (volition, intention) is equated with moral action *(kamma)*.

As Buddhism believes in a succession of births, moral responsibility of an individual is not limited to one's single birth. Thus in Buddhism, moral responsibility and moral behaviour is founded on the doctrine of rebirth (q.v.). In this, however, some see a problem in reconciling the Buddhist theory of non-substantiality *(anattā* q.v.) with moral responsibility. Here the question is posed as to how one could maintain the identity of a person in his successive births if there is no permanent entity *(attā)* that passes from birth to birth, and if so, how could one conclude that it is the same person who is held morally responsible in another birth for some action of his done in the present. This, of course, clearly is a question of identity. According to Buddhism everything, including the individual, is in a flux, undergoing constant change. In such a situation there cannot be identity, but only continuity. Thus, the problem is self-created by mistaking identity for continuity. Once this mistaken belief is got rid of the problem too will cease to be.

S. K. Nanayakkara

FRIENDSHIP[1] is a mutual attachment, affection or deep regard that exists between two or more persons and, is distinguished from sexual or family attachments. It is a reciprocal relationship and forms an important element in every society, though not generally regarded as an indispensable requisite of life. Reciprocity and intimacy of relationship of friends, though the intensity of these two qualities may vary in different cases, are two fundamental requisites of friendship. The present article is not limited to this form of friendship alone but includes also 'friendliness' which denotes a general feeling of amity and cordiality that exists among different individuals of a community. Friendliness forms the basis upon which friendship is developed.

According to Buddhist ethics people who lead a community life are morally bound to develop friendliness among themselves. If they happened to be concerned only with themselves and are indifferent with regard to others they would be going against a moral obligation. Friendliness is an indispensable requisite of community life for, it lays a firm foundation for community life. Therefore, the Buddha in his ethical teachings stressed the importance of cultivating friendliness for the progress of community life. This is evident also from the importance attached to loving kindness *(mettā)*, compassion *(karuṇā)* and kindliness *(muditā)*. However, it should be noted that the Buddhist ethical teachings are not on the whole meant for the community of the Saṅgha alone but are also applicable to the daily life of laymen.

The Buddha often advised his monks to develop friendliness among themselves. He requested them to dwell with a mind full of friendliness and devoid of hatered. He frequently admonished the monks to train themselves in such a way that neither will their minds become preverted, nor will they utter evil speech, but will

7. It should be noted that various biases that influence the mind are not considered as coercive forces, and besides an individual has the ability to control them.

1. See *ERE.* VI, (pp. 131 ff.) for general remarks as well as for a detailed account of Greek and Roman views on friendship. See also John Ferguson: *Moral Values in the Ancient World,* (London, 1958, pp. 53–75).

dwell with a mind of friendliness, full of compassion and void of hatered. They were asked to train themselves first by suffusing one person with a mind of friendliness and beginning from him that mind of friendliness should be made to suffuse the whole world (*M.* I, p. 127). To live with a mind of friendliness suffusing the four quarters is a great virtue for a monk (ibid. 38). Addressing the monks of Kosambi who were disputatious and contentious, the Buddha mentioned six things that are conducive to affection, concord, harmony and unity. These are offering the fellow monks a friendly act of body, speech and thought both in private and public; sharing and enjoying among themselves whatever is lawfully acquired; being united with the fellow monks in virtues and flawless habits and also being united with them in views that are Ariyan and leading to the destruction of anguish (ibid. 320 ff.). In the ***Mahā Rāhulovāda Sutta*** Rāhula is advised by the Buddha to develop friendliness of mind, for, it drives away malevolence (ibid. 424).

Affection and respect are two essential conditions for developing friendliness. It is said that the showing of respect, by which is meant the showing of friendliness in acts of body, speech and mind, either in public or in private to fellow monks who are elders, is one of the qualities that help a monk to reach growth, increase and maturity in this doctrine and discipline *(dhamma-vinaye vuddhiṃ virūlhiṃ vepullam āpajjitum:* ibid. 222). It is also said that the monks should show friendliness to their teachers by listening and preparing their minds for profound knowledge and by not turning aside (*M.* II, p. 117).

Sublime it is to abide in friendliness and the Buddha is abiding in friendliness *(brahmā mettā vihāri-bhagavā hi mettā vihārī: M.* I, p. 369; see also *Sn.* pp. 25 ff.). How can one attain this sublimity or else, as often stated in the texts, what is the way to the companionship with Brahmā? *(katamo brahmānaṃ sahavyatāya maggo).* To attain this state a monk has to live suffusing the four quarters, everywhere and in every way, with a mind of friendliness that is far-reaching, widespread, immeasurable, without enmity and without malevolence. When the freedom of mind *(ceto-vimutti)* that is friendlines is developed thus, that deed which is done in a limited range does not rest there, does not remain there *(na tatrāvasissati na tatrāvatiṭṭhati: M.* II, p. 207).

Friendliness is an indispensable requisite for the progress and success of community life. Any conflict between self-interest and the interest of the community had to be avoided if community life is to be a success. Therefore, when leading a community life one has go give precedence to the interest of the community above one's own interest for, this is the only way to harmonize all the individuals of the community together 'like milk and water." However, it should be clearly noted that the sacrificing of self-interest does not amount to the sacrificing of one's autonomy. What is really meant by this is the sacrificing of one's personal worldly interest for the sake of the interest of the community. The Buddha, too, approved this sort of hehaviour on the part of the monks. Anuruddha's explanation of the ideal community life in which all monks live on friendly terms regarding one another with an eye of affection, clearly show the Buddhist idea of friendliness of mind. When the Buddha inquires as to how those in Anuruddha's group were living on friendly terms, one of them replied thus: "As to this, Lord, it occurred to me: Indeed it is a gain for me, indeed it is well begotten by me, that I am living with such fellow Brahma-farers. On account of this, Lord, for these venerable ones friendliness as to act of body, speech and mind whether openly or in private have arisen in me. Because of this, Lord, it occurred to me: Now suppose that, having surrendered my own mind should live only according to the mind of these vererable ones? So I, having surrendered my own mind am living only according to the mind of these venerable ones. Lord, we have divers bodies, but assuredly only one mind*(nānā hi kho no bhante kāyā ekañca pana maññe cittam: M.* I, p. 206; see also *M.* I, 398; III, p. 156; *A.* I, p. 70; III, pp. 64, 70; *S.* IV, p. 225).

Friendship is more limited in range than friendliness for lesser number of people are bound together by friendship. Yet, it is marked by a mutual attachment and respect which is not prominent in friendliness. Those who are bound by friendship are more concerned with each other's welfare than those who are bound by friendliness. Importance of friendship is also frequently stressed by the Buddha. In one instance (*S.* I, p. 87 f.) the Buddha has said that the whole of this life in religion consists in righteous friendship *(kalyāṇa-sahāyatā)* and righteous association *(kalyāṇa-sampavaṅkatā).* Though one should show friendliness to all alike, even to those who are unfriendly and indifferent (*J.* II, p. 61), one should form friendship only with those who are good, because one's character is mouded under the influence of friends with whom one associates intimately (*J.* VI, p. 236).

Association with the good *(kalyāṇa)* is regarded as a source of much benefit. The Buddha has declared that there is no other single thing of such power to cause the arising of good states if not you arisen or the waning of evil states already arisen, as friendly with the good (A. I, p. 14). Therefore, one should pursue a good, faithful friend as one athist hastens to a pool (*J.* V. p. 233).

The Buddha's constant advice is not to form friendship with the wicked, for it is conducive to great loss (*J.* VI, p. 461; *A.*I, p. 16). It is one of the six causes that brings ruin to a man. The Buddha cites six perils that arise from

associating with evil friends for, then any gambler *(dhutta)*, any libertine *(soṇḍa)*, any tippler *(pipāsa)*, any cheat *(nekatika)* any swindler *(vañcanika)* and any man of violence *(sāhasika)* is his friend and companion (*D.* III, 183 f.; see also *Thig. vv.* 264, 681–82). Not only friendship with the wicked but friendship with the foolish, also, should be shunned. It is said that sense-lacking friends are worse than foes with senses. (*J.* I, pp. 247, 249). The association of the wise and the shunning of foolish friends was declared by the Buddha as one of the auspicious things (*Sn. v.* 29).

The characteristics of good and bad friends are described in Buddhist texts.[2] The well known proverbial saying that a friend in need is a friend indeed is found also in the Buddhist Canonical texts. In the *Digha Nikāya* (III, p. 184) it is said that only he who proves a comrade in the hour of need is to be called a friend *(yo ca atthesu jātesu sahāyo hoti, so sakhā)*. There are four types of comrades who are to be regarded as true friends. They are friends who are helpmates *(upakāro)*, friends who remain unchanged during prosperity and adversity, friends who show what is needed *(attha-akkhāyi)* and those who sympathise with their friend *(mittānukampako)*. The *Nettippakaraṇa* (p. 164) enumerates seven qualities of a good friend. A good friend *(kalyāṇa-mitta)* is endearing *(piyo)*, venerable *(garu)* emulatable *(bhāvaniyo)*, willing to talk to one *(vattā)*, willing for one to talk with him *(vacanakkhamo)*, willing to explain what is profound *(gambhīrañca katham kattā)* and never exhorting groundlessly *(na ca aṭṭhāne niyojako)*. It is said that such a friend should not be rejected as long as one's life lasts. The *Anguttara nikāya* (I, 285) defines a good friend as one who gives what is hard to give, does what is hard to do and bears what is hard to bear. The *Jātaka* (IV, 198), too, enumerates sixteen qualities that are to be found in good friends who are well established in their friendship.

"The absent he remembers; returned, he will rejoice:
Then in the height of his delight he greets you with voice.
Your foes he never honours, he loves to serve your friends,
Those who would slander you, he stays; who praise you he commends.
He tells his secrets to you, your secrets he never betrays,
Speaks ever well of all you do, your wisdom loves praise.
He joys to hear your welfare, not in your evil fame:
Should he receive some dainty, he straight thinks on your name
And pities you, and cries aloud
– O had my friend the same."[3]

The Buddhist texts speak of false friends, too. The *Jātaka* (V, p. 87) says that there is none worse than a false friend *(mittaddubhī)*. There are four who should be reckoned as foes in the likeness of friends namely, a rapacious person *(aññadatthu-haro)*, a man of words alone *(vaci-parama)* a flatterer *(anuppiya-bhāṇi)*, a fellow-waster *(apāya-sahāyo)*. The *Digha Nikāya* (III, p. 185 f.) describes these four types of false friends in detail. The rapacious person gives little and asks for much; does his duty out of fear and pursues his own interest. The man of words alone professes friendship as regards the past and future;[4] tries to gain favours by empty sayings; when the opportunity for service arises he avows his disability. The flatterer both consents to do wrong and dissents from doing right; praises to one's face and speaks ill of one to others. A fellow-waster induces one to indulge in strong drinks and to frequent the streets at untimely hours; he keeps company when one visits shows and fairs and also when one is infatuated with gambling. One should avoid such false friends for, they bring about one's ruin.

It is said that friends are won by giving *(dadam mittāni ganthati; S.* I, p. 215). Once a friendship is established the friends should be mutually generous, courteous, benevolent. One should treat one's friends as one treats one's own self, and should be as good as one's words are (*D.* III, p. 190). When thus treated, friends protect one when one is not on guard and on such occasions they guard one's property, too. They become a refuge in danger and do not forsake one when one is in trouble. Friends thus treated show, also, consideration to one's family.

The Buddhist texts offer advice as to how a friendship, once formed, should be cultivated and matured. The *Jātaka* (V, p. 233) says that if one wishes to further the friendship already established one should neither visit one's friends very often nor should one stay for too long with them for, constant meeting and prolonged staying very often changes the friend to a foe. It is also equally bad to be without meeting them at all. It is further added that friendship wanes by asking favours at wrong momments. Therefore, one should be very cautious when dealing with friends.

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2. See the definition of friend in *Khp.* p. 248 Ñāṇamoli's trasl. *The Minor Readings* p. 289; There it is said, 'Herein he (fattens) and tends, thus he is a friend; the meaning is that by his inclination to welfare he acts as a lubricant and protects from harm's coming *(Tattha mejjati tāyati cā ti mitto, hitajjhāsayatāya sinihyati, ahitāgamato rakkhati cā ti attho).*
3. See *The Jātaka* trsl. (ed. Cowell) IV, p. 123.
4. See *Dialogues of the Buddha,* Pt. III, p. 177, no. 3.

FRIVOLOUS TALK, worthless or empty talk, one of the four kinds of speech that come under the category of wrong speech *(micchā-vācā)*. See SAMPHAPPALĀPA, SPEECH.

FULL MOON. The Pali equivalent *puṇṇamā (puṇṇa* =full, *mā* = the moon) denotes the night of the full moon (cf. *puṇṇamāya rattiyā*, in the night of the full moon, *DA.* I, p. 145) and more specifically defined as the fifteenth day of the bright half of the lunar month *(sukkha pakkhe paṇṇarasī VvA.* p. 314). The Sanskrit equivalent *paurṇamī* is defined in the *Śabdakalpadruma* (in accordance with *Amarakośa)*) giving the same meaning *(pañcadaśī tithiḥ*, 'fifteenth day of the lunar half-month'). Hence the whole day (day and night) is understood by both Pali and Sanskrit usages of the word.

In the Vedic age the word *Upavasatha (upa+vas)* has been used in connection with the Soma sacrifice. It was believed that God Soma visited the house of the sacrificer on the day preceding the full-moon day to stay with him. The moon was identified with the Vedic God Soma who particularly represented the juice of the Soma plant. The sacrificer was instructed to observe and conform to some prescribed rites and rituals on the day before the full moon, in preparation for the sacrifice to be conducted on the following day *(Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* 1.1.1.7).

Nevertheless, by the time of the rise of Buddhism in the 6th century B.C., the two days of the waxing moon - the 8th and the 15th - and the two days of the waning moon - the 8th and the 14th-had been popularly accepted as days of special religious significance by many of the religious groups in India. On these days recluses of each group met at their respective centres to discuss and preach their doctrines *(tena kho pana samayena aññatitthiyā paribbājakā cātuddase pannarase atthamiyā ca pakkhassa sannipatitvā dhammam bhāsanti - Vin.* 1, p. 101). Lay people, too, visited these centres on such days to participate in religious ceremonies and also to learn their doctrines.

The full moon day itself was the most important of the above mentioned days of the lunar month, on which day groups of people set out in the moon-lit night, in happy mood, to visit religious teachers of their choice. The *Sāmaññaphala Sutta (D.* 1, p.47 ff.) records a graphic description of such a night. It reads: "Seated on the upper terrace roof of his palace surrounded by his ministers King Ajātasattu on the night of the bright full moon of kattikā gave utterance to a paean of joy, saying:

'How pleasant, friends, is the moonlight night!
How beautiful, friends, is the moonlight night!
How lovely, friends, is the moonlight night!
How soothing, friends, is the moonlight night!
How grand a sign, friends is the moonlight night!

'Who is the recluse or Brahman when we may call upon to night, who, when we call, upon him, shall be able to satisfy our hearts' (*SBB.* Vol. II, pp.65, 66).

The names of the famous six heretical teachers are mentioned in this discussion, but at the end king Ajātasattu decided to visit the Buddha who was residing on this particular day at Rājagaha in the mango grove of the Physician Jīvaka (*D.* 1, p. 47).

Pre-Buddhist Sākyans also seems to have considered the full-moon day as holy. According to the *Jātaka Nidāna* (*J.* 1, p.50) Queen Mahāmāya was observing the *uposatha* vows the day prince Siddhārtha was conceived in her womb.

Buddhism adopted some of the practices prevalent among several religious groups of the time, and observance of the four days mentioned above as holy is one such practice adopted by Buddhism. It is one of Buddha's ardent supporters, Seniya Bimbisāra, who made the suggestion to the Buddha that this practice be adopted and the Buddha, having accepted the suggestion enjoined the Bhikkhus to gather at *vihāras* on these four days, to perform religious rites and to preach the *dhamma (Vin.* 1, p. 101). The Buddha made special emphasis that one of these four days, preferably the full moon day, be set aside for the monks living within a locality *(sīmā)* to meet at a convenient centre to recite the code of conduct for the Bhikkhus *(pātimokkha*, q.v.). The purpose of this exercise is to help members of the Order of monks to remind themselves of the rules of discipline binding on them, and also to give an opportunity to Bhikkhus to confess their transgressions and make amends for them.

The practice of observing these four days of the lunar month as holy days has been followed from the time of the Buddha himself, up to the present day, by Buddhists living in many parts of the world, specially by the adherents of the Theravāda tradition of Buddhism (living in Sri Lanka, Thailand, Burma, Laos and Cambodia). In Sri Lanka these four days are designated as: (1) *pura-atavaka* (eighth day of the waxing moon) (2) *pasalosvaka* (fifteenth day of the waxing moon) (3) *ava atavaka* (the eigth day of the waning moon) (4) *amāvaka* (the fourteenth day of the waning moon). On the *pura-atavaka* night the waxing moon is visible as a crescent or perfect semi-circle, on the *pasalosvaka* night the moon is seen as a complete disc, on the *ava atavaka* night the moon is seen again as a crescent or perfect semi-circle and on the *amāvaka* night the moon becomes completely invisible.

Though all four days have been regarded as important holy days for the observance of religious practices by the

Buddhists, the full moon day itself has been considered as extraordinarily important. Buddhists all over the world consider the fullmoon day of each month as a day on which they should concentrate more on religious observances and practices.

The bhikkhus belonging to the Theravāda tradition of Buddhism still follow the practice of assembling together to recite the *Pātimokkha* rules on the full moon day, a practice that came into vogue in the time of the Buddha himself. Many lay Buddhists who on other days observe the five precepts *(pañcasīla)* as a constant and regular practice *(nityasīla)*, observe eight precepts on this day. The eight precepts they undertake to observe are (1) to refrain from killing and causing injury to living beings (2) to refrain from stealing (3) to refrain from sexual indulgence (4) to refrain from falsehood (5) to refrain from intoxicants (6) to refrain from using luxurious and comfortable seats and beds (7) to refrain from entertainments such as dance, song and musical shows (8) to refrain from using garlands, perfumes, cosmetics ornaments and embellishments.

Those laymen who decide to observe these eight precepts on the full moon day go to a temple early in the morning, clad in simple white garments. A bhikkhu administers the precepts to them. The devotees, having undertaken to observe these precepts throughout the day spend almost the whole day in the monastery. In many temples of the present day there are well organised programmes for the whole day consisting of sermons, religious discussions, chanting of selected *suttas*, meditational exercises, silent reading of texts, and ceremonial offerings to the Triple Gem *(tiratna)*.

Even those lay followers who do not undertake to observe the eight precepts on the full moon day make it a point to visit a temple with their families to worship at the shrines and pay their respects to the resident bhikkhus. The ceremonial offerings to the Triple Gem are usually held after sun-set when the entire surroundings become resplendent and serene with the light of the full moon. The offerings made are oil lamps, flowers, incense, medicinal herbs and beverages. In many temples, a sermon lasting for about an hour is delivered at night by a Buddhist monk.

The day of the full moon had become so significant for Buddhists because many of the important events in the life of the Buddha and in the history of Buddhism came to be associated and linked with several full-moon days of the lunar calendar. The following events are associated with some of the full moon days.

(1) The Full moon day that falls between March and April (Citta or Madin) — second visit of the Buddha to Sri Lanka which took place in the fifth year of his Enlightenment.

(2) The full-moon day that comes between April-May (Vesākha or Vesak) - The Buddha's birth, attainment of Enlightenment and th passing away (*Mhv.* ch. I. *v.* 12; *Mhv.* ch. III. *v.* 2); The ascetic Sumedha received the assurance from the Buddha Dīpankara that he would become a Buddha named Gotama; the performance of the twin miracle *(yamaka pātihāriya)* by the Buddha to subdue the pride of his relatives at Kapilavasthu (*J.* I, p. 88); the Buddha's third visit to Kelaniya in Sri Lanka in the eighth year of his Enlightenment on which visit the Buddha left an imprint of his foot on the peak of *Samantakūta* (Samanola) mountain, (*Mhv.* ch.I, *v.* 77). On this visit the Buddha consecrated sixteen spots (*Mhv.* ch. I, *vv.* 78ff.); the Buddha, knowing that his doctrine would be preserved in its pristine purity in Sri Lanka addressed God Sakka to protect the Buddhasāsana and the Sinhala race (*Mhv.* ch.7 *v.* 2f.); Aryan colonisation of Sri Lanka by Prince Vijaya and his seven hundred followers in 544 B.C. on the day of Buddha's passing away (*Mhv.* ch.7 *v.* 1); the inauguration of the construction work of the great *stūpa* (Ratnamali) in Anuradhapura in Sri Lanka (*Mhv.* ch. 29, *v.* 1).

(3) The full moon day that comes between May and June (Jettha-Poson) - Introduction of Buddhism to Sri Lanka in the 3rd century B.C., by Arahant Mahinda, the son of the Emperor Asoka (*Mhv.* ch.13. *vv.* 8-21).

(4) The full moon day that comes between June and July (Sālha, Āsālha — Esala). The conception of Siddhārtha in Queen Mahāmāyā's womb (*J.* I, p. 50); the birth of Prince Rāhula to Princess Yasodharā, the wife of Prince Siddhārtha; the Great Renunciation of Prince Siddhārtha to become a wandering ascetic in search of the Truth; the preaching of the first sermon — *Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta* by the Buddha to the five ascetics (*DPPN.* Vol. i, p. 1138); observance of the first rains retreat *(vassa)* by the Buddha and the five monks at Isipatana; the performance of the Twin Miracle *(yamaka pātihāra)* by the Buddha to subdue the pride of the heretics (*DPPN.* Vol. II, p. 683); commencement of the preaching of Abhidhamma by the Buddha to his mother and other gods in the *Tāvatimsa* heaven, in the seventh year of his attaining Enlightenment. *(DhsA.* 31, 32 *Ency. Bsm.* Vol. 1, p.40); commencement of the first Buddhist Council *(sangiti)* at Rājagaha (q.v.) presided over by Arahant Mahā Kassapa, three months after the passing away of the Buddha (*Mhv.* ch. 3, *v.* 14); Arittha and fifty-five monks receiving higher Ordination at Anuradhapura in Sri Lanka (*Mhv.* ch. 19, *v.* 66); the first *vassa* retreat of sixty two arahants in Sri Lanka (*Mhv.* ch. 16, *v.* 17); the laying of the foundation stone for the construction of

Ratnamāli Cetiya in Anuradhapura and the enshrinement of the sacred relics of the Buddha and of Arahants in the Ratnamāli Cetiya (*Mhv.* ch. 29, *vv.* 14 ff); the commencement of the annual procession (Daladā Perahära) in Kandy in Sri Lanka; commencement of the rains retreat.

(5) The full moon-day that comes between July and August (Savana, Nikini) - observance of the rains retreat by monks who fail to commence its observance on the previous full moon day;
(6) The full-moon day that comes between August and September (Potthapāda-Binara) - commencement of Buddhist processions at Mahiyangana and Sri Jayawardhanapura, Kotte.
(7) The full moon day that comes between September and October (Assayuja, Vap) — the conclusion of the Buddha's preaching of Abhidhamma in Tāvatimsa heaven; the recital of the Vinaya Pitaka for the first time in Sri Lanka at Thūpārāma in Anuradhapura presided over by Arahant Mahā Arittha; the Buddha aspirant Metteyya born as a human being entered the Order of monks after listening to an inspiring discussion on Abhiddhamma between the Buddha and the thera Sariputta; on the instructions of Arahant Mahinda, King Devānampiyatissa sent envoys led by Mahā Arittha to request Emperor Asoka to send his daughter Sanghamittā Theri to Sri Lanka to establish the Order of Nuns. (*Mhv.* ch. 18, *vv.* 7,8).
(8) The full moon day of October-November (Kattika, Il) Metteyya the Buddha — aspirant obtains the assurance from Gotama the Buddha that he would become a Buddha in the future. The sending of the first sixty monks by the Buddha in various directions to preach the dhamma; the Buddha's arrival at Uruvelā with the main purpose of converting the three Kassapa brothers and their thousand followers; the conclusion of the three month's rains retreat and offering of *kathina;* the attainment of *parinibbāna* of the chief disciple of the Buddha, arahant Sāriputta (*DPPN.* 11, p. 1116),
(9) The full moon day that comes between November and December (Māgasira, Unduvap) - the arrival in Sri Lanka of the Theri Sanghamittā with a sapling of the sacred *bodhi* tree in Buddhagayā,
(10) The full moon day that comes between December January (Phussa, Durutu) - the Buddha's first visit to Sri Lanka in the ninth month of his Enlightenment (*Mhv.* ch.1, *v.* 19).
(11) The full-moon day that comes between January and February (Māgha, Navam) - conferment by the Buddha of the exalted titles of Chief Disciple *(agga sāvaka)* on Sāriputta thera and Moggallāna thera; the proclamation of the code of conduct *(pātimokkha)* for the monks by the Buddha, twenty years after the founding of the Order of Monks; the Buddha's announcing relinquishment of *āyusankhara* that within three months his *parinibbāna* (passing away) would take place.
(12) The full-moon day that comes between February and March (Phagguna, Mädin) - the historic journey of the Buddha to the city of Kapilavāstu accompanied by a following of twenty thousand monks.

Though all full-moon days are regarded as holy by Buddhists, the Vesākha full-moon day and the Asālha full-moon day are considered specially significant to Buddhists all over the world. The Vesākha full-moon day is considered the most important as three significant events in the life of the Buddha are associated with this day. The three events are: (1) The birth of Prince Siddhārtha, (2) His attainment of Bodhi at the age of thirty-five and (3) the *mahāparinibbāna* of the Buddha at the age of eighty, after a forty-five year period of missionary activity. Many Buddhists all over the world commemorate these three events in great splendour. Normally, two days are set apart for the commemoration activities, the full-moon day and the following day. On the day of the full-moon men, women and children flock to temples to honour the Buddha by observing the eight-precepts *(asthānguposatha sila).* Some of the people who do not observe the special *silas* on this day spend their time in temples attending to the many needs of those who observe the *silas.* Temples, houses and streets are decorated with the six-hued Buddhist flags and scenes depicting important events in the life of the bodhisattva and the Buddha are set-up, beautifully painted. In many towns massive pandols are erected with colourfully painted panels depicting various Jātaka stories. People organise themselves in groups to provide the poor and needy with cooked food, soft-drinks, dry rations and clothing. The night of the Vesak full moon day and the day following becomes resplendent with illuminations of many kinds-electric bulbs, oil lamps, and many attractive Vesak lanterns.

Many lay Buddhists enjoy a holiday the day after the Vesak full moon day. Gaily dressed, they leisurely roam the streets enjoying the various scenes depicted and seeing the decorations and illuminations. While many keep on walking on the streets enjoying the sights, some others busy themselves entertaining them with gifts of food and drink.

The full-moon day next in importance to Vesak full moon day, to all Buddhists, is the full moon day of Asālha on which day, the Buddha preached his first sermon to the five monks at the Deer Park in Isipatana. On this day, too, many devotees observe the eight precepts. In many temples the *Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta* is ceremonially chanted by the bhikkhus and sermons are delivered and discussions held on the same theme.

Two full moon days are specially significant for Sri Lankan Buddhists, namely, the full moon day of Jettha or Poson which comes between May and June, and the full moon day of Māgasira or Unduvap which comes between the months of November and December. It is traditionally believed that Buddhism was officially introduced to Sri Lanka in the 3rd century B.C. during the reign of king Devānampiyatissa. Emperor Asoka's son Arahant Mahinda with four other arahant bhikkhus and a lay upāsaka came from India as emissaries from Emperor Asoka, bringing with them the message of Buddhism to King Devānampiyatissa. Arahant Mahinda alighted on the Mihintale mountain in Anuradhapura on the full-moon day of Jettha or Poson, on which day King Devānampiyatissa, too, was enjoying a hunting expedition in the jungle around Mihintale. The meeting of Arahant Mahinda and King Devānampiyatissa on the peak of Missaka mountain in Mihintale, is the beginning of the story of Buddhism in Sri Lanka.

Buddhists of Sri Lanka give much prominence to this incident, and they flock to Anuradhapura and Mihintale on the full moon day of Jettha or Poson to commemorate this event. Even in other parts of the country this event is specially commemorated, and apart from religious activities in the temples, there are processions held in several villages and towns in which an effigy of Arahant Mahinda is carried with great honour and respect.

As far as Sri Lankan Buddhists are concerned the full moon day that is of importance next to the full moon day of Jettha or Poson is the full moon of Māgasira or Unduvap. It is on this day that Saṅghāmittā Theri, sister of Arahant Mahinda, came to Sri Lanka along with several other theris bringing with her a sapling of the Bo-tree in India under which the Buddha attained Enlightenment. Sri Lankan Buddhists commemorate this event, too, annually on this day with various religious festivities.

Pategama Gnanarama

FUNERAL RITES. See DEAD, DISPOSAL OF THE.

GADALĀDENI VIHĀRA is a Buddhist shrine in Sri Lanka. It was built about the year 1344 A.C. (Saka 1266) in the village called Sinduruvāna, in the Kandy District, off the 106th kilometre on the Colombo-Kandy Road. It is known from an inscription *in situ* that the shrine was built by a monk named Sīlavaṁsa Dharmakīrti in the reign of Bhuvanaikabāhu IV (1341 - 1351 A.C) and that it was called the Dharmakīrti-vihāra. ***Saddharma-ratnākara***, a 14th Century Sinhalese literary work, calls it the Saddharmatilaka-vihāra. (Pl. XII).

It is from the inscription mentioned above that much of the information regarding the early history of this shrine is known. It states that this shrine was built entirely of stone, on a flat rock called *dikgala* by the thera Dharmakīrti. The architect is named Gaṇādhipati Ganeśvarācāri, probably a South Indian.

As regards the architectural features the inscription states that the shrine was of three storeys which seem to have been calculated by taking the terraced roof of the ***ardha-maṇḍapa*** and ***antarāla*** as the second storey, and a cell in the *vimāna* on a higher level as the topmost storey, in addition to the ground floor. The shrine contained, in its ground floor, at the time it was built, a large image of the Buddha depicted as seated under the Bo-tree with two standing images on either side and the gods such as Sakra, Brahma, Suyāma, Santusita, Nātha and Maitrī surrounding him. In the cell of the *caitya* on the topmost storey was an image of the Buddha depicting the preaching of the Abhidharma. A shrine for the 'king of gods' was also built to provide protection for the vihāra. There were also Bodhi-trees, *caityas,* flower-gardens etc. Vast stretches of land from several villages around the vihāra were donated to it by leading personages of that time like Senā Laṅkādhikāra, Vīrasiṁha Patirāja, Niśśaṁka Patirāja and prince Vīrasundara *(EZ.* IV. 90ff.). (Pl. XIII).

The vihāra, as it exists today, resembles, in its architectural features, the contemporary Hindu shrines of South India in the early Vijayanagara style. It is also known that Dharmakīrti thera built it on a plan identical with that of his former residence at Dhānyakaṭaka, i.e., Amarāvati, in India. The three images of the Buddha and those of the gods mentioned in the inscription are no longer to be found nor are the representions of the Bo-tree and the Buddha image depicting the preaching of the Abhidharma. On the walls are some scenes from the *Vessantara Jātaka* but they seem to belong to a later date. It is unlikely that any of the original paintings are extant now, for king Parākramabāhu VI (1412-67 A.C.) is stated to have renewed the plaster work.

The present Gadalādeni Vihāra is partly modern, having undergone renovations at various times. Nevertheless, it has preserved several noteworthy architectural features. The original walls are of stone and they appear to have been plastered and even painted over with floral patterns. Elaborate carvings of tiger or lion patterns and of female dancers are found in the upper regions of the outer walls. The upper storey of the porch is supported by elaborately carved stone pillars of the Kandyan style (A. K. Coomaraswamy, *Mediaeval Sinhalese Art,* pp. 145,

146). The woodwork of the tiled roof and the upper storey are modern and of inferior quality. To the right of the main shrine is a modern building erected on ancient stone pillars, now used as the lodging for the drummers (H. W. Cave, *The Book of Ceylon,* 340 ff.).

The ascent to the rock on which the shrine is built, was, in olden days on the north-eastern side. On the slopes of the rock to the right side of this ascent are several inscriptions dating from about the fourteenth century, the oldest of which is the one mentioned above. On the rock near the Bo-tree are two other inscriptions and near the entrance to the shrine is an inscribed slab-pillar (*EZ.* IV, 8 ff.; 90 ff.).

Tradition asserts that the Gadalādeni-vihāra was the residence of Sīlavaṁśa Dharmakīrti thera and his pupils, and their successors. Later king Rājasiṁhs I (1581-93 A.C.) who favoured Hinduism is said to have converted it to a Hindu *devālaya* and from that time it was used for the purpose of invoking the blessings of gods for almost four centuries under the management of several *Basnāyaka Nilames.* Later, in the time of king Kittisiri Rājasiṁha (1747-82 A.C.) it was given over to the successors of Välivita Saranaṅkara Saṅgharāja thera (G. Vajiranana thera, *Vihāravagavitti,* 43 f.).

Nandesena Mudiyanse

GAGGAMANTĀNIPUTTA. See AṄGULIMĀLA

GAGGARĀ, a lotus pond named after a queen by the name of Gaggarā, in Campā, in ancient India. On the bank of the lotus pond was a Campaka Grove where the Buddha stayed on his visits to this area. ***Kandaraka Sutta** (M.* 1 p. 339 f), ***Kārandava Sutta** (A.* IV, p. 168f) and ***Sonadaṇḍa Sutta** (D.* I. p. III f) were preached by the Buddha while living in this Campaka Grove. Sāriputta Thera, one of the two chief disciples, preached the *Dasuttara Sutta* to a group of monks, once on a visit to this place. (*D.* III, p. 272). Near this pond was a monastery of some heretics (*A.* V. p. 189). The Campaka Grove on the bank of the pond was considered to be a place conducive for meditation by the monks (*SnA.* 1, p.17). This pond, together with that at Jetavana is given as an example of a very beautiful lotus pond. (*AA.* 1. p. 264).

W. G. Weeraratne

GAHAPATI. This Pali term, derived from the Sanskrit *gṛhapati* and found used in Vedic literature, is generally rendered into English as 'householder'. However, a study of the contexts in which the term occurs makes clear that this English rendering is not quite accurate, and that the term *gahapati* connotes also other nuances of meaning.

An early definition of the term is found in the *Vinaya* (III, p. 212) which reads as, *gahapati nāma yo koci agāraṃ ajjhāvasati.* In *The Book of Discipline* (II, p. 47) it is rendered into English as one who lives in a house, with a footnote (No.5) added to say that the *Critical Pali Dictionary* explain, *ajjhāvasati* as 'to dwell in (as owner)'. It is important to note that *ajjhāvasti* (from *adhi+ā+*root *vas,* to live, dwell) refers to proprietory rights, a salient feature of a *gahapati.* Thus *ajjhāvasati* certainly adds more weight and importance to the term *gahapati,* helping it to connote a person of higher status than a mere 'householder, to indicate whom the Pali term *gihi* seems more suited and often used. In fact the authors of the *Vedic Index* renders the term *gṛhapati* into English as 'householder as the master of the house' *(Vedic Index,* s.v. *gṛhapati).* Therefore it is seen that the term *gahapati* could be better rendered into English as chief-householder or chief-occupant. It is seen, however, that this is not used as a term of address to chief-householders or chief-occupants all and sundry. Contextual evidence show that the term *gihi* is commonly used in such instances. (cf. *A.* III, pp. 116, 258). The *gahapati* is used as a term of address indicative of addressee's total engrossment in and responsibility of household affairs and his high social status based on his possession of wealth and property, the latter being a very important attribute. According to the *Potaliya Sutta* the main characteristic features and attributes of a *gahapati* are (a) possession of wealth (b) engagement in an appropriate vocation (c) total engrossment in household affairs (*M.* I, p. 360).

Parallel to this usage the term *gahapati* was used in another sense. This sense is also found defined in the *Vinaya* (III, p. 222), which indicates that this meaning too is of the same antiquity as the above mentioned one. The definition runs as follows: *gahapatikonāma ṭhapetva rājaṃ rājabhoggaṃ brāhmaṇaṃ avaseso gahapatiko nāma.* (A householder means: excepting the king and he who is in king's service and the brahmin, he who remains is called a householder: *The Book of Discipline,* II, p. 67). According to this definition the term *gahapati* is used to refer to a particular social group distinct from the king and those in royal service (i.e. *khattiyas)* and brahmins. The term *gahapati* has been often used in this sense when reference is made to *khattiyakula* (khattiya family), *brāhmaṇakula* (brahmana family) *gahapatikula* (gahapati family: *Vin.*II, p. 161); *gahapatimahāsāla* (wealthy gahapatis) brāhmaṇa mahāsāla (wealthy brahmins: *S.* I, p. 71; cf. *A.* I, p. 166; *khattiya, brāhmaṇa gahapati, samaṇa* (recluse: *Vin.* I, p. 227); *khattiya paṇḍita* (learned khattiya), *brāhmaṇa paṇḍita* (learned

brahmin) *gahapati paṇḍita* (learned gahapatis), *samaṇa paṇḍita* (learned recluses: *S.* III, p. 6).

The *Aṅguttara-nikāya (A.* III. p. 362) not only classes the *gahapatis* in a social group separate from the *khattiyas* and *brāhmaṇas* but also points out that each of these social groups has different aims, quests and ideals. Attainment of wealth and wisdom is given as an ideal common to all three groups. The distinctive ideal of attainment of power, earth, dominion is attributed to the *khattiyas*. Chanting of *mantras*, performance of sacrifice *(yañña)*, attainment of *brahmaloka* are given as the ideals of brahmins. The gahapatis are said to have as their distinctive aim and ideal learning crafts, engagement in some form of employment and accomplishment of work undertaken.

These contextual evidence strengthen the presumption that the term *gahapati* was used also to indicate a particular social class distinct from the *khattiyas* and *brāhmaṇas*, and also different from the *samaṇas* who had totally remounced all household affairs *(vohāra samucchedа: M.* I, p. 360). This presumption finds further support in the fact that the *gahapati* is commonly used as a term of address to *seṭṭhis* (merchants). Thus, Anāthapiṇḍika, the chief-lay patron of the Buddha, is regularly so addressed. (*Vin.* II, p. 158; *A.* II, p. 68; cf. *S.* I, p. 56). The *setthis* belonged to the *Vaiśya (vessa)* class, and hence it could be surmised that the term *gahapati* was used also to connote the well-to-do *vaisyas* of high social standing.

This presumption appears, however, to lose its authenticity because of the occurrence of the term *brāhmaṇagahapati (Vin.* I, p. 35; *M.* I. p. 400 ff, *S.* I. p. 184). I of *gahapati* was used to connote the well-to-do vaiśyas how could one explain the compounded term *brāhmaṇa gahapati?* It is seen that the exact meaning of this compounded term depends on the particular context in which it is used, for in certain instances it connotes a single group, namely the brahmin 'householders' (cf. *M.* I, pp. 100, 400; II, pp. 54, 74, 144, 164), and in others, two different groups namely, brahmins and *gahapatis (Vin.* I, p. 35) cf. I. B. Horner's observation on this point in *The Book of Discipline* IV., p. 47 fn. 3). It should be noted that while the compounded term *khattiya-gahapati* does not occur in Pali, the term *gahapati* itself is not generally used in relation to *khattiyas*.

Regarding the compounded term *brāhmaṇa-gahapati* used to indicate brahmin 'householders', one could only make a surmise that this term was used to connote brahmins who markedly deviated from the accepted life-patterns of the brāhmaṇa class and led lives more akin to those of *gahapatis*, possessing wealth and property and engrossed in mundane, household affairs as described in the *Potaliya sutta*.

S. K. Nanayakkara

GAJALAKṢMĪ an ancient Indian concept probably of folk religious origin, which has been incorporated into the symbolic art of the Buddhists from the earliest times.

In the early Buddhist art expressions the "Gajalakṣmī" motif is found in bas-relief carvings at *Sāñci, Buddhagayā, Bhārhut, Amarāvatī* in India and Anuradhapura in Sri Lanka.

In these instances a female divinity (later termed *Lakṣmī* - *hence Gajalakṣmī)* is depicted flanked on either side by an elephant holding pots filled with water in its trunk as if attempting to perform a lustration of the goddess. Here the elephants represent the *diggaja* the elephants of the quarters. It would be quite an interesting study to investigate how this motif was syncretized into a form of Buddhist Art.

In the earliest bas-reliefs from *Sāñci, Bhārhut, Buddhagaya* etc. in India, the goddess is shown either standing or seated on a lotus. Her heavy bosom, bare except for a necklace and the prominent public region barely covered with a *mekhalā* (jewelled girdle), worn over the loins, make the divinity much closer to the representations of the early cult images of the great mother goddess. In the Indian repertoire itself early sculptural representations of the Mother Goddess from Harappa, Mohenjodaro etc., which are definitely of a pre-Buddhist date, show the divinity in like manner.

It is not clear what the artist meant when he depicted gajalakṣmī in scenes showing the birth of Prince Siddhārtha. According to the Buddhist legends, on the occasion of the Bodhisatta's conception Queen Māyā has dreamt that she was taken in her couch by the four guardian deities of the quarters (i.e. *Cattāro-mahārājāno)* to Anotatta lake and was bathed in its sacred waters.

This episode is thus counted as the beginning of the story of the Buddha's birth. Hence when the story is depicted in art it is appropriate to represent the sacred lustration of Queen Māyā as the beginning of the narrative. One may justify the appearance of *Gajalakṣmī* in the early bas-relief panels of Budhist art, as a symbolic representation of the Buddha s appearance in the world. Here the female figure represents Queen Māyā and the elephants as *diggaja*, symbolising the guardians of the four quarters.

Most conspicuous among the early representations of this motif are the ones found on the *Torana*, railing architraves of *Sāñci* and *Buddhagaya*. In the later religious art of India, both of the Buddhists as well as of the Hindus, and less frequently of the Jainas the *Gajalakṣmī* motif is found literally used for the specific purpose of symbolising *Srī* or goddess of prosperity. It may be that the later Hindus and Jainas derived the concept from the Buddhists and syncretized it to suit their purpose.

Although the interpretation of many early western art critics is that *Gajalakṣmi* represents queen *Māyā* in Buddhist art, it is more preferable to trace the origin of the whole concept to a pre-Buddhist universal cult of adorning the divine mother who was later visualised as *Śrī, Subhagā, Lakṣmi, Śakti, Pattini*, etc.

In Sri Lanka a rare specimen of the *Gajalakṣmi* motif is found in the stone archway of the Isurumuniya Temple. Yet another bas-relief of the *Gajalakṣmi* motif is found in the famous *Galpota*, the so-called stone-book of Nissanka Malla at Polonnaruwa. It may probably be taken as a stone couch of pre-Polonnaruwa origin with the *Gajalakṣmi* motif incised on it and utilised for some specific purpose, religious or secular.

According to the Indian epics this motif has a particular significance with regard to Sri Lanka, hence its importance for Sinhalese Buddhist art. According to epic tradition 'Gajalakṣmi' motif has been current in Sri Lanka in the far distant pre-historic ago too. A matter that needs further investigation by the archaeologists and art-historians is whether there was a flair for preserving art-motifs of a pre-historic tradition during historic times in Sri Lanka. The need to install a pavilion resembling Kuvera's aerial chariot i.e., *Nārivāhana* within the apartment of the great Brazen Palace *Lohapāsāda* could be cited in this instance. (*Mhv.* xxxvii, 29).

Gajalakṣmi was a popular theme of decorative art in Buddhist temples in the mediaeval period of Sri Lanka and could be found both in stone and wood-carvings within brackets of pillars.

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GAL-VIHĀRA, the name by which the ancient Uttarārāma is now known. It was built by king Parākramabāhu I (1153-86 A.C.), at Polonnaruva in Sri Lanka. The *Mahāvamsa* (lxxviii, 3-73 ff) records, '....... Likewise the ruler of men had the Uttarārāma built. By breaking down the rock not far from the great stūpa, he, bringing into play every kind of skilled work, had three grottoes made by expert craftsmen, namely the *vijjādhara* grotto, the cave with the image in sitting posture and the grotto with the recumbent image' *(Cūlavamsa* tral. II, p. 111). The close compatibility of this description with the existing ruins at Gal-vihāra has helped the archaeologists in its identification. (Pl. XIV).

Gal-vihāra – 'rock monastery', the present name of this shrine is indicative of its structure – a rock-hewn shrine. It has been described by archaeologists as the most impressive antiquity, unrivalled in its special features, to be seen in Sri Lanka and possibly even in the continent of India.

Gal-vihāra became so famous, in the words of H.C.P. Bell (*ASCAR*. 1907, p. 7 ff.) by "the line of gigantic figures carved from the grey rock which forms their background, calm, immovable, majestic, amidst the bush of sorrounding forest, gazing ever fixedly into the space with the pensiveness of profound meditation, or wrapped in eternal slumber, which inspires in the thoughtful beholder wonder and admiration mingled with an instinctive sense of silent awe."

This monument described in such elegant terms lies about one and half miles north of the promontory situated between the Topāvāva lake and the citadel. It is less than a quarter of a mile from the extensive site wherein are located the Kiri-vehera, the Jetavanārāma and the other connected buildings now in ruin. Here, the south-east face of a living rock about fifty-six yards in length, rising about thirty feet above the level ground and gradually falling away at each end has been selected by the stone-masons as best adapted for their purpose. It was this physical formation of the rock that doubtless decided the distribution of the several images and the shrines. This rock face has been cut back nearly fifteen feet for the sculpturing of the three great images and scooped out as much as seventeen feet to make the *vijjādhara-guhā*.

These images of the Gal-vihāra are famous for their aesthetic qualities as well as for their colossal size. The largest of them is the statue of the recumbent Buddha which measures 46 feet 4 inches in length. It portrays the *parinibbāna* and is sculptured in the canonical posture, resting on the right side with the head upon the right hand supported on a bolster, the left hand stretched along the body and thigh, and the left foot placed directly upon the other but slightly receding. A low flat cushion is placed beneath the feet. On the sole of each foot and the right palm is carved a fully open lotus in low relief. The bolster on which the right hand and the head rest is beautifully carved and the artistic skill of the sculptor is displayed by the cleverly imitated depression in the bolster suggesting the weight of the head and the hand. Amidst these fine qualities of the recumbent Buddha it has been also observed that much of its beauty is lost by the badly shaped spherical head and the unduly stiff fat neck.

The standing figure found close to the recumbent image is considered by critics of fine art as a better specimen of sculpture. It has been the subject of controversial views, the popular one being that it portrays Ānanda lamenting over the death of the Buddha (D. T. Devendra, *The Buddha Image and Ceylon*, p.75; H.C.P. Bell, *ASCAR*. 1907, p. 14). According to S. Paranavitana *(University of Ceylon, History of Ceylon,* I, p. 605) it portrays the Buddha and according to Farrer *(In Old Ceylon*, p. 199) it is a statue of the future Buddha Maitreya.

This statue stands upon a lotus pedestal two feet high carved into an open lotus with nine boldly cut petals in a radius of five feet and ten inches. This figure, like the other Buddha images here, has drooping ears and short curled hair. The upper robe is dropped neatly over the left shoulder, and looped up by the left forearm. It differs from the usual standing Buddha images in the manner of its placing the arms crossed against the chest, and the slight inclination of the head and shoulder to the right and the gentle fixture of the trunk, giving the statue a realistic posture. The sorrowful expression of the countenance is a noteworthy feature displaying skill of the sculptor. (Pls. XV - XVII).

The central cave shrine with the smaller sedent Buddha is cut into the rock and measures 26 feet in length, 12 feet 9 inches in breadth and 9 feet 9 inches in height. The floor level is five feet higher than that of the adjoining shrine with the seated Buddha and above the cave brow the rock rises for nearly 13 feet. The mouth of the cave is strengthened by four pillars cut from the living rock, two at the corners and the other two in the middle, between them.

At the back of the cave directly behind the second pair of pillars is a statue of the seated Buddha on a throne, sculptured from the rock to nearly full round. The statue is seated in the fixed contemplative posture on an *āsana* (seat) and is backed by a *torana* (arch). The seat is decorated with lions, *vajras* and a lotus cushion and the *torana* is decorated with standing lions and *makara* (dragon) figures. On either side of the Buddha, on the two sides of the base of the seat, stand two bodhisattvas as attendants, girt in waist-cloths, wearing the brahman's cord and elaborate, tapering head-dresses. Each figure bears a *cāmara*, a chowrie, in the hand thrown across the opposite shoulder. Above the head of the Buddha statue is a *chatra* carved out from the rock. Under this *chatra* and between the peaked finals of the *torana* and the Buddha's head two figures of Hindu gods, 2 feet in height are sculptured, one on each side. Only the figure from the knees upwards is visible and both gods are four-armed. Two of the hands are held in front of the body with palms joined up in veneration. In the other two hands, held up with elbows bent are the insignia appropriate to each god. The god on the right of the Buddha is identified as Brahma and the god on the left as Viṣṇu.

Traces of old paintings are still found on the walls and roof of the cave amidst modern paintings of an inferior quality.

To the left of this cave is the cave of the other sedent Buddha, a statue of a larger size but in the same posture. It is also on a seat decorated with lion and *vajra* motifs and at its back is a *torana* decorated with *makara* figures and other designs strongly suggestive of a cobra's hood. As a background to the *torana* is half displayed the facade of a storeyed temple.

Presently the statues of the Gal-vihāra except the small seated Buddha in the rock cave remain uncovered but traces of brick walls that once sheltered them are visible. It is apparent that these shrines of brick walls and possibly of wooden roofs have perished while the rock-cut cave remains.

On the summit of the rock are found the brick remains of some structure. Here probably stood a *vihāra* in which were enshrined the four or five standing images of life-size Buddhas, carved from limestone, the broken pieces of which were discovered in the vicinity.

On the sloping rock face between the rock-cut cave and standing image there is a long Sinhalese inscription of 51 lines. This inscription, known as the Polonnaru-katikāvata is an ordinance for the guidance of Buddhist monks instituted by king Parākramabahu I (*EZ*. II, p. 256 ff.).

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GĀMADHAMMA, the "conduct of village folk", "vile conduct" is a reference to sexual-behaviour, in Pali Buddhist texts. It is also sometimes called conduct of the outcaste *(vasaladhamma) D.* 1, 4; *A.* 1-211; *J.* 11, 180; *VvA.* II, *DA.* 172). Refraining from sexual activities was considered in ancient Indian society as a virtue and the Buddha says in the *Brahmajāla Sutta* that the average man *(puthujjana)* praising the virtue of the Buddha would say: "The recluse Gotama has abandoned all ignoble life *(abrahmacariya)* and is practising the noble life *(brahmacariya)* and is quite aloof from sex life, the conduct of the village folk". (*D.* 1. p. 4). The general attitude of the wise and the good *(viññu, sādhu)* to sexual conduct is well portrayed in the *Aggañña Sutta* where it is stated that when in the process of world evolution, when some people saw others resorting to sexual behaviour, they threw mud and stones at them condemning them for such low behaviour (*D.* III, p. 88, 89).

Buddhism, though it avoided all extremes, paid due heed to reasonable public opinion. It recognises sexual conduct as something vulgar that goes against the path of virtue, but did not condemn it totally as many other religious groups at the time did. It accommodated sexual life as an essential evil in average family life, but laid down limits that would conduce to social happiness and harmony. Thus a lay follower of the Buddha is not expected to practise complete celibacy. An average layman is expected to marry at the proper age and start family life. But as far as sex life is concerned he should be satisfied with his own wife and should not resort to sexual

behaviour with wives of others or with harlots or with young women in the protection of their parents or other kinsmen (*M.* III, p. 46). But this concession given to the Buddhist layman is not given to the bhikkhu or the Buddhist recluse. A person who enters the Order of Bhikkhus has to be a strict celibate. The gravest crime a bhikkhu can perform is to engage in sex life, and one who is found guilty of such conduct is expelled from the order and is not admitted again. See PĀRĀJIKĀ.

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GAṆAPATI. See GAṆESA

GAṆḌAMBA. . The Mango-tree at the gate of Sāvatthi, named after Gaṇḍa, the warden of the King's park. When the Buddha made it known that seven days hence he would be performing miracles *(pātihāriya)* under the Mango tree at the gate of Sāvatthi, the heretics, with the help of their supporters caused all mango trees in the area to be cut. On the seventh day the Buddha went on his alms round in Sāvatthi with a following of bhikkhus, and the warden of the Royal Park, on seeing the Buddha offered him a huge ripe mango. The Buddha partook of the mango at the same spot and handed over the seed to Ānanda Thera to be handed over to Gaṇḍa, the warden, to be planted in that spot. In a moment a huge mango tree with wide-spread branches sprouted forth and the tree came to be known as Gaṇḍamba.

The God Sakka ordered his master-builder Vissakamma to build a pavilion under the mango-tree and in a moment a magnificent pavilion made of the seven precious stones sprang up. The Buddha performed the twin miracle *(yamaka pātihāriya,* q.v.) in this pavilion and subdued the vanity of heretical groups who claimed that they were superior to the Buddha in that respect. (*J.* IV, p. 264–5).

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GAṆḌAVYŪHA SŪTRA, the fifth of the nine *dharmas* or *āgamas* (religious texts) considered in Nepal as the most important and authoritative texts of Mahāyāna Buddhism. It is also considered as a part of the *Buddhāvataṃsaka Mahāvaipulya Sūtra* of which it constitutes the ninth assembly (see *Avataṃsaka Sūtra).* Two printed editions of the text are available, one by D. T. Suzuki and H. Idzumi and published by the Society for the Publication of Sacred Books of the World, Kyoto, Japan, 1949, and the other by P. L. Vaidya and published in the Buddhist Sanskrit Texts series (No. 5) by the Mithila Institute of Post-graduate Studies and Research in Sanskrit learning, Dharbhanga in 1960. According to the colophon, the original text of the *Gaṇḍavyūha Sūtra* was much more extensive and what is extant today is only a part of it. The colophon runs. "A section of Sudhana's quest for benevolent friends which is a part of the Great Mahāyāna text *Gandhavyūha Sūtra"(ārygaṇḍhavyūhanmahādharmaparyāyād yathālabdhaḥ sudhanakalyāna mitraparyupāsanacaryaikadeśa āryagaṇḍavyūha mahāyānasūtrarājaḥ samāptaḥ.* It is further proved by a statement in the body of the text (*BST.* No. 5, p. 394) which says that Sudhana was advised to meet several well-versed belevolent friends numbering over one hundred and ten *(dasottaraśatam),* but of these hundred and ten the extant text describes only fifty-two or fifty-three.

The sūtra commences with a salutation to all Buddhas and Bodhisattvas as is customary with most Mahāyāna Sūtras. Eight verses which follow contain the gist of the entire sūtra. The sutra proper begins with the usual statement 'thus have I heard' *(evaṃ mayā śrutam)* etc. The Buddha was seated in the assembly of bodhisattvas, monks and lay disciples attending on him in Jeta's Grove at Śrāvasti. In this assembly a discussion took place regarding the imposibility to fathom the virtues, powers and greatness of the Buddha and the means to obtain a fraction of that greatness. The Buddha knowing the contents of their discussion gained the *samādhi* (concentration of mind) called the Lion's Awakening *(siṃha-vijrumbhita).* As soon as the Buddha gained this *samādhi* entire Jetavana assumed a divine air. From the Buddha-fields in the ten directions multitudes of bodhisattvas flocked to the assembly, each paying tribute with miraculous offerings. Though all these wonders took place at Jeta's Grove, the great disciples *(śrāvakas)* such as Śāriputra and Maudgalyāyana did not see them, because they had not planted in them the thought of enlightenment *(bodhicitta* q.v.) and because they were not bent on *Mahāyāna.* The bodhisattvas were greatly elated and ten of them sang the praises of the Buddha. The bodhisattva Samantabhadra, who had understood the nature of the *samādhi* and also the prowess of the Buddha, explained to the assembly ten ways of gaining that *samādhi.* The Buddha, to enlighten the bodhisattvas further, sent forth a ray of light from the hair between his eye-brows, and this reached all the Buddha-fields in the ten directions and illuminated them all, and everything taking place in them became visible to the bodhisattvas assembled at Jetavana. They saw in some Buddha-Fields *(buddha-kṣetra)* people taking vows to become Buddhas in the furture; in some, bodhisattvas undergoing training to become Buddhas; in some, bodhisattvas striving hard

to attain enlightenment at the feet of bodhi trees; in some, Buddhas preaching the Dharma; in some, Buddhas gaining various *samādhi* and exhibiting their prowess, etc. When all these were seen, the congregation of bodhisattvas was filled with compassion *(karunā)* and they decided to work for the welfare of all beings being born in various spheres of life. The Bodhisattva Mañjuśri sang hymns to express his joy and admiration.

After witnessing all these, the gathering dispersed. Mañjuśri with a following of many bodhisattvas started a tour of the southern country. Sāriputra and six thousand *bhiksūs*, too, by the power of the Buddha, made up their minds to follow Mañjuśri and as they were going Mañjuśri explained to the monks how he had attained his powers. At the end of the sermon all those monks made up their minds to train themselves in the Mahāyāna to become Buddhas in the future, and accordingly developed the *bodhicitta*. Thereafter, the bodhisattva Mañjuśri proceeded to the town Dhānyākara. The citizens of Dhānyākara came to see him in great numbers. Among them was the merchant's son Sudhana. Mañjuśri saw that Sudhana was fit to be trained in the path of enlightenment and preached to him a befitting sermon and left the town. Sudhana followed him and asked for further instruction and Manjuśri advised him to seek the assistance of benevolent friends *(kalyānamitra)* to gain that supreme knowledge. He directed Sudhana to a monk named Meghaśri. Having taught whatever he knew he directed Sudhana to another *bhiksu* by name Sāgaramegha, and he in turn directed him to another monk by the name Supratisthita. In this way Sudhana was gradually directed from Supratisthita to a Dramida named Megha, a treasurer named Muktaka, a bhiksu named Sāradhvaja, a female devotee named Āśā, a sage named Bhismottaranirghosa, a brahman named Jayosmāyatana, a girl named Maitrāyani, a *bhiksu* named Sudarśana, a boy named Indriyeśvara, a female devotee named Prabhūtā, a householder named Vidvan, a treasurer named Ratnacūda, a perfume-dealer named Samantanetra, a king named Anala, a king named Mahāprabha, a female devotee named Acalā, a wandering ascetic named Sarvagāmi, a perfume-dealer named Utphalabhūti, a servant named Vaira, a treasurer named Jayottama, a bhikksuni named Simhavijrubhitā, a householder named Vesthila, a bodhisattva named Avalokiteśvara, a bodhisattva named Ananyagāmi, a deity named Mahādeva, an earth-goddess named Sthāvarā, several night-goddesses named Vasanti, Samantagambhiraśrivimalaprabhā, Pramuditanayana-jagatvirocanā, Samantasattvatrānojaśri, Praśāntarutasāgaravati, Sarvanagararaksāsambhavatejahśri, Sarvavrksapraphullanasukhasamvāsā and Sarvajagatraksā-pranidhānaviryaprabhā, a forest-deity named Sutejomandalaratiśri, a Sākyan damsel named Gopā, Queen Māyā, a divine damsel named Surendrābhā a children's preceptor named Viśvāmitra, a treasurer's son named Silpābhijña, a female devotee named Bhadrottamā, a goldsmith named Muktasara, a householder named Ajitasena, a brahman named Sivarāgra, a boy named Srisambhava and a girl named Srimathi. Each of the individuals approached by Sudhana related his or her experience in *samsāra* where they had met past Buddhas and developed various *samādhi* through which they had gained knowledge about one or more aspects of enlightenment. Next Sudhana goes to the bodhisattva Maitreya who relates to him how he had accumulated merit in innumerable *kalpas* in the past in order to accomplish the attainment of enlightenment *(sambodhi)*. He persuaded Sudhana to be very diligent in his search. Having left the bodisattva Maitreya he thought of the bodhisattva Mañjuśri. Mañjuśri stretched his hand from a hundred and ten leagues' distance and, caressing Sudhana's head, praised his effort to meet benevolent friends and placed him in the realm of the bodhisattva Samantabhadra. Sudhana saw the bodhisattva Samantabhadra seated in front of vairocana Buddha, in an assembly consisting of inumerable bodhisattvas and exhibiting advanced psychic powers. Samantabhadra then explained to Sudhana the extent to which he had practised virtues in the past for an incalculable length of time under innumerable Buddhas in order to mature himself for enlightenment. Sudhana, too, at the end of Samantabhadra's sermon took a vow to follow the course of training followed by Samantabhadra himself. The sūtra ends with a hymn by bodhisattva Samantabhadra in which the Buddha's virtues are extolled.

The *Gandavyūha Sūtra* can be treated as a Mahāyāna Sūtra, developed during a time when rivalry between the Sthaviravāda and Mahāyāna was much acute. At the very outset the greatest among the Sthaviravāda disciples such as Sāriputra, Maudgalyāna, and Kāśyapa are belittled saying that they could not see the wonders that took place when the Buddha entered the *samādhi* called Simhavijrumbhitā, even though they lived near the Buddha in Jetavana, because they had not cultivated the thought of enlightenment, because they had not undergone the training that culminates with enlightenment, because they had not trained others on the path of enlightenment and because they were self-centred in their ideal to attain Nirvāna. The *śrāvakas* are compared to the departed ones *(pretas)* who suffer from acute thirst, but who do not see the vast stretches of water that surround them. Ten similar comparisons are made to debase the ideal of the *śrāvakas* and to extol the ideal of the bodhisattvas. The concept of innumerable Buddhas with incalculable life spans with unbound powers to perform wonders and miracles is well developed in this sūtra. The cult of all powerful bodhisattvas who remain in *samsāra*

without attaining Buddhahood, too, seems to have been developed by the time of the composition of this sūtra and the bodhisattva Samantabhadra is one such example occurring in the sūtra. The Buddha-fields and Buddhas in them are always referred to as incalculable and beyond description *(anabhilāpya)*. Throughout, emphasis is placed on *mahākaruṇā* and *mahāprajñā* which are two fundamental concepts of Mahāyāna. The *bhakti* (q.v.) cult is also very prominent in the sūtra, specially in the section where Samanthabhadra is described. The merit accrued by practising virtues for many *kalpas* (aeons) is said to be not as great as one hundredth part of the merit accrued by one remembering or uttering the name of Samantabhadra.

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GANDHA, meaning ordour or olfactive object is one of the twelve bases (āyatana) on which depends the process of perception. Being the olfactive object it is referred to as the external base *(bāhira āyatana)*, as opposed to the olfactive organ, the nose *(ghāna)*, which is called the internal base *(ajjhattha āyatana)*. Explaining the process of perception the *Madhupiṇḍika Sutta (M.* I. p. 112) says that olfactory consciousness *(ghānaviññāna)* arises dependent on the nose, and ordour. Coming together of these three i.e., the olfactory organ, the olfactory object and the olfactory consciousness is sensory infringement *(phassa)* and dependent on this arises feeling. The Sutta similarly goes on to explain how the other sense faculties too function and further points how this process which starts as a natural event turns out to be a subjective process finally ending up making the individual himself a hapless object of it. (See further, CONCEPT, EXPERIENCE, PERCEPTION, VEDANĀ).

Gandha being an object of sense organ is called one of the five sensuous objects (Kāmarāga). The Buddha points out that individuals get attached to these sensuous objects according to their desires (*S.* I, p. 79), and that this attachment becomes a fetter *(S. IV.*p. 283). Therefore, he advises, his followers to give up attachment to these (*Sn. v.* 974). This detachment could be achieved by training oneself to remain without getting entranced by the general and detail attributes of ordour and other sensuous objects. (*D.* I. pp.70, 183). Therefore, when confronted with olfactory objects an individual should remain detached (*S. IV.* 5 ff), considering its permanence, non-substantiality and unsatisfactoriness (*M.* III, p. 272).

Though the term *gandha* in its general use connote both good and foul ordour, it is quite frequently used to mean fragrant scent, perfume etc. when often coupled with *mālā* (garlands) and *vilepana* (unguent) which are all items of personal adornment. The *PED.* says that *gandha* is one of the fourteen items of approved gifts *(deyyadhamma)* for *samaṇas, brāhmaṇas* etc. (PED. s.v. cf. *t.* p. 65). *Saṃyutta Nikāya* mentions the offering of perfumes *(gandha)* as a cause that brings about a happy birth in the heavenly world (*S.* III, p. 252 ff).

The Buddha while approving the use of *gandhālepa* (scented ointments) for those monks suffering from skin diseases (*Vin.* I. p. 206), disapproved the use of perfume as a personal adornment (cf. the eighth of the ten *sikkhāpadas, mālā-gandha, vilepana-dhāraṇa maṇḍana-vibhūsanaṭṭhānā...*'.

The use of perfume as a cosmetic item has been common in India during the time of the Buddha. It has been customary to use scented ointment after a bath (*J. I.*, p. 254, 265). The *Jātaka* even refers to perfume shops *gandha-āpana (J. I.* p. 290).

The *Brahmajāla Sutta (D. I.* p.7) mention *gandha-kathā* (talk about perfumes) as one of the low types of conversational topics. The commentary explains that one should not indulge in talk connectd with ordour in a sensuous manner but may talk about it if it is connected with some spiritual subject (*DA.* I. p.89).

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GANDHABBA (1)*. Pali equivalent of the Vedic term Gandharva used in Buddhist texts in explaining the phenomenon of conception without reference to a permanent entity like the Atman. In this sense, the term occurs twice in the *Majjhima Nikāya* signifying the last of three conditions necessary for successful conception. In the *Mahātaṇhāsaṅkhaya Sutta (M.* I. p. 265) it is said that for conception *(gabbhassa avakkanti)* to take place there should be the simultaneous presence of three things: coitus of parents, the mother should be in her proper season *(utunī)* and the *gandhabba* must be present *(gandhabbo ca paccupaṭṭhito hoti:* Ibid.). Buddhaghosa's comment is very clear on the point: "Gandhabba here denotes the being who comes into the scene of conception *(tatrūpakasatto)*; it is not that *Gandhabba* remains in the proximity observing the union of parents; what is implied is that a certain being *(satto)* who is driven

* This article is a summary of the paper "Vedic Gandharva and Pali Candhabba" by O. H. de A. Wijesekara, *University of Ceylon Review*, Vol. III, No. 1, April 1945, pp. 73-107; see also his paper on 'Vitalism of Becoming: a comparative study' in the *University of Ceylon Review*, Vol. I, No.1, pp. 57-58 for *Viññāna* as the *sine qua non* for embryonic development.

on by the mechanism of *kamma* is about to be born in that situation *(MA.* II, p. 310). It would be idle to seek to explain away the being about to enter the womb as an unconscious lapse into popular terminology, for the significance of the text is weighty enough, to compel Buddhaghosa to resort to the particular terminology he uses. Lord Chalmere translates the last phrase *(gandhabbo ca paccupatthito hoti)* as if there is the presiding deity of generation present *(Further dialogue of the Buddha)* I, p. 189), and is followed by the P.T.S. Dictionary which says, citing only this single context, that the *Gandhabba* is said to preside over child-conception. The other occurence is in the *Assalāyana Sutta* where the Buddha relates to Assalāyana a discussion said to have taken place between Asita Devala and seven sages who were too proud of their brahmin birth. The three conditions necessary for conception are stated (*M.* II, p.156), in exactly the same terms as above, in order to ridicule the overbearing brahmins. Devala queries whether it would be possible to determine the caste identity of the particular *Gandhabba* as being *khattiya, brāhmana, vessa, sudda.*

Here the text is unequivocal and leaves no doubt as to the real nature of *gandhabba* which clearly must refer in the context to the 'spirit' of a previously dead *khattiya, brāhmana, vessa* or *sudda.*

That the meaning of the term in the above context is a samsāric being in the intermediate state (between death and rebirth) seems unmistakable. However, according to the evidence of the *Kathāvatthu* some of the early non-Theravāda schools seem to have developed the idea of an *antarābhava,* perhaps drawing inspiration from this concept of *gandhabba.* Amarakosa (circa A.C. 450) lends support to this assumption by its definition of *gandharva* as *antarābhava sattva:* a being in the intermediate state between death and birth *(Amarakosa,* Poona, 1941, p. 301). According to the *Kathāvatthu* the Sammitiyas (=Vātsiputriyas) held the Antarābhava to the carrier..of certain qualities from one existence to another and to be a *puggala.* Keith observes that the Sammitiyas in common with the Pubbaseliyas held that after death there was an intermediate state before rebirth, a view with which he connects the opinion of both the Pubba - and Apara-seliyas, referred to in the *Kathāvatthu,* that the embryo was at birth immediately provided with a full sense-apparatus. The Vaibhāsikas (and the Sarvāstivādins) too, have acceptd the belief in an intermediate being which was however opposed by the Mahāsanghika, Ekavyavahārika, Lokottaravādins and the Kukkutikas. The *kathāvatthu* and the *Milindapañha* (p. 83) the Sthaviravāda texts, too are opposed to this view (Keith, *Buddhist Philosophy,* pp. 207-208). It may seem curious that although the doctrine is discussed by so many schools, the use of the term gandhabba is conspicuous by its absence.

In the Theravada tradition Buddhaghosa makes no reference at all in his *Visuddhimagga* to *gandhabba* when he discusses conception as an important topic. The *Milindapañha,* gives a long discussion on this problem, mentioning the term *gandhabba* in several places, but appears to be confused about the exact import of the term, which it reduces to connote some *'devaputta'* awaiting conception in a human womb.

It is also significant in this context that *viññāna* is represented in the early *Nikāyas* as the *sine qua non* for embryonic development. The *Digha-nikāya* clearly asserts that if *viññāna* were not to descend into the mother's womb, or if having descended into the mother's womb were to leave, then conception will not be successful (*D.* II, p. 63).

The term *viññāna* occurs several times in the early Nikāyas in the sense of 'survivor' and in the *Majjhima-nikāya* it is called technically *samvattanika viññāna* or the *viññāna* that persists in *samsāra* (leading on to a next life) for which in the scholastic period the term *bhavanga* (q.v.) was substituted.[1] This *samvattanika viññāna* is regarded as continuing up to *nevasaññānā-saññāyatana* and is thus clearly the samsāric *viññāna* to which Sāti referred as the *viññāna* that fares on and continues, but erred in saying that it did so 'without change of identity (*tadeva....anañnam)*" and also in taking it as an agent (lit. speaker) and experiencer *(vado vedeyyo; M.* I. p.256). This samsāric *viññāna* is no other than the stream of consciousness *(viññānasota)* extending into both worlds *(Idha loke patitthitañ ca paraloke patitthitañ ca: D.* III, p. 105), also called *bhava sota (S.* I, p. 15; IV, p. 128) or stream of becoming. It is extremely significant that in the *Pāyāsi sutta* which clearly refers to this samsāric *viññāna* in the conch-shell illustration, *viññāna* is made analogous to *puroisa (D.* II, pp. 335, 337f). It is the same *viññāna* that is called *āhāra (M.* I. pp. 48, 261) explained elsewhere as the cause of rebirth (*S.* II, p. 13) or *bija (S.* III, p. 54; *A.* I. p.223), and the other categories constituting individuality are said to be the home of *viññāna* (*S.* III, pp. 9, 10). In view of such evidence the conclusion is irresistible that *viññāna* in early Buddhism was regarded as the sole accelerating factor which on account of its being charged with rebirth-potential leads a being to a

1. Vasubandhu identifies the *Alayavijñāna* of the Yogācāra school with the *Bhavanga* of the Tāmraparniya (i.e. the Theravādins of Sri Lanka), *Mūlavijñana* of the Mahāsanghikas and the *Asansārikavijñāna* of the Mahiśasaka schools - *Karmasiddhi-prakarana,* tr. by E. Lamotte, Melanges Chinois et Bouddhiques, IV, 1935-36.

new birth and does not in itself cease to be at the death of that being.

The difference between this *samsāric viññāna* and the Upanisadic *vijnānātman* that was held to be the 'survivor' according to the doctrine of reincarnation, is that in the *Upanisad* the term *ātman* expressly denotes a metaphysical substrate that is permanent and unchanging *(Brhadānayaka Upanisad,* 3.5.1; *Chāndogya Upanisad, 8.1.5, 7.1.3), whereas in early Buddhism the samsāric viññāna* is identical with *bhava* implying the very opposite nature of impermanence *(anicca)* and evolution *(viparināma, A.* I. p. 258; II, p. 177), being pictured as a continuously changing stream *(sota),* it is, in fact, clearly asserted that it is wrong to view this *viññāna* as *ātman (attato: S.* III, p.4) in the metaphysical sense accepted in the *Upanisad* and rejected in Early Buddhism (*S.* IV, p. 54; *Vin.* I, p. 14; *M.* I, p. 138).

It should now be clear what connotation the term *gandhabba* has in early Buddhism, for, the above discussion would have shown the doctrinal correspondence between its application and that of *viññāna* whose philosophical import is of extreme significance for the theory of survival. Consequently, it is incorrect to regard this use of *gandhabba* as due merely to popular notions.

Popular usage may perhaps be reflected in the occurence of such terms as *bhārahāra (S.* III, p. 25), *satta (S.* I, p. 37) and *nara (S.* I, p. 206) to denote practically the same 'surviving factor' as indicated above in a way appealing mere to the popular mind. The word *sambhavesi,* however, occuring in several places (*S.* II, p. 101; *M.* I, p. 48; *Sn. v.* 147) cannot be regarded as merely popular, approximating as it does to the above discussed *viññāna* and hence to *gandhabba,* and should rather be called a quasi-technical term. It may further be pointed out that whether the application of these terms be held to be popular or otherwise, they all refer to a concept that undoubtedly forms an integral aspect of early Buddhist philosophy of rebirth.

Judging by the exact connotation of the term *gandhabba,* it is clear that it refers to a state of the *samsāric viññāna.* The term was deliberately employed by the Buddha, perhaps for the first time in the religious history of India, to denote the surviving factor in man incontradistinction to the term *ātman* or *vijñanātman* that were used to designate the 'survivor' in the *Upanisad.* The anchistological import of *viññāna,* however, must be admitted to be earlier than Buddhism (cf. *vijñānamaya-purusa, Brhad. Up.* 2.1.15), and it is precisely here that the importance of this use of *gandhabba* to denote a particular state of *samsāric viññāna* is found, especially in its bearing on the much discussed theroy of *anatta.*

Upali Karunaratne

GANDHABBA (2), a class of celestial beings, mentioned in Pali literature, equivalent to, and apparently derived from, the Vedic *gandharva.* They are associated in Buddhist literature with music, song and dance, the best-known musician among them being the Pañcasikha mentioned in the *Sakkapañha Sutta (D.* II, p. 265f), who obtained audience with the Buddha by playing on his lyre the Beluvapanduvinā. Suriyavacckasā, his beloved, is reported in this same sutta, as having danced at the Sudhamma hall of the Tāvatimsa gods and seen the Buddha there. The Gandhabbas seem to have been noted for their fondness for sense-pleasures, always athirst for happiness (loc. cit.). The Buddha (*S.* III, p. 250f.) defines them as those gods who arise being associated with the fragrance of root-wood, of hard-wood, of pith, bark, leaves, flowers savours and scents. They are believed by some to be long-lived, beautiful and happy. The *Mahāsamaya Sutta (D.* II, p. 257) describes them as forming the retinue of Dhatarattha, the divine ruler of the eastern quarter and king of Gandhabbas.

The *Anguttara-nikaya*(II, p.39) uses the word *vihangama* as an epithet for them, which is commentarily explained as 'being able to go through the air' *(ākāsacaro gandhabba-kāyika-devo).*

The Gandhabbas, however, do not enjoy a high place in the Buddhist hierarchy of gods. According to the *Janavasabha Sutta (D.* II, p.212) and also the *Mahāgovinda Sutta (D.* II, p. 215), they dwell in the lowest heaven which a person taking refuge in the Buddha, Dhamma and Sangha can attain after death. They thus belong to the plane of the Cātummahārajika. In the *Sakkapañha Sutta* (loc. cit.) they are also referred to, along with the *asuras* and *nāgas,* as being the ministers and suite of Sakkha who in the *Vidhurapandita Jātaka* (*J.* V. p.260) is referred to as Gandhabba-rāja. But in other passages, they are named together with *yakkhas, kumbhandas* and nāgas. For instance, in the *Atānātiya Sutta (D.* III, pp. 203; 204) where the term *yakkha* has not yet gathered its meaning as demon, but stands only for a powerful non-human being capable of both good and harm, they are depicted as those who could be among the spirits who may disturb the meditations of monks in solitude. The sutta implies that they could be controlled by reciting the *ātānāta* ward-rune.

At the same time as he describes the Gandhabbas as belonging to his suite, Sakka seems to consider them as belonging to an inferior class, to be born among whom is degrading to a monk, having had all the opportunity to listen to the Buddha-word, and be re-born in a higher state. It may be noted that the gandhabbas have no separate place in the division into GATI (see COSMOLOGY).

Malalasekera (*DPPN.* s.v. on which this article is primarily based) points out that the word Gandhabba occurring at *M.* I, p. 265f. can be misinterpreted as a divine being presiding over conception, but it actually occurs only in a context dealing with the circumstances necessary for conception. *(mātāpitaro ca sannipatitā honti, mātā ca utuni hoti, gandhabbo ca paccupatthito hoti).* He shows that the commentaries explain that here ***gandhabba*** means 'being fit and ready to be born to the parents concerned.' *(tatrupaka satto tasmin okase nibbattanako satto).* The *Tīkā* says that the word stands for ***gantabba,*** see GANDHABBA (1).

Several other names, besides that of Dhataraṭṭha, are given as chieftains among the Gandhabbas who attended the preaching of the *Mahāsamaya Sutta* (loc. cit.), namely, Panida, Opamañña, Mātali, Sakka's charioteer, Cittasena, Nala and Janesabha. Timbaru, the father of Suriyavaccasā is also referred to as a lord of the Gandhabbas. Apparently Sikhaddhi mentioned in the ***Sakkapañña Sutta*** *(D.* II, p. 268) as the son Matali, beloved of Suriyavaccasā, was also a gandhabba.

The female counterparts of Gandhabbas are known as ***accharā*** (nymphs). Suriyavaccasā, also known as Bhaddā, is the best known of them and the story of Pañcasikha's love for her, recorded in the celebrated love poem of the *Sakkapañña Sutta* probably gave rise to the Characterisation of Gandhabbas as very romantic people. It is noteworthy that the second and the third *vaggas* of the *Dīgha-nikāya* are frofuse with episodes with the Gandhabbas, often featuring the Buddha as hero. See *DPPN.* s.v. Gandhabba, and also CĀTUM-MAHĀRĀJIKA).

Bandula Jayawardhene

GANDHAKUṬI 'The fragrant hut', was the name given to the room or hut *(kuṭi)* specially constructed for the use of the Buddha in the monastery built by the treasurer Anātha piṇḍika in the Jeta's Grove *(Jetavana)* in Savatthi (*J.* I.92). The Buddha used to live in this apartment whenever he visited Savatthi in his preaching rounds.

The Gandhakuti formed the centre unit in a building complex made up of apartments for the Buddha and the great disciples and the whole complex was designated as *Gandhakuti-parivena.* On several occasions the Buddha summoned the bhikkhus to assemble in the Gandhakuṭi parivena and addressed them on important religious matters. (*J.*I, p.501; III. p.67).

Once when the Buddha was living in the Gandhakuṭi in the Jetavana monastery, some heretical groups hatched a plan to discredit and villify the Buddha and the bhikkhus. They instigated a beautiful and attractive *paribbājikā* by name Sundari to frequent the Jetavana Monastery and hover close to the Gandhakuṭi, thereby giving the impression to the public that the Buddha and the Bhikkhus were having an intimacy with the ***paribbājikā.*** Some weeks later the heretics caused Sundari to be murdered secretly and hid her corpse in a thicket in the vicinity of the Gandhakuṭi. When the corpse was discovered later the heretics spread the rumour to the effect that the Buddha and the monks were responsible for the crime. For sometime the Buddha and the bhikkhus had to face severe insult and public censure. The situation became so hostile and tense that Ananda appealed to the Buddha to leave the Jetavana monastery along with the bhikkhus and go elsewhere, but the buddha pacified Ananda saying that when a problem arises the bhikkhus should not get excited and run away from the problem, but should maintain their calm and balance of mind and work with diligence. As time passed by the plot came to light and the heretics themselves had to face the repercussions (*UdA.* 256ff; *J.* II, 415f).

The *Buddhavamsa* commentary *(BuvA.* p.298) and the commentary to the *Dīghanikāya (DA.* II. p.424) mention that all past Buddhas had their Gandhakuti at the site of Gotama Buddha's Gandhakuti in the Jetavana Monastery and the four legs of the bed used by each past Buddha in his Gandhakuṭi rested on the identical spots in this room.

Visākhā, the famous female lay supporter of the Buddha, too, built a monastery for the Buddha and the bhikkhus in the Pubbārāma to the east of Savatthi. In this monastery, too, there was a building complex designed and made for the use of the Buddha and the great disciples. It is said that the Buddha, during the last twenty years of his life, whenever, he visited Savatthi stayed in the *Gandhakuṭi* in the Jetavana Monastery and in the special apartment built for him in the Pubbārāma Monastery alternately in order to please Anathapindika and Visākhā, his chief lay supporters, (*SnA.* I. p.336).

The Buddha spent nineteen rainy seasons in the Gandhakuti in the Jetavana Monastery (*DhA.* I. p. 3; *BuvA.* 3).

Malalasekera opines that the special hut built for the use of the Buddha in every monastery that was built and offered to the bhikkhusangha by the generous benefactors subsequently, was given the name Gandhakuṭi (*DPPN* Vol. I. p.745).

W. G. Weeraratne.

GANDHĀRA* **History**. The earliest mention of Gandhāra is found in the Bisitun inscription of Darius, when it was the eastern-most satrapy of the Achaemenid Empire. The names of Gandhāra and its people, Gandhāri, occur in the Vedas. Although there is some division of opinion regarding the territories embraced in this ancient province, it may be thought of as having comprised eastern Afghanistan and northwestern Pakistan including the Kabul Valley and the modern districts of Peshawar, Mardān, Swat, and Buner-or, roughly, the territory south of the Hindukush and north of the Punjab.

The term Gandhāra, over and above its geographical association, is used to describe the art which flourished in this region during the early centuries of our era. This school, which from its connections with classical art is sometimes described as Graeco-Buddhist, as will be revealed below, has its stylistic affiliations with Rome rather than Greece. Actually, the art of Gandhāra extended beyond the geographical limits of the province: remains have been found as fār nerth as the Oxus region and at the ancient city of Taxila, south of the Indus River.

Gandhāra as already noted, was originally a province of the Archaemenid Empire, and its territories marked the eastern limit of the conquests of Alexander the Great. Rejoined to India under the Mauryas, it was the object of great missionary activity by Asoka, one of whose inscriptions was carved at Shāhbhāz-garhi in the Peshawar district. The early rulers of Gandhāra also included the Indo-Greek descendants of Alexander's captains, such as the pious Menander. With the disintegration of the Greek dynasties, the Sakas, a Scythian horde of Central Asian origin, established themselves in Gandhāra about the first century B.C. A Parthian dynasty ruled in Taxila as late as the first century A.D. These Parthians were driven out in turn by the Yüeh-chih from north-west China, who, under the name of their most powerful tribe, the Kushans, conquered the Kabul Valley and Gandhāra about 50 A.C. The first great Kushan dynasty was brought to and end by an invasion from Susanian Iran, either under Ardashir or Shāpur I, between 225 and 250 A.C. This dabacle appears to have brought to an end also the great creative period of Gandhāra art. The final blow to Gandhāra and its civilization was the invasion by the White Huns in the fifth century A.C.

Although Buddhism had penetrated to Gandhāra even as early as Maurya times, it was not until the advent of the Kushans that the region assumed an important place in the history of Buddhism and its art. Although never specifically associated with the Buddha's mortal career, Gandhāra gained a particular renown of sanctity through the assignment of the locales of the Buddha's earlier incarnations–the renunciations and martyrdoms of the *Jātaka* tales–to sites in this region. There is no reason to suppose that the first two Kushan sovereigns, Kujula and Wima Kadphises, were even Buddhists, but their successor, Kanishka, (*q.v.*) is remembered as one of the great patrons of the religion, a second Asoka who rned Gandhāra into a veritable Holy Land of Buddhism. Kanishka convened the Fourth Buddhist Council, and it is generally believed that the Buddhism of the Great Vehicle (Mahāyāna) made its appearance under his reign and patronage.

The dates of Kanishka's reign, all important for the chronology of Gandhāra, are still the subject of dispute among scholalrs. The earliest date suggested for the beginning of the king's reign is 78 A.C., a year that presumably had marked the beginning of a Saka era. A date of 143 A.C. has been proposed by René Ghirshmann, reckoning from the fact that Kanishka's dynasty lasted 98 years and presumably came to an end with the Sasanian invasion of 241 A.C. Actually, neither of these years fits in particularly well with the chronology of the Kushan Dynasty by as a whole, so that the most satisfactory date for the accession of Kanishka is 125 or 128 A.C., a chronology supported by Sir John Marshall.

The history of Gandhāra after the Sasanian conquest is rather obscure. After a period of interregnum it seems that a lesser Kushan dynasty established itself south of the Khyber Pass, whereas the northern territories continued under Sasanian rule. It should be noted that Gandhāra was only the northern portion of the Kushan Empire. This is important because, whereas a strongly Westernized art flourished in Gandhāra, a purely Indian tradition developed under Kushan patronage at their southern capital of Mathurā.

We owe a great deal of our knowledge of Gandhāra and its art to the accounts of the Chinese Buddhist pilgrims who have left very full descriptions of their travels to its sacred sites. These records include the story of Fa Hsien's journey in c. 400 A.C. the journey of Sung Yün in the sixth century when Gandhāra was under the yoke of the Huns., and the most detailed of all the histories, Hsüan Tsang's *Hsi Yü Chi* Records of the Western Countries, composed in the early seventh century, when religion as well as art was in its final decline.

*This article is reproduced from the *Encyclopaedia of Buddhism, Volume of Specimen Articles.*

Even in the seventh century when Hsüan Tsang visited the region, Gandhāra was a stronghold of Theravāda (Hinayāna) Buddhism. The pilgrim speaks of five schools of the Little Vehicle, but some of these, like the eclectic Sārvāstivādin sect, were transitional to the Great Vehicle; so that even such a confirmed Mahāyānist as Hsüan Tsang found their teaching congenial. In its mixture of older Indian and Iranian concepts the Sārvāstivādin sect had something of the universal character of Gandhāra art.

The first examples of Gandhāra art came to the attention of the scholarly world through chance finds and amateur exploration early in the nineteenth century. Our knowledge of the art of Gandhāra is based largely on the finds from the excavation of many sites in western Pakistan. These would include the ancient city of Taxila, successively a stronghold of Alexander's followers, the Sakas and the Kushans, and numerous foundations around Peshawar, notably Charsadda, the ancient Pushkarāvati, Sahri-Bahlol, Takht-i-Bahi, and Jamālgarhi. Among the centres in Afghanistan should be mentioned Hadda, the ancient Nagahāra, and Begram, the former Kapiśa. It is to be regretted that not one of these excavations was carried out under modern scientific methods, so that the reports are without value for establishing a chronology of the finds.

Arts. The Chapters of Gandhāra's history from the third to the first century B.C. when the rigion was under the dominion of the Bactrian Greeks, are of little import for the development of Buddhist art. The rule of Alexander's successors in Bactria and Gandhāra was too unstable to make for the introduction of a monumental art. Beyond the perpetuation of the Greek language as a kind of *lingua franca,* the contribution of the Bactrian Greeks appears to reside entirely in their magnificent coinage, and it is not until the advent of the Sakas and Kushans that the techniques and forms of Classical art appear to have penetrated Gandhāra. There are, to be sure, a few vestiges of Greek architecture and even sculpture of a Hellenistic type from the period of Saka-Parthian domination in the first century A.C., but the great period of art in Gandhāra coincides with the reign of the Kushans.

The charactr of Gandhāra art was largely determined by the commercial and diplomatic relations between the Kushan rulers and the Western World.[3] Beginning with Augustus (27 B.C.-9 A.C.), the Emperors received embassies from the Kushan realm. These exchanges continued through the reigns of Trajan (98-117 A.C.) and Hadrian (117-138 A.C.) and into the Antonine period (c. 138-180 A.C.). The discovery of many precious objects of Alexandrian workmanship at Taxila and Begram in the Kabul Valley testifies to the cultural connection with the Graeco-Roman West, connections which with the demand for imagery following kanishka's patronage of Buddhism was supplemented by the import of artisans from the Roman East. From the point of view of types, techniques, and even iconography the art of Gandhāra might be regarded as a provincial Roman school. The content is, of course, Buddhistm just as the content of Early Christian art in Rome and the East is Christian, but presented in the same terms used for embodying the concepts of pagan cults. The Gandhāra sculptors introduced many themes from Classical sources, such as tritons, centaurs, and atlantide, but these mythological forms are enployed in a decorative rather than a devotional way. Their presence testifies to the stylistic intimacy between Gandhāra and the Roman world.

Although a number of students of Gandhāra art, the present writer included, have assumed the existence of an archaic period marked by the hesitant imposition of Classical techniques truly Classical or Graeco-Roman style, this view seems no longer tenable. It is more logical to suppose that Gandhāra sculpture, the creation of journeymen craftsmen from the Roman West, perhaps from Syria or Alexandria, was obviously produced in the completely mature Imperial Roman style of the late first and early second centuries since there is no reason to believe that, once settled in Gandhāra, these thoroughly trained professional carvers would have reverted to an archaic or primitive manner. In the following centuries the work fell more and more into the hands of locally trained craftsmen and for this reason gradually returned to Indian rather than Classical ideals.

The material principally used for Gandhāra sculpture was a bluish slate known as chalicose schist. Some of the finer examples were carved from a green phyllite and a variety of steatite or soapstone. Originally the stone sculptures were painted and gilded. Stone carving was gradually replaced by another medium–lime plaster–after the fall of the Great Kushan Dynasty in the third century A.C. The stucco or lime plaster was reinforced with such binding media as small stones, animal hair, and straw. This material was generally reserved for the heads of images, the bodies of which were fashioned in mud or clay, covered with only a thin layer of gypsum plaster.

1. The summary of this evidence on the date of Kanishka may be found in H. Deydier, *Constribution à l'étude de l'art du Gandhāra,* Paris, 1950.
2. For the Chinese pilgrims, see S. Beal, *Buddhist Records of the Western World,* 2 vols. London, 1906.
3. Cf. Sir M. Wheeler, *Rome beyond the Imperial Frontiers,* London, 1954, pp. 154-172.

The images, as well as the architectural decorations carried out in stucco, were covered with a complete polychromy.

The Buddha Image. The greatest contribution of Gandhāra to Asiatic art was the invention of the Buddha image. The first anthropomorphic representation of the Teacher was probably linked with the emergence of the devotional sects of Buddhism and their demand for the portrayal of the object of worship in an accessibly human form, instead of the entirely symbolical references to the Master in the art of early Theravāda Buddhism.

The processes of deification, leading to the Buddha's representation in human form, were already at work in the early Buddhist period. Although in the early sutras Sākyamuni is a man, he is something more than that, since in his knowledge, enlightenment and self-mastery, he is super natural. And on occasions his supernatural nature is revealed directly in miracles. It was an easy transition from the veneration felt for this supernatural person to worship the Buddha as a divinity. Already in the *Lalita Vistara,* q.v. probably composed in the second century A.C., the Buddha appears as an exalted supernatural being. In early Buddhism the Buddha in his Nirvāna entered a realm of invisibility where, as the *Dīgha-nikāya* states, "neither gods nor men shall see him"; so that it was inappropriate to represent him by anything except symbols. In Mahāyāna Buddhism there appears the ideal of the Bodhisattva as a being capable of Nirvāna, but remaining in the world in order to save mankind. Since, for this role of saviours in the world of men, it was appropriate to represent the Bodhisattvas as ideal humans, in the same way it was logical to portray the conception of the eternal Buddha as a symbol in human shape, enabling the worshipper to grasp at this absolute being. For the masses the Buddha, like the older Indian deities, became a popular god who could, as well as the *yakkhas* and *nāgas* of old, be represented in human shape.

Such principles of Mahāyāna Buddhism as the deification of the Buddha and the substitution of the Bodhisattva for the arhat ideal were factors which in the early centuries of the Christian era more than anything else brought about the need for actual representations of the Buddha as a man rather than as an emblem. The anthropomorphic representation of divinities, such as the *yakshas* in the early Indian schools of art, as well as the influence of the anthropomorphic tradition in the religions of Greece and Iran, were additional factors contributing to the appearance of the Buddha image. As has already been pointed out, the period of the Kushans was one of dominant Roman influence, and it may even be that the precedent of representations of the deified Roman Emperor may have exercised an influence on the portrayal of the divine Buddha in human form.[4] In a similar way the fact that the Mahāyāna doctrine was centered around the miraculous life and person of the Buddha rather than his words gave a new impetus to the representations of scenes from his life. Whether or not the first Buddha statue was made in Gandhāra or in the Indian workshops of Mathurā is immaterial, except for those seeking a chauvinistic priority for Indian craftsman. The best evidence seems to Indicate that the earliest representations of Śākyamuni in human form were made more or less simultaneously at Mathurā and in Gandhāra in the late first and early second centuries A.C. The representations of the Buddha on coins of Kanishka may be taken as an indication that statues of the Master were made in Kanishka's reign, or shortly before.[5] The Buddha type represented on Kanishka's coin is obviously made in imitation of Gandhāra type.

There are a number of Buddha statues with inscriptions dating them in an unknown era. These statues from Loriyān Tangai and Charsadda have inscriptions from the years 318 and 384. The employment of these inscriptions as a foundation for a chronology has proved a vertiable quicksand for every student of Gandhāra art, for the simple reason that the era in which these years are reckoned remains an unknown factor. Actually, the comparison of the style of the images with datable examples of Roman sculpture is the only method for arriving at a chronology[6]. The drapery of these statues is conventionalized into sharp parallel ridges and appears to be derived from Roman sculpture of the Antonine and severid periods, so that these Buddhas must date from no earlier than the late second century A.C. In this way it might be possible to conclude that a Śaka era, beginning in c. 150 B.C., was in use, since this would enable us to date these figures in 169 and 234 A.C., respectively. It is to be noted that these images already reveal a conventionalization of the style of the earliest of Buddha statues, which were probably made shortly

4. H. Buchthal, "The Western Aspects of Gandhāra Sculpture", *Proceedings of the British Academy,* XXXI, 1945, pp. 8-9.
5. P. Gardner, *Catalogue of Greek Coins in the British Museum: the Greek and Scythic Kings of Bactria and India,* London, 1886, Pl. XXVI, 8.
6. B. Rowland, "Gandhara and Late Antique Art: the Buddha Image", *American Journal of Archaeology,* April, 1942.

before 100 A.C. To this same period belong the Buddhas from Sahri-Bahlol and Takht-i-Bahi.

The standing Buddha image in Gandhāra is not so much an imitation as an adaptation of Western types and techniques by the Roman or Syrian artisans who were called on to produce icons appropriate to the new type of Buddhism. If we take as typical of this first phase in the development of the Buddha image the beautiful statues formerly in Hoti-Mardān, it is apparent at once that the head was suggested by the youthful type of the Apollo Belvedere. The heavy, plastically conceived folds of the robe revealing the body, and yet existing as an independent volume, suggest the garments of Roman draped figures from the Claudian through the Flavian periods (c. 40-100 A.C.). The sculptors of the Gandhāra Buddhas were never very orthodox in their representation of the magic marks or *lakṣaṇas*. Actually a topknot of wavy hair or the *krobylos* borrowed from Apollo is used to disguise the *uṣṇīṣa*, which must have puzzled the Eurasian craftsman as much as the *yoga* posture for the seated image.

The world of the first century was a small one, and since in spite of the primitive methods of travel communications were very quick, it is not necessary to assume a great time lag between the appearance of a teachnique in Rome and its transmission to the provinces and ultimately to India. It is logical to suppose, therefore, that fashions popular in Rome in the sixties and seventies of the first century would have found their way to Gandhāra long before 100 A.C. The Buddha image resulting from the combination of the Apollo head and the body of the togaed Emperor is inevitably a very humanistic one that has little to do with revealing the Mahāyāna conception of the Master as a reflection of the supreme reality.

The whole later development of the Buddha image in Gandhāra, and indeed in all the East, is away from this Hellenic conception in terms of idealized and individualized, material beauty towards a more abstract figuration in accord with Indian tradition and infinitely more appropriate for expressing the immaterial, spiritual reality which is the Buddha. Already in the images of the late second and third centuries A.C. as illustrated by the examples from Loriyān-Tangai and Charsadah, the drapery has become more schematized and is no longer a realistically conceived volume separate from the body. In even later examples, such as the Buddhas from the Begram region in Afghanistan, the robe is only schematically symbolized by a series of stringlike loops descending down the median line of the body. The representation of the figure has become entirely frontal, and the bodily proportion is in a ratio of five heads to the total stature, a canon approximating the debased Roman figure sculpture of the fourth century and later. This style appears to illustrate the same reversion to ancient Oriental ideals of frontality and formalized linear representation that may be noted in the history of the sculpture of Palmyra. Indeed, the method of representing drapery is so close that a continuing influence from this late center of Roman Provincial art may perhaps be assumed. It is worth noting that this final step in the development of the Gandhāra Buddha furnished the model for representations of Śākyamuni in Central Asia and China in the fourth and fifth centuries when, with an even further removal from the Classic source, the figure style became completely schematized and anti-naturalistic. These late Gandhāra Buddhas, with their simplification of the drapery to a network of cords, must be behind the employment of this same formula as a wonderfully rhythmic linear pattern in the Buddhas of the Gupta period from Mathurā, which made a perfect synthesis of Chinese and Indian ideals.

Just as the statue of the defied Roman Emperor may have influenced the anthropomorphic representation of Buddha, so the Classical cult of the colossal that began to manifest itself in the giant effigies of Nero and Constantine certainly has a reflection in the giant images of Bāmivān in Afghanistan. These two colossal statues, respectively 120 and 175 feet high, were carved out of the sandstone cliff and covered with a heavy layer of mud and plaster originally painted and glided. The 120 foot colossus is an enlargement of a typical Gandhāra Buddha of the second century A.C. The larger 175 foot statue, with its drapery arranged in string like folds, corresponds to the late phase of Gandhāra sculpture. The purpose in - fashioning these immense statues was partly for show and partly to symbolize by these gigantic dimensions the concept of the universal Buddha as equivalent to the cosmos itself.

The reason for the appearance of these colossi is given by Hsüan Tsang who tells us that Bāmiyān was a stronghold of the Lokottaravādins, one of the sects emphasizing the more than mortal nature of the Buddha.[8] Both of the giant statues were iconographically complemented by the painted decoration of their niches. Around the top of the niche of the 120 foot Buddha are painted the seven Buddhas of the past and Maitreya, and on the soffit of the vault a solar deity as an allegory of the coming of these Tathāgatas as suns to illuminate the world. The niche of the 175 foot Buddha was once completely painted with multiple figures of Buddhas symbolizing the

7. Cf. *Archaeological Survey of India, Annual Reports*, 1906-07, 1907-08, 1909-10, 1911-12.

8. Beal, *op. cit.* I, p.50.

myriad mind-made emanations of the Buddha of the *Lotus Sutra* or vairocana in the *Avataṃśaka.*

No less important than the development of the standing Buddha image in Gandhāra was the origin in this school of the Buddha seated in *yoga* posture. Here the foreign craftsmen were at a total loss to find a Graeco-Roman prototype for a personage seated with his legs folded beneath him. The result, as may be seen in the earliest of these statues, was an attempt to disguise the legs locked in the *padmāsana* under the voluminous drapery of a standing figure. More often than not, the seated Gandhāra Buddhas give the impression of a truncated torso set on the completely disarticulated log-like legs. The folds of the drapery over the legs are usually arranged as though the limbs were in a standing position. The development of the seated type is the same as that illustrated by the standing Buddhas, with an increasing tendency towards the disintegration and abstraction of the form. This trend is already clearly marked in a statue dated in the 89th year of Kanishka (216 A.C.). An even later example in the Yale University Gallery of Art (New Haven. U.S.A.) marks the same stage in the development as the standing Buddhas from Begram. (Pls. XVIII, XIX).

The Bodhisattva Image. The Gandhāra workshops also produced the type of Bodhisattva image. A great many of these statues are undoubtedly portrayals of Prince Siddhārtha, appropriately dressed in the finery of a contemporary rājā and perhaps intended as emblems of the Buddha's temporal power as Cakravartin. From the point of view of costumes these images appear to have prototypes in the earlier Indian conception of the *yakshas* and the rājās and gate guardians represented at Sāñchi and Bhārhut. The dress consists of a skirt or dhoti, a turban, and jewelled torques, necklaces, and armlets decorating the nude torso. The drapery of the skirt in these statues is arranged in a series of stiff folds, archaistic in appearance, like the swallowtail mannerism of neo-Attic sculpture. The nude anatomy is modelled with the same smooth suppression of the muscular structure that was the fashion in such Graeco-Roman statues as the Apollo Belvedere. Sometimes the massive proportions of the Bodhisattva statues suggest an adaptation of a more Indian canon.

Although many of these Bodhisattva images, as already stated, are portrayals of Siddhārtha, others bearing such attributes as the *lota* or water bottle are the earliest representations of maitreya. Still other examples with a small Buddha in the crown must have been intended for Avalokiteśvara, identified by this unmistakeable emblem of his spiritual father Amitābha. As in the case of the Buddha image, the Gandhāra Bodhisattva types furnished the models for the representations of these personifications of Buddhist powers for later Indian art as well as for the art of the Far East. (Pl. XX).

Reliquaries. Important for any discussion of Gandhāra sculpture is the famous reliquary of Bimarān. This gold circular box studded with rubies was found in 1840 by Charles Masson in a stupa at Bimarān in Afghanistan.[9] The fact that coins of the Śaka king Azes were found associated with the casket has led some scholars to attribute this object to the first century B.C. But actually the coins could have been inserted at any time subsequent to their minting as tribute for the relics. Around the drum of the little box runs an arcade which encloses a repeated group of four figures of the Buddha flanked by three worshippers, perhaps including Indra and Brahma. The style of the drapery of these figures is related to such stone examples as the Buddhas from Loriyān-Tangai and Charsada from the late second century A.C. the motif of figures in an arcade is a definite borrowing from a device of Roman sculpture that makes its first appearance in Roman Asiatic sarcophagi of the second century A.C. Accordingly the Bimarān reliquary is only the smaller metal equivalent of the stone Gandhāra sculpture in the finest period of its development.

No less famous is the reliquary of Kanishka, found in the ruins of the famous stupa pagoda erected by that monarch at the site of Shāh-ji-ki-dhērī near Peshawar. The Kanishka reliquary is a metal box in the shape of a pyxis surmounted by freestanding figures of the Buddha and two Bodhisattvas on lotuses mounted on the lid. Around the side of the lid drum of the box are two zones of ornament comprising *haṃsa* and erotes carrying a garland. On one side of the box appears the statue of the divinized Kanishka flanked by the sun and moon. There is also a very mutilated inscription, sometimes translated as referring to the first year of Kanishka's reign. More certain is the reading of the dedication by the Sārvāstivādins and the name of the maker, Agisela, perhaps a craftsman of Greek origin. Actually this reliquary is more valuable as a historical memento of the great Buddhist king than as a monument important for the development of Gandhāra art. Although the Kanishka deliquary has sometimes been presented as an example of an archaic linea.: stage in the development of Gandhāra art, its style is actually a miniature version of the debased and misunderstood copies of Gandhāra statues made at Mathurā in the second century A.C. If the inscription on this object can really be related to Kanishka, it would furnish us with another indication that the Buddha image was already established before his reign.

9. C. C. Wilson, *Ariana Antiqua with a Memoir,* by Charles Masson London, 1840, p. 69.

Reliefs. Just as Roman sculpture served the purposes of the state by extolling the virtues of the Emperor in a series of panels epitomizing his achievements, so Gandhāra sculpture extolled the career of the Buddha for the glory of the Kushan state and its church. It followed the device of dividing the hero's life story into a number of separate scenes, just as the life of Trajan is presented in a succession of panels on his arch at Benevento. The scenes chosen for illustration in the Gandhāra reliefs are not only the eight great events already related in symbolical fashion in earlier sculpture, but a whole sequence of lesser events and miracles drawn from such sources as the *Lalita Vistara* and the *Parinirvāṇa Sūtra*. The staging of these events, in which the Buddha always appears in human form, provided a whole series of iconographical and compositional formula for the narration of the Buddha story, which exercised an influence on all later treatments of the subject.

The content of the Gandhāra reliefs, with the exception of a few Classical subjects, is the life of Buddha and the *Jātaka stories*. It is notable that the sources for the life appear to be the *Lalita Vistara* and the *Mahāvastu*, the texts stressing the miraculous aspects of the Buddha legend which marked the transition from the Theravāda (Hinayāna) to Mahāyāna Buddhism. One of the great contributions of the Gandhāra school was the development of a continuous cycle of events fixing the iconography of the Buddha's life in a certain number of scenes, just as in Roman art, and also following this precedent. In early Christian art the hero's life was narated in a logical sequence of separate panels with the figure of the Emperor, Christ, or the Buddha dominating each scene. This is a method of narration that marked the end of the old method of continuous narration, in which a number of episodes were included in the same scene. Just as the artists of the Early Christian period devised a number of compositions from certain themes from the life of Christ, presented, as one would expect, in the artistic vocabulary of pagan art, the school of Gandhāra created a set of standard illustrations for the Buddha story. These compositions are more or less original inventions with borrowings of familiar types and techniques of Roman sculpture.

We are probably justified in assuming that the invention of the Buddha image preceded the introduction of the Buddha in human from into the reliefs, since in every case the figures appearing in the reliefs seem to be imitated from the statues to a point where in the reliefs of the Nirvāṇa, the reclining figure is simply a standing Buddha image placed on its side and with the drapry folds arranged as for a standing image.

The chronology of relief sculpture in Gandhāra can be determined approximately by comparisons with developments in the Western Classical world. The earliest Gandhāra reliefs bear a close resemblance to the type of carving evolved in Rome during the Flavian and Trajanic periods (*c.* 70-117 A.C.), in which the figures are more or less isolated and sparated against the plain background. A somewhat later series of reliefs is very close to the Hadrianic style (*c.* 117-138 A.C.), in which the figures are placed in easy conversational attitudes and the employment of a certain amount of overlapping gives an effect of spatial depth. These earliest types of Gandhāra relief must belong to a period from *c.* 75 to 125 A.C. The parallels continue with the appearance in Gandhāra of the deeply undercut illusionistic technique developed in Rome under the Antonines and Severids (*c.* 138-217 A.C.). If the earliest of these styles reached Gandhāra in the last quarter of the first century A.C. through the intervention of Roman journeymen craftsmen, the latest style presumably appeared towards the end of the second century A.C.

It is a question whether any Gandhāra reliefs can properly be called archaic. As already mentioned in the discussion of the Buddha image, it seems that from its very nature the Gandhāra school came into being literally overnight, through the appearance of foreign craftsmen. These men were certainly not working in an archaic manner, so that, as in the case of the Buddha statues, the Gandhāra, relief style appeared fully matured. The "archaic reliefs" are more likely late debased copies by Indian workmen. Many of them later examples, especially in stucco, reveal a decadence in the departure from the Classical norm, and what is generally more interesting, a gradual translation into more Indian terms.

Typical of the first phase of Grandhāra relief sculpture are some of the beautiful panels from Hoti-Mardān, now in the Archaeological Museum at Peshawar. The arrangement of the figures and the costumes of the female attendants are the Indian counterparts of the style of relief found at such Roman monuments as the Forum of Narva (96-98 A.C.). The great Nirvāṇa relief from Loriyān-Tangai illustrates the fully developed style of Gandhāra relief, with the dense massing of forms and deep undercutting strongly reminiscent of the Roman style of the Antonine period (138-180 A.C.). The serpentine dragons on the cornice of this relief are taken from a common ornament of the Roman Asiatic sarcophagi of the second century A.C. (Pl. XXI).

The iconography of some scenes, such as the Enlightenment with the empty throne beneath the Bodhi tree, was already established in the early periods of Indian art. It required only the insertion of a seated Buddha figure on the *vajrāsana* to adapt the composition to the new treatment of the legend. Almost all the other episodes, however, are creations of the Gandhāra sculptors, sometimes on the basis of compositional prototypes existing in Roman reliefs. Some very elaborate panels, identified as

representations of the Great Miracle, may actually be the first representations of the Buddha Paradise or the miraculous creation of *Nirmāna* Buddhas by the transcendent Buddha of the *Lotus Sūtra*. In the same way the reliefs with Buddha surrounded by a halo filled with smaller Buddha figures seem to prophesy the iconography of Vairocana at the centre of a vast *manddala* of *Dhyāni* Buddhas, as we see him in the sculpture of mediaeval Japan.

Stucco Sculpture. The technique of stucco sculpture was probably introduced to Gandhāra as early as the first century A.C. from Alexandria, where in the late Hellenistic period it had been used to replace expensive marble. Some of the heads from the Parthian period, found in the apsidal temple at Sirkap, Taxila, are reflections of Roman sculpture of the period of Augustus. It seems likely that at sites like Taxila and Haḍḍa in Afghanistan stucco began to be used for Buddhist sculpture just as early carving in slate, and that, following the decline of Kushan power in the third century, it gradually replaced stone entirely. The types of Gandhāra stucco sculpture reflect Hellenistic and Roman precedents just as closely as their counter-parts in stone. As a general rule the examples of stucco sculpture are more interesting, owing to the more malleable nature of the medium. Many of the heads found at Taxila and Haḍḍa, especially those of lay personages, are marked by a passionate intensity of expression, approximating the dramatic realism of later Roman sculpture[10]. At times the combination of a modified naturalism with an expression of passionate tenderness and a kind of spiritualized pathos approximates the style of Gothic art in the West. It is possible that the new ramphasis on the humanity and personality in many of these heads is at once a reflection of late Classical art and an appropriate expression of the later Buddhist cults of salvation in which the promise of survival in paradise for the individual was as much a possibility as the hope of heaven for every man in the mystic Christianity of the Gothic period.

The heads of the stucco images were made both with moulds and modelled free-hand. The same development toward Indianization takes place in this madium as in the stone sculpture. The heads become more mask-like and the once Classically organised drapery is reduced to a linear formula. Some of the latest examples in terra cotta form Fondukistan in the Ghorband Valley, dating from the sixth or seventh century, are hardly to be distinguished from the fullblown sensuous ideal of Gupta art.

Painting. So little Gandhāra painting has survived that nothing can be said about it from the point of view of a chronological stylistic development. Such examples as we have seem to reflect the same adaptation of Late Antique formulae as were evident in sculpture. The painted decoration of a niche from Haḍḍa reveals figures in a style not unlike the Early Christian wall-paintings of the fourth and fifth centuries A.C.[12] The most complete cycle of Gandhāra painting, actually in Central Asia, is the wall-paintings of a stupa in Mirān, now in the Museum of Central Asian Antiquities in New Delhi[13]. The representation of *Jātaka* scenes suggests the treatment of these themes in Gandhāra sculpture, and the painted frieze of garland-bearing erodes and busts of angels and celestial musicians are reflections of the type of Late Roman paintings to be seen at Palmyra and Dura Europos, a style in which the originally illusionistic modelling of the forms has been reduced to an arbitrary thickening of the contours. The figures have very much the same dryness and already conventionalized Classicism which we discern in the sculpture of Gandhāra.

The famous examples of the wall-paintings at Bāmiyān belong to a relatively late period and are provincial variants of Indian and Sasanian styles. The Sasanian decorations, such as the sun god above the head of the 120-foot Buddha and the painted imitation of the textiles in Group D, are probably the work of Iranian artists in the service of Buddhism in the centuries after the Sasanian conquest of the third century A.D. The niche of the 175-foot Buddha contains representations of multiple Buddhas and Bodhisattvas. In their refined sensuous elegance and massive bodily proportions these figures appear as provincial reflections of the style of Gupta India.[14]

Architecture. In the architecture of Gandhāra we can observe something of the same imposition of Classical and Near Eastern forms on an essentially Indian framework that is notable in the sculpture.

The decoration of the Buddhist monuments of Gandhāra included a free adaptation of the Classical orders. Whereas in a few non-Buddhist buildings at Taxila, such as the Fire Temple at Jandial of the Saka Period, Ionic pillars and capitals were used, the order predominates in the majority of stupas and viharas of the

10. Cf. Sir J. Marshall, *Taxila*, Cambridge, 1951 and J. Barthoux, *Les fouilles de Hadda, Mémoires de la délégation archéologique franzaise en Afghanistan* (hereafter *MDAFA*) III, Paris 1930.
11. See *Revue des Arts Asiatiques*. X & XII.
12. J. Hackin, L'oeuvre de la délégation archéologique francise en Afghanistan (1922-32), Tokyo, 1933, Fig. 27.
13. Sir M. A. Stein, *Serindia*, Oxford, 1921, Pl. XL-XLV.
14. See J. Hackin, A. & Y. Godard, *Les antiquités bouddhiques de Bāmiyan, MDAFA*, II, Paris, 1928 and J. Hackin, R. J. Carl, Nouvelles recherches archéologiques à Bāmiyan, MDAFA, III, Paris, 1933.

Kushan period.[15] These Corinthian capitals have nothing to do with the truly organic composition of the Classical original. The acanthus leaves, calyx cups, and helical spirals are attached in a completely superficial fashion to a core that is esentially the bracket capital of the early Indian tradition. Sometimes in imitation of the Roman Composite order figures of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas are enframed in the acanthus foliage.

Generally speaking, the Gandhāra stupa is a magnification of the earlier type of relic mound represented by the monuments of Sānchī and Bhārhut. The typical Gandhāra stupa consists of one or more square basement storeys surmounted by a high drum supporting the usual hemispherical cupola. Judging by the small models of Gandhāra stupas, the emphasis was on the superstructure with an elaborate *harmikā* upholding a mast with multiple umbrellas. Although some Gandhāra stupas, such as the Kunāla stupa at Taxila, were mentioned as Mauryan foundations by the Chinese pilgrims, it is reasonably certain that the vast majority of these monuments, as well as the monastic establishments with which they were associated, were dedicated during the extraordinary period of patronage accorded to Buddhism under the Great Kushan Dynasty. From ancient Bactria to Taxila, in the remote valleys around Jelālābād and the wild glens of Swat and Buner, there can still be seen the ruinous piles of literally scores of Buddhist relic mounds, many of which can be identified with the famous sites mentioned by Sung Yun and Hsüan Tsang.

The main mass of the Gandhāra stūpa was generally a conglomerate of rubble and earth, over which was placed a facing of roughly shaped stones with many small courses of stones or snecks filling the interstices between these boulders. The relics were embedded in the mass of the building, sometimes in the deepest foundations and sometimes in a chamber on a level with the drum. The Gandhāra stupa differs from its early Indian precedents in that the decoration has been transferred from the railing and *toranas* to the body of the monument itself. The base and drum of the Gandhāra stūpa were completely encased in a sculptural revetment carried out in stucco or lime plaster. The decoration consisted of panels of scenes from the life of Buddha, separated by pilasters of a Classical type, or in some of the later stupas figures of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas framed in the niches of a continuous arcade surrounding the body of the monument.

It is not entirely certain whether these multiple statues are to be taken as an indication of the Mahāyāna character of these monuments. The question is whether they represent the universal Buddhas of all the quarters or if this duplication of Buddha images may simply indicate many separate donations or the conception, quite possible for Theravāda Buddhism, of the same Buddha seen everywhere at once. It is possible, of course, that like the chapels dedicated to Christ and the saints in the apse of the mediaeval cathedral we have personifications of different aspects of the same Buddha in the successive niches surrounding the relic mound. It is of course on the basis of such prototypes that there developed the later decoration of Mahāyāna stupas, like those of Nālandā or the great monument at Barabudur, in which the Buddhas of all the directions in their niches on different sides of the monument replace the Hinayāna figuration of multiplied statues of Śākyamuni.

In the arcades of the Gandhāra stupas the supports of the arches are engaged Ionic or Corinthian pilasters. The arches themselves are of the pointed ogee leaf-shape type that had been developed in the *chaitya* window of earlier Indian periods. A further Classical feature of some of the larger stupas is the base, supported by atlantids or couchant lions. (Pl. XXII)

Famous in the annals of Gandhāra is the stūpa raised by King Kaṇishka at Peshawar. The accounts of its vast dimensions and the miraculous portents during its construction vary in the accounts of the Chinese pilgrims, Sung Yün and Hsüan Tsang, who saw it in the sixth and seventh centuries. According to the former, it was 700 feet high and surmounted by an iron mast upholding thirteen golden circlets.[16] One gathers from Sung Yün's account that the upper portions of the monument were constructed largely of wood. From Hsüan Tsang's description we learn that the building was at least 750 feet high, crowned by a mast with twenty-five copper umbrellas.[17] The foundations of this great tower were excavated at the site of Shāh-ji-ki-ḍhērī from 1908 to 1910. The plan was that of a great square 180 feet on a side with projections on each side, giving the plan a cruciform shape. The total diameter, including these projections, was 286 feet. There were presumably stairways in the four projecting wings leading to the upper levels of the base. The facade of the surviving basement storey was covered with stucco Buddha images in relief, separated by Corinthian pilasters. There are many reflections of this great stupa, as in the Rawak vihāra at Khotan and the Ahimposh stupa near Jelālābād. It has also been suggested that the enormous mound at the Top-e-Rustam at Balkh was a copy of the famous building at Peshawar. This structure

15. Marshall, *Taxila*, Pl.44
16. Beal, *op. cit.* I, p. civ.
17. *Ibid.* p. 103

had the same cruciform plan and consisted of three square basement storeys surmounted by a high drum. The square base was approximately 160 feet on each side and the total height has been estimated as about 200 feet over all. It seems likely that in their original state the Kanishka stupa and the Top-e-Rustam were enormously magnified enlargements of such miniature stupas as the example from Loriyan-Tangai in the Indian Museum at Calcutta; and possibly the stucco model at Mohara Moradhu, Taxila[18] may reflect the appearance of this famous shrine. Notable in each case is the greater attenuation of the stupa and the emphasis on the superstructure, notably the mast of umbrellas, a factor certainly affecting the development of the pagoda in the Far East.

The Buddhist vihāra in Gandhāra represents an elaboration of the arrangement of monastic complexes in earlier periods. The basis of the plan of such a monastery as Takht-i-Bahi was a series of connected open courtyards surrounded either by cells for the accommodation of the brotherhood or by niches to house the cult statues and reliefs. Some of the courts were filled with votive stupas of various sizes; large enclosed chambers served as refectories or assembly-halls. The monastic buildings at Taxila and elsewhere in Gandhāra were constructed of the so-called diapermasonry typical of the region, in which large stones were surrounded by courses of smaller stones. Some elements of the construction, like the heavy overhanging cornices of the niches, were imitations of prototypes in thatch. Like the exterior of the Gandhāra stūpa, the entire surface of the stone fabric must have been covered originally with a heavy layer of lime plaster richly polychromed and gilded. (Pl. XXI)

There is nothing Classical about the plan of any building discovered in Gandhāra. The only possible exception is the shrine at Surkh Kotal in Afghanistan, a monument dedicated to Mazdaean fire worship and arranged according to the plan of similar sanctuaries in Iran of Parthian or Sasanian time.[19] It is the one monument testifying to the diversity of beliefs followed under the Kushans.

There are further interesting reflections of Western elements in the rock-cut architecture of the cave temples at Bāmiyān. One of the chapels behind the 175-feet Buddha has a coffered dome that might have been inspired by the vaults of the Temple of Bacchus at Baalbek. In a number of the assmebly-halls we find an imitation of the familiar squinch of Sasanian domical architecture.[20]

Although it has been necessary to stress its Classical, rather than its Indian aspects in order to indicate the origin of both form and technique, Gandhāra art is not important primarily as an illustration of a Roman conquest of the East. Actually, the forms of Roman art were themselves conquered in their absorption into the mainstream of the Indian and, ultimately, Asiatic traditions of Buddhist art. Gandhāra is important not so much for any aesthetic reasons, but for its positive contributions of the anthropomorphic conception of the Buddha and, through an adaptation of the Roman narrative method of relief, the establishment of a fixed iconography for the Buddha legend. When both of these contributions came to be translated into more appropriately abstract and spiritualized terms, they provided models for the Buddhist art of all of Asia.

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18. Marshall, *Taxila*, Pl. 98(b).
19. D. Schlumberger, "Le temple de Surkh Kotal en Bactriane," *Journal Asiatique*, 1952, pp. 433 ff.
20. Hackin, *L'ocuvre de la délégation archéologique franzaise en Afghanistan (1922-32)*, Fig. 49 and Hackin & Godard, Pl. XXX. XXXI.

GAṆEŚA, also known as Gaṇapathi, is the elephant-faced Hindu god who was incorported into Buddhist Pantheon. In the *Sādhanamālā*, two Buddhist goddesses, Parṇaśabarī (pp. 306-7) and Aparājitā (p.403), are represented as trampling him under their feet. In one *Sādhana* Gaṇeśa is represented as an independent principal god (pp. 592-3).

The Buddhists were averse to certain practices of the brahmanic faith. Thus Gaṇeśa who was regarded by the Hindus as the remover of all obstacles *(vighna)* and the bestower of perfection *(siddhidātā)* and success in tantric rites was considered by the Buddhists to be the most dangerous obstacle to be removed *(Sadh.* 306-7; 403). As to the activities of Gaṇeśa there runs a Nepalese legend that at a certain time an Oḍiyāna Buddhist paṇḍit was performing a tantric rite on the bank of the Baghvati river near Kathmandu in order to obtain perfection. Gaṇeśa, being opposed to the idea, began placing dangerous obstacles in the way of the due performance of the rite. The paṇḍit, finding himself helpless, invoked the god Vighnāntaka, the destroyer of all obstacles, who appeared in a fierce and terrific form armed with destructive weapons and giving chase to Gaṇeśa who was by this time flying in terror (B. Bhattacharya, *The Indian Buddhist Iconography)*, p. 180).

All this points to Gaṇeśa's opposition to Buddhism and also his inferiority compared to the Buddhist gods. But when he was incorporated into the Buddhist pantheon in the Vajrayāna, he was given the status of a principal god with an independent form on a par with other Buddhist gods. Thus in the *Sādhanamālā* as well as in the *Niṣpannayogāvali* he appears as a principal god.

According to the *Gaṇapati-sādhana* of the *Sādhanamālā* (pp. 592-3) he is a god of red complexion wearing the crown *(jaṭāmakuṭa)*, decked with many ornaments, and having a protruding belly, one face, three eyes, one tusk and twelve arms. He carries in his right hands the axe *(kuṭhāra)*, the arrow *(śara)*, the goad *(aṅkuśa)*, the thunderbolt *(vajra)*, the sword *(khaḍga)* and the spear *(śūla)*; and in his left hands, the pestle *(mūsala)*, the bow *(cāpa)*, the club *(khaṭvāṅga)*, a skull full of blood *(asṛkkapāla)*, another skull of dried meat *(śuṣkamāṁsa-kapālaphatka)*. He sits in the *ardhaparyaṅka* posture in a dancing attitude and rides the mouse on a red lotus.

In the *Niṣpannayogāvali* he is described differently. According to *Dharmadhātu-vāgiśvara-maṇḍala* (p.62), he is white in colour and has an elephant-face. A snake forms his sacred thread. He rides the mouse as usual, but has only four arms; in his two right hands he carries the trident *(triśūla)* and sweet-meats *(ladduka)*, and in his two left hands the hatchet *(paraśu)* and a radish *(mūlaka)*; but accordinng to the *Bhūtadhārā-maṇḍala* of the same work (p. 72) he carries the hatchet and radish in his two right hands and the trident and a skull in his two left hands.

In Japan Gaṇeśa is known as Shoten-sama or Kangi-ten to whom several temples are dedicated, notably the one at Ikoma between Nara and Osaka. His images generally consist of two human figures with elephant heads, wearing long robes and standing face to face with their trunks on each other's shoulders. They are kept in a brass case and offerings of food including alcohol are spread out before them (Sir Charles Eliot, *Japanese Buddhism*, p. 138). He belongs to the pantheon of the Shingon Sect (ibid. p. 355).

He seems to be unknown in China at the present day, except in Lamaist temples, but the Chinese *Tripiṭaka* contains several *sūtras* which describe the ritual of his worship. As the translations of these *sūtras* are ascribed to Bodhiruci, Amoghavajra and others of about the same period, this deity must have been familiar to the Chinese of the eighth century. But it is said that in 1017 A.C., the Emperor Chen-Tsung issued an edict prohibiting the inclusion in the *Tripiṭaka* of the *sūtra* about him in four volumes and the translation of similar works so that probably his cult was suppressed after this time (ibid. 138-9).

In Sri Lanka Gaṇeśa is considered as the god of wisdom and of obstacles. Though he causes obstacles he also removes them. Thus he is invoked at the commencement of all undertakings and at the openning of all compositions. Thus we read the invocatory formulas, *namaḥ Śrī Gaṇāya*, or *namo Gaṇeśāya vighneśvarāya*. These aspects of Gaṇeśa crept into popular worship even among the Buddhists. In Sri Lanka the bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara is often referred to as Nātha. One form of Nātha is Gana Nātha, i.e. Gaṇeśa, the son of Gauri and Śiva. This is an instance where Hinduism has influenced the Buddhist beliefs and practices. (Nandasena Mudiyanse, *Mahayana Monuments in Ceylon*, M.D. Gunasena & Co., Ltd., 1967, pp. 20-22). This trend culminated with the worship of Gaṇeśa as Gaṇadeviyo – the god of Wisdom and learning. The *Gaṇadevihälla*, a ballard written in Sinhala describing the birth of Gaṇeśvara was sometimes used as an alternative school text. A prayer to Gaṇadevi for wisdom is also contained in the *Vadan-kavipota* – a Sinhala primier. Both texts are of unknown authorship and came to be used in the Kandyan period when popular Buddhism in Sri Lanka was greatly influenced by Hindu cults. Both texts were used as primary readers and therefore, greatly contributed to the popularising of Gaṇeśa among the Buddhists.

The Pali word *vināyaka* is an epithet applied to the Buddha (*M.* II, p. 94), and it connotes the Buddha's role as leader, guide or instructor (*PED.* s.v. *vināyaka*). The

Sanskrit word vināyaka (meaning taking away, removing remover of obstacles, a 'guru', spiritual precepter, a Buddha, Monier Williams, *Sanskrit-English Dictionary)* embraces a wider meaning than the Pali word.

This epithet has been used rarely as an appellation to the Buddha but more commonly applied to Gaṇeśa in the Dravidianised form of the word as Vināyagar. These aspects of Gaṇeśa as god of wisdom with the ability of removing obstacles and his sharing an appellation with the Buddha equipped him to gain acceptance in popular worship. It also paved the way for the Hindus in South India to convert a large number of Buddhist temples to places of Hindu worship by replacing the Buddha statue with that of Vināyagar. The worship of Gaṇeśa, became a convernient mode to drape some of the Buddhist shrines in Hindu garb. T[illegible]ess is acknowledged by Swami Vivekananda when h[illegible] "....the temple of Jagannata is an old Buddhist temple. We took this and others over and re-Hinduised them. We shall have to do many things like that yet." (*Complete works,* Vol. III, p. 264, as quoted by Joshi, *Aspects of Buddhism in Indian History,* The wheel Nos. 195/196, Buddhist Publication Society, Kandy, Sri Lanka, p. 38). (Pl. XXII)

M. Karaluvinna

GANGĀROHAṆA, name given to the festival that was held to conduct the Buddha from Rājagaha to Vesāli where the Buddha preached the *Ratana Sutta* in order to rid the city of the triple dangers of famine, evil spirts and disease. The story as found in the *Dhammapadatthakathā,* (III, pp. 436 ff. *Dhp.* 290) and the *Khuddakapāṭhatthakathā* (p. 160 ff.), is called *Gangārohana* or the "Ascent of the Ganges," because of the fact that in the course of this journey the Buddha had to cross the river Ganges *(Gangā).*

The story goes that, after a period of plenty and prosperity, there came a famine in Vesāli which was followed by starvation, disease and death. Several courses of action were adopted by the rulers but without success. Ultimately they dicided to invite the Buddha who was at this time residing at Veḷuvana in Rājagaha enjoying the hospitality of king Bimbisāra. The invitation was accepted by the Buddha. When Bimbisāra came to know that the invitation had been accepted he at once volunteered to prepare a special road from Rājagaha to the banks of the Ganges, the outer limit of the city, covering a distance of five leagues. Accordingly, the ground was made even and a rest-house was erected at an interval of one league each. When everything was ready the Buddha set out on his journey accompanied by five hundred monks. According to the description, each league of the journey was strewn knee-deep with flowers of five colours and decorated with flags, banners and standards all along. Two white parasols, a lower and a higher one, were held over the Buddha and a single parasol over each monk. The king, along with this retinue, honoured the Buddha with flowers and perfumes and lodged him for one night in each rest-house, bestowing rich offerings upon him and his attendant monks. In this manner he conducted the Buddha to the banks of the Ganges in five days. In order to ferry him across to the Vajjian territory he decorated a boat and requested the Vasālians also to prepare a special road for the visitors. Consequently, they, too, prepared the road from their city to the banks of the Ganges, a distance of three leagues, and came forward to conduct the Buddha with parasols and other offerings. In the meantime, the king fastened two boats together, erected a pavilion thereon, festooning it with flowers and prepared a seat made of many kinds of jewels. The Buddha sat therewith his monks seated around him in a circle and the voyage began. As the story goes, Bimbisāra descended knee-deep into the water and promised the Buddha that he would wait on the river bank until the Buddha's return, a duration of more than seven days. After sailing a distance of one league up the Ganges the Buddha and his retinue reached the boundaries of Vesāli. The Licchavi princes came to welcome the Buddha and as soon as he set foot on their territory a heavy shower is said to have fallen cleansing the whole city of Vesāli of the putrefying dead bodies and disease-causing germs. In three days the visitors were conducted to the city of Vesāli. In the evening, at the request of the Buddha, Ānanda learnt the *Ratna Sutta* from him and went round the city reciting it all night. With its recitation all the evil spirits are said to have fled the city. It is said that the Buddha himself recited the sutta for seven days thereafter in a specially prepared pavilion when the pestilence subsided. Having served his mission he left Vesāli and was conducted to the bank of the Ganges in three days by the Licchavi princes. The story continues with accountes of *nagas* and deities of the entire universe *(cakkavāla)* paying homage and making offerings to the Buddha. On the opposite bank of the river Bimbisāra was making arrangements to welcome the Buddha back. The account goes on to mention that as there was a large number of boats offered by many *nagas* and gods; the Buddha by his supernatural power created in each boat a figure of the Buddha attended by a retinue of 500 monks. The Buddha and his retinue were conducted to the *nāga* realm and regaled with food and drink.

Despite these supernatural events the story adds that in five days the Buddha was conducted back to Rājagaha. The author of the story does not want to stop here but continues after the fashion of the Jātaka tales, to a past

story in which the Buddha, as a bodhisattva, had performed a meritorious act on account of which he received these honours and offerings. It is this entire section of the *Dhammapada* commentary that is called the *Gangārohana vatthu*.

It is important to note that in the *Khuddakapātha atthakathā* (pp. 160 ff.) where the story is repeated, it is not specially designated as *Gangārohana-vatthu* but included in the *Ratanasutta-vannanā* as it forms the *nidānakathā* of the *Ratana Sutta*. The Sanskrit version of the story, with slight variations, is found in the *Mahāvastu* (I, p. 253 ff.) but here, too, the story is not called *Gangārohana*. Here it is designated as *Chatravastu* probably because many parasols *(chatra)* are said to have been used in the celebration.

A. G. S. Kariyawasam

GANGĀROHANA-VARNANĀVA, is a Sinhala work written in 1806 by Don Thomas Samarasekera Dissanayake, describing a religious festival held on the river Nilvalā in the Matara District of Sri Lanka, probably in imitation of the Gangārohana (q.v.) festival held in Vesāli. A rich person of the area, by the name David de Saram, wanted to hold a religious festival on the river Nilvala and accordingly he chose that portion of the river from a village called Godapitiya to the city of Matara for the purpose. Pavilions and arches were erected on the river itself and within each of those pavilions, which were tastefully decorated, two seats were prepared to house a relic of the Buddha and Buddhist monks remaining around in boats were made to recite *pirit*. These were the main features of the festival and it was to witness these that people came in large crowds. Festivals at night with fireworks seem to have been an added attraction. Celebrations went on for ten days.

The book is written in the Sinhala verse form known as *silo*, one hundred of which complete the book. The work, belonging to decadent period in Sinhala literature, is not of much poetic value, and both in contents and style it is a mediocre work. This work has become significant in the history of Sinhala literture because a single line of it was responsible for a major literary controversy in later times. The book is edited by Munidasa Kumaranatunga and published by the Epa Press, Colombo, Ceylon, 1933.

A. G. S. Kariyawasam

GANTHA (Skt. Grantha): a form derived from the root *grath*, 'to tie' is used in early Buddhist literature as a general term suggestive of the concept of bondage (*Sn. vv.* 347, 798, 847, 857, 912; *Dhp. v.* 211 etc.). In the later literature the term has acquired greater significance and is used as a technical term synonymously with *kilesa, kleśa* meaning defilements (*Vism.* p. 683, *Abhsy.* p.44). It connotes that aspect of the passions which drags sentient beings towards the cycle of continued existence *(vatta, samsāra)* and keeps them tied to it (*Nd.* I, p. 98; *Vbh.* p. 374; *DA.* III, p. 1024; *DhsA.* p. 377). Thus, it has rightly been identified with the origin of suffering *(samudayasaccam ganthe : Vbh.* p. 117).

There are four such ties enumerated in the texts, namely, the organic tie of covetousness *(abhijjhā-kāya-gantha)*, organic tie of ill-will *(vyāpāda-kāya-gantha)*, of clinging to the view that purity is attained by rites and rituals *(sīlabbataparāmāsa-kāya-gantha)* and dogmatism *(idam-saccābhinivesa-kāya gantha : D.* III, p. 30; *S.* V, pp. 59-60; *Nd.* I, p. 98; *Dhs.* p. 201f. *Vbh.* p. 374; *Netti.*: p. 114 ff.; *Vism.* p. 583).

The *Vibhanga* in its treatment of *gantha* gives to list of synonyms with reference to the first two ties. *Abhijjhā* is the same as *rāga* or *lobha;* and *vyāpāda* is the ill-will towards enemies. *Sīlabbataparāmāsa* is the clinging to the false belief in the view that purity is attained through mere rites and rituals. *Idam-saccābhinivesa* is dogmatism; i.e., to take one's own views alone to be correct and all other views to be false. Views in this case pertain to purely speculative theories; all the ten views included in the "unanswered" *(avyākata*, q.v.), such as the world is eternal or that the world is not eternal, are given. All shades of wrong views, except *sīlabbataparāmāsa*, come under this *(Vbh.* pp. 374-75).

The *Niddesa* confines its explanation of even the first two ties to speculative views and says that *abhijjhā-kāyagantha* is the attachment *(rāga)* to one's own views whereas hatred *(āghāta)* towards others' views is *vyāpādakāyagantha (Nd.* I, p. 98).

The *Abhidharmasamuccaya* gives the same four ties in more or less similar terminology, but explains them in a different way. *Granthas* are so called, it says, because they overwhelm the organism which is, by nature calm, resulting in its being agitated and distracted; lust for wealth, wrong behaviour in debates, agony to be undergone in performing difficult rites and rituals as well as unwise contemplation on matters to be realised–all this promotes agitation of mind and hinders its tranquility *(Abhsy.* p. 48).

It may be noticed that the concept of tying, so clearly brought out in the Pali texts, is lacking in the *Abhidharma-samuccaya* explanation, which instead brings out the idea of the agitation of the mind *(citta-viksepa)*. According to Pali tradition, as already seen, these four are called *kāyagantha* because they keep mental and physical organism *(nāmakāya* and *rūpakāya)* res-

pectively tied together to continued existence by way of decease and rebirth *(Vbh.* p. 374; *Vism.* p. 683 f. *DA.* III, p. 1024).

These four are some of the passions, considered as ties in view of the special function they perform; they, in fact, represent the three basic passions, namely, lust *(lobha* or *rāga),* hate *(dosa)* and delusion *(moha)* : *abhijjhā* represents *lobha* or *rāga* : *vyāpāda* represents *dosa* and *sīlabbataparāmāsa* and *idamsaccābhinivesa* represent *moha.* Thus it is the three basic passions that act in their capacity as ties. The ways of arising and the method of breaking these ties are, therefore, the same as those of passions.

The *Suttanipāta* (*v.* 847), to cite a few references, for instance, traces the origin of ties in sense-impressions *(saññā)* whereas the *Dhammapada (v.* 211) attributes their origin to likes and dislikes *(piyāppiya). Saññā* is the impression one derives from a sense-object; *piyāppiya* is an elaboration of *saññā.* A saññā is *piya* when the object cognised is pleasant and attractive; it is *appiya* when the object is unpleasant and repulsive. The former gives rise to *abhijjhā* whereas the latter to *vyāpāda.* Abstaining from developing likes *(piya)* and dislikes *(appiya)* towards the sense-objects cognised is, therefore, the means by which *gantha* is broken. This abstinence is made possible by following the noble eightfold path *(ariya aṭṭhaṅgika magga: S.* V, pp. 59-60), or by cultivating the four application of mindfulness *(satipaṭṭhāna: Netti.* p. 31). The net result is the attainment of intuitive knowledge which is brought to its perfection in four stages: The last two ties are broken in its first stage, i.e., the first knowledge of the path *(paṭhama magga-ñāna); vyāpāda* in the third stage; i.e., the third knowledge of the path *(tatiya-magga ñāṇa)* and *abhijjhā* in the fourth stage, i.e., the fourth knowledge of the path *(catuttha magga ñāṇa : Vism.* p. 685).

Those who have broken these ties completely are called the sages (*muni : Sn. v.* 912), the foremost among them is the Buddha *(Netti :* p. 54). See KILESA.

Upali Karunaratne

GANTHADHURA, the assignment of the study of texts as opposed to the assignment of development of insight *(vipassanā-dhura),* is one of two alternative religious assignments undertaken by bhikkhus. Such a strict division was not present at the inception of the Order of monks. The main purpose of monkhood was to lead the noble religious life *(brahmacariya)* with the aim of attaining freedom from Saṃsāric bondage. In leading this noble religious life a bhikkhu had not only to learn the teaching of the Master but also to follow it. Subsequently, when the preservation of the Dhamma in its pristine purity in the oral tradition became a necessity, particular groups of monks were specially assigned this task. Such formal assignments were done at the First Council itself. With the increase of scholarly activities of monks the study of texts along with commentaries, and their preservation in the oral tradition became still important. References to different types of *bhāṇakas* (reciters) such as *dīghabhāṇaka, Majjhiabhāṇaka* etc. are also indictive of the existance of bhikkhus whose main vocation appears to have been the study of texts. In spite of this emphasis on the study of texts the vocation of the bhikkhus was not divided with two separate courses.

The division is a subsequent development and, as the history of Buddhism in Sri Lanka shows, it came into being as a result of certain events that took place in Sri Lanka in the 1st century B.C. When natural calamities and political upheavels that took place in the 1st century B.C. threatened to wipe out the oral tradition of texts, the bhikkhus assembled at the monastery called Mandlārāma at Kallagāma and by a majority deicision accepted that study *(pariyatti)* is more important than practice *(paṭipatti)* for the preservation of the Dhamma. Since then the study of texts *(gantha-dhura)* came to be considered as a separate assignment and subsequently became more popular than *vipassanā-dhura* which was cinsidered as more suitable for the old and the weak. (See furthe DHURA).

S. K. Nanayakkara

GANTHĀKARA-PARIVEṆA. A vihāra or dwelling place of bhikkhus attached to the Mahāvihāra in ancient Anuradhapura. The vihāra was so named, probably because it housed a good library *(gantha =books, ākara* = respository). The *Cūlavaṃsa (Cv.* xxxvii, *v.* 243) records that Buddhaghosa, the great commentator, translated from Sinhala to Pali the commentaries while living in this vihāra, and hence it can be surmised that this vihāra had a well-equipped library with canonical texts in Pali and their commentaries in Sinhala *(Sīhalaṭṭhakathā).* It is also recorded in the *Cūlavaṃsa (Cv.* Iii, *v.* 57) that Kassapa V restored and renovated this vihāra.

W. G. Weeraratne

GANṬHIPADA (Sinh. *gäṭapada*) lit. "term of obscure meaning", is the designation of a class of literature of an exegetical nature composed both in the Sinhala and Pali languages, commencing at a period immediately following the classical commentarial epoch. Although in modern terminology *gaṇṭhipada* is a "glossarial work" it was

essentially intended "to facilitate the understanding of difficult words, phrases and disputable points in the commentaries" (Dhammadhara Thera ed. Vimativinodanī, Colombo, 1935 quoted H. Saddhatissa Thera ed. *Upāsakajanālankāra*, London, 1965 p. 59 f.). It is generally believed that the *Ganthipada* period extends from the 6th century A.C. onwards (ibid). The available exegetical works on the Tipitaka prior to the compilation of the Pali commentaries were the traditional *Sihala-atthakathā* dating back to the 3rd century B.C. Their growth with accretions and emendations was arrested with the writing down of the Canon and commentaries in the 1st century B.C. during the reign of Vattagāmani Abhaya. Further, as a result of rendering in Pali the *Sāhala-atthakathā* by Buddhaghosa and his successors in the 5th-6th centuries A.C. the commentarial tradition in the Sinhala language suffered a setback (V.W. Abhayagunawardhane, ed. *Parivāraganthipada*. Maradana, 1990, pp. xxix ff). While the widening gap between Pali and Sinhalese at the latter's Apabhramśa and Neo-Indo-Aryan stage necessitated facile explanations of Pali works in the fast changing Sinhala idiom (cf. D.E. Hettiarachchi ed. *Vesaturudā-sanne*, Colombo 1950, p. 30ff.). As a knowledge of Pali became a prime necessity to follow the traditional exegesis of the Pali texts a great need was felt to interpret the Buddhist teachings in the idiom of day to day use. To satisfy this need a class of literature represented by *ganthipada(Sinh. gätapada), sanya* (Sinh. *sanne*), "auxiliary works" (Sinh. *pitapot)* and "annotations" (P. Sinh. *parikathā)* came into existence. These exegetical works were written not only on Pali commentaries to serve as further elucidation of matters raised in them but also on canonical works as may be illustrated by *Parivāraganthipada*. Abhayagunawardhane (ibid) makes reference to a passage in the *Viśuddhimārgasannaya* of King Parākramabāhu II of Dambadeniya which states: "if a word's denotation is obscure it is a *ganthipada*, if its connotation is obscure it is an *arthapada.* "The Sinhalese exegetical works which at the outset were designated as *ganthipada* and *arthapada*, and beyond the etymological meaning of these two terms, acquired a new semantic significance to include in their category *gätapada, sanne, pitapot* and *parikathā*. The most ancient extant work belonging to this class of literature is King Kāśyapa V's *Dhampiyā-atuva-gätapadaya* (10th century) written on the Pali *Dhammapada-attakathā*. It is observed (Horana Vajiranana Thera, ed. *Kudusikhasannaya* unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Ceylon, 1968) that both *Ganthipada* and *Sanya* literature had their origin about the same time and that the same work was often designated both as a *ganthipada* and *sanya* (quoting D.E. Hettiarachchi ibid p. 54). These names are generally interchanged as seen in the colophon to the *Dhampiyā-atuvā-gätapadaya*. Besides the above, the most important among extant works are: *Jātaka-atuvā-gätapadaya, Bodhivamsa-gätapadaya* (both 12th century A.C.) and *Parivāragantipada* (15th century A.C.).

Sāriputta Thera (12th century A.C.) in his *Vinaya-tīkā* entitled *Sāratthadipani* (ed. Devarakkhita Thera, Vol. I, p.7) refers to three *ganthipada:* Mahā, Majjhima and Cūla which he specifically states were written in Sinhalese while he uses the name *Ganthipada* (absolutely) to refer to the work in Pali. The inaccessibility of the Sinhala *ganthipada* to monks overseas is adduced as the reason for compiling the *Sāratthadipani-tīkā* in Pali (p.2). Coliya Kassapa Thera, author of *Vimativinodani* the subsequent Vinaya-*tīkā* also refers to and quotes from the *ganthipadas*. There are numerous references to *ganthipada* sources in the oldest Vinaya-*tīkā* the *Vajrabuddhi* too (11th century). However, the *Cūlaganthipada* referred to in the history of the *sāsana* in Myanmar in the 17th and 18th centuries is a comparatively recent work in Pali belonging to the post-*tīkā* period (vide Saddhatissa Thera, ibid pp. 55 ff.).

In tracing the evolution of the *tīkā* literature the time lag between the end of the commentarial epoch (6th century A.C.) and the Polonnaru period (12th century A.C.) is described as the period of the growth and fermentation of ideas (Lily de Silva, ed. *Dighanikāya-atthakathā-tīkā*, London, 1970, p. xxxi). The growth and expansion of the *Sihala-atthakathā* was arrested in the 1st century B.C. after the writting down of the Canon and commentaries. Then came the translation of this commentarial tradition into Pali in the 5th and 6th centuries A.C. Next came the annotations in the form of the *ganthipada* and allied literature which was finally crystallized in the *tīkā* literature of the Polonnaru period. "We learn of these *ganthipadas* through the *tīkāa* much in the same manner as we learn of the *Sāhala-atthakathā* through Pali commentaries" (ib. p.xxxii). There has been an independent espansion of *ganthipada* literature prior to the Polonnaru period and apparently its use and influence diminished with the growth of the *tīkā* literature though there is clear evidence of ganthipada literature being known even as late as the Kotte period (15th century. See D.E. Hettiarachchi ibid. p.72). Apart from the various Vinaya *ganthipada* that *Sāratthadipani* mentions it also refers to several other works of this nature on *Visuddhisagga, Abhidhamma* and *Patisambhidāmagga*. Despite the *ganthipada* being superseded by the *tīkās* they survived to the present day though the number that has gone into oblivion is considerable.

A significant feature of the *tīkās* on the four major Nikāya texts of the *Suttapitaka* attributed to *ācariya* Dhammapāla, 6th century A.C. is their relative silence on

the *ganthipada*. Considering that Dhammapāla flourished in the commentarial epoch it can be surmised that the need for compiling *ganthipada* on the *atthakathā* to these Nikāyas had not arisen as the "obscure points" had already been adequately treated in the *tīkās*. This is also confirmed by Sāriputta's *tīkā* on the *Anguttara-atthakathā* (13th century A.C.). Lily de Silva (ibid. p. xxxvii) observes : "If *ganthipadas* to *Anguttara Nikāya* were is existence specific mention of them would certainly have been made" and adds that on the other hand the same author's *Sāratthadīpanī* on the Vinaya makes copious references to the *ganthipada*. It is generally believed (vide Saddhatissa Thera ibid 52ff.) that the *ganthipada* literature bridges the commentarial and Polonnaruva periods and that the *Līnatthappakāsanī* (the *tīkās* on the commentaries to the four major Nikāyas) and *Visuddhimagga-tīkā* were compiled at a time before the *ganthipada* were written (vide L. de Silva ibid.). On the other hand, the post canonical floating exegetical tradition on the Vinaya was preserved in four *ganthipadas* and finally evaluated in the three Vinaya *tīkās*, *Vajirabuddhi*, *Sāratthadīpanī* and *Vimativinodanī* (11th-12th centuries A.C.).

N. A. Jayawickrama

GARBHADHĀTU. See VAJRADHĀTU

GARUDA (var: GARULA) a class of mythical birds, mentioned in both Pali and Sanskrit Buddhist literature, usually together with *nāgas* (q.v.)

Reference to them occur as early as the Nikāyas. The *Dīgha-nikāya* (I, p. 149) speaks of them in passing, in connection with the concept of the *mahāpurisa* elaborated in the *Lakkhana Sutta* (loc. cit.) which states that the *mahāpurisa*, if he fares forth as an ascetic, will receive the homage of the *asuras, sakkas, rakkhasas, nāgas, gandhabbas* and *garudas*. Although not mentioning them by name, the *Samyutta-nikaya* (I, p. 224) gives, vaguely, a story (which is elaborated later, in the *Kulāvaka Jātaka)* according to which Sakka, fleeing from the celebrated *sura-asura* war tells Mātali, his charioteer, that he would rather face death at the hands of his enemies, the *asuras*, than 'nestless make these birds.' This passage refers to 'these birds' as nesting in the forest of the silk-cotton trees *(simbalivana)* which in other contexts (see belong) are identified with the abode of the *garudas*. It is their nests that were in danger of being crushed by the chariot-pole of Sakka's vehicle speeding through the *Simbali* forest. This is confirmed in the elaborate verson of this story in the above mentioned *Jātaka (J.* I, p. 202).

It is in the *Jātakas* that the *garudas* are mostly referred to. Here the picture that is drawn of them is that they are birds of giant size, or at least that they are able to assume such size at will. A *garuda* in the ***Kotisimbali Jātaka (J.*** III, p. 397) assumes a size of 150 leagues. There is also no doubt that they were conceived of as being of great strength. The same *jataka* (loc. cit.) refers to this *garuda*, dividing the great ocean by the flapping of his wings, the wind raised being known as a *garuda-wind*. He lifts in the air a snake thousand fathoms long, along with the banyan tree round which the snake wraps itself. The *garuda* does not even know that he had uprooted the banyan. In the *Bhūridatta Jātaka (J.* VI, p. 177) too, a *garuda* is figured as carrying off a banyan tree with its roots. In the *Sussondi Jātaka (J.* III, p. 187 f.) a *garuda-king* stirs up in the city a storm so great that its people, fearing their houses would fall, take flight. In this *jātaka*, he carries the queen Sussondi on his back, and in the *Kākāti Jātaka (J.* III, p. 91), where the *garuda* is referred to as a royal bird, a man Natakuvera, hides in its thick plumage and is carried across the sea. It is probable because of their great strength that Sakka sets the *garudas*, along with *nāgas, yakkhas kumbhandas* and the four regents, as guards over Tāvatimsa against invasion by the *asuras (J.* I, p. 204).

The other characteristic of the *garudas*, mentioned in the jātakas, is their possession of magical or supernatural power and spells. In the *Sussondi Jātaka* (loc. cit.), the *garuda* plunges the whole city in darkness in order to carry off the queen. The king, in the *Amba Jātaka (J.* IV, p. 202) asks his gardener, whether the mangoes out of season are given to him by a *nāga* or *garuda*. The Alambāyana-spell of priceless value, by which *nāgas* are magically tamed, was also given by a *garuda*, in the *Bhūridatta Jātaka (J.* IV, p. 177 ff.), and by its use much was achieved. Two instances are found in what seem different versons of the same story, of *garudas* assuming human form and playing dice with kings.

The most emphasised fact in the jātakas is the eternal enmity between the *nāgas* and the *garudas*. Although in the Nikāyas they are merely mentioned together, in the later writings, the *nāgas* are always referred to as living in fear of the *garudas*. This is best brought out in the *Uraga Jātaka (J.* II, 13 f.), where the *nāga* discovers a *garuda* standing by his side at a festival and is frightened to death. The *garuda* gives relentless chase. In typical Buddhist fashion the Jātaka writer uses this accepted mythical belief in the enmity of these two classes of beings to demonstrate the efficacy of the Buddha's teaching of loving-kindness in bringing sworn foes together in perfect harmony.

The enmity of the *nāgas* and *garudas* is explained by the fact the former was the food of the latter. Lurid descriptions are given of a how a *garuda* devours a *nāga*.

The *garuda* who eats only flesh and not fruits, unlike other birds (*J.* III, p. 397; VI, p.177), strikes the snake with its beak and splitting open its belly, gobbles the fat. In the *Sussondi Jātaka*, the *garudas* are described as living in the *nāga* island of Seruma, evidently in close proximity to their staple food.

But, inspite of this explanation, it appears that the myth of the enmity of the *garudas* and the *nāgas* could be traced to the same source as the story of the *Mahābhārata* (I. p. 16 ff.), where the enormous bird, *garuda*, born of the second egg of Vinatā, becomes the perennial enemy of, and goes on devouring the *nāgas*, the sons of Kadri. In fact, it is clear that at least one jātaka carries echoes of the connection. The *Vidhura-pandita Jātaka (J.* VI, p. 178) refers to the *garuda* as the son of Vinatā.

Associated with the enmity of the *nāgas* and *garudas* is also the legend of the *garudas* learning the secret of capturing *nāgas*. This legend is given in the *Pandāra Jātaka (J.* V, p. 77), according to which in the early days, *garudas*, trying to capture snakes, used to perish by the thousands. The snakes swallowed stones, and a *garuda* lifting them by their heads, could not bear the weight, were exhausted and fell down dead. It was the treachery of Karambiya, the fake-ascetic, which enabled the *garudas* to learn that the secret lay in lifting the snakes by their tails. Thereafter, the *garudas* did so, whereupon the stones fell from the mouth of the snakes, which then were light enough to be carried. The *Bhūridatta Jātaka* (loc. cit.), too, alludes to this legend.

The two jātakas, referred to above as giving different versions of the same story (*J.* III, p. 91 f., p. 187f.), depict the *garudas* as passionate lovers who are finally disillusioned by the fickleness of women. In one (*J.* III, p.187), the *garuda* was the bodhisatta himself, Sāriputta, too, in a different context (*J.* III, p.400) is said to have been born once as a *garuda*.

Although the Seruma island is given as the abode of the *garudas* in the *Sussondi Jātaka*, they are usually spoken of as living in the Simbalivana. *Garudas*, having captured snakes, go to roost on Simbali trees (e.g., *J.* VI, p.177). The Simbali tree has been identified with the *Bombax Heptaphyllum. (PED.* s.v.).

That *garudas* were identified with supannas is suggested by the *Vidhurapandita Jātaka* (loc. cit.) which establishes a *Samyutta nikāya* (I, 146) reference to 'sculptured freizes of fair-winged birds' as a reference to *garuda* figures.

The *Dhammapada* commentary *(DhpA.* III, p. 135) gives an amusing tale which illustrates that the ancient prototype of the aeroplane was conceived in the shape of a *garuda*. A builder escapes from the terror of prince Bodhi by making himself a wooden flying-machine in the shape of the mythical bird. The *garuda* in Buddhist sculpture is depicted as a winged man.

Jacobi (*ERE.* II, p. 805) remarks that *garuda* is also identified with Tarkeya, originally a distinct mythical being, figured either as a bird or horse, and apparently representing the sun. He concluded that the *garuda* therefore, seems to be a combination of different divine forms of the sun, represented as a winged being. W. Crooke (*ERE.* XI, p. 415) points out that the *garuda* has been compared with the the Simurgh of the Persian and the Roc of the Arab tradition, the latter of which attacks snakes.

Bandula Jayawardhana

GĀTHĀ, stanza, (derived from Vedic, *gai*, *gāyate*, 'to sing, to recite') refers to any form of verse as illustrated by oft-recurring phrases such as *gāthāya ajjhabhāsi (Vin.* I. p.7 etc. s.v. *ajjhabhāsi* in *PTC* for refs.) and those with other case forms (*s. v.* gāthā in *PTC*). Individual verses as well as metrical literature of any form are connoted by the term *gāthā* though in the case of metrical literature it generally refers to narrative verse best represented by verses in popular meters such as *anuṣṭubh śloka* and *triṣṭubh* quatrins (cf. *catuppadāya.....gāthāya attham*, the meaning of a four line stanza, *A.* II, p. 178). *Gāthā* generally is meant to be recited or sung (cf. *gāthā sugitā parisāya majjhe*, 'the stanzas were well recited in the midst of the assembly') - *J.* IV, p. 395. In the commentarial gloss on *gāthāya ajjhabhāsi*, 'addressed with a stanza' *gāthāya* is explained as: *akkharapada-niyamita-ganthitena vacanena*, 'in a statement composed in fixed syllables and metrical lines' at *KhpA.* p. 117. As regards the all important aspect of 'reciting' or 'singing', *gāthā* has a significant role to play in performances involving *nacca-gita-vādita*, 'dance, song and instrumental music.'

Apart from the general meaning of *gāthā* as a verse, the entire metrical literature in Pali can be designated by this term. Though stanzas that are found interspersed with prose in the major works of the Tipitka, in particular the four *āgama* collections, are designated by a cognate term *geyya*, 'what should be sung (f.p.p. of *gai*) they, as well as those works in the *Khuddaka-nikāya* that are for the most part in verse are to be designated as *gāthā*. In the descriptive classification of the teachings into nine classes which subsequently came to be known as the *navanga-satthu-sāsana* (enumerated at *M.* i. p.133 etc.) one constituent is named *geyya* which is defined as: all *suttas* containing stanzas (*VinA.* p. 28 etc.), and the Sagāthavagga of the *Samyutta-nikāya* is cited as an example. In contrast to the prose which is enunciated or read, verse had to be recited or sung. Another constituent of the ninefold division is named *gāthā* but it is not defined. The *Dhammapada*, *Theragāthā*, *Therigāthā* and sections entirely in verse in the *Sutta-nipāta* that cannot be

designated as *sutta* are given as examples of *gāthā*. It is to be inferred that prose has to be excluded from the *aṅga* called *sutta* while *geyya* is verse interspersed with prose. The significant fact is that both *geyya* and *gāthā* refer to verse and that they constituted a separate literary medium.

The older stratum of the metrical literature in the ***Khuddaka-nikāya*** represents an archaic form of Pali in contrast to the language in the prose writings so much so that the term *Gāthā-pāli* has come into vogue in designating the language of the metrical works which is sometimes also called the Gāthā dialect. The verses of the ***Dhammapada**, Udāna, Itivuttaka, Sutta-nipāta, Jātaka, **Thera and Therigāthā*** belong to this category while the less archaic canonical metrical literature represented by works such as the *Vimānavatthu, Petavatthu, Apadāna, **Buddhavaṃsa*** and *Cariyāpiṭaka* follow closely the standard metrical excellence set by the earlier works even though the individual "poems" in each of these texts follow a set pattern in a stereotyped framework.

It was the Buddhists, particularly those who followed the Pali tradition, who gave the recognition of a standard literary medium to *gāthā*. This is seen to recur subsequently in Hybrid Sanskrit works such as *Mahāvastu and Lalitavistara* though the Sanskrit Buddhist *kāvyas* such as those of Aśvaghosa, Bhartṛhari, Sāntideva and others followed the usual Sanskrit norms. The *gāthā* tradition, however, continued uninterrupted in Pali until the medieval period when it was supplanted by the ornate style so characteristic of the Sanskrit *kāvya*. See AṄGA and NAVAṄGA.

N. A. Jayawickrama

GATI, noun from the root *gam* to go, literary means 'going'; but, by way of usage, it has acquired several developed meanings, and we find it used in no less than seven meanings in different contexts. In five of these contexts, the term *gati* is used in a general way to mean (1) "extent", e.g. *yāvatā jagato gati* (*A.* II, pp. 15, 17), as far as the universe goes, extends, i.e., in the entire universe, (2) "functioning", e.g., (a) *yāvatā, channam phassāyatanānaṃ gati tāvatā papañcassa gati*, (*A.* II, pp. 161-2), as far as is functioning of the six bases of contact, there is obsession functioning, (b) *cakkaṃ pavattitaṃ.....yāvati yāvatikā abhisaṅkārassa gati tāvatikaṃ gantvā... bhūmiyaṃ papati* (*A.* II, p. 112), the wheel kept rolling as long as the impulse (that set it rolling) was functioning, and then fell to the ground, and (c) *jātimaraṇasaṃsāraṃ ye vajanti punappunaṃ itthabhāvaññathābhāvaṃ avijjāyeva sā gati* (*Sn.* v. 729), the round of countless births and deaths is the functioning of, conditioned by, ignorance; (3) route, e.g., *ākāseva sakuntānaṃ gati* (*Dhp.* v. 92) just like the route taken by birds in the sky; the word ***padaṃ*** (*Thag.* v. 92) is synonymous with this *gati*; (4) destiny in this life, i.e., career, e.g., *ayaṃ hi deva kumāro dvattiṃsamahāpurisalakkhaṇehi samannāgato yehi samannāgatassadve gatiyo bhavanti, anaññā* (*D.* II, p.16), this babe, my lord, is endowed with the thirty-two marks of the sup[...]an, and to one so endowed, two careers lie open, and none other; (5) field of existence, e.g., *gati migānaṃ pavanaṃ ākāsa pakkhīnaṃ gati* (*Vin.* V, p. 149; *SnA.* p. 346), the forest is the field of animals, the sky that of birds.

Destiny after death and the sphere or realm of existence into which rebirth is possible are the two most important meanings attached to the term *gati*; the former is the going after death and the latter the place where sentient beings go after death; the two are interconnected; because both signify one and the same process; only two stages are indicated.

In the following instances; *gati* means going or destiny after death: (a) *sālho nāma bhante bhikkhu nādike kālakato tassa kā gati ko abhisamparāyo* (*D.* II, p. 91); sir, the monk Sālha has died at Nādikā; what is his destiny, where has he been reborn? (b) *Pūrano... kālakato, tassa kā gati ko abhisamparāyo?* (*M.* I, p. 388); (c) *Esā maccherino gati* (*Pv.* p.34), this is the destiny of the miser; (d) *gato so tassa yā gati* (*Pv.* p. 11), gone is he where he is destined (e) *jīvitaṃ vyādhi kālo ca dehanikkhepanaṃ gati* (*Vism.* p. 237), life, sickness, death, disposal of the corpse and the destiny.

The spheres or realms of existence into which rebirth is possible are five or six. This is the most important of all Buddhist classifications of sentient beings, and is the basis of the various Buddhist wheels of life *(bhavacakra)*. The fivefold division is made by most sects of the Theravāda (*D.* III, p. 234; *M.* I, p. 73; *S.* V, pp. 474-770 the sixfold division by a few sects of the Theravāda (*Pv.* p.66; *Mhvu.* III, p. 368) and most sects of the Mahāyāna (*Sdmp.* pp. 4, 7, 44, 53, 126, 211). The fiv[...]s are (1) the inhabitants of the hells *(niraya* or *naraka)*; (2) the ghosts *(peta, preta, pettivisaya* or *yamaloka)* (3) animals *(tiracchānayoni, tiryak* or *tiryañcah)*, (4) mankind *(manussa* or *manusya)* and (5) gods *(deva)*. In the sixfold classification we find titans *(asura)* as the fourth category placed between the third and the fourth of the fivefold division. Those who advocate the five-*gati* theory never denied the existence of *asuras*, who, according to them, were not of sufficient importance to be given a place as a separate *gati*.

This is one of the points discussed in the *Kathāvatthu* according to which the Andhakas and the Uttarāpattakas regarded the *asuras* as a separate destiny. The Theravāda ruling was that there are only five destinies and that the

asuras do not constitute a separate destiny as some of the *asuras,* namely the troop of Vepacitti who have been formerly devas and who resemble them in shape, sex-life, diet and also intermarry with them belong to the *deva-gati,* whereas the *asuras* known as Kālakañjaka who in the same respects resemble the *petas* belong to the *peta-gati (Kvu.* Book VIII, point 1; Points of Contraoversy, p. 211).

This discussion is very important as it throws light on the criterion by which the beings are divided into destinies. The criterion being the similarity in bodily shape, sex-life and diet, those who are similar in these respects form one destiny.

According to the *Pañcagatidīpanī* the world of titans *(asuranikāya)* is a section of the sphere of manes *(pettivisaya)* which also included six more kinds of beings called *Kumbhaṇḍa, Rakkhasa, Gandhabba, Pisāca, Bhūta,* and *Yakkha (J.P.T.S* 1881, pp. 157-8).

'All sentient beings, when they die, are reborn into one or the other of these five or six destinies. There is no other form of existence possible. The first four *gatis* of the six-fold classification are characterised as evil or unhappy and termed *duggati* and *apāya,* while the last two are considered happy *(sugati* or *abhimatagati).*

As far as the birth *(yoni)* of beings in the five spheres is concerned, Buddhaghosa says that beings in hells, ghosts consumed with thirst and the gods in heaven are of spontaneous birth, whereas the remaining ghosts, animals, human beings and earth-gods are born in any of the four modes of birth, namely, oviparous *(aṇḍaja),* viviparous *(jalābuja),* of moisture *(saṃsedaja)* and spontaneous *(opapātika, Vism.* p. 552).

The (cosmologicall relationship between these spheres of existence *(gati)* and the three planes of existence *(dhātu)* is as follows: The sensuous plane *(kāmadhātu)* includes hells, ghosts, animals, mankind and the six *kāmāvacara* gods. The remaining gods better known as *brahmas* are found in the material plane *(rūpadhātu)* and the nonmaterial plane *(arūpadhātu).* There are sixteen (or seventeen or eighteen) kinds of gods in the five material planes and four kinds in the non-material plane.

A totally different list of four evil existences *(gati)* is give in the *Sikṣāsamuccaya,* namely, (1) inopportune birth, birth under such circumstances that one cannot practise *brahmacaryā,* (2) birth in a Buddhakṣetra which contains no Buddha, (3) birth in a heretical family and (4) birth in all the evil spheres *(Sikṣ.* p. 147).

It is clear now that the term *gati* in the sense of sphere of existence is synonymous with *saṃsāra.* Nibbāna, therefore, is the freedom from *gati.* It is impossible for the sentient beings to know the destiny of the perfectly liberated ones (*M.* I, 334; *Dhp. vv.* 92. 420; *Sn. v.* 644) because they have no destiny after death (*Sn. v.* 499; *SnA.* II, p. 416). Only the perfectly liberated ones, especially the Buddhas, know the destiny (as well as freedom from destiny) of all beings (*M.* I, p. 328; *Sn. v.* 377; *SnA.* 1, p. 368).

So far the Theravāda and Mahāyāna accounts of the various relams of existence *(gati)* have been more or less in agreement; but on one point there is wide divergence. According to Mahāyāna every man upon reaching supreme and perfect enlightenment acquires a spiritual realm, called Buddhakṣetra to which he repairs after death and in which he continues to instruct the bodhisattvas and other persons who may be born there, leading them to supreme enlightenment. This concept of Buddhakṣetra is totally absent in all Theravāda schools. In earlier references, these Buddhakṣetras are not permanent, and life therein is only the preparation for nirvāṇa or Buddhahood, but according to the Shin sect of Japan, rebirth in Sukkhāvati, the paramount Buddhakṣetra, is itself the highest goal and is final and complete happiness.

Upali Karunaratne

GAUḌAPĀDA, a renowned philosopher and author of the Āgamaśāstra. It is possible that Gauḍapāda hailed from Bengal (Gauḍa), and the name seems to be an epithet rather than a personal name.[1] Opinion is divided with regard to his date. The tradition, which makes him a grand-guru of the Advaita teacher Śaṃkara, would place him in cir. 700 A.C. as the latter is supposed to have been born in cir. 788 A.C.[2] On the other hand, it has been pointed out that since some extracts resembling the verses of the *Agamaśastra* have been quoted in the Tibetan translation of the *Tarkajvala* of Bhāvaviveka which is usually placed in cir. 500 A.C., Gauḍapāda can also be placed in the same century.[3] It may be pointed

1. A. B. Keith, *Religion and Phylosophy of the Veda and Upanishads, HCS.* Vol. 32, 1925, p.503, Note. 1.
2. S. N. Dasgupta *(History of Indian Philosophy,* Vol. I Cambridge, 1926, p. 423), held that "in order to be able to teach Śaṃkara, Gauḍapāda must have been living till at least 800 A.D."
3. Vidhusekhara Bhattacharya, (Ed.) *Āgamaśastra,* (1950), pp.43 ff. R.D. Karmakar, (Ed.) *Gauḍapāda-kārikā,* pp. III-IV. The present writer cannot categorically say that the *Tarkajvala* an auto commentary on *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā* of Bhāvaviveka, actually quotes passages from the work of Gauḍapāda. For brief notices of the Sanskrit mss. of this work of Bhāvaviveka see Rahula Sāṃkṛtyāyana in *J.B.O.R.S.* Vol. XXIII, Pt. I. The ms. itself is preserved in the K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna.

out here that Bhavya or Bhāvaviveka, the noted Svātantrika-mādhyamika teacher, seems to have flourished in cir. 600 A.C. and was a contemporary of the Vijñānavāda teacher Dharmapāla (cir. 550–610 A.C.) of Nālandā[4]. Therefore, while it is possible to place Gaudapāda in the middle of the 6th century A.C. one cannot be certain about the tradition that Saṃkara was his grand pupil. To Gaudapāda are ascribed, apart from the *Āgamaśāstra*, the following three works: *Sāṃkhya-kārikā-bhāsya*, *Uttaragita* and the *Subhagodayastuti*. The authorship of these works, however, seems to be doubtful.

The text of the *Āgamaśāstra* is divided into four chapters *(prakaranas)* and consists of 215 memorial verses *(kārikas)*. The work starts as a commentary on the *Māndūkya Upaniṣad* but assumes the form of an original treatise.

Walleser[5] had pointed out that the *Āgamaśāstra* bears considerable Mahāyāna Buddhist influence; V. Bhattacharya had discussed, with remarkable thoroughness, the Mahāyāna Buddhist contents in this text.[6] He was of the view that the IVth chapter, the *Alātaśānti prakarana*, cannot be regarded as an integral part of the *Āgamaśastra*. He even held that the four chapters of it "are four independent treatises and are put together in a volume under the title of *Agamaśāstra*." The opinion is shared by T. R. V. Murti who remarks that the first three chapters are the works of "a keen Vedāntin" while the fourth chapter was "written most probably by a Buddhist."[7] R. D. Karmakar on the contrary takes great pains to show that all the four chapters of the treatise are from the pen of Gaudapāda, and that there is no Buddhist influence in its contents except the Buddhist phraseology.[8] S. N. Dasgupta, however, held that "there is sufficient evidence in his *kārikas* for thinking that he was possibly himself a Buddhist, and considered that the teachings of the *Upaniṣads* tallied with those of Buddha."[9] Mahamahopadhyaya Gopinatha Kaviraja seems to recognise the fact that Nāgārjuna's *Madhyamakaśāstra* had influenced the thought of the *Gaudapādakārikas*.[10]

The present writer, however, opines that there is no cogent reason to doubt that the 215 verses of the *Āgamaśāstra* are from the pen of a single author and that the *Āgamaśāstra* of Gaudapāda is a document of rapprochement between Buddhism and Vedānta, and points out the hybrid origin of *Advaita* doctrine of Vedānta. The scattered seeds of monism in the *Upaniṣads*[11] were developed for the first time by Gaudapāda (cir. 600 A.C.) and perfected by Saṃkara (cir. 800 A.C.) who established the classical form of Advaita Vedānta. Saṃkara himself seems to prove that no one before Gaudapāda had taught the monistic Vedānta when he credits his grand-guru with the discovery of the advaita doctrine, which according to his belief, lay hidden deep in the *Vedas*.[12]

It is admitted that pre-Gaudapāda Vedānta is neither systemetic nor monistic, and, that Gaudapāda flourished and wrote his *Āgamaśāstra* after all the important Vijñānavāda and Mādhyamika philosophers had lived and diffused the idealistic, absolutic and monistic tenets of Buddhist philosophy. It stands to reason, therefore, that the Advaita turn in Vedānta in and after Gaudapāda, was due to Buddhist influence in both its tenets and techniques.

The age of Gaudapāda was one of philosophical controversies and almost warlike activities of theologians espousing different creeds. But it was also an age when rapprochement between Brahmancial theology and Mahāyana Buddhology was nearly completed: an age when *parama-saugatas* like Emperor Harsa worshipped Brahmanical gods; Bodhisattvas like Avalokiteśvara assumed the form of Maheśvara; Brahmanical images were being enshrined in Buddhist temples; Buddhist logicians like Saṃkarānanda were being quoted as authorities on *Pratyabhijñāśastra* by Abhinavagupta and Jayaratha; an age, when the historical Buddha was being relegated to the realm of Vaiṣnava mythology by being transformed into an *avatāra* of the supreme God.[13]

4. The contemporaneity of Bhāvavieka and Dharmapāla is attested by Husan Tsang; Cf. Thomas Watters, On Yuan Chwang's Travels in India (Delhi reprint 1961) Vol. II. pp. 215 ff. E. Obermiller. BU-Ston's History of Buddhism, Part II, Heidelberg, 1932, pp. 134-36. S. Radhakrishnan (Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, p1452, note) seems to assign Gaudapāda to 7th century A.C. but he also inclines towards N. Walleser's view quoted above.
5. Der altere Vedanta, pp. 5f. as quoted in A.B. Keith, loc. cit.
6. *Agamaśāstra* (Ed. V. Bhattacharya pp. iv, lvii).
7. *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, London, 1955, pp. 14-15
8. *Gaudapādakārikā* (Ed. Karmakar) pp. xxx-xli.
9. *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I. p. 423.
10. *Bhāratiya Samskrti Aur Sādhanā*, Pt. I, Patna, 1962, pp. 132-133.
11. A.B. Keith, op. cit., II. pp. 516 f.
12. Saṃkara's commentary on the *Gaudapādakārikā*. (Anandāśrama Sanskrit Series Ed.) p. 214; S.N. Dasgupta, op. cit., pp. 422-423.
13. See the present writers *Studies in the Buddhistic Culture of India* (During 7th and 8th centuries A.D.), Delhi, 1967, Chapters II, X and XII.

In such an age it is neither curious nor surprising to see Gaudapāda endeavouring to harmonise the basic principles of Buddhist and Brahmanical philosophies. He, therefore, commented on the *Mandūkya Upanisad* on the one hand, and paid devout homage to Buddha, on the other. He was true to the spirit of his age. Buddhist contents in the *Agamaśastra* of Gaudapāda are already well known to scholars. Some have acknoledged while others have explained them away. In the following paragraphs it is proposed to review the correspondence and rapprochement between the *Agamaśastra* (abbreviated *AS*) and some early Buddhist sources in Sanskrit.

AS, 1.7. refers to those who view creation as being of the nature of dream and illusion: *svapna-māyā sarūpeti srstiranyair vikalpitā.* This obviously refers to the Buddhist view of the world; e.g. *māyādi-svapnasadrśam vipaśyanto vimucyante. Lankāvatāra-sūtra,* X. 251; X. 279; x. 291 etc.) and *māyā ca sattvāś ca advayam etadadvaidhikāram; iti te svamnaś ca sattvāśca advayam etadadvaidhikāram; sarv adharmā api devaputrā mayopamā svapnopmā : Asta-Sāhasrikā Prajñpāramitā (Ed.* BST. - 4) p. 20

The Buddhist philosophical terms occur in the very first chapter, e.g. *vikalpa, AS,* 1. 29. The idea expressed in *AS,* 1.22 corresponds to the Buddha's perception of the triple world *trisu dhāmasu* is the same as Buddhist *tridhātu;* the great ascetic *(Mahāmuni* referred to here is no other than Buddha Sākyamuni also called *Mahāśramana.*

In *AS,* II.I. Gaudapāda, like Vasubandhu, says that "as in dream, so in waking, the objects seen are unreal" cp. *Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi Vimśatikā,* verses 1-2. "The wisemen (who) speak of the sameness of dream and waking state", *AS* II.5, are clearly the Idealistic *(Vijñanavādin)* Buddhist thinkers, who are also referred to as "the knowers of the mind" at *AS,* II, 25.

The first line of *AS,* II, 31: *Svapnamāye yathā drste gandharvanagaram yathā,* repeats the first line of *MS.* VII, 34. (*MS = Madhyamaka Sāstra) Yathā māyā yathā svapne gandharvanagaram yathā.* The thought contained in these two verses is absolutely identical, namely, that the world of sense is unreal like illusion, dream and ***gandharvanagara.*** The negative conception of the ultimate truth ***(paramārtha)*** expressed in *AS,* II, 32, recalls so many verses of the *Madhyamakaśastra* e.g., *MS.* opening lines, and *MS,* chapter XXV. *Astasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā* (BST-4) p. 177 - *Sarvakalpavikalpa-prahino hi tathāgatah: Vajracchedika prajnaparamita* (Ed. Conze) Chap. 14 - *Sarva samjñā apagatā te Buddhā Bhagavantah* and Madhyamakaśāstra, XVIII. 9.

Aparapratyayam śāntam prapañcair aprapañcitam/
Nirvikalpam anānārtham etattattvasya laksanam/
have manifestly supplied the thought and words for the *AS,* II. 35.

Vitarāgabhayakrodhair munibhir vedapāragaih/
nirvikalpo hyayam drstah prapañcopaśamo 'dvayah./
S.N. Dasgupta[14] is right when he says that the Buddhist were the first to use the words ***prapañcopaśaman*** *śivam.*

The technical Buddhist term *vitatha* occurs for the first time in the *Astasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā* (cir. 200 B.C.) and also in the *Vajracchedikā prajñāpāramitā* (cir. 300 A.C.[15]). The third chapter of the *AS,* is captioned *Vaitathya,* 'falsity'.

The use of the word *'samghāta'*(composite, aggregate) in *AS,* III.3, for objective bodies is a Buddhist usage, and gives the same meaning as is given by such Buddhist technical terms as *'samskrit'* (composed, componded) and *'khandha'*(aggregate, group). The statement that 'all aggregates are like a dream' ***(samghātah svapnavat*** *sarve)* is in perfect accord with such Buddhist scriptural statement as, for instance, are reproduced below:

> *Svapnagatikā hi Subhūte sarvadharmāh*[16];
> *'Supinam vidyud abhram ca evam drstavyam:*[17]
> *Yathaiva gandharvapuram maricikā;*
> *Yathaiva māyā supinam yathaiva/*
> *Svabhāvaśūnyā tu nimittabhāvanā,*
> *Tathopaman jānātha sarvadharmān//*[18]

The arguments for the theory of non-origination *(ajātivāda)* of things or entities advanced at *AS,* III, 20; 28, seem to bear an unmistakable influence of the

14. S.N. Dasgupta, op. cit., p. 425 note
15. *Astasahasrikā Prajñāpāramitā,* Ed. BST.-4, p. 53; *Vajracchedika Prajñāpāramitā,* Ed. Conze p. 42.
16. *Astasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā* (Ed. BST.-4) p. 149.
17. *Vajrcchedika Prajñāpāramitā* (Ed. Conze), p. 62 CF. *Madhyamakaśāstra,* VII, 34; *Catuhśataka,* XIII, 25
18. *Samadhirājasūtra* (Ed. Vaidya, BST-2, 1961), IX, 11

Madhyamakaśāstra.[19] In *AS*, III, 29; 30, however, Gaudapāda seems to give a very faithful expression to the *Vijñānavāda* tenet; two nearest parallels are the two verses of the *Lankāvatāra-sūtra* (III.65 and 121). The essence of these verses in both works is that the nondual *(citta, mana)* appears as dual in the forms of the perceiver and the perceptible, and that its manifestations in dream and waking states are alike. It should be observed that in *AS*, III. 33, the first line seems to be more *vijñānavādin*, while the second line equally clearly Upanisadic; here, then, we find a perfect combination of two thought currents. The view that "knowledge and the object of knowledge are idential" *(Jñānajneya, bhinnam–AS*, III. 33) is peculiarly a *Vijñānavāda* view repeatedly taught by Vasubandhu and the *Lankāvatāra-Sūtra*[20]

Gaudapāda's description of the ultimate state of spiritual perfection in the three successive verses, i.e. *AS*, III. 37-39 is strongly reminiscent of numerous passages in early Mahāyāna sūtras describing the nature of Tathāgata in Nirvāna.[21] The mention of 'intangible yoga' *(asparśa yoga)* at *AS*, III. 39, is most likely as allusion to Nirvāna. The adjectives used for Nirvāna at *AS*, III. 47, are in full agreement with Buddhist description of the final state of freedom.[22] We have seen that the hypothesis of the IVth chapter of *AS*, entitled *'alātaśānti'*, being an independent treatise is not well-grounded; the course of thought in the *AS*, reaches its logical conclusion in its fourth chapter. The *Lankāvatāra-sūtra* uses the works *'alātacakra.*[23] Āryadeva has also used this illustration in his work.[24] Both these authorities are older than the *Agamaśāstra.* The use of the word *'dharma'* at *AS*, IV, I, in the sense of an entity is 'peculiarly Buddhistic". The opening verse of this chapter adores the Supremely Awakened one *(Sambuddha)* who is the best among men *(dvipadam varam)*, who, with knowledge infinite like the sky, realised the dharmas (lofty and deep) like the Space, and who is identical with the object of wisdom. In Buddhism, the supreme knowledge is the law of *pratītyasamutpāda*, and it is often identified with Buddha so that latter is the goal of the highest wisdom *(jñeyābhinna).*[25] Likewise, *AS*, IV. 2, repeats the salutation to him, who being the benefactor of all living creatures *(sarva-sattva-sukho hitah)*, taught the intagible-contemplation *(asparśa yoga*, probably *asamprajñāta samādhi)*, and a doctrine which can neither

19. See e.g., *M.S.* Chapter I
 Compare, e.g. *AS*-III, 29-
 Yatha svapne dvayābhāsam spandate māyayā manah/
 Tathā jāgraddvayābhāsam spandate māyayā manah/
 with *Lankāvatārasūtra*, III, 65 -
 Cittamātram na drsyo sti dvidhā cittam hi drsyate /
 Grāhyagrāhakābhavena śasvatoccheda-varjitam//
 Cf. V. Bhattacharya in *Indian Historical Quarterly*, Vol. X, 1934, pp. 5-6.
20. Cf. *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi Vimsatikā*, verse I; Deux Traites de Vasubandhu, Ed. S. Levi, verse 17, p. 35; *Lankāvatārasūtra*, X. 58
21. *AS*, III. 37-X 112 etc..
 Sarvābhilāpvigatah sarvacintāsamutthitah/
 Supraśāntah sakrjjyoti samādhiracalābhayah//
 Compare with *Astasāhasrikā* (Ed. BST.-4) p. 177-
 Sarvakalpa-vikalpa-prahino hi tathāgatah
 ibid. p. 96- *Acintya Bhagavan prajñāpāramitā/*
 Tathā hi Subhūte prajñāpāramitā na cittena jñātavyā na cittagāmaniyā
 Vajracchedika (Ed. Conze) p. 46 - *Acintyo ayam*
 dharmaparyāyas tathāgatena bhāsitāh; Saddharmapundarika sūtra
 (Ed.- BST-6) p. 27- *atarko atarkāvaccrastathāgata*
 vijñeyah Sāriputra Saddharmah/
 Samadhirājasūtra (Ed. BST.-2) p.190 -
 Yo asau dharmasvabhāvam jānati suprasāntam/
22. *Lankāvatāra*, X. 174; *Saddharmapundarika sūtra* (BST-6) p. 84-85;
 Dhammapada, verses 203-204; *Madhyamakaśāstra*, XVIII, 9; *Tathāgata guhyasūtra* - *"Tatra tathāgato na kalpayati na vikalpayati/ Sarvakal pavikalpajālavasanāprapañca vigato hi śāntamate tathāgataś,*"quoted in *Prasannapadā* (Ed. BST.- 10) p. 236.
23. *Lankāvatārasūtra* X. 173
24. *Catuhśataka* XIII. 5.
25. *AS*, IV. I. *jñānenākāśakalpena dharmān yo gaganopamān/*
 jñeyābhinnena sambuddhastan vande dvipadam varam/
 Cp. *Lalitavistara* (Ed. BST-I) Chapter I, verses 1-2; *Samyutta-nikāya* vol. II, p. 340-341. The *ipse dixit* of Buddha - *yo pratityasamutpādam paśyati, sa Buddham paśyati* - is well known in Pali as well as in Sanskrit texts.

be disputed nor contradicted.[26] Commenting on this verse, S. Radhakrishnan says that "the *kārikā* is an attempt to combine in one whole the negative logic of the Mādhyamikas with the positive idealism of the *Upanisads*"[27]. Eminent scholars including M. Walleser, H. Jacobi, La Vallee Poussin, V. Bhattacharya, S. N. Dasgupta, V. Sukthankar and others have already discussed in detail the Buddhist influence in the last chapter of the *Āgamaśāstra, AŚ*, IV. 3 ff. expound the theory of non-origination of dharmas, a theory characteristically peculiar to the Mādhyamikas. *AŚ*, IV. 22-23 are comparable to *Madhyamakaśāstra*, I.I, 7 and XXI. 7, 13, which deny causation and origination. Words such as *'prajñapti'* (cognition), *'citta'* (consciousness), and *'viparyāsa'* (illusion of false appearance), *AŚ*, IV.25-27, are all technical Buddhist words known to older texts of Buddhism. *AŚ*, IV. 33 is thoroughly Buddhistic both in thought and words the statement "all dharmas are unreal" *(sarve dharmā mṛṣā)* is comparable to Nāgārjuna's statement 'all dharmas are void' *(sarve dharmā śūnyāḥ)*. *AŚ*, IV. 36 have numerous parallels in *Vijñānavāda* texts and the *Lankavātāra* (chapter X); *AŚ*, IV. 42, seems to speak in the vein of early *Mahāyāna sūtras* like the *Saddharmapuṇḍarika* which explain away the realistic teachings. *AŚ*, IV. 57 is comparable to *Madhyamakaśāstra* XXIV. 8-10; while *AŚ*,, IV. 58-59 recall *Catuhśataka*, X. 14, and so many passages in the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā* and the *Vajracchedikā*, *AŚ*, IV. 68-70 seem to paraphrase a few verses of the *Samādhirājasūtra* (Ed. EST-2, XXXIX, 13-18) and the *Lankāvatāra* (X. 24, 37). Mention of *agrayāna* at *AŚ*, IV. 90, obviously refers to *Buddhayāna;* the expressions like *sarve dharmā anādayaḥ AŚ*, IV. 93, etc. have manifest Buddhist flavour around them.

L. M. Joshi

GAUTAMA. See GOTAMA

GE-DAN, Tib. *dGah-lDan (var. Ge-Dan)* is one of the three established monasteries (centres of learning) in Tibet, situated about thirty miles north-east of Lhasa, the capital of Tibet. The full name of this monastery is dGah-lDan Nam-Par Gyal-wahi glin, or the Continent of completely Victorious Happiness. According to Waddel this monastery is said to have been the residence of three thousand and three hundred monks, and is divided into two schools, namely, Byan-rtse and S'ar-tse, each with its club.

Tsong-Kha-Pa and his pupil rGyal-tshab-rje founded this monastery in the year 1409 A.C. Tsong-kha-Pa was its first abbot. He raised this monastery to high fame and filled it with costly images. When he died his tomb was built in the premises of this monstery in 1419 A.C., his pupil rGyal-tshab Dar-marin-Chen suceeded him as the head of the Ge-Lu-Pa sect. A special prayer ceremony is held at Ge-Dan even today on the death anniversary of its founder. A service in his honour is held here every morning, even at present. This monastery, the walls of which are of felt overlaid with silk and supported by pillars of red lacquered walnut wood, has a gilt pagoda-like roof, and the tomb is in a chapel of its own. It is enclosed in a circular Mongol tent presented by a Mongol chief of the Dzungarian tribe who entered Lhasa two hundred years ago. He is said to have destroyed temples and images of the Red Hat sect and helped the Yellow Hat sect.

The tent encloses nearly the whole of the chapel. Inside the tomb there is a beautiful pagoda ((chorten q.v.) said to be of solid gold. Within this gold casket, wrapped in fine cloth, inscribed with sacred syllables, are the embalmed remains of the great reformer *reposing* in a sitting posture. Among the noteable objects is a magnificent representation of the future Buddha Cam-Pa seated on the throne. Beside him stands a life sized image of Tsong-Kha-Pa in his role as Jam-pal Nin-Po, the name assigned to him in the Gan-Dan heavens. The impressions of the hands and feet said to be those of Tsong-Kha-Pa are found in a cell cut out of a rock. Another shrine holds an effigy of Tsong-Kha-Pa with images of his five disciples viz. Shes-rab Sen-ge and others standing round him. In the foreground is a large raised platform partly of plain wood, partly inlaid with silver containing figures of elephants made of precious stones and seven or eight goddesses, whose duty it is to make offerings to Tsong-Kha-Pa. The profusion of barely grains on this platform was symbolic of the wish of all to give. Round the sides of the chapel arranged outside the tent on platforms, seven feet above the ground, are the tombs of many of the successive high priests of the Ge-Dan monastery. Each of these is appointed as an old man, for seven years and is known as Ge-Dans enthroned *(Ge-Dan Ti-Pa)*. He is the highest of all the priesthood.

26. Cf. V. Bhattacharya, *Agamaśastra* (Ed.) p. 92-98.
27. *Indian Philosophy*, Volume II, p. 465, note 2
To the modern sources on Gaudapāda we may add T.M.P. Mahadevan, *Gaudapāda, A Study in Early Vedanta*, 3rd ed. University of Madras 1960, and N. Ariyaswami Sastri, "A New Approach to Gaudapāda", *Bulletin of Tibetology*, Vol. VIII No. I. (Feb. 1971) pp. 15-46.

The fact that Tsong-Kha-Pa lived in Ge-Dan and is entombed there gives it an added sanctity, more than the other two seats of learning in Tibet namely, Dre-Pung and Sera. For further details see Ge-Lu-Pa.

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Indumathie Karunaratne

GEDIGĒ, a Sinhalese term used to denote an architectural type of Buddhist buildings, remains of several of which have been discovered in Sri Lanka. The origin of the word is doubtful. H. C. P. Bell (*ASCAR,* 1910-11, p. 50) has accepted the view of Rao Bahadur Krishna Sastri, the late Govt. Epigraphist for India, that it has originated from the Tamil word *gedi* or *gadinai* meaning a rest-house and that it is connected with the Sanskrit word *ghatikā*. S. Paranavitana *(JCBRAS.* XXXVI, 126 ff.) who differs from the above opinion attributes its origin to the Pali term *giñjakāvasatha,* a term used in the *Majjhima-nikāya* (I, p. 205) and its commentary (*MA.* II, p. 235) to refer to a building constructed of bricks. S. Paranavitana's assumption is based on the fact that in the *Rūpasiddhisanne* (Colombo. 1927, p. 164), a Sinhalese work of the 12th century, the term *gedigē* has been given as the Sinhalese equivalent of the Pali term *giñjakāvasatha,* thus showing what was meant by the term in the 12th century.

It is most probable that the *gedegē,* originally, was a brick building. As seen from the commentary of the *Majjhima nikāya* (loc. cit.), the *giñjakāvasatha* that was constructed near Nādikā for the Buddha was a hall, containing walls, stairs, pillars, etc. all of brick. These were plastered and white-washed and were decorated with flower and creeper motifs. The hall was furnished with carpets, beds and chairs. Lodging places for day and night, and cloisters *(caṅkama)* were also provided.

This description, perhaps the earliest extent, of a *giñjakāvasatha* shows the type of building meant by the term. A noteworthy feature of the building described above is that it was made of brick, plastered and white-washed, thus leaving only the shape of the building bare, and not the material of which it was constructed. This, perhaps, led the later builders to apply the term *gedigē* to any building of a particular type, namely one with solid walls and corbelled roof, irrespective of the material of which it was made, whether brick or stone.

Several such buildings in Sri Lanka belonging to different periods are know by this term *gedigē.* A ruined brick structure within the citadel of Anuradhapura, the remains of a shrine of stone in the village of Nālanda in the Mātale district and a vihāra situated near Kandy are among them. The Galmaḍuva and the Lankātilaka temples, both in the Kandy district are also known, sometimes, as *gedigēs.* It does not appear however, that *gedigē* was the name given to any of them by their builders (Paranavitana, *JCBRAS.* XXXVI, p. 126).

It is worth while examining some of the features of the two well known *gedigēs* in Sri Lanka, the one at Anuradhapura and the other at Nālanda.

The Anuradhapura *gedigē* the reains of which were first noticed in 1886 by Burrows *(Ceylon Government Sessional Paper* X, 1886, p.6), is assigned to the 8th century by S. Paranavitana (*ASCMem.* III, p. 7) though Burrows (loc. cit.) thought it belonged to the 12th century. It is a very large and lofty building having thick walls made of bricks and a corbelled roof. Three fragments of the original walls still remain in position and the tallest of them is, at present, 25 ft. high. Their thickness is 3 feet, rising at some places to 5 feet. The walls must have originally been over 30 feet high and the remains of some stairs on the west side show that there had been an upper storey. (Pl. XXIII).

An upper and a lower series of arches or arched windows with stone frames (4 feet 5 inches × 2 feet 2 inches) provided light and ventilation to the building. The sole entrance was on the south through a door-frame (9 ft. × 4 ft. 4 in.). This leads to a narrow passage (3 feet 3 in.) enclosing a central room 12 feet 3 in. square. The outer face of the walls is profusely moulded.

This is a rare specimen of brickwork of such dimensions in Anuradhapura, the purpose of which, says H.C.P. Bell (*ASCAR.* 1897, p.4), is unknown.

The excavations of 1928 and 1929 in the area considered as the royal enclosure in Anuradhapura have revealed another brick building of exactly the same plan as that of this *gedigē.* Its sanctum or the inner room contains also an *āsana* which was not found in the *gedigē.* The mouldings of this building are better preserved though the remaining walls do not stand up to the same great height. This structure, like the *gedigē* also belongs to the 8th century. S. Paranavitana (*ASCMem.* III, p.3 ff.) remarks that this also appears more like a religious shrine than a building intended for living purposes though no cult objects of any sort were found within or near it. Since this locality was the royal enclosure it is quite possible that it was one of the religious edifices located within the limits of the royal palace.

The *gedigē* and this structure are the only examples of this type of building so far discovered in Sri Lanka belonging to this early period *(ASCMem.* III, p. 3 ff).

The *gedigē* in the village Nālanda, in the Mātale district is a stone-built monument dating at least from the 11th century according to H.C.P. Bell (*ASCAR*. 1911, p. 50) and 8th century according to S. Paranavitana (University of Ceylon, *History of Ceylon*, p. 401). The ruins of this *gedigē* are found isolated in a paddy field about ¾ mile away from the high road, and is approachable by a wide path that starts from the high road near the present rest-house. (Pl. XXIII).

The *gedigē* stands on a wide *maluva* or a terrace about 3 to 4 feet above the sorrounding land. This *maluva* is similar to that of a Buddhist vihāra in Sri Lanka.

In front of the shrine is an open portico built of stone. This open portico is mounted from a plain moon-stone and three steps which are flanked by balustrades with *makara* heads. A further pair of steps admits one to the vestibule *(antarāla)*. These steps are carved with *gana*, *vajra* and *palā-peti* motifs and on either side of the upper steps are two elephant heads carved in high relief.

Between the vestibule and the actual shrine there is a space of 26 feet by 22 feet 4 inches. This space within which stand eight pillars in two rows, four in each row gives a Hindu atmosphere by its close similarity to a Dravidian *maṇḍapam*.

Passing through this *mandapam* one enters the actual shrine (10 feet 8 in. by 7 feet 2 in.). The walls of this shrine, all built of stone slabs, are 3 feet 8 inc. thick. This shrine, like the brick-built *gedigē* of Anuradhapura has had a domed roof which no longer exists. Its actual shape could be determined only if its component members are forthcoming from the heaps of stone now lying around the structure.

The sculptural remains of the shrine discovered in and around it strongly suggest that this was a Buddhist monument considerably influenced by Hindu architecture. Some of its noteworthy sculptures are the standing image of the Buddha, the torso of a bodhisattva, a seven-hooded *nāga*, three *padmāsana* pedestals of statues and the four-armed Gaṇeśa seated on a *padmāsana*. On a facade in the upper part of the outer wall of the shrine is sculptured a figure of Vaiśravaṇa, guardian deity of the north, as Kuvera, the god of luck and wealth.

The form of Hinduism favoured at this temple was Vaishanvite and the Hindu sculptures show a close similarity to those of the famous Pallava site of Māmallapuraṃ.

The *gedigē* near Kandy which is called the Asgiri-vihāra-gedigē or the Adāhanamaḷu-gedigē is a shrine in the Dravidian style, closely resembling the Gadalādeni-vihāra and was erected by king Senāsammata Vikramabāhu in the second half of the 15th century at the spot where his mother was cremated *(University of Ceylon, History of Ceylon*, 681. 787 f.; *EZ.* IV, 9). It is not considered as significant a monument as the other *gedegē* perhaps due to the late date of its construction.

H. R. Perera

GE - LU - PA (spelt *dge-Lugs-Pa)*. also referred to as the dGe-lDan-Pa, is the name of the most numerous sect of Lamas founded by Tsong-Kha-Pa (blo-bzong-Grags-Pa; 1357-1417 A.C.). It is popularly known as the Yellow Hat sect, because Tson - kha - Pa adopted the yellow hat for himself, and his disciples followed him. In this connection there is a story that Tson -Kha - Pa, failing to dye his hat in a colour to his liking, suddenly remembered that the master Gon - Pa Rab - śe of the 10th century who was noted for his chaste life, once wore a yellow hat, and he also dyed his hat in yellow.

When Buddhism first appeared in Tibet in the 7th century it was restricted only to a few noble families including that of the king and was ignored by many, who followed the indigenous animistic religion named Bon. At this stage a few Indian and Chinese bhiksus ministered to the adherents of the new faith until in the 8th century some Tibetans were ordained after which, Buddhism made rapid advance in Tibet.

It was into this scene of religious activity in Tibet, that the institution of the Dalai - Lama was established at a later stage. It owes its appearance to Tson-Kha-pa who is named after his birth place Tson - Kha. He was a monk of exceptional intellectual attainments, religious devotion and great proselytizing ability. His aim was to reform the monastic discipline, propagate austerity and spirituality and also to do away with the divisions and the rivalries of the Tibetan Buddhist Order.

The reforms of Tsong - kha - Pa's were directed mainly against the rapid deterioration of the lamaist priesthood from the 13th century. By his own example, he restored disciplinary rules, laying special stress on celibacy and abstention from intoxicants and secular pursuits. Ge-Lu-Pa lamas seem on the average to have led more pure lives than those of the other sects in Tibet.

The Ge-Lu-Pa sect adopted the *Mādhyamika* philosophy of Nāgārjuna, with its central doctrine of *śūnyatā (Prāsaṅgika)* which avoids both the affirmation and negation of existence. This is called the *Middle View.* It forms the basis of the Ge-Lu-Pa theory of "the voidness". It was adopted as one of the five required courses in all the leading lamaseries of this sect. The

Ge-Lu-Pa sect rejected the view-point put forward by the writings of Jo-Nang-Pa-Dol-Po Shes-rab-rgyal-mtshan (1292 - 1361 A.C.) and his successors which was accepted by the other sects like Ka-Gyu-Pa etc., that it is by the path of seeing that one experiences nothingness directly and it is its vision that releases a series of psychological processes.

Tson-Kha-Pa had a nephew, a monk named Ge-Dun-Trup-Pa whose learning and vigorous propagation of the Buddhist doctrine led to the rapid increase of the number of followers of th Ge-Lu-Pa sect. He founded one of the greatest Ge-Lu-Pa monasteries at Ta-Shi-Lhun-Po where he was the abbot at the time of his death in 1475. At a later time it was recognized that the spirit of Ge-Dun-Trup-pa had undergone reincarnation in a young monk named Ge-Dun-Gyatso and he too was in due course similarly succeeded by a child Sonam - Gyatso as the third incarnation of Ge-Dun-Trup-Pa. He visited Mongolia in 1578 and in 1586 and converted the prince Altan-Khan and a large number of his followers into the new sect. Altan Khan gave him the title Tale (Dalai) meaning 'ocean' and this title was also later applied to his two predecessors. Within a short period the Ge-Lu-Pa sect commanded the spiritual allegiance of all the rival tribes of Mongolia and this led to the supremacy of the Dalai Lama and to the building up of the Mongol Empire. Eventually the Ge-Lu-Pa sect which commanded the loyalty of the Mongolia became the ruling power of Tibet. It was Sonam-Gyatso who first laid the foundation for the secular power of the Ge-Lu-Pa sect. During his time the austerity, discipline and spiritual attainments of its lamas attracted a large number of followers to the Ge-Lu-Pa sect. Through its lay supporters this sect gradually became involved in the political disputes of the day, and soon became the principal rival to the dominant Kar-Ma-Pa (s.v.) sect which was supported by the kings of Tesang dynasty. In 1642 the Mongol prince Gusri Khan supported by the other Mongol followers of the Ge-Lu-Pa sect invaded Tibet, displaced the Kar-Ma-Pa lamas and placed Ngawang Lobzang Gyatso, the fifth Dalai Lama as the religious head of the country. Gusri Khan became the king of Tibet. The relationship between the king and Dalai Lama was that of patron and priest. After the death of Gusri Khan, when his successors did not take much interest in the adminstration of Tibet, the fifth Dalai Lama gradually drew all spiritual powers into his hands. He combined for the first time the temporal and spiritual powers in one person. He encouraged literary activity in the country and also caused a large palace monstery to be built on Potala hill. Tibet seems to owe all its present secular and ecclesiastical institutes to him.

The Chinese dynasties patronized Lamaism with a political motive. They thought that by making the Tibetans more conscious of their religious duties, they would be able to control their martial qualities.

The rise of the Manchu (Ching) dynasty synchronized with the rise of the Ge-Lu-Pa sect, and with that the institution of the Dalai and the Panchen Lamas became more popular.

The head of the Ge-Lu-Pa sect is the Dalai Lama, the religious and political head of Tibet. The three chiefs of the three leading monasteries of the Ge-Lu-Pa sect namely, Dre-Pung, Se-Ra and Ge-Dan functioned under him. They not only formed the economic and cultural backbone of this sect, but also wielded throughout the country a determining influence on the political and religious life of Tibet. Politically, only these three monasteries were allowed to represent the clergy in the national conferences summoned on important occasions. They owned a large extents of real estate, which in feudal Tibet amounted to almost regional governments. They ran a few magistracies with full administrative powers. Religiously, they had a large number of affiliated monastries all over Tibet. A Lama is expected to belong to one of these monasteries, if he needs recongnition. Dalai Lama himself belongs to all the three monasteries. When a young Lama comes of age before he assumes religio-political authority, he is expected to visit these three monasteries, to be enrolled as a member of each congregation, starting always with the most powerful monastery, De-Pung.

Ge-Dan is the smallest of the three leading Ge-Lu-Pa monasteries, which is still recognised as the fountain head of this sect. The two famous academies for occultist studies in Lhasa namely, Gyu-Me and Gyu-To are affiliated institutions of this monastery. These were founded by the direct disciples of Tson-Kha-Pa for the advanced learning of Tantra. The scholars to be admitted to these two institutions are the graduates from the three leading monasteries with a degree called *Ge-Shi* (Friend of virtue). A Ge-Shi is expected to have mastered all the exoteric studies and is qualified to take up the esoteric course. These two acedemies are considered to be the postgraduate schools, and from among their graduates come the candidates for the highest honour of the Ge-Lu-Pa Order. The Tibetans attach great importance to those who undergo training in one of these academies. Gyu-Me and Gyu To are famous for their methods of solid teaching, discipline and ascetic training. The disciplinary rules of these places cover all fields of daily living, including dress, eating and sleeping. Scholars of these two schools study Yoga. Their training comprises an eloborate program of exercises to achieve complete mastery of spiritual and physical forces. A throne (Tib. *Khri*) in the Ge-Dan monastery, said to be the one in which Tson-Kha-Pa sat, is preserved to this day for the

best scholar of the sect. The occupant of the throne is known as the Ge-Dan Khri-Pa (the enthroned of Ge-Dan) and he is recognized as the legitimate successor of the great Founder himself.

The temple named Nai-Chung (samll place) at the foot of the De-Pung monastery is the place where the Tibetans pray for the long life of the Dalai Lama. The function of this place is to give oracles. Nai-Chung has become the nickname of the god of oracles enshrined in this Temple. The Nai-Chung oracles give prophecies through a human medium, who is always a monk in the temple who occupies a high government rank. Often the Tibetan Government officials go there to seek advice. The Dalai Lama also has a private temple at Potala. This temple, including the three leading monasteries, the two exoteric acedemies and the Nai-Chung temple form the neucleus of the Ge-Lu-Pa sect. The Tibetans refer to these seven places as the seven great miracles.

Panchen Lama with his Trashi Lun-Po monastery maintains a court and a separate monastic organisation. He is surrounded by the abbots of the four colleges of Trashi-Lun-Po. The culmination of the career of a Lama at this monastery after decades of exoteric and esoteric training is to become the great precious Master of Occultism (Nga-Ch'en Rin-Po Che). This monastery has its own affiliated institutions and its own text books and degrees.

The Ge-Lu-Pa monasteries are solely meant for males between the ages of five and sixty years. They are allowed to carry on their individual pursuits provided they do not transgress some of the basic concepts of Buddhism. Among these lamas are found both the scholars and the illiterates, the rich and the poor as well since candidates are all admitted on an equal footing. Even an incarnate lama gains official recognition only if he is enrolled in one of the three leading lamaseries namely, De-Pung, Se-Ra and Ge-Dan.

In these monasteries there are lamas who study and those do not study. The latter are trained in all aspects of religious rites which cater to the daily needs of the people. They range from servants to the lama warriors. The latter are the only lamas in the Ge-Lu-Pa sect who are allowed to grow their hair. They have a cult of their own and worship their own gods and chant their own hymns. On festive occasions they maintain public order. Sometimes they also act as bodyguards to high Lamas when travelling.

All the Ge-Lu-Pa lamaseries offer five fundamental courses, each requiring two or five years for completion. The texts and the order of courses vary in different lamaseries, but the subjects invariably include dialectics, disciplinary rules and the Middle view. The Ge-Lu-Pa sect attaches great importance to open debate. These debates are the only form of examination known to the lamaist education system and therefore it is an absolute requirement for all who aspire to the Ge-Shi degree. Ge-Shi offered at the three leading lamaseries is divided into four types. The two lower degrees are awarded by the Lamaséries while the two higher degrees are awarded by the government. The Examination takes the form of a debate. After graduation at one of these lamaseries, a graduate has to follow a course of occultist studies in case he aspires to attain an exalted position in a lamaist career. The idea is that the Ge-Lu-Pa sect believes that the proper way to attain Buddhahood is to start with the exoteric and proceed on to the esoteric training.

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Indumatie Karunaratne

GENEROSITY. *Cāga, pariccāga* (and *dāna*) are the technical terms in Buddhism that come very close in meaning to the word generosity. The word generosity carries the meanings: "nobility of conduct' or 'behaviour', 'willingness to forgive injuries', 'magnanimity', 'liberality in giving' and 'munificence'. In a developed religious sense *cāga* or *pariccāga* means the readiness of a noble man *(ariya puggala)* to part with anything or perform something to help another to minimise his suffering and improve his condition. In the *Pañcaṅgika Vagga* of the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* (*A*. III, p. 34) it is said: "as stainless on her sky bound course, the moon outshines in splendouur all the stars' array, just so the virtuous, believing man, in charity *(cāga)* outshines the mean on earth." In this context and in many others, *cāga* is used in a very comprehensive connotation to include all the shades of meaning that could be attached to the word generosity in English.

Buddhism teaches of four attitudes of mind that should be cultivated by all who seek a development of character. These attitudes are friendliness *(mettā)*, pity *(karuṇā)*, altruistic joy *(muditā)* and equanimity *(upekkhā)*. These attitudes are called divine abidings or sublime states *(brahmavihāra)*, because they are the most exalted attitudes of mind a human being could develop towards other beings. One has to be friendly towards all. When one is friendly towards others, one is naturally restrained from doing things that are injurious to others in any way. On the contrary; such a person would always look

forward to doing something that would benefit another in some way. When he sees others in want and undergoing difficulties and hardship, he feels pity for them and is inspired to do everything within his power to help them out of those situations and relieve them of their pain and suffering. He feels happy when he sees others happy and content and are living peaceful lives. Lastly he maintains equipoise, balance of mind, in all situations in life (cf. *phutthassa - loka dhammehi cittaṃ yassa na kampati: Sn.* v. 268)..

While cultivating these four noble attitudes of mind a generous person always practices five basic duties towards all other beings *(pañca sila)*. They are: (1) He refrains from killing or causing destruction to any form of life directly or indirectly. He also restrains others from doing such things and speaks in praise of those who refrain from doing harm to living beings. Having done so he would devote all his resources - material, monetary, intellectual and physical strength to help others improve their conditions. It is regardinng such generous people that the Buddha said: "Herein the Ariyan disciple lives at home with heart free from taint of stinginess *(vigata-malamacchera)*, he is open-handed *(muttacāgo)*, pure-handed *(payatapāṇi)*, delighting in giving *(vessaggarato)*, one to ask a favour of *(yācayogo)*, one who delights in dispensing charitable gifts" *(dānasamvibhāgarato)* (*A.* II, p. 66). (2) He refrains from taking what is not voluntarily given to him. In other words he refrains from stealing. Stealing here does not mean taking away only of material things without the consent of the owner. It also includes other things such as depriving others of opportunities of improving their lot by resorting to cheating bribery and corruption. Having refrained from all types of stealing, he restrains others, too, from doing such things and works to maintain justice and fairplay in society. (3) He keeps full control over his sense faculties and avoids wrongful and illegal sexual indulgences such as molestation of women under the guardinaship of others. He leads a very simple life, being content with the minimum of needs. (4) He refrains from speaking false-hood, slander, unpleasant speech, gossip etc. and always speaks the truth, speaks in a way to bring about understanding unity and friendship among others. (5) He avoids all types of intoxicating food and drink so that he could maintain good physical health and mindfulness that are very essential to lead a life beneficial to many others. Thus these five basic *sīlas* are very strictly adhered to by a man who has in him the noble virtue of generosity.

Generosity is also directly linked with the noble-Eightfold-path *(ariya aṭṭhangikamagga: M.* III. p. 71-8?). Generosity has to start with right views. A man would not practise generosity, if he has no respect for life, if he does not accept the idea of efficacy of action both good and bad, if he is not convinced that acts of generosity could make life better and pleasanter to many, it is because one has the highest respect for life, it is because one believes in the efficacy of actions that one is inspired to do things that would make things better for others. This constitutes right views in him. These right views make him think that he should not do anything that would be injurious to another in any way, and on the contrary, they make him think of ways and means of helping others to improve their lot. This constitutes right thoughts *(sammā-sankappa)* in him. Inspired by these right thoughts he avoids all speech that would cause damage or harm to another and uses his speech in a way that is conducive to better understanding among all people. This constitutes right-speech *(sammāvācā)* in him. He avoids all activities that could cause worry or hardship to another, and does things that would help improve the condition of others. This constitutes right actions *(sammā kammanta)* in him. In his personal life he engages himself in some profession or job that would not harm another in any way. This constitutes his right livelihood *(sammā-ājiva)*. To avoid wrong views and wrong attitudes to life and to cultivate right views and right attitudes to life, to avoid wrong thoughts and to cultivate right thoughts, to avoid wrong speech and practise right speech, to avoid wrong action and pursue right action, to avoid wrong livelihood and follow right livelihood one should always be energetic and enterprising. This constitutes right effort *(sammāvāyāma)* in him. Unless he is mindful, unless he is alert and vigilant he cannot lead a life in conformity with the above discussed qualities. So, such alertness or mindfulness constitutes his right mindfulness *(sammāsati)*. When he follows these seven steps successfully, they tend to make him calm, pacified, contented and mature. These constitute right concentration of mind *(sammā-samādhi)* in him. Thus we see that generosity is linked with the Noble Eight-fold Path in Buddhism.

There is again a fourfold activity know as bases of generosity *(sangahavatthu)* discussed in connection with a magnanimous or generous person. Firstly he treats the world by bestowing gifts of food, drink, clothes and other material things to needy people as and when the occasion demands *(dāna)*. Next, he treats the world with pleasant speech - that is by speaking the truth, using pleasant, refined and kind speech *(peyyavajja)*. Again he treats the world by engaging in activities that are beneficial to others such as social service *(atthacariyā)*. Lastly he treats the world by being modest and impartial to all *samānattatā* (*A.* II, p.66).

A generous man could enjoy a fourfold happiness according to Buddhism (*A.* II, p. 69). He feels happy when he sees that he has enough wealth *(atthisukha)*. He feels happy when he thinks that his wealth is begotten by just means *(anavajjasukha)*. He feels happy when he

thinks that he spends his wealth for his own benefit as well as that of others *(bhogasukha)* and he feels happy when he thinks that he is free from debt to others *(ananasukha)*.

A man who practises *cāga* or *pariccāga* with a sublime attitude of unbounded love *(mettā)* and compassion *(karunā)* to all, can do so only if he has overcome anger and hatred, which are the basic characteristics of a selfish man. So one who practises *cāga* at the same time practises forbearance *(khanti, khamā)*. Such a person does not feel enraged when others do wrong to him. On his own initiative he forgives them, and if there is anything that he could do to help such wrongdoers, he would do it willingly with friendly and sympathetic feelings. A practising Buddhist is expected to behave in this way. The Buddha, by example, has showed the purposefulness of such behaviour throughout his career.

W. G. Weraratne

GENESIS. The term genesis means "creation", "generation" or "production." It has also been used as the title of the first book of the Christian Bible. Seeing the relation between the purpose of the book of Genesis in the Bible and the Buddhist canonical discourse entitled *Aggañña Sutta* (q.v.) in the *Dīgha-nikāya* of the *Sutta Pitaka*, scholars have described the *Aggañña Sutta* as the Buddhist book of Genesis.[1] In accordance with this description the discussion of the concept of Genesis in relation to Buddhism will in the sequel pay special attention to the religious, ethical and philosophical significance of the ideas contained in the *Aggañña Sutta*. As a general theory of creation, generation or production Buddhism propounded the theory of Conditioned Genesis or Dependent Origination; the theory of *Paticca-samuppāda* (Skt. *Pratītyasamutpāda)*, which though variously interpreted, is a cardinal doctrinal tenet common to all systems of Buddhism. It was presented as the Buddha's theoretical Middle Way which avoided a number of extreme views such as eternalism, nihilism, a variety of deterministic theories as well as forms of indeterminism which held that there is no casual order whatsoever in the universe. The *Aggañña Sutta* narrative is evidently an early Buddhist attempt to construct a legendary history of the origin of the world, the evolution of man and social institutions which is consistent with the general theory of conditioned genesis.

A student of the development of human ideas in the numerous cultures of the world is bound to be struck by the universality of the presence of cosmogonical myths to account for the beginnings of the universe and all existence. It may be said that the presence of a cosmogony indicates a higher level of development in abstract thinking. In the Indian context the Buddhist account of the origin and development of the world and society was preceded by numerous cosmogonical myths belonging to the Vedic tradition. Indian thought had already reached a high level of development in abstract thinking and attained considerable philosophical maturity by the time the Buddha began his mission as a strikingly innovative teacher. The story of genesis found in the *Aggañña Sutta* is illustrative of some of the uniquely innovative aspects of the Buddhist world view. Compared to the degree of attention that the Biblical story of Genesis has received in the history of religious ideas it should be remarked that considering the richness of imagination and the philosophical vision implicit in the Buddhist story, it has received far less attention than it deserves.

Most cosmogonies attempt to postulate a primal element from which the universe came into being. The cosmogonical myths of ancient cultures are a mixture of primitive animistic beliefs and beliefs about supernatural forces thought to underlie the veriegated multiplicity of the phenomenal world. According to Homer the prime component of the universe is the ocean and according to Hesiod it is earth. In later Milesian thought an attempt was made by the more philosophically minded to present theories about the origin and development of the universe on a more naturalistic and speculative basis. According to one of the Egyptian cosmogonic legends primal spirit and primal matter coexist in all eternity in indissoluble union and the diversity in the universe emerges from these first principles. In Chinese cosmogony the origin of everything is traced to the Male and Female principles Yang and Yin. In the Judeo Christian tradition God is the maker of both heaven and earth, the sea and all that is in them. The Biblical myth of Genesis is an attempt to reconstruct in terms of the religious consciousness of the Israelite people the legendary history of the origin of the world, the beginning of human existence, the nature of the man-woman relationship and the nature of morality and the source of sin.

In the *Ṛgveda* which contains the earliest religious literature of the Indians, the dominant characteristic is found to be an explanation of natural phenomena by a process of deification involving the positing of wills behind the dynamic forces of nature. However, sceptical questions appear to have been raised about the absolute origin of things even at this early age as evidenced by the

1. The larger portion of the narrative is also preserved in the Buddhist Sanskrit text *Mahāvastu*. See E. Senart's edition (Paris, a l'imorimarie Nationale 1882) Vol. I. pp. 338-348.

Nāsadiya hymn of the *Rgveda.*[2] An attempt to trace even certain conventional divisions of society to divine origins is marked in the *Rgveda*, itself. According to the *Purusa Sūkta* of the *Rgveda*, the four castes, Brāhmana (priests), Rājanya (rulers), Vaiśya (common people) and Sūdra (menials) were created respectively out of the mouth, the arms, the thighs and the feet of the Primeval Person.[3] This idea is repeated in the *Atharvaveda* and came to be fully established in the period of the *Yajus Samhitās* and the *Brāhmanas.*[4] There is an attempt in the Brāhmanas to give a monotheistic explanation for the origin of the universe. In the *Brāhmanas* are found many legends about Prajāpati creating the universe. In the beginning was Prajāpati and nothing but Prajāpati; he through the performance of austerities, created the worlds. In some legends waters seem to have been believed to be coeval with Prajāpati.[5] The *Upanisads* turn to be more philosophical in tracing the beginnings of existence to the abstract principles of *Ātman* and *Brahman.* In the *Upanisad* creation is attributed to *Ātman* in the shape of man *(purusa). Purusa* finds delight in multiplying Himself. Thereupon He becomes husband and wife and created all beings that exist in pairs.[6] In the *Taittiriya Upanisad* the sequence is given as *Brahman*, space, wind, fire, water, earth, food, seed, men and all creatures.[7] The Sānkhya system is also an attempt to give an evolutionary account of man and the physical universe in terms of two primordial realities called *prakrti* (matter) and *purusa* (spirit).

Buddhism appears to have held that all speculative thinking about the absolute beginnings of things inevitably lead to unverifiable dogmas *(ditthi).* The *Brahmajāla Sutta* of the *Dighā-nikāya* makes an enumeration of pre-Buddhist views classifying them broadly as speculations about the past *(pubbantakappikā pubbantānuditthino)* and speculations about the future *(aparantānukappikā aparantānuditthino).* The Buddha is said to have understood all the variety of such speculative views but transcended them not holding dogmatically to any one of them. There is reason to believe that Buddhism consistently refrained from formulating any speculative theories about the absolute origin of things primarily due to its epistemological outlook. It is characteristic of the early Buddhism of the Pali canonical suttas that it claims to base its theory of reality on the data of experience alone. Experience, however, includes in the Buddhist view what Buddhism describes as the experience of *abhiññā* (higher knowledge or super cognition) in addition to the ordinary sensory experiences. Revelation, scriptural authority, and speculative reason are not recognized as dependable ultimate sources of knowledge. The Buddha claimed to have the ability to remember the past beyond one life time back into a beginningless series of past lives if he so wished to relive those memories. He also claimed the supercognitive ability to use clairvoyant vision *(dibbacakkhu)* to observe the present, unhindered by the physical or physiological limitations of oridinary vision. He did not claim (at least according to the material contained in the early stratum of canonical doctrine) to possess a faculty of knowing by which one could directly witness the past or the future. In accordance with this epistemological position, the first biginning of any individual life series which is subject to the *samsāric* process is said to be unknown *(anamataggo ayam samsāro, pubbā koti na paññāyati).* With regard to the individual, one can only speak of the origination or production *(samudaya)* of the unsatisfactory process of *dukkha* but not of any metaphysical soul or ego entity like in religious systems which have the concept of an immortal self. This process is to be accounted for by discovering the immediately perceivable conditions related to it. The canonical suttas contain a number of formulations stating the causal dependencies which explain the genesis of *dukkha* and the *samāric* process.[8] No particular causal factor is to be taken as the unconditioned first cause. Buddhism holds the same view about the evolution of the physical universe. It does not postulate an absolute beginning. It explicitly rejects the theory of divine creation. In the *Pātika Sutta* the Buddha claims to know the beginning of things *(aggaññañ ca.... pajānāmi).* Here, he rejects the view that one could account for the beginnings in terms of creation by God or Brahma *(issarakuttam brahmakuttam)*[9]. In the Buddhist view it is possible to speak only of relative beginnings. The Buddhist story of Genesis in the *Aggañña Sutta* may be said to be purported to state in the form of legendary history the relative beginnings and the gradual evolution of the physical world, sentient existence and man and his social institutions. Its significance ought to be judged not for the historical accuracy of what it states,

2. *Rgveda* X. 129. See also K. N. Jayatilleke's discussion of the Nāsadiya hymn in *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge* (George Allen and Unwin Ltd. London 1963) p. 25f.
3. *Rgveda*, X. 90.
4. *Atharvaveda*, xix, 6.6: *Pancavimsa Brāhmana*, vi. 1.6–11.
5. *Satapatha Brāhmana*, xi.1.6.1.
6. *Brhadāranyaka Upanisad*, I.4.
7. *Taittiriya Upanisad*, II. 1.
8. See specially the *Nidāna Samyutta* of the *Samyutta-nikāya*.
9. *Digha-nikāya* III, p. 28.

but for the underlying philosophical conceptions of the nature of man and the universe and the laws governing evolutionary processes of nature in the physical, social and psychological spheres. In this account may be found some of the deepest philosophical intuitions of Buddhist thought including the most noteworthy aspects of its social and political philosophy.

According to early Buddhist cosmology, the physical universe consists of innumerable world systems extending in the form of galactic clusters. The Buddhist conception of the universe does not accord with a narrow geocentric view which was common to most prescientific cultures. The world systems are said to be in a continuous process of evolution and involution over incalculable aeons going through periods of "opening out" *(vivattamāna)* and "closing in" *(saṃvaṭṭamāna)*. The recognition of the fact that despite the immensity and the apparent order and stability of our physical world, it is subject to the law of universal change is a reaffirmation of the Buddhist doctrine of transience *(anicca)*. The *Aggañña Sutta* states that during a period of involution, the larger part of sentient beings survives in the abode of luminous existence *(yebhuyyena sattā ābhassara-saṃvattanikā honti)*. This view is in accordance with the Buddhist theory of survival that until a living being eradicates craving it has to wander in the cycle of *saṃsāra*. It is said that when after a long period of time the world begins to evolve the beings from the luminous abode pass away and are reborn in this world. According to the description given in the sutta these beings possess no gross physical bodies, have a kind of astral or spiritual existence and do not feed on any material food but on joy. The Sutta says:

> Now at that time, all had become one world of water, dark and of darkness that maketh blind. No moon or sun appeared, no stars were seen, no constellations, neither was night manifest nor day, neither months nor half months, neither years nor seasons, female nor male. Beings were reckoned just as beings only.[10]

It says that after a time just as scum forms on the surface of boiled milky rice that is cooling, the earth begins to form on the expanse of water. Here Buddhism is putting forward a naturalistic notion of physical evolution in place of the current Brahmanical theories of divine origins of the natural world. However, as the description proceeds, the peculiarly Buddhist world view comes into focus in its assertion that even the physical and physiological changes are to be accounted for in terms of the motives and desires of sentient beings. The interaction between the psychical aspects of sentient existence and the physical environment is brought out in the legendary story that follows. The sensory qualities of colour, odour and taste are said to appear in the evolving earth-matter, giving rise to the psychological response of craving for the savoury earth. Thus the Buddhist story about the beginnings suggests that moral evil in the world is not due to the intervention of any supernatural agency benign or malign, but it is part of the process of dependent origination. Elsewhere in the suttas where deeper psychological analysis occurs, the origin of moral evil is traced to the process of sense perception beginning with the contact of the senses with the external world.

The *Aggañña Sutta* further says that the self-luminance of the first beings in the period of evolution disappears as a consequence of their craving for the savoury earth. When the self-luminance disappears the sun and the moon and stars and constellations become manifest giving rise to changes of season and the conventional distinctions between months, half months and years. When living beings feed on material food of the earth, they are said to have gradually undergone change in their physical constitution and appearance. This brings about distinction in the physical appearance of living beings. There comes a stage when the savoury earth also disappears and beings live on the vegetative outgrowths which appear subsequently on the surface of the earth. After a long process of evolution in which varieties of vegetation serve as the food for living beings, one being replaced by another, finally rice becomes their staple food.

Of special significance is the view presented in the sutta about the appearance of sexual distinction. The sutta says:

> And in measure as they, thus feeding, went on existing, so did the bodies of those beings become even more solid, and the divergence in their comeliness more pronounced. In the female appeared the distinctive features of the female, in the male those of the male. Then truly did woman contemplate man too closely and man, woman. In them contemplating over much the one the other, passion arose and burning entered their body. They in consequence thereof followed their lust (ibid. p. 85).

Buddhism explains the emergence of sex distinction as a consequence of an evolutionary process involving psychophysical interaction. This is in marked contrast to the Biblical view that it is an original distinction attributable to God, the supreme Creator. In the narrative itself the Buddhist attitude towards sex is expressed by saying that in the first occurrence of the sexual act it met with common disapproval. This is a reaffirmation of the early Buddhist position that sexual pleasures have to be transcended in order to attain the higher levels of spiritual maturity. The

10. *Dialogues of the Buddha* (SBE) ed. T.W. Rhys Davids, (London 1921) Part III, p. 82.

Aggañña Sutta account is in accord with the early Buddhist position that the higher religious life *(brahmacriya)* requires the transcendance of the vulgar pleasures of sexual union *(virato methuna gāmadhammā).*

The Buddhist story goes on in gradual stages to account for the evolution of the economic and social life of man from which some of the most important principles of Buddhist social and political philosophy can be derived. A crucial stage in the process of social evolution is the beginning of private property. The sutta says that the practice of common consumption of the produce of the earth is later replaceed by a system of private property. People errect fences and demarcate the boundaries of their own property. This marks the beginning of the evil practice of theft. Human greed leads to the evil practice of stealing the property of another person. This in turn marks the beginnings of a political order to regulate harmonious social and economic relationships. The first ruler, according to this Buddhist legend, is one elected by the people *(mahājanasammato).* By this story Buddhism appears to be challenging the predominant view about the nature of the authority of a ruler implicitly suggesting that the ruler's authority is derived from the people themselves, in the form of a social contract, decided on a political order headed by a king. Buddhism presents through this legend a radically different account of the source of political authority. The Buddhist legend gives strength to a democratic conception of the origin of political authority whereas the well known Brahmanical accounts seek to derive the authority of kings from a divine source. A peculiarly Buddhist etymology is suggested for the term *rājā* (king) saying "one is called *rājā* because he delights the people by his adherence to justice" *(dhammena janaṃ rañjetiti rājā).*

It is at this point that the main intention of the Sutta is thrown into clearer focus. In the introductory section of the Sutta which briefly states the circumstances under which the Buddha preached it, the Buddha asks one of his disciples named Vāseṭṭha, who had entered the Buddhist Order from a Brahmin family, about the common Brahmin reaction to his decision to lead a religious life under the Buddha who was a non-Brahmin teacher. Vāseṭṭha's answer suggests that it was definitely hostile reaction coloured by notions of the caste superiority of the Brahmins who claimed to be the direct progeny of Brahma, the creator God himself (ibid. p. 78). It is at this point that the Buddha remarks that the Brahmins display such an attitude because they are ignorant of the past *(porānaṃ asarantā)* and proceeds to speak of the origins of things. The Buddhist story rejects with subtle irony the Brahmanical view of a static, divinely ordained social order along with the social inequalities consisting of the privileges and immunities for the upper classes justified by the Brahmanical view of the nature and origin of society established on the authority of the sacred scriptures. The most striking feature of the Buddhist story is its explanation of the four caste groups then recognized in Indian society as a product of natural social processes. The story suggests that conventional social stratifications are not static features of the natural order of events, but depend on social conventions and socio-economic contingencies. In this connection, too, the Buddhist story introduces new etymologies with more concern for a moral purpose than their factual correctness. Rejecting the Brahmanical view about the nature of society, the *Aggañña Sutta* quite emphatically declares that the different castes arise out of beings who were originally equal and like unto each other *(tesaññeva sattānaṃ sadisānaññeva no asadisānaṃ).* As against the Brahmanical view Buddhism maintains that human beings belong to one species. The Buddhist account ends with emphasis on the supremacy of moral values insisting that the person who is endowed with right knowledge and good conduct is the highest among gods and men *(vijjācaraṇa sampanno so seṭṭho devamānuse).*

It may be said that the Buddhist story of Genesis illustrates clearly the contrasting paradigm of a non-theistic religious system like Buddhism when viewed in relation to theistic cosmogonies. The story gives expression to the non-authoritarian and humanistic character of Buddhism as a religious system. The view it presents about the nature of the cosmos and the processes of cosmic evolution may not have been intended to be based on historical facts. It represents an account of origins in keeping with the fundamental doctrinal tenets of Buddhism. It reaffirms the Buddhist positions that the question of absolute origins of things is unanswerable, that explanations in terms of creation by a supreme being are unsatisfactory, that change is a universal feature of all existence and that reference to material factors alone is incomplete as an explanation of changes in the sphere of sentient existence as well as its material and social envioronment. The role of the will and desire of beings in the processes of evolution is emphasized. A humanistic account of the nature of political authority as well as social institutions is presented with a view to affirming the overriding nature and the primacy of moral values in all human activities and relationships.

P. D. Premasiri

GENETICS is the science of the transmission of hereditary characteristics. The *nikāyas* seem to take for granted the fact of the transmission of hereditary characteristics

from parents to offspring. Therefore in the argument against the validity of caste distinctions the *Assalāyana Sutta (M.* II, p. 153) maintains that the offspring in an intercaste marriage would look like either the mother or the father. In the commentarial tradition genetic inheritance of the Bodhisatta seems to have been quite a concern, for it records that the Bodhisatta selected a virtuous lady of high birth as his mother *(DA.* II, p. 430).

The commentaries seem to have systematised the influences which shape human life when it puts forward the theory of the five cosmic laws called *pañca niyāma-dhamma.* The five are: *kammaniyāma,* (moral laws), *utuniyāma*(physical laws), *bijaniyāma,*(biological laws), *cittaniyāma,* (psychological laws), and *dhammaniyāma* (causal laws).[1] In this analysis genetics comes under *bija-niyāma* which is explained in the *Digha-nikāya* commentary (*DA.* II, p. 432) as the natural biological function of the fruit of rice coming from the rice seed, sweet taste from a seed which has sweetness inherent in it and bitter taste from a seed with bitterness inherent in it.

The *Saṃyutta-nikāya* (*S.* III, p. 54) enumerates five types of *bījas* or germinating agents, namely, *mūlabija, khandhabija, phalubija, aggabija* and *bijabija,* plants propagated by roots, stems, joints, shoots and seeds respectively. For proper germination and growth these *bījas* should be uninjured, fresh, not exposed to the elements and full of sap. They should be well planted on the ground and watered. When these conditions are fulfilled the *bījas* germinate and grow.

In this *sutta* the four stations of consciousness *(catasso viññāna* are compared to the earth element in association with *thitiyo)* which the *bijas* germinate. These four stations of consciousness are none other than the four aggregates *rūpa, vedanā, saññā* and *saṅkhāra* in association with which only can *viññāna* thrive. The *sutta* states that it is impossible for *viññāna* to grow apart form these four. The passionate delight *(nandirāga)* one takes in existence and sense experience is similar to the element of water which helps the plant to grow. Consciousness endowed with the nutriments is comparable to the five kinds of *bijas* or germinating agents.

According to Buddhism heredity is not the only factor which determines the morphological structure and character traits of an individual. The *mahātanhā-saṅkhaya Sutta* maintains that for conception to take place there should be not only the union of parents during the mother's fertile period, but also the presence of the *gandhabba* (q.v.) (*M.* I, p.265). By *gandhabba* is meant the karmically propelled consciousness of an individual awaiting rebirth after death.[2] When conception takes place by the satisfactory fulfilment of these conditions the physical structure and the character traits of the new born individual are determined by what the parents contribute as well as by the contribution made by the karmic heritage of the individual seeking rebirth. Therefore the *Cūlakammavibhaṅga Sutta (M.* III, p. 203) says that beings are owners of their deeds *(kamma),* inheritors of their deeds, deeds are their matrix, deeds are their kinsmen and deeds are their resort. If, for instance, an individual has caused injury to other beings in the past and if he happens to be reborn as a human being he is subject to physical deformities and ailments. If he has deprived others of life he gets a short span of life etc.

The *Aṅguttara-nikāya (A.* I, p. 176) looks at the phenomenon of conception from another angle. It states that conception takes place *(gabbhassavakkanti hoti)* depending on the presence of six elements. They are the elements of earth, water, fire, air, space and consciousness *(viññānadhātu).* When we compare this statement with that of the *Mahātaṇhāsaṅkhaya Sutta* quoted above it appears that the parental contribution is represented by the five physical elements and *gandhabba* is represented by *viññānadhātu.* According to the *Aṅguttara-nikāya (A.* I, pp. 223-224) *kamma* is the field, consciousness *(viññāṇa)* is the seed and craving *(taṇhā)* is the moisture for the birth of beings in the spheres of sense pleasures *(kāmadhātu),* material form *(rūpadhātu)* and immateriality *(arūpadhātu).*

These *suttas* go a long way to show that according to Buddhism parental contribution alone is not sufficient for the birth of a human being. If the karmically energised consciousness of a being awaiting rebirth is not present conception cannot take place.

It is important to note that there is a close relationship between *kamma* and *saṅkhāra,* the latter being used as a more precise technical term which has psychological connotations, whereas *kamma* is a general term which has gained greater popular currency. The *Saṃyutta-nikāya (S.* III, p. 87) maintains that the five aggregates which go to make up the human being are constituted into what they are by the *saṅkhāras,* the purposive motivational forces of the mind. The *saṅkhāras* mould the body into what it is, the sensations..... perceptions..... volitional activities ....and consciousness into what they are *(rūpaṃ rūpattāya saṅkhatam abhisaṅkharonti.... vedanaṃ vedanattāya....saññaṃ saññattāya.... saṅkhāre saṅkhārattāya.... viññāṇaṃ viññāṇattāya*

1. *Dhammaniyāma* is explained as casual laws on the strength of *S.* II, p.25 - *thitā va sā dhātu dhammaṭṭhitatā dhammaniyāmatā idappaccayatā.*

2. O. H. de A. Wijesekera, 'Vedic Gandharva and Pali Gandhabba', in *University of Ceylon Review,* Vol. III, No. 1, April 1945.

sankhatam abhisankharonti. Sankhatam abhisankharontiti. Sankhatam abhisankharontiti kho bhikkhave tasmā sankhārā ti vuccanti). Thus the five aggregates are said to be moulded into their present form by the work of *sankhāras*. It is the same idea that is expressed in more popular language by the statement that beings inherit their *kamma*. The *Samyutta-nikāya (S.* II p. 65) states that the body has to be understood as not being one's own or anybody else's, but as old *kamma* which has been compounded, willed and made sensitive *(nāyam kāyo tumhākam na pi aññesam. Purānam idam kammam abhisankhatam abhisañcetayitam vedaniyam datthabbam).* Similarly the sense faculties are also recognised as being determined by former *kamma (S.* IV, p. 132). Thus the physical structure of the body including sense faculties owes its particular formation to the *kammic* heritage. It can be said that the *kammic* potentialities inherent in the *gandhabba/viññāna*, the rebirth seeking consciousness, choose a particular genetic pattern which is a suitable medium for their expression out of innumerable cell conbinations made possible by the parental genetic heritage.

The *Lakkhana Sutta* enumerates thirty-two signs of a great man visible on the body of the Buddha. The *sutta* maintains that these physical characteristics are the results of noble deeds done by the Bodhisatta in previous births as a human being. For example the Buddha has a lustrous pair of deep blue eyes with long eye lashes because he had always looked at people with pleasant eyes (*D.* III, p.167). The *sutta* seems to provide testimony to the statement that the body is a fabrication of the *kammic* heritage.

The episode of Pilindivaccha (*Udāna* p. 28) shows that habits are strong and that they survive death as they form part and parcel of the *kammic* heritage of man. Pilindivaccha was an arahant but he was in the habit of addressing others as *vasalā*'outcastes.' The Buddha saw this as the residue of an old *samsāric* habit of his and explained that this monk had been born a brahmin continuously during 500 previous births where he was used to addressing others as *vasalā*. The habit persists in spite of his having attained arahantship. The *Tittha Jātaka (J.* I, p. 182) relates how a pupil of Sāriputta could not make any progress with the contemplation on the impurity of the body *(asubhabhāvanā).* The Buddha explained that this monk had been a goldsmith during 500 previous births and therefore the loathesomeness of the body does not appeal to him as an object of meditation *(kammatthāna).* Such are a few particular instances recorded in the texts which can be pointed out as evidence for the *kammic* heritage of man, beisdes, of course numerous episodes in the *Vimānavatthu, Petavatthu* etc.

The *Mahā Dhammapāla Jātaka (J.* IV, pp. 50-55) is an excellent episode which illustrates the Buddhist belief that the *kammic* heritage determines even the genetic heritage of man. Dhammapāla's family had observed the basic five precepts meticulously for seven generations. As a result of the accumulation of wholesome *kamma* thus, it is said, that none in this family died without re[illegible]ng ripe old age.

It can be concluded that man inherits a particular genetic pattern from his parents in consonance with his *kammic* heritage. The former is but a suitable medium of expression for the potentialities of the latter.

Lily de Silva

GERMANY, BUDDHISM IN. The Greeks were the first Europeans who know anything about Buddhism. Thanks to the expedition of Alexander the Great, when they got information about Indian Philosophy they already noticed the differences between the doctrines of the Brāhmanas and Samanas. The scanty remarks that have come down to us from early writers whose works have been lost are chiefly found in the books of the Fathers of the Christian Church. Clemens of Alexandria (150-122 A.C.) already mentions a stūpa which he calls a pyramid and St. Hieronynus (circa 420 A.C.) records that Buddha was born in a superhatural way; but when he tells that his mother was virgin this is apparently a confusion with the story of the birth of Jesus Christ. It was from works like these that German scholars derived their first knowledge of Buddhism.

Another way in which the message of the Buddha reached central Europe during the Middle Ages was through the legends which though Christian in garb were Buddhistic in essence. In the legends of Hubertus, Julianus, Placidus and other Christian Saints it is related that they were in their youth great hunters, did not believe in Christ and even persecuted Christianity. One day when chasing a stag, it led the hunter away from his companions and stopped in the midst of a forest. Then the hunter noticed that a radiant cross with the picture of Christ was between the antlers, and the stag began to speak; "Why do you persecute me? I am Christ, believe in me, become baptised." The hunter does accordingly. The story seems to be a Christian adaptation of *Nigrodha miga Jātaka* because in Christianity Christ never takes the shape of an animal, although in Buddhist literature, there are many stories of Buddha having been born as an animal in his previous existences. There are some other Christian legends also that seem to be adaptations of Buddhist stories.

The most conspicuous of these legends is that of Barlam and Josaphat (Joasaph). It tells of the Indian King Abenner, who was opposed to Christianity. When a son Josaphat was born to the King who had been childless for many years, the astrologers predicted his future greatness and wisdom and that he would abandon the religion of his fathers and turn to Christianity. When the king heard this he was greatly distressed and to avert the fulfilment of this prophecy he built a palace where the prince was confined so that he should not come into contact with misery or death. When the prince had grown up he was allowed by his father to leave the palace for a ride. On this occasion he met a blind man, a leper, an aged man and a corpse, and heard that misfortunes and miseries are the common lot of a man. He was deeply moved and then heard that the secret of deliverance from these woes was known only to holy hermits. Under the guise of a jewel merchant the anchorite Barlaam preached to him the Christian doctrine and converted him. After several futile attempts on the part of the king to lead Josaphat back to his faith, the prince forsook his home, he bacame a disciple of Barlaam and led an ascetic life. After Barlaam's death Josaphat lived alone in the desert for many years. After his decease his body was taken to India. At his tomb many miracles occurred.

Already the Portuguese writer Diogo de Couto was struck by the great resemblance of a part of this legend with that of Buddha's renunciation of the world. He therefore wrote about it in his work *"De cada quinta das Asia des deites quo os Portugueses fizerae"*(Lisboa 1612 p.123) and later writers have done much to show that the legend is an adaptation of Buddhist prototypes. The name of the prince Josaphat is a corrupt form of the title Bodhisattva; perhaps a reminiscence of the king of Judah of this name mentioned in the Bible (2 Chron. Ch. 17-20) may be one of the reasons for the change. Barlaam is the well known epithet of the Buddha, Bhagavān (the Lord). Thus the great Indian religious teacher reappears again in a double form in the West and is venerated as a Christian saint.

The reason for this duplication may have been, as Ernst Kuhn surmises, that according to Buddhist teaching Buddha has found the truth by himself whereas for a Christian this is not possible. Other names occurring in the story also seem to be derived from the Indian legends. Thus Zardan, the nobleman entrusted with the guardianship of the young prince has been identified with Chandaka, Gautama's charioteer and the companion in his flight from his father's palace."

The legend exists in many versions in many different languages. There have been discussions about the question which version may be the oldest one. Some scholars think a Pahlavi rendering, no longer extant and composed about the time of the reign of Chosroes, the Great of Persia (A.C. 531-579) represents the most ancient text. They believe that a Syriac translation, attributed to the sixth century, was the source of the earliest Greek translation. Others think that this Greek rendering represents the first known version. The Greek translation is ascribed to "John Monk of the Convent of St. Sabas", but it appears among the works of St John of Damascus. Until now it was believed that this attribution of its authorship to this famous Father of the Church was wrong. In a attribution entitled *"Studies Patristica et Byzanting, Vol. 1"* the celebrated professor of Byzantine Studies at the University of Munich, Francis Doelger has proved that the author of the Greek text was really the famous Johannes of Damascus, who is acknowledged as the last great Father of the Greek Church. He lived for about twenty years in the Sabas monastery in Jerusalem and died in 750 A.C. It is not certain from which source the priest obtained this knowledge of the story, but it is quite certain that the subject matter of this book has partly its ultimate source in India. In the Middle Ages Barlaam and Josaphat were very popular saints so that the Greek Church dedicated August 25th to be the commomoration of St. Jasaphat and the Roman Church November 27th to the joint service of the two saints (they first appear in the Martyrologium of 1538). So strong was the conviction of the historicity of these saints that relics of St. Josaphat in the form of a bone and part of the spine were shown in Venice until the sixteenth century, when they were brought to Lisbon and finally to Antwerp. It is very curious that in this way the Buddha has become a saint of two Christian churches.

In our context it is noteworthy that the two saints were venerated in Germany especially since Rudolf Von Eus (1200-1254) has written a German biography in poetical form, using as his source a Latin version of the ancient legend. How widely the fame of the saints spread in Germany one guess from the fact that even in far away Eastern Prussia there was no library of the Toutonic order which this work was not in hand.

As we have seen all the news about the Buddha that reached Germany during the Middle Ages came from literary sources. It was not until later on that Germany obtained first-hand knowledge from the writings of Marco Polo (1256-1323) and other travellers who visited the countries of Asia. As the Indian sub-continent was no

longer Buddhist at the time many books dealing with India which appeared since Vasco da Gama's exploration of the sea route (1498) do not mention Buddhism. The first information about the Buddhist doctrine, therefore, came from Ceylon, Burma, Siam, China, Japan and Tibet. The earliest attempts to explain the Buddhist teaching and to connect Buddhism with the history of the Western world were very fanciful. So the German physician Engelbert Kampfer (1651-1716) who visited Siam and Japan, believed that Buddha was originally an Egyptian priest who fled to India because King Gambyses who ruled Persia (529-22 B.C.) had killed the sacred bull of Apis when he had conquerred Egypt. But gradually the knowledge of Buddhism increased and the German public took more interest in the tenets of Buddhism. It was the philosopher Leibniz who already mentioned the "*śūnya*" of Mahāyāna and Germany's greatest philosopher Immanuel Kant dealt in his lectures on Geography with Buddhism in the form of Theravāda and Mahāyāna. Relying on the books of travel he wrote "the Talapeins (monks) of Fegu are praised as world's kindliest men. They live on the food for which they beg at the houses and give to the poor what they do not need for themselves. They do good to all living beings without making any discrimination of religion. They think that all religions are good which make men good and amiable. Kant already knew that Buddhists do not believe in a Creator and a ruler of the universe who judges men after death, for he writes "they reject the idea of a divine providence but teach that vices are punished and virtues are recompensed by a fatal necessity."

Kant did not know much about Buddhism because he lived at a time when Buddhist texts had not yet been studied and translated by European scholars. It was only after his death that Western Indology and Buddhology had their beginnings. French and English savants were the first to occupy themselves with Buddhist texts in Sanskrit and Pali. German scholars at this time devoted their labours chiefly to Hindu religion and poetry. Nevertheless the knowledge of Buddhism spread more and more. Buddhism even won an enthusiastic admirer in the philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860). He had been introduced by Frederic Major to the study of Indian antiquity in 1814 and from this time on he was greatly influenced by it in framing his own metaphysical system. When he died he left a large library which contained almost all the important books on Buddhism published in Europe at his time. He believed in a profound conformity of his doctrine with that of the Buddha. These are his words: "If I were to take the results of my philosophy as a yardstick for the truth I would concede to Buddhism the preeminence of all the religions in the world. In any case I can be glad to see that my teaching is in such great harmony with a religion which has the greatest number of adherents on earth." There are indeed many points in which the German philosopher agrees with Buddhism. They both deny the existence of a Personal God, they teach that the cosmic process has no beginning nor end, they assume the existance of many world systems, they make no essential but only a gradual difference between man and animals, they do not believe in immortal souls or metempsychosis but in palingenesia caused by the will *(saṃskāra)* of the previous existence. They acknowledge a moral law as a moving factor in the universe. Though they both have a pessimistic outlook on life, they are optimists insofar as they are both convinced of the possibility of a liberation from the trammels of existence. Just as for the Buddha, for Schopenhauer too the state of deliverance cannot be explained with the help of terms and words belonging to our world. Schopenhauer's system being an original and independent outcome of his own thinking it differs, of course, in many points from Buddhism, a fact which partly finds its reason in the circumstance that at the time of Schopenhauer Buddhism was not yet sufficiently known in Europe.

Schopenhauer was a great herald of Buddhist wisdom; his works have had a very deep influence on many other thinkers and last but not the least, they have stimulated many scholars to study Buddhism thoroughly. So Schopenhauer, though himself was not a Buddhist theologist, has done much for the development of Buddhist studies in Germany in the second half of the last century. These studies inaugurated by the works of Christian Lassen (1800-1876) have found their acme in F. Max Muller, Hermann Oldenberg, Wilhelm Geiger and a galaxy of other scholalrs.

Helmuth von Glasenapp

General Outlook

In contrast to the spread of Buddhism in the countries of Asia, the Dhamma was not brought to Germany by Buddhist 'missionaries' but the Germans themselves went to the East to bring home the teaching of Gotama, the Buddha. There are several reasons why the Germans had become interested in Buddhism.

At least since the 'Romantic Age', if not earlier, i.e., from the beginning of the 19th century, Indian wisdom, and India herself became an object of sentimental attachment among German thinkers and poets. Goethe himself wrote highly in praise of Kālidāsa's *Śākuntalā*. This sentimental attachment was extended to the Buddha and his teaching when the first reliable news became known by the middle of the past century. The philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer, the composer Richard Wagner and many others did much to spread the knowledge of the Buddha's teaching among the educated

classes of Germany. In spite of the fact that Buddhism had long ago ceased to be a major living religion of India, India and Buddhism became closely associated in the minds of Germans. This holds true even today. And because Germany had at no time political and special commercial interests in India, this great sympathy underwent no changes in the course of history.

In the 19th century, there was an evergrowing criticism directed against the Christian church and its teaching, and a strong anticlerical movement. Critical thinkers who were at the same time religiously minded, welcomed the teaching of the Dhamma which had been brought by Indological scholars in their painstaking studies to Germany. This critical mind, dissatisfied with the creed in the dogmatically fixed teaching of the Church found unbound freedom of research and expression in Buddhism.

Scholars of comparative religion, of history, and of linguistics, did eager research work in editing and translating Buddhist texts of the Theravāda, and, to a lesser degree, of the Mahāyāna. In spite of the fact that these scholars as a rule remained to be Free-thinkers, or even Christians, most of them became very friendly towards Buddhism, in this way helping much to make Buddhism acceptable to the German public.

A the same time, when the scriptures of the Theravāda became the main subject of study to those interested in the Dhamma, it was the magnificent Buddhist art or Japan, China, Korea and Tibet which caught the eye of both connoisseur and layman. It is interesting to state that though the 'Far East' is for almost all reasons indeed 'far' removed from European mentality, the Buddhist art, say of Japan, is holding the first place in the estimation of German Buddhist, even of those belonging to the Theravāda. Quite a number of persons became Buddhists by the mere charm of the Buddha-statues from the Far East. And, in addition, a Buddha image will be found in many non-Buddhist homes in Germany, where it is an object of aesthetic appreciation and, more important than that, of pure sympathy, blended with the sympathy for India and the 'Romantic East.'

Formerly it has been said that the Germans are a people of 'thinkers and poets', and there is still some truth in this statement. The philosophical character of the Dhamma greatly appealed to their minds. But following a trend of enthusiasm the first Buddhists in Germany went to the extremes instead of walking the path step by step. The image of the Buddhist put before the German public was that of an Arahat and not that of the ordinary layman or Upāsaka. Thus the interpretation of the Dhamma by Buddhists at the turn of the last century during the first decades of the present one suffered from an extremely monkish outlook thereby causing much harm to a wider acceptance of Buddhism by the people. Instead of bringing forth the Buddhist virtues of *mettā*, *karuṇā*, and *muditā*, mainly *upekkhā* was praised as a Buddhist virtue, all the others being more or less disdained as 'fetters' in a subtle disguise. Much harm has been done by this one-sided presentation, so that even today some people stay away from Buddhism because they rightly feel they cannot act as an Arahat does.

The German Buddhists became aware of the Buddha through Buddhist art, of the Dhamma by an abundance of most excellent books on Buddhism and translations from the *Tipiṭaka*, mostly of the *Suttapiṭaka*, but they had a distorted idea of the Saṅgha because they had never seen a *bhikku* in their country. Those Germans who joined the Saṅgha, remained as a rule in Sri Lanka or in Myanmar. With the exception of short and rare visits it is only since the Second World War that *bhikkhus* were staying more frequently for longer periods in Germany. This is mainly due to the efforts of the 'German Dharmaduta Society' of Sri Lanka and some organizations in Thailand.

Now, anyone who has visited Buddhist countries in South and South-East Asia has found to his pleasant surprise that the *bhikkhu* he meets there are not aloof and 'cold' as he might have expected from his book-knowledge, but extremely friendly and full of human warmth. They are not Arahats who take no interest in the life of their fellow men, but are rather well-wishers to the gradual spiritual advancement of the Upāsakas.

The misunderstanding of the character of the Theravāda has turned some Buddhists during recent years towards the Mahāyāna, especially towards, Zen, and a few towards Lamaism. In the long run, however, it is hardly to be expected that the Mahāyāna will gain much ground in Germany. Those who are inclined to rites, ceremonies, and mysticism can easily find their spiritual home in Roman Catholicism. Those who put creed and belief first in their spiritual aspirations could well remain in the Protestant Church. Theravāda, on the other hand, can meet an urgent need, in fact it is the only stronghold against dogmatiom and materialism and the new belief in science. The interest a minority of German Buddhist holds in Mahāyāna will help to free Theravāda from some constrictions acquired during the long history of the Dhamma.

Historical Survey

When in the second half of the nineteenth century Buddhism came to the attention of the German public, the Christian churches were in a dominant position. Membership in one of the main denomination, Protestant in Northern Germany, Roman Catholic in Southern and Western Germany was practically obligatory for candidates to hold an office in the public services. While the

Protestant church was, in general, more tolerant, the Roman Chtholic church kept a strict control over the minds of the population. Persons who turned to Buddhism, did as a rule, not publicize this fact. Up to the thirties of the present century many were shy to break officially with the church, an act which had to be done by a declaration at a magistrate's court. In the past century this was legally not even possible. Independent philosophers might announce their sympathy and preference for Buddhism, but even Schopenhauer did not officially leave the Protestant church and was in consequence buried according to the Christan rites.

However, when more people became earnestly interested in Buddhism and tried to apply its teachings to their way of life, attempts were made to found Buddhist communities. Not all will be mentioned here. In 1903, Dr. Karl Seidenstücker, an Indological scholar, founded in Leipzig the "Buddhistischer Missions - verein für Deutschland" renamed, 1906, "Buddhistische Gassellschaft für Deutschland". It was he who edited, in 1905, the first Buddhist periodical in Germany; which also changed its name: "Der Buddhist" - "Buddhistische Warte" - "Mahabodhiblätter". In 1911, the society's name was changed into "Deutscher Zweig der Mahabodhi Gesellschaft".

In 1912, Dr. Woldgang Bohn organized the "Bund für buddhistisches Leben" in Halle. It was affiliated to the "Deutscher Zweig der Mahabodhigesellschaft" in 1921. The society's activities ended in 1928. There were branches of this society in Munich, Hamburg, Berlin, and Breslau. Dr. Bohn was a physician like many of the prominent Buddhists in Germany. Together with Ludwig Ankenbrand he published in 1913 the periodical "Zeitschrift für Buddhismus," its editor after the First World War was for several years the renowned scholar Wilhelm Geiger.

These early attempts at founding Buddhist communities did not meet with much success. This could be expected for several reasons. One of them was the fact that at that time persons likely to becom interested in Buddhism were dissatisfied with every form of organized religion: Churches, priesthood, rituals, and ceremonies. The predominant form of Buddhism in the country was strict Theravāda. As pointed out earlier the *bhikku*-ideal was foremost in the minds of the first European Buddhists. Now, the fact that the most learned and eager Buddhists left Europe to enter the Saṅgha in Myanmar or Sri Lanka has rightly be considered a handicap for the propagadtion of the Dhamma in the West. This tendency has continued up to this day, and attempts to build up a Saṅgha in Germany has failed in consequence. In the course of the years, more than 100 Germans joined the Saṅgha in South-East Asia for a shorter or longer period, among them were the prominent scholars Nyanatiloka and Nyanaponika, who were proficient in Pali and Buddhism.

Scanning the Buddhist literature of that time one will find that emphasis was on "science" and "reason" in the Dhamma. At the same time special importance was attributed to practising Buddhism by keeping the *sīlas*. On the other hand, meditation in the technical meaning of the word, e.g. *Satipaṭṭhāna* was more or less neglected. No qualified teachers were in residence in Germany. In course of time some changes took place. The necessity to practise *Mettā* became evident after the holcaust of the First World War and its aftermath, unprecedented in history. Mahāyāna was considered to have a stronger emotional appeal than the Theravāda and won more interest than it had drawn before. However, it should not be forgotten that it had some sympathizers as early as the beginning of the century. Indeed, among the very first books published on Buddhism in the middle of the 19th century there were also Mahāyāna-scriptures.

In the years between the two wars, several Buddhist groups were reactivated, others newly founded. But to this day they never won a great number of active members, most Buddhists still prefer to remain unorganized.

At that time, there was an important development which helped to give the Dhamma a sound basis in Germany. Two permanent centres were created. They are intimately connnected with the names of two prominent Buddhists who had the greatest influence on the spread of the Dhamma in Germany. They are Dr. Paul Dahlke, and Dr. Georg Grimm.

In 1924, "Das Buddhistische Haus Berlin-Frohman" was opened to the public by a well known physican, Paul Dahlke. In a beautiful suburb of Berlin, then the political and cultural capital of Germany, a Buddhist temple and residence were completed. It was the first building especially erected for Buddhism in Europe. It has remained a centre of Buddhist activities up to this day. In 1957, it was acquired by the German Dharmaduta Society, and since that time qualified *bhikkhus* from Sri Lanka are residing there. Paul Dahlke (1865-1928) was since 1903 one of the foremost Buddhist authors of his time. Many of his books have been translated into English, one into Japanese. He had visited several times India, Sri Lanka, South-East Asia and Japan. He studied Pali in Sri Lanka, one of his teachers being Hiddkaduwe Sri Sumangala. Dahlke adhered to the Theravāda in its strictest form, but appreciated much the Buddhist art of Japan. In fact, the temple of his "Buddhistisches Haus" is in the Japanese style. From 1917 to his death in 1928, he published in his periodical "Neubuddhistische Zeitschrift", later on renamed "Die Brockensammlung" meaning *piṇḍapāta* - outstanding articles on the

Dhamma, many of them dealing with modern sociological and political problems from the Buddhist point of view. In addition to his main works, he translated widely from the *Suttapitaka,* adding commentaries of his own to these translations. Himself a physician and natural scientist, he exposed the fallacies of the materialistic concept of life as it was held in vogue by scientists of his time. In constrast to them he explained how the Buddhist teaching of *kamma* and rebirth did solve the problems of life and death. Paul Dahlke was an independent thinker and contributed an explanation of the *paticcasamuppāda* according to Buddhist exegesis. He refused to limit the *paticcasamuppāda* only to explain rebirth through three existences: past, present and future. Instead he showed how it can be applied also to this very existence. It is remarkable how Dahlke derived from the study of the *Suttapitaka* and meditation without a thorough knowledge of the *Abhidhammapitaka* – an explanation of the *paticcasamuppāda.* which comes close to the one termed *ekacittakkhanika-paticcasamuppāda.* (causal genesis within a single moment of consciousness) in the *Vibhanga.*

One of his followers, Dr. Max Bruno (later Anuruddha Thera) especially dealt in his thought provoking lectures with the problem of *avijjā* in the *paticcasamuppāda.*

At this point, reference must be made to the long controversy between Dahlke and Grimm concerning the correct interpretation of *anatta.* Dahlke struck to the official Theravāda teaching and Buddhaghosa's commentaries. Quite a different view was taken by Grimm. In his "great syllogism" he argued that while the five *khandhas* are *anicca, dukkha,* and *anatta* the real *atta* was to be found behind them. This unfortunate controversy was taken up by many Buddhists siding either with Dahlke or Grimm. It brought about a rift which prevented a closer cooperation of the different groups. After the Second World War this rift has been closed. The disputed question has been left to the discretion of the individual and is no more a hindrance to friendly cooperation.

The second permanent centre is the "Buddhistisches Haus Georg Grimm" established in 1935 in Utting near Munich. It is the headquarters of the "Altbuddhistische Gemeinde" which was founded, under another name, by Dr. Georg Grimm (1868-1945) and Dr. Karl Seidenstücker in Munich in 1921. Grimm began his studies with theology but later changed to law and philosophy. He served for some time as a judge but retired early to spend his time on Buddhist studies. He was born as a Roman Catholic in Bavaria, Dahlke as a Protestant in East Prussia. Grimm's background was philosophy, Dahlke's natural sciences. Grimm was a personal friend of Paul Deussen, who had studied Schopenhauer and Indian philosophy, especially the Upanishads and Vedanta. Dahlke declined to found an organized community, Grimm did, his community is active to this day. He wrote many well known books on the Dhamma which have been translated into English and other languages.

The third permanent centre was established only after the Second World War, in 1962, at Roseburg, 50 kms. from Hamburg. It is the "Haus der Stille". Many seminars and summer schools are being held there, the most of the time a *bhikkhu* is in residence. Several *bhikkhus* from Thailand have visited the place conducting meditation classes.

To foster the study of Buddhism the first European Buddhist congress was held in Berlin, in Setpember 1933. It was organized by Dr. Wolfgang Schumacher, a pupil of Dahlke.

In the middle of the Second World War, a suppression and persecution of Buddhist groups was started by the Nazi government. The date was the summer of 1941 after the spectacular flight of Rudolf Hess to Scotland in his attempt to bring about a peace agreement. Hess was known for his interest in exotic religions, and mysticism. His very high rank in the political hierarch had acted somehow as a protection for those religions, among them was Buddhism. An additional protection was at first the fact that Germany's war ally, Japan, was a country with a prominent Buddhist population. In addition, Buddhism was an Aryan religion. Now, several prominent Buddhists were arrested, others were forbidden to teach the Dhamma. The "Gemeinde un Buddha" in Berlin, founded by Martin Steinke in 1922, was closed down, its property was confiscated.

After the Second World War, the need for an engagement of the religions in solving the problems of the world was even more keenly felt than some 30 years before. Buddhist establishments were reactivated again, new groups were founded, e.g. the "Buddhistische Gesellschaft" of Munich (1948), Berlin (1951) Hamburg (1954), the "Buddhistisches Seminar" Hamburg (1948) and the "Buddhistisches Sekretariat" Berlin (1946). This time, from the very beginning a healthy spirit of tolerance prevailed. The terrible experiences of the war and its aftermath were foremost in the mind of the people. The wish for cooperation resulted eventually in the formation of the "Arbeits-gemeinschaft der Kirchen und Religionsgesellschaften in Berlin", all churches and religious communities being represented by delegates, and so are the Buddhists. One of the results of its existence is the fact that regularly twice a year Buddhist lectures are broadcast over the RIAS radio station in Berlin (West). This is quite unique in Europe.

The authorities of Berlin (West) take a friendly interest in the activities of the Buddhists, e.g. the senator for science and art declared open the newly built library of

the "Buddhistisches Haus"; also financial help has been granted.

Most Buddhists in Germany adhere to the Theravāda, but there are also followers of the Mahāyāna, e.g. the active "Arya Maitreya Mandala" of the Vajrayāna school (Berlin and other cities 1952), and the "Buddhistische Gemeinschaft Jōdo Shinshū" (Berlin 1956). Since about 1964, also Zen Buddhism has been favoured by quite a number of Germans. As in life it is in history: one cannot dissect a development into exactly defined periods. Though interest in Zen became evident after the Second World War, Zen was not entirely unknown to the German public before.

Today meditation, both *Satipaṭṭhāna* and *Zazen*, is being practised under the guidance of resident or visiting meditation masters from Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Japan, mostly in Berlin and Hamburg (Roseburg).

The Dhamma came first to Germany through books, therefore a word should be added on the Buddhist literature now available in the German language. It is immense in quantity and excellent in quality. Of the original scriptures practically the whole *Suttapiṭaka* has been translated from the Pali into German, and the Suttas have held to this day the main interest of German Buddhists. Foremost among the translators were Karl Eugen Neumann (1865-1915) Nyanatiloka Mahāthera (1878-1957), Karl Seidenstücker, Paul Dahlke (1865-1928), Wilhelm Geiger, and Julius Dutoit. Max Walleser should be mentioned as a translator and interpreter of Mahāyāna scriptures. Buddhological studies have been conducted at most of Germany's universities in the field of Indology and Comparative Religion. A special chair for Buddhological studies has been created at the University of Hamburg.

Predictions about the future are impossible, speculations sometimes futile. Concerning the future of Buddhism in Germany much depends on the general trend of thought which will prevail among the younger generation. It is almost certain that there will be no large communities. Few persons in this country become Buddhists "by birth", the majority turns to the Dhamma out of personal conviction. One should never forget that Buddhists form only a tiny minority of the German people. The Germans have to a great extent left the churches and are, at present much inclined to agnosticism. But already the end of this trend is in sight. Though no considerable growth in the number of "professing" Buddhists in to be expected, there is no doubt that Buddhist ideas have already widely penetrated the minds of the educated classes. This knowledge of Buddhist ideas and its beneficial influence will continue to grow.

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Guido Auster

GEYYA, the second of the nine-fold division or literary composition types of the word of the Buddha *(navaṅga satthu sāsana)* which constitute the *Tipiṭaka* or the Buddhist Canon. The word is derived from the Vedic *gai,* meaning 'to sing' and it means 'that which should be recited or sung'. According to the commentator Buddhaghosa (*VinA.* 1, p.28) discourses of the Buddha in prose *(sutta)* with verses or *gāthas* interspersed are *disignated as geyya,* and the *Sagāthā vagga* (chapter with verses) of the *Saṃyutta nikāya (S.* 1, p. 1ff.) is given as an example. See AṄGA(2), GĀTHĀ and NAVAṄGA.

W. G. Weeraratne

GHAṆTASĀLĀ, a village in the Tsallāpalli Zamindari in South India, thirteen miles west of Masulipatam. Here are found the remains of an ancient Buddhist site exposing a glorious civilization that flourished in Andhra in the earliest period of her history (K.R. Subramaniam, *Buddhist Remains in Andhra,* 11, 12).

Great stūpas with surrounding monasteries have existed at this Buddhist site (B. Rowland, *The Art and Architecture of India,* 116). Excavations conducted here in the quarter of the nineteenth century have brought to light the remains of a stūpa constructed of bricks, and measuring 122 feet in diameter. This stūpa probably belonged to the period a few years subsequent to the later works at Amarāvatī (q.v.). Its remaining walls show the arrangement of a dome not hitherto met with in any of the sites examined in South India. In the centre is a cube of solid brickwork, measuring ten feet square. Around it is a hollow chamber, nineteen feet square, with walls 4 feet 3 inches thick. Around this wall, and several feet away from it is a circular wall 3 feet 6 inches thick and 5 feet 10 inches in exterior diameter. Around it is another massive circular wall of brick, measuring 18 feet 3 inches thick. Now, the cube at the centre is connected with the walls of the square chamber by four cross walls. This chamber, in turn, is connected with the inner circular wall by twelve such cross walls and the inner circular wall is connected with the outer circular wall by sixteen such

cross walls. Thus in the square space there are four chambers, between this square and the inner circular wall twelve chambers and between the inner circular wall and the outer circular wall sixteen chambers. All these chambers were filled with a kind of black mud (A. Rea, *South Indian Buddhist Antiquities*, 32, See ground plan). It has been conjectured (Rea, op. cit. p.39) that the inner circle represents the original dome, while the walls outside it are the foundations of the processional paths around it.

Fragments of sculptured marbles of the Amarāvatī type, possessing the same refined qualities, have been found at Ghaṇtasālā (K. R. Subramaniam, op.cit. p. 17). A beautiful representation of a stūpa, similar to those found at Amarāvatī, and a finely sculptured slab representing the worship of the sacred Bodhi-tree are among them (A Rea, op. cit. Plates XXVII and XXVIII). Many of the marble slabs are plain.

It is not possible to say whether a stone railing stood around the stūpa (Rea, op. cit. p.33), but if the sculptured slab mentioned above is a representation of this monument, then it could be said that this stūpa was very much similar to that of Amarāvatī with all its embellishments. That the stūpa had, like those at Amarāvatī and Nāgārjuna-koṇḍa, the set of five beautifully carved *āyaka* pillars at each of its four gates is indicated by an epigraph from Ghaṇtasālā which registers the gift of one such pillar (cp. *EI.* XXVII, p.4).

Other epigraphs discovered at Ghaṇtasālā (*EI.* XXVII, pp. 1-4) also contain material of some historical importance though they give neither dates, nor names of kings or dynasties. Two of them, incised on sculptured pillars in a remarkably decorative writing similar to those of the epigraphs of the Ikshavaku dynasty from Jaggayyapeta and Nāgārjunakoṇḍa and assigned to about the third century A.C., mention the construction of a stone *maṇḍapa* with a *gandhakuṭi*, a railing *(vedikā)* and a *toraṇa* at Ukhasirivaddhamāna by a resident of Kaṇṭakasola. Another record on a piece of sculpture also mentions a *maṇḍapa* donated by a householder of Ukhasirivaddhamāna. J. Ph. Vogel (*EI.* XXVII, p.2) thinks that either Ukhasirivaddhamāna or Kaṇtakasola of these epigraphs was the ancient name of Ghaṇṭasālā, more probably the former. Incidentally, Kaṇtakasola is mentioned in an epigraph at Nāgārjunakoṇḍa and is possibly identical with 'the great emporium Kantakossyla' mentioned by Ptolemy. The name of the Aparaseliya school of Buddhism is found in another fragmentary inscription and the record is probably of a donation to the monks of that school. These few epigraphical records from Ghaṇtasālā confirm the prevalence and flourishing state of Buddhism in the delta of the Kṛṣṇā river during the early centuries of the Christian era (Vogel, op.cit. p. 1ff.).

H. R. Perera

GHOSTS. See PETAS

GIJJHAKŪṬA, literally 'Vulture Peak', is a hill near Rājagaha, repeatedly mentioned in the Pali canonical literature as a frequent and favourite abode of the Buddha during his life-time. Several suttas are reported to have been preached on occasions he was residing there, and several important personages, both historical and not, are said to have met him on the peak. The peak has also been recorded as the place where he lived shortly after the secession of Devadatta, and as the place from where he began his last journey before his demise, indicating that it was his final residence in the last days of his life. Alexander Cunningham *(Ancient Geography of India*, Calcutta, 1924, p. 534f.), on the authority of Hsüan tsang and Fa-hsien, has identified the hill with modern Sailagiri, (also known as Giriyek Hill), about two and a half miles north of the old town of Rājagaha which is near modern Rajgir (For location on map, see: Cunningham, *Archaeological Survey of India*, 1862-1865, Simla, Plate XIV).

The Buddha seems to have preferred this peak for its seclusion (*D.* III, p.36) and to have had pleasantest memories of it, as seen from the *Mahāparinibbāna Suttanta*, (*D.* II, p.72 ff.) in the last days of his life. Nevertheless, his stay there seems to have been quite eventful.

Two events in particular appear to be of importance from an historical point of view, and several of the other events associated with his life on the peak, centre round those two. One of these central events is the visit of Vassakāra, one of the chief ministers of Magadha (*D.* II, p. 72 ff, *A.* IV, pp. 18, 21) who goes to the peak to meet the Buddha at the request of Ajātasattu to consult the Teacher's opinion of the Vajjis prior to his proposed campaign against them.

The other of the two central events is the secession of Devadatta which again seems to have taken place in the last stages of the Buddha's career. There are four suttas delivered on the peak recording the denunciation of Devadatta, three of them named after Devadatta himself (*S.* I, p. 153; *A.* II, p. 73; *A.* IV, p. 160).

In the *Mahāsāropama Sutta (M.* I, p. 191) we find the Buddha philosophizing from the event. On another occasion (*S.* II, p. 155), most probably after the crisis, although not expressly so stated, the Buddha points out at Mahā Kassapa, Moggallāna, Sāriputta, Anuruddha, Puṇṇa Mantāniputta, Upāli and Ānanda who are walking in the vicinity of his residence on the peak, comments on their virtuousness and then, pointing to Devadatta, describes him as a man of low tastes round whom have flocked men of his own category.

Once on the peak, Upaka initiates a quarrelsome debate (see *Upaka Sutta, A.* II, p. 182f.) with the Buddha, on the ethics of criticising others, probably hinting at the Buddha's adverse comments on Devadatta. In fact, the commentarial observations on this sutta lend support to this view. The commentary (*AA.* II, p. 554) mentions that Upaka was a supporter of Devadatta and came to abuse the Buddha on hearing that he had declared Devadatta as destined to hell. It is interesting that, when Upaka returns from the peak, he goes straight to Ajātasattu with the report of the discussion, and Ajātasattu chastices Upaka, praising the Buddha.

Whatever this may be, that there was a certain atmosphere of intrigue against the Buddha while he was residing at Gijjhakūṭa in the last days of his life is further authenticated by the several conspiracies and schisms referred to in the *Vinaya* (II, p. 193 f). The climax to this chain of intrigues, initiated by the warted ambition of Devadatta for leadership in the Saṅgha, came when the secessionist attempted to take the life of the Buddha. Having failed to do so through others, Devadatta decides to kill him by his own hand, and one day, when the Buddha is pacing up and down in the shadow of Mt. Vipula, obviously meditating, the would be assasin hurls down a rock, which fortunately for the Buddha, halts between two mountain crags. A splinter from the rock, however, hits the Buddha on his foot and draws blood.

According to the *Dhammapada* commentary (*DhpA.* II, p. 164), which gives further details of this incident, Devadatta climbed Gijjhakūṭa (which thus must have been in the close neighbourhood of Mt. Vipula) and it was from here that he hurled the rock. The commentary adds that the Buddha suffered intense pain, and was removed by the monks to Maddakucchi from where, at the Buddha's own request, they took him to Jīvaka's mango grove, where Jīvaka ministered to the wound.

The *Vinaya* passage cited above also suggests that there was a monastic settlement around, and that, after this attempt on the Buddha's life, in the atmosphere of intrigue and the suspicion engendered by it, the loyal *bhikkus* tried to protect the Buddha from any further danger from Devadatta by walking up and down in the vicinity of the Buddha's abode. Throughout the night they pace up and down, pretending to be at their studies, but the Buddha seeing them dismisses them to their dwelling places which could not have been to far away.

Another incident similar in description to Devadatta's attempt seems to have taken place while the Buddha was living on the peak, when again the Buddha's life is in danger: One rainy night in intense darkness, while the Buddha was sitting out on the peak, rocks came crashing down on him, and the Buddha at once realised that it was the work of Māra. The passage (*S.* I, p. 109) indeed draws a vivid picture of the Buddha meditating alone on the wooded mountain on a dark and rainy night, with only the open sky above him, meeting the fear and terror created by the falling boulders with the heroic declaration of his moral strength and his unshakability as that of the very peak itself. The Buddha breaks out in poetic ecstacy, as he realizes the presence of Mara in the fear and terror created:

"Thou there! could'st shake the whole of Vulture Peak
From top to base, no movement would there be
In Buddha's whose is perfect liberty."

trsl. Mrs. Rhys Davids, *Kindred Sayings* (PTS) I p.137

The peak is associated also with the visitations of celestials and often non-humans. As early as the *Dīgha nikāya* itself two such visits are mentioned. The *Āṭānāṭiya Suttanta (D.* III, p. 195) describes the visit of Vessavaṇa, the lord of Yakkhas, in the company of the other Cātumahārājika *devas* to gift the *Āṭānāṭa* ward-rune to the Buddha as a protection against the disturbances of unruly *yakkhas*, which was considered useful for *bhikkhus* meditating in the wilderness.

Placed even before this sutta, in the same Nikāya, is the *Mahā Govinda Suttanta (D.* II,220f.) where Pañcasikha, visiting the Buddha at Gijjhakūṭa, engages in a long discourse describing to the Buddha certain incidents which took place in the heavens.

The *Samyutta nikāya (S.* I, p. 233; IV, p.98) mentions two visits to the peak, of Sakkha, the ruler of the gods. The *Pañcasikha Sutta* of the *Samyutta nikāya (S.* IV, p.101) also mentions another visit of Pañcasikha to the peak, to ask the identical question and get the idential answer as Sakkha does in the *Sakkha Sutta (S.* IV, p. 98) which is placed immeditately before this *Pañcasikha Sutta.* The visit of Brahmā Sahāmpati is in the *Samyutta nikāya (S.* I, p. 153). The *Aṅguttara nikāya (A.* IV, p.75) relates another incident in connection with the visit of two other Brahmadevas to the peak.

The Buddha was also visited on the peak by several important human personage. Besides Vassakāra and Upaka already mentioned, there was the prince, Abhayakumāra (*S.* V, p. 126), the discussion with whom seems to have been named *Gijjhakūṭa Sutta* after the spot where it

took place. Abhayakumāra came to discuss the views of Pūrana Kassapa and went away, a convert of the Buddha. There were also the three Paribbājakas (wandering ascetics), the dogmatic Dīghanakha who also went away converted (*M.* I, p. 497) and Sutavā after whom the *Sutavā Sutta (A.* IV, p. 369) is named and Sajjha after whom the *Sajjha Sutta (A.* IV, p. 371) is named, these last two asking the same question and getting the same answer. The *Suttanipāta (Sn. vv.* 487-509) records a discussion on the merits of giving, carried out on the peak by the Buddha, with Magha who visits him there.

Then there are the visits of Soṇa (Soṇa Kolivisa of the *Vinaya*) of Campā, Kassapa of Kassapagotta and Dhammika (*Vin.* I, p. 179 f., *A. I*, p. 236f.; III. p. 365 f.).

The Buddha seems to have left the peak from time to time to visit others, usually teachers of rival religious groups. There was apparently a community of Paribbājakas living in the neighbourhood, in Queen Udumbarikā's park which had been allocated to them. (*D.* III, p. 36; *A.* II pp. 29, 175, 185). The Buddha himself tells Mahānāma, the Sakyan (*M.* I, p. 92), how be visited the Jains who were living on Kalasilā (Black Rock) on the slopes of Mt. Isigili and held debate with them.

Apparently, a Jain community of monks was living at this time on the neighbouring mountains, while the Buddhist community was living on Gijjhakūta and the environs, and the Paribbājakas in the valley below. This valley, and the activities going on there could probably be seen from the Buddha's abode on the peak. There seems to have been much intellectual traffic among these three groups, sometimes members of others groups going up to meet the Buddha, and sometimes he coming down to meet them. A visit is also mentioned (*S.* V, p.448) when he decided to go with monks to Paṭibhānakūta. Here, when a monk remarks on the precipitous nature of that peak, the Buddha makes it an occasion to use it as a simile to illustrate his preaching that life can be a greater precipice than this. One may note in passing that, that a monk who had been on Gijjhakūta should make this remark gives room for the inference that Paṭibhānakūta was steeper than the latter peak.

The Buddha seems to have sometimes lived alone on the peak, taking shelter in the cave known as Sūkara-khatalena, the cave dug out by the boar. Although his stay in this cave is actually mentioned only twice, once when he was visited by Dīghankha and once when he was discoursing with Sāriputta (*S.* V, p. 233ff.) on the *āsavas*, this was probably his usual dwelling place whenever he was on the peak.

Sometimes, however, the Buddha seems to have lived on the peak in the company of other monks. The peak was probably cluttered with little dwellings *(kuṭi)* of monks, and the *Dīgha nikāya* speaks of a refectory *(upaṭṭhāna sālā)* on the hill (*D.* II, p. 72 cf. *A.* III p. 383). At times, other monks seem to have been residing on the peak while the Buddha resided at Rājagaha or elsewhere.

Two suicides that of Channa and Vakkali, in fact, intensify the tragic mood which seems to hang over the peak, in what was probably the last days of the Buddha. Channa's suicide seems to have taken place on the peak itself, and it is Sāriputta and Mahā Cunda, who were his companions on the peak, who report the matter to the Buddha. Vakkhali, however, dies at Mt. Isigili, but the Buddha who had visited him at Kumbhakāranivesana (Potter's Shed), where the monk was lying ill, goes from there to the peak, and it is there, on the hill, that two devas prophesy to him the coming death and "utter release" of Vakkhali. The Buddha comes down again to visit the scene of suicide on Mt. Isigili.

Inspite of the prevailing seriousness, the *bhikkhus* seem to have had their playful moments too, and it is when one of them scaled the peak and took a leap off it, killing a basketmaker, that the Buddha framed the Vinaya rule (*Vin,* III, p. 82) prohibiting jumping for *bhikkhus.* Again six of them scale the peak and throw a stone for fun and the Buddha lays down a rule against this type of activity. (*Vin.* loc. cit.).

From all the above facts, and a few more bits of information scattered in the canonical texts, it is possible to deduce some geographical data about the peak and its environs. Gijjhakūta was probably of some height or at least difficult of approach. Abhayakumāra declares (*S.* V. p. 126) that he was fatigued by the climb. Vassakāra (*D.* II, p. 72 ff), had to alight from his carriage at a point where the road to the peak from Rājagaha was impassable, and walk up to the Buddha's abode.

There is no doubt that the Gijjhakūta was situated not far from the city of Rājagaha, as practically all references mention this to be so. The peak probably formed one of a cluster of hills, some of the others being Mt. Isigili, Mt. Vipula, Paṇḍava, Corappapāta and the Paṭibhānakūta which were apparently, all within walking distance of our peak. In the plain below was Udumbarikā's park which was within sight of Moranivāpa, the peakcock's feeding ground, on the bank of the lotus pool called Sumagadha. Also flowing through the plain was the Sappini river. The Buddha setting out from the peak at eventide (see e.g. *A.* I, p. 185) could reach its banks and after the debate with Sarabha could actually get back to the peak the same night.

Dabba, the Mallan, who speaks of Gijjhakūta as a place distant from Veḷuvana (*Vin.* II, p. 76; III, p. 159) also mentions a number of places, namely the Kālasilā on

the slopes of Mt. Isigili, Corapabbata, the Sattapani cave on the slopes of Mt. Vebhāra, Sītavana, Gomati Glen and the Tapoda Grove, all in one list, along with Gijjhakūta. This list suggests that Dabba could reach them all in a single trip, as he does when he leads the monks to their lodgings in these different places with the aid of the miraculous light on his finger. The same list is also found, with slight variations, in the *Mahāparinibbāna Suttanta (D.* II, p. 116). This Suttanta also mentions Ambalatthikā as the first of the towns the Buddha touched on his last journey. It was therefore probably the nearest of them to the Gijjhakūta.

The Pali commentaries rarely add any new incidents to those already mentioned in the canon, but often elaborate upon them. The only new incident mentioned in the commentaries is, perhaps, the Buddha's encounter with the slave-girl Punnā who offered him her rice-meal when he was on his begging rounds at Rājagaha. On his return, he relates this episode to the monks at Gijjhakūta. The *Dhammapada Commentary (DhpA.* III, p. 321) which refers to this event, records it as having taken place a short time after Dabba's journey to Gijjhakūta mentioned above.

But the most interesting of these elaborations is perhaps the story which tires to explain how the Sūkarakhatalena came to be the habitation of the Buddha. According to the *Samyutta* commentary (SA. III, 197, SHB.), this cave which is described there as steep and to be reached only by climbing, was found as a hollow in the ground in the time of Kassapa Buddha, when the earth was still young, but in the period between Kassapa and Gotama Buddha, a boar *(sūkara)* dug up the soil around and the rains exposed the cave below. A forester discovering it, cleared it up and furnished it and finally gifted it to the Buddha. The three *Gijjha Jātakas (J.* II, p. 50; III, pp. 330; 483) and the *Migalopa Jātaka (J.* III, p. 255) mention Gijjhakūta as the abode of vultures, but it is not certain whether the name Vulture Peak was derived from this fact of its habitation by vultures or the shape of the peak which was supposed to be like a vulture's beak. There is only one instance in the canonical texts (*S.* II, p. 254 cited already) where vultures are mentioned as being present on the peak. Cunningham (loc. cit.) refers to a tradition according to which the name was derived from the fact that Ānanda was frightened by Māra in the guise of a vulture, and the Buddha allayed his fears by touching him on the shoulder.

Bandula Jayawardhana

GILĀNA(P)PACCAYA, means "support for the sick" i.e. medicament, one of the four resources *(nissaya)* of the *bhikkhu's* daily life. In prescribing the four resources the Buddha's advice to his disciples was to be moderate in their use. The Buddha advised the monks to be abstemious in eating. The *nissayas* ought to be enjoyed thougtfully and prudently, not for sport, not for indulgence, not for personal charm or adornment, but just enough for the support, for the continuance of body, for its resting unharmed, to help the living of the higher life, with this thought: My former feelings I check and I set going no new feeling. Thus it will serve as my maintenance, blameless and cunducive to comfort in life. Accordingly the Buddhist monks had only one meal a day and they were often referred to as *ekabhattika*, "those having only one meal a day". This presupposes that Buddhist monks live all their lives abstaining from eating at night, and refraining from eating at unpresercribed hours *(yāvaji vam ekabhattikā rattūparatā viratā vikālabhojanā, A.* I. p. 212).

Thus during the formative stage of the Buddhist *Sangha* medicament *(gilānapaccaya)* was the only nutriment that was permissible for acceptance at any time of the day to a Buddhist monk to keep the body fit. But later on *gilānapaccaya* came to be used in a developed sense to include any beverage that could properly be taken by a Buddhist monk.

The *Vinaya* mentions the set of four resources of a Buddhist monk: (I) robe *(civara)*, (ii) food received as alms *(pindapāta)*, (iii) lodging i.e. a place to sleep and rest *(senāsana)* and (iv) decomposing (cattle)-urine as medicine *(pūtimuttabhesajja, Vin.* I, p. 58). At some other places (e.q. *M.* I, p. 33) the fourth requisite *bhesajja* is more fully described as *gilānapaccaya-bhesajja-parikkhāra.*

In this compound *gilānapaccaya* (support for the sick) stands as an adjective qualifying *bhesajja-parikkhāra*, "medicament as a requisite". Thus *gilānapaccaya* denotes what types of medicines are acceptable to a sick monk. This appears to be the original sense in which the term had been used. The *Vinaya* passage cited above makes specific reference to the four resources of a Buddhist monk. According to this passage the Buddha had explained that a monk who had gone forth must be content with *pūtimutta*, a decoction of gall-nut in decomposing cattle urine as medicine *(bhesajja)*, the fourth requisite, and ghee *(sappi)*, fresh butter *(navanita)*, oil *(tela)*, honey *(madhu)*, and molasses *(phānita)* are sanctioned as extra acquisitions *(atirekalābha Vin.* I. p. 58).

Thus at the begining of the *sangha* as an institution there was a tendency to keep to the austere practices and *pūtimutta* was the allowable medicine and ghee etc. were additional articles permitted. *Vinaya* further states that these extra acquisitions are mentioned as the five

medicines. Thus ghee etc are described as medicines as well as what may be agreed upon as medicine and although they may serve as nutriments for people yet could not be reckoned as substantial food (*imani kho pañca-bhesajjāni seyyathīdam sappi navanitam telam madhu phānitam bhessajāni c'eva bhesajjasammatāni ca lokassa āhārattañ ca pharanti na ca olariko āharo paññāyati. Vin.* I, p. 199). Therefore the Buddha allowed monks to make use of these five medicines during prescribed hours if they had accepted them during such times. Later when necessity arose, the Buddha relaxed this rule and allowed the monks who had accepted these five medicines to make use of them at all hours. It is understood that this rule presupposes the right time and the wrong time for eating solid foods and soft foods (*Vin.* I, p. 200). When solid food is defined in the *Vinaya* medicines are excluded (*Vin.* IV, p. 83). According to this definition it is anything that constitutes medicine, if it does not fall into the category of solid food, or soft food. People could offer these five kinds of medicines to the monks at any time of the day, i.e. irrespective of the right and wrong time prescribed for the acceptance of hard and soft food. But monks are forbidden to live in abundance. The *Vinaya* mentions that Pilindavaccha was customarily a receiver of these five kinds of medicines and he used to give them away to his companions. Thus his company of monks came to live in abundance and the Buddha prescribed that medicines which may be partaken of by sick monks i.e. ghee, fresh butter, etc. having accepted them may be stored at most for seven days (*Vin.* I, p. 209).

One of the eight boons begged for and granted by the Buddha to Visākhā was that she be allowed to give medicine for the sick. (*gilānabhesajjam dātum DhpA.*).

Visākhā was foremost among those who offered this requisite to the monks. She went round the monastery to find out what medicines and other requisites are needed by the monks who visit or leave the monastery or those who are sick or in need of such requisites. When Visākhā celebrated the dedication ceremony of Pubbārāma, at its conclusion she gave medicines to the monks filling the bowl of each monk.

Apart from these five medicines which are more commonly offered to the *Sangha*, sugar though mixed with flour and syrup could be made use of by monks, if flour and syrup are added to sugar so as to make it hard and if it can still be called sugar (*thaddhanattāya gule pittham pi charikam pi pakkhipanti, so ca gulo tveva samkham gacchati anujānāami bhikkhave yathisukkam gulam paribhuñjitum, Vin.* I, p. 209). The rule relating to the use of sugar and sour gruel brings out clearly the distinction between medicine and beverage. The Buddha allowed sugar for a monk who is sick and sugar-water to a monk who is not sick (*anujānāmi bhikkave gilānassa gulam agilānassa gulodakam, Vin.* I. p. 226). The Buddha allowed the use of salted sour gruel for a monk who is ill, but for one who is not ill to make use of it by using it as a beverage mixed with water (*gilānassa lonasovirakam, agilānassa udakasambhinnam pāna paribhogena paribhuñjitum (Vin.* p. 225)

Later any drink which could properly be given to a monk at any time of the day served the purpose of *gilāna paccaya* in its secondary sense which is equivalent to *pāna* (beverage). Thus when the Buddha arrived at Āpana, a market town of Anga, Keniya — the matted -hair ascetic prepared abundant drinks and invited the Buddha to accept it from him. The Buddha accepted his invitation and on that occasion allowed the monks eight kinds of drink: mango drink (*ambapānam*), rose apple drink (*jambupānam*), "banana-berry" drink (*cocapānam*), banana drink (*mocapānam*), honey drink (*madhupānam*). In addition, the Buddha allowed the monks the juice of all fruits except the juice of the fruit of corn, also the juice of all leaves except vegetable juice, the juice of all flowers except liquorice juice and also allowed sugarcane juice (*Vin.* I. p. 246). Thus any beverage which does not belong to the class of soft food is acceptable to the monks. With this development the original sense of the term *gilānapaccaya* faded away and now it is in usage almost synonymous with *pāna* (beverage). Therefore even when tea or any other beverage is offered to a monk it is innvariably called *gilānapaccaya;* and when medicine is given to a sick monk it is called *bhesajja* and not *gilānapaccaya.*

M. Karaluvinna

GILGIT, ancient site with a stūpa, where in 1931 the discovery was made of Buddhist Sanskrit manuscripts, about two miles west of the Gilgit cantonment (35-50 N., 74-15 E.) in N.W. Kashmir.

It was in July of that year Sir Aural Stein reported that some boys, who were tending their flocks above Naupur village, cleared a piece of timber sticking out on the top of a small stone-covered mound. Excavations brought to light a great mass of ancient manuscripts, which palaeographically can be dated back to the sixth century A.C.

These Gilgit manuscripts, as they have been called since then, represent the original Sanskrit canon of Buddhism, and they are some of the earliest so far discovered in India, similar to those discovered in central Asia and Eastern Turkestan. Up to the time of this discovery at Gilgit, these text were known only through their Chinese and Tibetan translations.

The language of the manuscripts is similar to that of the *Mahāvastu*, *Lalitavistara*, or *Suvarnaprabhāsa*, and

is really a Prakrit of a peculiar type, using largely Prakrit words with Sanskrit inflections and Sanskrit words with Prakrit inflections, with endless irregularities, lack of sequence of tenses, indiscriminate euphonic combinations, arbitrary conjugations and declensions, which has become known under the name of Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit. The uniformity in these irregularities might indicate that a language of this type had obtained currency at a certain period in the extreme north-west of India.

The Gilgit manuscripts are written on birch-bark in Gupta characters. As is usual in such manuscripts, two laminas of bark are pasted together to make up one folio. In some cases, parts of the lamina of one side peel off, while the corresponding portion of the other side of the folio remains intact. They were kept in Srinagar till 1947 as the property of the Government of Jammu and Kashmir, after which they were removed and are now preserved in the National Archives of Delhi. Formal permission for publication was received from the Government of Kashmir and the Central Government of India in 1958 and 1959, respectively.

An interesting fact relating to the site where the manuscripts were found is that they were deposited within the vault of a stūpa. The further fact that sometimes in the colophon the names are given of the donor, his relatives and friends, suggests that the texts were deposited in the stūpa as a sacred objects, for the purpose of acquisition of merit through the propagation of the *dharmaśāstras.*

It was only in the third of four stūpas built side by side from north to south that manuscripts have been found. This stūpa has double basements, the lower of which measures 6.6 metres (about 22 ft.) on each side and the next receding about 60 cm. (2 ft) on all the four sides. The height of this stūpa is 12 to 15 metres (40-50 ft.). The diameter which contained the manuscripts is 2.4 metres (8 ft.). In the centre of the chamber there were five wooden boxes, the fifth containing the other four in which were kept all the manuscripts. One of the manuscripts is the gift of king Śrideva Sāhi Surendra Vikramāditya Nanda, who appears to be a son of Vikramāditya, son of Raṇāditya, and reigned over the Dard country during the reign of Bālāditya in Kaśmīra, which gives an additional historical basis for the dating of the manuscripts.

It was through the activities of the Sarvāstivādins, who fanned out from Magadha to the North-west as a sequel to Aśoka's council at Pāṭaliputra, that Kaśmīra became a centre of Buddhist philosophical studies. They obviously preferred a more Sanskritised version of the Buddhist canon to that in Pali based on the dialect of Magadha.

The texts found in these manuscripts are (1) *Bhaiṣajya-guru Sūtra,* relating the great resolution *(mahāpra nidhāna)* made by each of the seven Buddhas and the effect of such resolutions, the present manuscript being the last chapter; (2) *Ekādaśa-mukha* containing two dhāraṇis (3) *Hayagrīva-vidyā,* a magical charm very likely to be used as an amulet to be tied to a part of the body; (4) *Sarvatathāgatādhiṣṭhāna-sattvāvalokana-buddha-kṣetra-sandarśana-vyūha,* a *dhāraṇi,* to which several other *dhāraṇis* have been added later together with descriptions of their respective rites; (5) *Śrīmahādevi-vyākaraṇa,* which apart from being expository contains also the *Aṣṭottaraśata-vimalaprakhya-stotra* in full and a *mantra* for the worship of the goddess Śrī; (6) *Ajitasena-vyākaraṇa-nirdeśanāma ımahāyāna-sūtra,* which appears to be an admixture of Hīnayāna and semi-Mahāyāna concepts, indicating the state of Buddhism where the Mahāyāna ideals of the *pāramitās* were being included in the earlier ethical code, without the more developed *śūnyatā* philosophy; (7) *Samādhirāja Sūtra,* one of the nine principal texts of the Mahāyānists, also known as *Candrapradīpa Sūtra,* refers to that state of mind in which Buddhas and bodhisattvas realise that all worldly objects, thoughts and deeds, good or bad, are non-existent *(abhāva)* and it is this knowledge alone which can rescue one from this world of delusion; (8) *Bhaiṣajyavastu,* belonging to the Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya, giving only those parts containing stories of the *avadāna* type with a mere fourteen pages giving some information about medicines with another twenty of monastic rules of discipline relating to the acceptance by monks of molasses, meat, fruits and uncooked food; (9) *Vinaya-vastu* of the Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya Piṭaka, of which only a little more than a half of the original has been salvaged, showing a general agreement between the Sanskrit and Pali versions, although the manner of putting the topics is different.

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H. G. A. van Zeyst

GIRAGGA-SAMAJJA, a festival held annuallly (*AA.* I, p. 156; *DhpA.* p. 73) or from time to time (*SnA.* I, p. 327) in Rājagaha. According to the *Buddhavamsa Commentary* (p. 126) it was an annual festival held all over India and dated from the time of Dīpaṅkara Buddha. Buddhaghosa explains it as a festival held on

level ground in the shadow of a mountain outside the city (*VinA.* IV, p. 831). As Rājagaha was a city surrounded by mountains it was quite natural that the festival has been held near a mountain. The word *giragga* meaning "mountain top" just refers to that particular place whereas *samajja* is the important word which primarily means a gathering of people, an assembly where not only the various items of entertainment such as dance, song, music, (*Vin.* II, pp. 107-8, IV, p. 267) and theatrical performances (*VinA.* IV, p. 831, *Mhvu.* II, p. 57), but also food and drink were provided (*Vin.* IV, p. 85). People from all over Aṅga and Magadha, including the members of royal families and the nobility, attended it and special seats were prepared for them (*Vin.* II, p. 150, *VinA.* pp. 14, 831; *SnA.* I, p. 327). According to the *Avadānaśataka* (p. 185), people from the six great cities assembled at Rājagṛha to see it, and among them was a dance-teacher from the south. It was attended even by monks and nuns and when the Buddha was informed of it he prohibited that practice of the monks (*Vin.* II, pp. 107-8, IV, pp. 85, 267).

The Buddhist Sanskrit equivalent for Pali *giragga-samajja* is *giriyagra-samāja (Mhvu.* II, p. 57). The form *girivalgu* in *girivalgusamāgama (Avś.* p. 185) which refers to the same festival, according to Edgerton (*BHS.* II, p. 212), is a corruption for *giryagra* in *giriyagrasamāja,* and *samāgama* meaning one and the same.

As has been mentioned, the important word is *samajja.* A phonetic equivalent of Sanskrit *samajya,* meaning assembly, *samajja* is undoubtedly the same word as *samāja* in the Sanskrit language as well as in the Asoka's Rock Edict No. 1. According to the *Sigālovāda Sutta (D.* III, p. 183) there are said to have been six items of entertainment at such a *samajja,* viz., dancing, singing, music, recitations, conjuring tricks and acrobatic shows. It is more or less synonymous with *ussava, nakkhatta* and *chaṇa.* The inseperable association of *samjja* with *ussava* is borne out by the *Uraga Jātaka* (II, p. 13) where it is said that the festive occasion having been announced, there was a large popular gathering *(ussave ghosite mahā-samjjam ahosi).* The term *nakkhatta* is generally used in Pali to denote the seasonal festivals, and the phrase *nakkhattaṃ ghuttham* or *ghositaṃ* is of the same import as *ussavaṃ ghositaṃ,* meaning: the festival has been announced. The phrase *nakkhattam kiḷati (J.* I, pp. 50, 250) conveys the idea of the celebration of a festival, making merry, taking a holiday. *Chaṇa* (from Sk. *kṣaṇa*) is just another word (*J.* III, p.539) which may be treated as a synonym of *nakkhatta* or *ussava.*

Thus *Samajja* or *samāja* as a festive gathering was intended, according to the Hathigumpha inscription of Khārvela, to witness the exiting contests and musical varieties. The contests were not only those between men and men, but also between animals and animals. The primary object, then, of *samajja* was entertainment by exciting and amusing shows *(visūka-dassana),* of which typical instances are mentioned in the *Brahmajāla Sutta (D.* I, p. 6). The list consists not only of such musical varieties as dances, songs, instrumental music, pantomimes, balled-recitations, minstrel's songs and opera; or in fights between elephants, horses, buffaloes, bulls, goats, rams, cocks and quails or in magical and acrobatic feats, but also some manly contests as bouting, fighting with sticks, boxing and wrestling, and such martial, and military shows as mockfights, roll-calls, manoevers and reviews. This is amply corroborated by the description of scenes in the midst of a *samajja* as given in the *Tittira Jātaka (J.* III, p. 541).

Malalaskera thinks that the *samajjas* perhaps were originally a pagan religious festival, a survival of old community dancing with an exogamic significance (*DPPN.* I. p. 765-6). This view may find support from a reference to *samāja* in the *Mahābhārata* where it figures as a Śaiva festival accompanied by drinking, song and dance (Hopkins, *Epic Mythology,* pp. 65, 220). The word also occurs in Vātsyāyana's *Kāmasūtra* (i. 4. 26), not in a technical, but in a general sense of gathering at the temple of Sarasvatī, once a month or fortinightly, where music and dances were performed.

Kautilya in a passage of his *Arthaśastra* (ii, p. 25) refers to *samāja,* along with *utsava* and *yātrā,* where the drinking of wine was unrestricted for four days; and in another passage (xiii p. 5) points out the conquerer's duty of conciliating the conquered people by respectinng their love and devotion to their country, their religion and their institutions such as *utsava, samāja* and *vihāra.* It was by organisation of such festive occasions *(ussava* and *samāja*), according to the *Hathigumpha* inscription, that Khāravela sought to exhilarate the citizens of Kālinga capital, in celebrating the success of his first military campaign.

Asoka in one of his edicts (Rock - Edict No. 1) refers to two kinds of *samāja,* one good which he encourages and the other bad which he bans. He did not specify the *samājas* which, in his opinion, were good or those which were bad. In the Rock Edict No. IV, however, he refers to exhibitions of *vimānas,* chariots, elephants, illuminations; he may have held these exhibitions as good *samājas* which were approved of by the good *(sādhumatā).* In banning the bad type where he saw many evils he may have followed the teachings of the *Sigālovāda Sutta (D.* III, p. 183), where the Buddha disapproved of frequenting the *samajjas* on the part of a good householder, apparently due to the infatuation caused by them and the consequent neglect of household duties.

It was on the occasion of such a *samajja* that Sāriputta (= Upatissa) and Moggallāna (= Kolita) were disgusted and decided to renounce the world (*DhpA.* pp. 73-4; *AA.* I, p. 156; *SnA.* I, p. 327).

Upali Karunaratne

GOD.

Introductory. The English word God, probably like similar words in other Teutonic languages, denoted originally anthropomorphic beings of a higher order who were venerated. After the conversions of the Teutons to Christianity the word came to be applied also to the one Christian omnipotent deity. With regard to the many "gods" believed by the Buddhists to owe their transitory existence to their karma see the article "deva". In the context of this article the word God is used exclusively in the sense of theistic dogmatics as a denotations of a self-existent eternal omnipotent being that has created the world and rules the destinies of the cosmos and its inhabitants. According to this view, God is the universal law-giver; he is the final cause of all moral commandments and ritualistic regulations; as the supreme judge he watches over their observation, rewards the virtuous and punishes the trespassers. Through his revelations he has imparted to mankind the knowledge necessary to understand the world and its history. Besides being the Maker and Preserver of all things visible and invisible he unites all glory, goodness and blessedness in himself, possessing all moral excellencies and qualities; in the highest degree he owns absolute holiness. It is to him that the afflicted turn to be relieved from their burden, and the faithful hope for salvation through his grace.

The idea of a personal god to whom absolute power, wisdom and goodness are attributed is common to Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Vaishnavism, Shaivism and many other religions. It is therefore comprehensible that the adherents of these faiths expected to find in Buddhism also similar conceptions of a supreme deity. Perhaps the French traveller La Loubere was the first European who noticed that Buddhism differs in this respect from the teachings of the other great religions; speaking of the Siamese he wrote in 1691: "I think that one can establish that they have no idea of God."[1] Later researches have confirmed this statement in a similar way so that other writers frequently have dealt with this subject. Even the German philosophers towards the end of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th century take up this point; thus Immanuel Kant remarks: "(the Siamese Buddhists) reject the idea of a divine providence, they think that through a fatal necessity vices are punished and virtues are rewarded."[2] Arthur Schopenhauer, whose philosophy had much in common with Buddhism, made a special point of the statement that Buddhism is an "atheistical religion". He thought it "scandalous" that even scholars made it a habit of identifying religion with theism.[3]

There are three ways in which champions of the idea that all higher religion must acknowledge a creator and ruler of the universe try to harmonise Buddhism with this conception:

1. Some (e.g. Father Wilhelm Schmidt)[4] say that Buddhism is a philosophy and not a religion. But this seems rather strange, because Buddhism has places of worship, monasteries and other religious institutions. It acknowledges also the existence of many supernatural beings (devas) equivalent to the gods of the Greeks and other peoples or to the angels of Christianity and Islam. The Romans who coined the word "religion" also did not understand the word in a theistic sense.

2. Others (e.g. Hermann Beckh)[5] try to free Buddha of the reproach of atheism by saying: Buddha wanted only to teach a way of salvation, he disapproved of all metaphysical speculations and left undecided the question whether there is a God or not. But this is in obvious contradition to the fact that Buddha has explicitly denied the existence of God, in some of his sayings, as we shall see later on. Nor is an explanation offered of the reasons why all the schools of the Hīnayâna have decidely rejected the idea of God and have been eager to prove by argumentation that there can be no Iśhvara.

3. Others like Mahâtmâ Gândhî have propounded the view that Buddha taught the existence of God, but that his pupils misunderstood him. Another version of this theory asserts that what Buddha taught was a sort of Vedântic pantheism. One refers to the fact that the Nirvâna of the Buddhists is similar to some aspects of the Brahma of the Upanishads. But there are great differences in other respects. For never has a Buddhist taught that the Nirvâna is the cause of the world as the Vedântists do with regard to the Brahma which is the "source of the world" (*Brahma-sûtra* I, 1, 2).

1. La Loubère, *Du Royaume de Siam* (Amsterdam 1691), vol. I, p. 395
2. Immanuel Kant, *Vorlesungen über physische Geographie,* chapter on Siam, see H. von Glasenapp, *Kant und die Religionen des Ostens* (Würzburg 1954), p. 55
3. A. Schopenhauer, *Der Satz vom Grunde* para 34.
4. W. Schmidt, *Ursprung und Wesen der Religion* (Münster 193, p. 4)
5. H. Beckh, *Buddhismus* (Berlin 1916), I, p. 121 f., II, p. 126 f.

So all these attempts to construe an ancient "theistic" Buddhism are not successful. They do not take into consideration the fact that even if one may have some doubts about the authenticity of the words of the Buddha as they are recorded in the most ancient texts, Buddhism since at least 2000 years has been opposed to the doctrine of a ruling God. Nor can it be understood how in a system which flatly deprecates the idea of a permanent, unchangeable substance and which teaches a universal conditional origination, the idea of a divine ruler and creator of the world-processes can have a place. Indeed, with the exception of some later hybrid semi-Hinduized forms of the faith all learned Buddhists of ancient and modern times are in conformity with J. Takakusu's dictum "Buddhism is atheistic – there is no doubt about it."[6]

Buddhist arguments against the existence of God: Already in the older works of the Pâli Canon many reasons are adduced to show that the supposition of a ruler of the universe is not to be reconciled with the belief in a moral order of the world. So the Buddha said according to *Anguttara- nikâya*:[7] "There are certain recluses and brâhmins who hold this view: 'Whatsoever weal or woe or neutral feeling is experienced, all that is due to the creation of a Supreme Deity *(issara-nimmâna-hetu)*'. Then I say to them: 'So then, owing to the creation of a Supreme Deity, men will become murderers, thieves, unchaste, liars, slanderers, abusive, babblers, covetous, malicious, and perverse in view. Thus for those who fall back on the creation of a Supreme Deity as the essential reason there is neither desire to do, nor effort to do, nor necessity to do this deed or abstain from that deed. So then, the necessity for action or inaction not being found to exist in truth and verity, the term "recluse" cannot reasonably be applied to yourselves, since you live in a state of bewilderment with faculties unwarded."

In a similar way also the verses in the *Mahâbodhi-Jâtaka* and in the *Bhûridatta-Jâtaka* remark that this world full of sorrow and ill cannot have been created by a God (Brahmâ) who is good and almighty.[8] The Buddha rejects also the doctrine of the brahmans that there is a God who cannot be seen,[9] and denies that their traditions alleged to be founded on revelation have any basis, for these traditions are forwarded by one generation to the other included in the basket (of lore); but no brahmin can say that he speaks from his own experience.[10]

As by some brahmins of his time Brahmâ was believed to be the supreme god, the creator and ruler of everything an the father of all,[11] the Buddha lays special stress on the consideration that Brahmâ, about whose existence he has no doubt, cannot be an omniscient, almighty eternal being. He is no primordial and immortal but owes his experience to karma and is liable to change and decay.[12] Nor is he omniscient, as is told in the *Kevaddha-sutta*.[13] The Buddha not only shows that Brahmâ cannot be the creator of the world, but also offers a theory for the origin of this wrong view. (For this and for the other details see the article Brahmā).

In the works of the great dogmatists besides these old arguments many others are adduced.[14] An *âdi sarga* i.e. a "first creation" with which the whole world-processes begins is impossible, because every state is dependent upon another that preceded it; there can be no time when the cosmos did not exist, at least in the latent form of the karma of former beings. If God is the supreme ruler why did he not accomplish at one and the same time the creation, preservation and destruction of the universe, for an eternal and immutable cause ought to produce all its effects simulataneously.[15] The theory of dependent origination contradicts the assumption of one cause to which everything can be traced. The doctrine of karma is incompatible with the assumption of an almighty God, because his function would only consist in being the executing organ of the automatically working law of retribution. There is also a difficulty in finding out the motive of God's acting: if He acts without desiring to act he must be subject to another, if He acts because he desires to act He is subject to desire and therefore not independent. If there is a natural casuality - so that a shoot is produced from a seed because many factors like the earth, the water etc. combine – the supposition of God is quite superfluous, all the more as the activity of God cannot be settled.

The concepts of the theists concerning Visṇu or Śiva as the god whom they think as the unique *Iśvara* of the world are very unsatisfactory because they attribute to

6. J. Takakusu, *The Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy*, 2nd ed., (Honolulu 1949) p. 45.
7. *A.* I, p. 174. The Book of Gradual Sayings, translated by F. L. Woodwards (London 1932), Vol. I, p. 158 f.
8. *Jâtaka*, V. p. 238; and VI, p. 208.
9. *D.* I, pp. 238-243
10. *M.* II, p. 169; cf. *D.* I, p. 239 f.
11. *D.* I, p. 18 = *D.* I, p. 220 = *M.* I, p. 327
12. *A.* V, p. 60.
13. *D.* I, p. 221 f.
14. *Abhidharma-kośa* trad. la Vallée Poussin 2, 64, d vol. I, p. 312 ff., *Sphutârthā* p. 237, *Bodhicaryâvatâra* 9, 119-126.
15. la Vallée Poussin, *ERE* vol. II, p. 184 a.

their supreme being partiality insofar as he loves those who worship him and hates those who do not. He lacks the qualities of a bodhisattva who does good equally to all beings. The theists of the different sects are also at variance as to which of the gods is the highest one and quarrel among themselves about this question.[16]

Buddhist Atheism and comparative Religion: Buddhism is not the only system of thought arisen in India which denies the existence of an eternal world-ruling God. Beside the agnostics, sceptics, and materialists who disavow that there are any supernatural beings at all, there are the (classical) Sâṅkhya and the Mîmâṅsâ which acknowledge the existence of devas but at the same time contest the legitimacy of the theory that an *Iśvara* governs the cosmos and the life of its inhabitants. But there is also another great Indian religion which categorically denies the being of a "kartâ-hartâ" (creator and destroyer): Jainism has raised a great number of arguments against theism. It seems also that already in the Vedic times some thinkers saw in the governing power of the Universe an impersonal force, the *rta* which regulates everything and stands high above the gods. But also outside India there are numerous religions which teach that the world is not controlled by a personal God but by an eternal cosmic and moral law. In China especially Chu Hsi, the celebrated founder of Neo-Confucianism (1130-1200) has developed views of this kind. But the idea that the world and life are not governed by a personal God but by an impersonal force on which even the gods are dependent, is to be found with many ancient religions. So some Greeks believed that the gods are subject to the power of Destiny, and similar conceptions were also shared by ancient Romans, Celts, Teutons, Babylonians and Arabs. This proves that Buddhism does not stand alone in assuming that it is not a personal God but an eternal law, that, is the principle that controls the world.

The reason why the Buddha's views differ in this respect from those of the theistic religions is that whereas in the idea of God many conflicting currents of thought are combined which Buddhism clearly separates from each other. For the idea of God embraces the ideas of a creator, ruler, and destroyer of the universe as well as that of an author of moral laws, of a just judge, of a helper in need, and of a saviour of mankind. In Buddhism these same ideas cover a number of separate factors. The creation, rule, and destruction of the universe are ascribed to the universal moral law inherent in the cosmos, a law which finds its expression in the automatic working of karma. There is therefore also no need of a Law-giver and of a Judge, who allots rewards and punishments. The revealers of this law are the Buddhas who for this reason are venerated. The transitory devas function as helpers in worldly trouble and as tutelary angels. Concerning the question of salvation the Buddhist schools differ; for some of them salvation can be reached only by man's own endeavours, for other sects the grace of the Buddha Amitâbha is the expedient of redemption. The feelings of devotion and reverence which the theistic religions concentrate upon God, are turned towards the Buddhas as the sages who have shown the way to Nirvâna or to the Arhats and Bodhisattvas who are on the way to it.

Thus the same ideas, impulses, instincts, longings, and hopes which determine the theistic religions are equally alive in Buddhism; and above all the most essential factor of all religious life is extant: the conception of an awe-inspiring holiness and the sense of the holy which is different from everything profane.[17]

Helmuth von Glasenapp

God is a proper name of the deity who constitutes the basis of the (varying) world-views or theologies (lit. "thoughts about God") that are espoused by practitioners of Christianity.[1] His attributes (which for most Christians include being, eternality, omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence, goodness and creatorhood) have been matters of absolute presuppositions in Christian history.[2] There are many other English names for this deity, which are always capitalized (e.g. 'Lord', 'the Holy', 'the Father', 'the Sacred', 'Jehovah'), but today 'God' is by far the most common. Capitalization of the name distinguishes this Christian God from the 'gods' of other religions, even though some of them, who are conventionally referred to in English discourse by a native name

16. Nâgârjuna, *Mahâprajñâparamitaŝâstra*, French translation by E. Lamotte, vol. I, p. 138 f., 562.

17. The subject of this article has been dealt with in detail in H. von Glasenapp, *Buddhismus und Gottesidee* (Wiesbaden 1954).

1. We make this statement recognizing the fact that in certain instances the name 'God' is also applied to the supreme deity of non-Christian religions, especially Judaism (see also note 4, below). But, as detailed below, it is our thesis that such usage always reflects a (positive or negative) polemical stance *vis-á-vis* Christianity, and this more limiting definition is put forward in order to highlight that polemic.

2. On absolute and relative presuppositions, with special reference to the role of God in Christian thougt, see R. G. Collingwood, *An Essay on Metaphysics.*

(e.g. 'Visnu', 'allah', 'Yhwh') rather than 'God', closely approximate the Christian God in the eyes of their (Vaisnava, Muslim, Jewish) devotees. Because the theistic religions, Christianity included, have been prone to claim exclusivity for the being, eternality, omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence, goodness and creatorhood of their own Gods, the creation and maintenance of linguistic rules for naming them have been highly charged affairs. In bygone days, breaking these rules could even result in execution.

The Christians (primarily missionaries) who first began to produce English books about world religions in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries[3] were heirs to such a tradition in which the name, 'God', was never employed casually. Although by then misuse of the name could no longer result in death, it was still considered a road to perdition. If it ever occurred to these people that 'God' might appropriately translate names of the supreme deity in other religions, the idea was shunned as blasphemy.[4] 'God' named the heart and soul of Christians; to apply it to those "heathen gods" whose very existence Christians were enjoined to deny was unthinkable.

During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the use of the name, 'God', became a matter of concern for non-Christians, too. Calling one's own deity 'God' allowed a vast range of polemical responses to Christianity to emerge among the practitioners of the other theistic religions (who were largely under Christian colonial domination). Certain Western-oriented Hindus, for example, used 'God' in English discourse about Visnu or Brahmā in order to make universalistic claims.[5] With quite a different motive did certain Oceanic and African peoples describe (to missionaries) their native 'God' (named with some approximation of 'Jehovah'): a God who had been all-powerful once but who currently was totally useless or dead, worthy of no more than nostalgia or ridicule.[6] Refusing to call one's own deity 'God' in English also had polemical force, as it allowed a Muslim or Saiva to venerate as God not 'God' but 'Allah' or 'Śiva'. In the West, too, the use or not of 'God' by scholars and seekers of non-Christian religions reflected their own beliefs and interpretations.

The first serious studies in English of Buddhism[7], which were produced by and for Christian missionaries (who needed to learn about the religions they encountered in order to combat them), did not, of course, apply the name 'God' to the god known by the early Buddhists: Brahmā (q.v.). Most subsequent writers have followed suit: the god of Buddhist mythology and philosophy is conventionally called 'Brahmā' in English rather than 'God'.

But in the Buddhist case, opting against the use of the English name 'God' does not reflect a bidden polemic with Christianity, for Buddhists have no interest in defending any God: Brahmā is the God of Brahmins, not Buddhists. The Buddha and his followers borrowed the name from their Brahmanical counterparts in order to refute, not only their theology but the basis of all theologies: the idea of God. With philosophy as well as mythology the Buddha reduced Brahmā from Godness to participation in the pain of *samsāra,* denying all the attributes ascribed Him by the Brahmins and portraying Him as, at best, a pious Buddhist. As this has been discussed in detail already (s.v. Brahmā) it need not be repeated here. But it is important to note that Buddhism's non-theocentrism has been a large part of its appeal to nineteenth and twentieth century thinkers who are unable to accept God as an absolute presupposition. Although Neitzsche had Zoroaster declare the death of God, his anthropocentrism - his belief that man can surpass God - was largely a product of his knowledge of Buddhism. The first great English translators of Buddhist texts and scholars of Buddhism such as F. Max Müller (editor of the *Sacred Books of the East* and *Sacred Books of the Buddhists series*) and T. W. Rhys Davids (founder of the Pali Text Society) - established the lasting convention of calling Brahmā 'Brahmā' rather than 'God', not in order to avoid blalsphemy (like their missionary predecessors) as much as to preserve

3. For the origins of Euro-American discourse on world religions see Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *The Meaning and End of Religion.*
4. Judaism presents an exception to this generalization; the supreme deity of the Hebrew Bible has often been called 'God' in English discourse. Christianity incorportes the Hebrew Bible of Judaism into its own Holy Bible as an "Old Testment" that has been fulfilled and thus supreseded by the "New Testament" containing the words of Jesus and his disciples. Christians thus believe that their God *is* the supreme deity of the Hebrew Bible, and account for discrepancies between the "Old" and "New" Testaments by claiming that Jesus understood God better than the authors of the Hebrew Bible. In response to this appropriation and devaluation of Judaism by Christianity, embedded in the use of 'God' to name the supreme deity of the Hebrew Bible, many modern writers refer to Him by Hebrew custom as 'Yhwh' or *'God'*
5. Among many possible examples we might call attention to the use of 'God' in the writings of the Arya and Brahmo Samaj, and Mahatma Gandhi.
6. See Jonathan Z. Smith, "The Unknown God" in his *Imagining Religion.*
7. E. g. Howard Malcolm's *Travels in South-east Asia* and R. Spence Hardy's *Manual of Buddhism.*

Buddhism's Godlessness. Yet there is irnoy in the use of 'Brahmā' rather than 'God' by writers in English on Buddhism: it renders non-polemical one of the most polemical stances taken by the early Buddhists. Translators could more forcefully capture the spirit of the Buddhist critique in English if they called Brahmā 'God'.

In ancient India, too, the Buddha's polemic against theocentrism evoked change. Even some non- Buddhists developed anthropocentric world-views. Others, theists, explicated new theologies that attempted to undercut the Buddha's significance just as he undercut Brahmā's: theologies of a Viṣṇu whose cosmic lifespan is so immense that the Buddha, including all his *kalpas* of Bodhisattahood, is merely one of ten divine incarnations; of a Śiva whose meditative achievements mock the Buddha's austere *samādhi* with their erotic revelry. In response to these new theologies, Buddhists in turn began to reformulate the Buddha's non-theocentrism. Some (like the Theravādins) argued in new ways that salvation is a human rather than divine affair; Viṣṇu is allowed all His glory, but He stands at the feet of the Buddha in Buddhist temples, humbly recognizing that Godness pales in comparison with Buddhahood. Others (like the aspirants to birth in the Pure Land of Amitābha (q.v.)) began to conceive of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas as omniscient, omnipresent and eternal rivals to the Godness of a Viṣṇu or Śiva.

In modern times, Buddhists who affirm the anthropocentrism of the Buddha (especially the Theravādins) have been occasionally vocal critics of the Christian God; as examples we might mention the Buddhist participants in the Pānaduravāda (q.v. Panadura-debates) and Anagārika Dharmapāla (q.v.).[8] Buddhists with faith in a God like Buddha (especially the practitioners of Shin Buddhism have, on the contrary, tended to pursue ecumenical relations with Christians by means of the "Buddhist-Christian Dialogue" which seeks to find a common (theological) basis for the practice and philosophy of both religions.

Gunapala Dharmasiri and Jonathan S. Walters

GODDESSES, even though represented in pre-Aryan and Vedic religion, seem to have come into prominence at a later stage of the religious development in India. They occupy a very subordinate position in the early Vedic beliefs. Most of the goddesses who are included in the Vedic pantheon are either divinities of natural phenomena or appear as wives of great gods. Many of them have no independent character and hardly anything is mentioned about them except their names which are simply formed from the names of the great gods, often with the addition of the feminine suffix *ānī*. Thus, Rudrāni is derived from Rudra; Varuṇāni and Indrāni from Varuṇa and Indra, respectively. Of the independent goddesses Uṣas appears to be the most important. But even she is not equal to the gods. Sarasvatī, another important goddess of the *Ṛg-veda* is ranked with the lowest class of deities. However, in the later Vedic period, reflected in the *Brāhmaṇas* and *Purāṇas,* goddesses gradually begin to acquire importance.

Even though a noun of the feminine gender is most frequently used for 'deity' *(devatā)* in Pali goddesses are seldom specifically referred to in early Buddhism. However the term *deva-dhītā* is often met with in Buddhist literature, in contrast to *deva-putta,* when it connotes 'divine damsels', but they are neither full fledged goddesses, nor do they play an important role in the religious beliefs of the time. Textual evidence suggests, that the early Buddhist pantheon was made up of the important Vedic gods and also of a few gods of the folk religion (*D.* II, 253; III, p. 194; *M.* I, p. 280). On being taken over to the Buddhist pantheon, they lost much of their importance and were made subordinate to the Buddha and his eminent disciples. They, like all other beings, are subject to birth, decay and death. As goddesses were not prominent in the Vedic pantheon they do not seem to have received the attention of the early Buddhists too. Although the goddesses Siri (=Śrī) is mentioned she, too, does not appear as a full fledged goddess (*DPPN.* II, p. 1139). Thus, the important deities accepted by early Buddhism are exclusively male.

Even in early Mahāyāna Buddhim, gods and goddesses are not given prominence. But with the development of popular Mahāyānism, the importance attached to gods and goddesses increased. Under the influence of Hinduism, which is quite rich in its pantheon, popular Mahāyānism, too, increased its pantheon. Goddessess, for example, Gauri, Lakṣmī, Durgā, Kāli, Sarasvatī, were of great importance in the Hindu pantheon. This may have prompted the Mahāyānists to create goddesses by deifying objects of natural phenomena, abstract ideas and other objects such as books, and attach importance to them.

8. For a recent, systematic treatment of Theravāda Buddhist antitheology, with special reference to the ideas of modern Christian theologians, see Gunapala Dharmasiri, *A Buddhist Critique of the Christian Concept of God.*

It is by the introduction of Tārā, the deification of the abstract idea of 'crossing-over' the ocean of *samsāra,* that the way was paved for numerous goddesses to enter the Buddhist pantheon. Soon after the appearance of Tārā another important goddess arose. She is Prajñāpāramitā, the deification of the important Mahāyāna text under the same name. Gradually, deification gained importance and this resulted in the increase of the pantheon. New gods and goddesses arose in quick succession. Mahāyāna texts themselves bear witness to how new deities emerged and gained prominence. One such clear case is the deification of the earth into a goddess. The *Mahāvastu* (II, p. 282) and the *Lalitavistara* (pp. 232 f.) quite clearly depict the different stages of her emergence as a goddess. (See BHŪMI-SPARSAMUDRĀ)

But it was with the rise of Vajrayāna, in which the goddesses came to play integrat role in the form of Sakti, or ḍākinī that goddesses really came into prominence. In Vajrayāna deification became a very common feature. Mainly in order to popularise their tenets Vajrayānists carried out deification to the furthest extreme. They deified almost everything that drew their attention. The concept of Dhyānibuddha (q.v.) along with the concepts of *kula* (family) and *śakti* (q.v.) enhanced the process of deification. The Dhyānibuddhas were regarded as the heads of the five *kulas,* and they together with their *śaktis* were considered as progenitors of all the gods and goddesses. The wide acceptance of the concept of śakti resulted not only in the increase in the pantheon, but also in the increase in the importance of goddesses. The popular belief was that a god was more disposed to listen to the invoker when worshipped in the company of his śakti. In Tibet, where this belief was very strong, goddesses acquired great importance.

In the early period of Vajrayāna deification was regarded as a result of an elaborate psychic process. But later gods and goddesses were produced according to the whims and fancies of the Vajrayānists. The meditations, explained in the *Sādhanas,* left much room for imagination on the part of the worshipper. The worshippers who revelled in deifying, zealously followed the examples set by the Mahāyānists and began to deify texts, abstract ideas and objects. Following the deification of Prajñāpāramitā, the Vajrayānists turned into a goddess the text *Mahāmāyūrī.* The goddess *Tārā* served as a good example of deification of an abstract idea. This may have prompted the *Vajrayānists* to deify the concept of *Sūnya* into a goddess, named Nairātmā.

The Vajrayānists, in trying to explain the nature of deities, stated that they are manifestations of *śūnya.* It was believed that these deities emanating from *śūnya* may take any colour according to the Tantric rite in which they are invoked. The stock number of colours accepted by the Vajrayānists was five, corresponding to the five cosmic elements. By attributing these colours the same deity was conceived in different forms. Thus the goddess Tārā, who had gained much popularity by this time, was conceived in different forms such as Sita-Tārā (white-Tārā), Syāma-Tārā (green Tārā) and finally in twentyone different forms. The Vajrayānists also accepted that *śūnya* manifests itself as different deities in accordance with the different functions it had to perform. This resulted in the rise of pacific and angry forms of the same deity. Tārā, who was originally a most pacific goddess, was also thought of as manifesting hereself in angry forms such as Mahācina-Tārā (Ugra-Tārā), Ekajaṭā, Bhṛkuṭī and Kurukullā. The Vajrayānists were so enraptured with deification that they represented the same deity in different forms by varying the number of heads and hands and also by varying the symbols and gestures displayed by them. Effects of these attempts are seen in the numerous manifestations of the same deity. For example, the goddess Kurukullā, herself another form of Tārā, is represented in five different forms as Sukla-Kurukullā, Tārodbhava-Kurukullā, Uḍḍiyāna-Kurukulla, Astabhuja-Kurukullā and Māyājālakrama-Kurukullā. Thus all the important goddesses[1] were represented in different forms and were held in high esteem, because they were considered as capable of performing important functions. Thus, Kurukullā was invoked by unhappy lovers, and another goddess called Parṇaśabari was invoked during epidemics. Jāṅguli was regarded by the Vajrayānists as the goddess who cures snake-bite and was invoked for that purpose.

All the goddesses in the Vajrayāna pantheon are not of equal rank. Their rank varies according to their importance and the part played by them in Vajrayāna beliefs. One and the same goddess may be of much importance in one form and of less importance in another. The goddess Mārīcī is an important emanation of Vairocana, but her manifestation as Aśokakāntā is of little importance and she is represented as an attendant of Khadirāvani-Tārā. Thus, of the three emanations[2] of the Dhyānibuddha Amitābha, Bhṛkuṭi and Kurukullā are more important than Mahāsitavatī who is also one of the five protectresses. There are about fourteen major emanations of Aksobhya and most of them are of fierce appearance. Of

1. Compare also the cases of Jāṅguli Prajñāpāramitā, Vajravārāhī etc.

2. The attribution of numerous deities to the five Dhyānibuddha does not seem to be consistent for, the same deity is assigned to more than one Dhyānibuddha. See the case of Vasudhārā who is regarded as the emanation of both Aksobhya and Ratnasambhava.

these fourteen Mahācina-Tārā, Jaṅguli, Ekajaṭā, Vidyujjvālākarāli, Parṇaśabari, Nairatmā, as well as the two pacific goddesses Prajñāpāramitā and Vasudhārā, are more important than Vajracarcikā, Mahāmantrānusārinī, Mahāpratyaṅgirā, Dvajāgrakeyūrā, Jñānaḍākini and Vajraḍākini. There are about seven goddesses emanating from Vairocana and of these Mārīci, Uṣṇīsa-Vijayā, Vajravarāhi and Cundā are very important. These goddesses appear also under numerous forms. The other three namely, Sitātapatra-aparājitā, Mahāsāhasrapra-mardani and Grahamātṛkā are not so important. About ten goddesses emanate from Amoghasiddhi and of these at least six are different forms of Tārā, namely, Khadirāvani-Tārā, Mahāśri-Tārā, Vaśya-Tārā, Saḍbhuja-Tārā, Dhanada-Tārā and Sita-Tārā. Others are Parṇaśabari, Vajraśṛṅkhalā, Mahāmāyūri and Vajragandhāri. Two forms of Tārā such as Vajra-Tārā and Prasanna-Tārā are included among the six goddesses emanating from Ratnasambhava. Others are Vasudhārā, Aparājitā, Vajrayogini and Mahāpratisarā, who is also the principal goddess in a group of five protector goddesses.

The Vajrayānists were not content even after carrying out the process of deification till they ran out of objects and concepts that suited their purpose. Then they began to deify almost all objects and concepts irrespective of their significance in religious belief. This process added numerous groups of collective goddesses to the Vajrayāna pantheon. They created six goddesses by deifying the six quarters. Another group of five were formed and named as five protectresses *(pañcarakṣā-devatā)*. There are other groups whose origin and functions are not clear. One such group is the eight Gauri goddesses. Various modes of dancing such as *lāsya* and *nṛtya*, as well as numerous musical instruments such as the lute *(vīṇā)*, flute *(vaṃśa)*, tambourine *(muraja)* and kettle drum *(mukunda)*, were turned into goddess. Luminous bodies such as the sun, moon, stars and lightening, too, were conceived as goddesses. Even such objects as the door planks, the lock, the keys and curtains were turned into goddesses under the name Kapāṭā, Tālikā, Kuñci, and Paṭadhārini, respectively.[3] They added four more goddesses to the pantheon by creating four animal faced goddesses namely Hayāsyā, Sukrāsyā, Svānāsyā, and Simhāsyā. The *pāramitas* (perfection) the *vaśitās* (special powers acquired by bodhisattvas) different *bodhisattvabhūmis* (stages),[4] *dhāraṇis* and the four *pratisaṃvits* (analytical knowledge) were all turned into goddesses.

Beside these goddesses the Vajrayāna pantheon consists also of a few goddesses taken over from the Hindu pantheon. Sarasvati, Gaṇapatihṛdayā, Vārāhi, Cāmuṇḍā are some of the goddesses thus incorporated in the Buddhist pantheon (see also APASARAS, DEIFICATION).

S. K. Nanayakkara

GODS. The concept of gods, though present in Buddhism, does not either form part of its central teachings or serve as a basis for its religious practices. Buddhism is a non-theistic religious-philosophy. This means that it does not accept the possibility of a Creator God, either as the Creator of man or as the Creator of the world.

Not only was the Buddha conversant with the the current sixth century B.C. views of creation *(eke samaṇabrāhmaṇā issarakuttaṃ brahmakuttaṃ ācariyakamaggaññaṃ paññapenti,* D. III. p. 28) but what is more important, he did not think that such a view could explain anything about the world. Buddhism does not call the world contingent but only impermanent. Its central thesis emphasizes that everything is subject to an unceasing flow of change *(vipariṇāmadhamma,* cf. G. Dharmasiri, *A Buddhist Critique of the Christian concept of God,* 1974, p. 33).

The *Aggañña Sutta* of the *Dīgha Nikāya (D.* III, 80f. *Dialogue of the Buddha,* III, 77f.) quite clearly states that both the physical world and the human society are not the products of any creative fiat of a God but merely the products of an evolutionary process (Marasinghe, M. M. J. *Gods in Early Buddhism,* 1974, p. 45 = *GEB).* It is also clear from the *Aggañña Sutta* that any one single evolutionary process of the world is only one in a long series of such processes which operate in the Universe like several other processes or laws of nature.

The Pali term which describes the gods in the Buddhist tradition *'deva'* is defined in the Pali Text Society's *Pali-English Dictionary* as "The popular etymology refers it to the root *div* in the sense of playing, sporting or amusing oneself; *dibbantīti devā, pañcahi kāmaguṇehi kīlanti, attanā vā siriyā jotanti ti attho: KhpA.* p. 14; a god, divine being; usually in pl. *devā*, the gods. As title attributed to any superhuman being or beings regarded to be in certain

3. B. Bhattacharya *(The Indian Buddhist Iconography,* p. 316) is of opinion that the door-plank as well as the other parts of the door were deified as the door was held to be important because of its power of giving protection against thieves, animals and intruders.

4. They increased the number of *pāramitas, vaśitās* and *bodhisattva-bhūmis* to twelve by adding two new ones into each group. The two pāramitas added were Ratnapāramitā and Vajrakarma-pāramitā. The new *vaśitās* and *bodhisattva-bhūmis* were Tathatāvaśitā and Buddha-bodhiprabhāvaśitā, Adhimukticaryā-bhūmi and Samantaprabhā-bhūmi.

respects above the human level....Always implying splendour and mobility, beauty, goodness and light and as such opposed to the dark powers of mischief and destruction" (*s.v. PED.*).

Thoughout the Buddhist texts, the Buddha's enlightenment is consistently explained as consisting of complete and comprehensive knowledge and insight of the entire world together with its beings both mortal and immortal *(so imam lokam sadevakam samārakam sabrahmakam sassamaṇa-brāhmaṇim pajam sadevamanussam sayam abhiññā sacchikatvā pavedeti; D.* I. 250; *Dialogues of the Buddha* I, 316). It must be pointed out here that according to the Buddhist conception of the world, the 'world' that is of interest to Buddhism is the 'world of beings' (*GEB.* p. 43). And it is important to note that this 'world of beings' is the world of gods and men *(sadevamanussam).* Thus, the gods form as integral part of the world and they do, therefore, occupy a definite place in the Buddhist cosmological conceptions.

All living beings in the world are classified under four broad groups according to the form of their birth *(yoni)*, as egg-born *(aṇḍaja)*, womb-born *(jalābuja)*, moisture-born *(saṃsedaja)* and those of spontaneous origin *(opapātika).* Of these, the fourth includes the gods (*M.* I, 73; *GEB.* trp. 46).

A detailed description of the different spheres or realms of existence of the diverse types of beings is contained in the *Mahā-sihanāda Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya (M.* I. 73f.). The five destinies or bournes *(gatiyo)* of beings as explained therein are, purgatory *(niraya)*, animal birth *(tiracchānayoni)*, realm of the *petas (pettivisaya)*, realm of human beings *(manussā)* and realm of the gods *(devā)*, (*GEB.* p. 46).

The gods belong to different heavenly realms or spheres. These vary from the most frequently mentioned seven to as many as twenty-five or even more sometimes. Almost all the contexts invariably have the names of the first six heavenly spheres while in most contexts they have *Brahmaloka* (or *Brahmakāyikā devā)* as the seventh. The longer list, it is important to note, is found only in a few contexts, pointing to the possibility that this increase is a result of increasing the number of the *Brahma* realms to suit the special doctrinal requirements of Buddhism.


The seven heavenly spheres thus mentioned are as follows: *Cātummhārājikā, Tāvatiṃsā, Yāmā, Tusitā, Nimmānarati, Paranimmitavasavatti* and *Brahmaloko* (or *Brahmakāyikā devā).* According to the longer lists the following heavenly spheres are found in addition to the above seven: *Ābhā, Parittābhā, Appamāṇābhā, Ābhassarā, Subhā, Parittasubhā, Appamāṇasubhā, Subhakiṇṇā, Vehapphalā, Avihā, Atappā, Sudassā, Sudassī, Akaniṭṭhā, Ākāsānañcāyatanūpagā, Viññāṇañcāyatanūpagā, Ākiñcaññāyatanūpagā,* and *Nevasaññānāsaññāyatanūpagā.* Of the first six heavenly spheres, the *Cātummahārājika* (q.v.) has the Four Great Kings *(cattāro mahārājāno)* as Kings while each of the other five has a King or chief god who is superior to the rest of the gods in that particular heavenly sphere and who also exels them in ten ways (*A.* III. 333, IV. 242, 253, 256). Of these, the god most frequently referred to is Sakka, the King of the *Tāvatiṃsa* gods.

According to the *Mahāsīhanāda Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya (M.* I. 73 f.) beings in heavenly spheres experience feelings which are exclusively pleasant *(ekantasukhā vedanā)* compared with the continued suffering which is sharp and severe *(ekantadukkhā tippā katukā)* of the beings of purgatory, suffering which is sharp and severe *(dukkā tippā katukā)* of the beings of the animal world *(tiracchāna yoni)*, feelings which are abundantly painful *(dukkhabahulā vedanā)* of the beings of the realm of the *petas (pettivisaya)*, and the experience of pleasure in general *(sukhabahulā vedanā)* of the beings of the realm of human beings.

According to Pali Canonical texts, even human kingship is beggarly when compared with the happiness in the heavenly spheres (*A.* I, p. 213; IV, pp. 252, 256. etc.). The gods enjoy their fill of the five celestial sense-pleasure, there being some gods who even pass away from their state of celestial existence due to over-indulgence in these pleasures (*D.* I. p. 19). The gods make special merriment on particular occasions such as when a Bodhisatta is born in the world of human beings. The gods have radiant bodies, their radiance depending on the degree of purity of their deeds in the previous human existence.

Although the different heavenly realms are arranged hierarchically, the Pali texts are silent as to what constitutes the difference between them. It seems that the higher realms are preferable to the lower ones, mainly as one goes higher and higher in the scale, the length of the life-spans also increases, the idea apparently being that while the gods of the *Cātummahārājika* realm have a life-span of five hundred celestial years, the gods of the *Paranimmitavasavatti* realm have a life-span of sixteen thousand celestial years - years of similar celestial bliss (*GEB.* p. 51).

It is the degree of intensity and the purity of action which determines the state of heavenly existence one is reborn into. While liberality *(dāna)* and morality *(sīla)* are sufficient for rebirth into the six lower heavenly realms, it is the degree of perfection in the meditative accomplishments *(bhāvanā)* which determines rebirth into the *Brahma* realms (*GEB.* p. 266-267). See chart.



The Buddhist re-interpretation of the Heavens (cf. with chart facing page 62, Marasinghe, M. M. J., Gods in Early Buddhism 1974)

As much as the differences which exist between one heavenly realm and another are those which relate to the quality or degree of spiritual attainment which determines such rebirth, the heavenly realms in the Buddhist texts are also not to be understood as cosmographically definable (*GEB.* p. 43) compartments in space. This means that titles such as *Cātummahārājika* and *Tāvatiṃsa*, terms which describe the gods of certain specific religious or spiritual values, are not intended at all to indicate geographical locations.

Although in all the Canonical contexts where several heveanly realms are referred to, they are arranged hierarchically, nothing is said about their physical location in space, either in relation to one another, or in relation to the world of human beings. For example, according to these, the *Tāvatiṃsa* gods are higher than the *Cātummahārājika* gods, but this does not therefore necessarily imply that the realm of the *Tāvatiṃsa* gods is spatially located above the realm of the *Cātummahārājika* gods. Further, it cannot also be argued, according to these Nikāya contexts that, any one realm of the gods is spatially distinct from the rest of the heavenly realms. It may be noted here that this is an important characteristic of the analytical cosmology of Early Buddhism, which thereby differed from the cosmographical 'world views' of other contemporary Indian religious philosophies (*GEB.* p. 43 f.)

Thus, the heavenly realms are not conceived of as blocks or comparments in a storeyed structure either above or below the human world, but as categories or types of beings of similar attainments or accomplishments and composition existing in environments parallel and coterminous with the world of human and other beings (*GEB.* p. 56 f.). This also means that the gods too

are therefore, subject to the same conditions of change and impermanence as are the human and other beings. They too are finite, having a beginning and an end, although their conditions of birth, living, etc., are said to be much better than those of human beings (*S.* III, 85; *Kindred Sayings,* III. 71).

According to the evidence in the Pali Canonical texts the Buddhist gods are not objects of prayer or religious ritual. This is not because all religious practices acceptable to Buddhism were devoid of religious ritual, but because the path of the spiritual development of man and everything that is associated with the practice thereof was considered dependent solely on man and was therefore outside the intervention and supervision of any one else, divine or otherwise.

Hence, the gods are irrelevant to the attainment of *Nibbāna* in Buddhism. Therefore, the gods have no central or important function to perform in Buddhism. Although the path of enlightenment has to be worked out entirely by oneself, the guidance of a teacher or the companionship of a friend is regarded as helpful. Even the role of the teacher *(ācariya)* in Buddhism seems to be but a combination of the roles of both the mentor and of the friend according to the *Vinaya* texts *Vin.* I, p. 60 f.).

The importance of such companionship is praised throughout the early Canonical texts. We find extolled even in such ancient documents as the *Khaggavisāṇa Sutta* of the *Sutta nipāta,* one of the most ancient suttas exemplifying the ascetic *(muni)* ideal among the Pali texts (*SK.* pp. 207-221). Such a friend is often referred to as a *kalyāṇamitta* – 'a noble companion' or a kind and well-intentioned friend, in the Pali texts.

This is one of the roles in which the majority of the gods in the early Canonical texts are seen to be active when they are associated with disciples who are engaged in exertion to attain *Nibbāna.* The *Suttas* of the *Vana Saṃytta (S.* I, pp. 197-205) show that at the slightest sign of faltering on the part of the meditative disciples, these kindly gods come and exhort them to take heed, lest they fail to attain the goal which they are seeking to attain (*GEB.* p. 86).

But, it is most important to note that such help and advice from and intervention by the gods is entirely voluntary and when such help and advice is offered, it is offered with great reverence and do not, therefore, come as directives from superiors. Therefore, such help is neither to be sought after, nor is to be depended upon. This is quite eloquently brought out in a *sutta* at *S.* I, p. 205 where being highly pleased by the kindly admonition of the deity, the disciple requests the deity to correct him in case of future transgressions as well. To this the deity replies:

Neva taṃ upajīvāmi – māpi te katakammase
tvam eva bhikkhu jāneyya – yena gaccheyya suggatiṃ
("Neither am I dependent upon thee,
Nor yet hath guilty deed by thee been done
But thou, O almsman, thou thyself shouldst, know
How thou to blissful destiny mayst go" (*Kindred Sayings* I, 261).

Although it is possible that a god might point out in case of a faltering on the part of the disciple, it is the disciple himself who knows better (*GEB.* p. 88).

The other, is where the gods contact either the Buddha or one of his disciples invariably to seek resolution of a doubt that has arisen in their minds or some matter connected with the future well-being of the teaching (*GEB.* p. 84).

Thus, it is the Buddha and his eminent disciples – either *arahants,* those striving for enlightenment, or lay disciples of considerable accomplishments in the requirements for enlightenment–who have close contact with the gods, except in a very few instances. It may be noted here in passing that the Nikāya texts record only three instances where the gods are said to have visited those outside the above categories, but it is important to note that in all these instances, the visits are of specially limited purpose. Therefore, it is the Buddha and his eminent disciples who are able to see and converse with the gods and thus, it is only they who know the gods (*GEB.* p. 90).

The evidence in the Pali Canonical texts is quite clear that such knowledge and contact is the result of higher religious accomplishments. All Canonical contexts where the subject of the higher knowledge *(abhiññā)* is discussed are agreed that it is the Fourth *Jhāna-(catutthajjhāna)* which provides the requisite pliability of mind for such acquisitions (*D.* I. 791 *M.* I. 34; etc.). It is after one attains the mental purity and concertration of the Fourth *Jhāna* that, "with mind thus serene, pure, translucent, cultured, devoid of evil, supple, manoeuvrable, firm and imperturbable" one is able to direct it to achieve any kind of higher knowledge or any of the acquisitions, he is desirous of acquiring, such as the knowledge of the recollection of past existences *(pubbenivāsānussatiñāṇa),* the divine eye *(dibba--cakkhu),* the divene ear *(dibbasota),* or any of the psychic powers *(iddhividha)*(*D.*I. p. 79). Thus, the ability to hear heavenly sounds and see heavenly forms results from the cultivation of *samādhi* directed for that specific purpose.

Here too, the texts are quite clear that the process of communication with the gods begins with the hearing of sounds, followed by the sighting of their forms (*D.* II, p. 205; cf. also the *Janavasabha Sutta* account of the Buddha's meeting with Janavasabha, *D.* II. p. 205). According to the *Mahāli Sutta* of the *Dīgha nikāya,* the

problem of Sunakkhatta was that he could see the forms but not hear the sounds (*D.* I, p. 153). According to the Buddha, it was so, because his *samādhi* was of limited resolve or application, i.e. because it was aimed only at seeing heavenly forms and not at hearing heavenly sounds *(Evam h'etam.... ekamsa-bhāvite samādhimhi dibbānam rūpānam dassanāya .... no ca kho dibbānam saddānam savanāya (D.* I, p. 153; *GEB.*, p. 93).

According to the Gayā Sutta in the *Anguttara Nikāya* the enlightenment of the Buddha was not complete until he mastered the Eightfold Series of Knowledge and Insight which transcends the gods *(atthaparivattam adhideva-ñānadassanam).* These as enumerated in the *sutta* are:

i. Perceiving the auras *(obbhāsam hi kho sañjānāmi);*
ii. Seeing forms (... *rūpāni ca passāmi);*
iii. Stand with (be in the company of), talk to and engage in conversation with, the gods *(devatāhi saddhim santitthāmi, sallapāmi, sākaccham samāpajjāmi);*
iv. Distinctive knowledge of these gods as to the different realms or spheres to which they belong *(imā devatā amukamhā vā amukamhā vā devanikāyā'ti);*
v. Penetrative knowledge regarding the gods as to what past deeds conditioned their present births as gods and from having been what they came to be reborn as such, etc. *(imā devatā imassa kammassa vipākena ito cutā tattha upapannā'ti);*
vi. Knowledge regarding their subsistence, their ex perience, their weal and woe, etc. *(imā devatā evamahārā, evamsukha-dukkha-patisamvedaniyo'ti);*
vii. Knowledge regarding the length of their life-spans, the length of life in their present states, etc. *(imā devatā evamdīghāyukā, evamciratthitikā'ti);*
viii. Knowledge of whether he had dwelt with these gods formerly or not *(imāhi devatāhi saddhim sannivutthapubbam yadi vā na sannivutthapubban'ti)* (*A.* IV. p. 302; *Gradual Sayings* IV. 201; *GEB.* p. 93).

According to the sutta, each successive stage of this knowledge and insight resulted from a further purification of the knowledge and insight of the previous stage, through *samādhi (....ñānadassanam parisuddhitaram assā'ti: A.* IV. p. 302; *Gradual Sayings* IV. 201).

It is clear from the above discussions that it is the concentration of mind *(samādhi)* which enables one to establish contact, or in other words, see and converse with and thereby know the gods. Also, in as much as there are distinctions between the higher and the lower heavenly realms, there are also distinctions in the states of *samādhi* by means of which one is able to reach the gods of the different heavenly realms. This is why bhikkhu Kevaddha who entered into a state of *samādhi* which could only enable him to establish contact with the gods of the lower heavenly realms *(atha kho so Kevaddho bhikkhu tathārūpam samādhim samāpajji yathāsamāhite citte devayāniyc maggo pātur ahosi: D.* I. 215) had to enter into another (higher) *samādhi* to establish contact with the *brahmakāyikā* gods *(atha kho...Brahmayāniyo maggo pātur ahosi: D.* I, 220). Thus, the samādhi which resulted in the *devayāniya magga* was not sufficient for establishing contact with the higher gods of the Brahmakāyika realms, which therefore required the (higher) *samādhi* corresponding to the relevant spiritual refinement.

It is important to note here how the text describes bhikkhu Kevaddha's attainment of the path to the gods. It clearly states that the path to the gods *arose in the mind thus cultured (yathāsamāhite citte devayāniyo maggo pātur ahosi).*

Thus, the entire process of hearing, seeing and conversing with and thereby knowing the gods takes place in *samādhi.* This is exactly how the gods too 'meet' or transact with the Buddha or with his eminent disciples. According to the texts, these 'meetings' take place either towards the latter part of the night *(abhikkantāya rattiyā)* or when the Buddha was spending his noonday rest in meditation *(divāvihāragato hoti patisallino).*

As these transactions take place whilst in *samādhi* and as the heavenly realms are not conceived of as spatially distinct physical compartments in space (*GEB.* p. 56f.) there is no need for physical migration of either of the parties for such transactions. This is quite clearly borne out by textual evidence. In the account of the eightfold series of knowledge and insight discussed above, the fourth stage is the acquisition of the distinctive knowledge of the gods with regard to the heavenly realm or category to which they belong *(imā devatā amukamhā vā amukamhā vā devanikāyā'ti).* Unless this is taken as referring to a congregation or an assembly of gods where all gods of the different heavenly realms had gathered together, the only way in which we can understand this is in a non-cosmographic sense. It is quite clear that the context does not refer to any particular gathering of the gods, it being a general statement regarding the Buddha's acquisition of the knowledge of the gods.

It is important to note here that the gods who come under the above discussions do not exhaust the entirety of the gods in the early Buddhist texts. An examination of the Pali Canonical texts shows that there are three distinct types of gods in these texts. The first type consists of those gods and spirits who formed part of the general Indian mythology into Buddhism, perhaps with minor re-orientation. These may be designated as adoptions from contemporary mythology. The second type consists of those gods and spirits who also were adopted from this same general Indian mythological heritage, but were

completely transformed to suit the special requirements of Buddhism, performing the new functions assigned to them. These may be designated as adaptations from the general Indian mythological heritage. The third type consists of those gods and spirits who were created by Buddhism and were as a result added on to the general Indian mythological heritage. It would be useful to make at least a brief survey of these three types.

1. **Adoptions from the contemporary mythological traditions:** It is estimated that the first Aryan invasions of India occurred about the beginning of the second millennium B.C. The gruesome stories of the wars which preceded the Aryan settlements in the new lands they came to occupy were no longer history when these events finally came to be recorded in the Ṛgvedic hymns. During the long time-gap between the events and their final recording in these texts, not only the events but also the peoples involved in these events had faded from actual history to myth and legend. As D.D. Kosambi explains, "Indra smashed the enemies of the Aryans, looted the 'treasure-housed of the godless'. The demons he killed are named: Śambara, Pipru, Araśasānas, Sushna (who may be a personification of the drought), and Namuci among others; many of these names sound un-Aryan. It is always difficult to separate Vedic myth from possible historic reality; rhetorical praise may or may not represent some military success on the battlefield. Were the women in Namuci's 'army' human or mother goddesses? Did the demon have two wives or does he represent the local god of two rivers seen so often on Mesopotamian seals? The Aryans had destroyed other urban cultures before coming to India. Indra wiped out the remnants of the Varaśikhas at Hariyūpiyā on behalf of Abhyāvartin Cāyamāna, an Aryan chief. The tribe destroyed was that of the Vricivats, whose front line of 130 panoplied warriors was shattered like an earthen pot by Indra on the Yavyāvatī (Ravi) river, ... Such vigorous language describes some actual fight at Harappā, whether between two Aryan groups or between Aryans and non-Aryans". (Kosambi, D.D., *Culture and Civilization of Ancient India,* 1965, 78; *GEB.* p. 70).

According to Kosambi's estimation, the Indra of these records, "resembles a human war leader of just such violent, patriarchal bronze-age barbarians as the Aryans of the first wave patently were. In fact, it still remains an open question whether Indra is not a deified ancestral war leader who had actually led the Aryans in the field, or perhaps a succession of such active human chiefs... (Kosambi, *op. cit.*, 78; Perry, W.J., *Children of the Sun,* 1923, p. 132; *GEB*, p. 71).

Similarly, "The Iranian records speak of the *var* of King Yima, a rectangular place into which neither death nor the winter cold could penetrate till someone sinned; in fact, a limited form of the 'Golden Age', as it were. Then good King Yima saved his people from general punishment for the broken tabu by taking death upon himself, to become the first mortal. In India, Yama of the *Ṛgveda* was also the first mortal, the old ancestral death-god, and still remains a god of the dead. Originally, the death Indo-Aryan went to join his ancestors in the protection of Yama; later Yama presided over the tortures of the dead in the underworld while other gods ruled in heaven....Yama and his protected domain was a prehistoric reality before the great Indo-Aryan migration" (Kosambi, *op. cit.* 77f.; *GEB.* p. 71).

The Asuras, whom the Aryans confronted on their arrival in India, "were the ruling families: and not the common people. In civilization they were far in advance of the Aryans. It would seem, indeed, as if the Asuras had reached a higher degree of civilization than their Aryan rivals. Some of their cities were.... places of considerable importance. And, in addition to this, wealth and luxury, the use of magic, superior architectural skill, and ability to restore the dead to life, were ascribed to the Asuras by Brahmanical writers" (Perry, *op. cit.* p. 132 f.).

Thus, not only gods like Indra and Yama, but such classes of non-Aryan peoples like the Asuras and the Rakshasas too were part of the gereral Indian mythological tradition by the time of the sixth century B.C. Hence, these are taken as mythology in the Pali Canonical texts and made profuse use of, for purposes of religious edification.

2. **Adaptations from the contemporary mythological traditions:** Those coming under this type also existed either as mythology or legend before Buddhism took them over. But, because of the complete transformation effected in them during the process of adaptation, there is harldy a trace of their original forms in the new concepts. In other words, in this class certain elements of then current popular mythologies are seen to undergo an actual change into characteristic Buddhist appearance. The gods and spirits thus adapted were intended to serve more definite doctrinal functions than those of the first type (*GEB.* p. 78).

Sakka, Māra, Vessavaṇa and the Brahmās seem to provide good examples of this type. Sakka for example, is not found as a separate god in any pre-Buddhist Indian religious text. It was an epithet of the god Indra, originally used in the *Upahvya* rite, instead of his true name (Keith, A.B., *Religion and Philisophy of the Veda,* 1925, 338). Sakka is the King of the *Tāvatiṃsa* gods. He is very human in his character. "The Buddha has," in the words of Tachibana "humanized and moralized the Indra of the Veda". He, "is not in any way free from general human weakeness. He is passionate, full of hatred, ignorant, timid and cowardly (*S.* I, p. 219). He is subject

to birth, old age, death, lamentation, sorrow, dejection and despair (*A.* I. 144)." According to Dr. Malalasekara, "These and other passages show that Sakka was considered by the early Buddhists as a god of high character, kindly and just, but not perfect, and not very intelligent. His imperfections are numrous." He is much inferior to the Buddha and the *arahants* and also to other good men. He finds their company attractive:" even the scent of seers long vowed to holy things" is sweet to him. Thus, the character of the Buddhist Sakka is quite different from that of his Vedic counterpart Indra. "In the Veda he appears as a great helper and giver of boons to his supplicants. Indra increases the wealth of the person who offers sacrifices and praises to him." Although Sakka continues to wear the warrior's garb as depicted in the Buddhist texts, he is very little but an exemplary lay follower of the Buddha. He occasionally visits the Buddha and the *arahants,* although he himself is being worshipped by brahmins and nobles on earth (*GEB.* p. 67). The change from the un-aging, immortal Vedic Indra to the almost human Sakka shows the extent of adaptation that has been effected in Buddhism.

Māra, going back perhaps to the Vedic Mṛtyu, the god of death, combines in his new form, elements taken from the contemporary Brahmanic and non-Brahmanic mythologies of evil. The traditional Vedic god of death has in Buddhism, undergone change from one who is inflicting death to one who is ever alert and vigilant to prevent the attainment Enlightenment. The shifting of the concentration of activity from actual death to the effort to conquer death for all time is very significant. As Buddhism does not recognize any god or spirit as capable of inflicting harm or injury on man, Māra too, is depicted only as one who is ever alert to disrupt the attainment of Enlightenment, but finds himself incapable of attaining this objective as the disciple is always alert and mindful.

Vessavana is one of the Four Great Kings of the gods of the lowest heavenly realm, the *Cātummahrājika.* He rules over the *Yakkhas.* According the *Āṭānāṭiya Sutta,(D.* III, pp. 194 ff) he was the author of the *Āṭānāṭiya rune,* which in Buddhism, substituted the *rakṣāmantras* of the popular religion. Vessavaṇa, appearing for the first time in the Budhist texts as the name of a god, seems to have been derived from Vaiśravaṇa, an epithet of Kubera, the Vedic god of wealth and prosperity according to an *Atharva Vedic* passage. Vessavana is recorded to have had great respect and concern for the Buddha and his disciples (*GEB.* p.67).

The Brahmanic religion knew only of the Great Brahma who was their Creator of the world and of man. This one single Creator God Brahma has grown in Buddhism into a whole new class of gods - the *Brahmakāyikā devā (DPPN.* I. p.337; *GEB.* p. 203), still representing the highest class of beings among the gods. The realms of the Brahmās are eight in number ranging from the lowest *Brahmakāyikā devā* to that of the *Nevasaññānasaññāyatanūpagā devā.* It is interesting to note here that the number eight also corresponds to the number of stages of *Jhāna* attainment in the path of spiritual development in Buddhism. It is the attainment of the relevant *jhāna* that entitles one for rebirth into the company of the relevant gods of the Brahma realm (see chart). It is also important to note here that each realm of the Brahmās has a chief Brahmā. Thus, not only is there a plurality of the Brahmās in Buddhism, there is a plurality of the Mahā Brahmās too. Several of these Mahā Brahmās have been referred to in the Buddhist texts, the most frequently referred to among these being. Sahampati, the senior-most chief Brahmā at the time (s.v. *DPPN*).

The Brahmās, though having extremely long life-spans, are themselves not free from being subject to the laws of *kamma,* as are the other beings. Not only the Brahmās, but even their very realms are subject to change *(Brahmaloko pi āvuso anicco addhuvo sakkāyapariyāpanno...S.* V. p. 410).

It must be noted here that the gods coming under this category constitutes the most vital element in the Buddhist re-definition of the currently accepted theory of the gods. What is most important to remember is the fact that though they have been presented dressed in recognizable attire, they have undergone complete transformation as regards their inner character.

Thus, it is not heroism in battle which now entitles one for rebirth either in the lower or in the higher heavenly realms. It is the qualitative level of one's attainment in liberality *(dāna),* morality *(sīla)* and meditation *(bhāvanā)* which determines the level or the stage of heavenly existence that one becomes entitled for rebirth into. While those coming under the first category were taken as mythology and were treated as such, the gods and spirits coming under this category were those who seemingly resembled gods and spirits who were known in the general Indian religious traditions, but were now performing completely different functions.

3. Gods created by Buddhism: In this type are included all those gods who were recruited to the celestial ranks during the very life-time of the Buddha. Some of the gods who come under this type are, Anāthapiṇḍika, Rohita, Hatthaka, Ugga, Pahārāda, Verocana, Candana, Tudu, Kakudha, Kassapa, Māgha, Māgadha, Dāmali, etc.

All the names of gods coming under this type, it must be noted, are quite familliar to a reader of the Pali Canonical texts, not because they are the names of gods, but more particularly because they actually are the names of people who took an active interest in the Buddha's teaching at the time. Anāthapiṇḍika was a wealthy

banker of Sāvatthi who was famous for his unparalleled generosity to the Buddha and the Order. Ugga was another follower of the Buddha hailing from Vesāli, also reputed for his liberality as well as learning in the *dhamma*. Tudu, was the teacher of Kokālika and Kakudha was an attendant of Moggallāna and was an inhabitant of Koliya. And not only these Janavasabha, around whom the *Dīgha-nikāya sutta* of that name is woven, was the Magadhan King Bimbisāra himself, now in his new position in the company of Vessavaṇa (*GEB*, p. 69).

In the gods of this class we are witnessing how Buddhism made profuse use of an historical process which has been in operation throughout history in almost all or most known societies, namely, the process of mythologisation of the historical, for religious edification. As much as the early encounters of the Aryan invaders with the indegenous peoples of ancient India had faded into myth and legend by the time these accounts came to be recorded in the Vedic texts, myths and legends of diverse tribal groups kept on being added on to the rich heritage of Indian myth and legend as these tribes got absorbed into the framework of the 'Cultured Societies', thereby completely losing their tribal identities. Evidence in the Pali Canonical literature shows quite clearly that this process was taking place in the peripheral tribal societies of the Buddha's time. It has been shown that the yakkhas and the Nāgas who were tribal peoples who took an active interest in the Buddha's teaching at the time, had got completely merged into the 'Cultured Societies' leaving only their myths and legends by the time the commentraial l terature came to be written down in Sri Lanka (*GEB*. p. 70 f.). Buddhism has by making use of this historical process of mythologisation, shown that by living according to the teachings of the Buddha, it is quite easy either to become a god or to attain spiritual perfection thereby surpassing the gods.

Of the above three types, it is important to note here that the first type already existed as mythology before it was used by Buddhism. What actually has happened in Buddhism is its use for doctrinal elucidation or edification, perhaps with minor re-orientation. Hence, in this class can also be seen the purely illustrative (or symbolic) function of mythology in Buddhism. The *Rādha Saṃyutta* (*S*. III, 188-200) and the *Sakka Saṃyutta* (*S*. I. 216-240) provide some excellent examples of this type. In the second type are included those gods who were adapted from the general Indian mythological traditions to perform specific functions in Buddhism. Those coming under the third type not only were followers of the Buddha, but were his contemporaties as well, before they were reborn as gods. It is important to note here that the second and the third types included the entirety of the active gods in Buddhism.

The foregoing discussion brings out several important characteristics of the gods that we meet with in the Buddhist texts. The gods no longer are immortal inhabitants of everlasting celestial abodes, far removed from the world of mortal human beings. Spirithood, therefore does not quite contrary to the contemporary Brahmanic religious conception thereof, confer immortality (cf. *Yakṣatva amaratvam'*, Coomaraswamy, A.K., *Yakṣas*, Part 1-5). No longer are we to think of the heavens as the abodes of the gods and these to be separate compartments in space, spatially distinct from the world of human beings. They are not visible to the naked human eye and can be contacted through *Jhāna*. The ability to hear, see, converse and be with the gods is an accomplishment especially to be cultivated after one attains the Fourth *Jhāna* if one so desires. As the heavens are not to be taken as spatially distinct compartments in space, communication with the gods does not necessarily involve physical migrations of the parties involved either (*GEB*. p. 95). Neither are the 'heavens' and the gods therefore to be reached exclusively after death.

Birth in the celestial states of existence is neither an accident, nor an inevitable occurrence as the freedom to be reborn in any form of existence whether human or divine is one distinct advantage of having led a religious life (*M*. I. p. 289). It certainly does not result form either sacrifice, prayer or other form of supplication. They no longer are the objects of sacrifice, prayer or other form of religious practice or ritual and are therefore, not supported by systems of beliefs and ritual. Their intervention in the affairs of men is purely voluntary and is therefore not available at one's desire, request or compulsion through religious ritual.

Though celestial life is said to be consisting of continued (unbroken) happiness, it is a complete waste from the point of view of one's Nirvāṇa as, the longer one is in such existence the longer delayed becomes the possibility of attaining Nirvāna. As birth as a human being is an essential pre-condition to one's attainment of Nirvāna, celestial birth offers no advantage whatever towards maturing one for the goal of Enlightenment. It is, therefore justifiable to say that the gods in Buddhism are not an accepted item but merely a tolerated accessory. Thus, what we see in the Buddhist texts are merely the outer shells of the gods whom we meet elsewhere. They have ben completely transformed in their inner character performing entirely new functions altogether. Not only does the concept of gods in Buddhism not lend support to the concept of God or Gods in other religions, but also it proves the case against them as well.

M. M. J. Marasinghe

GOKANNA,(var. **Gokannavihāra**, an ancient Buddhist site on the eastern coast of Sri Lanka. The *Mahāvamsa* mentions that King Mahāsena built there a temple named Gokannavihāra (*Mhv.* XXXVII. *v.* 41; *MhvA.* II. p. 685). The *Vamsatthappakāsini* describes the circumstances that led to the building of this temple. According to this account earlier on the same site there was a *devālaya* which was a breeding ground of heretics and was a hindrance to the Buddhasāsana *(devālayam.... titthālayabhūtam sāsanassa khānum iva jātam kuditthinam ākarabhūtam.* ibid.). King Mahāsena demolished the *devālaya* and constructed the Gokanna Vihāra on the eastern coast of the island *(Gokannavihāram puratthima samuddatīre kārāpesi* (op. cit.). Later King Aggabodhi V built a "practising hall" *(padhānaghara)* for the Gokannavihāra in the vicinity of the village Gokanna (*Mhv.* XIVII. *v.*5). From an account in the *Cūlavamsa* it appears that Gokanna was the last of a series of fords in Rohana important from a strategic point of view along the Mahāvālukāganga (i.e. modern Mahavāli ganga) from Sarogāmatittha (i.e. Vilgamuva in the Matale District) to the eastern coast. In an earlier verse Gokanna is described as the ocean *(mahannava, Mhv.* Xli, *v.* 79), perhaps the reference is to the bay at which Mahavāliganga falls into the sea. There was the Gokannatittha - an ancient seaport in the vicinity of the eastuary of Mahākandaranadi (*MhvA.* I. p. 269) Panduvāsudeva and his retinue from India landed at this port of Gokanna (*Mhv.* VIII. *v.* 12). Bhadda-kaccānā and her retinue coming from India also landed at Gonagāmakapattana (op. cit. viii, *v.* 24) and *Vamsatthappakāsini* refers to it as Gonagāmapattana (*MhvA.* I. p. 272). At present a Hindu *kovil* named Koneśvaram stands at the earlier site of Gokanna. On literary evidence Geiger identified Gokanna with the modern township named Trincomalee *(Mhv. trsl.* pt. 1, p. 59, n. 4; p. 316, n. 2).

The identity of Gokanna with modern Trincomalee can be phonetically explained. The Pali term *Gokanna* is explained in the *PED* as 'a large species of deer' and Geiger translates *gokanno* as elk-stag. It appears that *gokanna* is a Pali translation of a Sinhala word *gona* as evident from the variants of the term as Gonagāmakapattana, Gonagāma and also from the Dravidianised term Koneśvara, *(Kona).* Thus *gona* the principal part of the word *gokanna* is a contracted form of the latter. It has been applied to a place as its name. This place happened to be a mountain which had acquired some sanctity, for it has been twice described in the *Cūlavamsa* as the scene of magic rites (*Mhv.* Xli, *v.l*vii, *v.* 5). This background helps to bring forth the connection between Gokanna and Trincomalee. Trincomalee is the Anglicized version of the Dravidian term Tiru-kona-malai which in turn perhaps was derived from Pali *siri Gokanna.* In Tamil *tiru* is prefixed to express the sanctity of *kona* the mount *(malai). Kona* stands for the earlier word *gona* which is treated as the proper name, and in Tamil a single character stands for both hard and soft gutterals *k* and *g.* Thus we get Tiru-kona-malai which means "the holy *kona* the mount" or the "Sacred mount Gokanna".

M. Karaluvinna

GOKULIKA (var. kukkulika, kukkutika) is the name of a sect that resulted from the first schism within the Mahāsanghika in the second century after the Buddha's passing away. Two other schools the Paññattivādins and Bāhulikas (or Bahussutikas) are said to have sprung from this (*Mhv.* V. v.4 f; *Dipv.* v. 40 f).

According to the *Kathāvatthu-atthakathā* the view that "All conditioned things are absolutely cinderheaps"- a view referred to in the *kathāvatthu* (p.208)-was held by the Gokulikas. This, the *Atthakathā* says, is due to their misunderstanding of such suttas as *Ādittapariyāya sutta (Vin.* I, p. 34; f. *S.* iv, p. 19) which the Gokulikas considered as teaching that 'All conditioned things are without qualification no better than a welter of embers *(kukkula),* whence the flames have died out, like an inferno of ashes, (see *Kuv.* trsl. *Points of Controversy,* p. 127). The *Kathāvatthu* (p. 208f.) records how the Theravāda countered this proposition by pointing out various forms of happiness.

Kukkulika and Kukkutika are its variant names, and perhaps their view that 'all compounded things are absolutely cinderheaps *(kukkula)* is responsible for their name Kukkulika, which may have been misconstrued as Kukkutika. While one of the Chinese rendering of the name 'Ch-in' points to the original Kukkutika, the other version Huei-chan indicate that it could be from Kukkulika. Malalasekera is of the view that Kukkulika could be the original name of which Gokulika was either a corruption or a derivation from the name of one of their teachers (*DPPN.* p. 783).

K'yeu-chi suggests that it might be a brahman clan name and rejects Paramārtha's interpretation, 'those who live on the cinderheap'. The *Mañjuśri-pariprcchā Sūtra* says that name originated from a famous Vinaya-master. Thus it is not possible to establish the original form of the name.

This school maintained that of the three Pitakas only the Abhidharma was important, for that contained the real teaching of the Buddha, whereas the sūtras and the vinaya-rules were more preparatory teachings. Thus they considered themselves not to be bound by any rule of discipline and interpreted the vinaya-rules according to their own particular convenience, professing that the

Buddha had allowed their transgression. They fostered only logic, believing that too deep a study of the sūtras would lead to pride and become a hindrance in attaining deliverance. They declined to preach in order to devote themselves to meditation.

Nothing is known of their residence, nor of their writings. While Vasumitra attributes to them the same theses as those of the Mahāsanghikas, Bhavya makes a distinction without, however, mentioning their specific doctrines. Bhavya also mentions the two schools originated from them, viz., the Bahuśrutiyas and the Prajñaptivādins.

They are not heard of after the 9th century A.C. and it is probable that they were completely absorbed into Mahāyāna.

Bibliography: A. Bareau, *Les Sectes Bouddhiques du petit vehicule* (Saigon, 1955); P. Demieville, *L'Origine des Sectes bouddhiques d'apres.Paramartha* (Bruselles, 1032); A. Schiefner, *Tāranāthas's Geschichte des Buddhismus in Indien* (St. Petersburg, 1869).

H. G. A. van Zeyst

GOLI, a village in South India, in the Palnād Taluk in Guntur district and situated on the Gollaru, a tributary of the Kistna river. Near it, in a field, is the site of an important Buddhist monument – stūpa which though small in its size, has yielded several sculptures which equal in beauty and treatment to those at Amarāvatī (q.v.). Some of the finds are deposited in the Madras Government museum and others are still on the site. Among those deposited in the museum is a sculptured slab of a nāga, 4 feet, 7 inches in size, which is an excellent specimen of sculpture. It is cut out of light green marble and is shown as twisting itself in intricate coils. It has seven hoods. At the root of the central hood is a platform with a small, stūpa, on either side of which is a worshipper. Besides this naga-figure there are three other sculptures now on the site of the stūpa, fixed into the walls of the room of the nāga. One of them is a long freize, containing seven panels, most of them illustrating scenes from the life of the Buddha. One is a white marble slab showing a small stūpa and there is also a similar slab showing the foot-print of the Buddha.

Among the sculptures from Goli which are deposited in the Madras Government museum, there are – a few which depict scenes from the Buddha's life and also some incidents from his previous births such as the *Chaddanta Jātaka,* the *Sasa Jātaka* and the *Vessantara Jātaka.* Another sculpture possibly depicts the *Mātuposaka Jātaka.*

Among the several sculptures which depict incidents from the Buddha's life, those showing the subjugation of the elephant Nālāgiri, the temptation of the Buddha by Māra's daughters and the offering of alms to the bodhisattva by Sujāta, deserve special mention.

Another incident from the life of the Buddha, namely his first sermon at the deer park is sculptured on a small piece of slab 1′ 1½″ x 9″. The two cushions on the empty throne represent the Buddha. The two deer in front indicate that the place shown is the deer park.

There is another slab in which the Buddha is represented as preaching, but, whether it depicts any particular incident in his life is not known. In this sculpture the Buddha is seated crosslegged on a throne, with his left hand placed on his left foot indicating half-meditation and his right hand raised in the *abhayamudrā,* the posture of dispelling fear.

A sculpture of a standing figure in royal attire, possibly representing prince Siddhartha, is also among the slabs from Goli. Two dwarfish yakṣas on either side of the figure hold a *chattra* and a *cāmara,* thus indicating that the princely figure represents the bodhisattva.

Amidst other sculptures from Goli are several figures of *nāgarājas* and pairs of male and female figures. The purpose that these *nāgarājas* served, is similar to that of a *dvārapāla,* a door-keeper or a guardian of a treasure or a sacred place.

The human pairs, like at Amarāvati and Nāgārjunakoṇḍa, are a common feature at Goli. These are usually found on either side of, or in between, larger panels representing episodes in the life of the Buddha or his previous births. There are four such human pairs, a man and woman in each, two representing persons of royalty or nobility and the other two, persons of the middle class.

No definite date has been assigned to the Goli stūpa and its sculptures. But on the grounds of the close similarity of the Goli sculptures to those at Amarāvatī scholars have assigned them to about the 3rd century A.C.

The short inscription on the caitya slab, too, bears much resemblance to those at Amarāvatī belonging to the fourth period in its scripts. Thus, all this evidence help us to assign the ruins at Goli to about the 3rd century A.C. It is probable that both the stūpa and its sculptures were accomplished at the same time, unlike at other sites, for the stūpa is too small an undertaking to have belonged to an earlier date than the sculptures.

H. R. Perera

GOOD AND EVIL. Buddhism can be conceived as a teaching which guides human beings in their search for the highest good. The highest good is to be attained by overcoming all evil. Good and evil are used in the English language as evaluative terms in a variety of contexts, both moral and nonmoral. Although the Indian languages which were used to express the teachings of the Buddha do not possess terms that exactly correspond to the English terms good and evil, the concepts of good and evil occur in a variety of contexts in the philosophical and religious literature of Buddhism. In more recent discussions in Western philosophy the traditional tendency to search for definable or indefinable properties for which the terms good and evil stand has been discredited. Attempts are made by philosophers to make a distinction between terms that have a primarily descriptive function and those that have a primarily evaluative function, and it is widely held that terms such as good and evil are typical examples of terms that have primarily the latter function. The term good, being the most general word of commendation in the English language is used to commend something, whatever the point of view may be from which the commendation is made. One may speak of 'a good motor car', 'a good knife', 'a good apple', 'a good poem,' 'a good sunset', 'a good man', 'a good action', and so on.

By good is usually meant that which is desirable as opposed to bad or evil which is undersirable. In this sense we often speak of the good that we attain or that comes to us as opposed to the evil that befalls us, the evil that we suffer and endure. There is also a philosophical tendency to consider *the Good,* as the really, absolutely and ultimately desirable goal for the attainment of which all prudent human beings should strive. Good conceived in this manner is the *summum bonum* accepted in certain religious and philosophical systems and is sometimes equated with happiness. Those religious and philosophical systems which have the concept of such an attainment consider the attainment of it as the means of overcoming all evil both physical and moral. Some philosophers, however, deny that there is one supreme Good, the attainment of which should be the goal of all rational beings. They would rather contend that there could be a plurality of *goods* worth attaining in our life. Sometimes, with respect to our general existential condition the question is raised whether it is good or evil, and systems of thought have been classed under pessimism or optimism depending on the answer given to this question. There is also the good and evil that we as rational agents do, and discussion of good and evil in that sense comes within the province of ethics. Furthermore, the terms good and evil are used in evaluating the motives, the psychological traits or character traits of human beings, and ethics is concerned with the examination of the rational basis for making such moral distinctions.

As sentient beings we may be subject to the good and evil that becomes an indispensable part of our sentient existence, while as moral beings we may ourselves be or produce good or evil, or possess such characteristics of personality which may be designated as good or evil. Regarding all this variety of contexts in which judgements of good and evil are made philosophers have raised the problem of their objectivity. A number of divergent theories have been put forward as clarifications of the logical features of such judgements. Some have considered these judgements to be objective, while others have held them to be subjective. Some have argued for absolutist positions while others have argued for relativist positions. The Logical Positivists, for instance, have held that judgements involving good and evil are not genuine propositions and as such they could not be true or false.[1] Most contemporary philosophers hold that there cannot be knowledge of good and evil in the way in which we can have knowledge of matters of empirical fact. According to the emotivist theory of value judgements all utterances used in making evaluations are to be construed as mere expressions of attitudes or emotions. They are used not merely to evince the speaker's attitude but also to change or redirect the attitudes of others.[2] They are also analyzed as commands in a misleading grammatical form,[3] or prescriptions having the function of guiding our choices.[4]

In the context of religions the concept of evil has given rise to a special problem which philosophers and theologians have widely discussed as "the problem of evil."[5] This problem is of special interest to theistic religions which accept a creator God like the God of the Christian religion, believed to be having the attributes of omniscience, omnipotence and infinite goodness. Buddhism, being a non-theistic system, does not confront a special problem of showing how the admission of the presence of evil in the world is consistent with other aspects of its world-view. Buddhism considers the recognition of the prsence of evil as supremely significant and attempts to give an explanation of its origin and also to propose a way of overcoming it. Buddhism does not consider evil to

1. A. J. Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic,* (Dover Publications 1952) Ch. VI.
2. C. L. Stevenson, *Ethics and Language,* (Yale University Press, 1944).
3. R. Carnap, *Philosophy and Logical Syntax* (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. Ltd. London, 1935), pp. 24–25.
4. R. M. Hare, *The Language of Morals,* (Oxford University Press, 1964).
5. M. B. Ahern, *The Problem of Evil,* (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1971); Ninian Smart, *A Dialogue of Religions* (SCM Press Ltd. London) 1960.

be an illusion, but takes it to be one of the primary truths to be understood.

In the light of the numerous approaches that systems of religion and philosophy have adopted with respect to the notions of good and evil, it will be illuminating to consider what special features are to be discerned in the Buddhist approach. One of the most important senses of good is good as well-being with evil as its opposite. In Buddhist terminology there are three key terms used in the sense of well-being, namely, *attha, hita* and *sukha.* Their opposites *anattha, ahita,* and *dukkha* are used in the sense of ill or undersirable. Out of these terms the term *dukkha* (q.v.) has special significance to Buddhism, for in the formulation of the Buddhist teaching the existence of *dukkha* is considered as a fundamental truth to be understood. The Buddhist path of liberation is described as a path for the liberation from the ills or evils of existence. It is a path for the cessation of ill *(dukkha-nirodhagāminipaṭipadā),* and for the attainment of supreme happiness which is often identified with the highest good that man is capable of attaining.

In order to understand the Buddhist notions of good and evil in the sense of human well-being and ill it is important to understand what Buddhism presents as the first noble truth of its teaching, the noble truth of *dukkha.* Giving an extentional definition of *dukkha,* the Buddhist teaching specifies the key aspects of evil to which a human being is subject as follows:

> Birth is *dukkha,* decay.... disease... death.... grief, lamentation, sorrow, distress, and anxiety... not obtaining what one desires... is *dukkha,* in brief the five aggregates of grasping are *dukkha. (M.* I, p. 48)

According to Buddhism the existential predicament of all sentient beings in their unenlightened condition involves unsatisfactoriness, and therefore, is evil. Buddhism analyzes the entirety of sentient existence in experiential terms into internal spheres of sense *(ajjhattikāni āyatanāni),* their respective external objects *(bāhirāni āyatanāni)* and the respective forms of consciousness that are produced by the contact between the senses and their corresponding objects *(cakkhuviññāna, sotaviññāna,* etc.). Sometimes the individual is analyzed into five aggregates of personality consisting of mental and material components. Each of these elements is said to be characterized by impermanence. That which is impermanent is unsatisfactory *(yad aniccaṃ taṃ dukkhaṃ).* The process of *dukkha* goes on in cyclical fashion involving birth, decay, death and rebecoming until one ultimately dissolves the personality factors and puts an end to rebecoming *(punabbhava)* by the eradication of craving and all notions of self. If anything has a compounded nature *(saṅkhāra)* it is impermanent. If anything is impermanent it is unsatisfactory. Therefore Buddhism teaches that the good of man does not consist in searching for or hankering after things of a compounded nature, including the factors of one's own personality, for such a pursuit leads merely to prolong the ills of existence. The highest good, from the point of view of Buddhism, is therefore the attainment of perfect detachment and utter destruction of craving for existence, which assures immediate liberation from unsatisfactoriness.

The physical evils of existence such as earthquakes, droughts and famines and all kinds of natural disaster are part of the unstable nature of compounded things. They are evil relative to the desires and interests of sentient beings. One could here and now reach a mental state in which one is no longer psychologically affected by the possibility or actuality of such events by the total extincton of the notion of self and the eradication of all craving for existence. In this sense one could transcend physical evil as well even in this life itself. The highest development that one can reach in one's living experience is the possibility of not being psychologically affected when one is touched by the natural order of things.[6]

Buddhism presents the view that it is due to delusion that unenlightened common folk think and act as if the good life consists in the pursuit and gratification of sense desires. Sense desires are productive of happiness which is extremely unstable due to the very constitution of our own psychological nature and the nature of the physical world. Sense desires *(kāmā)* involve little enjoyment *(appassādā)* but much suffering and anxiety *(bahu-dukkhā bahūpāyāsā)* as well as an excess of evil consequences *(ādīnavo ettha bhiyyo: M.* I, p. 91). The person who desires sensuous enjoyment becomes joyful so long as his desires are gratified. But once his sensuous enjoyments are lost he becomes afflicted like a person who is pierced by an arrow.[7] The world consists of objects that excite the inner desires and passions. Sentient beings naturally have the tendency to seek pleasure in the satisfaction of these desires. The pursuit of sense pleasures does not conduce to any stable happiness. It systematically leads to increasing bondage to passions and servile dependence on them for one's happiness. The

6. *Phuṭṭhassa lokadhammehi cittaṃ yassa na kampati*
asokaṃ virajaṃ khemaṃ etaṃ maṅgalaṃ uttamaṃ (Sn. v. 268)

7. *Kāmaṃ kāmayamānassa tassa ce taṃ samijjhati*
addhā pītimano hoti laddhā macco yadicchati
tassa ce kāmayānassa chandajātassa jantuno
te kāmā parihāyanti sallaviddho va ruppati (Sn. 766-767).

hapiness involved in the gratification of sense desires is meagre compared to the nobler forms of happiness that could be attained by mental culture. Numerous similes are given by the Buddha to show the delusion involved in believing that sensuous delight constitues real happiness. Sensuous delight is no better than the pleasures felt by the leper in scratching his sores.

Buddhism considers the process of becoming *(bhava)* to involve inevitable suffering. Becoming in any form is judged to be an evil. The highest good consists in the cessation of becoming *(bhavanirodha)* which is also called *nibbāna*. Each individual is believed to be caught up in the cyclic process of *saṃsāra*, a process the beginning of which is unknown. The predicament of the person who is caught up in the process is aptly expressed by Raṭṭhapāla who resolves to practise the higher spiritual discipline under the Buddha thus:

> The world is unenduring and is being (constantly) dragged on to (destruction). It is supportless and beyond one's power. Nothing in it belongs to oneself, for one eventually has to leave everything behind. It is also deficient in lasting satisfaction and results in servile bondage to desires (*M.* II, p. 68)

Buddhism does not have the concept of an ultimate good which could be viewed as a superior form of the survival of individual sentient existence. Even the highest form of heavenly existence is subject to the law of impermanence. There could be no escape from the bonds of suffering until rebecoming in any form is overcome. It is for holding this view about the nature of existence that Buddhism has sometimes been described as a form of pessimism. It is said that Eastern pessimism has its best known and fullest expression in philosophic Buddhism (*ERE.* VI, p. 321). It is evident that with its emphasis on the truth of *dukkha* Buddhism does not view life as it is ordinarily lived as good. However, the Buddhist endeavour may be described as an attempt to overcome unsatisfactoriness and to transform a life that is evil to one that is good. To this extent it may be said to involve an optimism rather than a pessimism. To this it may be objected that Buddhism is merely a negative optimism. For "The final goal is one ever to be desired, never to be enjoyed; though it may be attained, never to be consciously attained." (ibid. p. 322)

The idea that the final goal of Buddhism is never to be consciously attained is based on a misunderstanding. Such an idea is contrary to the repeated emphasis in the Buddha's teaching that the purpose for which men of family renounce the household life and take to the noble faring *(brahmacariya)* is fulfilled in this life itself, and one lives abiding in it here and now having realized it with one's own higher knowledge.[8] The reason for interpreting Buddhism as a negative optimism is probably the absence in Buddhism of the notion of an eternal heavenly existence as a reward for living the religious life. The doctrine of eternalism *(sassatavāda)* according to which an enduring self entity is believed to survive to eternity after attaining the goal of the spiritual life is considered in Buddhism as a mistaken assumption. The Buddha had nothing to say about the after-death state of the person who reaches the goal of *nibbāna* apart from saying that it is freedom from a recurrent process of *dukkha* in *saṃsāric* existence. However, he had much to say about the happiness, joy, freedom, knowledge, insight, understanding, compassion and equanimity of the person who attains the highest goal as a living human being.

According to the Buddhist analysis of the nature of reality, there can be no instance of unrelated or unconditioned existence. Due to the conditioned nature of things, transience (*anicca* q.v.) and insubstantiality (*anatta*, q.v.) are their universal characteristics. Unsatisfactoriness *(dukkha)* is caused by uncultivated and unwholesome psychological responses to the world of mind and matter which is characterized by transience and insubstantiality. The unwholesome responses are due to delusion or ignorance (*avijjā* q.v.). Buddhism seeks to explain evil in terms of the principle of dependent origination *(paṭiccasamuppāda)*. The Buddha rejects alternative theories of the origin of evil such as (1) that evil is self-caused *(sayaṃkataṃ dukkhaṃ)*. (2) that evil is other-caused *(paraṃkataṃ dukkhaṃ)*. (3) that evil is both self-caused and other-caused *(sayaṃkatañ ca paraṃ katañ ca dukkhaṃ)* and (4) that evil is neither self-caused nor other-caused but arises fortuitously *(asayaṃkāraṃ aparaṃkāraṃ adhiccasamuppannaṃ dukkhaṃ: S.* II, p. 19f.). Evil is not considered in Buddhism to be part of the divinely ordained scheme of things, but something that dependently arises in the natural order of things. Buddhism explains the origin of evil in the sense of the existential ills of man through an analysis of the perceptual process. An unenlightened or deluded response to the stimuli of the senses leads to *dukkha*. Man can overcome *dukkha* here and now only by responding to the stimuli of the senses with understanding and insight. As the *Mūlapariyāya Sutta* of the *Majjhima-nikāya* asserts, the nature of man's cognitive response to everything physical and mental has to be transformed from one described as *sañjānāti*, in which case one gets involved in the proliferation of ego notions and the consequent attachment and clinging to things, to one described as *abhijānāti* and *parijānāti* whereby one destroys all notions of the ego and is freed from all attachment and clinging (*M.* I, p. 1f.). This in turn leads

8. *Yassatthāya kulaputtā sammadeva agārasmā anagāriyaṃ pabbajanti tadanuttaraṃ brahmapariyosānaṃ diṭṭheva dhamme sayaṃ abhiññā sacchikatvā upasampajja viharati* (*M.* II, p. 61).

to a total transformation of man's emotive responses to the perceptual world. In the attempt to overcome evil man has ultimately to depend on his own effort. There is no question of any external force saving him from evil. Only those who save themselves are saved *(na hi añña-mokkho)*.

The good life in the Buddhist view is the life free from craving *(tanhā)*, the life free from the unwholesome mental traits greed *(lobha)*, hatred *(dosa)* and delusion *(moha)*. It is a life in which the corruptions of the mind or the cankers are extinct *(āsavakkhaya)*, and all the latent tendencies of evil *(anusaya)* are overcome. In positive terms the good life is a life consisting of insight, wisdom compassion, peace of mind and happiness. This is the state of perfection described as *sambodhi* (enlightenment) and *arahatta* (worthiness) in Buddhism of the Pali Nikāyas.

From the Buddhist point of view, suffering, whether it is mental or physical, is intrinsically evil. The highest good is therefore equated with the final end of all *dukkha* and the attainment of the highest happiness *(parama-sukha)* which is called *nibbāna*. This does not however mean that according to the Buddhist evaluation of human experience all pleasant experience *(sukha)* is unconditionally good or that all unpleasant experience *(dukkha)* is unconditionally evil. If that were the case Buddhism could justifiably be called a crude form of hedonism. Buddhism recognizes a difference in quality in the different kinds of desirable experience that man is capable of attaining. In the hierarchy of desirable experiences sense pleasures occupy the lowest position because they cause much unhappiness in the long run. The desirable experiences associated with the cultivation of the mind, such as in the rapturous states of meditative experience are considered to be of a higher order. The highest in the hierarchy consists of the freedom of mind and the freedom through insight *(cetovimutti, paññāvimutti)* which assures emancipation from the cycle of becoming.

Buddhism sees a close relationship between the path that leads to the overcoming of evil which consists of the suffering that man experiences in his unenlightened condition, and the evil that man produces due to his own morally evil nature. The message of the Buddha is to cease to do all evil *(sabbapāpassa akaranam)*, to cultivate what is good *(kusalassa upasampadā)* and to purify the mind *(sacittapariyodapanam D.* II, p. 49). All suffering is overcome when man gets rid of moral evil. Buddhism uses the terms *akusala* and *pāpa* to signify moral evil. That which is morally wholesome is *kusala* or *puñña*. The morally good deeds that fall within the sphere of *puñña* have the tendency to produce wholesome consequences which the agent himself is likely to experience in his present existence or in some future existence while the morally evil deeds falling within the sphere of *akusala* or *pāpa* similarly have the tendency to produce consequences of an opposite nature. The person who is perfect in *kusala* is one who has attained the highest goal and put an end to rebecoming leaving no room for the fruition of *puñña* or *pāpa* in any future becoming *(bhava)* in the cycle of *samsāra*. Such a person transcends the sphere of good and evil in the sense of *puñña* and *pāpa* but becomes perfect in *kusala*. It should be noted that the unqualified assertion that the goal of Buddhism is to transcend both good and evil on the ground that Buddhism at some point advocates the abandoning of both *puñña* and *pāpa* could lead to misleading implications.[9] The liberated person or the Tathāgata, is one in whom moral evil is totally extinct and wholesome traits of character are fully developed *(sabbākusaladhammapahīno kusalasamannāgato)*.

Buddhism deals with moral evil at two levels. At a more subtle and basic level moral evil is to be found as psychological or dispositional traits of character. At the grosser level they find expression in overt behaviour in the form of bodily and verbal acts. The roots of moral evil *(akusalamūla)* are the psychological dispositions referred to as lobha (greed), *dosa* (hatred) and *moha* (delusion). They are found in the mental constitution of all unenlightened beings in the form of latent tendencies *(anusaya)*. The latent tendencies are enumerated as *rāga* (lust), *patigha* (hatred), *ditthi* (dogmatic belief), *vicikicchā* (doubt), *māna* (conceit), *bhavarāga* (attachment to becoming) and *avijjā* (ignorance: *M.* I, pp. 109–110). *Asava* translated as 'influxes', 'intoxicants' or 'cankers' also refer to evil in the form of psychological traits. Moral evil which finds expression in verbal and bodily behaviour usually classified into seven types of unwholesome action, namely, killing, stealing, sexual misconduct, false speech, slanderous speech, harsh speech and frivolous speech. These along with the three evils that operate at the psychological level, namely intense greed *(abhijjhā)*, malice *(byāpāda)* and false view *(micchāditthi)* constitute the ten basic types of moral evil (*M* I, p. 47).

Moral goodness consists primarily in ridding oneself of the unwholesome traits of mind which give expression to unwholesome behaviour. This is to be achieved by a systematic process of mental culture consisting of three stages of training called *sīla* (wholesome practices involving primarily abstention from bodily and verbal deeds of an unwholesome nature such as killing, stealing etc.), *samādhi* (mental composure) and *paññā* (understanding or insight). The Noble Eightfold Path of Buddhism also

9. "Interpretation of Two Principal Ethical Terms in Early Buddhism", P. D. Premasiri, *The Sri Lanka Journal of the Humanities*, Volume 2, Number 1, June 1976.

presents the same scheme of ethical transformation with the emphasis that a right perspective or world view or attitude towards life *(sammādiṭṭhi)* is a precondition for any such ethical transformation. In brief the good life recommended in Buddhism may be said to consist in the cultivation of the thirty-seven qualities that conduce to enlightenment, traditionally enumerated as the *sattatiṃsa bodhipakkhiyā dhammā*. The highest good or the good as an end consists in the destruction of greed, hatred and delusion and the cultivation of non-greed or charitability, non-hatred or universal compassion and non-delusion or wisdom. All activity adopted for achieving this goal is considered in Buddhism to be good as means.

See BODHIPAKKHIYĀ DHAMMĀ.

There is reason to believe that Buddhism attempts to define moral good and evil in terms of non-moral good and evil. Bodily, verbal and mental conduct which is characterized as morally evil in Buddhism is so characterized because such conduct is said to be conducive to ill *(dukkhudrayaṃ dukkhavipākaṃ)* and is injurious to oneself as well as to others *(attabyābādhāya saṃvattati parabyābādhāya saṃvattati ubhayabyābādhāya saṃvattati: M*, I, p. 44). Killing which is primarily an expression of the latent unwholesome tendency of hatred is injurious to both the agent as well as others affected by his action. The agent of such action corrupts his own character increasing the chances of greater suffering for himself and also causes suffering to others by his unrestrained and unsympathetic deeds. Not only does he indulge in such behaviour but also encourages others to behave in the same way *(parañ ca tathattāya samādapeti)* thus increasing suffering all round.

With regard to judgements involving moral good and evil Buddhism takes an objectivist and cognitivist position. It is objectivist to the extent that observable facts are considered to be logically relevant to our judgements regarding moral good and evil. It is cognitivist for the same reason, for Buddhism holds that one may say something true or false in expressing a judgement about what is morally good or evil. The view that nothing is good or bad, but thinking makes it so is not one that Buddhism seems to approve of. Buddhism explicitly admits the possibility of ethical knowledge. Moral scepticism is discouraged. It is the knowledge of good and evil that is considered to be of utmost importance in Buddhism. However, this knowledge is not to be based on tradition or authority but on one's own observation and experience. Unlike religious systems which consider morality to be based on revelation, and moral rules to be ordained by a supreme divine law giver, Buddhism holds that it is possible for each person to know by himself the distinction between what is morally good and evil *(attanāva jāneyyātha ime dhammā kusalā....ime.. akusalā....: A.* I, p. 189). From the Buddhist point of view, what is believed to be commanded by God may be good not because it is commanded by God, but because it is good. In order to know that what is commanded by God is not evil, but good, there must be a criterion other than being commanded by God. In this regard Buddhism points to a close connection between our judgements of good and evil and our experience of certain courses of action and modes of behaviour conducing to general happiness or welfare and others leading to the opposite consequence. In the *Kālāma Sutta* the Buddha tells the Kālāmas that they could discover by themselves what is good or evil and points out that when a person's mind is overwhelmed by such unwholesome states of mind as greed, hatred and delusion, they tend to act in such a way that harm is done to themselves as well as others. Buddhism does not take the position that any idiosyncratic reason could be given as a reason in favour of a moral conclusion. An act is morally evil if it conduces to general unhappiness and harm in the long run. Morally good actions conduce to the happiness and well being of the agent as well as others. In the ultimate sense Buddhism sees no conflict between actions that conduce to one's own well being and those that conduce to the well being of others. A person who looks after his own well being looks after the well being of others as well. Moral evil is a result of the lack of empathy and the lack of the same concern with the interests and well being of others as that of oneself.

An implication of the Buddhist view of the nature of moral knowledge is that moral truth is to be established on the basis of our knowledge of the nature of the world, the nature of man, and in brief the nature of the human predicament. We cannot determine what is morally good or evil without considering certain facts about the world, man and his destiny. No act could be right or wrong in itself. It is necessary to see the network of causal relationships between a particular act and other happenings associated with that act in order to determine whether it is good or evil. The question raised by the modern philosophical sceptic with regard to ethical knowledge on the ground that there is a logical gap between facts and values is not considered to be a plausible reason in Buddhism for denying the possibility of making commonly acceptable moral judgements. There is a sense of rationality which may be neither inductive nor deductive in the traditional sense involved in our making judgements about what is morally good and evil.

In the foregoing account an attempt was made to discuss the Buddhist views on the place of evil in the world and in the moral life of human beings from a philosophical and ethical point of view. One more

important aspect that remains to be examined is the mythology of evil in Buddhism. Among the popular mythologies of most cultures there is recognition of external demonic forces which threaten the life, security and health of human beings. Attempts to avoid the influence of such demonic forces take the form of finding magical means of keeping out of their way, by propitiating them through methods such as performing the right kind of sacrifice. This is a characteristic of many animistic belief systems which attempt to deal with the ills of existence by looking outward as it were without attempting to transform one's own inner nature. As Trevor Ling observes, "Popular demonology is in essence the attempt to project personal patterns upon the world, and to identify certain hostile forces or powers in the world, and to discover how best to deal with them, by propitiation, spells, chants, sacrifices and so on."[10] In the demonology of Buddhism the most important figure is Mara (q v) the Evil One. In Buddhism Mara symbolizes all evil. In mythological terms to overcome evil is to overpower Māra along with his armies, as the Buddha himself is said to have done immediately prior to his enlightenment. Māra is represented in the mythology of Buddhism as an evil demon who was constantly watchful of every opportunity to prevent the Buddha from attaining the goal of enlightenment. Even after the Buddha's enlightenment subsequent to the defeat of Māra by the Buddha along with Māra's retinue, the latter sought to prevent, whenever he seized an opportunity, the spread of the enlightenment of the Buddha to other beings. The symbol of Mara the Evil One embodies the ills of human existencee and their hidden roots. In the Pali canonical scriptures Māra is explained as death *(maccu)*. In some instances Māra stands for the five aggregates of personality *(khandhamāra: S.* III, p. 188). The sense spheres, their respective objects and the consciousness that arises through their contact are said to be Māra's possessions (*S.* I, p. 114). The armies of Māra are named according to the defilements of mind, the unwholesome psychological traits, or any other impediment physical or mental on the way to enlightenment. Thus sensuous desire *(kāma)* is said to be the first army of Māra (*Sn. v.* 436) *Taṇhā* (craving), *rati* (sensuous delight) and *rāga* (lust) are Māra's daughters who make a desperate attmept to distract the Buddha in his final battle with the forces of evil before enlightenment. The Buddha is represented as the supreme conquerer of Māra. The demonic force of Māra's temptations are to be overcome not by magical means but by the cultivation of Buddhist virtues. Trevor Ling (op. cit. p. 63) has shown that "....if all the passages found in the Canon which refer to the conquest of Māra are brought together and arranged systematically the result will be a fair conspectus of the Buddhist way of salvation." The Māra symbol in Buddhism is yet another instance of the Buddhist practice of transforming existing beliefs by a process of psychologisation and ethicisation to suit the fundamental doctrinal structure of Buddhism. As Ling observes ".... the Pali Buddhism of the Canon does not close the frontier of thought where it touches animism and popular demonology: it allows it to remain open, but controls it from the Buddhist side, and for Buddhist purposes. The means by which such control of this frontier between popular demonology and Buddhist doctrine and methods is maintained is the symbol of Māra the Evil One (*ibid.* pp. 79-80).

According to Buddhism as represented particularly in the Pali canonical sources, the antidote to all evil that affects man, whether it is physical, moral or demonic, is mental culture and spiritual discipline, but not magical practices and other forms of ritual associated with animistic beliefs which have no moral significance. The highest good of man is to be attained by the complete conquest of evil and this is ultimately effected not by changing things outside of oneself but by changing one's own inner nature.

P. D. Premasiri

GOTAMA (1) - The last of the twenty-five Buddhas. He was a Sākiyan,[2] son of Suddhodana,[3] chief ruler of

10. T. O. Ling, *Buddhism and the Mythology of Evil,* (London George, Allen and Unwin Ltd. 1962) p. 40.

1. No comprehensive account of Gotama Buddha is as yet possible. The details given in this article are those generally accepted by orthodox Theravādins and contained in their books, chiefly the Pāli Commentaries, more especially the *Nidānkathā* of the *Jātaka* and the *Buddhavamsa* Commentary. Biographical details are also found in the *Mahā Vagga* and the *Culla Vagga* of the *Vinaya Pitaka*, the *Buddhavamsa* and in various scattered passages of the Nikāyas of the *Sutta Pitaka*. References to these are given where considered useful. Controversy exists with regard to many of the matters mentioned, for discussion of the varying views regarding these, reference should be made to the works of Oldenberg, Rhys Davids (both Professor and Mrs. Rhys Davids), Kern, E. J. Thomas and other scholars. Further particulars of persons and places mentioned can be obtained by reference to the articles under the respective names.
2. The Sākiyans were evidently subjects of the Kosala king; the Buddha calls himself a Kosalan *M.* II. 124.
3. All Pali Commentaries and Sanskrit works represent the Buddha as the son of the king, decendant of a long line of famous ancestors.

Kapilavatthu, and of Mahā Māyā, Suddhodana's chief consort, and he belonged to the Gotama-gotta. Before his conception he was in the Tusita heaven, waiting for the due time for his birth in his last existence. Then, having made the "five investigations" *(pañcavilokanāni)*,[4] he took leave of his companions and descended to earth.[5] Many wondrous and marvellous events attended his conception and birth.[6] The conception takes place on the full-moon day of Asālha, with the moon in Uttarāsālha, and Māyā has no relations with her husband. She has a marvellous dream in which the Bodhisatta, as a white elephant, enters her womb through her side. When the dream is mentioned to the brahmins, they foretell the birth of a son who will be either a universal monarch or a Buddha.

An earthquake takes place and thirty-two signs appear, presaging the birth of a great being. The first of these signs is a boundless, great light, flooding every corner of the ten thousand worlds, everyone beholds its glory, even the fires in all hells being extinguished. Ten months after the conception, in the month of Visākha, Māyā wishes to visit her parents in Devadaha. On the way thither from Kapilavatthu she passes the beautiful Lumbini grove, in which she desires to wander; she goes to a great *sāla*-tree and seizes a branch in her hand; labour pains start immediately, and, when the courtiers retire, having drawn a curtain round her, even while standing, she is delivered of the child. It is the day of the full moon of Visākha; four Mahābrahmas receive the babe in a golden net, and streams of water descend from the sky to wash him. The boy stands on the earth, takes seven steps northwards and utters his lion-roar, "I am the chief in the world." On the same day seven other beings were born: the Bodhi-tree, Rāhula's mother (Rāhulamātā, his future wife), the four Treasure-Troves (described at *DA*. I, 284), his elephant, his horse Kanthaka, his charioteer Channa, and Kāludāyi The babe is escorted back to Kapilavatthu on the day of his birth and his mother dies seven days later.

The isi Asita (or Kāladevala), meditating in the Himālaya, learns from the Tāvatiṃsa gods of the birth of the Buddha, visits Suddhodana the same day and sees the boy, whom they both worship. Asita weeps for sorrow that he will not live to see the boy's Buddhahood, but he instructs has nephew Nālaka (v.l. Naradatta) to prepare himself for that great day.[7] On the fifth day after the birth is the ceremony of namegiving. One hundred and eight brahmins are invited to the festival at the palace; eight of the — Rāma, Dhaja, Lakkhana, Manti, Kondañña, Bhoja, Suyāma and Sudatta — are intepreters of bodily marks, and all except Kondañña prophesy two possibilities for the boy; but Kondañña, the youngest, says, quite decisively, that he will be a Buddha. The name given to the boy at this ceremony is not actually mentioned, but from other passages it is inferred that it was Siddhattha (*q.v.*).

Among other incidents recounted of the Buddha's boyhood is that of his attaining the first jhāna under a jambu-tree. One day he is taken to the state ploughing of the king where Suddhodana himself, with his golden plough, plouhgs with the farmers. The nurses, attracted by the festivities, leave the child under a jambu-tree, They return to find him seated, cross-legged, in a trance, the shadow of the tree remaining still, in order to protect him. The king is informed and, for the second time, does reverence to his son.[8]

The Bodhisatta is reported to have lived in the household for twenty-nine years a life of great luxury and excessive ease, surrounded by all imaginable comforts. He owns three palaces–Ramma, Suramma and Subha–for the three seasons.[9] When the Bodhisatta is sixteen years old, Suddhodana sends messengers to the Sākiyans asking that his son be allowed to seek a wife from among their daughters; but the Sākiyans are reluctant to send them, for, they say, though the young man is handsome, he knows no are; he summons an assembly of the Sākiyans and performs various feats, chief of these being twelve feats with a bow which needs the strength of one thousand men.[10] The Sākiyans are so impressed that each sends him a daughter, the total number so sent being forty thousand. The Bodhisatta appoints as his chief wife the daughter of Suppabuddha, who, later, comes to be called Rāhulamātā.[11]

4. See *s.v.* Buddha.
5. According to the *Lalitavistara* he appointed the Bodhisattva Maitreya as king of Tusita in his place.
6. Given in the *Acchariyabbhutadhamma Sutta* (*M.* III, 18f.);also *D.* II, 12 f. A more detailed account is found in *J.* i. 47 ff.; both the *Lal* and the *Mtu.* II, 14 ff. differ as to the details given here of the conception and the birth.
7. For details see *s.v.* Asita.
8. *J.* I, 57 f.; *MA.* I, 466 f.; the incident is alluded to in the *Mahā Saccaka Sutta (M.* I, 246); the corresponding incident recounted in *Mtu.* II, 45 f.) takes place in a park, and the details differ completely. The *Lal,* has two versions, one in prose and one in verse and both resemble the *Mtu.*, but in these the Buddha is represented as being much older. The *Divy.* (391) and the Tibetan versions (e.g. Rockhill, p. 22) put the incident very much later in the Buddha's life. Other incidents are given in *Lal,* and *Mtu.*
9. Mention is made of his luxurious life in *A.* I, 145, also in *M.* I, 504; further details are given in *AA.* I, 378 f.; *J.* I. 58, See also *Mtu.* II. 115; *cf. Vin.* I, 15; *D.* II, 21.
10. The feats with the bow are described in the *Sarabhanga Jātaka (J.* V. 129 f.).
11. She is known under various names; Bhaddakaccā (or Kaccānā), Yasodharā, Bimbā, Bimbasundarī and Gopā. For a discussion see *s.v.* Rāhulamātā.

According to the generally accepted account, Gotama is twenty-nine when the incidents occur which lead to final renunciation. Following the prophecy of the eight brahmins, his father had taken every precaution that his son should see no sign of old age, sickness or death. But the gods decide that the time is come for the Enlightenment, and instil into Gotama's heart a desire to go into the park. On the way, the gods put before him a man showing signs of extreme age, and the Bodhisatta returns, filled with desire for renuciation. The king, learning this, surrounds him, with greater attractions, but on two other days[12] Gotama goes to the park and the gods put before him a sick man and a corpse. On the full-moon day of Āsālha, the day appointed for the Great Renunciation, Gotama sees a monk and hears from his charioteer praise of the ascetic life. Feeling very happy, be goes to the park to enjoy himself. Sakka sends Vissakamma himself to bathe and adorn him, and as Gotama returns to the city in all his majesty, he receives news of the birth of his son. Foreseeing in this news a bond, he decides to call the babe Rāhula *(q.v.).* KisāGotamī *(q.v.)* sees Gotama on the way to the palace and, filled with longing for him, sings to him a song containing the word *nibbuta.* The significance of the word (=extinguished, at peace) thrills him, and he sends to Kisā his priceless gold necklace which she, however, accepts as a token of love. Gotama enters the palace and sleeps. He wakes in the middle of the night[13] to find his female musicians sleeping in attitudes which fill him with disgust and with loathing for the worldly life, he decides to leave it. He orders Channa to saddle Kanthaka, and enters his wife's room for a last look at her and their son.

He leaves the city on his horse Kanthaka, with Channa clinging to its tail. The devas muffle the sound of the horse's hoofs and of his neighing and open the city gates for Gotama to pass. Māra appears before Gotama and seeks to stay him with a promise that he shall be universal monarch within seven days. On his offer being refused. Māra threatens to shadow him always. Outside the city, at the spot where later was erected the Kanthakanivattanacetiya, Gotama turns his horse round to take a last look at Kapilavatthu. It is said that the earth actually turned, to make it easy for him to do so. Then, accompanied by the gods, he rides thirty leagues through three kingdoms–those of the Sākiyans, the Koliyans and the Mallas–and his horse crosses the river Anomā in one leap. On the other side, he gives all his ornaments to Channa, and with his sword cuts off his hair and beard, throwing them up into the air, where Sakka takes them and enshrines them in the Cūlāmanicetiya in Tāvatimsa. The Brahmā Ghatikāra offers Gotama the eight requisites of a monk, which he accepts and adopts. He then sends Channa and Kanthaka back to his father, but Kanthaka, brokenhearted, dies on the spot and is reborn as Kanthakadevaputta.[14]

From Anomā the Bodhisatta goes to the mango-grove of Anupiya, and after spending seven days there walks to Rājagaha (a distance of thirty leagues) in one day, and there starts his alms rounds. Bimbisāra's men, noticing him, report the matter to the king, who sends messengers to enquire who this ascetic is. The men follow Gotama to the foot of the Pandavapabbata, where he eats his meal, and they then go and report to the king. Bimbisāra visits Gotama, and, pleased with his bearing, offers him the sovereignty. On learning the nature of Gotama's quest, he wins from him a promise to visit Rājagaha first after the Enlightenment.[15] Journeying from Rājagaha, Gotama in due course becomes a disciple of Ālāra-Kālāma. Having learnt and practised all that Ālāra has to teach, he finds it unsatisfying and joins Uddaka-Rāmaputta; but Uddaka's doctrine leaves him still unconvinced and he abandons it. He then goes to Senānigāma in Uruvelā and there, during six years, practises all manner of severe austerities, such as no man had previously undertaken. Once he falls fainting and a deva informs Suddhodana that Gotama is dead. But Suddhodana, relying on the prophecy of Kāladevala, refuses to believe the news. Gotama's mother, now born as a devaptta in Tāvatimsa, comes to him to encourage him. At Uruvelā, the Pañcavaggiya monks are

12. According to some accounts, e.g. that of the Dīghabhānakas, the four omens were all seen on the same day (*J.* I. 59).

13. In some versions the Renunciation takes place seven days after the birth of Rāhula (*J.* I, 62).

14. The account given here is taken mainly from the *Nidānakathā (J.* I, 59 ff.) and evidently embodies later tradition; *cp. D.* II, 21 ff. From passages found in the Pitakas (e.g. *A.* I, 145; *M.* I, 163, 240; *M.* II. 212 f.) it would appear that the events leading up to the Renunciation were not so dramatic as given here, the process being more gradual. I do not, however, agree with Thomas (*op. cit.* 58) that, according to these accounts, the Bodhisatta left the world when "quite a boy". I think the word *dahara* is used merely to indicate "the prime of youth," and not necessarily "boyhood". The description of the Renunciation in the *Lal,* is very much more elaborate and adds numerous incidents, no account of which is found in the Pāli.

15. This incident is also mentioned in the *Pabbajjā Sutta. (SN.* vv. 405-24), but there it is the king who first sees Gotama. It is significant that, when asked his identity, Gotama does not say he is a king's son. The Pāli version of the sutta contains nothing of Gotama's promise to visit Rājagaha, but the *Mtu.* version (II, 198-200), which places the visit later, has two verses, one of which contains the request and the other the acceptance; and the *SNA.* III, 385 f.), too, mentions the promise and tells that Bimbisāra was informed of the prophecy concerning Gotama. There is another version of the *Mtu.* (ii. 117-20) which says that Gotama went straight to Vaiśāli after leaving home, joining Ālāra, and later visited Uddaka at Rājagaha. Here no mention is made of Bimbisāra. We are told in the *Mtu.* (II, 25 ff.) that Bimbisāra and Gotama (Siddhattha) had been playmates, Bimbisāra being the younger by five years. Bimbisāra's father (Bhāti) and Suddhodana were friends.

his companions, but now, having realised the folly of extreme asceticism, he decides to abandon it, and starts again to take normal food; thereupon the Pañcavaggiyas, disappointed, leave him and go to Isipatana.[16]

Gotama's desire for normal food is satisfied by an offering brought by Sujātā to the Ajapāla banyan tree under which he is seated. She had made a vow to the tree, and her wish having been granted, she takes her slave girl, Puṇṇā, and goes to the tree prepared to fulfil her promise. They take Gotama to be the Tree-god, come in person to accept her offering of milk-rice; the offering is made in a golden bowl and he takes it joyfully. Five dreams[17] he had the night before convince Gotama that he will that day become the Buddha. It is the full-moon day of Visākha; he bathes at Suppatittha in the Nerañjarā, eats the food and launches the bowl up stream, where it sinks to the abode of the Nāga king, Kāḷa (Mahākāḷa).

Gotama spends the rest of the day in a *sāla-grove* and, in the evening, goes to the foot of the Bodhi-tree, accompanied by various divinities; there the grass-cutter Sotthiya gives him eight handfuls of grass; these, after investigation, Gotama spreads on the eastern side of the tree, where it becomes a seat fourteen hands long, on which he sits cross-legged, determined not to rise before attaining Enlightenment.[18]

Māra, lord of the world of passion, is determined to prevent this fulfilment, and attacks Gotama with all the strength at his command. His army extends twelve leagues to the front, right, and left of him, to the end of the Cakkavāla behind him, and nine leagues into the sky above him. Māra himself carries numerous weapons and rides the elephant Girimekhala, one hundred and fifty leagues in height. At the sight of him all the divinities gathered at the Bodhi-tree to do honour to Gotama — the great Brahmā, Sakka, the Nāga-king Mahākāla — disappear in a flash, and Gotama is left alone with the ten *pārami*, long practised by him, as his sole protection. All Māra's attempts to frighten him by means of storms and terrifying apparitions fail, and, in the end, Māra, hurls at him the Cakkāvudha. It remains as a canopy poised over Gotama. The very earth bears witness to Gotama's fitness to be the Enlightened One, and Girimekhala kneels before him. Māra is vanquished and flees headlong with his vast army. The various divinities who had fled at the approach of Māra now return to Gotama and exult in his triumph.[19]

Gotama spends that night in deep meditation. In the first watch he gains remembrance of his former existences; in the middle watch he attains the divine eye *(dibba-cakkhu)*; in the last watch he revolves in his mind the Chain of Causation *(paticcasamuppāda)*. As he masters this, the earth trembles and, with the dawn, comes Enlightenment. He is now the supreme Buddha, and he breaks forth into a paean of joy *(udāna)*.[20]

For the first week the Buddha remains under the Bodhi-tree, meditating on the Paticcasamuppāda; the second week he spends at the Ajapālanigrodha, where the "Huhuṅka" brahmin accosts him[21] and where Māra's daughters, Taṇhā, Arati and Rāgā, appear before the Buddha and make a last attempt to shake his resolution;[22] the third week he spends under the hood of the nāga-king Mucalinda,[23] the fourth week is spent in meditation under the Rājāyatana tree,[24] at the end of this period

16. *J.* I. 66f. The *Therigāthā* Commentary (p.2) mentions another teacher of Gotama, named Bhaggava, whom Gotama visted before Alāra. *Lal*, (330 (264)) contains a very elaborate account of Gotama's visits to teachers; he goes first to two brahmin women, Sāki and Padmā, then to Raivata and Rajaka, son of Trimandika, and finally (as far as this chapter is concerned) to Alāra at Vaiśāli. A poem containing an account of the meeting of Gotama with Bimbisāra is inserted into this account. The next chapter tells of Uddaka. An account of Gotama's visits to teachers and of the details of his austerities is also given in the *Mahā Saccaka Sutta*, already referred to (*M.* I. 240 ff.); the *Mahā Sihanāda Sutta (M.* I, 77 ff.) contains a long and detailed account of his extreme asceticism. See also *M.* I. 163 ff.; II. 93 f.
17. The dreams are recounted in *A.* III. 240 and in *Mtu.* II, 136 f.
18. *J.* I. 69. The Pitakas know nothing of Sujātā's offering or of Sotthiya's gift. *Lal*, (334-7 (267-70)) mentions ten girls in all who provide him with food during his austerities. *Divy.* (392) mentions two, Nandā and Nandabalā.
19. The whole story of the contest with Māra is, obviously, a mythological development. It is significant that in the *Majjhima* passages referred to earlier there is no mention of Māra, of a temptation, or even of a Bodhi-tree; but see *D.* II, 4 and Thomas (*op. cit.*, n. 1). According to the *Kālingabodhi Jātaka*, which, very probably, embodies an old tradition, the bodhi-tree was worshipped even in the Buddha's life-time. The Māra legend is, however, to be found in the Canonical *Padhāna Sutta* of the Sutta Nipāta. This perhaps contains the first suggestion of the legend. For a discussion see *s.v.* Māra.
20. There is great doubt as to which were these *Udāna* verses. The *Nidānakathā* and the Commentaries generally quote two verses (153, 154) included in the *Dhammapada* collection *(anekajāti saṃsāram*, etc.).. The *Vinaya* (I. 2) quotes three different verses (as does also *DhsA.* 17), and says that one verse was repeated at the end of each watch, all the watches being occupied with meditation on the paticcasamuppāda. *Mtu.* (II. 286) gives a completely different *Udāna*, and in another place (ii. 416) mentions a different verse as the first *Udāna*. The Tibetan *Vinaya* is, again, quite different (Rockhill, p. 33). For a discussion see Thomas, *op. cit.*, 75 ff.
21. Māra now comes again and asks the Buddha to die at once (*D.* II. 112).
22. *J.* I. 78; *S.* II. 124; *Lal.* 490 (378).
23. *Vin.* I. 3.
24. This is the *Vinaya* account (*Vin.* I. 1 ff.); but the *Jātaka* (i. 77 ff.) extends this period to seven weeks, the additional weeks being inserted between the first and second. The Buddha spends one week each at the Animisa-cetiya, the Ratanacaṅkama and the Ratanaghara, and this last is where he thinks out the *Abhidhamma Piṭaka*.

takes place the conversion of Tapussa and Bhallika. They take refuge in the Buddha and the Dhamma, though the Buddha does not give them any instruction.

Doubts now assail the Buddha as to whether he shall proclaim to the world his doctrine, so recondite, so hard to understand. The Brahmā Sahampati[25] appears before him and assures him there are many prepared to listen to him and to profit by his teaching, and so entreats him to teach the Dhamma. The Buddha accedes to his request and, after consideration, decides to teach the Dhamma first to the Pañcavaggiyas at Isipatana. On the way to Benares he meets the Ājivaka Upaka and tells him that he (the Buddha) is Jina. On his arrival at Isipatna the Pañcavaggiyas are, at first, reluctant to acknowledge his claim to be the Tathāgata, but they let themselves be won over and, on the full-moon day of Āsāḷha, the Buddha preaches to them the sermon which came to be known as the *Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta*[26]. At the end of the sermon Koṇḍañña becomes a sotāpanna and they all become monks.

This sermon is followed five days later by the *Anattalakkhana Sutta,* at the conclusion of which all five become arahants. The following day the Buddha meets Yasa, whom he converts. Yasa's father, who comes seeking him, is the first to take the threefold formula of Refuge. Yasa becomes an arahant and is ordained. The Buddha accepts a meal at his house, and Yasa's mother and one of his former wives are the first two lay-women to become the Buddha's disciples. Then four friends of Yasa and, afterwards, fifty more, enter the Order and become arahants. There are now sixty arahants besides the Buddha, and they are sent in different directions to preach the Dhamma. They return with many candidates for admission to the Order, and the Buddha, who up till now had ordained men with the *"ehi bhikkhu"* formula, now allows the monks themselves to perform the ceremony of ordination.[27]

After spending the rainy season at Benares,[28] the Buddha returns to Senānigāma in Uruvelā, on the way converting and ordaining the thirty Bhaddavaggiyā. At Uruvelā, after a long and protracted exercise of magical powers, consisting in all of three thousand five hundred miracles, the Buddha wins over the three Kassapa brothers, the Tebhātika Jaṭilā, with their thousand followers, and ordains them. They become arahants after listening to the *Ādittapariyāya Sutta* preached at Gayāsīsa; with these followers he visits Rājagaha, where King Seniya Bimbisāra comes to see him at the Laṭṭhivanuyyāna. The following day the Buddha and the monks visit the palace, preceded by Sakka disguised as a youth and singing the praises of the Buddha. After the meal, the king gifts Veḷuvana to the Buddha and the Order. The Buddha stays for two months at Rājagaha,[29] and it is during this time that Sāriputta and Moggallāna join the Order, through the instrumentality of Assaji.[30] The number of converts now rapidly increases and the people of Magadha, alarmed by the prospect of childlessness, widowhood, etc., blame the Buddha and his monks. The Buddha, however, refutes their chargees.[31]

[32]On the full-moon day of Phagguna (February-March) the Buddha, accompanied by twenty thousand monks, sets out of Kapilavatthu at the express request of his father, conveyed through Kāludāyi.[33] By slow stages he arrives at the city, where he stays at the Nigrodhārāma, and, in order to convince his proud kinsmen of his power, performs the Yamakapāṭihāriya and then relates the Vessantara Jātaka. The next day, receiving no invitation to a meal, the Buddha begs in the streets of the city; this deeply grieves Suddhodana, but later, learning that it is the custom of all Buddhas, he becomes a sotāpanna and conducts the Buddha and his monks to a meal at the palace. There all the women of the palace, excepting only Rāhulamātā, come and do reverence to the Buddha. Mahāpajāpati becomes a sotāpanna and Suddhodana a sakadāmi. The Buddha visits Rāhulamātā in her own apartments and utters her praises in the *Candakinnara Jātaka.* The following day the Buddha persuades his half-brother, Nanda, to come to the monastery, where he ordains him and, on the seventh day, he does the same with Rāhula. This is too great a blow for Suddhodana, and at his request the Buddha rules that no person shall be ordained without the consent of his parents. The next day the Buddha preaches to Suddhodana, who becomes an anāgāmi. During the Buddha's visit to Kapilavatthu, eighty thousand Sākiyans join the Order, one from each

25. According to *J.* I, 81, with the gods of the thousand worlds, including Sakka, Suyāma, Santusita, Sunimmita, Vasavatti, etc.
26. *Vin.* I. 4 ff.; *M.* II. 118 ff.; *cp. D.* II. 36 ff. Regarding the claim of this sutta to be the Buddha's first sermon see Thomas, *op. cit.*, p. 86; see also *s.v.* Pañcavaggiyā.
27. *Vin.* I. 15 ff.; *J.* II. 81 f.
28. About this time Māra twice tries to tempt the Buddha, once after he had sent the disciples out to preach and once after the Retreat (*S.* I. 105, 106; *Vin.* II, 21, 22).
29. *BuA.* 4. It was probably during this year, at the beginning of the rainy season, that the Buddha visited Vesāli at the request of the Licchavis, conveyed through Mahāli. The city was suffering from pestilence and famine. The Buddha went, preached the *Ratana Sutta* and dispelled all dangers (*DhA.* III. 436 ff.).
30. *Vin.* I. 23 ff.
31. *Vin.* I. 42 f.
32. The account of the first twenty years of the Buddha's ministry is summarised from various sources, chiefly from Thomas's admirable account in his *Life and Legend of the Buddha* (pp. 97 ff.). The necessary references are to be found under the names mentioned.

family. With these he returns to Rājagaha, stopping on the way at Anupiya, where Anuruddha, Bhaddiya, Ānanda, Bhagu, Kimbila and Devadatta, together with their barber, Upāli, visit him and seek ordination.

On his return to Rājagaha[34] the Buddha resides in the Sitavana. There Sudatta, later known as Anāthapiṇḍika, visits him, is converted, and invites him to Sāvatthi. The Buddha accepts the invitation and journeys through Vesāli to Sāvatthi, there to pass the rainy season.[35] Anāthapiṇḍika gifts Jetavana, provided with every necessity, for the residence of the Buddha and his monks. Probably to this period belongs the conversion of Migāra, father-in-law of Visākhā, and the construction, by Visākhā, of the Pubbārāma at Sāvatthi. The vassa of the fourth year the Buddha spends at Veluvana, where he converts Uggasena[36] In the fifth year Suddhodana dies, having realised arahantship, and the Buddha flies through the air, from the Kūṭāgārasālā in Vesāli where he was staying, to preach to his father on his death-bed. According to one account[37] it is at this time that the quarrel breaks out between the Sākiyans and the Koliyans regarding the irrigation of the river Rohiṇi. The Buddha persuades them to make peace, and takes up his abode in the Nigrodhārāma. Mahāpajāpati Gotami, with other Sākiyan women, visit him there and asks that women may be allowed to join the Order. Three times the request is made, three times refused, the Buddha then returning to Vesāli. The women cut off their hair, don yellow robes and follow him thither. Ānanda intercedes on their behalf and their request is granted.[38]

In the sixth year the Buddha again performs the Yamakapāṭihāriya, this time at the foot of the Gaṇḍamba tree in Sāvatthi. Prior to this, the Buddha had forbidden any display of magic powers, but makes an exception in his own case.[39]

He spends the vassa at Mankulapabbata. After the performance of the miracle he follows the custom of all Buddhas and ascends to Tāvatiṃsa in three strides to preach the Abhidhamma to his mother who is born there as a deva, and there he keeps the seventh vassa. The multitude, gathered at Sāvatthi at the Yamakapāṭihāriya, refuse to go away until they have seen him. For three months, therefore, Moggallāna expounds to them the Dhamma, while Culla Anāthapiṇḍika provides them with food. During the preaching of the Abhidhamma, Sāriputta visits the Buddha daily and learns from him all that has been recited the previous day. At the end of the vassa, the Buddha descends a jewelled staircasee and comes to earth at Sankassa, thirty leagues from Sāvatthi.[40] It was about this time, when the Buddha's fame was at its height, that the notorious Cincā-māṇavikā was persuaded by members of some hostile sect to bring a vile accusation against the Buddha. A similar story, told in connection with a paribbājikā named Sundari, probably refers to a later date.

The eighth year the Buddha spends in the country of the Bhaggas and there, while residing in Bhesakalāvana near Sumsumāragiri, he meets Nakulapitā and his wife, who had been his parents in five hundred former births.[41]

In the ninth year the Buddha is at Kosambī. While on a visit to the Kuru country he is offered in marriage Māgandiyā. The refusal of the offer, accompanied by insulting remarks about physical beauty, arouses the enmity of Māgandiyā who, thenceforward, cherishes hatred against the Buddha.[42]

In the tenth year there arises among the monks at Kosambi a schism which threatens the very existence of the Order. The Buddha, failing in his attempts to reconcile the disputants, retires in disgust to the Pārileyyaka forest, passing on his way through Bālakaloṇakāragāma and Pācinavaṃsadāya. In the forest he is protected and waited upon by a friendly elephant who has left the herd. The Buddha spends the rainy season there and returns to Sāvatthi. By this time the Kosambī monks have recovered their senses and ask the Buddha's pardon. This is granted and the dispute settled.[43]

In the eleventh year the Buddha resides at the brahmin village of Ekanālā and converts Kasi-Bhāradvāja.[44] The twelfth year he spends at Varañjā keeping the vassa at the

33. This visit is not mentioned in the Canon; but see *Thag*. 527-36; *AA*. I. 107, 167; *J*. I. 87; *DhA*. I, 96 f.; *ThagA*. I, 997 ff.
34. *J*. I, 92. The story is also told in the *Vinaya* III, 154), but no date is indicated.
35. *Vin*. II. 158; but see *BuA*. 3, where the Buddha is mentioned as having spent the vassa in Rājagaha.
36. *DhA*. IV, 59 f.
37. *AA*. I. 341 *SNA*. I. 357; *ThigA*. 141; details of the quarrel are given in *J*. V. 412 ff.
38. *Vin*. II. 253 ff.; *A*. IV, 274 f.; for details see *s.v.* Mahāpajāpati.
39. *DhA*. III, 199f; *J*. IV, 265 etc.
40. For details see *s.v.* Devorohana.
41. *AA*. I. 217. The same is told of another old couple in Sāketa. See the *Sāketa Jātaka*. The Buddha evidently stayed again at Sumsumāragiri many years later. It was during his second visit that Bodhirājakumāra (*q.v.*) invited him to a meal at his new palace in order that the Buddha might consecrate the building by his presence.
42. *SN*.; pp. 163 ff.; *SNA*. II. 542 ff.; *DhA*. I. 199 ff. Thomas (*op. cit.*, 109) assigns the Māgandiya incident to the ninth year going probably on *AA*. I, 435 but other Commentaries say the Buddha was then living at Sāvatthi.
43. *Vin*. I. 337 ff.; *J*. III 486 ff.; *DhA*. I. 44 ff.; but see *Ud*. *iv*, 5; *s.v.* Pārileyyaka.
44. *SN*., p. 12 f.; *S*. I. 172 f.

request of the brahmin Verañja. But Verañja, forgets his obligations; there is a famine, and five hundred horse-merchants supply the monks with food. Moggallāna's offer to obtain food by means of magic power is discouraged.[45] The thirteenth Retreat is kept at Cālikapabbata, where Meghiya is the Buddha's personal attendant.[46] The fourteenth year is spent at Sāvatthi, and there Rāhula receives the upasampadā ordination.

In the fifteenth year the Buddha revisits Kapilavatthu, and there his father-in-law, Suppabuddha, in a drunken fit, refuses to let the Buddha pass through the streets. Seven days later he is swallowed up by the earth at the foot of his palace.[47]

The chief event of the sixteenth year, which the Buddha spent at Ālavi, is the conversion of the yakkha Ālavaka. In the seventeeth year the Buddha is back at Sāvatthi, but he visits Ālavi again out of compassion for a poor farmer who becomes a sotāpanna after hearing him preach.[48] He spends the rainy season at Rājagaha. In the next year he again comes to Ālavi from Jetavana for the sake of a poor weaver's daughter. She had heard him preach, three years earlier, on the desirability of meditating upon death. She alone gave heed to his admonition and, when the Buddha knows of her imminent death, he journeys thirty leagues to preach to her and eastablish her in the sotāpattiphala.[49]

The Retreat of this year and also that of the nineteenth are spent at Cālikapabbata. In the twentieth year takes place the miraculous conversion of the robber Aṅgulimāla. He becomes an arahant and dies shortly after. It is in the same year that Ānanda is appointed permanent attendant on the Buddha, a position which he holds to the end of the Buddha's life, twenty-five years later.[50] The twentieth Retreat is spent at Rājagaha.

With our present knowledge it is impossible to evolve any kind of chronology for the remaining twenty-five years of the Buddha's life. The Commentaries state[51] that they were spent at Sāvatthi in the monasteries of Jetavana and Pubbārāma. This, probably, only implies that the Retreats were kept there and that they were made the head-quarters of the Buddha. From there, during the dry season, he went every year on tour in various districts. Among the places visited by him during these tours are the following.[52] Aggālavacetiya, Anotatta, Andhakavinda, Ambapālivana, Ambalaṭṭhikā, Ambasaṇḍā, Assapura, Āpaṇa, Icchānaṅgala, Ukkaṭṭhā (Subhagavana), Ukkācelā, Ugganagara, Ujuññā (Kaṇṇakatthaka deer-park), Uttara in Koliya, Uttarakā, Uttarakuru, Uruvelakappa, Ulumpa, Ekanālā, Opasāda, Kakkarapatta, Kajaṅgalā (Mukheluvana), Kammāsadhamma, Kalandakanivāpa (near Benares), Kimbilā, Kitāgiri, Kuṇḍadhānavana (near Kuṇḍakoli), Kesaputta, Koṭigāma, Kosambi (Ghositārāma and Badarikārāma), Khānumata, Khomadussa, Gosiṅgasālavana, Candalakappa, Campā (Gaggarā), Cātuma, Cetiyagiri in Vesāli, Jīvakamabavana (in Rājagaha), Tapodārāma, Tindukkhānu (paribbājakārāma), Todeyya, Thullakoṭṭhita, Dakkhiṇāgiri, Daṇḍakappa, Devadaha, Desaka in the Sumbha country, Nagaraka, Nagaravinda, Nādikā (Giñjakāvasatha), Nālandā (Pāvārika mango-grove), Nālakapāna (Palāsavana), Paṅkadhā, Pañcasālā, Pāṭikārāma, Beluva, the Brahma world, Bhaddavati, Bhaddiya (Jātiyāvana), Bhaganagara (Ānandacetiya), Maṇinālakacetiya, Manasākaṭa, Mātulā, Mithilā (Makhādeva mango-grove), Medaḷumpa, Moranivāpa, Rammaka's hermitage, Laṭṭhivana, Videha, Vedhaññaambavana, Venāgapura, Verañjā, Vesāli (also various shrines there, Udenaceitya, Gotamacetiya, Cāpalacetiya, Bahuputtakacetiya, Sattambacetiya, Sārandadacetiya), Sakkara, Sajjanela, Salalāgāraka in Sāvatthi, Sāketa (Añjanavana), Sāmagāma, Sālavatikā, Sālā, Simsapāvana, Silāvati, Sitavana, Sūkarakhatalena, Setavyā, Hatthigāma, Halidavassana and the region of the Himālaya.

There is a more or less continuous account of the last year of the Buddha's life. This is contained in three suttas: the *Mahāparinibbāna*, the *Mahāsudassana* and the *Janavasabha*. These are not separate discourses but are intimately connected with each other. The only event prior to the incidents recounted in these suttas, which can be fixed with any certainty, is the death of the Buddha's pious patron and supporter, Bimbisāra, which took place eight years before the Buddha's Parinibbāna.[53] It was at this time that Devadatta tried to obtain for himself a post of supremacy in the Order, and, failing in this effort,

45. *Vin.* III. 1 ff.; *J.* III. 494 f.; *DhA.* II. 153.
46. *A.* IV. 354; *Ud.* iv. i.
47. *DhA.* III. 44
48. *DhA.* III. 262 ff.
49. *Ibid.* 170 ff.
50. For details see *s.v.* Ānanda.
51. E.g. *BuA.* 3; *SNA.* (p. 336 f.) says that when the Buddha was at Sāvatthi, he spent the day at the Migāramātupāsāda in the Pubbārāma, and the night at Jetavana or *vice versa.*
52. For details of these visits see *s.v. passim.*
53. *Mhv.* ii. 32

became the open enemy of the Buddha.[54] Enlisting the support of Ajātasattu, he tried in many ways to kill the Buddha. Royal archers were bribed to shoot the Buddha, but they were won over by his pesonality and confessed their intentions. Then Devadatta hurled a great rock down Gijjhakūta on to the Buddha as he was walking in the shade of the hill; the hurtling rock was stopped by two peaks, but splinters struck the Buddha's foot and caused blood to flow; he suffered great pain and had to be taken to the Maddakucchi garden, where his injuries were dressed by the physician Jivaka.[55] The monks wished to provide a guard, but the Buddha reminded them that no man had the power to deprive a Tathāgata of his life.

Devadatta next bribed the royal elephant keepers to let loose a fierce elephant, Nālāgiri, intoxicated with toddy, on the road along which the Buddha would go, begging for alms. The Buddha was warned of this but disregarded the warning, and when the elephant appeared, Ānanda, against the strict orders of the Buddha, threw himself in its path, and only by an exercise of *iddhi*-power, including the folding up of the earth, could the Buddha come ahead of him. As the elephant approached, the Budha addressed it, pervading it with his boundless love, until it became quite gentle.[56]

These attempts to encompass the Buddha's death having failed, Devadatta, with three others, decides to create a schism in the Order and asks the Buddha that five rules should be laid down, whereby the monks would be compelled to lead a far more austere life than hitherto. When this request is refused, Devadatta persuades five hundred recently ordained monks to leave Vesāli with him and take up their residence at Gayāsīsa, where he would set up an organisation similar to that of the Buddha. But, at the Buddha's request, Sāriputta preaches to them and they are persuaded to return. When Devadatta discovers this, he vomits hot blood and lies ill for nine months. When his end approaches, he wishes to see the Buddha, but he dies on the way to Jetavana-whither he is being conveyed in a litter-and is born in Avici.[57]

From Gijjhakūta, near Rājagaha, the Buddha starts on his last journey. Just before his departure he is visited by Vassakāra, and the talk is of the Vajjians; the Buddha preaches to Vassakāra and the monks on the conditions that lead to prosperity. The Buddha proceeds with a large concourse of monks to Ambalatthikā and thence to Nālandā, where Sāriputta utters his lion-roar *(sihanāda)* regarding his faith in the Buddha. The Buddha then goes to Pātaligāma, where he talks to the villagers on the evil consequences of immorality and the advantages of morality. He utters a prophecy regarding the future greatness of Pātaliputta and then, leaving by the Gotamadvāra, he crosses the river Ganges at Gotamatittha. He proceeds to Kotigāma and thence to Nātika, where he gives to Ānanda the formula of the *Dhammādāsa*, whereby the rebirth of disciples could be ascertained. From Nātika he goes to Vesāli, staying in the park of the courtesan Ambapāli. The following day he accepts a meal from Ambapāli, refusing a similar offer from the Licchavis; Ambapāli makes a gift of her park to the Buddha and his monks. The Buddha journeys on to Beluva, where he spends the rainy season, his monks remaining in Vesāli. At Beluva he falls dangerously ill but, with great determination, fights against his sicknes. He tells Ānanda that his mission is finished, that when he is dead the Order must maintain itself, taking the Dhamma alone as its refuge, and he concludes by propounding the four subjects of mindfulness.[58] The next day he begs in Vesāli and, with Ānanda, visits the Cāpālacetiya. There he gives to Ānanda the opportunity of asking him to live until the end of the kappa, but Aanada fails to take the hint. Soon afterwards Māra visits the Buddha and obtains the assurance that the Buddha's nibbāna will take place in three months. There is an earthquake, and, in answer to Ānanda's questions, the Buddha explains to him the eight causes of earthquakes. This is followed by lists of the eight assemblies, the eight stages of mastery and the eight stages of release. The Buddha then repeats to Ānanda his conversation with Māra, and Ānanda now makes his request to the Buddha to prolong his life, but is told that it is now too late; several opportunities he has had, of which he has failed to avail himself. The monks are assembled in Vesāli, in the Service Hall, and the Buddha exhorts them to practise the doctrine he has taught, in order that the religious life may last long. He then announces his impending death.

The next day, returning from Vesāli, he looks round at the city for the last time and goes on to Bhandgāma[59];

54. Devadatta's desire to deprive the Buddha of the leadership of the Sangha seems to have been conceived by him, according to the Vinaya account (*Vin.* II. 184), almost immediately after he joined the Order, and the Buddha was warned of this by the devaputta Kakudha. This account lends point to the statement contained especially in the Northern books, that even in their lay life Devadatta had always been Gotama's rival.

55. *S.* I. 27.

56. This incident, with great wealth of detail, is related in several places - e.g. in *J.* V. 333 ff.

57. For further details and for references, see *s.v.* Devadatta.

58. *D.* II. 100.

59. According to the Commentaries (e.g. *DA.* II, 549), after the rainy season spent at Beluva, the Buddha goes back to Jetavana, where he is visited by Sāriputta, who is preparing for his own parinibbāna at Nālakagāma. From Jetavana the Buddha went to Rājagaha, where Mahāmoggallāna died. Thence he proceeded to Ukkācelā, where he spoke in praise of the two chief disciples. From Ukkācelā he proceeded to Vesāli and thence to Bhandagāma. Rāhula, too, predeceased the Buddha (*DA.* II. 549).

there he preaches on the four things the comprehension of which destroys rebirth — noble conduct, earnestness in meditation, wisdom and freedom.

He then passes through the villages of Hatthigāma, Ambagāma and Jambugāma, and stays at Bhoganagara at the Ānandacetiya. There he addresses the monks on the Four Great Authorities *(Mahāpadesā)*, by reference to which the true doctrine may be determined.[60] From Bhoganagara the Buddha goes to Pāvā and stays in the mango-grove of Cunda, the smith. Cunda serves him with a meal which includes *sūkaramaddava*.[61] The Buddha alone partakes of the *sūkaramaddava*, the remains being buried. This is the Buddha's last meal; sharp sickness arises in him, with flow of blood and violent, deadly pains, but the Buddha controls them and sets out for Kusinārā. On the way he has to sit down at the foot of a tree. Ānanda fetches him water to drink from the stream Kakutthā, over which five hundred carts had just passed; but, through the power of the Buddha, the water is quite clear. Here the Buddha is visited by Pukkusa, the Mallan, who is converted and presents the Buddha with a pair of gold-coloured robes. The Buddha puts them on and Ānanda notices the marvellous brightness and clearness of the Buddha's body. The Buddha tells him that the body of a Buddha takes on this hue on the night before his Enlightenment and on the night of his passing away, and that he will die that night at Kusinārā. He goes to the Kakutthā, bathes and drinks there and rests in a mango-grove. There he instructs Ānanda that steps must be taken to dispel any remorse that Cunda may feel regarding the meal he gave to the Buddha.

From Kakutthā the Buddha crosses the Hiraññavatī to the Upavattana sāla-grove in Kusinārā. There Ānanda prepares for him a bed with the head to the north. All the trees break forth into blossom and flowers cover the body of the Buddha. Divine mandārava-flowers and sandal-wood powder fall from the sky, and divine music and singing sound through the air. But the Buddha says that the greater honour to him would be to follow his teachings.

The gods of the ten thousand world systems assemble to pay their last homage to the Buddha, and Upavāna, who stands fanning him, is asked to move away as he obstructs their view.

Ānanda asks for instruction on several points, including how the funeral rites should be performed; he then goes out and abandons himself to a fit of weeping; the Buddha sends for him, consoles him and speaks his praises. Ānanda tries to persuade the Buddha not to die in a mud-and-wattle village, such as is Kusinārā, but the Buddha tells him how it was once the mighty Kusāvati, capital of Mahāsudassana.

The Mallas of Kusinārā are informed that the Buddha will pass away in the third watch of the night, and they come with their families to pay their respects. The ascetic Subhadda comes to see the Buddha and is refused admission by Ānanda, but the Buddha, overhearing, calls him in and converts him. Several minor rules of discipline are delivered, including the order for the excommunication of Channa. The Buddha finally asks the assembled monks to speak out any doubts they may have. All are silent and Ānanda expresses his astonishment, but the Buddha tells him it is natural that the monks should have no doubts. Then, addressing the monks for the last time, he admonishes them in these words: "Decay is inherent in all component things; work out your salvation with diligence." These were the Buddha's last words. Passing backwards and forwards through various stages of trance, he attains Parinibbāna. There is a great earth-quake and terrifying thunder, and the Brahmā Sahampati, Sakka king of th gods, Anuruddha and Ānanda utter stanzas, each proclaiming the feeling uppermost in his mind. It is the full-moon day of the month of Visākha and the Buddha is in his eightieth year.

The next day Ānanda informs the Mallas of Kusinārā of the Buddha's death, and for seven days they hold a great celebration. On the seventh day, following Ānanda's instructions, they prepare the body for cremation, taking it in procession by the eastern gate to the Makuṭa-bandhana shrine, thus altering their proposed route, in order to satisfy the wishes of the gods, as communicated to them by Anuruddha. The whole town is covered knee-deep with mandārava-flowers, which fall from the sky. When, however, four of the chief Mallas try to light the pyre, their attempt is unsuccessful and they must wait until Mahā Kassapa, coming with a company of five hundred monks, has saluted it. The Commentaries (e.g. *DA*. II, 603) add that Mahā Kassapa greatly desired that the Buddha's feet should rest on his head when he worshipped the pyre. The wish was granted: the feet appeared through the pyre, and when Kassapa had worshipped them, the pyre closed together. The pyre burns completely away, leaving no cinders nor soot. Streams of water fall from the sky to extinguish it and the Mallas pour on it scented water. They then place a fence of spears around it and continue their celebrations for seven days. At the end of that period there appear several claimants for the Buddha's relics: Ajātasattu, the Licchavis of Vesāli, the Sākiyans of Kapilavatthu, the Bulis of Allakappa, the Koliyas of Rāmagāma, a brahmin of Vethadipa and the Mallas of Pāvā. But the Mallas of Kusinārā refusing to share the relics with the others, there is danger of war. Then the brahmin Doṇa counsels concord and divides the relics into eight equal parts for the eight claimants. Doṇa takes for himself the measuring

60. *Cf. A*. II, 167 ff.

61. There is much dispute concerning this word. See Thomas, *op. cit.* 149, n. 3.

vessel and the Moriyas of Pipphalivana, who arrive late, carry off the ashes. Thūpas were built over these remains and feasts held in honour of the Buddha.[62] It is said[63] that just before the Buddha's Sāsana disappears completely from the world, all the relics will gather together at the Mahācetiya, and travelling from there to Nāgadipa and the Ratanacetiya, assemble at the Mahābodhi, together with the relics from other parts. There they will re-form the Buddha's golden-hued body, emitting the six-coloured aura. The body will then catch fire and completely disappear, amid the lamentations of the ten thousand world-systems.

The Ceylon Chronicles[64] record that the Buddha visited the Island on three separate occasions. The first was while he was dwelling at Uravelā, awaiting the moment after the conversion of the Tebhātika Jatilas, in the ninth month after the Enlightenment, on the full-moon day of Phussa (Dec.-Jan.). He came to the Mahānāga garden, and stood in the air over an assembly of yakkhas then being held. He struck terror into their hearts and, at his suggestion, they left Ceylon and went in a body to Giridipa, hard by. The Buddha gave a handful of his hair to the deva Mahāsumana of the Sumanakūta mountain, who built a thūpa which was later enlarged into the Mahiyangana Thūpa. The Buddha again visited Ceylon in the fifth year, on the new-moon day of Citta (March-April), to check an imminent battle between two Nāga chiefs in Nāgadipa; the combatants were Mahodara and Cūlodara, uncle and nephew, and the object of the quarrel was a gem-set throne. The Buddha appeared before them, accompanied by the deva Samiddhi-Sumana, carrying a Rājayatana tree from Jetavana, settled their quarrel and received, as a gift, the throne, the cause of the trouble. He left behind him both the throne and the Rājāyatana tree for the worship of the Nāgas and accepted an invitation from the Nāga king, Maniakkhika of Kalyāni, to pay another visit to Ceylon. Three years later Maniakkhika repeated the invitation and the Buddha came to Kalyāni with five hundred monks, on the second day of Vesākha. Having preached to the Nāgas, he went to Sumankūta, on the summit of which mountain he left the imprint of his foot.[65] He then stayed at Dighavāpi and from there visited Mahāmeghavana, where he consecrated various spots by virtue of his presence, and proceeded to the site of the later Silācetiya. From there he returned to Jetavana.

Very little information as to the personality of the Buddha is available. We are told that he was golden-hued,[66] that his voice had the eight qualities of the Brahmassara[67] — fluency, intelligibility, sweetness, audibility, continuity, distinctness, depth and resonance — that he had a fascinating personality — he was described by his opponents as seductive[68]-that he was handsome, perfect alike in complexion and stature and noble of presence.[69] He had a unique reputation as a teacher and trainer of the human heart. He was endowed with the thirty-two marks of the Mahāpurisa.[70] There is a legend that Mahā Kassapa, though slightly shorter, resembled the Buddha in appearance.[71]

Mention is often made of the Buddha's love of quiet and peace, and even the heretics respected his wishes in this matter, silencing their discussions at his approach.[72] Examples are given[73] of the Buddha refusing to allow noisy monks to live near him. He loved solitude and often

62. The concluding passage of the *Mahā-parinibbāna Sutta* (*D.* II, 167) states that the Buddha's relics were eight measures, seven of which were honoured in Jambudipa and the remaining one in the Nāga realm in Rāmagāma. One tooth was in heaven, one in Gandhāra, a third in Kālinga (later taken to Sihala),, and a fourth in the Nāga world. Ajātasattu's share was deposited in a thūpa and forgotten. It was later discovered by Asoka (with the help of Sakka) and distributed among his eighty-four thousand monasteries. Asoka also recorded the finding of all the other relics except those deposited in Rāmagāma. These were later deposited in the Mahācetiya at Anurādhapura (*Mhv.* xxxi. 17ff.). Other relics are also mentioned, such as the Buddha's collar-bone, his alms bowl, etc. (*Mhv.* xvii. 9 ff.; *Mhv.* i. 37 etc.).

63. E.g., *DA.* iii. 899.

64. *Mhv.* i. 12ff.; *Dpv.* i. 45ff.; ii. 1 ff. etc. The Burmese claim that the Buddha visited their land and went to the Lohitacandana Vihāra, presented by the brothers Mahāpunna and Cūlapunna of Vānijagāma *Ind. Antiq.* xxii., and *Sās.* 36 f.).

65. Legend has it that other footprints were left by the Buddha, on the bank of the river Nammadā, on the Saccabaddha mountain and in Yonakapura.

66. E.g., *Sp.* III. 689.

67. E.g., *D.* II. 211; *M.* II. 166 f. It is said tht while an ordinary person spoke one word, Ānanda could speak eight; but the Buddha could speak sixteen to the eight of Ānanda (*MA.* I. 283).

68. E.g., *M.* I. 269, 275

69. E.g., *M.* II. 167.

70. For details of these, see *s.v.* Buddha.

71. Attempts made, however, to measure the Buddha always failed; two such attempts are generally mentioned — one by a brahmin of Rājagaha and the other by Rāhu, chief of the Asuras (*DA.* I. 284 f.). The Buddha had the physical strength of many millions of elephants (e.g. *VibhA.* 397), but his strength quickly ebbed away after his last meal and he had to stop at twenty-five places while travelling three gāvutas from Pāvā to Kusināra (*DA.* II. 573).

72. E.g., *D.* I. 178 f; III. 39; even his disciples had a similar reputation (e.g., *D.* III. 37).

73. E.g., *M.* I. 456; see also *M.* II. 122, where a monk was jogged by his neighbour because he coughed when the Buddha was speaking.

spent long periods away from the haunts of men, allowing only one monk to bring him his meals.[74] According to one account,[75] it was his practice to spend part of the day in seclusion, but he was always ready to see anyone who urgently desired his spiritual counsel.[76]

In the Mahā Govinda Sutta[77] Sakka is represented as having uttered "eight true praises" of the Buddha. Perhaps the most predominant characteristics of the Buddha were his boundless love and his eagerness to help all who sought him. His fondness for children is seen in such stories as those of the two Sopākas, of Kumāra-Kassapa, of Cūla Panthaka and Dabba-Mallaputta and also of the novices Paṇḍita and Sukha. His kindness to animals appears, for instance, in the introductory story of the *Maccha Jātaka* and his interference on behalf of Udena's aged elephant, Bhaddavatikā *(q.v.)*. The Buddha was extremely devoted to his disciples and encouraged them in every way in their difficult life. The *Theragāthā* and the *Therigāthā* are full of stories indicating that he watched, with great care, the spiritual growth and development of his disciples, understood their problems and was ready with timely interference to help them to win their aims. Such incidents as those mentioned in the ***Bhaddāli Sutta,***[78] the introduction to the *Tittha Jātaka* and the ***Kañcanakkhandha Jātaka,*** seem to indicate that he took a personal and abiding interest in all who came under him. It was his unvarying custom to greet with a smile all those who visited him, inquiring after their welfare and thus putting them at their ease.[79] When anyone sought permission to question him, he made no conditions as to the topic of discussion. This is called *sabbaññupavāraṇa*.[80]

When he was staying in a monastery, he paid daily visits to the sickward to talk to the inmates and to comfort them.[81] The charming story of Pūtigatta-Tissa shows that he sometimes attended on the sick himself, thus setting an example to his followers. In return for his devotion, his disciples adored him, but even among those who immediately surrounded him there were a few who refused to obey him implicitly — e.g. Lāludāyi, the companions of Assaji and Punabbasuka, the Chabbaggiyas, the Sattarasavaggiyas and others, not to mention Devadatta and his associates.

The Buddha seems to have shown a special regard for Sāriputta, Ānanda and Mahā Kassapa among the monks, and for Anāthapiṇḍika, Mallikā, Visākhā, Bimbisāra and Pasenadi among the laity. He seems to have been secretly amused by the very human qualities of Pasenadi and by his failure to appreciate the real superiority of Mallikā, his wife.

The Buddha always declared that he was among the happy ones of this earth, that he was far happier, for instance, than Bimbisāra,[82] and he remained unmoved by opposition or abuse.[83]

The *Milindapañha*[84] mentions several illnesses of the Buddha: the injury to his foot has already been referred to; once when the humours of his body were disturbed Jīvaka administered a purge,[85] on another occasion he suffered from some stomach trouble which was cured by hot water, or, according to some, by hot gruel.[86] The *Dhammapada* Commentary[87] mentions another disorder of the humours cured by hot water obtained from the brahmin Devahita, through Upavāna. The Commentaries[88] mention that he suffered, in his old age, from constant backache, owing to the severe austerities practised by him during the six years preceding his Enlightenment, and the unsuitable meals taken during that period were responsible for a dyspepsia which persisted throughout the rest of his life,[89] culminating in his last serious illness of dysentery.

74. E.g., *S.* V. 12, 320; but this very love of solitude was sometimes brought against him. By intercourse with whom does he attain to lucidity in wisdom? they asked. His insight, they said, was ruined by his habit of seclusion (*D.* III. 38).
75. *A.* I. 181.
76. E.g., *A.* IV. 438.
77. *D.* II. 222 f.
78. *M.* I. 445.
79. *Vin.* I. 313.
80. E.g., *M.* I. 230. When the Buddha himself asked a question of any of his interrogators, they could not remain silent, but were bound to answer; a yakkha called Vajirapāṇi was always present to frighten those who did not wish to do so (e.g. *M.* I. 231). The Buddha was not over-anxious to get converts, and when his visitors declared themselves his followers he would urge them to take time to consider the matter - e.g., in the case of Acela Kassapa and Upāligahapati.
81. See e.g., *s.v.* Kutāgārasālā.
82. E.g., *M.* I. 94.
83. E.g., in the case of the organised conspiracy of Māgandiyā (*DhA.* IV. 1 f.).
84. p. 134.
85. *Vin.* I. 279.
86. *Vin.* I. 210 f.; *Thag.* 185.
87. *DhA.* IV. 232; *ThagA.* I. 311 f.
88. *MA.* I. 465; *DA.* III. 974; see also *D.* III. 209, when he was preaching to the Mallas of Pāvā.
89. *SA.* I. 200.

The *Apadāna*[90] contains a set of verses called *Pubba-kammapiloti*; these verses mention certain acts done by the Buddha in the past, which resulted in his having to suffer in various ways in his last birth. He was once a drunkard named Munāli and he abused the Pacceka Buddha Surabhi. On another occasion he was a learned brahmin, teacher of five hundred pupils. One day, seeing the Pacceka Buddha Isigana, he spoke ill of him to his pupils, calling him "sensualist." The result of this act was the calumny against him by Sundarikā in this life.

In another life he reviled a disciple of a Buddha, named Nanda; for this he suffered in hell for twelve thousand years and, in his last life, was disgraced by Ciñcā. Once, greedy for wealth, he killed his step-brothers, hurling them down a precipice; as a result, Devadatta attempted to kill him by hurling down a rock. Once as a boy, while playing on the highway, he saw a Pacceka Buddha and threw a stone at him, and as a result was shot at by Devadatta's hired archers. In another life he was a mahout, and seeing a Pacceka Buddha on the road, drove his elephant against him; hence the attack by Nālāgiri. Once, as a king, he sentenced seventy persons to death, the reward for which he reaped when a splinter pierced his foot. Because once, as a fisherman's son, he took delight in watching fish being caught, he suffered from a grievous headache when Vidūdabha slaughtered the Sākiyans. In the time of Phussa Buddha he asked the monks to eat barley instead of rice and, as a result, had to eat barley for three months at Verañjā. (According to the Dhammapada Commentary (iii. 257), the Buddha actually had to starve one day at Pañcasālā, because none of the inhabitants were willing to give him alms). Because he once killed a wrestler, he suffered from cramp in the back. Once, when a physician, he caused discomfort to a merchant by purging him, hence his last illness of dysentery. As Jotipāla, he spoke disparagingly of the Enlightenment of Kassapa Buddha, and in consequence had to spend six years following various paths before becoming the Buddha. He was one of the most short-lived Buddhas, but because of those six years his Sāsana will last longer.[91]

The Buddha was generally addressed by his own disciples as Bhagavā. He spoke of himself as Tathāgata, while non-Buddhists referred to him as Gotama or Mahāsamana. Other names used are Mahāmuni, Sākyamuni, Jina, Sakka (e.g. *Sn. vs.* 345) and Brahma (*Sn. vs.* 91; *Sn.* A. ii. 418), also Yakkha (*q.v.*).

The *Aṅguttara Nikāya*[92] gives a list of the Buddha's most eminent disciples, both among members of the Order and among the laity. Each one in the list is mentioned as having possessed pre-eminence in some particular respect.

Among those who visited the Buddha for discussion or had interviews with him or received instruction and guidance direct from him, the following may be included in addition to those already mentioned.[93]

Aṅkura, Aggidatta, Acela-Kassapa, Ajātasattu, Ajita the paribbājaka, Ajita the Licchavi general, Attadattha, Anitthigandhakumāra, Anurādha, Anuruddha, Annabhāra, Abhaya-rājakumāra, Abhayā, Abhiñjaka, Abhibhūta, Abhirūpa-Nandā, Ambattha the monk Arittha, Ariya the fisherman, Asama, Asibandhaputta, Assaji, Assalāyana, Ākotaka, Āmagandha, the yakkhas Ālavaka and Indaka, Ugga of Vesāli, Ugga the minister, Uggata-Sarīra, Uggaha, Ujjaya, Unnābha, Uttara-devaputta, Uttara the Nāga king, Uttara, pupil of Pārāsariya, Uttiya, Udaya and Udāyi, the brahmins, Uttara, pupil of Brahmāyu, Uttarā, daughter of Punna, Uttarā the aged nun, Upavāna, Upasāḷha, Upasena, Upāligahapati, Ubbiri, Eraka, Esakāri, Kakudha, Kandaraka, Kapila the fisherman, Kappa, Kappatakura, Kalārakkhattiya, Kassapa the deva, Kāna, Kānamātā, Kātiyāna, Kāpathika, Kāmada, Kāranapāli, the Kālāmas, Kāligodhā, Kimbila, Kisāgotamī, Kukkutamitta the hunter, Kundadhāna, Kundaliya, Kulla, Kūtadanta, Keniya the Jatila, Kevaddha, Kesi the horse trainer. Kokanadā, the two daughers of Pajjuna, Kokālika, Khadiravaniya-Revata, Khānu-Kondañña, Khema the deva, Khemā, Ganaka-Moggallāna, Gavampati, Guttā, Gotama Thera, Caṅki, Candana, Candābha, Candimā (Candimasa), Citta-Hatthasāriputta, Cunda, Cunda-Samanuddesa, Cundī, Culla-Dhanuggaha, Culla-Subhaddhā, Chattapāni, Janapada-kalyāni -Nandā, Janavasabha, Jantu, Jambuka, Jambukhādaka, Jānussoni, Jāliya, Jīvaka- Komārabhacca, Jenta, Jotikagahapati, Tāyana, Tālaputa, Tikanna, Timbaruka, Tissa, cousin of the Buddha, Tissa, friend of Metteyya, Tissa of Roruva, Tudu-brahmā, Thulla-Tissa, Dandapāni, Dāmali, Dāsaka, Dīgha the deva, Dīghajānu, Dīghatapassi, Dīghanakha, Dīghalatthi, Dīghāvu, Dummukha, Dona, Dhammadinnā, Dhammārāma, the Dhammika-upāsaka, Dhammika the brahmin, Nanda Thera, Nanda the herdsman, Nandana, Nandiya-paribbājaka, Nandiya the Sākiya, Nandivisāla, Nāgita, Nālakatāpasa, Nālijangha, Nigamavāsi-Tissa, Nigrodha, Niṅka, Nīta, Nhātakamuni, Paccanikasāta, Pañcasikha Pañcālacanda, Patācārā, Pasenadi, King of Kosala, Pahārāda the asura, Pātaliya, Pārāpariya, Pingala-

90. *Ap.* I. 299 f.

91. *Sp.* I. 190 f.

92. *A.* I. 23 ff.

93. This list does not pretend to be complete. Some of the names have already been mentioned in this monograph in various connections.

Kaccha, Pingiyāni, Pilinda-Vaccha, Pilotika, Punna-Koliyaputta, Punna-Mantāniputta, Punnā, Punniya, Pessa the elephant trainer, Pokkharasāti, Potthapāda, Pothila, Potaliya, Phagguna, Baka-brahmā, Bahuputtikā, Bāvari and his sixteen disciples, Bāhiya-Dāruciriya, Bāhuna, Bilālapādaka, Belatthakāni, Bojjhā, Brahmāyu, Bhagu, Bhaggava, Bhaddā, Bhaddā-Kundalakesi, Bhaddāli, Bhaddiya the Licchavi, several Bhāradvājas (Akkosaka*, Aggika*, Asurinda*, Ahimsaka*, Kāsi*, Jatā*, Navakammika*, Bilangika*, Suddhika*, Sundarika*), Bhāradvāja, husband of Dhanañjāni, Bhāradvāja, friend of Vāsettha, Bhuñjati, Bhūmiya, Bhesika the barber, Machari-Kosiya, Manibhadda, Mandissa, Mahā-kappina, Mahā-Kassapa, Mahā-kotthita, Mahā-Cunda, Mahā-dhana, Mahā-nāma, Mahā-Moggallāna, Mahāli (Otthaddha), the two Māgandiyas one the brahmin and one the paribbājaka, Māgha, Mānava-Gāmiya, Mānatthaddha, Mātuposaka, Mālunkya-putta, Migajāla, Migasira, Mendaka of Bhaddiya, Moliya-Phagguna, Moliya-Sīvaka, Yasoja, Ratthapāla, Rādha, Rāhula, Rāsiya, Rūpanandā, Roja the Malla, Rohini, Rohitassa, Lakuntaka-Bhaddiya, the goddess Lājā, Lomasa-kangiya, Lohicca, Vakkali, Vangisa, Vajjiyamā-hita, Vaddha the Licchavi, Vaddhamāna, Vappa, Varadhara, Vassakāra, Vārana, Vāsetthaupāsaka, Vāsettha, friend of Bhāradvāja, Visākha Pañcālaputta, Visākhā, Virā, Vekhanasa, Vendu, Vatambari, Sakulu-dāyi, Sakka, Sankicca, the two Sangāravas, Sangharak-khita (Bhāgineyya°), Saccaka, Sajjha, Satullapa devas, Sanankumāra, Santati, Sandha, Sandhāna, Samiddhi, Sarabha, Sarabhanga, Sātāgira, Sātāli, Sāti, Sānu, Sikhā-Moggallāna, Sigāla, Sirimā, Siva, Sīvali, Sīha the general, Sukhā, Sūciloma, Sujātā, daughter-in-law of Anātha-pindika, Sudatta, Sunakkhatta, Sunita, Sundara Samudda, Sundarā-Nandā, the leper Suppabuddha, Suppavāsā, Subha Todeyyaputta, the two nuns named Subhā, Subhūti, the novice Sumana, Sumanā, sister of Pasenadi, Subrahmā, Surādha, Suriya, Susima, Seniya, Seri, Sela, Sona-Kutikanna, Sona-Kolivisa, Sonadanda, Sonā, the two Sopākas, Hatthaka Alavaka, Hatthaka-devaputta and Hemavata. See also *s.v.* Buddha and Bodhisatta.

G. P. Malalasekera

GOTAMA (2) (Sanskrit: Gautama), the family or lineage *(gotta)* to which the Buddha belonged and by which name he came to be latterly known as if it were a surname *(samano Gotamo)*. It is thus the name by which he is addressed by brahmins and others who are not his followers. The Buddha himself calls it his ancestral name when he explains himself as "... *Gotamo gottena* (*D.* II, p. 3). Thus with his personal or given name Siddhattha (Sanskrit: Siddhārtha), he is generally known as Siddhattha Gotama or Siddhārtha Gautama.[1] We find the Buddha addressing his father Suddhodana as Gotama, using the clan name (*Vin.* I, p. 82). As the term *gotta* *(gotra* q.v.) implies that its members are descended from one common ancestor,[2] the members of the Gotama clan are regarded as having descended from the ancient Vedic seer *(rsi)* Gautama and are accordingly known by the patronymic Gotamā (from Sanskrit Gautama).[3] They constituted one of the traditional *gottas (mūla-gotra)* of ancient India.

It appears that all the Sākiyas of Kapilavatthu belonged to the *Gotama-gotta* frequently mentioned in the Nikāyas (e.g. *S.* IV, p. 183). The Buddha addresses his Sākiyan relatives of Kapilavatthu as *"Gotamā"*. And as there also were Sākiyan settlements at places other than Kapilavatthu (e.g. Cātumā, Khomadussa, Sāmagāma etc.) it may be possible that while the Sākiyas of Kapilavatthu were of the *Gotama-gotta* these other Sākiyas belonged to different *gottas.*[4] Further, as the Gotamas were regarded as belonging to one of the higher *gottas (Vin.* IV, p. 6) there must have been other *gottas* within the Sākiya clan *(jāti)* which were either inferior to or of the same rank as the Gotamas.

However, a problem arises. The Vedic seer Gotama is regarded as belonging to the brahmin caste whereas the clan to which the Buddha belonged was of the Khattiya caste. Thus the contradictory situation of a Khattiya clan tracing its origin to a brahamin ancestor arises. Whether the Gotama clan of the Sākiyas had an original ancestor different from the Vedic seer is not clear, for several Gotamas are referred to as ancient teachers in the lists of teachers *(vamsa)*.[5] But an objection raised against this

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1. The author of ***Buddhavamsa*** seems to have overlooked this genealogical connection of the name when he merely says (as a future event) that the Buddha's father would be Suddhodana and the Buddha himself Gotama: *(pitā Suddhodano nāma – ayam hessti Gotamo: Buv.* p. 13, *v.* 65)
2. E. J. Thomas, *The Life of the Buddha,* London, 1931, p. 22
3. *Gotta* (Sanskrit: *gotra*) from *go* + root *trā* literally means cow-stall or herd, a group capable of protecting the cattle of a settlement. The latter sense seems more suited to its employment in later times denoting 'family' or 'class', where members claim to be all descended from one ancestor – cf. A. A. Madconall and A. B. Keith, *Vedic Index of Names and Subjects,* Varanasi, 1958, on GOTRA; *vide* s. v. GOTRA.
4. Except, at least, those of Devadaha, for the *Dulva* says (Rockhill, *Life of the Buddha,* p. 12) that the city of Devadaha was founded by the Sākiyas of Kapilavatthu when their numbers increased and that they were related to each other. This explains why the Buddha's step-mother Mahāpajāpati, who was a Sākiyan lady from Devadaha was called Gotamī.
5. A. A. Macdonell and A. B. Keith, op. cit. GAUTAMA

conjecture is that it would fail to explain the Buddha's epithet Aṅgīrasa,[6] derived from an ancient seer by this name, who, along with Gotama, is regarded as an ancestor of the Gotama clan. Here Gotama is regarded as a descendent of Aṅgīrasa, who being more a mythical than an historical character, has replaced the former as the founder of the *Gotra*.[7]

It should also be mentioned here that each of the noble families or rulers in ancient India seems to have had a *gotta*-name (e.g. Mallas as Vāseṭṭhas, Sākiyas as Gotamas, Koliyas as Byagghapajjas etc.).[8] The existence of such an ancestral name seems to have been accepted as a matter of course. What is not clear is how the Sākiyas of the Khattiya caste came to use a brahmanic *gotta* name. The most plausible explanation seems to be that these names were used as family names quite early in Indian society, and perhaps the *gotta*-names had no Brahmanic or Khattiya caste connotations in Ṛgvedic India when they were originally used. The distinction became apparent only when this historical fact was forgotten and the problem was looked at from the viewpoint of subsequent Indian society when the Khattiyas and the Brāhmaṇas had become two distinct *varṇas*.

A solution usually offered by some scholars[9] is that at the *pravara* ceremony invoking Agni, when the person making the offering is not a brahamin, the custom was to invoke the ancestors of the officiating priest. But, here too, to think that this custom led to the substitution of the priest's family name for the offerer's family name applicable to all his ancestors and descendants is too far fetched.[10]

Another explanation offered[11] is that the Aṅgīrasas, along with the Bhārgavas, were more closely allied to the Khattiya caste than to the Brāhmaṇa caste in virtue of their close associations with the *Atharvaveda* which provided the needs of the ruling class (i.e. Khattiyas) as against the other *Vedas*. Accordingly, the Gotamas, with their possible identity with the Aṅgīrasas, had become a Khattiya clan by the time of the Buddha.

Meanwhile, the Buddhist commentators have resolved these difficulties in their own way by disregarding the Vedic connection of the two seers Aṅgīrasa and Gotama. The name Aṅgīrasa, hey have explained in different ways as meaning "emitting rays of various hues from the body" (*DA*. III, p. 963) or as "being possessed of attainments such as virtue" or that it was a personal name given by the Buddha's father in addition to Siddhattha (*ThagA*. II, p. 226). In the case of the name Gotama they have invented a legend according to which Okkāka, the immediate ancestor of the Sākiyas, to which clan the Gotamas belonged, was born of an egg formed from the coagulated blood and semen of an ascetic Gotama as he lay impaled for the alleged murder of a courtesan. The egg was hatched by the heat of the sun.[12]

This legend also seems to explain in the same mythical manner the claim of the Sākiyas, and hence the Gotamas, as belonging to the solar dynasty *(sūryavaṃsa)* when it says that the egg was hatched by the Sun. According to the accepted Indian tradition, Okkaka or Ikṣvāku, was a descendant of Vaivasvata Manu, the son of the Sun. When the Buddha said that he belonged to the solar dynasty[13] *(ādicco nāma gottena; Sn. v.* 423; cf. *Mhvu.* III, p. 199), what he meant was that he, as a member of the Sākiya clan, belonged to the solar race of kings, beginning from Mahāsammata, as come down in the Buddhist tradition.

A. G. S. Kariyawasam

GOTAMAKACETIYA, a pre-Buddhist shrine near and to the south of Vesāli (*D*. III, p. 9), dedicated to a yakkha named Gotamaka. This cetiya or shrine is mentioned by the Buddha, in a sermon to Ānanda, at the Cāpālacetiya in Vesāli as one of the six very beautiful spots around the city of Vesāli (*D*. II, 102). Later a vihāra was built in its precincts for the Buddha and his disciples. During the first few years of his ministry the Buddha visited this place and stayed there on several occasions and on one such visit he laid down the Vinaya rule which allowed monks the use of three robes, for, the Buddha himself experienced the bitter cold that night and had to cover himself in several robes. (*Vin*. I, p. 288).

Two suttas, namely (1) *Gotamaka Sutta (A*. I, p. 276) and (2) *Hemavata Sutta (SnA*. I, p. 199) are mentioned as

6. E. J. Thomas, op. cit. pp. 22-3
7. R. Fick, GOTRA, ERE, vol. 6, p. 353
8. H. Oldenberg, *Buddha*, Delhi, 1971, p. 414
9. E. J. Thomas, op. cit. p. 22; Oldenberg, op. cit. p. 415
10. See also Oldenberg, op. cit. p. 415
11. R. Fick, op. cit. pp. 355-6
12. DPPN. I, 787; E. J. Thomas, op. cit. p. 5
13. In this connection compare the Buddha's epithet *ādicca-bandhu* — kinsman of the Sun.

being preached by the Buddha while he was staying at this shrine. The *Divyāvadāna* (p. 201) mentions a Gautama-nyagrodha in a list of noted places in Vesāli and Malalasekera (*DPPN.* s.v.) opines that the reference is to the Gotamakacetiya.

W. G. Weeraratne

GOTRA (Pali, *gotta*). **Original significance of the term.** There is no English term that exactly connotes the meaning of the term *gotra.* Writers in English, therefore, use such words as clan, ancestry, lineage and family in rendering it into English. It should be noted at the outset that the institution of *gotra* is quite different from the institution of caste (q.v.) which is a much wider social group and which invariably consists of a number of *gotras.*

The term *gotra* is derived from the word *go* (=cattle) and the root *trā,* to 'protect'. Yet, how it acquired the meaning it connotes at present is not quite clear. Most probably it originally meant a group large enough to protect the cattle ownsed by a *viś* (a settlement) or number of families.[1] Cattle were the most treasured property of the Vedic Indians, and therefore, they did their best to protect them from wild animals, thieves and other dangers. Usually the cattle were driven out for grazing in the morning and driven back to their shelters in the evening. Whether there were specially built shelters or enclosures meant solely for the protection of cattle is doubtful. As the number of cattle owned by the people seems to have been quite large it seems reasonable to hold that a sizeable force was required to guard them from rival clans bent on cattle raids *(gaviṣṭi).*

It is believed that the Vedic Indians built their houses with maximum security in view, and that a number of these houses formed a village. The village was an enclosed settlement fenced from outside providing protection against wild animals and enemies. It is probable that the cattle, too, lived within this enclosure from which they were driven out in the morning for grazing. In the evening they were driven back,[2] and once they entered the enclosure the entrance to it was closed. During the nights this fenced settlement provided protection for both, the people and the cattle. Though most of the minor items of property may have been divided among individual families cattle were owned by them jointly. This joint right over the cattle was a binding force within the settlement. Subsequently, the community that lived as a cohesive unit to protect their jointly owned cattle too, came to be denoted by the term *gotra.* The term is used in this developed meaning in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (iv, 4, 1). Later this term was used to denote a group of persons descended in the male line of a common ancestor who was often regarded as a holy sage *(ṛṣi).*

There are eight sages who are regarded as originators of *gotras (gotrakārin).* They are, Gautama, Bharadvāja, Viśvāmitra, Vaśiṣṭha, Jamadagni, Kāśyapa, Atri and Agastya. The eight *gotras* originating from these sages are sub-divided, generally, into forty-nine. But this number is not fixed. The numbers vary according to divergent traditions. Some think that there are twenty-four or thirty-two *gotras (Śabdakalpadruma,* s.v. *gotra)* whereas some others favour the number eighteen (Chentsal Rao, *The Principles of Pravara and Gotra,* pt. III). However, it is clear that the main eight *gotras* were later sub-divided into quite a large number of *gotras.*

Every brahman was proud of his *gotra* and was obliged by law to know to which particular *gotra* his family belonged. When consecrating the sacrificial fire *(agni-havyavāhana),* which is also addressed as *ārṣeya* (descendent of the *ṛsi.*) a brahman had to invoke his ancestors and show that he being a descendant of worthy ancestors was fit to perform sacred rites. This invocation was called *pravara.* Each of the *gotras* had either one, two, three or five sages as its ancestors. As a general rule, persons were called *sagotras* (of the same *gotra*) if they had in common even one of the ṛsis invoked in the *pravara.* intermarriage between *sagotras* was prohibited. But it is not quite certain whether this rule existed in the early Vedic period. However, in comparatively early times it was felt necessary to grant exemptions.

Even during the time of the Buddha the term *gotra* had the same meaning as it was understood by the later compliers of *Dharmaśastras.* The institution of *gotra,* too, existed though it may not have been as developed as it was in later times. A number of *gotras* (Pali *gotta)* such as Opamañña, Kaṇhāyana, Kassapa, Gotama, Vāseṭṭha, Vessāyana, Bhāradvāja, Kaccāyana, and others, are mentioned in Buddhist texts.[3] A large section of the Buddha's disciples, too, came from distinguished *gottas.* Buddhist texts speak of superior and inferior *gottas.* They place Vāseṭṭha, Gotama, Moggallāna and Kaccāyana in the former category, and Bhāradvāja along with Kosiya in the latter (see *Vin.* IV, 6; *DA.* I, p. 246; but cp. *DA.* III, p. 860).

The stage of development which the institution of *gotta* had reached by the time of the Buddha is not quite clear

1. *Rgveda* viii, 50, 10
2. *Ṛgveda* iv, 54, 7, 10
3. See *DPPN.* I and II under each name. See also *D.* I, p. 104

from the references found in Buddhist texts. Therefore it is not possible to say for certainty, whether such rules as those which prohibited intermarriage between *sagotras* were in force at the time. It is not known whether the Sakya clan, which is one of the major clans referred to in Buddhist texts to which also the Buddha belonged, was sub-divided into a number of *gottas.* Thomas seems to suggest that the whole clan belonged to the Gotama *gotta* whose members claim to be the descendants of the *ṛṣi* Gotama.[4] This view finds support in the fact that the Buddha, at least on one occasion, is said to have addressed the Sakyans as Gotamas (*S.* IV. p. 183). If all the Sakyans were of Gotama *gotta* it is quite evident that the rule which prohibited intermarriage between two persons of the same *gotta* was either non-existent at the time or if it existed, it was not strictly observed. Besides, king Suddhodana married two Sakyan princesses Māyā and Mahā-Prajāpati Gotami[5] and prince Siddhattha himself married the daughter of his maternal uncle.[6]

It is evident from Buddhist texts that even during the Buddha's day people took pride in their *gotta.* Very often brahmans approached the Buddha and inquired about his *gotta.* It was customary to address persons by their *gotta* names and this seems to have been considered as a very respectful way of addressing people of high rank. The Buddha too, followed this custom (*M.* I, p. 175, pp. 228-50, 497-500; *M.* II, p. 40; see also *Dial.* vol. II, pt. I, pp. 194f.). Even the Buddha himself was addressed by his *gotta* name Gotama.

Though the Buddha followed the custom of addressing people by their *gotta* names, it is quite clear from the canonical texts that he did not attach any value to the institution of *gotta* as the brahmans of his time did. Just as he denounced caste distinctions, he denounced *gotta* distinctions, too. The attitude he adopted with regard to problems connected with caste, *gotta* and such other social groupings is made clear in the *Ambaṭṭha Sutta.* There he says that it is where the talk is of marrying or giving in marriage, that reference is made to such things as caste *(vaṇṇa)* and *gotta.* In the supreme perfection of wisdom and in righteousness *(anuttarāya vijjā-carana sampadāya)* there is no reference to the question either of caste or *gotta* for, whosoever are in bondage to the notion of caste and birth or to the pride of social position or of connection by marriage, they are far from the best wisdom and righteousness. It is by getting rid of all such kinds of bondage that one can realise for oneself that supreme perfection in wisdom and in conduct (*D.* I, p. 99f.). In the *Suttanipāta (v.* 104) pride of **gotta** *(gottat-thaddha)* is given as a cause for one's downfall. The Buddha's view was that the problem of *gotta* was a problem only to the worldings. This does not affect those who are above worldly affairs. When questioned regarding *gotta* the Buddha replied that he is neither a brahman nor a prince, not even a merchant *(vessayāna)* or anybody else. But, he said, knowing well the *gottas* of the worldlings *(puthujjana)* he wanders the world with no stains *(akiñcano:* see *Sn. v.* 455 cf. *v.* 645). The Buddha's attitude towards the problem of *gotta* is plainly stated in the *Suttanipāta* (*v.* 648) where it is said that the *gottas* are mere designations *(sāmañña)* passed by general consent. (see also CASTE).

Special Buddhist usage of the term: The term *gotra* which denotes a group of persons descended from a common ancestor, was later adopted by the Theravādins as a religious term with a technical meaning. Though the term by itself is not found in Pali texts it occurs in the conjoined term *gotra-bhū,* (q.v.) which denotes the stage between the ordinary unconverted worldling *(puthujjana)* and the stream-entrant *(sotāpanna). The gotra-bhū* is described as one, whether layman or bhikkhu, who, as converted, no longer belonged to the worldling but was among the ariyas, having Nibbāna as his aim (s.v. *PED.*). Why this particular Sanskrit term was adopted to designate this category of spiritually advanced persons is not quite clear. On this point Har Dayal's suggestion is quite noteworthy. He is of opinion that, as all Buddhists were considered as belonging to the family or clan of Gautama Buddha, as they were his spiritual sons and heirs, the Theravādins adopted this term to endow all converts, irrespective of caste differences, with a common *gotra.* Thus, all those who passed the stage of *puthujjana* by being converted to Buddhism were considered as belonging to the lineage of the Buddha, for, once they became converted they develop a spiritual relationship with the Buddha. This is specially evident in the case of bhikkhūs who are often addressed as *Buddha-putta* (sons of the Buddha) or *Sakya-putta* (sons of the Sakya).

To become one in the lineage of the Buddha one had to undergo a course of spiritual training and acquire certain virtues. This induced them to develop a predisposition, an aptitude or an inclination for further spiritual advancement. Subsequently the term *gotra* was used to denote this idea of pre-disposition, aptitude or inclination.

Among the converts there were persons of different inclinations. The Mahāyānists categorised them broadly into three groups namely *niyata-gotra, aniyata-gotra* and *agotra.*

4. E. J. Thomas: *The Life of Buddha as Legend and History,* p. 22
5. Her name too suggests that she belonged to the Gotama *gotta.*
6. Later, even when the institution of *gotra* was much developed and the rule prohibiting marriage between *sagotras* was observed more rigidly, the *Baudhāyana-dharma-sūtra* (ed. E. Hultzsch, p. 2) allows a man to marry the daughter of the maternal uncle or paternal aunt.

The *niyata-gotras* or those who are of fixed inclination are those who by virtue of their previous merits and innate dispositions are destined to belong to either the *śrāvakayāna-abhisamaya-gotra* or *pratyekabuddhayāna-abhisamaya-gotra* or *tathāgatayāna-abhisamaya-gotra*. The *aniyata-gotras* or those of undetermined inclination are those who are still on the borderline and may become either Hīnayānists or Mahāyānists. The *agotras* or those without an inclination are sub-divided into two groups viz. those who are unable to attain *nirvāna* at all *(atyantam)* and those who for the time being *(tatkāla)* will not attain *nirvāna*.

It is further said that among the *niyata-gotras* it is the qualities *(dhātu)* that settle one's aspiration *(adhimukti)* and it is the aspiration that determines the attainments *(prāpti)*. The frution becomes high, medium or low according to one's *bija* (seeds). It is said that the *śrāvakas*, as they lack the five powers *(bala)* and five confidences in oneself *(vaiśaradya)* do not possess powerful merit, and therefore, they are inferior to bodhisattvas. Their merits are not everlasting as they seek *anupadhi-śesa-nirvāna* *(nirvāna* without any residue). Neither are their merits capable of producing extremely good results, for, they do not dedicate themselves to the service of others.

The *Lankāvatāra Sūtra* (p. 63f.) also speaks of five *gotras* which it collectively refers to as *pañcābhisamaya-gotra*. The five *gotras* referred to here are the same as those mentioned in the *Sūtrālankāra*. Here, instead of using the term *niyata-gotra*, the three *gotras* included in it are treated separately.

The persons who fall into the *śrāvakayāna-abhisamaya-gotra* are described as those who are enraptured by knowing and realising the teaching of the general and individual qualities of the generic properties of the body *(skandha-dhātu-āyatana-svasāmānya-laksana)*; their intellect *(buddhi)* will leap forth with joy in knowing that things are of mere appearance *(laksana-paricaya-jñāna)*, and not on acquiring an insight into the things pertaining to the casual law *(pratītyasamutpāda-avinirbhāga laksana-paricaya)*. They having had an insight into their own *śrāvakayāna* and abiding in the fifth or the sixth stage become free from all forthcoming afflictions *(pratyutthāna-kleśa)*. Having reached an inconceivable mode of passing away *(acintyacyutigata)* they proclaim that they have led holy lives and that they have destroyed birth. Through the realization of the essencelessness of being *(pudgalanairātmya)* they finally gain the knowledge of *nirvāna*. There are others who believe in such things as ego *(ātma)*, being *(sattva)* vital principle *(jīva)*, nourishment *(posa)*, supreme being *(purusa)* and personal soul *(pudgala-sattva)* and seek *nirvāna* in them. There are still others who believe that all things are dependent upon causes *(kāranādhīnān sarva-dharmān)* and seek the way to *nirvāna* in this belief. Yet, the *Lankāvatāra Sūtra* adds, as they lack insight into the essencelessness of all things *(dharma-nairātmya)* they do not really attain emancipation. It is here that those who are inclined to follow the *śrāvakayāna* make the mistake of regarding non-deliverance as deliverance.

Those who belong to the *pratyekabuddhayāna-abhisamaya-gotra* are enraptured by hearing the accounts regarding the enlightenment of particular individuals *(pratyekābhisamaya)*. They are also enraptured by miracles and by discourses which teach them to keep themselves aloof.

The *Tathāgatayāna-abhisamaya-gotra* is threefold. Firstly it includes those who are inclined to realise that the true nature of things is their essencelessness *(svabhāvanihsvabhāva-dharma-abhisamaya-gotra)*. Secondly, those who are inclined to understand that the realisation of the truth is possible only whithin one's own-self *(adhigama-svapratyātma-ārya-abhisamaya-gotra)*. Thirdly, those who are inclined to realise the greatness of all the external Buddha-fields *(bāhya-buddhaksetraudārya-abhisamaya-gotra)*.

If a person shows no signs of fear when any of the three above mentioned aspects are disclosed or when the inconceivable realm of the *ālaya-vijñāna*, where body, property and abode are seen to be the manifestation of the mind itself *(svacitta-drśya-dehālayabhogapratisthācintyavisaya)*, is disclosed such a person should be regarded as belonging to the *tathāgatayāna-abhisamaya-gotra*.

Those who belong to the *aniyata-gotra* may take to any one of the above mentioned three gotras namely *śrāvaka-°*, *pratyekabuddha-°* or *tathāgata-°*. It is merely a preparatory stage *(parikarma-bhūmi)*. A *śrāvaka* when his *ālaya-vijñāna* is purged of all *kleśas* and *vāsanās* will attain the bliss of meditation by seeing the essencelessness of all things and will finally attain the state of a Buddha.

The *Lankāvatāra* does not describe those persons who fall into the category of *agotra*.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. *ERE*. VI, pp. 353 ff.; J. H. Hutton, *Caste in India;* Max Müller *History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature* pp. 380 ff. See also the *Ambattha Sutta (D.* I, 87 ff.) and the *Aggañña Sutta (D.* III, 80 ff.).

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GOTRA-BHŪ, 'become of the lineage,' a pre-*sotāpanna* stage in the scheme of the spiritual progress of the Theravādins. As a technical term this was used from the

end of the Nikāya period to designate one, whether a layman or a bhikkhu, who, as converted, was no longer of the worldlings *(puthujjana)* but among the noble ones *(ariya)*. The term occurs also in the *Dakkhināvibhanga Sutta* of the *Majjhima-nikāya* (III, p. 256) and in two other suttas of the *Anguttara-nikāya* (IV, p. 373; V, p. 23; see *PED*. s.v.).

A worldling *(puthujjana)*, by cultivating noble qualities, becomes a *gotra-bhū* and thus qualifies to rise still higher in the scheme of spiritual progress that leads to Nibbāna *(Pug.* pp. 12f.). The *Anguttara-nikaya* (IV, p. 373) includes the *gotra-bhū* among the nine persons worthy of salutation and who are an unsurpassed field of merit. The commentary, too, describes the *gotra-bhū* as one endowed with exceedingly perfect insight and thought, with immediate prospects of attaining the stage of stream-winner and the way (*AA*. IV, p. 107; but cp. *A.* IV, p. 292 and *Pug.* p. 14 which do not consider the *gotra-bhū* as belonging to the *ariya*).

The *Patisambhidāmagga* (I, pp. 66 ff.) considers it not only as a pre-sotāpanna stage but also as indicating a class of beings who are on the way to arahantship and who may be in possession of one of the paths *(magga)* and fruits *(phala)*. The *Visuddhimagga (Vism.* p. 672) describes it as a stage to be reached after maturing in the stage called 'purity by knowledge and vision of the path' *(patipadā-ñānadassana-visuddhi)*. It further says that the *gotra-bhū* is only able to have Nibbāna as the object but he is unable to dispel the darkness that conceals the truth. This darkness is to be dispelled by the three kinds of adaptation-consciousness *(anuloma-citta)*. In the *Compendium of Philosophy* (pp. 66 ff.) this stage is described as implying an evolution which transcends the conditioned and has for its objects Nibbāna. This stage is follwed by a single moment of path-consciousness by which the first of the Four Noble Truths is discerned, error and doubt got rid of, Nibbāna intuited and the constituents of the Noble Eightfold Path are cultivated. See also GOTRA.

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GOTRA BHŪMI a stage in the spiritual lineage, the second of the seven (sometimes 8 or 10) stages of spiritual development of a Buddha's disciple *(śrāvakabhūmi: Mahāvyutpatti,* BB. XIII, p. 18). The other six, as given in the *Mahāvyutpatti,* are *śuklavidarśanā, astamaka, darśana, tanu, vītarāga* and *krtāvin.* As they refer to the spiritual progress of a disciple *(śrāvaka)* and not of a bodhisattva, they are the *bhūmis* according to Hinayāna, although they are not mentioned in the Pali texts. The list (of 7) occurs at *Śsp.* pp. 1562-3 where in a negative description of Mahāyāna, which is compared to the open space *(ākāśa)*, it is said that just as these *bhūmis* are not found in the *ākāśa*, so are they not found in Mahāyāna either.

If a comparison is made between these stages of the *śrāvaka's* path in Hinayāna with the other stages of *srotāpatti, sakrdāgāmi, anāgāmi,* and *arhatva,* the *gotra-bhūmi* being the stage next to the first *śuklavidarśanā-bhūmi,* also belongs to the pre-*srotapātti* stage, when the disciple is about to enter the path of sainthood. *(Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism and its relation to the Hīnayāna,* N. Dutt, p. 241). According to E. Obermiller *(The Doctrine of Prajñāpāramitā,* p. 49) the *gotra-bhūmi* is so called because the disciple abiding in this stage knows that he belongs to the spiritual lineage *(gotra)* of the *śrāvaka.*

However, it is of interest that at *Śsp.* pp. 1472-3 and 1520 these seven *bhūmis,* with the addition of *pratyeka-buddha-bhūmi, bodhi sattva-bhūmi* and *buddha-bhūmi,* are given as the ten *bhūmis* of a bodhisattva, whereas the usual list of *bodhisattvabhūmis* is quite different from this one. This grouping may be due to the fact that all the four Hīnayānic stages of development (i.e. *srotāpatti* etc.) are regarded (by the Mahāyānists) as covering only some of the Mahāyānic stages, whereas the Mahāyānists, aspiring for Buddhahood , go much further for their emancipation than the last stage *(arhatva)* of the Hinayānists. On this basis it is not strange that the seven Hīnayānic stages are expanded into ten by the addition of the three other *bhūmis* and are called *bodhisattvabhūmi* in the *Śatasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā* (loc. cit.). See also GOTRA-BHŪ.

A. G. S. Kariyawasam

GOTRA-VIHĀRA, pre-bhūmi stage almost parallel to the *gotra-bhū* (q.v.) stage of the Theravāda scheme of spiritual progress. The *Bbh.* (see ch. entitled *Vihāra-patala)* divides the pre-bhūmi stage called *Prakrticaryā* into two stages namely *gotra-vihāra* and *adhimukticaryā vihāra.* It is said that a *gotrastha,* i.e., one who is established in the noble lineage, is endowed with noble qualities and high aims which are characteristic features of a bodhisattva. As the *gotra-vihāra* is merely a preparatory stage it only indicates the attempts made by an aspirant to develop the thought of enlightenment *(bodhi-citta q.v.)*. A person who has reached this stage commences to do good deeds of his own accord and he does so wisely and with a feeling of charity. This stage forms the foundation of the other stages *(vihāra),* for, it enables an aspirant to quality for further spiritual progress.

S. K. Nanayakkara

GRATITUDE *(kataññutā, kataveditā)* is considered a noble virtue in Buddhism. In the *Mahāmangala Sutta (Sn. v.* 265) it is described as a very auspicious characteristic *(mangala)*. The commentary says that this is considered a noble attitude on account of several factors, one of them being that virtuous men *(sappurisā)* praise it *(KhpA.* p. 147). The same source defines gratitude as acknowledging or remembering constantly a good turn, whether it be great or small, done to one by another. The Buddha has spoken of this virtue in many a place. He has described it as a characteristic of a good man *(sappurisa)*; and the absence of the same virtue as a characteristic of a bad man *(asappurisa: A.* I, p. 61). Ingratitude *(akataññutā)* is enumerated as one of several mental phenomena that has to be dispelled in order to develop trances *(jhāna: A.* III, p. 273). Ingratitude is also explained as an evil tendency in men that causes them to be reborn in hell after death (*A.* II, p. 226).

All men are not grateful by nature. In the *Anguttaranikāya* (I, p. 87) the Buddha declared two individuals who are very rare in the world, the man who volunteers to help others in need *(pubbakāri)* and the man who is grateful *(kataññū, katavedi)*. In two jātakas women are described as generally ungrateful (*J.* III, p. 474; *J.* IV, p. 124). Once the Buddha admonished some monks to discipline themselves to be grateful, saying that some monks, who call themselves the followers of the son of the Sākyans *(Sākyaputtiyā samaṇā)* do not have in them even that amount of gratitude shown by some jakals.

By example the Buddha taught the importance of this social virute. Immediately after attaining enlightenment he showed his gratitude to the bodhi-tree, for the shelter it provided him when attaining enlightenment. As a sign of gratitude, it is said, that he kept on looking at this tree, with unblinking eyes, for a full week (*J.* I, pp. 77-8). Then having decided to preach the Dhamma, being entreated by Brahmā Sahampati to do so, he wanted to preach it, first to Ālārakālāma and then to Uddakarāmaputta, under whom he studied for some time during his quest for enlightenment, but soon he realised that both of them had died a few days earlier. Then he thought of the five ascetics, as they had rendered him great service while he was practising austerities. (*Vin.* I, pp. 7-8).

The *Cullasetthi Jātaka (J.* I, p. 22) records how a man named Cullantevāsika, who became fabulously rich by overhearing a statement made by Cullasetthi, showed his gratitude to the latter. Cullasetthi while touring the city saw a dead mouse in the street and said: "an intelligent man can make a fortune even with this dead mouse." Cullantevāsika heard this statement, and took the mouse with him, and before long he could dispose of it for an insignificant coin. With that coin he procured some honey and sold it with a profit. In this way he made a great fortune before long, and one day he took several thousand pieces of gold to Cullasetthi and offered it to him as a mark of gratitude.

The story of the Sinhalese king Śrī Sanghabodhi, too is another inspiring instance to show how greatly this virtue is valued by Buddhists. Śrī Sanghabodhi was a very pious king loved by his subjects. After two years of becoming king, he abdicated the throne in favour of his younger brother Gothābhaya and withdrew into a forest to become an ascetic. The new king was suspicious about his sage-brother, and he thought that some day he would return and take back the kingdom. So, as soon as he was duly anointed, Gothābhaya issued a proclamation to the effect that whosover produced the head of the sage Śrī Sanghabodhi, would be rewarded with a thousand pieces of gold.

Several people set out in search of Śrī Sanghabodhi to kill him in order to procure the reward. One of them, while searching for his whereabouts in a dense forest, saw the sage meditating at the foot of a tree. The man did not recognise that it was Śrī Sanghabodhi himself, and going to the sage saluted him and sat at a respectful distance. The sage talked very kindly to him and gave him spiritual advice. The man was much pleased and offered the sage half of the meal he had brought with him. After the meal, the sage inquired from the man as to what he was searching for in that forest, and when the man told the sage that he was searching for Śrī Sanghabodhi to take his head to Gothābhaya to procure a reward, the sage revealed his identity and volunteered to allow the man to kill him and take the head away as a token of gratitude for the meal he had offered. When the traveller realised that the sage was none other than Śrī Sanghabodhi himself, he pleaded for forgiveness, but Śrī Sanghabodhi himself severed his own head and handed it over to the man (See *Hatthavanagallavihāravamsa*).

Gratitude is considered an important virtue for the preservation of peace and good-will in society. People who are in a position to help others in some way are expected to volunteer to do that service *(pubbakāri: A.* I, p. 87), and those who benefit by that service should be grateful in return *(katavedi)*. Mutual trust, friendship and good-will can prevail only in this manner. In the absence of these virutes no society can progress.

W. G. Weeraratne

GREED. See LOBHA, TAṆHĀ.

GRIEF. See DOMANASSA.

GUARDIAN DEITIES. The concept of guardian deities could be found in any developed religious system, especially in its popular aspects. Even before the major religions were founded it is seen how people believed in spirits and deities as inhabiting the different aspects of natural phenomena as evidenced, for instance, from the *ñat*-worship of the Burmese. In addition to this kind of belief in spirits there was also the practice of deifying natural phenomena (e.g. rain, wind, dawn etc.) and then propitiating them as deities. The best example for this religious practice is the *Ṛgveda* of the Indians (see also DEIFICATION; GODS).

In Buddhism, too, the belief exists, but the role of such deities is peripheral as they play no part in the Buddhist scheme of salvation. A general belief among the Buddhists is that all deities who are of Right Views *(sammā-diṭṭhi)* are guardians and followers of the law (dhamma). In addition there is also a general belief that there are other spirits *(bhūta)* such as *yakkhas, nāgas* etc. who also act as guardians Thus the *Suttanipāta (v.* 223) refers to this belief when such spirits are requested to grant protection to the humans. The main responsibility of these deities is to guard and protect all that is connected with the Buddha and his teaching. These include not only virtuous individuals who live according to the Dhamma, but also religious establishments, scriptures, places of worship ect. In reciprocity for the protection given, the people too are excepted to fulfil certain obligations towards these deities by transference of merit *(pattidāna, anumodanā,* q. v.) making offerings and so on. Sometimes these guarding spirits, especially those of lower grades, create problems for men unless offerings are made to them and are properly propitiated. Therefore, it is customary to propitiate them and appeal for their help and protection at the beginning of any important undertaking.

Guardian deities in Buddhism can be divided into two categories as higher and lower or superior and inferior. Those like the four Lokapālas, eight Dharmapālas, and Sakka could be classed as higher divinities as they are not confined to any country or area, while other deities confined to different countries and areas may be called inferior or minor divinities.

Another possible division that deserves our attention is that pertaining to peaceful and fierce deities. While deities like the Lokapālas or Sakka are not represented as fierce deities, there are others like the eight Dharmapālas who are represented in fearful aspect, specially in Tibet and Japan. This is attributed to the task of protection entrusted to them, for it is their duties that make them appear fierce. Another explanation, which is a philosophical one, is that while the peaceful deities depict the benevolent aspect of existence, the fearful ones depict the malevolent aspect. Thus these two types of deities depict the two major aspects of existence.

In Burma, where the animistic kind of spirit-worship in the form of the worship of *ñats* is an important feature of the religion in practice, the belief in guardian deities is also connected with this *ñat*-worship. Even the Buddhist monasteries are regarded as being protected by the *ñats,* and the spirit-shrines *(ñat-kun: ñatsin)* are constructed close to the pagodas. The Buddhist monks themselves take part in rites connected with *ñat*-worship. While every village has a *ñatsin* for the guardian *ñats* of the neighbourhood, feasts are held regularly in their honour.

Thus, according to Burmese belief the guardian spirits are also capable of doing great harm, unless they are propitiated. Thus they occupy a place midway between the benevolent and the malignant spirits. Among the infinite variety of *ñats* mention may be made of those presiding over the days of the week. Thus the *ñat* of the day on which a person is born demands special propitiation. The house-guardians are called *eing-saung-ñat.* It is said that the Burmese grind into powder the bones of respected relations who have been cremated, mix it with wood-oil *(thissū)* and make images of Buddha *(thayō)* out of it. They pray to these images as house-guardians.

The belief in guardian deities is widely prevalent in China too. The Chinese term *Weito,* equivalent to the Sanskrit term *Veda,* is used to designate the guardians of Buddhist monasteries *(vihārapāla).* This name shows that his origin is Indian. His image is said to be placed behind that of Maitreya, the future Buddha. He is accompanied and assisted by a tutelary deity Chia-lan. He is treated as defender of the Buddha's Law as well as of monasteries. He is mentioned as the general-in-chief under the four Lokapālas, whose armies he commands. He is regularly invoked by the Chinese Buddhists for monastic supplies, and as protector of monasteries he is represented as being clad in complete armour holding a defensive weapon, especially a sword. He stands facing inward, opposite the principal sanctuary. Sometimes his image is said to be placed in small shrines at turning points of long roads, to protect pilgrims from evil influences. Referred to in Chinese works as a *deva (t'ien shēn)* he is worshipped as a heavenly protector, and in the 7th century A.C. his statues became a common feature in Buddhist monasteries. As a tutelary deity he generally accompanies Kuan Yin (Avalokiteśvara). Iconographically he is represented in three different forms: Standing, with one hand resting on the pearl which adorns the handle of his club, while the other is lifted in prayer or rests on his hip. Also standing, with both hands lifted in prayer, the club lying across his elbows. Sitting, with one hand on the club and the other resting on his knee.[1]

In the Fa Yü Ssu on the island of Pu To where Kuan Yin is worshipped as the chief deity, the idea of *Weito* as guardian deity has been carried out to its full extent. In

1. J. Prip. Möller, *Chinese Buddhist Monasteries,* Hong Kong, 1967, p. 17

certain Chinese Buddhist sūtras in which Śākyamuni's picture is found on the first page, the picture of *Weito* is to be found at the end of the volume. He began to be particularly popular in China since the 7th century A.C. Sometimes he is represented as the guardian of monasteries along with Vaiśravaṇa.

Another group of guardians of Buddhist monasteries in China are the *Chin-lan* comprising some of the higher Chinese deities such as the God of War, four Lokapālas, *Weito* etc. They are generally placed in the outer hall or near the front entrance of a temple. Their duties are those of gatekeepers *(dvārapāla)*. Represented with a third eye on the forhead they either stand or sit. There is a story of an historical person being made into one of them. Another deity regarded as the guardian of the gate of heaven is *Li Ching,* who is also called *T'ot'a Li* or the pagoda-bearer as he is represented as holding a miniature pagoda. He is said to be found in nearly all Buddhist temples.

Yet another class of Chinese guardian deities are the door-gods or the guardians of doors called *Shen tu* or *Shen shu yü lü* or *Mēn Shēn.*[2]

In China, the two legendary generals Heng and Ha, also constitute an important pair of *dvārapāla*. The two names are of non-Buddhist origin and are connected with two generals who lived at the beginning of the *Chou* dynasty and fought each other with flames and poisonous gas streaming from the mouth of one and the nostrils of the other. These two generals were later canonised and conferred with the task of guarding the gates of Buddhist temples. There is another story which says that two half brothers Mi-chi and Chi-kang, vowed to protect 10,000 Buddhas of the present and help them propagate the doctrine. These two parts of the names put together give the Sanskrit name Guhyavajra.

When iconographically represented Mi-chi is placed to the left of the entering visitor in the place of the present Ha, with his mouth open and Chi kang to the right occupying the place of the present Heng, with his mouth shut. Both are portrayed as almost naked giants and are usually armed with clubs. They are found as early as the 5th century A.C. in the sculpture of the Yung Kang grottoes in Shansi and at numerous places in north China, dating from the succeeding centuries.

There are also early examples of yet other kinds of Buddhist guardian deities in China. At each side of the entrance to a cave at Pao Shan in Honon and dating from 589 A.C. is carved a bearded warrior. On the left and right are the two "spiritual kings" Nārāyaṇa and **Kapila** respectively, both of whom are associated with China as guardians of Buddhist sancturaries. They both have swords and tridents while Kapila wears a body armour as well. In a cave at T'ien Lung Shan there are two *vajra* gods on the outside, while in the inside on either side of the door and back to back with the two outside figures are two celestial warriors armed with tridents. During the T'ang dynasty one sees the development of the Dvārapāla from a more placid type to a more ferocious type and parctically nude representations supersede the dressed or armoured ones.

Another group of 24 deities called Chu T'ien are regarded as tutelary deities who, as patrons of China and supporters of the Buddha, protect the Buddha's teaching in that country. Even the Chinese teachers like Confucius are included among these.

As regards the mountain gods, who also function as guardian deities, the following words may be quoted: "There are a million gods of the mountains, for every mountain, hill, peak, knoll and headland has its presiding divinity; the greatest among these being the north, south, east, west and central peaks. The first mountain god was seen in the days of the Emperor Yao when the prime minister Pi Ling separated the peaks of the Ssuch'uan province and met the god of the mountain" (Kenneth W. Morgan, *The Path of the Buddha,* NY. 1956, p. 228). And it may be mentioned that in China the mountains P'u-to, Wu-tai, Chin-hua and Omen have been dedicated to the Bodhisattvas Avalokiteśvara, Mañjuśri, Kṣitigarbha and Samantabhadra respectively.

The Buddhist monasteries in Japan too are provided with guardian kings called *Nio* and the four ***Lokapālas*** (Jap. *Shintennō)* are represented at Hōryuji. These *Nio* are derived from the door-keeper *(dvārapāla)* idea of India and are thus expected to guard the holy place against all evil spirits. These guardian deities are also called *Knongo-rikisi* or strong men holding the *vajra* (Sk. *Vajravīra).* When paired as guarding the entrance to a monastery on either side of the door they are called *Nio.* The name *Knongo-rikisi* can refer to one or both of them. They are described as demi-gods serving as the guardians of a Buddhist precinct, half-naked and each holding a *vajra* club, one with his mouth closed symbolising latent might and the other with his mouth wide open symbolizing the exhaled power.[3] Alice Getty records that the *Nio,* when conceived singly, is regarded as the guardian of the Buddhist scriptures. As a pair they are believed to reside on the mountain Sumeru manifesting themselves whenever worshipped with proper ceremonies.

2. The Trantric Buddhist work *Niṣpannayogāvalī* too mentions four such goddesses representing the door-lock *(tālikā)* the key *(kuñci),* door-plank *(kapāṭā)* and the door-curtain *(paṭadhāriṇī)*
3. *Pageant of Japanese Art* (Sculpture) p. 197

Among the earliest and the finest of the hollow dry lacquer statues in Japan are the *Hachi-bushu* or eight classes of supernatural beings guarding the Buddha or the Eight Guardians of Śākyamuni. These are *ten (deva), ryu (nāga), yasha (yakṣa), kandabha (gandharva), ashura (asura), karura (garuḍa), kinnara* and *magoraka (mahoraga).* A typical example of these in Japanese sculpture is the one in the Kofukuji in Nara, believed to have been made in the 8th century. Loveliest of them is the famous *ashura (asura),* the demon king of Hindu mythology, who after his coversion, became one of the eight guardians of the Buddha.

Another group of Buddhist guardian deities in Japan are the Twelve Heavenly Generals or Juni Shinsho, who are usually grouped in a circle around the Yakushi Buddha (Bhaiṣajyaguru). The twelve generals, as armoured warriors guarding his twelve vows, are said to have promised to protect all faithful readers of the *Bhaiṣajyaguru Sūtra* and the devout worshippers of Bhaṣajyaguru Buddha, and were praised for this virtuous practice by the Buddha himself. These twelve are distinguished by the objects they hold in their hands and have individual names. Their number being twelve, they are worshipped not only as attendants of Yakushi but also as the guardians of the twelve zodiacal signs, in which case they wear on their heads the animals associated with these. The wooden representations of these 12 generals made in 1064 A.C. are found at Horyuji, Nara.

Yet another representation of one of these named Mekira at Shinyakushiji is described as being of "a vigorous attitude with the raised sword. He seems to cry out against his enemies. The armour of the Tang warrior which he wears, the standing hair of the head, the bulging eyes, fierce frown, lips drawn back to show the teeth and the tongue — all help to increase the expression of the figure."[4]

There are yet other individual guardian deities such as Vajrapāṇi (thunderbolt-bearer) or Shu-kongo-shin, who is the Japanese version of Indian Indra. Represented as a fierce warrior, with bulging eyes, long and curly hair etc. he is described as "a guardian god of Buddhism clad in armour and holding a *vajra* club in his hand in a menacing posture showing his divine wrath against evil spirits."[5] This type of deity is mainly the creation of the esoteric sects. Although fierce-looking, he is a benevolent genii guarding Buddhism, whose representations in Japanese sculpture are said to be very few.

Among the guardian deities that belong to a still later period (8th and 9th centuries A.C.) are the Five Great Kings or Vidyārājas (Go dai myo-ō). These are regarded as the manifestation of Vairocana's (Dai-nici) wrath against evil. The most important is the Fudo-Myo-ō or Acala Vidyārāja (q.v.) originally a form of Śiva. These are said to have been introduced to Japan by esoteric sects. Their statues at Tōji and especially the carvings in the Kodō may be specially mentioned. These Vidyārājas are represented in paintings as well. The so-called "Yellow Fudo" of Mu-dera of the Tendai sect is the most celebrated protrayal of Acala Vidyārāja. This is usually kept hidden. A similar representation is found at Mañjuin in Kyōto. The Red Fudo of Koyo-San and the Blue Fudo at Shren-in at Kyōto are also well-known. Fudo Myo-ō is usually represented as a strange and terrifying creature. Sitting on a rock in a very firm posture he shows himself to be quite immovable *(acala).* The sword and the rope he holds are meant to conquer evil. The fangs at the corners of his mouth, protruding eyes, scowling eyebrows, curled up hair, muscular body, the flaming halo all give him a very dramatic and expressive look. Despite his appearance he is a benevolent deity, implying great spiritual power. "He guards and protects the practiser at all times and bestows on him long life, recovering from him, as offering, food that is left over. He is the god who completes the *bodhi* of the practiser" *(Ency. B'sm.* Vol. I, p. 155).

Another kind of guardian deity is Muryō Rikiku (Amitabalanāda) found at the Hachi monasteries in Wakayama Prefecture. He is one of the five awesome divinities (Go Dai Rikiku) with the powerful roar. Like Fudo, his wrath too is directed against the evil forces that might harm Buddhism. He and his group protect the king and the people who keep the Triple Gem. In iconography he is represented in the usual fearful way with the *vajra* and the other such features. Colourful flames surround his entire figure. The dance he is performing indicates a kind of spiritual ecstacy.

In addition to the four Lokapālas there are also in Japan several groups of minor deities who are assigned to different quarters of the universe. The *Juniten* (the Twelve Heavenly Beings) or *Goze Hoppoten* (world-protecting heavenly beings of the eight regions) are distinguished by their mounts which consist of demons and animals.[6]

At the Sokkuram cave temple in Korea, which is said to house some of the best stone sculptures of the 8th century in the East, is to be found a number of Korean guardian deities in high relief. Some of them are vajra-bearing guardians *(vajrapāṇi)* with clenched fists, defending the scred area from intruders. In the passageway are

4. Hugo Munsterberg, *The Arts of Japan,* pp. 45-47
5. *Pageant of Japanese Art* (Sculpture) p. 110
6. The *Nispannayogāvali* too refers to a group of eight deities said to be guarding the eight quarters.

to be found four guardian deities trampling on demons all protecting the main hall.[7]

Sakka, king of the gods, plays an important role in Sri Lankan Buddhism. The Buddha himself prior to his demise is said to have requested him to guard Sri Lanka Mhv. vii. vv. 2-4). Sakka sought out Mahinda and requested him to go over to the island when the time was suitable for its conversion (ibid. xiii, vv. 15, 16). And it is also recorded (ibid. vii. v. 5) that Sakka, in accordance with the Buddha's wishes, entrusted the responsibility of guarding the island to Uppalavanna who is one of four guardian deities, and the others in the quartet are Vibhīsana of Kelaniya, Skanda of Kataragama and Mahāsumana of Samantakūta (Adam's Peak). This mountain has become sacred to the Buddhists as they believe that the Buddha left the impression of his left foot on its peak when he visited the island. Mahāsumana is recorded as having met the Buddha on this occasion and since then he has come into prominence as one of the four guardian deities of the island.

In addition to these four major guardians there are also other deities whom the Buddhists worship and propitiate as their helpers and guardians. Pattini, the goddess of chastity, Nātha the future Buddha Maitreya (sometimes identified with the Bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara) and Dädimunda are three such important deities. All of them have shrines *(devālayas)* dedicated to them in various parts of the island. The usual method of propitiation is by making offerings to the deity concerned at his shrine through the officiating priest *(kapurāla)* in charge of the place, acting the same role as a Hindu priest *(pūsāri)* who makes the offerings on behalf of the devotee and invokes the deity's blessings by reciting a panegyristic invocatory formula called *yātikāva*, which is a respectful request for help and protection. The devotees are not allowed into the sanctum of the temple where the statue of the deity is found.

With regard to the deity Dädimunda there is a tradition among the Sinhalese Buddhists that he is the son of Yakkha Punnaka through the nāga maiden Irandatī of the *Vidurajātaka* (No. 545). According to the prevalent tradition he landed in Sri Lanka at Devundara and proceeded to Alutnuvara in the Kegalle District taking up permanent residence there in a temple which he himself had constructed. This is the chief *devālaya* of this deity at present. This same tradition also says that this deity was the only one who did not run in fear at the time of Bodhisattva Siddhattha's encounnter with Māra. While all the deities ran away in utter confusion and fright Dädimunda alone is said to have remained as the Bodhisatta's only guardian at this crucial hour. His special symbol is a club resembling a walking-stick *(soluva)*.

In Tibet the guardian deity *Pehar* (or *Bihar)* occupies an important place as a guardian of monasteries. His name, coming from the Sanskrit term *vihāra* meaning monastery, reveals his Indian origin. He receives the Tibetan appellation *Pehar* after assuming his main function as the guardian of the treasury at the Tibetan monastery at Samye. He is said to be originally a non-Buddhist deity transformed into a Buddhist guardian deity after his conversion by Padmasambhava. He is one of the five Great Kings of Tibet *(Mahāpañcarāja)*. In course of time *Pehar* has been given a large retinue, the members of which are said to be emanations of *Pehar* himself. They help him to fulfil his various duties all over the country. In iconographical representations he rides a white lion, assuming a Dharmapāla appearance; three headed and six armed he carries the sword *(khadga)*, knife *(chūri)*, bow *(cāpa)*, arrow *(sara)*, club *(gadā)*, and stick *(danda)*.

The other four members of the group of five Great Kings are *Choi-chung*, incarnate in state oracles as the king of magic, *Dalha*, the tutelary god of the warriors as the king of the body, *Luvang*, the god of the Nāgas and king of speech, and *Takochi*, the king of accomplishments. The deity called *Skin rgyal po mon bu pu tra*, also called *Gnod sbyin mgon po mon bu pu tra*, is said to be the special guardian deity of the Lhasa shrine. A guardian deity of a number of Tibetan monasteries, occupying a very important place is *Dge Bsryan Phying dkar ba*. He is said to have been originally a resident of *Nālandā* in India from where he was transferred to Tibet by Atiśa. Sometimes regarded as an emanation of Avalokiteśvara he is depicted as a peaceful deity. *Tsin dmar pu* is the guardian deity that is said to have succeeded Pehar at the Samye monastery. Said to be the leader of 100,000 demons, he is represented as a fearful *yakṣa*.

Mention also should be made of the four treasure-guards of the Tibetans stationed in the four quarters of the world. These are: (1) *rDo rje legs pa* guarding the white treasure of conch-shells in the east, (2) *rDo rje legs pa* guarding the yellow treasure of gold in the south, (3) *Gnayan Chen thang lha* guarding the red tresure of copper in the west, (4) *Stong dpon dgra lha rgyal* guarding the black treasure of iron in the north.

In Tibet the planetary god Rāhu also occupies an important place as a guardian deity. Regarded as ruling the other planetary gods, he is given several heads and many eyes and a wrathful appearance. Irreligious people are shot with arrows from his bow. With his central raven head he is said to guard the religious teachings while his thousand eyes watch the happenings of the three worlds.

7. *ERE* IX, p. 25

Guardian deities of mountains are widely worshipped in Tibet as well. Almost every peak in that country is regarded as the abode of a god or a goddess. Four such mountains in Tibet are *Yar lha shan po* of the Yarlung valley, *Sku la mkha'ri* in Lhoka, *Gnod sbyin gangs bzang*, and *Gnyan chen lhong lha*. The deities presiding over these mountains also go by the same names as the mountains. The last-named is treated as the guardian deity of a range of mountains running to several thousands of miles. He is also regarded as the guardian deity of the mountain Marpori, the hill on which the Potala palace is situated. He is said to take many forms in keeping with the type of work he had to do. In one aspect he "hastens to the ten quarters of the world in order to ward off all dangers threatening the Buddhist creed." [8] The Tibetans expect him to protect Tibet and the Samye monastery like a proprietor guarding his cattle or one guarding a treasure. Another instance is the mountain Amne Machan, guarded by *rMa chen spon ra* with a popular cult around him. The mountain Kanchenjunga, the third highest peak in the world, is regarded as being guarded by several deities. The Buddhists of Sikkhim venerate the personification of this mountain as one of the divine protectors of the land. And there are various legends about the divinities believed to dwell upon this Himalayan peak. According to one story, the Lokapāla Vaiśravaṇa dwells here where he is said to have stored the five kinds of treasures: gold, silver, gems, grains and holy books. Sometimes these guardians of mountains are also known as country-gods *(yul-lha)* or lords of the soil *(gzhi-dag)*. The god of the plain, called Thang-lha, is also an equally well known guardian deity in Tibet.

Those worshipped as protectors of different sects constitute another class of guardian deity. An important Tibetan deity of this type is *rDo rje shugs ldan* who is the deified spirit of a dead ancestor. Personal guardian deities *(iṣṭadevatā* or *yi-dam)* also comprise another important category. Very often it is the guardian deity of one's own sect that is taken up as the *iṣṭadevatā*, who could be chosen for a given enterprise or for a lifetime. The choice has, however, to be kept a secret if it is to become efficacious. In general, anyone can choose any deity as his *iṣṭadevatā* in keeping with his taste and deeds. In this manner families and castes too can have their own guardian deities, the choice being accepted by the succeeding generations as well. Thus Mañjuśrī, Avalokiteśvara and Vajrapāṇi are regarded as the guardian deities of the three families Tathāgata, Padma and Vajra, into which the Tantric deities were originally divided. Those deities are very frequently invoked in Nepal and Tibet.

The guardian deities of the Tantric *maṇḍalas* also may be mentioned. Usually a *maṇḍala* has four guardians at the four corners. Sometimes they are represented with their female counterparts as well.

In discussing these deities a phenomenon worth noting is how any deity could be admitted into the Buddhist pantheon as a defender of the doctrine. This is a special feature in Tibetan Buddhism where Padmasambhava is credited with admitting a large number of deities in this manner. Even the powerful Hindu god Śiva is said to have been forced into submission and made into a guardian deity through Vajrapāṇi and allowed to live only on condition that he would acknowledge the supremacy of the Triple Gem. Such converted deities are called *Cam-cen* about whom Snellgrove says that they are "treated alternately to threats and offerings. In no way are they permitted to interfere with the Buddhist doctrine, to which they are helplessly subject. Their inclusion in the lowest ranks of the Buddhist pantheon has allowed the Tibetans to remember their ancient gods while still being faithful to the new doctrine. Different protectors have come to be attached to different cycles of divinities and to their rituals. The reason for the connection could only be discovered by an historical study of the origin and development of these texts, which is a task still to be undertaken. The result of this is, however, that a group of protectors comes to receive attention in so far as they are called upon in ones or twos or threes in the rituals that are constantly being performed in a monastery." [9]

Snellgrove also gives a list of leading guardian deities worshipped at Jiwong monastery by the Nying-mapa sects. These include Mahākāla, Rahu, Viṣṇu, Mahādeva, Ekajaṭā, Vaiśravaṇa and Vajrakumāra. As almost all these are among the leading Indian divinities, they rank higher than the mountain gods and other local divinities.[10]

Generally speaking, it is not impossible to treat any deity as a guardian god for all the deities are expected to help the virtuous. Even Mahāyāna deities like Saṃvara and Vajradhara, who are not counted as guardian deities proper, are regarded as such at times. For instance both these deities are venerated as guardians in Nepal. And in the 15th chapter of the Buddhist Sanskrit work *Suvarṇaprabhāsa Sūtra* it is said that those devotees who hear and honour this *sūtra* will be guarded by the *yakṣas* and demons, by the female deities such as Hārītī Caṇḍā, Caṇḍikā, Dantī and Kūṭadantī and also by Sarasvatī, Śrīdevī and goddess of earth. It may also be mentioned here that according to the popular belief prevalent in Sri

8. Rene De Nesbesky-Wojkowitz, *Oracles and Demons of Tibet*, London, 1956, p. 207
9. D. L. Snellgrove, *Buddhist Himalaya*, Oxford, 1957, p. 242
10. Ibid.
11. This is an extension of the number thirty-three of the world of thirty-three gods *(tāvatiṃsa-devā)*.

Lanka people refer to 33 crores *(tistunkōtiyak)*[11] of deities that help and guard the good people. It is also the usual custom among the Sri Lankan Buddhists that at the end of any religious rite such as offering alms, flowers, lamps etc. or the recitation of *parittas,* they invariably request the guardian deities in general to safeguard them *(devā rakkhantu).* And a very popular statement uttered by them at the beginning of any new undertaking or on setting out on a journey or in the face of danger is "may there be the protection of the deities." *(deviyange pihitai).* (See Pls. XXIV-XXVII).

A. G. S. Kariyawasam

GUARDSTONE. A guardstone is a stone stele placed on either side of the entrance to a Buddhist temple or monastic facility such as a dwelling house or bathing pond for the use of Buddhist monks, usually with a flight of steps between the stelai, providing access to the temple or facility. These stelai are found in relatively large numbers in the ancient cities of Anuradhapura and Polonnaruwa. They were made of limestone upto about the sixth century and of granite thereafter. The dimensions of these stelai, above ground, range approximately from 1.60 m. length, 0.60 m. breadth, and 0.20 m. thickness to 0.43 m., 0.22 m. and 0.10 m. respectively. The undressed part of a guardstone which was buried underground would generally measure as much as or a little less than its height above ground. It has been observed that guardstones of smaller proportions are to be found at facilities such as bathing tanks, though in very many instances stelai have been removed from their original position in the course of reconstruction. The upper end of a guardstone is arched or segmental in shape, or has rounded corners. On the sculpted side of a guardstone there is usually a raised border around it, enclosing within the frame thus formed some figure in bas-relief. In some guard-stones, particularly those that carry the anthropomorphic figure of a divinity, there is the figure of a *bahirava* or dwarf at the right hand lower corner or at the left hand lower corner or at both these corners. The little dwarfs are shown in various lively attitudes, carrying in their hands sprigs of lotus flowers and buds or pots pouring out some liquid, perhaps milk. In some guardstones there is on the outer side a vertical pilaster on the top of which appears the figure of one of the four animals, the elephant, the lion, the horse and the bull, animals which appear also on the capitals of Asokan pillars found in various parts of India. Whether the figures on the pilasters of the guardstones of Sri Lanka were intended to indicate the directions which they faced cannot be stated with certainty as in many instances the guardstones are obviously not *in situ.* Again, in some of the guardstones carrying anthropomorphic figures are carved elaborate arches on which are illustrated the worldly pleasures that the central figures in them were expected to confer on those who viewed these stelai, as will be explained below. The guardstone at the Ratnaprāsāda and the two guardstones from Kapārārāma now exhibited in the Archaeological Museum, Anuradhapura are good examples of this type of highly ornate guardstone.[1]

On the basis of the figures appearing in guardstones and their shape, and taking the term guardstone in its wider sense of any stele placed on either side of an entrance to a sacred building or secular facility in a monastery seven main types of guardstone can be distinguished as follows[2]: 1. The *Pūrnaghata* type with the figure of a vase or pot filled with lotus flowers;[3] 2. The type with the figure of a multi-headed cobra resting on its coiled body, suggestive of a pot filled with lotuses,[4] 3. The type carrying the figure of a cobra with raised neck, flanked on either side by smaller cobras in the same stance.[5] 4. The type carrying the standing figure of a pot-bellied *bahirava,* dwarf.[6] 5. The type with a standing human figure invested with cobra hoods arranged around the head, to be referred to as *dvārapāla* type[7] 6. The type carrying the figures of a human male and female invested with cobra hoods arranged around their heads.[8] 7. The plain and simple type in the shape of a lotus petal in abstract form.[9]

It has been suggested that all these different types of guardstone symbolize water, and water being an essential ingredient of all life and sustenance, the guardstone in all its variety symbolizes life, fertility, wealth and good fortune.[10] This suggestion, however, has failed to take

1. *Ceylon Journal of Science,* Section-G (*CJSc.* (G)) Vol. I, Part 3, Plate L 1, and C. E. Godakumbura, *Guardstones,* Colombo, reprinted, 1982. Nos. 21 and 23 respectively.
2. Ananda K. Coomaraswamy, *History of Indian and Indonesian Art,* New York, 1965
3. Godakumbura, op. cit. Nos. 1–4
4. *CJSc.* (G), Vol. I, Part 3. Plate XIVII
5. Godakumbura, op. cit. No. 27
6. *CJSc.* (G) Vol. I, Part 3, Plate LI
7. Ibid. Plate LI
8. Godakumbura, op. cit. No. 20
9. *CJSc.* (G) Vol. I, Part 2, p. 48
10. D. T. Devendra, the Symbol of the Sinhalese Guardstone, *Artibus Asia,* Vol. XXI, Ascona, Switzerland, MCMLVIII, pp. 259-268

note of certain features appearing in the *dvārapāla* type of guardstone. In most of these guardstones, it will be noticed, the sculptor has gone out of his way to draw the attention of the viewer to the stalk of lotuses carried in the left or the right hand of the *dvārapāla*, depending on which side of the entrance the guardstone in question has been placed. It will be noted that the stalk is never shown with a loose end, this being always shown as rooted to the background of the stele, often very prominently decorated with a circle of lotus petals arranged around.[11] In a guardstone at the northern entrance to the Vatadāgē at Polonnaruwa even the capillaries issuing out from a well-delineated lotus bulb are explicitly shown stretching out as far as the edge of the guardstone.[12]

It is clear in these instances that the sculptor's aim was to draw the viewer's attention to the lotus bulb, the capillaries being added to make the identity of the lotus bulb unmistakable.

The significance of the lotus bulb in eastern art has been examined with a wealth of striking examples by P. D. K. Bosch in a monograph entitled *The Golden Germ*.[13] The lotus bulb, according to Bosch, symbolizes a profound Indian concept regarding the origin of all life, fertility, wealth etc. namely, the concept of *hiranya-garbha*, the golden germ. In Indian art the golden germ came to be symbolized by the lotus bulb, *the padmamūla*, which in turn came to be symbolized by the *pūrnaghata*, the vase filled with lotus flowers, the *bahirava*, the pot-bellied dwarf, the cobra whose coils are sometimes arranged in a manner suggestive of a pot filled with lotus flowers, by the conch shell, the *kirtimukha* and the *makara* to mention the common symbols that represent the concept of *hiranya-garbha*.[14]

Not all the guardstones scattered about in the ancient cities of Anuradhapura and Polonnaruwa can be considered to be *in situ*. Calamities such as wars and invasions, rebuilding operations and acts of vandalism would have removed some of them from the sites they originally occupied, preventing any attempt to place these guardstones in a chronological setting. Taking into consideration the style of sculpture and the lines of development of the concept of *padmamūla*, it is perhaps possible to trace the development of the guardstone in course of time, even approximately. Most probably it was the guardstone with the figure of a pot filled with lotus flowers that would have made its appearance first in about the first or second century A.C. The pot-bellied dwarf is nothing but a human figure incorporating a pot in place of the natural belly. Among the pot-bellied dwarfs appearing in guardstones the figure of Kuvera, the god of wealth, can easily be recognised by the prescribed features present in the figure. Śankha and Padma, two of the attendants of Kuvera, whose figures were placed at the entrance to the city of Alakā on Mount Kailāśa, have also been recognised among the *bahirava* figures depicted in guardstones found at Anuradhapura.[15]

These types appear to have been followed by the appearance of the *dvārapāla* type of guardstone, with the anthropo-theriomorphic Bodhisattva, identified as Avalokiteśvara[16] the most benevolent and merciful of the divinities of this class. Types six and seven were the next to make their appearance, the entire range of guardstones being brought into service by about the close of the sixth century. Ever since, however, the *dvārapāla* type of guardstone appears to have become the most popular type. In the ancient city of Polonnaruwa this is perhaps the only type that was made there. Inexplicably, the representation of what appears to be a *dvārapāla* type of guardstone can be seen in the *āyāgapata* of Lonaśobhikā now in the Mathura Museum, carrying a Brāhmi inscription of uncertain date. (Coomaraswamy, Plate XIX, Fig. 72).

After the end of the Polonnaruwa period, guardstones of the *dvārapāla* type continued to be made sporadically without any regard for aesthetic considerations, when in the nineteenth century *dvārapālas* appeared dressed all in their best with tall hats, cut-away coats and high collars.[17] (See Pls. XXVIII–XXIX).

P. E. E. Fernando

GUHYASAMĀJA TANTRA,[1] (vars. *Śrī-guhya-°; Guhyasamāja-mahāguhya-tantra-rāja)*, an authoritative text on Tantrism, written in a mixture of Sanskrit prose and verse. This text is also known as the *Tathāgata-guhyaka* and it is divided into two parts called the *pūrvārdha* and *uttarārdha*. Of these only the first part (pūrvārdha) which consists of 18 chapters is considered by scholars to be genuine. This view is mainly based on the fact that the early writers who quote from the

11. *CJSc.* (G), Vol. I, Part 2, Plate XV, lower picture
12. S. Paranavitana, *Art and Architecture of Ceylon*, Colombo, 1954, p. 40
13. F. D. K. Bosch, *The Golden Germ*. S. Gravenhage, 1960
14. Ibid. pp. 27, 34, 40-49 and 57-59. cf. also P. E. E. Fernando, The symbolism of the Guardstone.
15. S. Paranavitana, Śamkha and Padmá, *Artibus Asiae*, Vol. XVIII, 2, Ascona, Switzerland, *MCMLV*, pp. 121-127
16. P. C. Sestieri, Important Monuments of Ceylon, *Archaeology*, Vol. 12, No. 4 December, 1959, pp. 223-233
17. Godakumbura, op. cit. p. 23.

1. The Sanskrit text was edited by B. Bhattacharyya and published in 1931 in *GOS*. LIII.

Guhyasamāja-tantra refer to it as the *Astādasapatala* (i.e. consisting of 18 chapters). The second part (*uttarārdha*) contains a considerable portion of the *Prajñopāya-viniścaya-siddhi*, a work belonging to the 7th century A.C., and this makes it quite evident that the *uttarārdha* is a later addition.

The work begins with the stereotyped introductory formula of all Buddhist sūtras, 'Thus, have I heard...." (*evam mayā śrutam...*). However, there is one noteworthy peculiarity in this text. Here the Lord is represented as being in an assembly sporting in the sacred knowledge arising out of the body, mind and speech of the Tathāgatas. In this assembly the Lord Bodhicittavajra is requested by the numerous Tathāgatas and bodhisattvas to reveal the highest truth, the *Guhyasamāja*. Bodhicittavajra dissuaded them saying that it is extremely difficult to comprehend it. But being requested again and again he consented to reveal it and for that purpose he entered into different samādhis and transformed himself into forms of different Dhyāni buddhas and placed them in various sections of the *mandala*. Thus, he entered into the samādhi called *jñānapradīpavajra* and uttered the mantra of the Dvesa family. As soon as this was done he transformed himself into the form of Aksobhya. In this manner he produced the five Dhyāni buddhas, their female partners and also the four guardians. When the formation of the *mandala* was completed the Tathāgatas requested the Lord to reveal the nature of the thought of enlightenment (*bodhicitta*, q.v.) and the whole of the second chapter is devoted to the explanation of the nature of *bodhicitta*. The next two chapters describe the *Buddha-mandala* and the *Kāya-vāk-citta-mandala* with different modes of meditation and worship. The fifth chapter is rather important in that the Lord made a declaration that even those who have committed heinous crimes are capable of attaining emancipation. The Tathāgatas and the bodhisattvas who were assembled were shocked at this pronouncement and they questioned the Lord as to why he made such an improper utterance in the sacred assembly. The Lord explained that he preached the doctrine of the Buddhas, the way of enlightenment which is pure and immutable and arising from the explanation of the essence of things. On hearing this the bodhisattvas fell into a swoon. The Tathāgatas who were able to grasp what the Lord declared remained unaffected and they requested the Lord to revive the bodhisattvas. Then the Lord entered into a samādhi and issued numerous rays of light from his body. The bodhisattvas touched by these rays, regained consciousness. By this miracle the Lord was able to make the bodhisattvas comprehend the doctrine he preached. The sixth chapter contains various mantras and also a lengthy description of the highest form of meditation. In the next chapter numerous means by which emancipation could be acquired are described. Here it is clearly said that success or perfection (*siddhi*) is to be attained not by rigorous observances, but by the enjoyment of all sensual pleasures. A description of the highest form of worship and of the *kāya-vāk-citta-mandala* is found in chapter nine. The Lord again declared that omniscience can be attained by having recourse to theft, adultery and such malpractices. The bodhisattvas wondered at this unorthodox declaration. The Lord made it clear that this teaching should not be branded as base or repulsive, for the way of attachment is the same as the way of bodhisattvas which is the highest way. He further explains that space is to be found everywhere, all worldly phenomena are to be found in space. The phenomena do not belong to the sphere of pleasure or to the sphere of form or to the formless sphere or even to the four great elements. All worldly phenomena are to be understood in this manner. It is on this analogy of space that the disciplines enjoined by Tathāgatas are to be grasped. For instance, it is well known that smoke arises from a combination of three factors namely the churning rod (*kānda*) the churning pot (*mathanīya*) and the effort made by the hands. From that smoke fire is generated. But the fire resides neither in the churning rod nor in the churning pot nor in the effort made by the hands. The conduct of the Tathāgatas, too, should be understood thus.

The tenth chapter contains the mantra *hūṃ oṃ āḥ svāhā* which is said to confer the highest perfection. In the next chapter the Lord explained the hidden meaning of the mantra and also shows how it should be used in meditation. Various samādhis and their effects are described in the 12th chapter. The 13th chapter, besides dealing with samādhis, contains also the *vajrajāpa*, a prayer which is explained in great detail. This as well as the two following chapters contain mantras for the accomplishment of desired worldly objects. Thus, there are mantras to destroy enemies, to destroy dwelling places, to enchant and subdue people. All the six types of mantras, namely those meant for killing (*mārana*), destroying (*ucchātana*) enchanting (*vaśikarana*), restraining (*stambhana*), attracting (*ākarsana*) and propitiating (*śāntika*) which are found in tantric texts are also found scattered in these chapters. The 15th chapter prescribes ritualistic observances in the company of a young candāli girl of twelve years of age. The 16th chapter also describes various rituals, mantras, mandalas and other items connected with ritualistic practices. Numerous esoteric doctrines declared by Vajrapāni are found in the next chapter. The 18th chapter is extremely important, for, it explains numerous technical terms used throughout the text.

In order to preserve the secret nature, the doctrines are couched in enigmatical language (***sandhā-bhāsā***).[2] Only

2. On *Sandhā bhāsā* see *IHQ*. IV, 1938, pp. 287 ff. and P. C. Bagchi, *Studies in the Tantras*, pp. 27 ff.

the initiated are capable of grasping the intended meaning, The uninitiated, grasping the literal meaning brand the teachings of *Guhyasamāja-tantra* as vulgar.

Most probably the *Guhyasamāja-tantra* was written for the purpose of presenting the Tantric teachings in a systematic form. Bhattacharyya (op. cit. intro. xiv) suggests that it was written for the purpose of indicating a short and a correct path for obtaining enlightenment. This suggestion does not appear to be correct, for, it is quite obvious that Tantric teachings found in the *Guhyasamāja-tantra* are difficult to grasp and that rituals, samādhis and mantras are meant only for the initiated, and that it does not reveal a short cut.

A number of new concepts and doctrines are introduced by the *Guhysamāja-tantra.* The concept of Dhyāni buddha as well as that of the female principle *(śakti)* are found for the first time in this text. It also reveals quite a developed pantheon of Buddhist gods.

The exact date of the text is not known. In keeping with the normal practice followed by all Mahāyāna and tantric texts the *Guhyasamāja-tantra,* too, seeks to trace its origin to the Buddha. This is done solely for the sake of authority. B. Bhattacharyya (op. cit. intro. xxix) assigns it to the 3rd century A.C. and this date is accepted by other scholars (Lama Anagarika Givinda, *Foundation of Tibetan Mysticism,* p. 94). But Bhattacharyya's assumption with regard to the authoriship of the text, that it is a work of Asaṅga, cannot be taken as conclusive, for, the arguments adduced by him are not tenable.[3]

Though the *Guhyasamāja-tantra* may have been written by about the 3rd century A.C., its existence was first referred to in the 7th century and from that time onwards it came to be regarded as an authoritative work on Tantrism. Why the *Guhyasamāja-tantra* did not gain recognition earlier between that 3rd and the 7th centuries is a matter for conjecture. On this point Tāranātha's evidence cited by H. Kern (*Manual of Indian Buddhism* p. 133) is important. Tāranātha says that immediately after their introduction Tantric texts were transmitted secretly for nearly three hundred years before they obtained publicity through the esoteric teachings of Siddhas and Vajrācāryas. They were transmitted secretly, because they inculcated numerous rites, rituals and doctrines which appeared to be objectionable in the eyes of the uninitiated. The *Guhyasamāja-tantra* is full of such rites and doctrines. It did not even recognise the basic virtues and diciplinary rules incumbent on the followers of Buddhism. It advocated a life devoted to luxury and sensual pleasures. Almost everything that was prohibited in orthodox Buddhism was permitted by it. It had scant reverence for objects of veneration held in high easteem by the Theravādins and Mahāyānists. It disregarded all social rules and customs as being of no value to a Yogi, an initiated Tantrist. Thus, it advocated killing of living beings, uttering of falsehood, acquisition of things that are not given and even the association with women for immoral purposes. Therefore, it is quite possible, as Tāranātha suggests, that this text did not come into prominence until Tantrism gained ground. Once Tantrism came to be accepted by the people, the *Guhyasamāja-tantra* became the most authoritative work. It was extensively quoted by other writers such as Indrabhūti, Padmavajra and Anaṅgavajra.

Even the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* (pp. 7, 126, 158, 274, 318, 357) quotes from a text entitled the *Tathāgata-guhyaka.* The passages quoted in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* teach Mahāyāna morality and these passages cannot be traced in the Tantric text of the same name. Whether the *Guhyasamāja-tantra* is a later variation of the *Tathāgata-guhyaka* referred to in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* is not certain. H. P. Shastri *(A Descriptive Catalogue of Sanskrit Manuscripts,* I Buddhist Manuscripts, No. 18) refers to a manuscript called *Tathāgata-guhyaka,* a Mahāyāna work which he describes as a fragment of a very large work of Vaipulya class. The quotations found in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* are most probably from this Mahāyāna work. H. P. Shastri further says that this belongs to the first part of the *Guhyasamāja* and conjectures that this Vaipulya work is the original *Tathāgata-guhyaka* and that the *Guhyasamāja* is called *Tathāgata-guhyaka* only by analogy. Apparently it is this Mahāyāna work that is regarded as one of the nine sacred books *(nava-dharma)* by the Nepali Buddhists.

The popularity and the importance of the *Guhyasamājatantra* is seen by the presence of a number of commentaries on it. Amongst the earlier commentaries those of Nāgārjuna, Kṛṣṇācārya, Līlāvajra, Śāntideva and Ratnākaraśānti are important.

The *Guhyasamāja-tantra* gained much popularity in Tibet. The *Kangyur* contains the Tibetan version of the text as well as numerous commentaries on it. (See Bhattacharyya, , op. cit. intro. xxx ff.). The text was rendered into Chinese, too. Most probably *Nanjio* No. 1027 refers to the Chinese version of the *Guhyasamāja-tantra* (cp. also *Nanjio.* Nos. 23(3) and 1043.

S. K. Nanayakkara

GUṆABHADRA, a native of Central India, was a well known translator of Buddhist texts into Chinese. By caste a Brahman, he was later converted to Buddhism as a result of his reading the *Saṃyutkābhidharma-hṛdaya-*

3. See M. Winternitz, *A History of Indian Literature,* II, pp. 394 ff.

śastra. He studied the Śrāvaka teaching when he first became a Buddhist monk, but later on was also well-versed in Mahāyāna doctrines and hence the popular appellation "Mahāyāna." In the 12th year of Yüan-chia (435 A.C.) of the Earlier Sung dynasty, he arrived at Kuang-chou (i.e. Canton) by the sea route via Simhala (modern Sri Lanka), taking up abode at the Yün-fêng Monastery of the Yün-fêng Mountain. The governor of Kuang-chou, Chê Lang duly reported his arrival to the court, whereupon Emperor Wên-ti immediately sent to escort him to Nanking and lodged him at the Chihhuan Monastery. Yen Yen-chih a famous scholar of that time, paid him very high regard. Liu I-k'ang Prince of P'êng-ch'êng and Liu I-hsüan, Prince of Ch'iao, both being members of the royal family, even revered him as their teacher. These favourable circumstances enabled him to start the translation of Buddhist texts within a very short time.

During his stay at the Chih-huan Monastery, he first produced a translation of the *Samyutkāgama (Taishō,* No. 99) in 50 fascicles with the assistance of an assembly of learned śramanas.[1] The extant edition contains only 48 fascicles at present, of which the 23rd and the 25th are in fact from another translation of Gunabhadra, the *Aśokāvadāna* wrongly interpolated into it by the copyist. Following that, at the Tung-an Monastery he translated the *Mahābherī-hārika-parivarta (Taishō,* No. 270) in 2 fascicles and the *Sandhinirmocana-sūtra* (*Taishō,* Nos. 678, 679) in 2 fascicles. In the 13th year of Yüan-chia (436 A.C.), with the patronage of one of his benefactors Ho Shang-chih, Prefect of Tan-yang he translated the *Śrīmālā-simhanāda-sūtra* (*Taishō,* No. 353) in 1 fascicle at the same monastery. Again, at the Tao-ch'ang Monastery he translated the *Angulimālika-sūtra* (*Taishō,* No. 120) in 4 fascicles and the *Lankāvatāra-sūtra* (*Taishō,* No. 670) in 4 fascicles. (The *K'ai-yüan Catalogue* dates this translation in the 20th year of Yüan-chia, i.e. 443 A.C.). In the execution of these works, an assembly of over 700 pupils was called together with Pao-yün acting as the oral interpreter and Hui-kuan as the transcriber. "Discussion and analysis were carried on over and over again until the exact meaning of the text was represented satisfactorily." [2] In the 23rd year of Yüan-chia (446 A.C.), Liu I-hsüan, Prince of Ch'iao, upon being appointed Garrison Commissioner of Ching-chou invited Gunabhadra to go with him to his domain where he lodged the master at the Hsin Monastery. There he produced the translations of the *Aśokāvadāna (Taishō,* No. 99, fascs. 23 & 25) in 1 fascicle, the *Asta-mangalaka (Taishō,* No. 430) in 1 fascicle (the current edition wrongly ascribes this work to Sanghapāla), and the *Atīta-pratyutpanna-hetuphala-sūtra (Taishō,* No. 189) in 4 fascicles. In these undertakings, he was assisted by his disciple Fa-yung who used to act as the oral interpreter. Besides the nine books in 68 fascicles mentioned above, three more works are recorded in *Li K'uo's Catalogue* that can be ascribed with certainty to Gunabhadra: the *Ratnakāranda-sūtra (Taishō,* No. 462) in 2 fascicles, the *Bodhisattva-gocaropāya-vikurvana-nirdeśa (Taishō,* No. 271) in 3 fascicles, and the *Spiritual Dhāranī for Uprooting all Obstacles of Karma and Causing One to be Born to the Pure Land (Taishō,* No. 368) in 1 fascicle which was formerly recorded as a derivative from the *Smaller Amitābha-vyūha.* These twelve books in 73 fascicles are Gunabhadra's translations extant to-day. His other works as recorded in the *Biographies of Eminent Monks,* e.g. the *One fascicle Amitāyur-vyūha the Smaller Amitābha-vyūha),* the *One-fascicle Nirvāna-sūtra,* the *Sūtra on the Names of the Present Buddhas,* the *Summary Sūtra of the Five Aspects of the Supreme Truth,* etc., are all lost. The record in (Fei) *Chang-fang's Catalogue* that ascribes to Gunabhadra 17 more works including the *Vrddha-mahallikā-pariprcchā,* the *Candra-prabha-kumāra-sūtra,* etc., is not credible. As for the other 21 works including the *Ākāśagarbha-sūtra,* etc., which both catalogues of Li K'uo and Fei Chang-fang also ascribe to Gunabhadra, it requires further investigation before any definite inference can be made, since all these works are lost.

During his stay in Ching-chou, Gunabhadra, at the request of the Prince of Ch'iao, also delivered open lectures on the *Avatamsaka-sūtra (Taishō,* No. 278), assisted by his disciple Fa-yung as interpreter and another disciple Sêng-nien as director of affairs. Inspite of the fact that he had to depend much on the interpreter, still he could by all means communicate the profound ideas well enough. In the beginning of the Hsiao-chien period (454 A.C.), the Prince of Ch'iao, paying no heed to Gunabhadra's admonition, started an insurrection against the court. More than that, with a view to the master's high prestige in the eyes of the people, the prince had Gunabhadra brought along by force in his eastward march. The rebellious troops suffered total defeat in the hands of General Wang Hsüan-mo who, in obedience to the instruction given him by Emperor Hsiao-wu-ti beforehand, carefully escorted Gunabhadra back to Nanking. The emperor's regard for him became much the higher, when it was found out that in all his communications with the prince in Ching-chou (of which he had kept a complete record) not a single word had been said in connection with the latter's military plot. Once, the emperor asked Gunabhadra whether he had been still

1. The *K'aiyuan Catalogue,* records this to be a work done at the Wa-Kuan Monastery based on the Sanskrit text brought to China by Fa-hsien.
2. See *Biographies of Eminent Monks,* fasc. 3.

thinking of the late prince. The master answered, "Having received his patronage for ten years, how could I forget his kindness to me? I would rather humbly beg Your Majesty's permission to offer him a daily service of incense-burning for three years." To this supplication the emperor readily consented in appreciation of the master's heroic spirit. He died in the 4th year of T'ai-shih (468 A.C.) of the reign of Emperor Ming-ti, in his 75th year.

Guṇabhadra's style of translation appears rather plain and artless, but he has the merit of not distorting the original idea. Thus Fa-ts'ü, in his verdict on Guṇabhadra, says, "His translation is done with much deliberation, the crudity of the language being well compensated by the correct representation of the depth and scope of the theory."[3] For instance, in his translation of the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra,* he uses such expressions as "ju-lai-tsang shih-tsang" (the Tathāgatagarbha namely, ālaya-vijñāna) and "shih-tsang ming ju-lai-tsang" *(ālaya-vijñāna* also named as *Tathāgatagarbha).* Here the two Chinese characters standing for "ālaya-vijñāna," "shih" *(vijñāna)* and "Tsang" *(ālaya),* are put in an inverted order so as to give an impression of "inaccuracy in grammatical rendering." But if compared with the translation done by Bodhiruci in the Northern Wei, in which this statement is rendered as "The Tathāgatagarbha is not involved in the ālaya-vijñāna," thus splitting up the ālaya-vijñāna and the Tathāgata-garbha into two clear-cut categories, then apparently Guṇabhadra's rendering is more in agreement with the original text. This will suffice to show the correctness of Fa-ts'u's remark.

Guṇabhadra's translations have done a great deal in giving a systematic dissemination of the doctrine of the Yogācāra School, of which he himself was an adherent. The constituents of this system of thought may be traced to several sources. One is the Dhyāna teaching of the Sthaviravāda which has as its base the *Samyutkāgama.* Another source is the theory of the ālaya-vijñāna evolved from the Tathāgata-garbha, which is based on the *Aṅgulimālika* and the *Śrīmālā-siṁhanāda* sūtras. Still another source is the theory of the three self-natures evolved from the theory of the non-self-natures of the Supreme Truth, which is based on the *Sandhinirmocana-sūtra.* These Scriptures are just what Guṇabhadra made efforts to introduce to China. Lastly, but of particular importance, is the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* the sūtra par excellance of the Yogācāra system in which is expounded in detail the unique teaching of meditation developed by this system out of the theory that all things are but manifestations of the mind. It was this sūtra that Guṇabhadra took pains to reproduce in the Chinese language almost word by word. Rhetorically considered, it might come short of the principle of smoothness and grammatical correctness, but so far as the substance is considered, it is faithful to the original text. The seeds of this particular form of dhyāna sown by Guṇabhadra gradually took ro t through the efforts of Bodhidharma, Hui-k'o and others, and flowered in the appearance of the so-called Laṅkā (-avatāra) masters who adhered to this sūtra as their sole scripture and, in the course of its evolution and development, eventually led to the rise of the Ch'an School of China. The tradition of the Lanka masters formally acknowledged Guṇabhadra to be their first patriarch, and his "instruction of Dhyāna", a dissertation on the method of setting the mind at rest, was respected as an important basis of their theory. All these point to the fact that Guṇabhadra was not a translator only, but was also an illustrious teacher of Chinese Buddhism as well, a master deserving a place in the same level with Bodhiruci and Paramārtha.

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Li Chung-k'ang

GUṆAVARMAN (Chiu-na-pa-mo). Among the Kashmirian teachers who took the sea route to China, Guṇavarman achieved greater success as a Buddhist missionary than most of his contemporaries. His missionary zeal took him to propagate Buddhism in South-East Asia and the Far East, although his original plan was not specifically directed towards China. According to the statement of his biographer, it appears that he belonged to the ruling family of Kashmir. As he was greatly interested in the study of Buddhist literature and the practice of mediation he scorned the idea of being made the ruler of Kashmir. To avoid further trouble, he decided to leave Kashmir, and in course of time he reached Sri Lanka (Siṁhala country). According to the verse composed by himself before his death, it is seen that he attained the sakradāgāmin state at the Ka-po-li (Kapāra or Kapiri)[1] village in Sri Lanka. It appears that

3. See preface to *Srimālā Siṁhanāda Sūtra* in the *Collection of the Records of Translations of the Tripiṭaka,* fasc.9.

1. In the 8th century A.C. there was a Kapāra parivena (next to the Twin Pond) in Anuradhapura. See *Epigraphia Zeylanica,* Vol. V (Part I). Mr. D. T. Devendra in private communication, informs me that there is a village Kapirigama, now so called.

he lived there for a very long time, and his fame as a saint must have spread far and wide. What made him engage in missionary activities is clear from the following.

> "Offerings heaped up in large piles, but I regard them as fire and poison. My mind was greatly distressed, and to get rid of this disturbance I embarked on a ship. I went to Java and Champa. Owing to the effect of karma, the wind sent me to the territories of the Sung Dynasty (420–479 A.C.) in China. And in these countries I propagated Buddhism according to my ability...."[2]

The few lines quoted above indicate the causes and circumstances under which he was forced to carry on his missionary activities. He was essentially a *dhyāna* master of the Sarvāstivāda school which was still popular in Kashmir at that time. There is no record available regarding his missionary activities in Sri Lanka and Champa, but fortunately there is information about his success in Java and China.

Before the arrival of Guṇavarman in Java, the religion in that country was chiefly Brahmanic and there was hardly any influence of Buddhism. This is clearly stated in the *Travels of Fa-hsien*. We know that Fa-hsien reached Java from Lanka in 413 or 414 A.C. He was of the opinion that the Buddhist religion there was not of sufficient importance worth mentioning. Therefore, it is very likely that Guṇavarman converted P'o-to-chia (Vadhaka ?), the king of Java and his mother to Buddhism. In the beginning, both of them received the five precepts from him. However, the king went a step further expressing the wish to his minister that he intended to renounce the throne and become a member of the Saṅgha. His subjects strongly objected to his intended departure, and entreated him to continue as their ruler. Finally, he yielded to their request, if they could agree to his following conditions:

1. That the people throughout his kingdom should show respect to venerable Guṇavarman.
2. That all the subjects in his kingdom should completely stop taking of life of living beings and,
3. That the accumulated wealth in the government treasury should be distributed among the sick and the poor.

It is needless to say that the people in Java willingly agreed to all the conditions and received the five precepts from Guṇavarman. Later the King built a vihāra for him. It is said that the King carried timber personally for the construction of the monastery. This indicates the tremendous success of the spread of Buddhism in Java in the early part of the 5th century A.C. Naturally the credit goes to Guṇavarman.

His journey from Java to China is also of unusual interest. The news of Guṇavarman's missionary activities in Java reached China sometime before 424 A.C. In 424 A.C. the Chinese Buddhists in Nanking headed by Hui-kuan requested Emperor Wu-ti (424–452 A.C.) of the Sung Dynasty to write to Guṇavarman and the King of Java (Vadhaka), with the intention of inviting him (Guṇavarman) to China. Later, the Emperor sent Fa-chang, and other Buddhist scholars to Java in order to extend the Emperor's invitation to him in person. However, before the arrival of these messengers in Java, Guṇavarman had already left Java by boat and was going to a small country. Fortunately, however, the seasonal wind caused him to reach the shores of Canton in southern China. He stayed at a place called Shih-hsin for quite a long time. It was only in the 8th year of Yuan-chia (431 A.C.) that he reached Nanking at the repeated request of the Emperor. His advice to the Emperor on benevolent government was greatly appreciated by the ruler. Among his propagation activities, he preached the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-Sūtra* and the *Daśabhūmi-Sūtra* to a larlge audience and translated more than ten works of which the following five are still extant. 1. *Upāli-paripṛcchā-Śāstra* (*Nanjio* No. 1109), 2. *Upāsaka-pañcaśīlarūpa-Sūtra* (*Nanjio* No. 1114), 3. *Dharma-gupta-bhikṣuṇī-karma* (*Nanjio* No. 1129) 4. *Śrāmaṇera-karmavācā* (*Nanjio* No. 1164), (5) *Nāgārjunabodhi-sattva- suhṛllekhā* (*Nanjio* No. 1464).

Another important contribution of Guṇavarman was the assistance given by him towards the conferment of higher ordination to the Bhikṣuṇīs in China in accordance with the Vinaya. The normal practice is that Bhikṣuṇīs should receive their Upasampadā ordination from both the Bhikṣu and the Bhikṣuṇī Saṅghas. Otherwise it is incomplete. The institution of Bhikṣuṇīs in China has an early beginning. The Chinese historical annals inform that towards the end of the 4th century A.C. the rulers and members of the royal family showed great respect to both the Buddhist Bhikṣus and Bhikṣuṇīs. Take for instance, the Queen of Mu-ti (345–361 A.C.) who built the Yung-an-ssu[3] Nunnery for Bhikṣuṇī Tan-pi, and Emperor Hsiao-wu-ti (373–395 A.C.) who was a great patron of Bhikṣuṇī Maio-yin, though the latter[4] was unworthy of the honour. This shows that by the middle of the 4th century A.C. there existed a large number of Buddhist nuns. However, the earliest translation of the

2. *Kao-seng-chuan, ch. 3.*
3. See *Pi-ch'iu-ni'chuan* or the *Biographies of Bhikṣuṇīs, Nanjio,* No. 1497
4. *Ibid.,* The life of Miao-yin; Thin-shu, or the *Annals of the Tsin Dynasty*, see the Biography of Tao-tze. Also see T'and-yung-t'ung's: *Han-wei-liang-tsin-nan-pei-ts'ao-fu-chiao-shih,* p. 349 and pp. 453-4

Bhiksuni Pratimoksa was done by Fa-hsien[5] and Buddhabhadra in 414 A.C., and the formal proceedings for the ordination of Bhiksunis *(Dharmagupta Bhiksuni Karman, Nanjio* No. 1129) was translated by Gunavarman himself in 431 A.C. This being the case, it is very doubtful that the Bhiksunis in China were properly ordained before the arrival of Gunavarman in 431 A.C. Therefore, there arose the necessity (and a request was made to him) that he should help the Bhiksunis perform the rites for the higher ordination for the second time. At this juncture there came from Sri Lanka to the capital of the Sung Dynasty at Nanking, a batch of eight Sinhalese Bhiksunis, with the intention of conferring higher ordination on the Chinese nuns. As their number was less than ten and some of them had not yet completed the required age after the Upasampada ordination[6] Gunavarman helped them to invite a fresh batch of Bhiksunis from Sri Lanka. The leader of this new delegation was Theri Trisarana. As Gunavarman was in Sri Lanka for a long time, he was possibly the most suitable person to do it.[7] But unfortunately he could not live to see the fruit of his labour. He passed away in 432 A.C. at the age of 65, just before the arrival of the second batch[8] of Bhiksunis from Sri Lanka. He left behind him a poem of 36 stanzas regarding his views on meditation, his attainment and missionery career.

W. Pachow

GUNTAPALLE, var. Guntapalla etc., the modern name of an ancient Buddhist site in West Godavari District in Andhra in Southern India. Through the valleys of Godavari and Krishna rivers several roads passed and converged at Vangi (or Vengi) – a locality in Andhra. According to H. Dubreuil, the road to Kosala which started from Vangi followed Godavari to go to the centre of India via Nagpur, and Guntapalle is the only Buddhist site on this route (See K. R. Subramanian, *Buddhist Remains in Andhra and History of Andhra,* Madras, 1932, pp. iv–viii). This road greatly facilitated communication between the South — the Dakkhinapatha of the ancient literature — and Kosala, and there is reason to surmise that Buddhism reached Guntapalle from Kosala at a very early date. During the time of the Buddha his fame spread to this part of India, and Bavari sent his pupils to meet the Buddha who was at Savatthi, perhaps along this route (see BAVARI, DAKKHINAPATHA and DECCAN).

The archaeological remains at Guntapalle reveal that once it was an important centre of Buddhism in Andhra. Among the finds at this site are stone-built stupas, a rock-cut circular Buddhist *Sangharama,* stone images of the Buddha and also limestone images of the Buddha, a *caitya* containing a monolithic model of a stupa and large brick *caityas* ornamented with images of the Buddha made of limestone. These *caityas* are of a later date than the other finds. The *Sangharama* consists of two separate groups of chambers forming a large and a small monastery. Percy Brown observes that "No real attempt at any coordinated plan seems to have been made in arranging the cells of the monasteries which are crowded together probably because other chambers were, at a later date, inserted in the available intervening spaces. The facades show round arched doorways and windows with a projecting dome archway above, and the radiating spokes of a blind *caitya* window filling the space in between, the whole approximating the early Hinayana type of *Vihara* decoration but all rather coarsely executed and displaying little aptitude for this kind of work." Percy Brown, *Indian Architecture Buddhist and Hindu,* D. B. Taraporevala Sons Co. Pvt. Ltd., Bombay, reprint, 1976, p. 36.

A Pali inscription of a Buddhist nun who constructed steps to a monument at Guntapalle has also been discovered. From archaeological and architectural evidence it appears that this site developed into a Buddhist centre at least in the second century B.C. The nature of the structure and the remains of the stupa also point to an early date for its construction. According to A. K. Coomaraswamy this site was patronized by Andhra kings. He writes "Most of the Andhra kings .... are best known for their benefactions to Buddhist communities; to them are due most of the cave temples and monasteries of the Western Ghats, the Ghantasala, Bhattiprolu, Guntapalle and Amaravati *stupas* and other structures in the east and probably the Sanci gateway" (A. K. Coomaraswamy, *History of Indian and Indonesian Art,* Dover Publications, Inc. New York, 1965, p. 23).

Rock-cut architecture has drawn the attention of many scholars to this site. Percy Brown says that the smaller circular chamber found at this site "explains the kind of shelter that was first erected over the stupa — this appears to be the beginning of the construction of *caitya* hall .... The remains at Guntapalle are remarkable more for their antiquarian interest than for their artistic or architectural value" (Percy Brown, op. cit. p. 36). With

5. See *Bhiksuni-sanghika-vinaya-pratimoksa-sutra, Nanjio,* No. 1150
6. *Vin.* I, p. 58
7. See W. Pachow: Ancient cultural relations between Ceylon and China. *University of Ceylon Review,* Vol. XII, No. 3, 1954.
8. See the Life of Sanghavarman, *Kao-seng-chuan,* ch. 3

reference to the Buddhist rock-cut circular cave Benjamin Rowland remarks that it "....preserves the form of the Vedic hut, even to the inclusion of wooden rafters attached to the domical roof." (Benjamin Rowland, *The Art and Architecture of India,* Penguin Books, London, 1953, p. 23). These observations speak for the antiquity of the site. Caves *(guhā)* were also permissible dwellings for the Buddhist monks starting from the inception of the *sāsana* (*Vin.* I, p. 58) and rock cut cave temples are a common feature especially along the Western and Eastern Ghats of Southern India. At Guntapalle the work has been executed in a rough manner. Even the Buddha images found at this site do not present any new features, though the Andhra Buddha image displays some distinguishing marks. These facts speak for assigning an earlier date for Guntapalle than to any other Buddhist Centre in the region. The stūpa at Guntapalle has some aspects which according to Amita Ray are, "....stylistically comparable with those of Bhārhut and Sāñci Stūpas" (Amita Ray, *Life and Art of Early Andhradesa,* Delhi, 198?, p. 117).

Hsüan-tsang who visited the Andhra country calls the capital of the country P'ing-K'i-lo (Vingila). Samuel Beal comments that "this is probably the old city of Vengi, north-west of Elura Lake, between Godavari and Krishna rivers which was certainly in the Andhra dominions. In the neighbourhood are said to be rock temples and other remains (Samuel Beal, *Buddhist Records of the Western World,* Susil Gupta India Private Ltd., Calcutta, 1958, Vol. IV, pp. 420-21). Hsüan-tsang describes a great *saṅghārāma* not far from Vingila (i.e. Vangi or Vengi). Though the identification of the site is not quite certain, yet it is reasonable to suppose that this reference of Hsüan-tsang is to the Buddhist temple at Guntapalle. He wrote: "This monastery had spacious halls... There was an image of the Buddha... In front of this Convent were erected two stone stūpas..." *(ibid).* The Chinese pilgrim's visit was in the sixth century A.C. and during the course of several centuries that followed Buddhism in Southern India declined. Buddhist temples were deserted and places of Buddhist worship were neglected due to a variety of reasons. There had been usurpation of Buddhist sites by other religious communities. Subramanian mentions that Guntapalle was converted into *Liṅga Kṣetra* by Hindus (K. R. Subramanian, op. cit. p. 33). But some of the Buddhist sites remain, though in ruins, to tell the glorious past. "Even today on the hill of Guntapalle may be found the remnants of a grand *vihāra* associated with numerous other rock-cut monasteries and a large pillared hall" (D. K. Baruva, *Viharas in Ancient India,* Calcutta, 1969, pp. 198-99). See Pl. XXX.

M. Karaluvinna

GUPTAS. The breaking up of the Kuṣāṇa empire and the subsequent emergence of numerous small kingdoms on its ruins provided the most congenial atmosphere for the rise of a major political power in Northern India. It was in this setting that the Gupta dynasty which had an obscure origin, rose into prominence in Eastern India. Candragupta I, who ascended the throne most probably in 320 A.C., was the first important ruler of this dynasty, though according to some later inscriptions he was preceded by two other members namely, Śrī Gupta and Ghaṭotkaca. The role of the first two members of the dynasty in the establishment of the Gupta power is uncertain but it is possible that they were either feudatory rulers of some other monarch or were independent chieftains in their own right.[1]

Candragupta I, by virtue of the political strength he acquired perhaps through his marriage to a princess of the Licchavis, a long established tribe in the Nepal valley, could expand his authority to the neighbouring areas and his kingdom in its final shape included such regions like Magadha (South Bihar), Sāketa (Audh) and Prayāga (Allahabad).[2] Nevertheless, it was under his son and successor Samudragupta (c. A.C. 350-376) whose career is eulogized in panegyric form in the famous Allahabad Pillar inscription,[3] that the Guptas assumed imperial status. The larger part of the Indo-Gangetic plain, the Deccan and some areas in the southernmost part of the peninsula were conquered by Samudragupta.

His successor Candragupta II (c. A.C. 376-414) not only destroyed the formidable power of the Śaka rulers of Western India who posed a serious threat to the Guptas, but also took many steps to strengthen the empire and consolidate the gains made by his predecessors. Although Kumāragupta (c. A.C. 415-455), who succeeded Candragupta II, inherited a vast empire and enjoyed a virtually trouble-free reign, he does not appear to have added any new areas to his domain. Towards the end of his reign however, the western parts of the empire were threatened by the Hūṇa invaders, but they were thoroughly defeated by Kumāragupta who fought the battle on behalf of his father. After this decisive defeat the Hūṇas did not dare attempt another invasion of the Gupta empire for some time to come.

1. R. C. Majumdar (ed.), *The Classical Age,* Bombay, 1962, pp. 1-2. For details of Gupta political history and chronology, also see, S. R. Goyal, *A History of the Imperial Guptas,* Allahabad, 1967.
2. R. C. Majumdar, *op. cit.* pp. 2-4.
3. J. F. Fleet, *Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum,* Vol. III, *(Gupta Inscriptions),* London, 1888.

Skandagupta (c. A.C. 455-467) succeeded his father more through his military prowess than any strong claim to the throne as he was not the son of the first queen of Kumāragupta. Though he managed to keep the Hūṇas at bay, he had to face numerous domestic problems, and towards the end of his reign, the empire showed clear signs of disintegration. After Skandagupta, the Gupta authority was weakening rapidly though Budhagupta (c. A.C. 477–496) made a vain attempt to arrest the decline by rearranging the political and administrative structure. Since Budhagupta's demise the Guptas were fast losing control of most of western and central India, and in the meantime, the Hūṇas successfully broke through the Gupta defences and brought under their control a large part of northern India.[4] As a result, Gupta rule, for all practical purposes, was restricted to some areas of Bihar and Bengal. The available information on the political history of the period is so confusing that it is difficult to form a clear picture even of the order of succession of various rulers whose names appear occasionally in some inscriptions. What may be said with some degree of certainty is that the last known member of the Gupta line was one Viṣṇugupta whose Demodarpur (Begal) Copper Plate was issued in the Gupta Year 224 (A.C. 543/4).[5] By about A.C. 550 even Bihar and Bengal had come under several independent ruling families thus signalling the total disappearance of Gupta rule.[6]

Though the Guptas were able to conquer a large part of Northern India and the Deccan, they did not possess the same degree of centralized control over a large part of that territory as did the Mauryas over their empire. As is evident from the Allahabad inscription, even Samudragupta, who succeeded in conquering a number of kingdoms in the Deccan and the South, did not envisage imposing direct rule over such regions, but was satisfied with winning the mere allegiance of the local rulers who were allowed to continue in their positions. It was only in Northern India that the Guptas maintained some degree of central authority, but even that did not last long, for the Gupta feudatories were enjoying virtual autonomy from about the end of the 5th century.[7]

The Gupta period is generally described as the Classical Age of India on the grounds that it witnessed the high water-mark of the ancient Indian civilization with a 'wonderful outburst of intellectual activity and a unique efflorescence of culture,'[8] though some scholars have expressed reservations about this terminology arguing that such a description is applicable only to the upper classes of society amongst whom the living standards reached a high point unknown before.[9] It is further argued that the 'classicism' of the Gupta age was mainly confined to Northern India and that the Deccan and the south experienced its high level of civilization only in the post-Gupta priod.[10] Nevertheless, whether one agrees or not with the term 'Classical Age' in relation to the Gupta age, there is no denying of the fact that most of the subcontinent witnessed a high standard of civilization though it did not benefit every stratum of society in a uniform manner.

It is also noteworthy that the great cultural advances made in the Gupta period can in no way be considered as an isolated development restricted to the Gupta age itself. Indeed, most of the cultural traits that give a uniqueness to the Gupta age were already taking shape long before the rise of the Guptas. What is significant about the Gupta age is that all these developments which had begun in the previous centuries came to maturity in this period setting in motion a great leap forward in the Indian civilization. Among the many achievements of Gupta India, mention may be made of the excellent literary works of Kālidāsa the greatest Sanskrit poet. With the contributions of scholars like Āryabhaṭa and Varāhamihira, the Indians excelled in fields such as mathematics and astronomy, developing early forms of Algebra and Trignometry. The work of Suśruta which is again attributed to the Gupta times, bears testimony to the high level of knowledge the Indians had acquired in the field of medicine.[11] Thus as A. L. Basham has very rightly put it, 'the Gupta period merely assimilated these features fully in a complex civilization of unexampled urbanity to produce works of art, literature and learning which are among the greatest products of any early civilization anywhere."[12]

As in any other society in the ancient times, religion was a key factor behind the great cultural advances that were taking place in Gupta India too. Long before the advent of the Guptas and particularly after the Mauryas, the religious life of India was undergoing profound changes. The polytheistic nature of the Vedic religion was gradually but steadily changing into a belief system of

4. S. R. Goyal, *op. cit.*, pp. 370 ff.
5. *Epigraphia Indica*, Vol. XIV, 1919-1920, p. 142, line 1 ff.
6. R. C. Majumdar, *The Classical Age*, p. 44.
7. Romila Thapar, *A History of India*, Vol. I, Harmondsworth, 1969, pp. 141–42.
8. R. C. Majumdar, *op. cit.* p. xlii.
9. Romila Thapar, *op. cit.*, p. 136.
10. *Ibid.*
11. A. L. Basham, (ed.). *A Cultural History of India*, Oxford, 1975, p. 141 ff. and 170 ff.
12. See, Bardwell L. Smith, (ed.) *Essays on Gupta Culture*, Delhi, 1983, p. 2.

monotheism, thereby paving the way for the rise of two major religious beliefs around the Brahmanic deities Visnu and Śiva, ushering in a new phase in the Brahmanic religion. It is generally held that this new development in the Brahmanic belief system arose out of the need to meet the challenge posed by the two heterodoxies, Buddhism and Jainism, particularly the former.[13]

Many changes had been taking place within Buddhism too, both in its philosophy and in its structure. Schisms occurred in Buddhism from a fairly early stage of its history. The number of *nikāyas* kept on multiplying and some of them have been classified in later works as belonging to the Mahāyāna.[14] By the time of the Guptas, the Mahāyāna was a well established religious school and this form of Buddhism existed side by side with the non-Mahāyāna groups in many parts of India. Most of the major *nikāyas* of Buddhism have already come into vogue and among them mention may be made of the Sarvāstivādins, the Kāśyapīyas, the Dharmottarīyas, the Bhadrayānikas and the Mahāsaṅghikas as the *nikāyas* frequently referred to in pre-Gupta and Gupta records.[15]

Though most of the Gupta kings were followers of the Vaisnava faith, they generally pursued a policy of religious tolerance and thus were well disposed towards Buddhism as well. According to I-tsing,[16] Śrī Gupta, the first member of the Gupta dynasty, built a temple for the use of the Chinese Buddhist pilgrims at Mrgaśikhāvana and endowed it with the revenue of forty villages. Samudragupta is said to have granted permission to the ruler of Sri Lanka to build a monastery at Buddhagayā.[17] Budhagupta is described in Hsüan-tsang's account as a patron of the Nālandā monastery[18] while an inscription found at the same monastic complex, makes reference to a monastery built by a ruler named Bālāditya.[19] Bālāditya is another name used by Narasimhagupta, a Gupta king who reigned in the first half of the sixth century A.C. Vainyagupta, though a follower of the Vaisnava faith, as known from his Gunaighar Plate, sanctioned the donation of some land to the Mahāyāna *ācārya* Śāntideva, at the request of one of his royal officials.[20] This policy of religious tolerance pursued by the rulers paved the way for a healthy growth of religious pluralism for which the Gupta period has earned great fame. It also created an environment suitable for a better exchange of ideas and peaceful co-existence among many religious groups of the period.

Several inscriptions and many literary sources such as the records of the Chinese travellers Fa-hsien, Hsüan-tsang (early seventh century A.C.) and I-tsing (second half of the seventh century A.C.) and Buddhist texts and archaeological data provide useful information about the condition of Buddhism in the Gupta period. Of these, the records of the Chinese monk Fa-hsien (q.v.), who visited India in early fifth century A.C., is of particular significance not only because it is a contemporary source, but also because of Fa-hsien's keen interest in recording particulars about many Buddhist centres in all the regions he visited. In this regard, he provides valuable information about the communities of monks at different Buddhist monasteries including their doctrinal allegiances, the number of monks living in each monastery, the level of patronage received and even the general condition of the lay communities.

Of the major Buddhist centres in the Gupta kingdom Fa-hsien makes special mention of Buddhagayā where the Buddha attained enlightenment. To quote Fa-hsien:

> 'At the place where the Buddha attained perfect wisdom, there are three monasteries in all of which there are monks residing. The families of the people around supply the societies of the monks with an abundant sufficiency of what they require.... The disciplinary rules are strictly observed by them....."[21]

Sometime before the arrival of Fa-hsien a monastery had been built there by Kittisiri Meghavaṇṇa, a king of Sri Lanka, for the use of Sinhalese monks. This monastery ultimately grew into a major institution within the Buddhagayā monastic complex which consisted of several monasteries inhabited by monks belonging to different *nikāyas*. It was also the major north Indian Buddhist centre with which the Sri Lankan Buddhists maintained a close and constant relationship. The

13. A. L. Basham, *op. cit.* p. 60 ff.
14. For the history of Buddhist sects in pre-Gupta times, see, N. Dutt, *Buddhist Sects in India*, (reprint), Calcutta, 1970, and A. K. Warder, *Indian Buddhism*, Delhi, 1970, p. 286 ff.
15. Bardwell L. Smith *op. cit.*, p. 143.
16. J. Takakusu, *A Record of the Buddhist Religion as Practised in India and the Malay Archipelago by I-tsing*, (reprint), Delhi, 1966.
17. *Journal of the (Ceylon Branch) Royal Asiatic Society*, Vol. XXIV, No. 60, p. 75
18. T. Watters, *On Yuan Chwang's Travels in India*, Vol. II, 1905, p. 164.
19. *Epigraphia Indica*, Vol. XX, 1929-30, pp. 37-46.
20. The Gunaighar Plate in S. K. Maity and R. K. Mukerji, *Corpus of Bengal Inscriptions bearing on the History of Bengal*, Calcutta, 1967, pp. 65-70.
21. J. H. Legge, (tr.), *The Travels of Fa-hisen*, Cambridge, 1923, p. 87 ff.

monastery built by king Meghavaṇṇa did not remain a mere resting place for the Sri Lankan pilgrims, but gradually began to play an important role as a prominent Theravāda centre. The monastery always remained in the control of the Sri Lankan monks who soon became a force to reckon with as they formed themselves into a formidable group that could stand up to the Mahāyānist and Tantric challenge.[22]

Pātaliputra, the old capital of the Mauryas, was another important Buddhist centre well described by Fa-hsien. He lived there for three years studying Sanskrit and collecting Buddhist scriptures. According to him besides a famous stūpa constructed by emperor Asoka, there were two monasteries each belonging to the Mahāyāna and the Hīnayāna. He gives a graphic description of the functions of these monasteries, especially those of the Mahāyāna monastery, which served as a leading centre of Buddhist education.[23]

Nālandā, the centre of Buddhist learning flourished though it had by then not reached the zenith of its fame as the centre *par excellence* it enjoyed in later times.[24] Fa-hsien makes only a passing reference to it. Hsüan-tsang who gives a long account of this istitution, mentions Kumāragupta, Tathāgatagupta (Budhagupta?) and Bālāditya (Narasimhagupta) as past rulers who were patrons of Nālandā,[25] but the identification of these rulers with the Gupta kings with similar names is not certain.

Sārānāth was another place of significance to the Buddhists because of its association with the Buddha's first sermon. Again Fa-hsien's account of it is very brief and provides no valuable information. He merely mentions that there were two monasteries with some monks residing in them. But according to Hsüan-tsang, of the seventh century, there were some 1500 monks living at Sārānāth.[26] According to Fa-hsien, Mathura was a major Buddhist centre where there were some twenty monasteries with about three thousand monks, and the 'law of the Buddha still more flourishing.'[27] Hsüan-tsang also describes it in very lavish terms and states that monks belonging to both Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna lived there.[28] Several inscriptions belonging to the Gupta period have been found at Mathura but they are all votive inscriptions recording the gift of Buddha images and hence contain no other details.

Inscriptions, however, provide some useful information about certain aspects of monastic functions at Sāñchi. Two of the Sāñchi inscriptions belong to the Gupta period, one to the time of Candragupta II and the other to the time of Skandagupta.[29] Both these inscriptions refer to instances of donations of considerable amounts of money to two Buddhist *vihāras* for the performance of some religious functions. The functions envisaged by the donors included the feeding of monks and providing for the maintenance of lamps at several shrines. One of the benefactors of these donations was a high official under Candragupta II.

Apart from these major Buddhist centres, there were numerous centres with lesser numbers of monks and monasteries in many parts of the Gupta empire. Many more were flourishing in areas outside the confines of the territory of the Guptas. Among them mention may be made of the famous Buddhist centres in Saurāstra, Kashmir, Punjab, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh and Tamilnadu.[30] However, some of the old centres in Northern India had decayed and to some extent neglected while new centres were coming up in areas like Bihar, Bengal, Orissa, Gujarat and Central India. Kapilavāstu was 'desert' according to Fa-hsien, with only a few monks living there. Kusinārā and Vesāli, too, were desolate with a few visitors.[31]

It is clear from the evidence cited above, particularly that of the Chinese travellers, that there were a considerable number of Buddhist monasteries in many parts of the subcontinent during the Gupta period. The accounts of the Chinese travellers suggest that while the Mahāyāna groups were firmly entrenched, the non-Mahāyāna sections were in a state of decline in the areas under the Guptas. In fact, the non-Mahāyāna concentration was largely outside the territory of the Guptas. Nevertheless,

22. See P. V. B. Karunatilaka, 'Journeys to the Diamond Throne: Sri Lankan Buddhist Monks and Pilgrims at Buddhagayā', in S. Bandaranayake, L. Devaraja and K. D. G. Wimalaratne, (ed.), *Sri Lanka and the Silk Road of the Sea,* (UNESCO), Colombo, 1990, p. 141 ff.
23. Legge, *op. cit.*, p. 77 ff.
24. For a detailed description of the Nālandā monastery and its functions see, H. D. Sankalia, *The University of Nalanda* (second Revised Edition), Delhi, 1972.
25. T. Watters, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 86 ff.
26. *Ibid.*, pp. 46–45.
27. Legge, *op. cit.*, p. 42.
28. Watters, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, 1904, p. 301 ff.
29. J. F. Fleet, *op. cit.*, p. 31, 11. 5 ff. and pp. 261-262, 11. 2-7.
30. For a discussion on the condition of Buddhism in areas outside the territory of the Guptas, see Bardwell L. Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 140 ff.
31. S. Beal, (tr.) *Si-Yu-Ki, Buddhist Records of the Western World: Chinese Accounts of India*, London, 1981, Vol. II, p. 322 ff.

the general picture that emerges from the available information is that the Buddhist monks, irrespective of their doctrinal differences, had then been firmly organised on the basis of monasteries. Though this is a development that began long before the time of the Guptas, it was in this period that monasteries became fairly large institutions with hundreds, sometimes thousands, of monks concentrated in a single monastic complex. And most of these establishments also served as centres of education for monks and the laymen alike. In the period immediately after the Guptas, Buddhist centres like Nālandā and Valabhi became flourishing institutions of education catering to thousands of students from India and abroad.[32] As most of these centres had their origin in the Gupta times it may be surmised that they functioned in a similar manner in the Gupta period as well. In fact, Fa-hsien's account of the monasteries of Pāṭaliputra provides clear evidence regarding Buddhist monasteries serving as educational institutions in the Gupta times.

The establishment of monasteries and the concentration of large clerical communities in them brought about considerable changes in the life style of the Saṅgha. With the increase in the number of monks living in a monastery, the voluntary donations that came from a limited number of lay followers would certainly not have been sufficient to provide the requirements of the monks throughout the year; besides, even the construction of large buildings and their regular maintenance became a task beyond the capabilities of ordinary laymen, making it necessary for the monasteries to look for more stable and resourceful means of income. In these circumstances, the monasteries were becoming increasingly dependent upon the patronage of the more affluent sections of society such as the royalty, the royal officials and such other property owing groups.[33]

Though these changes had been taking place several centuries before the Guptas, it was in the Gupta period and after, that we see the monasteries develop into property owning organizations with direct involvement in economic functions. They came to be endowed with land, money, livestock and many other assets of economic value and had a fairly large labour force attached to them. Accordingly, the monastery became responsible for the management of property in its possession, ultimately shaping itself into one of the main institutions through which the general economy had been organized.[34]

The religious thought and literary activities of both the Mahāyāna and non-Mahāyāna schools also experienced a considerable growth in the period, but it was mostly the Mahāyāna philosophy and literature that showed a remarkable development under the Guptas. Several Mahāyāna scholars received lavish royal patronage. Vasubandhu, the famous philosopher and author of works such as the *Abhidharmakośa,* is believed to have been patronised by Candragupta II.[35] Vasubandhu's teacher Manoratha, and Saṅghabhadra who is said to be author of the Mahāyānasāra-śāstra were two other Mahāyāna scholars of fame who belonged to the Gupta period. The famous Buddhist logician Dinnāga author of several treatises including the *Pramāṇasamuccaya, Ālambanaparīkṣā, Tripiṭakaparīkṣā* and the *Nyāyamukha,* also lived in the last stages of the Gupta rule.[36]

Many Mahāyāna concepts that grew into prominence in later times had their origins in the Gupta age. It was during this period that the cults of Avalokiteśvara, Mañjuśrī and the goddess Prajñāpāramitā came to the forefront. The worship of Buddha Amitābha also became prominent in the Gupta Age. According to Fa-hsien, monks erected and worshipped stūpas dedicated to Sāriputra, Maudgalyāyana and Ānanda, three of the most prominent disciples of the Buddha.[37]

Towards the end of the Gupta period a schism took place in the Mādhyamika sect, the most important among the Mahāyāna schools. Consequent to this schism there came into being the groups known as the Svatantrikas and the Prāsaṅgikas, headed by Bhāvaviveka and Buddhapālita respectively.[38] Also it was in the Gupta period that the Yogāvacara Vijñānavāda school of the Mahāyāna reached the zenith of its development. Certain ideas and concepts expounded by the scholars of the Vijñānvāda school in texts such as the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra,* a work assignable to the Gupta period, ultimately paved way for the birth of concepts totally alien to the early Buddhist tradition. These concepts later became 'embellished with contemplation of *dhāraṇīs* and *mantras* culminating in the Mantrayāna and the Tantrayāna from about the seventh century A.D." [39]

32. L. M. Joshi, *Studies in the Buddhistic Culture of India,* Delhi, 1967, pp. 168–172.
33. See, P. V. B. Karunatilaka, "Buddhist Monasteries in Northern India: their Economic Functions in Early Medieval Times", in *Kalyani, Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences of the University of Kelaniya,* Vols. III and IV, 1984/85, Kelaniya, p. 83 ff.
34. *Ibid.*
35. L. M. Joshi, *op. cit.,* p. 8
36. *Ibid.* p. 809.
37. Bardwell L. Smith, *op. cit.,* p. 142.
38. L. M. Joshi, *op. cit.,* pp. 7–8.
39. M. Winternitz, *A History of Indian Literature*(reprint), New York, 1971, Vol. II, p. 303 ff., and Bardwell L. Smith, *op. cit.,* p. 149.

The Gupta age also marks an advanced stage of the art and architectural tradition of India, and a good number of the well preserved examples of the Gupta art belong to Buddhism. The high degree of aesthetic sense depicted in the Buddha images and other forms of decorative art found at places like Sārānāth bear testimony to the excellence of the Buddhist art of the Gupta age. The highly acclaimed Buddhist paintings at Ajaṇṭā (q.v.) and Ellora (q.v.) caves, though situated outside the confines of the Gupta empire, are generally treated as off-shoots of the Gupta main stream. So are the architectural forms found at caves in other parts of western India.[40]

The influence of the all-round cultural advances that took place in the Gupta period was not confined to the Indian subcontinent, but it made its impact in many countries including Sri Lanka, Central Asia, South-east Asia and even in far off China. Still, what is significant in the Gupta influence outside India was its overwhelming and unmistakable Buddhist character. See Pls. XXXI-XXXII.

P. V. B. Karunatilaka

GUṢIVĀḌA, (var. Gudivāda) the modern name of an ancient Buddhist site in the Kriṣna District in Southern India on the ancient route from Vangī or Vengī to the South, and Ghaṇṭaśālā and Bhattiprolu are two other well known Buddhist sites on this route. (See, K. R. Subramanian, *Buddhist Remains in Andhra and The History of Andhra,* Madras, 1932, pp. vi-viii). Gudivāda was the capital of the Kudūra country. A good road connects Peddavegi (via Ellora) and Gudivāda (ibid). This site, along with Bhattiprolu and Ghantaśālā was explored by an archaeologist named Rea in 1892. At the time of Rea's visit the ruins stood to a maximum height of eleven feet. Mitra mentions that "during an earlier demolition four stone receptacles were found each containing a crystal casket at four sides and they are now in the government museum in Madras. The mound at Gudivāda is hemmed in all sides either by roads or by houses. The stūpa now reduced to a low shapeless mound of bricks in the heart of the town, does not evince any interesting features" (D. Mitra, *Buddhist Monuments,* Sahitya Samsad, Calcutta, reprint, 1980, p. 216). The stūpa discovered at Gudivāda is one hundred and thirty feet in diameter and belongs to the second century B.C. At this site a large number of Buddha images were found though they do not represent any new noteworthy features. Among the finds are also some Sātavāhana and Roman coins. (A. Rea, *South Indian Buddhist Antiquities,* Archaeological Survey of India, Madras Archaeological Report 1892; B. N. Chaudhury, *Buddhist Centres in Ancient India,* Sanskrit College, Culcutta, 1969, p. 252). The presence of coins goes to establish that this centre came under money economy at an early date. Amita Ray writes that the antiquities discovered by archaeological explorations and excavations establish that Buddhism with its fully developed monastic organisation, its rites and rituals, images and symbols was introduced into this region during the third century B.C. and remained active till about the third century A.C. Buddhism may have been introduced to this region during the time of Asoka or immediately after Asoka and during the Sātavāhana rule" (Amita Ray, *Life and Art of Early Andhradesa,* Delhi, 1983, p. 185).

M. Karaluvinna

HADAYAVATTHU, heart as the physical base of consciousness, is regarded as the thirteenth of the twenty-four forms of derived matter *(upādā-rūpa).* Although there is no mention of it in the canonical texts it is referred to in commentarial and later literature.

While the term *hadaya* means the physical heart, the term *vatthu,* meaning physical base, is used to mean the physical organs on which the mental process is based and they thus constitute the five physical sense organs and (according to commentarial literature) the heart basis as the sixth. This sixth *vatthu* is not to be confounded with the sixth of the twelve spheres of sense *(manāyatana)* which is a collective name for all consciousness in general.

In the *Patthāna,* the seventh book of the *Abhidhamma Pitaka,* there is a recurring passage which refers to the corporeal phenomenon *(rūpa)* that serves, as support condition *(nissayapaccaya),* as the basis for the mind-element *(manodhātu),* the mind-consciousness element *(manoviññānadhātu)* and for the phenomena associated therewith (Tikap. p. 4).[1] It is the corporeal phenomenon of the writers of the Abhidhamma texts that was later given the designation *hadayavatthu* by the commentators. Thus in the description of the twenty-four forms of derived matter, Buddhaghosa describes the *hadayavatthu (Vism.* p. 447 f.) not only as the material

40. A. L. Basham, *op. cit.,* p. 202 ff.

1. Whereas here, in the Pali text, the mind-element and the mind-consciousness element, are given as occurring with heart-basis as the support condition *(nissaya-paccaya),* elsewhere (pp. 5, 17) the relation between the heart-basis and the mind-element is said to be that of prenascence-condition *(pure-jāta-paccaya)* and the relation between the heart-basis and the mind-consciousness element is said to be as prenascence-condition at times and not so at times.

support for the mind-element and the mind-consciousness element but also as subserving them and carrying out their functions. It is said to exist in dependence on the blood in the physical heart. Elsewhere *Vism.* p. 256, this physical heart is described as being of the colour of a red lotus petal and of the shape of a lotus bud with the outer petals removed and turned upside down. While its exterior is smooth the inside is compared to that of a loofah gourd *(kosātakī).* In those who possess understanding *(paññāvanta)* it is a little expanded while in those without understanding it is contracted. Inside it there is a hollow of the size of a *punnāga* seed-bed[2] where half a *pasata* measure (half a cupful) of blood is stored. It is this blood as support *(nissaya)* that *mano-dhātu* and *manoviññana-dhātu* occur. In a person of lustful temperament *(rāgacarita)* this blood is said to be red in colour and in one of malevolent temperament *(dosacarita)* black. In one of deluded temperament *(mohacarita)* it is like the water in which meat has been washed and in one of speculative temperament *(vitakkacarita)* it is like lentil soup in colour. In one of faithful temperament *(saddhācarita)* it is yellow and in one of wisdom *(paññācarita)* it is limpid, clear, unturbid, bright, pure and shining like a washed gem *(niddhota-jātimaṇi).* Buddhaghosa does not fail to say that the physical heart is found between the two breasts, near the middle of the frame of ribs (*ibid.* p. 356). Here the physical heart is described as a particular component of the body, without thought *(acetana),* indeterminate *(abyākata),* void *(suñña),* not a living being *(nissatta)* and belonging to the earth element.[3] This description refers purely to the physical heart independent of any mental activity.

The mind-element and the mind-consciousness element, which are found in the analysis of the *dhātus* or elements, and which have the *hadayavatthu* as their physical basis, are only two divisions of the consciousness in general which is designated as *manāyatana.* Hence it becomes difficult to conclude that the commentators of the Abhidhamma literature meant the *hadayavatthu* as the physical basis of mind absolutely. And, further it is said in the commentary (Translated into English by Ñāṇamoli in *Path of Purification,* p. 497, n.1) that "for while eye-consciousness etc. have the eye etc. as their respective supports absolutely, mind-consciousness does not in the same way have the heart-basis as its support absolutely."

However, this division of the thought process into two classes as *mano-dhātu* and *mano-viññāṇa-dhātu* seems to suggest a distinction observed in physiology between the brain and the spinal cord as the higher and the lower centres of the central nervous system. The proper functioning of the central nervous system depends on the proper functioning of the heart, and the close relation between the immaterial thoughts and the material nerve tissues is widely accepted and easily comprehensible. Considered in this light the term *vatthu-rūpa* used in the sense of substratum of matter to mean collectively the six physical organs on which the mental process is based, resembles the term central nervous system used in physiology to mean the co-ordinated mechanism of the brain and the spinal cord. However, in the ultimate analysis, the Buddhist concept of mind and matter *(nāma* and *rūpa)* as mutually dependent provides the most fundamental analysis of the human organism.

The fact that *manodhātu* and *manoviññāṇadhātu,* which have *hadayavatthu* as their support, are regarded not as consciousness in general but as two stages in the process of sense perception (i.e. marked by reception, investigation, determining, registering etc.) clearly shows that this Buddhist analysis, although not specifically mentioned, in fact treats of the functioning of the nervous system in association with the heart. Buddhaghosa's statement, referred to above, according to which there is a hollow inside the physical heart (there is no mention of the four-chambered heart) in which there is a handful of blood serving as the support for the mind-element and the mind-consciousness element, also shows that the function of the heart as the reservoir and distributor of blood was known to him. For, without this all-important activity of the heart the mind-body mechanism of man cannot function. The electric current-like messages that go to all parts of the body through the network of nerves cannot be if not for the supply of blood from the heart and in this sense it would not be wrong to localise the heart, in association with its blood, as the physical basis of consciousness. The nervous system carries out the functions of this mind-base. Although there is no canonical evidence to show that the Buddha accepted or rejected such a theory, it is quite possible that it might have been the general theory accepted at the time and as such it did not deserve to be separately treated.

Another important point that deserves attention both from a physiological and an ethical point of view is the relation between the quality of the blood and the quality of the thinking of the individual as mentioned by Buddhagosa *(ibid.* p. 256). The handful of blood in the cavity of the heart, serving as the basis of consciousness element, is said to vary according to the individuals and this variation depends on the character *(carita)* of the individual and on this basis human character is here

2. E. C. Baptist identifies *punnāga* with the tree known as *domba* in Sinhalese. He gives the botanical name as *calophyllum inophyllum guttiferae* which is also known as the Alexandrian laurel. The diameter of its seed in given as half an inch. *Abhidhamma for the Beginners,* pp. 122-3.
3. The English translation of the passages of the *Visuddhimagga* is based on that of Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli.

divided into six types mentioned above which, of course, is a very broad and general division.

It is generally accepted that the heart is the seat of emotions and it is emotions, when uncontrolled and unsublimated, that make people commit various acts that bring about suffering. The Buddhist method of solving this problem is to control and sublimate the emotions so that the individual can remain unaffected by them like the lotus in the water. By giving into and becoming victims of emotions what people actually do is to make knots in their hearts which become difficult to untie. The untying of such knots leading to release and enlightenment, as Lama Anagarika Govinda has pointed out *(Foundations of Tibetan Mysticism,* pp. 167-169), is a simile not only found in the *Upanisads* but used by the Buddha himself. It is by this kind of cutting of the ties of the heart, which is a graphic way of expressing the idea of purifying the heart of its defilements, that man can achieve enlightenment and release and have a character belonging to the sixth category mentioned above. By getting rid of evil thoughts one can gradually purify one's mind and thence improve the quality of one's blood. Mere physical purification cannot purify the heart. Outward cleanliness resulting from the inward purity is the genuine purification of the heart and it is traditionally stated as the advice of all the Buddhas.[4] Considered in the light of the above observations, too, it seems justified to hold the heart, in association with its blood, as the centre of the thinking mechanism of man.

According to the Buddhist conception of the psychic centres of the human body, of which usually six are enumerated, the centre that corresponds to the heart is called the ***anāhata-cakra*** (q.v.). Representing the element air, this centre is regarded as regulating and controlling the organs of respiration and is said to be situated on the vertical central axis of the body.

A. G. S. Kariyawasam

HADDA, an ancient Buddhist site in Afghanistan, greatly acknowledged as a centre of late Gandhāran Art. Hadda is situated in the Khyber pass near the modern town of Jalālābad, between Peshawar and Kabul.[1] Hadda is supposed to be (in also proximity of) the ancient Nagarahāra *(Na-Kie-lo-ho* of the Chinese travellers) of the Gandhāra kingdom[2].

Hadda as an archaelogical site became well known with the discovery of a large number of terra-cotta and stucco figures, torsos and figurines related to Buddhist art and stūpas with rich terra-cotta and stucco decorations and bas-reliefs depicting scenes from the life of the Buddha. The major discoveries at Hadda were made in the first quarter of the present century by a team of French archaeologists led by Foucher.

General Court in his unpublished memoirs mentions the ruins of Hadda in 1827. A little after this in 1839, John Kean conducted an archaeological survey of the Kabul area which included Hadda. In 1833, Martin Honiberger traversed the area in search of antiquities and unknowingly came across certain Buddhist stūpas at Dar-Ounta (Dār-Ūnta) within close proximity to Hadda. In the following year, Ch. Masson having met Honiberger, an antiquary working at the site, devoted his attention to excavate archaeological remains at the site of Hadda and Jalālābad. But his excavations happen to be of little value to the archaeologists as his main concern was directed towards research in numismatics, thus less attention was paid by him to the structural value and the architectural importance of his finds at the sites.

Another archaeological expedition of value was carried by Sir Louis Cavagnari in 1879. He was accompanied by W. Simpson who managed to recover some statues and engraved slabs of which some are now found in the British Museum.[3]

It was not until the French excavations of 1922, headed by the famous archaeologist M. Foucher, that the full significance of the remains could be appreciated. The hostile nature of the inhabitants of the area and the rugged terrain of the land presented much difficulty to the attempts of this French team. It is believed that, "before proper protective measures could be taken vast quantities of excavated sculpture were ruthlessly destroyed by the iconoclastic Moslem population of Jelālābād incited by the hostile Mullahs" (B. Rowland, op. cit. p. 111 note 3). The surviving finds from Hadda are equally divided between the Musée Guimet in Paris and the Musée de Kabul at Dar-ul-Aman.

4. *Sabbapāpassa akaranam*
Kusulassa upasampadā
Sacittapariyodapanam
Etam Buddhāna sāsanam

1. See map in *Artibus Asiae,* Vol. XXI 3/4, p. 233. Also see Seckel, *The Art of Buddhism,* p. 301.
2. J. Barthouse, *Les Fouiles de Hadda,* Paris, 1933, IV, p. 5; Beniamin Rowland. *The Art and Architecture of India.* 1953, p. 102.
3. H. Hackin, *L'Oeurve de la Delegation archaeologique française en Afghanistan,* 1922-32, Tokyo, 1933, p. 4ff.; J. Barthouse, op. cit. p. 11.

Recent finds have revealed that Hadda has been a centre of late Gandhāran art with an abundance of Indo-Hellenic and Greco-Roman characteristics. The repertory of Hadda consists predominantly of stucco and terra-cotta works. The use of stucco on such a vast scale in the Gandhāra area was believed to have begun in the third century A.C. after the Sassanian invasion of the Gandhāra kingdom.[4] The shifting of the patronage of the early Kusāna kings by about the 3rd century A.C. had resulted in a period of decadence on the entire field of Gandhāra art. The early masterpieces of lithic sculpture were never repeated. The Kīdara Kusāns or lesser Kusāns who made a vain bid to restore the glory of the Kusān Kingdom after the Sassanian invasion, could do nothing beyond repairing the works of the early Kusānas. The appearance of stucco and terra-cotta works in such abundance at Hadda could be accounted for by the introduction of a new as well as an easier medium to replace the earlier works on stone. Thus it could be surmised that Hadda had been a busy centre of architectural activity during this second phase of the Kusāna Kingdom. It could also be possible, that Hadda, which lies on one of the ancient trade routes between the East and the West, could have been a repertory for the supply of cult-objects of art, ranging from images of the Buddha and bodhisattvas to a variety of other objects, to callers from various centres from Buddhist countries throughout Asia. A general remark by Heinrich Zimmer, on this phase of Gandhāra Art, would further corroborate the above view, "they were mass produced in unpretentious skilled workshops, operating on a large scale and with as much speed as possible to provide numerous and extensive monasteries, stupas and other buildings with a lavish mantle of friese panels, statues and sculptured ornaments"[5]. Stucco figures of Buddhist Art with characteristics of the Gandhāra school have been discovered at various places beyond the Gandhāra region in Chinese Turkestan and the Far-East and in other Buddhist centres in Asia. Hadda stucco and terra-cottas are remarkably well made and are full of life and animation. There is a rare strength and vitality in these stucco figures. The element of portraiture is very strong and had reached perfection.

There can be little doubt but that all the stucco sculpture in Hadda was originally polychromed and brilliantly coloured. According to a general analysis of the stucco finds in the Kabul valley by Benjamin Rowland, "the flesh parts were tinted a pinkish terra-cotta shade, with lines of deeper red to indicate the folds of the neck, lips, nostrils etc. Brown irises defined the eyes, which were outlined in blue and brown. The robes of these Buddhist figures were painted a deep cinnabar; various colours, including a rich lapis-lazuli blue, were used to pick out the jewelled ornaments and head-dress" (B. Rowland, op. cit. p. 102).

The Hadda stucco and terra-cotta collection included a variety of ethnic types–Indian, Iranian, Greco-Roman, which speaks for the cosmopolitan nature of this centre. The stylistic variants, too, are equally great in number, ranging from a seemingly Hellenistic to purely Indian techniques.

The comparisons, published by French scholars, between Hadda sculptures and typical heads of the Gothic period have earned more fame to the finds at Hadda. Among the more classical pieces is a fragment of a figure holding a lapful of flowers. Not only the type and the floral attribute, but also the conception of the form and modelling appear entirely Roman to an even greater degree than the stone sculpture of Gandhāra.[6]

The affinity of Hadda art to the Gothic art of the 13th century is due to the fact that just as the art of Hadda is ultimately Greco-Roman in origin, Gothic sculptures, too, are based on classical prototypes. History bears evidence of the appearance of Romans in the West Asiatic field to subdue the Parthians who became the legitimate heirs to the Selucid Empire. Hence the inter mixture of Greek and Roman culture in the immediate vicinity of Afghanistan before Sassanian invasions of the area could be accounted for by the availability of Greco-Roman classical types within an easy reach of the Hadda artists.

The fame of Hadda as a pocket of neo-Hellenist art must have ceased to exist after the disastrous invasions of the Huns in the 5th century A.C. When the Chinese traveller Hsüan-tsang visited these sites, the stūpas were desolate and in ruins (S. Beal, *Buddhist Records of the Western World*, London, 1906, I, 91).

A full analysis of all the related sites in the Kabul valley would make a complete picture of the sculptural and architectural finds in these ancient Buddhist centres of Gandhāra art. Some relevant sites are, Bāmiyan, Begram (Kapīsa), Jamālgarhi, Jelālābād, Kabul, Kandahar, Kundus, Shāhi-Bahlol, Takht-i-Bāhi, Taxila.

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4. Benjamin Rowland, op. cit. p. 107; John Marshal, Greeks and Sakas in India, *JRAS.* 1947, pp. 16 - 17
5. H. Zimmer, *The Art of Indian Asia,* Vol. I, p. 346.
6. J. Hackin, op. cit. Fig. 4; Benjamin Rowland, op. cit. p. 102. J. Barthouse, op. cit. pl. 37. See also H. Ingholt, *Gandharan Art in Pakistan,* NY. 1957, p. 183.

HAIKU is a Japanese poetical form consisting of a metrical arrangement in three lines of 5, 7 and 5 syllables each. It is also known as Hokku which is the initial verse of Haikai Renga (linked verse). It originated in the first three lines of 31 syllable Tanka. The term haiku is the combined form of words 'hai-' in 'haikai' and '-ku' in 'hokku'. It was when the great master Matsuo Bashō (1644–1694 A.C.) elevated haiku to a highly refined form of poetry during the Edo period (1603–1867 A.C.) that haiku began to rival the older form of poetry. Originally, it was restricted to an objective description of nature indicative of one of the seasons. Haiku enjoys immense popularity among the Japanese even now and has produced after Bashō such great masters as Buson (1716–1783), Kobayashi Issa (1763–1827), Masaoka Shiki (1869–1902) etc in recently modern times.

After the establishment of the political capital in Edo (now called Tokyo), the Tokugawa shogunate became stable. As a result, commercial and literary activities steadily increased setting the stage for the rise of a townsman-oriented culture. It blossomed particularly during the Genroku era (1688–1703 A.D.), which, as long as its cultural epoch is concerned, lasted nearly a half century. Although the country was very much isolated trade-wise and culturally from the rest of the world owing to the government policy of self-imposed seclusion, commercial advances in the domestic scene were quite sufficient for the rise of a new rich class of merchants who played an increasingly important role in the dissemination of social and cultural independence. Another factor that contributed to the flourishing of Genroku culture was the rapid spread of learning and literacy among all classes in the 17the century. Under these circumstances, literary figures like Ihara Saikaku (1642 – 1693), poet and prose fiction writer and Chikamatsu Monzaemon (1653–1724), playwright, came to the forefront in the sphere of literary activities.

In the late 16th and 17th centuries, efforts, produced by the rise of a new culture designated as "townsman" culture, were made to liberate Renga from the bonds of the past. In these efforts two major schools of poetry emerged: the Teiman school headed by Matsunaga Teitoku (1571 – 1653) and the Danrin school which came into existence in the late 1670's and early 1680's. The former remained traditionalists, though innovators in the sense that they went beyond the restricted vocabulary of the traditional Renga. Then the latter school finally freed Haikai, a poetical form derived from Renga of medieval times in terms of both language and subject matter. Saikaku, whose literary interest as a member of the Danrin school in his early years was devoted to the composition of Haikai, thus found this poetic form to be a more effective device for lively and witty expression. However, the Danrin movement could not spread its wings due to the fact that its members concentrated mainly on clever word-play, which resulted in no time in the limitations of the scope of poetry.

It was Bashō who rescued Japanese poetry from the stalemate of the Danrin school. Born into a low-ranking samurai family, Bashō became a masterless samurai at the age of twenty-two. Then he abandoned his samurai status in order to devote himself to poetry in which he had been long interested. After studying for a while in Kyoto, he moved to Edo. Bashō like several famous poets of the past sought inspiration for his poems in his wide travels in the provinces. The most famous travel account of Bashō is "The Narrow Road of Oku" *(Oku no Hosomichi).*

The following is one of Bashō's best knows haiku poems:-

Furu ike ya!	The old pond, ah!
Kawazu tobikomu,	A frog jumps in:
Mizu no oto.	The water's sound![1]

H. Paul Varley writes: "..... The writer of haiku obviously cannot hope to enter into extended poetic dialogue. He must seek to create an effect, capture a mood, or bring about a sudden and sharp insight into the truth of human existence."[2] Bashō brought out in his above poem such truth of human existence. This is where Bashō found much inspiration in Zen Buddhism.

The following episode will illustrate the relation between Haiku and Zen Buddhism: There lived a poetess of Kaga called Chiyo (1703 – 1775) who was already reputed as a fine composer of haiku. Not being satisfied with a merely local fame and urged by her desire to improve herself in the art of making haiku poems, she called upon a famous haiku master who happened to visit her town. The master gave her a subject to write a haiku poem. The subject was "cuckoo", a bird much liked by the Japanese poets of haiku.

Chiyo tried several haiku poems on the subject, but the master rejected every one of them as merely conceptual. She was disappointed and beaten to the very end of her pride. One night she went on thinking about the subject. It was so intent that she did not notice it was dawning. Then the following poem formed itself spontaneously in her mind:

Hototogisu,	Calling "cuckoo", "cuckoo",
Hototogisu tote	All night long,
Akenikeri!	Dawn at last!

1. Cited from D.T. Suzuki's *Zen and Japanese Culture,* Tokyo, 1988, p. 227.
2. H. Paul Varley: *Japanese Culture,* Third edition, Tokyo, 1984, p. 172.

When this was shown to the master, he at once accepted it as one of the finest haiku ever composed on the subject. The reason was that her haiku truly communicated the author's genuine inner feeling without artifical or intellectually calculated scheme for any kind of effect. That is to say, there was no "ego" on the part of the author aiming at its own glorification. Chiyo for the first time realized that a haiku poem, so long as it is a work of poetical creativity, ought to be an expression of one's inner feeling altogether devoid of the sense of ego.

This is the meeting point between haiku and Zen. D.T. Suzuki has this to say about Zen: "Zen advises us not to follow the verbal or written teaching of Buddha, not to believe in a higher being other than oneself, not to practice formulas of ascetic training, but to gain an inner experience which is to take place in the deepest recess of one's being. This is an appeal to an intuitive mode of understanding, which consists in experiencing what is known in Japanese as Satori. Without Satori there is no Zen. Zen and Satori are synonymous." [3] "To experience Satori is to become conscious of the Unconscious (*mushin*, no-mind), psychologically speaking. Art has always something of the Unconscious about it." [4] He then writes about haiku: "A haiku does not express ideas but it puts forward images reflecting intuitions. These images are not figurative representations made use of by the poetic mind, but they directly point to original intuitions, indeed, they are intuitions themselves." [5]

Here are some of the representative haiku poems of various authors through the ages:

1. *Hitotsu ya ni* *Yujo mo netari,* *Hagi to tsuki.*	Under one roof, Prostitutes, too, were sleeping; The hagi flowers and the moon. [Bashō]
2. *Mizu soko no* *Iwa ni ochitsuku* *Kono ha kana.*	Under the water, On the rock resting, The fallen leaves. [Jōsō (1661-1704)]
3. *Asagao ya!* *Tsurube torarete* *Morai mizu.*	Ah! Morning-glory! The bucket taken captive! I begged for water. [Chiyo (1703 - 1775)]
4. *Tsuri-gane ni* *Tomarite nemuru* *Kocho kana.*	On the temple bell Perching, sleeps The butterfly, oh! [Buson (1716 - 1783)]
5. *O-botaru,* *Yurari-yurari to,* *Tori keri.*	A huge firefly, Waveringly, Passes by. [Kobayashi Issa (1763-1827)]
6. *Kusa mura ya;* *Na mo shiranu,* *Shiroku saku.*	Among the grasses, An unknown flower Blooming white. [Masaoka Shiki (1869 - 1902)]

Haiku in its briefest possible form seems to be suited for the Japanese people's artistic expression of their inner experience. D.T. Suzuki writes in the following manner of the Japanese character which will certainly help us to have a better insight into the Japanese mind influenced by Zen Buddhism and its relation to haiku: "The Japanese are not given to verbosity; they are not argumentative, they shun intelletual abstractions. They are more intuitional and wish to give out facts as facts without much comment, emotional as well as conceptual."[6]

References:

D.T. Suzuki: *Zen and Japanese Culture* Tuttle edition, Tokyo, 1988. H. Paul Varley: *Japanese Culture*, Third edition, Tokyo, 1986. Lewis Mackenzie, trs. and introduction: *The Autumn Wind: A Selection from the Poems of Issa*, Tokyo, 1984. Hajime Nakamura: *Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples*, Vol. 3, Tokyo, 1974, (in Japanese).

T. Endo

HAIMAVATA (Pali: Hemavata), one of the schools of early Buddhism, making its appearance in the third century after the Buddha's *parinirvāṇa*. Haimavatas find no mention in the *Śāriputra-paripṛcchā Sūtra* which is no doubt one of the earliest sources of information regarding the branching out of the various schools of early Buddhism, while other sources provide no coherent testimony. The *Dīpavaṃsa* (V. 54) refers to them as Hemavatika, arising first after the original branching off of seventeen schools *(vāda)* during the second century after the parinibbāna. And then they are lined up with the Rājagirikas, Siddhatthas, Pubba and Aparaseliyas, all of them grouped together by Buddhaghosa as Andhakas (*Kvu.* i. 9).

3. D. T. Suzuki: *Zen and Japanese Culture,* Tokyo, 1988, *Ibid.* p. 218
4. *Ibid.* p. 220
5. *Ibid.* p. 240.
6. D.T. Suzuki: *Zen and Japanese Culture,* Tokyo, 1988, *Ibid*,p. 230.

Somewhat later, Vasumitra identifies them with the Sthaviras who remained orthodox after the schism which gave birth to the Sarvāstivādins. According to the tradition of the Sammitīyas the Haimavatas are the first school detaching itself from the Sthaviras. From all this, at least so much will be clear that the Haimavatas are a sub-division, which later on is grouped among the Mahāsaṅghikas, according to Bhavya and Viṇītadeva and more precisely among the Andhakas by Buddhaghosa. Vasumitra attributes to them also the five theses of Mahādeva which formed the basis of the doctrine of the Mahāsaṅghika.

Commenting on Vasumitra, who dates the appearance of the Haimavatas at the beginning of the third century after the Buddha's death, Paramārtha relates that the conservative Sthaviras reacted against the influence of the Kātyāyanīputras, who gave over much importance to the Abhidharma by breaking away on the pretext of a return to the teaching of the sūtras alone, and established themselves in the Himalayan regions from where the name of their school was derived, according to the orthodox tradition (P. Demieville, *L'Origine des Sectes bouddhiques,* pp. 23 - 3 and 53-4).

Przyluski has attempted to identify the Haimavatas with the Kāśyapīyas *(Concile de Rājagṛha,* pp. 317-18), but this is contradicted by the fact that all sources make a clear distinction between these two schools (N. Dutt, *Early Monastic Buddhism,* II, pp. 170-1).

It does not appear, however, that the Haimavatas were considered as a separate school before the end of the fourth century A.C. for even at that time it had been observed that a group of Sthaviras residing in the Himalaya had preserved an archaic form of doctrine, probably owing to their isolated position in the mountains. At least that was the view of Vasumitra and the Sammitīyas. When it was found later, that their doctrine was strongly influenced by the Mahāsaṅghikas, they were accommodated with them.

There is no extant inscription, nor any testimony of the Chinese travellers, regarding the places of residence of the Haimavatas, but their name gives us a sufficiently clear indication thereto.

A Chinese translation of the *Vinaya- mātrkā,* entitled *P'i-ni-mu-ching, (taisho,* No. 1463; *Nanjio* No. 1138), appears to be a text belonging to this school; for, the recital of the Council of Rājagṛha terminates with a reference which indicates the origin of this text: 'This is the canon which five hundred monks reassembled in the Himalaya.' In this text special reference is made to the Himalayan region, to the necessity of warm clothing for the monks who dwell there and to Kāsyapa, the apostle of the Himalaya. It contains also a description of the canon of which this text forms part. The canon is here (op. cit. p 818) divided into three collections *(piṭaka)* of five sections each:

Vinaya-piṭaka:	*Bhikṣu-prātimokṣa, Bhikṣuṇī-prātimokṣa, Kaṭhina, etc., Mātṛkā, Ekottara*
Sūtra-piṭaka:	*Dīrghāgama, Madhyamāgama, Ekottarāgama, Saṃyuktāgama, Kṣudrakāgama (or Saṃyukta-piṭaka)*
Abhidharma-piṭaka:	*Sapraśnaka-vibhaṅga, Apraśnaka-vibhaṅga Saṅgraha, Saṃyukta, Prasthāna*

But elsewhere (op. cit. p. 820) a slight difference can be observed in the division of the *Sūtra-piṭaka,* where not only the order of the first four *āgamas* varies, but also the *Kṣudrakāgama* is omitted. The reading *Saṃyukta-piṭaka* (Chinese: *Tsa-ts'ang)* seems to be preferable to *Kṣudrakāgama,* the restoration of Przyluski who appears to have been guided by a similarity with the Pali Canon. One would do well to remember here, that the Mahāsaṅghikas and the Bahuśrutīyas possessed a fourth collection in their Canon, entitled the *Saṃyukta-piṭaka.*

Further, the scheme of the *Abhidharma-piṭaka* is identical with that of the Dharmaguptakas and the one mentioned in the Śāriputra-Abhidharma-śāstra, but for the amalgamation there of the third and fourth divisions into a *Saṅgraha-saṃyukta.*

The most outstanding points on which they differ from earlier schools are:

1. The bodhisattva is a worldling *(pṛthagjana).* (This thesis is mentioned by Vasumitra, but Bhavya mentions the opposite).
2. Heretics cannot attain the five kinds of superknowledge *(abhijñā),* according to Vasumitra and Vinitadeva, but Bhavya again mentions the opposite).
3. Among the gods there is no continence *(brahmacarya),* neither is there the development of the Path *mārga-bhāvanā).*
4. A bodhisattva enters the mother's womb at the time of his conception without producing any desire *(kāma).*
5. An Arhat may be seduced by another *(paropahṛta;* he may have ignorance *(ajñāna)* in some respects, may entertain doubts *(kāṅkṣā),* receive instructions from someone else *(paravitīrṇa)* and utter a cry *(vacībheda)* on entering the Path.
6. The conflict of sorrow *(duḥkha)* is shunned *(prajahati)* by means of the Path.
7. The individual *(pudgala)* is distinct from the aggregates *(skandha),* for, when Nirvāna is attained, the individual subsists, while the aggregates cease *(niruddha).*

This last thesis which is typical of the Pudgalavāda, being attributed to this school by the Sammitīyas who were Pudgalavādins, is for that reason extremely suspicious, especially when Vasumitra notes that the other theses of the Haimavatas are similar to those of the Sarvāstivādins.

According to Tāranātha, this school had ceased to exist during the time of Dharmapāla and Dharmakīrti, that is during the seventh century A.C. (Schiefner's translation p. 175).

BIBLIOGRAPHY: N. Dutt, *Early Monastic Buddhism;* Andre Bareau, *Les Sectes bouddhiques du petit Vehicule;* Przyluski, *Le Concile de Rajagrha;* P. Demieville, *L'Origine des Sectes bouddhiques.* Schiefner, *Taranath's Geschichte des Buddhismus in Indien.*

H. G. A. van Zeyst

HANAMATSURI or the Festival of flowers is at present performed in Japan on the 8th of April to celebrate the birth of the Buddha. The main item of this festival is the bathing of the image of the new-born bodhisattva with sweetened tea *(amacha).* For this the devotees prepare an altar colourfully decorated with flowers. In its centre is placed an ornamental vessel in which is placed the image of the infant bodhisattva represented in his characteristic posture, with the right hand raised high and the index finger pointed towards the sky. This is the posture which he had assumed when, just after his birth, he made his undaunted declaration of his superiority to all beings in the universe. A ladle and a bowl containing sweetened tea are kept on a side, so that the devotees who participate in this festival could pour sweetened tea over the head of the image.

An old Buddhist tradition found in the *Jātakanidāna* records that just after the birth of the bodhisattva, two streams of water fell miraculously from the sky, one on the infant bodhisattva and the other on his mother queen Māyā, in order to refresh their bodies (*J.* I, p. 53). This tradition, with minor variations in details, became widely prevalent in northern schools of Buddhism, specially in China where the ceremonial bathing of the image of the infant bodhisattva came to be considered as an extremely meritorious act. According to Chinese sources, however, this ceremony is of Indian origin, and I-tsing, the Chinese traveller monk of the T'ang dynasty makes reference to such a ceremony performed in India. Whatever the place of its origin this ceremony was extremely popular in China and was subsequently introduced to Japan, probably in the latter part of the 8th century. In Japan this festival is observed to date as a symbolic enacting of the miraculous bathing of the infant bodhisattva (see BATHING).

In Japan, however, this ceremony appears to have been blended with a Shinto ceremony also called Hanamatsuri centered on the Kami. The exact process in which this blending took place is not known. But perhaps one finds in this an indication of the early tendency towards amalgamation of Buddhism and Shintoism, a process which culminated in the Ryobu-Shinto movement. Another consideration which also could have facilitated this blending may be the timing of the two festivals, for if not the exact dates, at least the period in which the two festivals were held may have coincided, and hence the amalgamation became facilitated.

Gathering of flowers of different hues is the most marked feature in the Shinto rite. Some Japanese do yet observe this Shinto rite which is also fixed for the 8th of April. On this day the participants of this rite climb the nearby mountain cliffs, spend the day in merriment and then gather flowers of different hues and return home in the evening. The original belief seems to have been that the mountain-deities *(Yama-no-Kami),* who are none other than ancestral *Kami,* follow the flowers, return to their old homes and turn into guardians of rice-fields *(ta-no-Kami).* It may be that when the two ceremonies became amalgamated the *Kami* aspect of the Shinto ceremony paled into insignificance leaving in prominance only the flower gathering aspect which became highlighted in the Buddhist ceremony, for offering of flowers as a gesture of honour, reverence and gratitude is a well established practice in Buddhist worship.

S. K. Nanayakkara

HAPPINESS. Dictionaries are generally agreed in referring to happiness as being characterised by or showing pleasure of contentment. Since we are writing here in the Buddhist Encyclopaedia let it be first declared that it is the Pali word *sukha* (=happiness) which gives us our sense of direction. We do not wish to drift away from scriptural authority and speculate with unlimited freedom. Buddhist thinking looks upon happiness which primarily connotes a state of mind as operating in or having its genesis in both the physical and mental planes: *sukhanti dve sukhāni kāyikañca sukhaṃ cetasikañca sukhaṃ* (Ps. I. 188). This same text, the *Paṭisambhidāmagga* offers us some very insightful comments about both these categories of happiness or *sukha.* In both cases, happiness results from getting what one wishes for or seeks after. The Pali word which connotes this is *sāta* which means 'wished for' or 'gained' (Cp. Monier

Williams *Sanskrit English Dictionary* p. 1196 column 3). This word is often used as equivalent to and paired with *piya* (=dear or pleasant) as in *yam loke piyarūpam sātarūpam (D.* II. p. 304). Note here the beautiful comment on this in the Atthakathā :....*attanā patiladdhāni catusamutthānikagandhārammanādini kassa aññassa evarūpani atthiti maññanti. Tesam evam maññamānānam tāni cakkhādini piyarūpādini ceva sātarūpāni ca honti* (*AD.* III. p. 800).

A further keen observation is made in differentiating both categories of physical and mental happiness, two stages or two states of happiness. One is at the production level in the very process when it is referred to as *sukhā vedanā* i.e. sensing or experiencing happiness (both physical and mental: *kāya samphassajā cetosamphassajā sātā sukhā vedanā)* and the other at the production level when it is referred to as *sukham vedayitam* i.e. sensed or experienced happiness *(kāyasamphassajam sātam sukham vedayitam (Ps.* I. p. 188). At the mundane level of worldly existence, herein lies the joy of living or the happiness which the senses provide in their communication with the world. This happiness *(sukham somanassam)* is indicated as the gratification through the senses or *kāmānam assādo (yam kho bhikkhave ime pañcakāmagune paticca upajjati sukham somanassam kāmānam assādo. M.* I. p. 85). This position is philosophically viewed as being very restricted or circumscribed in the production of genuine states of happiness *(appassādā kāmā vuttā bhagavatā.... M.* I. p. 132). Such forms of happiness are relatively so because they bring in their wake considerable stress and strain and untold bitterness and dissatisfaction *(ādinavo ettha bhiyyo.* See further *M.* I. p. 132). Buddhism never denies the existence and the experiencing by man of different forms and levels of happiness but stresses the importance of making a realistic and relative estimation of such happiness in relation to the price that a man of the world has to pay for its purchase.

Granting the possibility of enjoying happiness at the down-to-earth mundane level in terms of material considerations, Buddhism envisages a very pragmatic and at the same time an ethically exalted plane of happiness for the man of the world. The *Anguttara-nikāya (A.* III, p. 67) provides us with a beautiful analysis and examination of this situation. Fulfilment of material needs, starting from food and raiment *(ghāsacchādana-paramatā)* man must have these things of daily need upto a satisfactory degree to prevent him suffer from want or have the means whereby to acquire them. This first situation is referred to as the happiness of possession or *atthisukha.* It is a reminder to the world of today that the Buddha who appeared in the world two and a half millennia ago was fully alive to the problem of the haves and the have-nots. Thus while possession implied happiness *(atthisukha),* non-possession or poverty spells unhappiness. The Pali word used for this lack or deficiency of basic needs of existence, which is the state of poverty, is *dāliddiya.* The unhappiness resulting from poverty or non-possession is *dukkha* and the word *sukha* is used to refer to the happiness resulting from possession (i.e. *atthisukha).* This is the rule with regard to the man of the world that he must have the means to supply himself with the needs in order not to be plunged in a state of unhappiness. Buddhist thinking refers to very positively and specifically saying 'To the pleasure seeker of the world, poverty indeed is painful' – *Dāliddiyam bhikkhave dukkham lokasmim kāmabhogino* (*A.* III, p. 351 f.). On the other hand, it is no secret that the true aspirant to the goal of *Nibbāna* in Buddhism finds that for him it is the rule to renounce *(nekkhamma, patinissagga, apacaya* etc.) and that total non-possession is his primary source of happiness. But as a man of the world he finds that it is possessions *(bhoga)* which provide him with his physical and mental happiness and satisfaction *(idha gahapati ariyasāvako utthānaviriyādhigatehi bhogehi bāhābalaparicitehi sedāvakkhittehi dhammikehi dhammaladdhehi attānam sukheti pineti sammā sukham pariharati: A.* III, p. 45). This means that happiness has to be acquired, either for one's own sake or for the sake of others, righteously and correctly and with injury to none. The means must be justifiable on its own grounds *(dhammikehi dhammaladdhehi).*

Whichever way one looks at happiness, whether with a philosophical sobriety and a meaningful level-headedness as indicated above or not, the human mind is attracted towards happiness *(sukha)* and is repelled by its opposite *(dukkha).* Associated with the desire to live and to avoid death is the desire to be happy and avoid unhappiness (...*jivitukāmā amaritukāmā, sukhakāmā dukkhapatikkūlā D.* II. p. 330). But herein comes the Buddhist standpoint towards happiness which is precise and totally uncompromising. The Buddha very clearly states in the *Mahāsaccaka Sutta* that happiness, to be acceptable and permissible, has to be free from lustful stains and sinful blemishes *(Na kho aham tassa sukhassa bhāyāmi yam tam sukham aññatreva kāmehi aññatra akusalehi dhammehi: M.* I. p. 247). This immediately implies the existence in terms of Buddhist thinking, of unacceptable grades of happiness, which share of the nature of lust *(=kāma)* and evil *(akusalā dhammā).*

There is also a reckoning of grades of happiness as superior or inferior, of higher and lower quality even within the same permissible area. While at a mundane, down-to-earth level a comparably lower level of happiness satisfies an average worldling, the religio-intellectual maturity which accompanies spiritual development of man in Buddhism makes him opt for the higher grades of happiness which are both permitted and recommended within the framework of transcendental *(lokuttara)*

growth in Buddhism. While the Buddha in the *Mahāsaccaka Sutta*, as quoted above, indicates the permissible areas within which a Buddhist may legitimately seek his quota of happiness (.....*yam tam sukham aññatra kāmehi aññatra akusalehi dhammehi M.* I. p. 247), and this he is presumed to be doing *(attano sukham esāno; Dhp. v.* 132). Buddhism also envisages spiritually higher grades of happiness which relatively reduce, without the batting of an eyelid, the worth of worldly happiness to a mere zero. This is the implication of the venerable Mahā Kassapa's observations about the joy and happiness he gets from a true comprehension of the Truth or *dhamma* as against his reactions to the melodies of super-grade orchestral music:

Na pañcangikena turiyena
rati me hoti tādisi
yathā ekaggacittassa
sammā dhammam vipassato (Thag. v. 1071)

'I do not derive so much joy and delight from the strains of music of the five-fold orchestra as much as I do when I grasp with a unified mind the truths of the teaching' (= *dhamma).*

The life of man in the world is a reality which Buddhism reckons with. But the exalted character of the sensory reactions to the stimuli of the world as reflected here does not necessarily imply a total ban on them to the man of the world. The Buddhist stress is on the fact that life in the world and all else associated with it i.e. everything besides and below *nibbāna* are conditioned or in other words are *sankhata,* having the characteristic of *anicca, dukkha* and *anatta,* of being transient, unsatisfactory and essenceless.

Both a realization of this position and acting in accordance with it are insisted on and beautifully reflectd in the story of young Dīghāvu in the *Samyutta-nikāya (S.* V. p. 344 ff). The Buddha himself is seen personally giving this admonition to Dīghāvu advising him to cultivate this new vision of life in the world and pointing out to him the way to release therefrom. The vitality and vibrancy of this exposition as a totally effective religious way compels us to produce it here in full in the original Pali. We consider it to be one of the finest examples of experiential religious culture, effected and recorded almost in the company of the Buddha.

Tasmātiha tvam Dīghāvu imesu catusu sotāpattiangesu patitthāya cha vijjābhāgiyadhamme uttarim bhāveyyāsi. Idha tvam Dīghāvu sabbasankhāresu aniccānupassī viharāhi anicce dukkhasaññī dukkhe anattasaññī pahānasaññī virāgasaññī nirodhasaññī ti. Evam hi te Dīghāvu sikkhitabban ti (S. V. p. 345).

To the Buddhist, the state which is the opposite of this samsāric state, i.e. the unconditioned state of Nibbāna which is *asankhata* is equally a reality. That is the logical opposite of *samsāra* and for that very reason it is no more than the reality of the non-existence of a state of painful processes: *upādānapaccayā bhavo, bhavapaccyā jāti, jātipaccayā jarāmaranam.* One is doubtful whether the oft-quoted passage at *Udāna (Ud.* p. 80) implies a factual existence of such a state beyond death. Its total and tremendous reality from the time of release to the point of material and consequent psychic break-up in death with a down-to earth fullness, precludes us from stretching anything in any form beyond this. The *Alagaddūpama* Sutta sees very clearly the liberatedness of the liberated being *(vimuttacitto bhikkhu)* in this form.

Evam vimuttacittam kho bhikkhave bhikkhum saindadevā sa-brahmakā sa-pajāpatikā anvesam nādhigacchanti idam nissitam tathāgatassa viññānam ti. Tam kissa hetu. Ditthe'vāham bhikkhave dhamme tathāgatam ananuvejjo ti vadāmi. (*M.* I. p. 140)

The *Kevaddha Sutta* speaks of this final termination of the samsāric man in Nibbāna as follows:

Viññānam anidassanam anantam
sabbato pabham
ettha āpo ca pathavī tejo vāyo na gādhati
ettha dīghañ ca rassañ ca anum thūlam
subhāsubham
ettha nāmañ ca rūpañ ca asesam uparujjhati
viññānassa nirodhena etth'etam uparujjhati.

This declaration by the Buddha to Kevaddha, (*D.*I. p. 223) the householder's son, implies an unquestionable totality of cessation in Nibbāna.

Therefore, Buddhism sees no contradiction in prescribing within its specific dimensions, for what would be deemed happiness for the man of the world. Nevertheless, the Buddhist has learnt to look upon Nibbāna as the highest happiness.

Nibbānam paramam sukham. It is so because it is the highest point of total dispossession, dispossession of those which stand in the way of true happiness, and the *Dhammapada* (*v.* 200) sums it up in no uncertain terms when it says –

Happily indeed do we live, we who have nothing,
Nothing by way of impediments to spiritual process.

Susukham vata jīvāma
yesam no natthi kiñcanam.

Bhikkhu Dhammavihari

HARIBHADRA, also known as Simhabhadra, was a pupil of Śāntaraksita. He took up the Perfection of Wisdom *(Prajñāpāramitā)*[1] as his special field of study

and prepared a series of works on the subject, in keeping with the views of his teacher.

In Tibet, Haribhadra is regarded as the principal source for the interpretation of *Abhisamayālaṅkāra* of Maitreya, the basic text on Perfection. His fundamental commentary on it, taken as the basis for its exegesis, is the *Sphutārthā*, also known as his Small Commentary. His *Abhisamayālaṅkārāloka* which explains the same text, often in the same words, incorporates also a full commentary on the *Astasāhasrikā Prajñā-pāramitā*, It aims to show how each passage of the *Sūtra* is in fact related to a topic of the way, quoting in conjunction with it the corresponding verse from Maitreya and without departing from the sequence of the latter's verses. Occasionally, another version of the *Prajñāpāramitā*, namely, the *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā*, is referred to as well. This last version is the subject of another of Haribhadra's works, a summary of the same version according to the *Abhisamayālaṅkāra*. He also wrote another commentary on the *Abhisamayālaṅkāra* with references to the *Ratnagunasañcayagāthā*, entitled the *Subodhinī*.

The basis for the interpretation of the *Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras* is the distinction of the two levels of reality. In addition, the non-perception of phenomena is stressed, i.e., not perceiving them as separate phenomena, since, in the ultimate analysis, there is no duality.

The training *(yoga)* is at the concealing *(samvrti* cf. Pali *sammuti* =conventional) level, ultimately *(tattvatah)* it is a non-training *(ayoga)*. Enlightenment is attained at the concealing level. Good and bad, actions and results, are only at the concealing level, not at the ultimate. All beings are at the ultimate level pure by nature, and the thought of the Tathāgata is not subject to change, to origination or cessation. Tathatā of the Tathāgata is not different from that of all phenomena.

Thus, in the course of his works, Haribhadra criticises the Vijñānavāda doctrine of the ultimate reality. Such an eternally pure element of phenomena *(dharmadhātu)* could not be attained. The knowledge of this reality being already pure, there could be no question of getting rid of its defilements and imaginings; otherwise it would not in fact be completely pure.

Contrary to Vijñānavādins, the nature of thought and the so-called three characteristics *(trissvabhāva)* are to be understood as follows: As imaginary *(parikalpita)* thoughts are imperceptible, being unreal, because they have no characteristics; as dependent *(paratantra)* they are imperceptible, being unreal, because they have no causes (do not originate, therefore): As perfected *(parinispanna)* they are imperceptible, being unreal, because they are not perfected, since they have no own nature *(svarūpa)*. The Vijñānavādins, he says, misinterpret the Perfection of Wisdom *(Prajñā-pāramitā)* and their view either will not account for experience or will conflict with non-duality *(advaya)*.

Though he generally follows Dharmakīrti, even in details, Haribhadra utilises three means of knowledge *(pramāna)*: perception *(pratyaksa)*, inference *anumāna)* and tradition *(āgama)*, apparently taking the last as an independent means of knowledge; Dharmakīrti takes only the first two as valid means of knowledge.

His work of expounding *Pāramitā* was continued by his pupil Buddhaśrījñāna (A.K. Warder, *Indian Buddhism*, Delhi, 1970, pp. 478 ff).

Upali Karunaratna

HARIPUÑJAYA. See DHĀTU-HARIPUÑJAYA

HĀRĪTĪ, a tutelary goddess, worshipped by Mahāyānists. According to legend she was originally a yaksinī, an ogress, a cannibal demoness, a piśācī, who had an insatiable desire for devouring children, before being converted by the Buddha at Rājagaha.

The name Hārītī, identifying the tutelary goddess, occurs only in the texts of the Mahāyānists. Franklin Edgerton (*BHS*. s.v.) describes Hārītī as follows: name of deity, referred to as a yaksinī, rāksasī or Bhūtamātar (see also *Saddharmapundarīka* ed. Kern. 1902, 400-7; *Svrn.*, p. 3. p. 162, *Mmk.* 44; *Sādh.* p. 103; *Lalitavistara*, ed. Lefmann, Halle 1902, p. 202). Of the texts referred to above none could be ascribed to a period before the first century of the Christian era.

Other than these textual references most fascinating remarks have been made of Hārītī by the two famous Chinese pilgrims Hsüan-tsang and I-tsing. Both refer to the cult of the goddess Hārītī among the Mahāyānists. Hsüan-tsang refers to a stūpa built in the Gandhāra kingdom near the town Puskalāvatī and identifies it as the place where the Buddha converted the mother of demons: "Here Śākya Tathāgatha converted the mother of demons and caused her to refrain from hurting men. It is for this reason that the common folk of this country offer sacrifices to obtain children from her". *(Chinese Accounts of India, translated from the Chinese of Hieun Tsiang*, by Samueal Beal, Calcutta 1958, Vol. II, p. 160).

According to I-tsing, the mother of demons was Hārītī (Ko-li-ti) and was venerated by the Buddhists in India as well as in China of his time. He refers to an image of the divine mother, (Hārītī) in the refectory of a monastery in India to which oblations were made at meal time. I-tsing identifies the image with Hārītī and relates the story of

her, how she, once an ogress, was converted by the Buddha and since then was worshipped by the Buddhists as the patron-deity of women seeking children and other wishes. He further says that the narrative of Hārīti is given in full in the *Vinaya* (of the Sarvāstivādins) and the portrait of the demon-mother of children (Kuei-tze-mu) has already been found in China *(A Record of the Buddhist Religion* by I-tsing, translated by J. Takakusu, Oxford 1986, pp. 37 f.; S. Beal, op. cit., p. 160, n. 96).

The legend of Hārīti according to the *Samyuktavastu* is as follows: At the time when the Buddha was dwelling in the Vihāra of the Bamboo Grove in Rājagaha, there was a yakṣa, protector of the region, named Sātāgiri. He was the brother of the yakṣinī Abhiratī, whose hand was promised to the son of the yakṣa protecter of Gandhāra called Pañcāla.

One day she confided to him that she wished to capture and eat all the children in Rājagaha. Sātāgiri remonstrated with her in vain, and, hoping to turn her from evil design, gave her in marriage to Pañcika, the son of yakṣa Pañcāla of Gandhāra. By him she had five hundred sons of whom the youngest was named Priyaṅkara, the most beloved of her.

But in Rājagaha all the children had disappeared and the parents in their despair appealed to the king who in turn invoked the yakṣa of the region. The yakṣa revealed to the parents that their children had been devoured by the yakṣinī Abhiratī and that they must go to the Buddha for protection. From that time she was called Hārīti, "the stealer of children". Having been informed by the people of Rājagaha, the Buddha, in order to reform her, concealed her youngest son Priyaṅkara, in his almsbowl. Hārīti sought for him in all the four quarters until she was advised by the lord of yakṣas Vaiśravaṇa to seek refuge in the Buddha.

Hārīti, thus went to the Buddha and having prostrated herself before him, besought him to release her beloved son. The Buddha promised to restore Priyaṅkara to her on condition that she would follow his precepts and provide security to children. Hārīti was soon converted, but having, forsworn all human food, she asked the Buddha on what food she and her five hundred children could thrive. The Buddha quietened her fears by ordering the monks to offer Hārīti and her children daily at each repast, the same food of which they themselves partook.[1]

The legend of Hārīti, the ogrees, is not found in Canonical Pali literature of Theravāda Buddhism but *Mhv.* xii, 21, states that the yakkha Pandaka *(Ext. Mhv.* xii, 25 Bhandaka) together with the Yakkhi Hārīti and 500 sons gained the First Fruit of the Path under Asoka's apostle to Kasmiragandhāra, the Elder Majjhantika. Similar legends of ogresses are not wanting in the Cannon; ee for example the story of yakkhinī Kālī, an attendent of Vessavana, (Kubera). She too, like Hārīti, was an ogress in the habit of devouring children and was later converted by the Buddha. Her aid was invoked for the protection of the crops and eight ticket-meals *(salākabhatta)* were established in her honour (*DhpA.* I. pp. 37 ff. see Kālī 4 in *DPPN*).

Apart from these sporadic legends found in Pali literature there is no evidene of a developed cult of the tutelary goddess Hārīti among the Theravādins. However, the reference, made in the *Mahāvamsa* (loc. cit.) is valuable in the sense that it throws some light on the legend of Hārīti and her 500 sons, prevailing in the Gandhāra region as far back as the early Christian era.

The above reference would give a glimpse of evidence for the origin and development of the cult of Hārīti, in the Gandhāra region particularly and amongst Mahāyānists in general. To corroborate this statement, one could obtain sufficient evidence form the field of archaeology. The representation of the goddess, Hārīti, singly or with her husband Pañcika, was a common theme of the early Gandhāra artists. A. Foucher, the French Archaeologist, has devoted a full study of the representations of Hārīti in Buddhist sculpture (A.Foucher, *The Beginnings of Buddhist Art,* Paris-London 1914, 'The Buddhist Madonna' pp. 271 ff). Foucher attributes the origin of the cult image of Hārīti, the Mahāyānist mother goddess, to the sculptors of Gandhāra, whence the cult (image) has spread in its multilateral path within other Buddhist countries reaching as far as China, Korea, Japan and Sumatra-Java.[2] Recent finds of the demonic goddess Hārīti in statuary and in painting in Mahāyāna Buddhist lands, fully justify the statements made by the two Chinese itinerant monks Hsüan-tsang and I-tsing in the 7th century A.C.[3]

1. The above is a summary of the translation from the *Samyuktavastu,* found in Alice Getty, *'The Gods of Northern Buddhism,* Tokyo 1962, pp. 84 f: Takakusu, op. cit. p. 38, n. 1, has given the following reference to the original texts, *The Samyuktavastu,* chap. xxxi; *Samyuktaratna Sūtra,* vii, 106).
2. See J. D. Dhirasekera, Hārīti and Pañcika: An Early Buddhist Legend of many Lands, *Malalasekera Commemoration Volume,* ed. O. H. de A. Wijesekera, Colombo, 1976, pp. 61-70.
3. Harold Ingholt, *Gandharan Art in Pakistan,* New York 1957,plates 340, 341, p. 145 f; A. Foucher, op. cit., plate XLVII, 2, pp. 282 ff.; A. Foucher *L'Art Grecobouddhique du Gandhara* II, Fig. 375, p. 125). The following plates refer to the representations of Hārīti as a tutelary goddess outside Gandhāra: A. Foucher, *The Beginning of Buddhist Art,* plate XLV, 1, 2, from Chinese Turkestan; plate XLVIII, 2 from Chandi-Mendut, Java; Frontispiece, painting from Turfan; Palte XLIX from Japan, goddess Ki-si-mo-jin; Plate L, from China — goddess Kuan-yin.

The images of Hāriti and her husband Pañcika are found is other centres of Indian art like Ajantā, Mathurā etc. *(Ency. B'sm.* Vol. I. Pl. XXIV).

Ramifications of the cult of the mother goddess bestowing children could be seen in Indian soil if one were to trace the origin of the legends of Krsna in the arms of his mother Devaki, Śiva-Pārvati with their divine children Ganeśa, Kārtikeya etc. As far as iconography is concerned, 'this is a consecrated theme, of which it will be easy for us to quote numerous examples spead over nearly twenty centuries and over the whole of the Far-east.[4] Nevertheless, attempts to draw analogies with Roman, Greek or even pre-historic prototypes of the mother goddess would be of no avail for a study of the Mahāyāna Hāriti cult. It would only show the wide dispersion of the cult of fertility-fecundity in the form of mother goddess in every corner of the world. Foucher's remarks are the most vindicative in this context, when he points out that such traces could be found in any pre-historic civilisation like in the Mexican art, in early Egyptian Art (where Isis suckling Horus is depicted in a very similar manner) and in early Roman depicitions of Madonna and Child Jesus.

Another noteworthy aspect in the study of the cult of Hāriti is its development in later esoteric Buddhism, especially under Vajrayāna or Tantric Buddhism. Although the records of Hsüan-tsang and I-tsing speak of the existence of the Hāriti cult in their homeland, it was found much modified later in China, Korea, Japan and even in Tibet and other countries in Chinese Turkestan.[5] Scholars like J.N. Banerjea and Gopinath Rao are not hesitant to trace later cults of Hindu goddesses like Jyesthā and Sitālā in India to the original Mahāyāna cult of Hāriti.[6]

A. D. T. E. Perera

HARIVARMAN, a Buddhist teacher who founded the Sarvaśūnyavāda or Satyasiddhi school of Buddhism. He was a native of Central India and lived about the third century A.C. He began his career as an eminent scholar of the Sānkhya philosophy but subsequently became an adherent of the Sarvāstivāda (q.v.) and joined the Buddhist Order. Afterwards he broke with them and put forward his own views refuting the Sarvāstivāda teachings. (Yamakami Sogen, *Systems of Buddhist Thought,* Calcutta, 1912, p. 174 ff.).

According to the Chinese monk Sanyin, the chief disciple of Kumārajiva (q.v.), Harivarman was the chief disciple of Kumāralabdha and composed the *Satyasiddhi Śāstra* about 890 years after the demise of the Buddha. Kitsan, a great teacher among Chinese Buddhists, confirms that the *Satyasiddhi Śāstra* was composed by Harivarman about 900 years after the Buddha's death; he was a disciple of Kumāralabdha who belonged to the Sarvāstivāda School (ibid.).

Harivarman puts forward his Śūnyavāda in his work the *Satyasiddhi Śāstra* the Sanskrit original of which is lost; it has come down to us in Kumārajiva's masterely Chinese translation. (*Taisho.* No. 1646, *Cheng-shih-Lun — Nanjio* 1274).

Unreality of the personality *(pudgalanairātmya)* as well as of the *dharmas,* i.e. *dharmanairātmya* (see DHAMMA 2) is a fundamental teaching contained in the early Buddhist texts such as the Pali *Suttapitaka.* But, when different Schools appeared and an interpretation of the teaching of the early texts was undertaken, they, while accepting the unreality of the personality, differed in regard to the nature of the *dharmas* as to whether they were real or unreal.

The Abhidharma of the Sarvāstivādins in full and the commentarial exegetical literature of the Theravādins to a lesser degree held that the *dharmas* are real in their noumenal state *(dharma-svabhāva).* Śūnyavāda of Harivarman is a reaction to this development; he refutes the Sarvāstivāda view that the *dharmas* are real and holds that both the personality and the *dharmas* are unreal *(śūnya).* His position could therefore, be regarded as a return to the position of the early suttas.

His work became very popular with the Buddhists of China; so popular that, under the Liang dynasty, a philosophical school actually came to be established in that country which took its name after the title of his

4. A. Foucher, op. cit. p. 279; see also H. Ingholt, op. cit. p. 148; Ludwig Bachhofer, *Ostasiatische Zeitschrift.* XXIII, 1937, pp. 6-15, *Oriental Art,* New Series, Vol. 5, p. 118).
5. See J. N. Banerjea, *The Development of Hindu Iconography,* Calcutta, 1956. pp. 381 f; Alice Getty, op. cit. pp. 86 f; N. Peri, Hāriti, la Mere-de-demons *Bulletin de École Française d'Extrême* Orient, Vol. XVII, 1917, p. 94. The reference to a cave belonging to mother Hāriti, in one of the earliest inscriptional records in early Sri Lanka would be quite interesting to the study of the cult of mother goddess *Hāriti* in ancient Buddhist lands. This inscription belongs to one of the caves of the Vessagiri group, at Anuradhapura. It runs; "Hāritimataha manorame lena" (S. Paranavitana *(Inscriptions of Ceylon* Vol. I, published by the Department of Archdeology, Sri Lanka, 1970. p. 7, No. 936(20). The reference to Hāritimata could be to this goddess.
6. J. N. Banerjea, op. cit. pp. 383 f.; J. N. Banerjea, Some Folk Goddesses of Ancient and Medieval India - *IHQ* LXV, 1983, pp. 101-9.

book, i.e., Satyasiddhi school, though the name of Harivarman, of his work and also of the school he founded have been forgotten in India, the country of their origin.

Upali Karunaratna

HARSAVARDHANA, king or rather emperor of India who reigned from Kanauj during the first half of the seventh century (606-648 A.C.). Known also as Harsa, Harsadeva or Śilāditya he is one of the important rulers of India whose career has brought him somewhat close to Asoka. Much information about him and his reign is available from his biography *(Harsacarita)* written by Bāna, Harsa's court poet, and from the records of the Chinese traveller Hsüan-tsang who visited him in his court at Kanauj while sojourning in India.

After the fall of the Gupta empire in the middle of the sixth century A.C. there remained in India only a number of small kingdoms and obscure dynasties which produced no personality strong enough to unify the country under a single authority. This resulted in a readiness in the country to welcome such a ruler and it was this need that was met by Harsa during the first half of the seventh century. Though a good part of Harsa's reign was spent in war, cultural and religious activities also flourished. Harsa's accession to the throne took place under somewhat tragic circumstances. His ancestors were known as Pusyabhūtis or Puspabhūtis who were a family of petty rulers in Thaneswar. Harsa's father, Prabhākaravardhana had added some adjoining areas to the kingdom at the end of the sixth century by repulsing some Hun invaders. In his old age when the Huns proved troublesome, again he sent his eldest son Rājyavardhana with a strong army. Harsa too joined the expedition. In the meantime Prabhākaravardhana fell ill and his wife, in view of her husband's impending death, committed suicide. Harsa hurried back and was forced to accept the rulership. When Rājyavardhana returned after the Hun war he had to solve an additional problem in that his sister Rājyaśri's husband, the ruler of Kanauj, had been murdered by the ruler of Malwa and Rājyaśri imprisoned. Rājyavardhana subdued the Malwa king but he met with his death at the hands of Śaśānka, the king of Bengal. It was in such a background of events that Harsa ascended the throne of Thaneswar and he, after securing his sister, set out to punish Śaśānka, his brother's murderer and on the way accepted the help offered by Bhāskaravarman, the king of Assam, who later became a great friend of Harsa. In the meantime, Harsa's sister, disappointed at the death of her brother and husband, had entered the Vindhya forest from where Harsa rescued her when she was about to immolate herself. As Harsa returned with Rājyaśri he was offered the throne of Kanauj which seems to be his first territorial acquisition. He was sixteen years old at the time. Thenceforward he enlarged his empire until it extended from the Panjab to Bengal and administered it with Kanauj as the capital. He failed to subdue the Deccan which was ruled by the Cālukya king Pulakeśin II and thus, the suzeraity of India during this period was divided between Harsa in the north and Pulakeśin in the south.

Harśa's reign was more or less a revival and a continuation of the glory of the Guptas, during whose time India experienced an efflorescnce of artistic and cultural acitivity. As regards religion the Gupta period marked the emergence of modern Hinduism which was a synthesis of old Brahmanism and Buddhism. Indian Buddhism at this time had developed into the four main branches as Vaibhāsika, Sautrāntika, Mādhyamika and Yogācāra. Each of these schools had its own exponents in the centuries that preceded Harsa so that by his time, as regards the metaphysical side of Buddhism, these four schools had come to stay. With regard to popular religion the worship of gods had become very popular and there was little difference between Buddhism and Hinduism in this respect. When modern Hinduism arose in such a background it had assimilated the features of both religions in quite eclectic fashion and Buddhism, as a separate religion, was on its way out from its native land. This historical background is also repsonsible for the religious tolerance of both the Gupta kings and Harsa. As a ruler, Harsa found no difficulty in treating both faiths with impartiality as there was no animosity between them. This kind of religious atmosphere, coupled with the enlightened attitude of the king, obviously helped the continuation of the cultural revival of the Guptas.

Although personal religion did not matter very much in such an eclectic type of religious atmosphere, it is generally believed that he was a Buddhist. According to available evidence (see *IHQ*. 1956, p. 168) he had been a Śaivite *(Paramamaheśvara)* upto the 25th year of his accession while his brother is referred to as a Buddhist *(paramasaugata)* and his father as a worshipper of the sun *(paramādityabhakta)*. His sister, Rājyaśri, too, is mentioned as a Buddhist. Whatever it may be, Harsa, too, after the fashion of Asoka, seems to have formally become a Buddhist towards the latter part of his life after his wars of conquest. His earlier predilection seems to have been towards the Hinayāna mainly owing to the influence of the Buddhist sage Divākaramitra of the Vindhya area. Later his contacts with Hsüan-tsang made him like Mahāyāna more.

While Harsa himself was a man of letters as well as a great patron of learning, his court was attended by such poets as Bāna, a brahman and Bhartrhari, a Buddhist

monk. The three Sanskrit plays *Ratnāvali, Priyadarśikā* and *Nāgānanda* are ascribed to him. While the first two are secular works *Nāgānanda* is a Budhist religious drama which opens with an invocation to the Buddha and has a Jātaka type of story for its plot, the key-note of the work being heroism and self-sacrifice. Harsa was an expert calligraphist too, and in addition to the three plays, two Buddhist hymns, *Suprabhāta-stotra* and *Asthamahāśri-caityasamskrtastotra*, (see *Harsa*, R. K. Mookerji, p. 159), and even a grammar are ascribed to him. Bāna was a devoted brahman and his biography of Harsa, the *Harsacarita*, which is more or less a historical romance, and his novel called *Kādambari*, both represent an atmosphere of a mixture of religions, where Buddhists and brahmans lived in perfect freedom. Bhartrhari, the popular gnomic poet, who is said to have oscillated between home and the cloister no less than seven times, was formally a Buddhist. Three series of "hundred stanzas" *(śataka)* on love *(Srngāraśataka)*, on polity *(Nītiśataka)* and on renunciation *(Vairāgyaśataka)* are ascribed to him. The Buddhist logician Dharmakirti too belonged to this period. Sir Charles Eliot observes, "For our purpose the gist of this literature is that Hinduism in many forms, some of them very unorthodox, was becoming the normal religion of India but that there were still many eminent Buddhists and that Buddhism had sufficient prestige to attract Harsa and sufficient life to respond to his patronage." (Sir Charles Eliot, *Hinduism and Buddhism*, II, p. 98). Although Harsa seems to have formally become a Buddhist towards the end of his life he "by no means disowned Brahmanic worship; but in his latter years his proclivity to Buddhism became more marked and he endeavoured to emulate the piety of Asoka. He founded rest houses and hospitals as well as monasteries and thousands of stūpas. He prohibited the taking of life and the use of animal food, and of the three periods into which his day was divided two were devoted to religion and one to business. He also exercised a surveillance over the whole Buddhist Order and advanced meritorious members". (loc. cit.)

One of the most important events for the history of Buddhism that occurred during the reign of Harsa was the visit of the Chinese pilgrim Hsüan-tsang (q.v.) who travelled in India for 16 years (629-645 A.C.). He was a learned man when he came to India and the purpose of his visit was not only to improve his knowledge but also to take copies of important Buddhist books back to his own country. While studying at the Nālandā university in the course of his sojourns he was invited by Harsa whom he visited in his court at Kanauj and was received as an honoured guest. He is said to have spent about 8 years in Harsa's empire, enjoying his hospitality. The Chinese traveller became such a favourite of Harsa that the latter would not allow him to be defeated in religious controversies, the result of which was that the terms of such contests were biassed and unfair. This attitude of the king was exhibited at the religious assembly held at Kanauj to which were invited scholars of various creeds and sects and which was held both to promote Mahāyāna and to honour the Chinese guest. It was a great assembly where thousands of scholars, both Buddhist and non-Buddhist, were present and during which a solemn procession took place every day. As a part of the programme a Buddha image was taken in it with Harsa and his ally Kumārarāja of Assam, as the gods Indra and Brahma respectively, attending upon the Buddha image. The incident is interpreted as aimed at showing the subserviency of gods to the Buddha. In the evening the king used to listen to Hsüan-tsang's discourses on Mahāyāna and it was here that he had issued instructions that no one should speak against Hsüan-tsang. No discussion could be expected in such a sectarian assembly. It may be owing to this kind of prejudiced behaviour, which goes contrary to the normal tenor of his rule, that disagreeable incidents had occurred on these occasions. "A temporary monastery erected for the fêtes caught fire and a fanatic attempted to stab the king. He confessed under examination that he had been instigated to the crime by Brahmans who were jealous of the favours which the Buddhists received. It was also established that the incendiaries were Brahmans and, after the ring-leaders had been punished five hundred were exiled. Harsa then proceeded to Allahabad to superinted a quinquennial distribution of alms. It was his custom to let treasure accumulate for five years and then to divide it among holy men and the poor. The proceedings lasted seventy-five days and the concourse which collected to gaze and receive must have resembled the fair still held on the same spot. Buddhists, Brahmans and Jains all partook of the royal bounty and the images of the Buddha, Sūrya and Siva were worshipped on successive days though greater honour was shown to the Buddha. The king gave away everything that he had, even his robes and jewels, and finally, arrayed in clothes borrowed from his sister, rejoiced saying 'all I have has entered into incorruptible and imperishable treasures.' After this, adds Hsüan Chuang, the king's vassals offered him jewels and robes so that the treasury was replenished. This was the sixth quinquennial distribution which Harsa had held and the last, for he died in 648." (Sir Charles Eliot, op. cit. II, p. 99).

There are other ways in which Harsa is recorded as having encouraged Buddhism. His reign, as shown above, was quite eventful in religious and cultural activities. Among the other known events of his reign may be mentioned his appropriation of a tooth relic of the Buddha from Kashmir which he enshrined in a vihāra at Kanauj. His gift to the University of Nālandā, which was the most distinguished centre of learning at the time, was a vihāra of brass or bronze about 100 feet in height.

Popular Buddhism at the time, like Hinduism, was marked by the worship of images introduced into it by the Mahāyāna. Caityas were very common and they were either associated with some events in the Buddha's career or enshrined with his relics. As a result of Harṣa's special attention there was a great growth of Buddhism in Kanauj while it declined in other places. For instance, while Fa-Hsien records only two Buddhist monasteries at Kanauj Hsüan-tsang could count about one hundred.

In summing up the following words in a work on Indian history may be quoted. "Harsa combines in himself some of the attributes and characteristics of both Samudragupta and Asoka. Like the former, he was a great warrior and conqueror, restoring peace, prosperity and unity to India. Like the latter, after establishing paramountcy, he devoted himself to pursuits of culture and learning, to the solemn pomp and grand processions of religion, instead of military displays and pageants.

"The last great emperor of ancient India, Harṣa evolved order out of chaos, once again giving the people a strong central state. From the small state of Thanesar to build an empire comprising almost all Northern India was no mean achievement. He occupies as conspicuous a place as Kaniṣka or Asoka in the history of Buddhism." (P. Saran and D.R. Bhandari, *The March of Indian History*, Ranjit Printers and Publishers, Delhi, 1959, p. 165).

A. G. S. Kariyawasam

HASITUPPĀDA-CITTA, consciousness producing satisfaction and resulting in a smile, is the name given in the Pali Abhidhamma manuals (*Abhs.* 2; *Abhut.* 12, *Nrs.* 6) to that aspect of the mind-consciousness-element *(mano-viññāna-dhātu)* which is described in the earlier Abhidhamma works as 'joyful mind-consciousness-element which is non-causal and inoperative *(somanassa-sahagata-kriyāhetuka-manoviññānadhātu).* The word has apparently been coined on the basis of a term, i.e., *hasituppāda-kiriyā,* meaning an act that results in a smile', found in Buddhaghosa's commentary to the *Paṭṭhāna-ppakarana (Tikap.* II, 276).

Non-causal and inoperative consciousness *(kriyācitta)* is characteristic of the Buddha and the arahants only. Because of their non-casual nature, they do not modify the character ethically one way or another. They are not conditioned by good causes, namely, the absence of greed *(alobha)* or of malice *(adosa)* or of delusion *(amoha)* and are entirely free from the latent evil tendencies *(anusaya). Hasituppāda-citta* is one that belongs to this category; hence its definition as *kriyāhetuka.*

There are thirteen kinds of consciousness that produce pleasurable feeling *(hasana-citta; Abhut.* 15; *Abhs.* 11, 90); but, save for this particular one, the other twelve kinds do other work, in addition. The *hasituppāda-citta* is limited to the production of pleasurable feeling alone; it is incapable of doing any other work; hence it alone is named *hasituppāda-citta (Paramārthapradīpa Abhidharmārthasangraha-vistara-bhāvasanne,* 1931, 30 ff).

The rise of this consciousness in the arahants is similar to that of other types of consciousness; i.e., it arises in the mind depending on sense-contact *(Abhidhammattha-vibhāvinī* of Sumangala and its *sanne* by M. Dharmaratna, p. 84). When an arahant sees, for example, a calm place suitable for exercising concentration of mind, he derives from it a pleasurable feeling which is *hasituppādacitta.*

The arising of *hasituppāda-citta* through the ear-door is effected in a somewhat different way. When an arahant hears a noise made by monks who are worldlings *(puthujjana-bhikkhū)* when quarrelling over distribution of things like robes etc,. he feels himself free from such bad behaviour, and this feeling of freedom gives rise to that pleasurable feeling which produces a smile.

The response is the same in the functioning of other sense organs as well. The smell of fragrance suitable for offering to the Buddha, taste of meals shared with his colleagues, or the physical comfort experienced when his colleagues attend to his body by massaging it etc., in all these and other similar instances, the *hasituppāda-citta* arises in the arahant *(Paramārthapradīpa,* 30 ff.).

The fact to be emphasised in this case is that the *hasituppāda-citta,* as has already been stated, is free of causal function *(ahetuka),* good or evil, and is inoperative; in other words, this *citta* is one that does not produce any karma. It just produces pleasurable feeling manifested outwardly in the form of a mere smile.

Upali Karunaratna

HAṬHA-YOGA, a form of Indian yoga recommended in the *Haṭhayogapradīpikā* and several other works (e.g. *Gheraṇḍa Saṃhitā* and *Śaiva Saṃhitā). The Haṭhayoga-pradīpikā*[1] of Svātmārāma, which is generally regarded as a standard work on *Haṭhayoga,* contains 383 verses divided into four chapters each dealing with postures *(āsana),* breathing *(prāṇayāma),* gestures

1. The text is edited and translated into English by Pancham Sinh as the Extra Volume 3 of the Sacred Books of the Hindus, 1915.

(mudrā) and concentration *(samādhi)*. Although the date of the text is not exactly known, the work being a Śaivite one its compilation could be assigned to about the 2nd or the 3rd century A.C. when Śaivism was gaining ground in India. The purpose of the work is given as explaining *haṭhayoga* for the attainment of *rājayoga* or 'royal union' which is the condition of complete self-mastery with one's faculties under perfect control and the practiser becoming his own master free from all bondages.

Achievement of this state of freedom was the purpose and aim of *rājayoga* as taught by Patañjali. In such a state of freedom man becomes a positive thinker who has realised his freedom amidst the activities of life. The purpose of the Buddha's teaching too is the achievement of this same state of release and in the teachings of both an ascetic element *(tapo)* is present. As the *haṭhayoga* practices involve the use of force on the body creating tension in the nervous system they belong more or less to the class of practices generally designated as self-mortification *(attakilamathānuyoga)* in Buddhism. However, this does not mean that this work contains only that kind of extreme ascetic practices, which, when practised would lead to physical and mental disorders.[2]

However, a point to be clarified is that there is a difference between extreme haṭhayogic practices and the ascetic elements that are actually necessary and unavoidable while the *yogin* progresses in his journey towards self-realisation. Right effort *(sammā-vāyāma)* as taught in Buddhism certainly includes a certain amount of disciplined behaviour wherein a certain degree of nervous tension might be unavoidable. But that would be only temporary.

As implied by the term itself (i.e. *haṭha = force)* practice of *haṭhayoga* requires considerable energy at least when compared with other systems of yoga. The general tone of *haṭhayoga* is to control the nervous system by force which inevitably brings about a condition of tension in the body. If the simple breathing exercises and postures of *haṭhayoga* are done without creating tension in the body they can be quite beneficial to the body and there would not be anything un-Buddhistic in them. All the chief features of this yoga (i.e. breath-controlling, posture and other physical exercises) belong to the common religious tradition of India going back even to pre-Buddhist times. Some of them were practised by Gotama[3] himself prior to his attainment of enlightenment and it was the self-mortifying elements among such practices that he later preached as not being conducive to one's spiritual progress.

Haṭhayogapradīpikā says that posture or *āsana* constitutes a first requisite of *haṭhayoga* and has to be practised for gaining steady posture, health and lightness of body and there is nothing un-Buddhistic in this provided these practices are not taken to excesses. Eighty-four *āsanas* are referred to as having been taught by Śiva out of which *siddha, padma, siṃha* and *bandha* are described and these are profusely illustrated in Indian iconography, both Buddhist and non-Buddhist. Sitting in these postures and concentrating and contemplating on breathing for the purpose of gaining mental and physical steadiness is a basic teaching in the entire religious tradition of India and this form of meditation is well-known as *ānāpānasati* in the Theravāda tradition.

Haṭhayogic practices and theories are important for Buddhism from another point of view in that they have many common features with the later form of Buddhism known as Vajrayāna or Tantric Buddhism.[4] The physiological basis of *haṭhayoga* is the same as that in this form of Buddhism in which various types of meditation are practised for the awakening of the power within the human body designated as *kuṇḍalinī* which is described as "a force lying in 3½ coils like a sleeping serpent in a cavity near the base of the spine. This is regarded as a goddess or power "luminous as lightning, who, even though sleeping, maintains all living creatures. She lies there with her head blocking a fine channel which goes straight up the spine and is known as *suṣumnā*". (Ernest Wood, *Great Systems of Yoga,* p. 97). This central nerve called *suṣumnā* is the vertebral column and there are said to be about 72,000 nerves of which this *suṣumnā* and the other two nerves *iḍā* and *piṅgalā*, running on its left and right respectively, are treated as the chief ones. Breath-control and physical exercises are performed for the purpose of cleaning these nerves so that the body will function properly.

2. It may be mentioned here that *haṭhayoga* practisers are advised to practise them always under the guidence of a teacher for otherwise they might lead to various diseases. Self mortifying practices of Hindu devotees at well-known shrines like Kataragama in Sri Lanka may be cited as examples of extreme forms of *haṭhayoga.*
3. The following words attributed to the Buddha in the *Mahāsaccaka Sutta (M.* I, 240) describing how he practised austerities is typical of *haṭhayoga.* "Then I thought what if I now set my teeth, press my tongue to my palate, and restrain, crush and burn out my mind with my mind. I did so and sweat flowed from my armpits. I undertook resolute effort, unconfused mindfulness was set up but my body was unquiet and uncalmed, even through the painful striving that overwhelmed me." English translation taken from E. J. Thomas' *Life of the Buddha,* p. 64.
4. For an account of this physical structure in relation to Vajrayānic practices see Anagarika Govinda's *Foundations of Tibetan Mysticism,* pp. 140 ff. For a detailed discussion of the haṭhayogic practices in terms of western anatomy see V. G. Rele's, *The Mysterious Kundalini,* published by D.B. Taraporavala Sons & Co. Bombay, 1939.

Generally speaking, while those hathayogic practices which do not create serious tension in the body may be accepted as conducive to good health as forms of physical training, those of the opposite type creating nervous tension have to be classed as un-Buddhistic. The set of six *bandhas* or means of body purification, recommended in the *Hathayogapradipikā* (ch. II, vs. 22-35) may be cited as examples of this latter type: (i) Swallowing a clean, slightly warm, thin cloth four fingers broad and fifteen spans long and gradually drawing it out again; (ii) Taking an enema sitting in water and using a small bamboo tube and then shaking and dispelling it; (iii) Drawing a fine thread twelve fingers long in at one nostril and out at the mouth; (iv) Looking at something without unblinking eyes until tears flow; (v) Massaging the intestines by moving the belly round and round; (vi) Breathing rapidly like the bellows of a balcksmith.

It may not be impossible to create situations of self-hypnosis by some of the hathayogic methods but these are not recommended to the Buddhist practitioner whose aim is to achieve release and enlightenment which is a state free from tensions and conflicts.

A. G. S. Kariyawasam

HATRED. See DOSA

HAYAGRĪVA[1], the horse-headed one, a god of the Tantric Buddhist pantheon, belonging to the *vidyārāja* class, venerated mostly in India and in other countries where Tantrism is prevalent. He is, also, regarded as the protector of horses and cattle, specially in Tibet, Mongolia and Japan.

The origin of the concept of Hayagrīva is anterior to the origin of Tantric Buddhism for, the title Hayagriva is used as an epithet of Viṣnu in epic literature.[2] The horse played an important role in Vedic mythology. The *Rg Veda* refers to a number of celestial horses such as Dadhikāra (Dadhikrāvan), Dadhyañc, Tākṣya, Paidva and so on.[3] The *Rg Veda* also, mentions that Dadhyañc was given a horse-head by the Aśvins.[4]

The epics contain numerous titles in which the *aśva* (horse) forms an integral part. The sons of Dānu are called Aśvaśiras, Aśvagrīva, Aśvasanku, Aśvapati. The title Hayagriva itself occurs in the *Mahābhārata* as an epithet of Viṣṇu who is referred to there as the reader and the promulgator of the sacred Vedas. He is, also, the Vedic sun god.[5] The *Mahābhārata* refers to another Hayagriva, a demon, an enemy of Viṣnu Hayagriva. The *Harivamsa*, the supplement of the *Mahābhārata*, repeatedly refers to this demon Dānava Hayagriva who is ultimately killed by Viṣṇu Hayagriva.[6]

Most probably the Buddhist Hayagrīva was evolved out of these earlier concepts specially from Viṣṇu Hayagriva and Dānava Hayagriva. But, when and how this concept was taken over to the Tantric Buddhist pantheon and adapted to suit the Tantric Buddhist beliefs is not exactly known. An earlier reference to the Buddhist Hayagriva is in the *Mahāvairocana Sūtra*[7] and therein he is described as a *vidyārāja*. van Gulik says that in China, in 653 A.C., a work was translated in which a special chapter was dedicated to the worship of *vidyārāja* Hayagrīva who is regarded as an aspect of Avalokiteśvara. Further, he adds that in a work rendered into Chinese by Bodhiruci in 650 A.C. *vidyārāja* Hayagriva is connected with Amoghapāśa, a form of Avalokiteśvara. On this evidence he assumes that by about the fifth century the Tantrists in India venerated Hayagriva as a *vidyārāja* and also as an aspect of Avalokiteśvara.

van Gulik's view with regard to the adaptation of Hayagrīva into the Tantric Buddhist pantheon is also noteworthy. According to him Hayagriva owed his acceptance into Buddhism to the fact that in Hinduism Viṣṇu Hayagriva was regarded as the reader and the promulgator of the Vedas and in this role he was quite suitable for transformation into a *vidyārāja*. He takes the term *vidyārāja* to be an abbreviation of *vidyādhara-rāja* and regards it as connoting a king of *vidhyādharas* who, according to him, are carriers *(dhara)* of magical knowledge or magic power *(vidyā)*. Further, he adds that the fierce representation of Viṣnu Hayagrīva also suited his transformation into a *vidyārāja* who is normally represented with a fierce countenance. However, it is clear from numerous representations of the Tantric god Hayagrīva that his form has been influenced not only by the representations of Viṣnu Hayagriva but also by the graphic description of Dānava Hayagrīva found in the epic literature.

1. This article is mainly based on R.H. van Gulik's *Hayagrīva*, 1935, Leiden. Also see Alice Getty, *Gods of Nothern Buddhism*, 1914, pp. 59, 63, 66, 80, 82 ff. 117, 130, 134, 142 f.; B. Bhattacharyya, *The Indian Buddhist Iconography*, 1958, Calcutta, p. 165.
2. van Gulik op. cit. pp. 10 f.
3. A. Macdonell *Vedic Mythology*, refer under these different names.
4. ibid. See under Dadhyañc or Aśvin; see also *SBE.* XLIV, pp. 444 f.).
5. ibid. See under Viṣṇu.
6. van Guilk. op. cit. pp. 13 f.
7. ibid. p. 24.

From India Hayagrīva was introduced into China, where no new features were added. In China he generally remains in a secondary place, except when represented as an aspect of Avalokiteśvara. There are particular mantras and dhāraṇis addressed to him. There are also instructions regarding the making of his statues and the drawing of paintings of Hayagrīva. He seems to have been invoked for numerous purposes, such as causing rain, vanquishing enemies, driving away devils, kindling love between two people, curing diseases and so on. Pl. XXXIII(a)

From China he was introduced to Japan, where he bears almost all the characteristics acquired in China. In Japan he is generally called Batō-kannon and occasionally Mezu-kannon. In popular belief he is regarded as the proctector of horses and cattle in general and as such he is identified with one of the six *Kannons* of the Tendai sect, Shishimui kanzeon. Butō-kannon also became a god of the roads, most probably because his images that are found all along the country roads became associated with the cult of phallic gods of the roads. Sometimes simple stones bearing the name of Batō-kannon are placed alongside the roads to represent Batō-kannon. As these stones resembled so many phalli the association of Batō-kannon and the cult of phallic gods of roads became easier. There are also special temples devoted to Batō-kannon. Of these the best known are the Enstū-ji at the foot of mount Fuji, and the Matsuo-dera in the Tango province, where his female aspect is also worshipped as one of the thirty *Kannons* of the west. In the *Kannon* temple at Komatsubara, Futakawa in Mikawa province people offer miniature figures of cows, horses and other animals at the image of Batō-kannon, in fulfilment of vows.

In Tibet he is regarded as one of the Dharmapālas and, when represented so, he has the rank of bodhisattva. It is said that Hayagrīva may also take the form of a tutelary god *(yi-dam)* in which case he would have the rank of a Buddha (Grünwedel, *Mythologie du Bouddhisme*, p. 166). In Tibet he is mainly regarded as a proctector of horses; he drives away demons by his loud neighing, and therefore, he is worshipped specially by horse-dealers. The celestial airy horse Langta played an important role in Tibetan popular belief. Hayagrīva, too, because of his predominant 'horse element', soon gained popularity among the masses.[8]

There are numerous representations of Hayagrīva. When regarded as an emanation of Amitābha he is represented as a dwarf in an awe-inspiring form with a protruding belly, and a face showing the fangs. He has three eyes and a reddish-brown beard. Generally he is of red complexion. He is adorned with a garland of skulls and eight serpents. The crown is formed by his braided hair. His second face is a blue horse's head in the act of neighing. With one foot he tramples upon the *brahmāṇḍa*. The other is extended to the end of the world. He wears a tiger-skin and holds the *vajra* and the staff in his hands. He emits multi-coloured rays from his body.

When represented as an emanation of Akṣobhya he has three faces, each face having three eyes; the right face is blue and the left face is white. The middle face is smiling. He bears an angry look in his eyes. His right face shows a rolling tongue, whereas the left shows the fangs firmly placed on the lips. He has eight hands. Of the four right hands, with one he shows the *karana-mudrā* and with the others he holds the mace *(vajra)*, the staff *(daṇḍa)* and the arrow. Of the four left hands, one displays a threatening gesture, another is held near the chest; with the remaining two hands he holds the lotus and the bow. Just as in the earlier mentioned form in this one, too, he wears a tiger-skin and is adorned with serpents.

In the representation called Paramāśva Hayagrīva, he has three faces and eight arms. The right face consists of the four faced head of Brahmā. He also bears a large greenish horse-head. With one of his right hands he shows the *tripatāka-mudrā* and with the other three hands he carries the *vajra*, the sword and the arrow, while with the four left hands he holds the lotus, three peacock feathers, the staff and the bell. He is figured as trampling upon Hindu gods.

There is another form which represents him in a dancing posture. In this representation, too, he has three heads and eight arms and also bears a horse-head. With two of the right hands he holds the arrow and the mace, while the third displays the *karaṇa-mudrā*. With his two upper left hands he holds the bow and the lotus whilst the two remaining hands are held at the chest, the right one holding the mace *(vajra)* and the left one the noose.

It is when represented as an aspect of Avalokiteśvara that he appears in gracious form. In this form he is figured as being seated cross-legged on a lotus. He has one head and four hands of which the two upper hands hold the string of beads and the lotus and the other two, held in front of the chest, display the *varada-mudrā* (wish-granting gesture).

At times Hayagrīva is also represented as having one head and two arms. With the right he carries a staff raised in a threatening attitude and with the left he holds a noose. As usual he wears a tiger-skin, and also, a garland of human heads. He has a green snake for his sacred thread. He appears to trample upon evil spirits. This form

8. For a textual description of Hayagrīva see *Sādh* II, Index ; *Taishō* Nos. 901, 1072 B, 1073, 1074. Almost all Chinese and Japanese sources are referred to in van Gulik's work.

is very popular in Tibet. Sometimes he is represented as wielding a sword with his right hand.

There is another form with three heads and four arms and four legs. It is in this form that he manifested himself when invoked by Atiśa. With his two upper hands he holds the *vajra* and the lotus and with the lower hands he draws a bow and with his feet he tramples the demons.

When represented in the most fierce form he has three heads, six arms and eight legs. He carries a sword, a trident and the *vajra* with his three right hands; a flame, a banner and a noose with his left hands. With his feet he tramples upon snakes. The lower part of his body is covered with the tiger-skin. Round his shoulders he seems to wear what appears to be a human skin which hangs down along his back. From the top of his head protrude three horse-heads. In Tibet, Hayagrīva in this fierce form is represented as an attendant of the five dreadful kings (Tib. *Skulna).*

Occasionally, Hayagrīva is represented together with his *śakti* called Mārici or Vajravarāhi. In this form he has three heads and six hands, a third eye and wears a lion's or elephant's skin and a necklace of human skulls. The two upper hands carry the *vajra* and the sword, the next two hands the mace and the magic staff *(khatvānga).* With the two lower hands he embraces the *śakti,* in the meantime holding a skull cup with the left hand and showing a mystic gesture with the right. The *śakti* who wears a crown of heads and holds a skull cup and a flower, encircles Hayagrīva with her legs. Her mouth almost touches the tongue of Hayagrīva. When represented in this form Hayagrīva may have two large wings.

A peculiar form of Hayagrīva is seen in his representation in the shape of the magic dagger (Skt. *kīla,* Tib. *phur-bu).* The hilt of this dagger is normally formed by a conventionalised *vajra* which is topped by one or more heads of Hayagrīva which are surmounted by a horse-head. The blade is fixed to the head of a dragon *(makara)* from whose yawning mouth it seems to jut out. The blade itself is often decorated with one or two serpents.

When represented as a secondary god he does not bear the horse-head. But his other characteristic features, such as his protruding belly and also his ornaments, make identification easy. Often, together with Tārā, Sudhanakumāra and Bhṛkuṭi, he accompanies Avalokiteśvara and in such representations Hayagrīva is at the left of Avalokiteśvara.[9]

S. K. Nanayakkara

HEALTH, state of freedom from physical or mental ailment. Hence it includes physical as well as spiritual soundness or well-being in which state the human organism discharges its functions efficiently. Disease or *vyādhi* being an integral part of the ordinary life, the perfect state of health from the Buddhist point of view would be the state of perfection itself wherein one has overcome craving *(tanhā)* and ignorance *(avijjā)* completely. It is more or less this viewpoint that is expressed at *Anguttara,* (II, 143) where, after dividing disease into two as physical and mental, it is said that although there may be beings who can be free from bodily diseases even for a period of hundred years it is hard to find in this world a person who can admit of freedom from mental diseases even for a single moment *(muhuttampi).* The person who can admit of such a state is the one who has destroyed the influxes *(āsava)* and conquered depravities *(kilesa).* The *Suttanipāta* (*v.* 749) also refers to genuine inward health as the condition in which the *āsavas* are eliminated. From the Buddhist point of view true health is based on the purification of the mind resulting in the production of a healthy body as well. Mere appearance of outward health is never an indication of true health.

The importance of health in the ordinary life of day to day activity, where one is expected to lead the correct life *(sammā-ājiva),* is fully recognised in Buddhism. Without a healthy mind and a healthy body one cannot think of leading a correct life. It is true that mind and body which are healthy in the ordinary sense would, as Buddhism teaches it, gradually become old and decrepit in course of time *(jarā)* and succumb to the state called death. But the overcoming of this sorrowful state of impermanence and change is the purpose of religious living for which health is considered as of inestimable value *(ārogyā paramā lābhā: Dhp. v.* 204; *M.* I, p. 508).

If health were to be genuine and complete it has to be both physical and spiritual. Spiritual health has to be achieved by basing one's life on an ethical footing, generally called *sīla* which is broadly divided as negative *(vāritta)* and positive *(cāritta)* or as those practices that are to be given up and those that are to be cultivated.

It is the person who first establishes himself in *sīla* and then works towards both mental and physical health that could be spoken as being destined to enjoy true health, both moral and physical. The bodily and mental hardships that one might have to face in the process would be of temporary nature. In the true state of health both mind and body should act in perfect harmony.

As there are no inhibitions or commandments in Buddhism there is no need for people to become mental

9. For some illustrations see plates in van Gulik's work. See also Alice Getty, op. cit. Plate XLIV, b and c; B. Bhattacharyya, op. cit., Figs. 1(A), 128, 129.

patients through self-imposed inhibitions and commandments. Buddhism only shows the way of practice which is generally based on the law of causality and its observance is left to the individual concerned. This freedom of belief and of practice allowed in Buddhism shows that it never expects to produce mental patients by trying to make unsuitable people follow its teaching. It is in keeping with this phenomenon that only the wise *(viññū)* are envisaged to experience its higher truths. It is owing to these reasons that finding each individual's potentialities *(upanissaya)* and working towards their florescence is always recommended in Buddhism.

The Buddha never overlooked the importance of health in ordinary life. Over-eating and such other unhealthy dietary habits that are contributory factors towards ill-health are pointed out to be given up. It is clearly laid down in his teaching the required quantity of food and abstemious use *(bhojane mattaññutā)* as well as forgoing the night meal would lead to good health. Regular dietary and other hygienic habits are recommended in order to preserve one's health. Regular bathing, regular tonsure and shaving, wearing clean clothes, getting up early and not over sleeping and such other habits are to be cultivated by those who intend to follow the pure life, whether as monk or as layman. The majority of Vinaya rules are, in short, nothing but regulations intended to preserve the health of the bhikkhus. Hence it follows that in addition to having a calm and a poised mind free from selfishness, greed, lust, anger, hatred, jealousy, fear, pride and worry one has to observe the various external hygienic practices as well.

The health-conferring nature of the Buddha's teaching is very well seen in the concept in which he is hailed as the king of physicians *(bhaiṣajya-rāja)*, an idea fully developed in the Far Eastern Mahāyāna. When considered from the Buddhist point of view ordinary human life is like a diseased body for the curing of which Gotama has given the prescription. Hence it is with perfect justification that sometimes an analogy is drawn between the Indian science of medicine, known as *āyurveda*, and the Buddha's analysis of the problem of life. Hence the four noble truths of suffering, the cause of suffering, the extinction of suffering and the path leading to the extinction of suffering are juxtaposed with the four divisions of *āyurveda* which are: disease or *roga*, cause of disease or *roganidāna;* curing of disease or *roganivārana*, and the administration of medicine or *tikicchā* (see Charles Eliot, *Hinduism and Buddhism,* I, pp. 200-1 see FOUR-NOBLE TRUTHS).

The value of good health is known to everyone and needs no emphasis. Not only is it called the highest gain *(paramalābha: Dhp. v.* 204; *M.* I, 508) but it is also referred to as one of the five kinds of bliss *(sampadā: D.* III, p. 235). It is also reckoned as one of ten desirable things in the world but hard to obtain (*A.* V, p. 135-6) and while unwholesome activity *(asappāyakiriyā)* is an obstacle to health, wholesome activity *(sappāyakiriyā)* promotes it.

Infatuation with one's own health *(ārogya-mada)* like any other form of infatuation is an obstacle to spiritual progress and has to be gradually overcome (*D.* III, p. 220; *Vism.* p. 77; *A.* III, p. 72).

A. G. S. Kariyawasam

HEART. See HADAYAVATTHU

HEAVEN AND HELL. Cosmology and Cosmogony form two of the essential topics of discussion in the scriptures of most religions. Even the most primitive belief systems give an important place to these subjects. This is not surprising because the life beyond death is a major concern of all religious beliefs. Religions attempt to explain how a good or bad life led in the present affects one's destiny after death. Naturally any religion should provide its followers, who believe in survival after death, with a map of the cosmos as it were, to show them the place or places available for their life after death, and also the paths leading to these places.

In most primitive beliefs the cosmos is a twin world consisting of the land of the living and the land of the dead located on the same earthly plane. The latter is often a mere shadow of the former with the dead occupying the same social status they had in the living world. The very bodies of the dead are replicas of the former living beings not even lacking in the defects they formerly had. The funeral rituals are essential for the dead to reach the land of the dead by the path shown to them by the priest. The priest would in some cases precede the cortége, giving verbal instructions regarding the path to the beyond to be followed by the deceased.

In some primitive societies the world was believed to be two-tiered with a subterranean world of the dead. Even in some of the ancient civilisations like that of the Egyptians the world was imagined to be two-tiered. The *Egyptian Book of the Dead* gives a graphic description of the journey of the dead from the world of the living to the world of the dead. The three-tiered world found in some religions may have developed from this. In it there is a world of gods located above the human world, either at the summit of a central mountain, e.g. the Mount Olympus of the Greeks and the Mount Meru of the Indians, or in the sky.[1]

1. *ERE.* IV, p. 411 ff. s.v. Death and Disposal of the Dead.

In ancient Indo-Aryan cosmology too the world was three-tiered but with a difference. According to the most widely held view in the Rg Vedic period, for there appears to be other views as well, this three-tiered world was formed by the earth, the atmosphere and the sky. The thirty-three major deities of the pantheon were equally divided among these three planes. The dead were generally regarded as proceeding to the abode of Yama, the first mortal to die, located in the third heaven *(trtīye nāke: Atharva Veda=Av.* IX, 5, 4), *(parame vyoman: Rg Veda=R V.* X, 148), which is also the third and the highest step of Visnu *(visnoh pade parame ibid.* 1, 154). This third heaven, called the fore-heaven, is also the place where the Fathers sit *(trtīyāha pradyauriti yas'ya pitara aste: A V.* XVIII, 2, 48). There are also traces of a belief, may be more primitive than the above, in a world of the dead located on the earth or underground, or at least of a view that the dead ascended to the sky by a subterranean path.[2]

Though not very prominent there also seems to have been a belief in a subterranean place of punishment described as the deep abyss *(padam gabhīram: R V.* IV, 5.5), the bottomless darkness (*anārambhe tamasi: ibid.* VII, 104.3), the lower darkness (*adhamam tamah:* ibid. X, 152.4) etc. Into this the gods hurl the hated and the irreligious (*ibid.* IX, 73.8). In the *Atharva Veda* (XII, 4.46) there is a definite reference to a hell designated the *nārak loka* opposed to the *svarga loka*. It is the place for the female goblins and sorceresses.

There are also indications in the *Atharva Veda* (IV, 14.3) of a belief in a four-tiered universe, or at least of an addition to the three heavens of the *Rg Veda.* Here the firmament *(nāka)* is placed between the usual three-fold universe and the 'heavenly world of light'. One is said to climb from the back of the sky, the firmament, into the 'world of light' *(divo nākaśya prsthāt svarjyotiragamaham).* Each of the three worlds viz. earth, atmosphere and sky is also sometimes sub-divided into three as 'three earths' etc. But when the world is divided into two, simply as the sky and the earth, the six sub divisions are called the 'six worlds' or 'spaces'. *(rajāmsi).* [3]

The heavenly world of the *Vedas* is, therefore, the abode of gods *(devas)* as well as of the fathers *(pitarah),* the manes, who are, however, always regarded as a different species of beings from the gods. Since, in the *Rg Veda,* devotees always implore the deities to grant them immortality in the third heaven, the undecaying world (*R V.* IX, 113.7 ff), the heavenly life envisaged there must be eternal. The fathers enjoy there eternal life, results of their past sacrifices and gifts made to the priests (ibid. X, 14.8). In place of the frail human body they receive a blemishless and vigorous body in which they rejoice at the same feast as Yama (ibid. X, 10). Immortality in the world of the blemishless, flowing with milk and-honey, according to Prof. Weber, was regarded from the oldest time a reward for virtue and wisdom.[4] A late passage says that the enjoyments of the fathers are a hundred times more than that of human beings who are lords of men. The enjoyments of the gods by merit *(karma devas)* are a hundred times from that of fathers and that of the gods by nature *(ājāna devas)* are a hundred times that of gods by merit *(Śatapatha Brāhmana=ŚB,* XIV, 7.1.32 ff). Commenting on this aspect of the Vedic religion Keith says 'the picture is simple, it is merely the pleasures of the earth, to the priestly imagination, heaped upon one another' (Keith, op. cit. p. 406 f.).

Rg Vedic Aryans seem to have depended on the mercy of gods very much more than on their own actions to enter heaven after death (ibid. p. 409). Yet there were also a number of religious rites that were believed to help one to reach heaven. Amongst them the foremost place could be given to the sacrifice (ŚB. I, 91.1 ff). In the *Atharva Veda* (IX. 5.27, IV. 34.3–4) there are specific sacrifices which would enable one to gain a particular benefit in heaven. Asceticism *(tapas),* death in battle, bestowal of thousands of largesses are also, according to the tenth *Mandala* of the *Rg Veda* (X. 154, 1–4) some of the other factors conducive to birth in heaven. Gifts to the brahamin priests *(daksinā)* who officiate at the sacrifice is an essential factor, according to the Brāhmanas (*ŚB.* I. 9.3.1) to reap the benefits of the sacrifice in heaven. These later texts also elevate the role of the sacrifice above that of gods in the Vedic religion. The sacrifice becomes the fulfiller of all wishes of both man and god.

Scant reference to a place of punishment in the *Rg* and the *Atharva Vedas* was mentioned above. Some scholars even thought that annihilation after death was the fate of those not gifted with eternal heavenly life. But it is not improbable that the Vedic Aryans believed in some sort of a world where the evil-doers *(duskrta)* go as opposed to *sukrtām u lokam,* 'the world of the righteous' where the 'unborn' is sometimes supposed to go (RV. X. 16.4). In later Vedic literature there are definite signs of the emergence of a concept of retributive action.

The *Atharva Veda* (XIX. 3) refers to sinners who injure brahmins sitting in streams of blood, probably in the future life, eating hair. In the *Śatapatha* (XI. 6.1) and the *Jaiminīya Brāhmana* (1.42) is the legend of Bhrgu who sees in the 'other world' such horrible things as men cut up into pieces and eaten by their own former victims.

2. A. B. Keith, *The Religion and the Philosophy of the Veda and Upanishads,* (HOS. 32), London, 1925, p. 410.
3. A. A. Macdonell, *Vedic Mythology,* p. 8.
4. John Muir, *Original Sanskrit Texts,* Amsterdam Oriental Press, 1967, v. 217.

Weber thinks that this is a legend regarding penal retribution executed by the former victims themselves on their oppressors while on earth (Muir, op. cit. *v.* 322). the *Jaiminiya Brāhmaṇa* refers to three hells and the *Kauśitaki Brāhmaṇa* threatens that a man could be devoured by the animals he ate up in that world if he does not perform a particular rite with special potency (Keith op. cit. p. 409). The *Śatapatha* also refers to other ideas of reward and punishment for one's deeds. A man is, therefore, reborn into a world he has made here (Muir op. cit. 317). What he receives in the other world corresponds to the sacrifices he has performed here. The Brahmanic concept of *karma,* therefore, has no ethical value attached to it. One who departs this life deficient in the knowledge and the practice of sacrifice is weighed in the balance and receives consequences accordingly (*ibid.* V. 314 ff.). Even in the *Upaniṣads* with a developed concept of *karma* there is no reference to a hell. They mention only the *devayāna* the path leading to the gods and the *pitṛyāna* (the path leading to the deceased ancestors). Those who travel by the latter return to this world, but not those who travel by the former. There are also the tiny creatures who ever revolve in *saṃsāra.*[5] It is in the period of the *Dharma Sūtras* and the *Dharma Śāstras* that one finds direct and detailed references to hells in Hindu literature. Long lists of hells akin to those found in some late Buddhist canonical texts are found in them. It is difficult to determine who has influenced whom. Yama, the king of the dead of the early *Vedas* has, in the later Hindu texts, assumed the role of a Righteous King *(Dharmarāja)* who presides over the destiny of the dead. He separates evildoers from doers of good and sends the former to hell for punishment and the latter to heaven to enjoy divine bliss.

Cosmology and Cosmogony in Buddhist Literature. The cosmos as portrayed in early Buddhist literature, when compared with the pre-Buddhist Vedic cosmos, is a considerably expanded one. This expansion can be safely assumed to be linked with the more developed concept of moral retribution *(kamma)* in Buddhism and the deeper levels of consciousness reached by adepts in meditation seeking total emancipation of the mind. However, within the Buddhist literature itself there are traces of a gradual growth of Buddhist cosmology. While reference to cosmogony is confined almost to a single discourse, the *Aggañña Sutta* of the *Dīgha Nikāya (D.* III, p. 80 ff.), the discourses are in general replete with references to many planes of happiness and misery in the cosmos. It is quite clear that early Buddhists believed in the existence of such worlds where beings are destined to be reborn according to merit *(puñña)* or demerit *(pāpa)* acquired during their life in this world or the stage one has reached on the Path to Nibbāna. On the whole it appears that, as in other religions, in Buddhism cosmology is a reflection of the Buddhist conception of life after death, moral retribution, and the Path of Emancipation.

The Buddhist Conception of Happy and Unhappy Worlds. *Sugati* and *duggati* are the basic terms in Buddhist scriptures for the happy and unhappy worlds respectively. *Sugati,* lit. 'good going' or 'good destiny', covers all the planes of existence in the cosmos from the human world and above. *Duggati* is used to cover all the subhuman states of existence. In numerous discourses of the Pali Canon these terms are used without any elaboration. To *sugati* is sometimes appended the term *saggaṃ lokaṃ* which literally means 'world of light' (Skt. *svarga).* This would show that *sugati* was a generic term and not confined to heavenly worlds. Similarly *duggati* is often bracketed with the three terms *apāya, vinipāta* and *niraya,* two of which, viz. *apāya* and *niraya* are popularly used to mean 'hell.' Yet one can assume that all four terms are used to refer in general to the three or four sub-human worlds regarded as unhappy states.

Buddhaghosa (*Vism.* p. 427) confirms that both human and divine destinies are covered by the term *sugati* but confines *sagga* to the heavenly states. However, he gives two alternative interpretations to the four terms refering to unhappy destinies. By the first he confirms the view stated above. But in the second he limits the connotation of the four terms only to one or a number of unhappy states as accepted in his day. *Apāya,* he says, refers to birth as animals *(tiracchānayoni)* because they are removed from a happy destiny. Since however powerful Royal Nāgas are born among animals, it is not an unhappy destiny *(duggati). Duggati* refers to the Realm of Fathers *(pettivisaya)* because it is removed *(apāya)* from a happy destiny and it is a miserable destiny. Yet it is not perdition *(vinipāta)* because it is not a state of fall like the Realm of Asuras *(asurakāya).* The *Asurakāya* is an *apāya, duggati* as well as *vinipāta* because it is deprived of all opportunities. *Niraya* is reserved for the hell in all its divisions such as Avīci. This second interpretation has to be accepted with caution because the early Buddhist texts refer only to three unhappy states. The fourth, *Asurakāya* is added only in a few late Canonical texts and of course in the commentaries.

Heavens: Their Classification. Buddhist literature refers to a hierarchy of heavenly worlds *(devaloka or devakāya),* arranged in an asceding order of refinement of heavenly bliss as conceived in Buddhism. These are divided into three categories as Kāma (sensuous pleasures), Rūpa (form) and Arūpa (formless), the three

5. *Chāndogya Uapaniṣad (Ch. Up.) Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (=Bṛh Up)* 5.2. 16.

spheres of becoming *(ubhava)*. The sphere of sensuous pleasures comprises, besides the human and sub-human planes of existence, six heavens viz. Cātummahārājika, Tāvatiṃsa, Yāma, Tusita, Nimmānarati and Paranimmitavasavatti. Of these the Tāvatiṃsa is said to be located on the summit of Mount Meru, the Central Montain of the world. The Cātummahārājika is placed below Tāvatiṃsa and is attached to the Central Mountain. The other heavens rise in order above Tāvatiṃsa.

Texts also refer to a variety of earth-bound *devas (bhummā devā)* like the *yakkhas, nāgas, garuḍas, kumbhaṇḍas* and *gandhabbas* whose place in the Buddhist scheme of the universe is not well defined. Some of these are at times classified under the Cātummahārājika gods. But at other times, some of them such as *nāgas* are classified under sub-human species of beings. They all belong to the sphere of sensuous pleasures. One can only conclude that this class comprises numerous groups of gods and godlings, worshipped by various Āryan and non-Āryan tribes of India, and were gradually absorbed into the pantheons of the major religions of India. The *Mahāsamaya Sutta (D.* II, p. 253 ff.) mentions a variety of such godlings who along with many classical Vedic gods visited the Buddha and the Arahants at Kapilavatthu.

The form sphere, in its fullest development, is comprised of sixteen classes of devas from the lowest Brahma-Pārisajja to the Akaniṭṭha *devas* at the zenith. These sixteen classes could be divided into six as follows. Three Brahma classes, three Ābhā classes, three Subha classes, Vehapphala, Asaññasatta and five classes of Suddhāvāsa devas.

There are four classes of formless devas corresponding to the four formless attainments *(arūpa samāpatti)*, viz. Ākāsānañcayatana *devas,* Viññānañcāyatana *devas,* Ākiñcaññāyatana *devas* and the Nevasaññānāsaññāyatana *devas.*

In the division of all beings into five destinies *(pañcagati)* all the twenty classes of heavenly beings named above are classified under *devagati,* and the term *deva* is the generic name covering all of them. Pali Canonical texts never divide them into two groups as *devas* and *brahmas,* which is a very late development. A stage in this development could be seen in the *Vibhaṅga* Commentary *(VbhA.* p. 521) which says "nine *brahma* worlds, five Suddhāvāsas...... along with Asaññasattas and Vehapphalas." Here only the first nine worlds of the form sphere are named *brahma* worlds.

Development of the System of Heavens. The Buddhist system of heavens as portrayed in the canonical and post-canonical Buddhist literature is an expanded version of the pre-Buddhist Vedic system. One can observe in the Buddhist texts the process of a gradual growth of the Buddhist cosmos which continued well into the post-canonical period. Therefore the Buddhist cosmos in its fullest development becomes apparent only in some of these late post canonical works.

The Buddhist system of heavens in its simplest and perhaps the earliest form could be seen in the seven-tiered heaven found in certain discourses including the *Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta (Vin.* I, p. 11 f.) the first sermon of the Buddha. This system comprises the six heavens of the sensuous sphere and the heaven of the Brahma *devas.* An *Aṅguttara-nikāya* discourse (*A.* I, p. 227 f.) giving a panoramic view of the Buddhist conception of the universe with its numerous world-systems *(lokadhātu),* describes a single world-system as consisting of the above seven heavens, four continents of the human world and the Mount Meru, the *axis mundus.* In the *Kevaḍḍha Sutta (D.* I, p. 251 f) a monk who goes to various heavens seeking for an answer to a metaphysical question is turned back to the Buddha by Mahā Brahmā in the Brahma world, the seventh heaven. This set of seven heavens seems to have been developed by the Buddhists from the parallel Vedic concept or taken over from some other contemporary *samaṇa* tradition.

The six heavens of the sensuous sphere could have developed from the 'six spaces' (*rajāṃsi*) mentioned above or it could have been based on the six sub-divisions of the two upper strata of the Vedic cosmos. *Tridiv,* often used in Vedic literature to mean the 'third heaven', is also sometimes used as a general term for heaven.[6] Inspite of the Buddhist concept of seven or more heavens, *ti-diva,* lit. 'three heavens', is used in Pali literature to mean heaven in general. Tāvatiṃsa, the World of the Thirty-Three, the second in the hierarchy of Buddhist heavens, also shows a close link with the Vedic concept. It recalls to memory the thirty-three gods of the *Ṛg-Veda* divided equally among the three planes of the world. Buddhists have brought them together in one heaven. Cātummahārājika, the first heaven in the Buddhist system, is the abode of the four guardian deities of the Tāvatiṃsa gods and their respective retinues. These four, the Four Great Kings, viz. Dhataraṭṭha, Virūḷha, Virūpakkha and Vessavana have Gandhabbas, Kumbhaṇḍas, Nāgas and Yakkhas respectively as their retinues. This heaven, therefore, could be a Buddhist innovation to accommodate within their pantheon some of the demi-gods outside the classical Vedic system, worshipped by various tribals newly converted to Buddhism. The third Buddhist heaven Yāma has no Vedic parellel. Yet it may have a distant link with the abode of Yama, king of the dead, who had his residence in the Ṛg-Vedic third heaven. Tusita, Nimmānarati and Paranimmita-Vasavatti with

6. Monier Williams, Sanskrit-English Dictionary, s.v. *tridiv*

no Vedic parallels may have been either Buddhist innovations or borrowed from another unrecorded system. The Buddhists placed in Tusita the Bodhisatta, in his penultimate birth (*M.* III, p. 119 f.). Probably they wished to place him in a new world above all the classical Vedic gods to show his superiority over them. The sixth Buddhist heaven is also sometimes in post-canonical works called the abode of Māra (*MA.* I, p. 32 f.), the 'lord of the sphere of sensuous pleasures' (*kāmāvacarissara:* J. I, p. 231 f.) His other designation Vasavatti may have prompted Buddhists to place him in that world.

The world of light, the fourth heaven of the *Atharva Veda,* could be the precursor of the Buddhist Brahmakāya, the 7th heaven. Light is the most characteristic feature of the Brahma world and the other worlds placed above it by Buddhists. Both the Tāvatiṃsa gods and the inferior gods of the Brahma world know the approach of Mahā Brahmā by the appearance of a great effulgence (*D.* I, p. 220). The two groups of gods above the Brahmakāya are the Ābhā *devas,* Gods of Light, and the Subha *devas,* Gods of Splendour, both of which underscore the importance of light for these worlds.

The concept of Brahmā seems to have started with the neuter term *brahman* meaning a 'prayer' or a 'spell' uttered by a brahmin priest. Gradually *brahman* became an attribute of Prajāpati, the creator god of the *Brāhmaṇas* and a new god Brahmā was later ceated from the term. *Brahmā* is the masculine form of the neuter *brahman.* It is found in the later *Brāhmaṇas* like the *Kauṣītakī* and the *Taittirīya* as well as in the *Upaniṣads* and the still later Sūtra literature where Brahmā is definitely identified with Prajāpati. By the time of the rise of Buddhism Brahmā had been recognized as the supreme deity.[7] Brahman, in its personal or impersonal forms, has ever remained the supreme expression of the highest reality conceived in Vedic-Brahmanic religio-philosophical thinking. Even when the personal Brahmā came to be replaced by Viṣṇu or Śiva in later Hinduism, they were identified in their highest impersonal aspect with Brahman.

In early Buddhist literature too the creator god of the brahmins is designated Brahmā (*D.* I, p. 221; *M.* I, p. 327). It is not surprising, therefore, that the Brahmā group was at the earliest stages recognized by them as the highest class of gods. Mahā Brahmā, the supreme deity of this class of gods, is called the ruler of a cluster of one thousand world-systems *(sahassī lokadhātu).* When the extent of the clusters increases to thousand, three thousand etc. up to even one hundred thousand world-systems, the designation of the ruler remains the same, Mahā Brahmā. Only the power and the majesty of each of them increase with the extent of the cluster (*M.* III, p. 101 f.). No other being could usurp his position even within the Buddhist system of heavens with seventeen other heavens above that of Mahā Brahmā. Buddhists used the word to express the realization of Nibbāna by the Buddha and the arahants. They are 'brahma-become' *(brahmabhūta A.* II, p. 207) i.e. one who has reached the *sumum bonum* of Nibbāna.

Buddhists would not rest content with Brahmā as the highest in the Buddhist pantheon. So one discourse, after enumerating the above seven groups of gods ending with the Brahmakāya, says "there are gods above them" *(atthi devā taduttari: A.* III, p. 314). The Buddha tells Baka Brahmā that there are three classes of gods, viz. Ābhassarā, Subhakiṇṇā and Vehapphalā residing above his world. Baka himself was among the Ābhassara *devas* in his former birth. He has forgotten his past because of his long stay in the present station (*M.* I, p. 329). The *Saṅkhāruppatti Sutta* (ibid. p. 99 ff.) gives a more expanded version of the cosmos. It places altogether seventeen classes of *devas* above the Bahma Group viz. Ābhā, Parittābhā, Appamanābhā, Ābhassarā, Subhā, Akaniṭṭhā and the four formless realms. The *Sāleyyaka Sutta* (ibid. p. 289) adds one more, viz. Sudassa, which is placed before Sudassī in the former list. The Ābhā group here could be sub-divisions of either the Ābhā or the Ābhassara *devas* while the Subhā group could be sub-divisions of the Subhā or the Subhakiṇṇā *devas.*

These *devas,* except the four formless classes, belong to the form sphere *(rūpa-bhava).* The multiplication of the Rūpa classes of gods does not end here. Attempts at sub-dividing the Brahmakāya also could be seen in the Nikāyas. The *Sakkapañha Sutta (D.* II, p. 272) refers to a Brahmapurohitakāya, probably a sub-division of the Brahmakāya. Later texts have three classes of gods under this category, viz. Brahma-Pārisajja, Brahma-Purohita and Mahā Brahmā. But the name Brahma-Pārisajja does not occur in the Canonical texts as a designation of a separate class of devas. The word nevertheless is used to refer to a *brahma-deva* of a lower rank, perhaps a counsellor, in the retinue of a particular Brahmā. For instance one discourse (*S.* I, p. 155) refers to *Brahmā, brahma-parisā* and *brahma-pārisajjā.* A Brahmā sometimes sends a *pārisajja* on an errand (ibid. p. 145). There are also references to ministers *(amaccā)* and counsellors *(pārisajjā)* of the four Great Kings. Māra takes possession of a *pārisajja* in the retinue of Baka Brahmā. Strangely the term *purohita* never occurs in such contexts. Yet when the Brahmakāya came to be sub-divided on the model of the Ābhā and Subha *devas,* they have picked the two terms *purohita* and *pārisajja* to designate two classes of inferior *brahma devas.* This division of the Brahmakāya into three may have been influenced by the

7. A. B. Keith in *Mythology of All Races,* Vol. 6, (New York, 1964), p. 744 ff. See also *EncyB'sm* s.v. BRAHMĀ.

similar division of the Ābhā and Subha *devas* into a number of groups. Probably to bring in line with the three Brahmā groups the four Ābhā and Subha groups also have been reduced to three each by dropping Abhā and Subha *devas* as separate groups.

Another addition to the Rūpa-bhava was made when an altogether new class with some peculiar characteristics was placed above the Vehapphala *devas* of this sphere. They are the Asaññasatta devas, the so-called 'Unconscious Gods' rarely mentioned in Canonical texts. These fall into a category of their own as the only species of beings in the world-system with only the aggregate of form *(rūpakkhandha)*. They probably are included in the Buddhist system of heavens to accommodate some non-Buddhist claim for an attainment akin to the cessation of perceptions and feelings *(saññā-vedayita-nirodha)*. Buddhaghosa says that only non-Buddhists who wish all thinking to cease are reborn in this world (*DA*. I, p. 118; cf. *KvuA*. p. 155). A Buddhist who has realized the higher stages of the Path to Nibbāna is not reborn here because with the mind not functioning due to the absence of the four mental aggregates, there cannot be any progress on the Path in this plane of existence.

The Five Pure Abodes. The five classes of devas Aviha, Atappa, Sudassa, Sudassī and Akaniṭṭha top the list of gods of the form sphere. They appear to be a purely Buddhist innovation to accommodate the Buddhists who have gained very high spiritual qualities but pass away without complete emancipation. The designation Suddhāvāsa given to these abodes seldom found in Canonical texts, underscores this fact. It also shows that the Suddhāvāsa concept is a late innovation.

According to some discourses a person who dies with only the five lower fetters broken, would gain a spontaneous birth, and is not liable to return from that world (*M*. I, p. 36). Since all higher classes of *devas* even in the sphere of sensuous pleasures are born without any direct participation of parents, one can surmise that any *deva* world was meant by this statement. Perhaps Buddhists were not statisfied with this arrangement of placing Buddhist monks, who have advanced far on the Path to Nibbāna, along with gods of the sensuous sphere or even with those of the form and formless spheres which destinies are open even to non-Buddhists. They devised a separate abode, for these saints who are on the threshold of Arahanthood. Only the noble ones *(ariyā)* are reborn here (*A*. II, p. 128). "They are like military camps of the Tathāgatas" says one commentary. Suddhāvāsas may remain empty even for a period of several aeons when there are no Buddhas (*AA*. IV, p. 19). It is therefore quite certain that these Suddhāvāsas are creations of Buddhists. Thus altogether there are sixteen classes of *devas* of the form sphere.

The Devas of the Formless Sphere. There is hardly any discussion in the Pali Nikāya texts of the conditions prevalent among the devas of the formless sphere or the location of their habitat that helps to form any clear idea about them. The Buddha claims to have lived among them in previous lives (*D*. III, p. 237). But he never describes his experiences in his discourses. The textual references are limited to the attainment of the four formless states by adepts in meditation and the possibility of their being reborn among the corresponding classes of formless *devas* (*M*. II, p. 262 f., *A*. I, p. 267).

From the Abhidhamma texts and the commentaries one can gain some idea about the Theravāda conception of the formless *devas*. Speaking of two ascetics reborn among these beings Buddhaghosa says that they did not possess the sensitivity of the ear *(sotappasāda)* to hear the Dhamma preached by the Buddha nor the legs to carry them to the place of preaching here (*MA*. II, p. 186). It is interesting that the commentator refers to the lack of *sotappasāda* but not the external ear *(sasambhāra-sota)*. However, Theravāda scholiasts try to exclude the possibility even of a sign of any form *(rūpa)*, gross or subtle, matter or even a mind-made *(manomaya)* body in the formless sphere. These *devas* are said to possess only the mind base *(manāyatana)*, and ideas *(dhammāyatana)*, and the elements of mind consociousness *(manoviññāna-dhātu)* and the element of ideas *(dhamma-dhātu)*. They need only three nutriments viz. contact *(phassa)*, representative congnition *(mano-sañcetana)* and consciousness *(viññāna)*. Buddhaghosa, contrary to all expectations, says that the beings of this sphere have the simple mentality *(nāma)* with consciousness as condition in both existence and rebirth-linking *(paṭisandhi)*. In this case he wants the reader to regard simple mentality as the complete mentality-materiality *(nāma-rūpa)* unit required for rebirth-linking (*Vism*. p. 407).

Theravādins never admitted any material element for the formless sphere. But they believed that there are four *deva* worlds located in space within the sphere. Some later Abhidhammikas also claim to know the distance from Akaniṭṭha to the Ākāsānañcāyatana as 5,580,000 yojanas. Other formless worlds also have the same distance from the one below it.[8] There is also a view that all formless heavens are located on the same plane (loc. cit.).

Sarvāstivādins seem to have held the view that there are merely four types of rebirth *(upapatyā caturvidhaḥ)* in the formless sphere. But the Arūpa sphere is not a place

8. *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha*, Sinhala tr. See *Abhidharmakośa*, Sinhala tr. by Moratuwe Sasanaratana (Panadura, 1948), p. 232.

(arūpadhātur asthānah). They do not have a particular place. Wherever a person who has realized a formless attainment dies he is reborn in that locality *(deśa)* itself.[9] The view that the highest Rūpa world is named Akanistha may have a bearing on this interpretation. Akanistha is so named because according to the *Abhidharmakośa* commentary, there is no higher plane *(bhūmi)* above it (La Vallée Poussin, op. cit. II, p. 382).

Mahāsanghikas and their sub-school, Andhakas, believed that some form of matter exists in the formless sphere. They seem to have held that no rebirth is possible without this. Theravādins reject this view in the *Kathāvatthu (Kvu.* p. 378 f.).

Thus they conceived of four heavens located in space above the form sphere which have no material element of any sort in them. The beings there have only the four mental aggregates. Probably due to this 'there is nothing conceivable with the divine-eye in the formless sphere' *(āruppe pana dibbacakkhussa gocaro natthi)* and the formless beings are discernible only through the omniscience of the Buddha *(DA.* I, p. 224).

Residents of the Heavenly Worlds. The two most frequently mentioned heavens are the Tāvatimsa of the sensuous sphere and the Brahmakāya of the form sphere with their respective leaders Sakka and Mahā Brahma. They are the ones most intimately connected with the religious background in which of Buddhism arose. A common feature of all heavens (also of hells) is their impermanency. Gods who believed themselves to be eternal beat their breasts and wept when they heard of the Buddha's doctrine of impermanence of all phenomena (*A.* II, p. 33).

The history of Sakka, king of gods *(devānam indo)* goes back to Vedic Indra, the war god of the Āryans. However in Buddhism this irascible, soma-drinking Asura basher of the *Rg Veda* has undergone considerable change. He does retain his character as the chief opponent of Asuras who represent evil. But his methods of dealing with them are made humane to suit Buddhist ethical principles. Sakka frequently speaks of his efforts to control anger and admonishes his subordinates on the benefits of the same (*S.* I, pp. 223, 231 ff.). Sakka, his wives and the thirty-three gods of Tāvatimsa were, in their previous lives, a group of men and women of high morals who worked for the welfare of their fellow human beings (*J.* I, p. 199 ff.) The *Sakkapañña Sutta* of the *Dīgha-nikāya (D.* II, p. 263 ff.)refers to his first meeting with the Buddha, the discussion on the Dhamma they had, and his becoming a stream-winner. The Sutta also alludes to the passing away of the old Sakka in the presence of the Buddha and his rebirth in the same place as a new Sakka. Probably this symbolically represents the transformation of the Vedic Indra, into the Buddhist Sakka, the faithful Buddhist devotee.

Brahma as the highest conception of reality in contemporary Brahmanic society is found portrayed by Mahā Brahmā in the Buddhist texts. He is the presiding deity of the Brahmakāya gods. The Brahmanic conception of Brahmā as the creator god is found in the *Kevaddha Sutta* (ibid. p. 221) where Mahā Brahmā calls himself the creator and father of all beings. Baka Brahmā of the *Brahmanimantanika Sutta (M.* I, p. 362 ff.) who makes the same claim must be identical with Mahā Brahmā. Baka says that his abode is eternal and that there is no higher deliverance. The Buddha shows the falsity of his claim and makes him see the reality about himself and his world. Mahā Brahmā was the first living being to be reborn in this world at the beginning of the present aeon. He came here from the Ābhassara world (*D.* I, p. 176). Baka Brahmā is also reminded by the Buddha of the same fact. The *Brahmanimantanika Sutta* states how Mahā Brahmā gave up his misconception and became a follower of the Buddha.

There are references in Pali texts to some other Brahmās under different names, e.g. Brahmā Sahampati (*M,* I, p. 168) and Brahmā Sanankumāra (*D.* I, p. 99). Whether these are separate Brahmās or different names of the same Mahā Brahmā is not clear. The commentaries hold the former view. The division of Brahmakāya into three with Mahā Brahmā as the highest amongst them probably strengthened the view about a number of separate Mahā Brahmās. The *Samyutta-nikāya* version of the story of Baka Brahmā also speaks of seventy-two other Brahmās in Baka's company (*S.* I, p. 143) who also could be Mahā Brahmās. This of course, is a different concept from the one mentioned above of separate Mahā Brahmāas presiding over various clusters of world-systems. In whatever form Brahmā is represented, as one or many, he is neither eternal nor is he a creator (*D.* I, p. 18 f.). Mahā Brahmā, however powerful, is impermanent like all other gods (*M.* I, p. 326). See pls. XXXIII(b), XXXIV.

Hell. Niraya is the most woeful of the three or four planes of misery in the cosmos referred to in Buddhist literature. Early Buddhist texts refer only to three of these viz. *pettivisaya* (realm of fathers), *Tiracchānayoni* (animal birth) and Niraya. Asuranikāya is added in some later Canonical texts as the fourth (*D.* III, p. 287). Of these *Pettivisaya* seems to be a result of degrading the 'realm of the fathers' referred to in the *Rg Veda.* Conditions in this existence are compared to a spotty shade cast by a tree with a thin foliage (*M.* I, p. 75). A person tormented by heat finds very little comfort in such a place. However, inmates of *pettivisaya* are benefitted by offerings made

9. *Abhidharmakośa,* ed. Louis de La Vallée Poussin, II, p. 383.

on their behalf by their former kith and kin. Later the term *petti*, derived from Sanskrit *pitṛ*, 'father', has got mixed up with another term *peta*, derived from Sanskrit *preta* meaning 'departed one.' Preta in Brahmanic / Hindu belief is a being in the intermediate zone between death and the next life, who at the end of a successful journey through that zone, becomes a *pitṛ*. But if proper funeral rites are not performed the pretahood becomes confirmed, and such a being has to undergo intense misery in that condition. In later Canonical texts like the *Petavatthu* the two terms *pettivisaya* and *peta-loka* are used as synonyms.

'Animal birth' is a self-explanatory term. The miserable conditions therein are compared to that in a cesspit (*ibid.* I, p. 74). Incessant fear is the basic character of animal life (*A.* V, p. 289). Some semi-divine beings like Nāgas and Garuḍas are included among animals. Even these cannot derive any benefit from leading a religious life of a recluse *(brahmacariyavāsa)*. Hence Nāgas cannot receive ordination in the Saṅgha (*Vin.* I, p. 88; *D.* III, pp. 263 f. 287).

The early Buddhist texts too, represent Asuras as arch rivals of *devas* (*S.* I, p. 216 ff.). They are described as a class of 'fallen gods' pushed down from their abode at the summit of Mount Meru by Sakka, the newly born ruler of that abode (*J.* I. p. 202). However, Sakka is said to have married an Asura maiden named Sujā. Subsequently, for some unknown reason, Asuras have been classed by Buddhists as a group of miserable beings. In the commentaries this dilemma is resolved by dividing Asuras into two classes. viz. (i) those on a par with the Tāvatiṃsa gods and (ii) the Kālakañjaka Asuras who are a group of miserable beings (*Kvu.* p. 360). The latter are said to live outside the *cakkavāḷa* wall of the world-system. But the same Kālakañjaka Asuras, curiously, are said to have visited the Buddha at Kapilavatthu where many other groups of divine beings also visited (*D.* II, p. 253 ff.). This confirms the later origin of the Asurakāya as the fourth woeful state *(apāya)*.

Like the *Rg Veda* the early Buddhist texts also speak very little about *niraya*, 'the hell'. Yet is it quite clear from these texts that early Buddhists did believe in a place of suffering after death for those who commit evil in this life. Unlike the other woeful states *niraya* is described as a place of definite pain *(ekantadukkha)*. The similie of the pit of burning charcoal (*M.* I, p. 74) used to describe *niraya* gives us an inkling of the type of suffering awaiting the sinner in hell.

A detailed description of suffering in hell is found in the *Devadūta Sutta* (*M.* III, p. 178 ff.) with its shorter version in the *Aṅguttara-nikāya*, (*A.* I, p. 138 ff.), and the *Bālapandita Sutta* of the *Majjhima-nikāya* (*M.* III, 163 ff.). These discourses designate the hell as Niraya or Mahāniraya, a term going back probably to the *naraka-loka* of the *Atharva Veda*. Buddhists also at times use the term *naraka* to denote hell. According to these discourses *niraya* is a veritable iron box, a hundred leagues square. Enclosed in iron on all six sides, it is said to be partitioned into sections. On its four iron walls are four doors which open periodically to disgorge the miscreants who have suffered enough for their past misdeeds. This Mahāniraya is probably the smae as Avīci (q.v) or Avīciniraya, popular in later texts. This is the hell where Devadatta (q.v.) was reborn after death. Here Avīci is described as a terrifying place with four doors. *(avīcinirayaṃ catudvāraṃ bhayānakaṃ: Vin.* II, p. 203).

The miscreant who reaches the hell is first tried by Yama, the king of the dead, referred to in the *Rg Veda* also. Herein he is demoted to sub-human level from the highest heaven assigned to him in the *Rg Veda*. If found guilty the sinner is handed over to the guardians of the hell *(nirayapālā)* who subject him to a number of punishments before pushing him in to Mahāniraya. Fire plays a major role in all these punishments. In the Mahāniraya the victim is roasted alive by flames darting forth from all six sides of the iron chamber. When released from that place, he has to suffer in succession in five other sub-hells placed adjacent to each other viz. *Gūtha-niraya, Kukkulaniraya, Simbalīvana, Asipatta-vana*, and the *Khārodakī-nadī*. Experiencing all these excruciating pains the sinner dies not until the consequences of his evil *kamma* are exhausted. Until then the cycle of suffering continues, the sinner being fished out of the River of Caustic Water, the Khārodakī-nadī, and dumped into Mahāniraya.

The five places of torture outside Mahāniraya are a form of lesser hells, but without any independent status of their own. They all belong to the same complex as the Mahāniraya. Przyluski[10] suggests that the Khārodakī-nadī encompasses the whole complex like the Vaitaranī of the Hindu myth that encompasses the city of Yama. But in the Buddhist myth the miscreant does not have to cross the river to reach Yama.

The concept of a single Mahāniraya with a number of ante-chambers has undergone considerable change in some of the later works of the Pali Canon. Thus the verses of the *Saṅkicca Jātaka (J.* V. p. 266) give a list of eight *nirayas* viz. Sañjīva, Kālasutta, Saṅghāta, the two Roruvas, Mahāvīci, Tapana and Patāpana. The commentary distinguishes the two Roruvas as Jālaroruva and Dhūmaroruva. The name Mahāvīci here is probably a contracted form of Mahā Avīci. Each of these is described in identical terms as Mahāniraya in the *Devadūta Sutta*. But, of course, the punishments, as indicated by their names, differ from one another. Each of them has sixteen

10. Jean Przyluski, *The Legend of Emperor Asoka*, tr. Dilip Kumar Biswas, (Calcutta 1967), p. 137.

ussada-nirayas as ante-chambers or post-chambers, with probably four on each side. This latter feature, however, is not a total departure from the earlier version. *Devadūta Sutta* describes only what happens to the sinner who is sent out from the eastern door. Perhaps there are similar lesser *nirayas* on the other three sides as well. If the river is taken as a boundary as suggested by Przyluski the number of the lesser *nirayas* would still be sixteen. The *Abhidharmakośa (ERE.* IV, p. 133), regards the Asipattravana and the Simbalīvana as a single unit. This would also reduce the number on each direction to four, with the river as the fourth. The *Mahāvastu* (III, p. 454) also refers to eight *nirayas,* with sixteen *utsada nirayas* for each main *niraya* in almost identical terms as the *Saṅkicca Jātaka.*

In Sri Lanka the grand total of *nirayas* has been accepted for a long time as one hundred and thirty-six.[11] But the post-commentarial Pali work *Pañcagatidīpanī,* (*JPTS.* 1884, *v.* 22) refers only to four *ussada nirayas* for each principal *niraya.* This would reduce the grand total to forty. In this text Avīci is assigned the eighth place in the list.

This agrees with works like the *Abhidharmakośa-Vyākhya (ERE.* loc. cit.) which describes Avīci as the lowest of all *nirayas.* In the Theravāda tradition too Avīci is often mentioned as the nethermost point in the world-system, with the opposite pole of *bhavagga,* the summit of existence (*J.* I, p. 71).

The *Jatakatthakathā* and the *Pañcagatidīpanī* explain each of the eight designations of the *nirayas.* Thus, in Sañjīva the victims spring back to life again and again. In the Kālasutta lines are drawn on their bodies with a black string before cutting them up into different shapes. Huge nountains crush victims in Saṅghāta. Blood-red flames enter the bodies of the sinners in Jālaroruva and caustic fumes do the same in Dhūmaroruva. In the great Avīci there is no interruption in the flames, occupancy of beings and the experiencing of pain. In Tāpana the beings who stand montionless are roasted and in Patāpana the heat is extremely severe.

A few other names, sometimes suffixed with the word *niraya,* appear to connote different tortures inflicted in these *nirayas* than independent hells. Kākola, Khuradhārā, Sataporisa, Sattasūla-niraya, Sunakha-mahāniraya and Saṃsavaka are some of these names occurring in late Canonical texts.[12]

Buddhist and Hindu Systems of Hells. Jean Przyluski has tried to prove that the Buddhist conception of *karma,* rebirth and *niraya* has been formed under Upanisadic and Mazdian (Zoroastrian) influence. Although some of the arguments presented are not convincing one cannot reject altogether the view that some outside influence has played an important role in the development of the concept of Buddhist system of hells. The system of eight hells of the *Saṅkicca Jātaka* seems to have no direct link with the concept of the Mahāniraya of the *Devadūta Sutta.* It is difficult to surmise the source of influence under which the Buddhists developed this new system.

The Brahmanic/Hindu tradition had by the period of the *Purāṇas* developed the concept of a full-fledged hell with a court of justice presided over by Yama, and various forms of punishments meted out to sinners.[13] The early Buddhist elaboration of the concept of hell in the *Devadūta* and *Bālapaṇdita Suttas* is more primitive when compared with the Purāṇic conception.

The earliest and the shortest list of seven hells in Hindu literature is found in the commentaries of the *Vedānta Sūtras* of Bādarāyana and the *Yoga Sūtras* of Patañjali (*SBH.* IV, 221, V, p. 442). Raurava, Mahāraurava and Andhatāmiśra are names common to both lists. The two Rauravas (Pali Roruva) are found in the Buddhist lists too. Kālasūtra (Pali Kālasutta) is found in the *Yoga Sūtra* commentary and the Buddhist lists and so is the name Avīci or Mahāvīci. Vaitaranī and Kumbhipāka of the *Vedānta Sūtra* commentary could be paralled by the Khārodaki-nadī and the Lohakumbhi, which are not designated *nirayas* in the *Devadūta Sutta.* These show either mutual influence or a common source of origin for Buddhisst and Hindu systems. If Bādarāyaṇa's *apiśapta* aphorism has been correctly interpreted by the commentator the concept of seven hells in Hinduism must be rather old. However, there is no conclusive proof to show that the Buddhists designed their new set of eight hells on the model of these seven Hindu hells.

All the eight names of the Buddhist list, however, are included in the longer lists found in the Hindu *Dharma Sūtras* and the *Purāṇas.*[14] Some of the names of the Buddhist minor hells are also included in these Hindu works. eg. the Thorny Sālmalī and Aśipatravana in the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* are the same as Simbalīvana and Asipattavana in Pali texts. Some modes of punishment in Buddhist texts are made into separate hells in Hindu works, eg. Lohaśaṅku hell may have originated from the place where a sinner is struck by iron pikes, *(ayasaṅku: Sn. v.* 667). In the same text it is said that sinners enter a 'blinding darkness' *(andhaṃ'va timisaṃ).* Hindu lists have Andhatāmiśra hell. At the Vetaranī, Hindu Vaita-

11. Spencer Hardy, *Manual of Buddhism,* p. 126
12. *Sn.* p. 128 f., *J.* VI., p. 247; V, pp. 143, 145, 269; *Vvu.* 52, 11-15
13. *Garuda Purāna* (Sacred Books of the Hindus, *SBH.* IX), Chap. iii, xiv.
14. *Manavadharmaśāstara,* iv, 88-90, *Viṣṇudharmasūtra, SBE.* vii. 140.

rani, flocks of Kākolas *(Kākolagaṇa)* and crows *(kāka)* attack sinners (ibid). Sakolaka and Kākola are names of hells mentioned in Hindu texts. While the Buddhist texts identify Mahānaraka with Avīci the Hindu texts take them to be separate hells. Thus it is possible that the later Hindu lists have come under considerable Buddhist influence.

A System of Cold Hells. In the *Saṃyutta-nikāya (S.* I, p. 152) is a discourse, also repeated in the *Suttanipāta,* which gives a list of ten *nirayas* which have never been incorporated into the list of hells in the late Canonical and post-Canonical works. These ten are: Abbuda, Nirabbuda, Ababa, Aṭaṭa, Ahaha, Kumuda, Sogandhika, Uppala, Puṇḍarīka and Paduma. The length of time one has to suffer in the first of these, viz. Abbuda, is expressed in a similie. If one were to remove every one hundred thousand years just one seed from a load of twenty Kosalan *khāris* of sesame, the load of sesame would be exhausted before the life span of one reborn in this hell. The life span in the Nirabbuda is twenty times that of Abbuda. Thus, the life span in each hell is twenty times more than that in the previous one. Paduma is the most terrifying of them all. The commentators say that these are not separate hells but mere designations of different places in Avīci where one has to suffer for that particular length of time (*SA.* I, p. 218).

Certain Buddhist Sanskrit works have included some of these names in their lists of hells. They speak of eight cold hells in their schemes, viz. Arbuda, Nirarbuda, Aṭaṭa, Havava, Huhuva, Utpala, Padma and Mahāpadma (*ERE,* IV, p. 133). Some of the names like Arbuda and Nirarbuda are said to be expressive of the shape of the inmates, while the others are onomatapoetic. They are named after the sounds made by the sufferers in the intense cold of these hells.

This concept of cold hells was known to the *Suttanipāta* commentator (*SnA.* p. 477). He says that, according to some these hells are named after the different ways of lamentation made by the tortured, and different modes of torture found at these places. Others say these are cold hells. The concept of cold hells must have beeen introduced after Buddhism came into contact with peoples coming from cold climes. Mazdaism does speak of cold hells in their scriptures.

A Metaphorical Interpretation of Heavens and Hells. Some materialist teachers and philosophers in ancient India questioned the existence of both heavens and hells. For instance Ajita Kesakambali did not accept the truth of a spontaneous birth (*opapāta: D.* I, p. 55). This would amount to a rejection of the existence of both heavens and hells since both divine and hellish beings are spontaneously born. Some Buddhist Schools also did not believe in the reality of certain aspects of heavens and hells. Some, for instance, believed that the guardians of the hell *(nirayapālā)* are not real but kamma-created. A verse quoted by them says that sinners are punished by their own *kamma* but not by the King of the Fathers (Pittirāja). Theravādins rejected this view as not conforming to textual evidence (*Kvu.* p. 596).

There is, however, some evidence in Pali texts of an early attempt to interpret metaphorically some of the contemporary terminology connected with beliefs in heaven and hell. In one discourse (*S.* IV, p. 206) the Buddha has rejected the view commonly held at the time that there is a place named Pātāla at the bottom of the ocean. Pātāla, according to him, is a synonym for painful sensations of the body. There is another instance where certain heavens and hells are named after the six faculties of sense contact *(cha phassāyatanāni).* Buddha claims to have seen the hells and heavens by these names. Speaking of the hells be says "Therein whatever object one sees with eye, one sees as uninviting, not as inviting; one sees as repulsive not as charming; one sees as ugly, not as lovely" and so forth with regard to all other senses as well. The converse is true of the six heavens (ibid. p. 126).

The commentator asserts that Avīci is meant here by the term *niraya* and Tāvatiṃsa by the word *sagga (SA.* II, p. 400). But the text refers to six hells and six heavens and not mere one. This could very well be a reference to the six types of sense experience, painful or pleasurable, one could experience in any sphere, especially in the human world. The commentator is not averse to this view for he says that both hell and heaven can be here in the human world because it has a mixture of both pain and pleasure.[15]

The *niraya* named Mahāpariḷāha, 'Great Burning' or 'Great Fever' with the same conditions as in the six hells noted above is mentioned in another discourse (*S.* V, p. 450). The commentator has not tried to identify it with any known hell. It may be the same as Mahāniraya because the *Bālapaṇḍita Sutta* uses the same terms in describing that hell. Mahāpariḷāha can be here and now in the human world as well, for one discourse says that mental and physical fever *(pariḷāha),* distress *(daratha)* and torment *(santāpa)* leading to anguish *(dukkha)* could result from sense perception. However, Theravādins of old who stuck to a traditional view of hell and heaven have never tried to develop on such metaphorical interpretations. See Pl. XXXV.

Paths to Heavens and Hells. *Rg Veda* speaks of the path to the third heaven discovered by Yama and followed by other human beings (*Rv.* X, 14, 1 - 2). Later Vedic texts

15. *Manussaloko pana vokiṇṇa-sukhadukkho. Idheva apāyo ca saggo ca paññāyati: SA.* II, p. 400.

speak of two separate paths leading to Heaven and the world of the fathers *(pitrs)*. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, *Chāndogya* and other *Upaniṣads* (*Bṛh. Up.* 6, 2. 15-16, *Ch. Up.* 5. 10, 1-7) describe the respective paths taken by those who follow the path of the fathers *(pitryāna)* and those who end up with Brahma, the highest reality viz. 'the path of gods' *(devayāna)*. The former returns to the human world again and again while the latter never returns. Some of the later *Purāṇas* (*Garuḍa*, ch. III) describe how the departed ones *(pretā)* follow the path to the seat of judgement of Yama, the King of Righteousness *(Dharmarāja)*. This path is supposed to exist in the physical world, delineated sometimes, in relation to various heavenly bodies or natural phenomena.

Buddhism also speaks of a path or paths or a journey *(gati)* and provisions for the journey *(pātheyya)*, of those who leave this world and go to the beyond (*Dhp.* vv. 235, 237). But in early Buddhism there is never an attempt to set out such a path as a physical reality. The path, used in a metaphorical sense, is to be followed while still living. The path followed here is the path of good or bad actions performed by a person. The former leads to a happy rebirth and the latter to an unhappy rebirth. The Buddha links the three spheres of sensuous pleasures *(kāma)* form *(rūpa)* and no-form *(arūpa)* to these actions *(kamma)*. If there is no performance of actions that would be effective in the sensuous sphere *(kāma-bhava)* there could be no becoming in that sphere. Similarly with the other two spheres. It is the seed of consciousness *(viññāna-bīja)* nurtured in the field of action that springs to life in an appropriate new birth (*A.* I. p. 223). Thus avoiding the path of evil actions and following the path of good actions one can ensure a happy life after death.

According to the *Kukkuravatika Sutta* (*M.* I, p. 387 ff.), harmful *(sabyābajjha)*, black, bodily, verbal and mental actions lead one to harmful worlds like *niraya*, while non-harmful *(abyābajjha)*, white, actions lead to non-harmful worlds like Subhakiṇṇa. A mixture of black and white actions leads one to worlds where one experiences a mixture of pain and pleasure. The human world is held out as an example. Certain *deva* worlds and subhuman planes are also said to have the same conditions. Actions which are neither black nor white lead to the eradication of kamma *(kammakkhaya)* viz. Nibbāna.

A further analysis would show that evil actions performed for sense gratification would lead to rebirth in *niraya* and other woeful states while good actions done with the same purpose would lead to rebirth in the heavens of the sensuous sphere. Good actions with an admixture of evil would lead to a human rebirth. The four *jhānas* or their equivalents like the four sublime abodes *(brahma-vihāra)* would lead to rebirth in the worlds of the form sphere *(rūpabhava: A.* II, p. 126 ff.) and the four formless attainments *(arūpa samāpatti)* lead to the worlds of the formless sphere *(arūpabhava:* ibid. p. 267). While the four formless attainments have each its corresponding plane of rebirth this aspect is not so clear in the case of the four *jhānas*. The commentaries call the three worlds of the Brahmakāya the 'plane of the first *jhāna*' *(pathamajjhāna-bhūmi)*. The next three worlds ending with Ābhassara are the plane of the second *jhāna* and the three worlds ending with Subhakiṇṇa the plane of the third *jhāna*. Although not expressly stated, all other worlds of the form sphere ending with Akaniṭṭha belong to the plane of the fourth *jhāna* (*Vbh.* p. 424f; *VbhA. p. 250). The Aṅguttara-nikāya* which says that the fourth *jhāna* leads to Vehapphala, explains that insight into true nature of the mental states obtained while in the four *jhānas* leads to the Pure Abodes *(Suddhāvāsa: A.* II, p. 128).

Nibbānic Path and the Cosmos. There seems to be a close relationship between the Buddhist world-system and the Path of Deliverence *(vimuttimagga)*. At the outset one could see that the realization of the four stages of the Path is expressed in terms of rebirth in or deliverence form rebirth in various states of existence. Thus, one who has realized the first stage of the path, *Sotāpatti*, is said to be 'not liable to fall' and 'certain to attain enlightenment' *(avinipāta-dhammo niyato sambodhiparāyano: M.* I, p. 34). Elsewhere the Buddha explains how a person can declare himself to be a Stream-winner *(sotāpanno)*, free from *niraya*, animal birth, the realm of the fathers and free from all forms of sub-human miserable existences (*S.* V, p. 356 ff.). A Stream-winner is further said to be liable to be reborn only seven times the most *(sattakkhattu-parama: A.* I, p. 233). A further development of this concept is seen in the terms *kolaṃkola* and *ekabījī* used with reference to Stream-winners. The first realizes deliverance after two or more rebirths, while the second puts an end to suffering after just one more rebirth (ibid. loc. cit.).

The term *Sakadāgāmin*, Once-returner, used of one who has reached the second stage of the Path, is self explanatory. He returns to this world just once and puts and end to suffering. An *Anāgamin*, a Non-returner, never returns to this world. Such a person has a spontaneous birth in a heavenly world and could be reborn in higher heavenly worlds before finally attaining Nibbāna. An Arahant has put an end to all rebirth *(khīṇā jāti)* and for him there is no whirlpool (of birth and death) to be shown *(vaṭṭaṃ natthi paññāpanāya: M.* I, p. 34 ff.).

The Path of Deliverence given in great detail in the Nikāya literature also seems to be closely aligned with different grades of worlds in the cosmos. Thus a monk who perfects moral discipline *(sīla)* and develops mental concentration *(samādhi)* realizes at one point that he is

free from the five hindrances *(pañca nīvaraṇa)*. Joy that is generated from this ultimately leads to concentration of the mind, and it is from there that the meditator enters the first *jhāna*. In expressing this it is said "separated from sensuous pleasures, separated from evil states of the mind he enters and abides in the first *jhāna*." This quite obviously is indicative of the transition of the meditator from the sphere of sensuous pleasures *(kāma-bhava)*, consisting of both woeful and happy states of this sphere, to the sphere of form. It was shown that the four *jhānas* are equivalent to the heavens of the sphere of form and the formless attainments to the heavens of the formless sphere. One who passes all these worlds and reaches the fourth attainment of the latter sphere reaches the summit of existence *(bhavagga: S.* III, p. 83). There are no worlds beyond that. Therefore one who attains the ninth attainment, i.e. 'cessation of perception and feeling' has gone beyond existence. There is no world corresponding to this attainment. Here he touches cessation *(nirodha)* with the body (*D.* I, p. 184). But to realize complete Nibbāna he has to climb down from this summit to a lower plane and seeing it with wisdom, eradicate all intoxicants (*M.* I, p. 456). This final emancipation can be achieved even at a lower stage in the sphere of form. The frequently mentioned stage for this exercise is the fourth *jhāna*.

Thus a Buddhist meditator traverses through the cosmos and finally goes beyond all existence *(bhava)*, before his death, in this very life itself. In a number of discourses the Buddha has shown how a person can be elevated to final emancipation in this very life by a competent instructor. This is especially stated about persons on their death bed. The *Dhānañjāni Sutta (M.* II, p. 193 ff.) shows how a brahmin on his death bed was led up, step by step, by Arahant Sāriputta, from *niraya* to Brahmakāya, through all sub-human, human, and six lower heavenly worlds. The brahamin was reborn after death in the company of Brahmakāya gods. The Buddha, however, rebuked Sāriputta for stopping here, for the brahamin was capable of going further and perhaps realizing emancipation.

A discourse of the *Saṃyutta-nikāya* (V, p. 408) shows how a discerning lay disciple could assist another wise lay disciple who is seriously ill. First he should be instructed to free his mind from attachment to the five strands of sense pleasures of the human world. In this manner his mind is led up through the six heavens of the sensuous sphere by showing that each world above is better than the lower one. When the mind of the sick person reaches Brahmakāya he is told that the Brahma world itself is impermanent, not lasting, and bound by the notion of self *(anicco addhuvo sakkāyapariyāpanno)*. If he is able to grasp this fact, then his mind could be released from bondage. There is no difference between his deliverance and that of one who has eradicated the intoxicants *(āsavakkhaya)*, i.e. an Arahant. Thus the system of heavens and hells has been made use of by bhikkhus to lead a person's mind to a happy rebirth or final deliverance from all suffering.

C. Witanachchi

HEDONISM, is the theory that pleasure is the chief goal and that pleasure should be the aim of human endeavour. Psychologically, it is the theory that every action is motivated by men's desire to be happy. Ethically, it is the doctrine that every man ought to aim at securing for himself and others the greatest possible sum of pleasure. The psychological theory and the moral doctrine need not necessarily go hand in hand.

Popular among Greek philosophers (Aristippos, Eudoxos, Epikuros), Hedonism was alien to the spirit of Christianity, but was revived by the 17th century materialistic philcsophers, Hobbes, Lock and others, and in the 19th century remodelled as Utilitarianism by Bentham and John Stuart Mill.

Several sayings of the Buddha would make one think of him as a hedonist. With Nibbāna as the goal of his doctrine he describes it as the highest bliss *(Nibbānaṃ paramaṃ sukhaṃ; Dhp. v.* 203). Happiness is the result to be expected from a pure mind (ibid. *v.* 2). This happiness, however, is not pleasure but arises in a serene mind *(sukhaṃ seti vippasannena cetasā:* ibid. *v.* 79); it is synonymous with the calm of peace *(upasanto sukhaṃ seti:* ibid. *v.* 201). Happiness is the relief from all conflict (ibid. *v.* 331). It exists in the attainment of wisdom and the avoidance of evil (loc. cit.). To be happy is to be content whether one has much or little (loc. cit.). An occasional note of utilitarianism is struck, e.g., when friends are said to be a pleasure when one is in need (ibid. *v.* 330). All these quotations are intentionally culled from one single text, the *Dhammapada,* which has no philosophic build-up and has therefore, the most practical value. They all point to happiness as distinct from pleasure or pleasurable feeling *(sukha-vedanā)*.

Pleasurable feeling is a sensation, but is, according to Abhidhamma, experienced only in the sensation of touch. "This exceptional distinction is assigned to the sense of touch, because the impact between the sentient surface *(pasāda-rūpa)* and the respective objects of other senses, both sets of which are secondary qualities of body, is not strong enough to produce physical pain or pleasure. But in the case of touch there is contact with one, or other, or all the three primary qualities (locality, temperature, pressure, i.e., *paṭhavi, tejo, vāyo)*; and this is strong enough to effect those primary qualities in the

percipient's own body" (Shwe Zan Aung: *Compendium of Philosophy*, Introductory Essay, pp. 14-5)

In a way similar to the distinction between the hedonistic feeling of pleasure and the intellectual experience of bliss, one should distinguish *upekkhā* (the hedonic neutrality or indifference, which is neither pleasure nor pain), from that equanimity which is a state of mind *(tatra-majjhattatā)*, implying a complex mental state.

Hedonistic pleasures are so varied that they are obviously not homogeneous and can, therefore, not be estimated quantitatively. Thus, to speak of the greatest possible sum of happiness as the aim of ethical living is rather meaningless. Pleasure may be an object of desire, but when a continuous state of happiness is shown as the goal it is not a sum of pleasures. And so it happens that many pleasurable feelings cannot produce happiness, e.g., a distinction is made (*M.* III, p. 62) between the feeling of pleasure *(sukha)* and the joy *(somanassa)* resulting as an associated mental state, both of which are grouped as feeling *(vedanā)*.

That there are kinds of happiness which are not to be classified under pleasurable feeling is shown in the Abhidhamma groupings of the mental factors *(cetasika)*, where pleasurable and non-pleasurable feelings are grouped under sensations *(vedanā)*, whereas joyful interest *(pīti)* is a mental factor grouped under the karmic formations *(saṅkhāra)*, or accidental properties *(pakiṇṇaka)*.

Neither this joyful interest *(pīti)* nor the bliss of wellbeing *(sukha)*, which are stages in the development of mental concentration and absorption *(jhāna)*, falls under the category of pleasure, association with which, however, is not excluded. For, happiness is clearly distinguished as sensuous feeling (pleasure) and spiritual emotion, even when a common term *sukha* is used.

But the spiritual emotions of joyful interest *(pīti)* and the experience of the bliss of well-being *(sukha)* are always shown as transcending all sense-pleasures *(kāma-sukha)*. That a happy rebirth is often shown as a legitimate and profitable *(ānisamsa)* quest for the simpler-minded layman (e.g., *A.* I, p. 58), that meritorious deeds are encouraged as carriers of happiness *(sukhāvahāni: S.* I, p. 2), and that conduct which leads to profit and happiness *(hitāya sukhāya samvattanti: A.* I, p. 190) is shown in the well-known advice to the Kālāmas as a guide-stone for ethical behaviour, point to the hedonist tendency in Buddhist morality. But, as in the ultimate sense not only immorality *(akusala)* but also merit *(puñña)* has to be left behind to effect a successful crossing of the stream of samsāra, it is also in the ultimate

[illegible] was particularly important and favoured [illegible]. According to the ancient belief, the [illegible] was regarded as a dangerous direction through which demons were supposed to enter. It was [illegible] that the [illegible] would serve as pro- [illegible].

[illegible] of Buddhism, doctrinally speaking, played a very important role in the history of Japanese [illegible]. It recognized various texts which were inde- [illegible] by such schools as the Pure Land School, the Zen school and the Nichiren school that [illegible] in the late Heian period and the Kamakura [illegible].

[illegible] period witnessed the emergence of another [illegible] school, the Shingon school, founded by [illegible] 774-835 A.C) who like Saicho [illegible] in fact on the same mission as Saicho in [illegible] C. and [illegible] Esoteric Buddhism from [illegible].

Kukai [illegible] the centre of the Shingon sect on [illegible] where he built a temple called Kongobuji. Later [illegible] which became another centre of [illegible] Buddhism in Japan. In addition to his priestly [illegible] renowned for calligraphy [illegible].

[illegible] the end of the Heian period, Japan plunged into [illegible] became uncertain as a result of civil war. People [illegible] with the fear of death. As the situation [illegible] Buddhist theory gained currency, [illegible] would enter into an age of degeneration of the true Dharma where no individuals could [illegible] hope to attain enlightenment by their own efforts [illegible]. This idea was called the theory of 'Mappo' ([illegible] Dharma); the last of the three stages [illegible] of the Buddha, the other two [illegible] the true Dharma), the period of the [illegible] 500 years (according to some 1,000) and (2) [illegible] Dharma), the period of the semblance [illegible] 1,000 years (according to [illegible] according to the Japanese [illegible] in the year 1052 A.C. It caught [illegible] mingled with the social, political [illegible] of the country and [illegible] reform movement for their salvation [illegible] the popularization of the Pure [illegible] of Buddhism. And subsequently with the [illegible] Kamakura period (1185 A.C. - 1333 A.C.), [illegible] Buddhist schools emerged.

[illegible] Matsunaga; *Foundation of Japanese [illegible]*, Vol. I, Tokyo, Third Printing, 1987. Shinsho Hanayama, translated and edited by Kosho Yamamoto; *A History of Japanese Buddhism*, Third Print, Tokyo, 1977. Association of the Buddha Jayanti, edited; *Japan and Buddhism*, Tokyo, 1959. H. Paul Varley; *Japanese Culture*, Third Edition, Tokyo, 1984. E. Dale Saunders; *Buddhism in Japan*, Fourth Printing, Tokyo, 1985.

T. Endo

HELA AṬUVĀ. See SĪHALA AṬṬHAKATHĀ

HELL. See HEAVEN AND HELL

HEMIS - GUMPA, is the most famous, the oldest and the wealthiest monastery in Ladakh.

The word *gumpa* is used to denote the spacious buildings in the monasteries containing the main prayer halls, the chapels and the large number of rooms occupied by the lamas. Inside the chapel are placed the beautiful images of Maitreya and other gods who are worshipped a number of times during the day and a butter lamp is kept burning constantly. The walls of the chapel and other rooms in the monasteries are decorated with beautiful paintings and costly tapestries. The walls of the monasteries are surmounted with a large number of prayer flags. The *gumpas* are also the places where the famous mystery plays of Ladakh are staged. Every monastery celebrates its own festival, which in addition to the performance of the customary offerings *(pūjā)*, is an occasion for music, dance and drama.

Hemis-gumpa is situated about twenty-two miles to the south-east of Leh and it belongs to the Red Hat sect of lamas. Hundreds of lamas of this sect reside in this monastery. Earlier, people reached this place either on foot or on horse-back. But now it has been connected with Leh by a motorable road.

At Hemis-gumpa, a grand festival is held annually in the month of June in honour of Padmasambhava. This is considered as the most famous festival in Ladakh. It attracts large crowds of people from the nearby villages and also from Ladakh. A mystery play, interspersed with dances, enacted on this occasion represents the fight between Good and Evil (q.v.) with the former triumphing at the end. The lamas take part in these plays dressed in elaborate brocade costumes. Some of them use large black hats crowned with images, and others wear masks of animals, skeletons etc. The orchestra used in these plays includes big trumpets, cymbals, drums and clarinets. At the end of this festival an offering is performed and it is considered as a safeguard against possible

calamities on the land and its people (Gannat, J. N.: *Buddhism in Kashmir and Ladakh*, pp. 198, 202, 216, 230-36).

Indumathie Karunaratne

HERESY. Owing to the absence of 'church' or 'theology' in Buddhism one may doubt whether it is possible to say that there were 'theological doctrines or systems rejected as false by ecclesiastical authority.'[1] Though there was no ecclesiastical authority as such the senior monks during the time of the Buddha had enough grasp of the fundamental tenets of Buddhism to detect whether any interpretation was within tradition or not. This informal authority was later designated as '*Theriya bhikkhū*' who were able to judge what is heresy and not. Condemning certain views and interpretations presented either by individuals or sects by Theras was in continuation even Sri Lanka as evidenced in declaring Vetullavāda as a heresy. Heresies were usually called evil views or misconceptions *(pāpakaṃ diṭṭhigataṃ; M.* I, pp. 130, 256) and when such views were reported to the Buddha he condemned them *(vigarahi)* in very strong terms.

Among the wellknown heretics during the time of the Buddha, the monk called *Ariṭṭhagaddhabādhipubba* needs special mention since he never reformed himself even though the senior monks and the Buddha himself tried to wean him away form his views. (*M.* I, p. 130 ff.). He maintained that the pleasures the Buddha declared to be stumbling blocks to spiritual progress are not so at all for the one who indulges in them (*Vin.* II, p. 25). Having failed to convince him that this was a false view the monks reported him to the Buddha. The Buddha delivered the *Alagaddūpama Sutta (M.* I, p. 130) to denounce his heresy explaining in various ways how the indulgence in sensual pleasures is harmful to the person who aims at spiritual progress. Ariṭṭha does not seem to have been moved even after the Buddha's condemnation of his forming such a view. The Buddha declared that he was a dull and empty person who was not even warmed up *(na usmikatopi)* in this *dhammavinaya.* When neither the Buddha nor the monks could make Ariṭṭha give up his minconception *(duggahīta)* he was subject to a punishment called *ukkhepaniya* which amounts to excommunication (*Vin.* II, p. 25). Buddhaghosa has, in his Vinaya commentary, enlisted him as an enemy of Buddhasāsana (*VinA.* IV, p. 874).

The *Mahātanhāsankhaya Sutta* of the *Majjhimanikāya* reports of another heresy held by a monk called *Sāti.* He held the views that 'A man's consciousness transmigrates and continues without change of identity' *(viññāṇaṃ sandhāvati saṃsarati anaññaṃ* (*M.* I, p. 256). Condemning this as [illegible] of his teaching the Buddha made it clear that consciousness was dependent on other causes or conditions to cause its arising and had no independent existence. Sati seems to have attempted to explain rebirth by referring to a factor of continuity, and thought of consciousness as suitable for this purpose. Buddhaghosa says that this monk was not a learned one. He was reported as being exposed mainly to the *Jatakas* and as a consequence of his impressions on the characters, who constantly reappear in former births of the Buddha and his contemporary followers (and even enemies), had formed this heresy.

The very opposite extreme of this view was the heresy propounded by the monk called Yamaka. He held that "in so far as a monk has destroyed the *āsavas* he is broken up and perishes at the break up of the body and becomes not" (*S.* III, p. 109 ff.). This view was reported to Sāriputta. He refuted this as a heresy by pointing out that it was wrong to say that someone perishes after death since it is not possible to claim that someone does exist even when he is alive. In reality, one's existence is a convention only. There is no being that is annihilated. Sāriputta equals this heresy to the murderous attitude a man harbours when he enters the service of a rich man with the intent of killing him. Such a man would always be a murderer even though his master knows him not to be so. Even so, the disciple who regards *rūpa* and the other *khandhas* as permanent and so on harbours a murderous intention.

Thus, during the time of the Buddha, there was a procedure of handling heresies or the attempts at misrepresenting the Buddha, and even excommunication of such heretics was in practice. Anticipation of such heretics after his *Parinibbāna* has made the Buddha to provide a technique of examination called '*Mahāpadesa*' the four great references (*D.* II, p. 124). This technique demands a thorough grasp of the existing Dhamma and Vinaya which was considered as the standard of authority. So, the later Theras had to classify Buddhist teachings into *Sutta* and *Vinaya* and then use them as the measure before denouncing any new teaching as a heresy. It was on this that the Elders who held councils rejected certain revisions proposed by various individuals and groups. During the time of King Bindusāra the *Pudgalavāda* of the *Vātsiputriyas* was rejected as a heresy and those who held it were branded as heretics in our midst '*antaścara tirthaka* (*BC.* p. 455). See further DIṬṬHI, DOGMATISM, MICCHĀDIṬṬHI.

Chandima Wijebandara

1. *Encyclopaedia Britannica* - 1982, Vol. IV, p. 1045.

HERUKA (Tib. Dges-pa Rdo-rje also written as Dgyes-pa Rdo-rje), a god of tantric Buddhism and the most popular deity of the Vajrayāna pantheon. Heruka belongs to the Vajra family (vajra-kula) and is a fierce form of Aksobhya Buddha. His colour is blue and his symbols are the skull (kapāla) and the thunderbolt (*vajra*). The foremost duty of Heruka is to protect the world against all forms of evil; and the tantrics believe that the worship of Heruka would secure Buddha-hood for the devotee. The *Heruka-Tantra*, a text of tantric Buddhism, is devoted entirely to the worship of this deity.

Heruka is venerated either in his *yab-yum (yuganaddha)* form or as a single deity, in all countries where tantric practices are followed. In *yab-yum* Heruka is assigned many spiritual consorts *(śakti)* and when thus depicted in mystic union with his various *śaktis* he is given distinctive names, Hevajra, Trailokyākṣepa, Buddhakapāla, Saṃvara, Saptaksara, Mahāmāyā etc. Of these the most popular form of Heruka in *yab-yum* is Hevajra and in this form he is especially venerated in Tibet, China and Nepal.

As for the origin of the concept of Heruka, it is not possible to say exactly when this tantric notion arose. But, in the *Kālikā Purāṇa*, the titles Heruka and the more common Heramba are used as epithets of Ganeśa, a deity of the Saivite pantheon and the superintendent of the troops attending on Lord Siva. In the same work (ch. 76) it is stated that Heruka arose out of a part of a *linga* (phallus), the others who were thus created being Bhairava and Bhairavī. Furthermore, according to certain ancient Hindu lexicographers the term Heruka also stands for an attendant of Mahākāla, a form of Śiva. Thus, it would not be incorrect to surmise that the tantric Buddhist Heruka was evolved out of this earlier Brahmanic concept, that is, from the Saivite Heruka. It is significant that in both versions, namely, when pictured against the mythological set-up of Hinduism, as well as when viewed in the set-up of the Tantric Buddhist pantheon, the two most dominant features of Heruka appear to be (a) that he occupies a comparatively secondary position in importance as a deity and (b) that his primary function is that of a guardian god. Hence, it is inevitable that Heruka, who is portrayed in Tantric literature as a protection-god, developed warrior-like qualities with awe-inspiring and ferocious characteristics. According to material available in Tibetan literature, the Tantric notion of a deity called Heruka appears to have been quite popular in the 8th century. Jñānapāda, the author of the *Heruka-sādhana*, is said to have lived around 800 A.C. and it is, therefore, obvious that Heruka would have been fully accepted into the Tantric pantheon by that time. The veneration of Heruka continued to be popular in Tibet and the adjoining lands until a much later period, because numerous shrines dedicated to this deity are found in these areas even today.

Descriptions giving the characteristics of Heruka when portrayed as a single deity are found in the *Sādhanamālā* (*Sādh.* Nos 241-5, 248 etc.) and also in the *Nispanna-yogāvali* of Abhayākaragupta. Following is the English translation of a typical description of Heruka from the *Sādhanamālā* (ibid. II, p. 469): 'The hero Heruka should be meditated upon (in the following manner): His colour is blue and he is covered by a human skin. His flaming brown hair rises upwards and his head is adorned by a garland of skulls. His crown is beautified by (an effigy of) Aksobhya. His round eyes are blood-shot. He wears a pendant consisting of skulls held together by entrails. He also wears ornaments made of human bones and has two arms and a gaping mouth which has projecting fangs. In his right hand he wields the thunderbolt *(vajra)* and in the left he holds a (blood ?) filled skull *(pūrnakapāla)*. Lying upon his left shoulder is that magic staff ***(khaṭvāṅga)*** which resembles the sacred thread *(yajñopavīta)* and whose upper end is shaped like the five-pronged thunderbolt *(pañcasūcikavajra)*, while its lower extremity resembles the single pointed one *(ekasūcikavajra)*. Human skulls, the double vajra *(viśvavajra)* and fluttering banners to which are attached tinkling bells decorate this *khaṭvāṅga*. (Ths adorned) Heruka is dancing on a double lotus *(viśvapadma)* on whose sun (? centre) he has placed his left foot, with his right foot placed on the left thigh.'

Although this sādhana does not mention the number of skulls in the necklace, elsewhere in the ***sādhanamālā*** (II, p. 473) it is specifically mentioned that the necklace of Heruka is beautified by a chain of half a hundred severed heads ***(śatārdhamuṇḍamālābhiḥ kṛtahāramanoramam)***. Another deviation appears to be that, according to the same sādhana, Heruka is described as standing on a corpse *(śavastha:* ibid. p. 473) and not on the conventional double lotus. Moreover, although here it is merely stated that the left hand carries a 'filled skull' ***(pūrna-kapāla)***, it is specifically stated in other sādhanas that this skull is filled with blood, e.g. *Sādh.* II, 473: ***raktaka-rotaka)***. However, in every sādhana, his ***āsana*** (the position of the lower limbs) is conceived as being in the dancing attitude of Ardhaparyaṅka with the right leg placed on the left thigh.

On the basis of such descriptions as given above, an image of a deity in black chlorite stone (10th - 11th century A.C.) discovered by N. K. Bhattasali and at present housed in the Dacca Museum, has been identified by experts on tantric iconography as that of Heruka. It is of extreme significance to those who study the growth of sādhana-literature on a comparative basis with the history of Buddhist iconography, that this image and the descriptions of Heruka, as given in the *Sādhanamālā*, agree in almost all details. The icon is of a deity with one face and two arms, slim of figure with well-proportioned limbs. He is in a dancing posture with the left leg slightly bent and the right leg placed on the thigh of the left leg

which is trampling a full-blown lotus which has two rows of petals: one turned upwards and the other turned downwards (: the conventional double lotus, *viśva-padma)*. The face of the deity carries an angry expression with the mouth slightly gaping, showing protruding teeth. The hair spreads out in the shape of rising flames. In its centre is a small effigy, apparently of a dhyāni-buddha and the flame-shaped hair of the image serves as a halo encompassing this tiny figure. According to literary descriptions of Heruka this dhyāni-buddha (q.v.) is undoubtedly, Aksobhya. The necklace around the neck of the figure has seventeen severed heads. Though the figure is slightly damaged and the right arm missing from the shoulder, the posture of the figure and the marks remaining on the stone suggest that the deity once held something in the right hand. A long staff (identified as the *khatvānga)* with a pointed lower end and flowing banners and tiny bells attached to it hangs from the left shoulder. Thus, there seems to be no doubt that the deity represented by the image described above is Heruka, who is portrayed in strikingly similar detail in tantric literature.

When accompanied by his śakti in mystic union, Heruka is known by the title Hevajra. In this aspect Heruka assumes many forms and these are enumerated in the *Sādhanamālā* and the *Hevajra Mandala* of the *Nispannayogāvali*. These forms differ according to the number of arms possessed by the deity when embraced by a specific śakti.

Thus, when two-armed and embraced by his Prajñā Nairātmā, he is called Trailokyāksepa (*Sādh.* II, p. 474). When embraced in *yab-yum* by Vajravārāhi, he has four arms (*Nispannayogāvali*, p. 14). When three-faced and in *yab-yum* posture with Vajraśrṅkhalā, he has six arms (ibid. p. 14). When eight-faced and in mystic union with Nairātmā, he has sixteen arms and four legs (ibid. pp. 14–5). In each form, the Tantric texts enumerate the objects he carries, when endowed with a definite number of hands.

Heruka when embraced by Citrasenā is known as Buddhakapāla (*Sādh.* II, pp. 500-3). In this form he possesses four arms, one face, is blue in colour and dances in Ardhaparyanka. In his four hands he holds the *khatvānga* (magic staff), the *kapāla* (skull), the *kartri* (small knife) and the *damaru* (small drum). When portryed in mandala, Buddhakapāla is depicted as being surrounded by twenty-four goddesses, arranged in three circles.

When Heruka has Vajravārāhi as his consort, he is called Vajradāka. In this type he assumes two forms; (1) Śambara and (2) Saptāksara. Further, in the guise of Śambara he appears in two variations (a) as the two-armed Śambara and (b) as the twelve-armed Śambara. Of the two-armed Śambara it is said in the *Sādhanamālā* (II, p. 504), that he has three eyes, a string of skulls on his forehead and a crescent moon on the crown. He also wears the six auspicious ornaments *(sanmudrā)* and is in ālidha posture (a particular āsana or position of legs). His symbols are the *vajra* and the *ghantā* (bell), he has matted hair and an effigy of Aksobhya on his crown. Vajravārāhi who embraces him also has three eyes and holds the *vajra* and a blood-filled *kapāla*.

The twelve-armed Śambara is described in the *Śambaramandala* of the *Nispannayogāvali*. In this form he has four faces and stands in the ālidha posture on the forms of Bhairava and Kālarātri. His two principal hands carry the vajra and the vajra-marked bell and he is said to display in full the nine dramatic sentiments *(navanātya-rasa)*.

As Saptāksara, too, his śakti remains as Vajravārāhi but in this form the deity has six arms and three faces. In many respects this form is similar to the variety of the two-armed Śambara, but in addition to the *vajra* and *ghantā* carried by Dvibhuja-śambara (the two-armed Śambara), Saptāksara, also carries a human skin *(nara-carma)*, a skull cup *(kapāla)*, a magic staff *(khatvānga)* and a trident *(triśula)* in the remaining four hands. And like the two-armed Śambara, this deity also stands in the ālidha attitude.

When Heruka embraces the Prajñā Buddhadākini, he has four faces and four arms and is called Mahāmāyā. In this form he is depicted as dancing the Tāndava in the Ardhaparyanka attitude. According to the *Nispanna-yogāvali* (p. 22) the form of Heruka called Mahāmāyā is blue in colour and carries in the four hands a skull cup *(kapāla)*, an arrow *(śara)*, a magic staff *(khatvānga)* and a bow *(dhanus)*.

From what has been stated above, it becomes clear that Heruka, in tantric Buddhism symbolises not merely a single deity, but represents rather the class-name of a host of independent deities, each possessing separate symbols of office, a particular goddess as his śakti, specific bodily characteristics, separate germ syllables *(bija-mantra)* etc. In his work *Buddhist Himalaya* (p. 205) D.L. Snellgrove observes, 'Heruka is not a single divinity but rather a type' (see also J. Przyluski, *'Heruka-Sambara'*, *Polish Bul. Orient.*, I, 1937, pp. 42-5) In fact, the multifarious forms of Heruka developed into an abundance of independent deities that ultimately the initial characteristics of Heruka as a single deity were almost lost in the labyrinth of these secondary emanations. Therefore, it is not surprising that in the later phase of Tantric Buddhism Heruka appears in five more forms as the fierce manifestations of the five dhyāni buddhas. Thus he is called Buddha-Heruka when he is in the fearful form of Vairocana, Vajra-Heruka when he is the fearful form of Aksobhya; Ratna-Heruka when he is the fierce form of Ratnasambhava; Padma-Heruka when he is the fierce

form of Amitabha and Karma-Heruka when he is the fearful [illegible] Amoghasiddhi (see D.L. Snellgrove, ibid. p. 79). It has been attempted in the *Hevajra Tantra* to give a technical explanation to the term *Sri Heruka* in the following manner:

Srikaramadvayam jñanam hekaram hetvādiśunyatā
rukārāpagatavyūham yakāram na kvacit sthitam
(D.L. Snellgrove, *The Hevajra Tantra*, II, p. 24).

Snellgrove translates the above verse as follows:

Sri implies monistic knowledge
He the voidness of causality,
Ru the end of discriminating thought,
Ka its indeterminability.
(ibid. I, p. 72)

According to the *Mantra-patala* of the *Hevajra-tantra* the bija-mantra of Heruka is *tam mam pam tam bam ōm deva picuvajre hūm hūm hūm phat svāhā*. But there is no strict agreement among the tantras as to the allotment of the seed-syllables to the different deities. Thus, according to the *Sādhanamālā* Heurka arose out of the germ-syllable *Hrih (Hrihkārasambhavam...... Herukam:* ibid. II, p. 472.

G. K. Wijesekera

HETU. The concept of *hetu* has played a very significant role in Buddhist philosophy. The teachings of early Buddhism have the characteristics of a philosophy as a way of life. The way of life that early Buddhism recommends is based on its account of the nature of reality. A conspicuous feature of the early Buddhist account of the nature of reality is its avoidance of certain notions of an unverifiable and metaphysical nature like God, Being, the Absolute or other monistic or pluralistic principles which serve as the primordial existence or existences in terms of which the empirical world of change and variegated existence could be explained. Buddhism emphasized knowing and seeing as the means of ascertaining truth. Neither speculative and *a priori* reasoning, nor dependence on external authority can serve as means to comprehending the nature of reality. Observation of the inner and the outer realities of the experiential world by making use of the sensory capacities of man, and the intelligent systematization of the observed data avoiding misinterpretations of experience which could occur due to various forms of mental biases and preconceived ideas is considered in Buddhism to be the secure way for attaining truth. The Buddhist concept of *hetu* may be described as referring to an explanatory principle which emerged as a consequence of this approach to truth.

The term *hetu* is generally rendered into English as cause, reason or condition. A cause is generally thought of as that which produces something and in terms of which that which is produced or the effect can be explained. In early Buddhism the term was associated exclusively with this causal sense and never with the logical sense of a rational justification for the conclusion of an argument claimed to be logically valid. Early Buddhism does not contain much discussion relating to the definition of the concept of *hetu*. Instead it pays more attention to those factors that could be identified as the *hetu* or productive cause or explanation of classes of phenomena which may be of immediate human interest and concern. However, ideas that are philosophically illuminating in respect of the analysis of the concept of cause are not entirely lacking in early Buddhist thought. This was inevitable as other explanations purported to be forms of causal explanations as well as non-causal philosophical positions have been offered by non-Buddhist philosophical systems contemporaneous with the time of the emergence of Buddhism. Buddhism had to make clear in what manner the distinctively Buddhist explanation in terms of cause differed from other non-Buddhist explanations in terms of cause or otherwise.

The term *hetu* is one among a number of terms used in the Pali Canon for expressing the idea of a cause. According to Buddhaghosa the terms *paccaya, kārana, nidāna, sambhava* and *pabhava* are synonyms for the term *hetu (Vism.* p. 532). The *Niddesa* adds terms like *mūla, samutthāna, āhāra, ārammana,* and *samudaya (Nd.* I, p. 256). *Hetu* and *paccaya* are the commonest and are often used together to denote 'cause' in the Pāli Nikāyas. In the early Buddhist texts these two terms have been used with no distinction in meaning. However, in later Abhidhamma the term *hetu* is used to mean a root cause, whereas the term *paccaya* is used to mean a supporting condition. A more detailed discussion of this distinction will be undertaken at a later stage in this article.

The idea of cause is implicit in the earliest expression of the truths that the Buddha revealed to the world in what is traditionally believed to be the first sermon of the Buddha delivered to the first five disciples at Isipatana in Benares. In this sermon he presents unsatisfactoriness *(dukkha)* in life as the problem that has to be overcome. This problem could be overcome by comprehending its cause *(samudaya* or *hetu).* The cessaton of *dukkha* also requires a particular means of bringing about the desired result. The path or the means to the cessation of *dukkha* also implies the notion of cause. In fact in the *Nidāna Samyutta* the term *upanisā* is used as a synonym for *hetu* to indicate both the ordinary process involving the causal origin of *dukkha* as well as the progressive stages of the path such as *saddhā, pīti* etc. productive of the cessation of *dukkha (S.* II, p. 30).

Reference is made to the central concern of Buddhism with explanation in terms of causes in several Canonical sources which may without doubt be said to belong to the earliest stratum of Buddhist literature. In the *Vinaya-piṭaka* where one of the earliest Canonical accounts of the Buddha's early mission of disseminating the *dhamma* is given. Assaji, one of the first five disciples of the Buddha, in answer to an inquiry as to what in brief is the Buddha's message says:

> The Tathāgata has declared the cause *(hetu)* of those phenomena which are produced from a cause. He has also declared (the means for) the cessation of those phenomena. Such is the message of the great recluse (*Vin.* I, p. 40).

It is also said that the Buddha's comprehension of causality consisted of the very essence of his enlightenment experience. All the doubts entertained about the nature of reality are said to have disappeared since the comprehension of the causal principle *(atha'ssa kaṅkhā vapayanti sabbā – yato pajānāti sahetu-dhammaṃ:* ibid. I, p. 2).

Early Buddhist use of the term *hetu* coupled with the term *paccaya,* is often associated with the distinctively Buddhist notion of causality expressed through a term coined anew by the Buddha, namely, *paṭiccasamuppāda.* The fact that the term *paṭiccasamuppāda* is not a term borrowed from the pre-Buddhist usage is specially significant, for whenever the Buddha found an existing term adequate to express distinctively Buddhist concepts by way of redefining those terms, he has refrained from coining an altogether new term. In the case of presenting his doctrine of causality, he probably found the existing terminology inadequate to express the revolutionary and original idea of dependent origination. The distinctive character of the Buddhist notion is highlighted in the Buddha's discourses in the *Nidāna Saṃyutta* by pointing out that *paṭiccasamuppāda* is the theoretical Middle Way that avoids the common and widespread tendency to fall into either of the extremes of eternalism *(atthitāvāda, sassatavāda)* and nihilism *(natthitāvāda, ucchedavāda)* *(S.* II, p. 17). The distinctive character of the early Buddhist concept of *hetu* could be determined only in relation to the concept of *patccasamuppāda.*

The Buddhist idea of cause *(hetu)* avoids the tendency to explain existence in terms of underlying unitary principles. Buddhism does not seek to explain existence in terms of material causes in the way the Milesian philosophers of Ancient Greece did by discovering some basic matter such as water, air or the like of which all things are composed. Nor does Buddhism attempt to explain all existence in terms of abstract indeterminate principles like the *apeiron* (Bo[illegible]) [illegible] ciples like *Atman, Brahman* o[illegible] thought which emphasized the [illegible] explanations of phenomena and [illegible] an empirical observation and [illegible] reality, Buddhism was not content [illegible] tendency to depend on abstract [illegible] pure speculation. Hence, although [illegible] concept of causal origination was n[illegible] Buddhist thought Buddhism [illegible] sented a radically different [illegible] with its new concept of dependent [illegible]

Individuated existence [illegible] cal personality trapped in the [illegible] of which the absolute beginning [illegible] is according to Buddhism, [illegible] *paticca sambhūtaṃ. S.* I, p. 134). [illegible] process arising depending on cause [illegible] certain alternative explanations of [illegible] are four alternative explanations [illegible] rejected in Buddhism. They are [illegible] of self-causation (expressed [illegible] terminology of the time as *sayaṃ kataṃ* [illegible] (2) explanation in terms of external cau[illegible] *kataṃ):* (3) explanation in terms of a combination [illegible] two *(sayaṃkatañ ca paraṃ kataṃ ca)* and (4) explanation in terms of fortuitous origination *(asayaṃkāraṃ apa-ramkāraṃ adhiccasamuppannaṃ* or *ahetu* [illegible]. It appears from the above classification that [illegible] three were recognized in Buddhism as varieties [illegible] explanation although those explanations were [illegible] be incompatible with the Buddhist view, while [illegible] was considered in Buddhism to be tantamount [illegible] rejection of explanation in causal terms altogether.

The four standpoints mentioned above are ref[illegible] several times in the *Nidāna Saṃyutta* of the *Saṃyutta-nikāya* in connection with the Buddha's [illegible] explanation of the origin of unsatisfactoriness *(dukkha)* *(S.* II, pp. 20-21). The first three were [illegible] conceiving the relationship between what may [illegible] the cause *(hetu)* and the effect *(phala)* with regard to any occurrence explainable in causal terms. The first view which may be called the theory of self causation, [illegible] understood as attempts to trace the origin and evolution of the universe to primeval substances, material or spiritual. The Milesian theories in early Greek philosophy fall into this category. In the Indian context explanations which fall into the same category are to be found in the tenth book [illegible] of the *Ṛg Veda,* in the *Brāhmaṇas* and the *Āraṇyakas* and more characteristically in the *Upanishads.*[1] K. N. Jayatilleke [illegible] the theories of *satkāraṇavāda* or [illegible] and [illegible]

1. See D. J. Kalupahana, *Causality the Central Philosophy of Buddhism,* (The University Press of Hawaii, Honolulu, 1975) p. 64.

[illegible]

[illegible] that there were both Vedic and [illegible] of this theory. According to Kalu[illegible] the doctrine of the Vedic tradition asserting the creation of the world by an omniscient and omnipotent God could be identified as one group of theories of external causation (Kalupahana, op. cit. p. 15 f.). There is no doubt that Buddhism recognized the theory of creation by a personal God as one of the dominant beliefs of the time. It is mentioned by the Buddha primarily to point out its consequence on the question of moral responsibility and free will. If one were to believe that whatever experience of pleasurable, painful or neutral feeling a person has is the product of divine creation *(yam kiñ cāyam purisapuggalo paṭisaṃvedeti sukhaṃ vā dukkhaṃ vā adukkhamasukhaṃ vā sabbaṃ taṃ issara-nimmānahetu)* the Buddha observes that such a belief will lead to a doctrine of inaction *(akiriya: A.* I, p. 173). However, there is no clear evidence to the effect that the doctrine of creation by God was identified explicitly in the Pali sources with the theory of external causation. Implicitly, of course, such a theory entails dualism, i.e. the dualism of the creator and the created world, and in this sense involves a distinction between the cause and effect. Moreover creation theories are mentioned in the *Brahmajāla Sutta* as semi-eternalist doctrines in the sense that the creator is believed to be eternal and the created beings non-eternal. This implies that the cause, the creator is different in essence from the effect, the created being.

The theory of external causation is explicitly referred to in the Pali Canon as the doctrine which asserted the annihilationist position *(ucchedavāda)*. The doctrine of annihilation was primarily associated in Buddhism with the view that there is an existent being who does not continue but is annihilated after death *(kāyassa bhedā parammaraṇā ucchedaṃ vināsaṃ vibhavaṃ)*. The causal theory of materialist schools of Indian philosophy subscribed to a doctrine of inherent nature *(svabhāva)* which explained all events in terms of a theory of natural determinism (Kalupahana, op. cit. p. 24 f.). The *svabhāva-vādin* maintained that a phenomenon does not depend on another phenomenon or group of phenomena for its existence. It depends on its inherent nature. Kalupahana points out that the materialists were referred to as non-causationists *(ahetuvāda)* due to their rejection of interdependence and any form of causation except inherent nature. According to Kalupahana, the reason for the Buddhist and Jaina identification of the materialist theory of causation with the theory of external causation despite the fact that the materialists believed in determinism through self-nature or inherent nature *(svabhāva)*, was the close association of the self-causation

[illegible] *of Knowledge*, (George Allen and Unwin Ltd. London, 1963, p. 452–453).

doctrine with the doctrine of ātman. The materialists rejected the theory of an eternal ātman and viewed the operation of inherent nature as purely the workings of physical law. All operations of the individual were believed to be governed by the inherent nature of the physical constituents of his being. Hence it was conceived as a theory of external causation, a theory according to which the individual cannot exercise any control over the physical laws that govern his behaviour.

The *niyativāda* theory of the Ājivakas was also a theory of external causation closely associted with *svabhāvavāda*. According to the Pali Canon Makkhalī Gosāla was a strict determinist who maintained that human initiative is of no avail because life is governed by three factors, destiny *(niyati)*, species *(sangati)* and inherent nature *(svabhāva)*. Just as a ball of thread unwinds itself to its full length both fools and wise alike reach their end according to destiny.[4]

Another theory which is mentioned in Buddhism in connection with the problem of freedom and moral responsibility is the theory of strict *karmic* determinism. It is referred to in the Buddhist texts as *pubbekatahetuvāda* and is sometimes attributed to the followers of Niganthanātaputta. It could also be classed among the doctrines of external causation because it held that all the present experiences of an individual are determined by his past deeds. According to the Buddha this view too, like the doctrine that all experiences are due to creation by God *(issaranimmānahetu)* negates the efficacy of human choice and will (*A.* I, p. 173).

The third type of causal theory accepted both internal and external causation *(sayam katañ ca param katañ ca)*. It is identifiable with the Jaina concept of causation which was asserted in terms of its epistemological pluralism. The Jainas admitted a plurality of causes and conceived this plurality under the two broad categories of internal cause such as human initiative *(purusakāra)* and external causes time, God, nature and *karma*.

It is important to examine what the distinctive character of the Buddhist notion of cause is in the context of the other alternatives it rejected. The most striking feature of the Buddhist explanation of existence in terms of cause is that it does not involve the search for a first cause or causes. Explanation in terms of cause is conceived not as *a priori* explanation but as empirical explanation. Buddhism admits that there are observable causal dependencies in the world open to empirical observation. The question of what those dependencies are, is a matter to be experientially discovered. The question why? as a question demanding an explanation is not understood as requiring an answer which ultimately stisfies the speculative interest. Unverifiable speculative explanations are, from the Buddhist point of view, not explanations in terms of cause. The Buddhist concept of *hetu* cannot be employed in the way that speculative metaphysicians of the west were accustomed to use the concept of cause for proving the existence God. In Buddhism, the admission of a causal order in the universe is not itself based on *a priori* considerations but on an observation of the nature of things. Any explanation given in terms of *hetu* in the teaching of the Buddha is invariably of observed finite existences and events, but not of ultimate wholes. Buddhism does not conceive the cause-effect series as constituting a chain of events in such a way that one could trace the first line in the chain or the uncaused first cause of the entire series. Buddhism views reality as constituting a dynamic system sustained by relativity and interdependence. The search for ultimate beginnings is bound to turn out to be a self-defeating exercise.

Samsāric dukkha is a fact that requires causal explanation. It cannot be explained away by *a priori* metaphysical arguments which prove that it is illusory in terms of other metaphysical principles that are speculatively or dogmatically established. The standard causal formula introduced in Buddhism to explain this consists of twelve factors. But it is to be conceived as an attempt to explain the existential predicament of man by identifying certain crucial causal factors which are observable in the dynamic system of relative and interdependent nature. There is no attempt in this formulation to trace the first beginning or the ultimate origins of existence. Buddhaghosa makes this point explicitly in his explanation of the Buddhist concept of *paticcasamuppāda*. He maintains that in the standard formula adopted in Buddhism for explaining the process of *samsāric dukkha* the fact that ignorance *(avijjā)* is placed first should not mislead us to think that it is an uncaused first cause. For *avijjā* itself is caused. Buddhaghosa cautions us not to interpret *avijjā* as an uncaused first cause like the concept of *prakrti* of the Sānkhya philosophy (*Vism.* p. 525).

While using the term *hetu* in the sense of cause Buddhism divests the term of its usual metaphysical associations by linking it to the Buddhist concept of dependent origination *(paticcasamuppāda)*. When Selā bhikkhunī says that this personality is produced due to a cause *(hetum paticca sambhūtam)*, denying that it is explainable either in terms of self causation *(na yidam attakatam)* or in terms of external causation *(na yidam parakatam)* she lays emphasis on the distinctive character of the Buddhist notion of cause. She goes on in this instance to explain it by means of an example. Causal

4. *Kasmā pan' ettha avijjā ādito vuttā. Kim pakativādinam pakati viya avijjā pi akāranam mūlakāranam lokassā ti? Na akāranam. Āsavasamudayā avijjāsamudayo ti hi avijjāya kāranam vuttam: Vism.* p. 525.

origination is exemplified in the growth of a seed sown in a field depending on factors such as the essence of the soil and moisture (S. I, p. 134).

Buddhaghosa's commentarial explanations are immensely helpful in understanding the distinctive character of the Buddhist notion of causal origination. Buddhaghosa explaining the term *samuppāda* says that it indicates the idea of arising together, but not arising one after another *(uppajjamāno ca saha sammā ca uppajjati, na ekekato, nā'pi ahetuto ti samuppādo: Vism.* p. 521). The term *paticcasamuppāda* denotes the dependence on the coordination of a plurality of conditions, *(paccayasāmaggim pana paticca apaccakkhāyā ti evam pi paticca so samuppādo cā ti paticcasamuppādo:* ibid). The idea of a plurality of causes is implicit in the Buddhist theory. Buddhaghosa views the totality of causes consisting of ignorance etc. *(avijjādi ekekahetu-sisena niddittho hetusamūho)* as related to the production of the single effect through the interaction and interrelation of jointly operating conditions *(svayam sahite yeva aññamaññam avinibbhogavuttidhamme uppādeti ti samuppādo ti pi vutto).* Causal production takes place interdependently, concomitantly, conjointly and simultaneously, but not in mutual isolation of the factors or in a time sequence of before and after *(paticca sāmam saha ca na ekekadesam nā pi pubbāparabhāvena ayam paccayatā dhamme uppādeti:* ibid.). This is evidently the idea implicit in the example of the seed sown in the field given by Selā bhikkhunī to explain the Buddhist notion of causal origination. Therefore, the Buddhist idea of the cause-effect relationship can in no way be interpreted as involving a chain-like series of events traceable ultimately to an absolute beginning which can be conceived as the uncaused first cause.

It has already been observed that the terms *hetu* and *paccaya* were used in the early Buddhist texts as synonyms. Buddhaghosa himself despite the influence of the Abhidhamma tradition is faithful to this original meaning when he considers *hetu* and *paccaya* as having the same meaning although they are linguistically different *(paccaya, hetu ......ādi atthato ekam vyañjanato nānam:* ibid. p. 533). However, in the same context Buddhaghosa made the distinction that came to be affirmed in the Abhidhamma period by referring to the root cause as *hetu* and to the supporting condition as *paccaya, (mūlatthena hetu upakārakatthena paccayo).* In early non-Theravāda sources also a distinction in meaning between *hetu* and paccaya (Sk. *pratyaya)* is denied. *(hetūnam pratyayānām kah prativiśesah. Na kaścid ity āha).*[5] D. J. Kalupahana observes that there is an important difference between the statement explaining the causal origin of sense perception in the *Abhidharmakośabhāsya* and its Chinese versions on the one hand and the statement in the Pali Nikāyas and the Chinese Agamas on the other. The *Abhidharmakośabhāsya* version presents the visual organ as the *hetu* and the external object as the *pratyaya* but no such distinction is implied in the Pali Nikāya and the Chinese Āgama versions. Kalupahana suggests the possibility that the Sarvāstivādins may have changed the statement found in the *sūtras* to suit their own theory of causation(op. cit. p. 62). The question of a distinction in meaning as well as what exactly is the distinction was somewhat a controversial one during the Abhidhamma period is suggested by Yaśomitra's reference to different opinions on the matter.[6] Kalupahana also concludes that it is the substance theory of the Sarvāstivādins according to which a distinction can be made between a thing and its states that led to the introduction of this distinction in meaning between *hetu* and *paccaya* at a later period in Buddhist Abhidharma traditions (op. cit. p. 63)

A clear indication of the distinction between *hetu* and *paccaya* is found in the *Nettippakarana,* a highly esteemed Theravāda text belonging to the post-Canonical period. The purpose of this text is supposed in the Theravāda tradition to be to serve as a guide to the study of the *dhamma. Nettippakarana* says that there are two things operating as productive causes, namely, *hetu* and *paccaya. (dve dhammā janayanti hetu ca paccayo ca).* It marks the distinction between the two by saying that *hetu* has the characteristic of being unique and *paccaya* has the characteristic of being in common *(asādhāranalakkhano hetu, sādhāranalakkhano paccayo).* This is illustrated by the example of the seed and the sprout. It is said that the seed is the unique condition for the generation of the sprout whereas the soil and moisture are common conditions *(Yathā ankurassa nibbattiyā bījam asādhāranam pathavi āpo ca sādhāranā. Ankurassa hi pathavi āpo ca paccayo).* The *Nettippakarana* further characterizes the distinction by saying that *hetu* is the essential nature or the thing itself which undergoes change, the inner nature of the thing, the principle of generation, whereas *paccaya* are the external supporting conditions *(Iti sabhāvo hetu parabhāvo paccayo, janako hetu pariggāhako paccayo: Nett.* p. 79).

The distinction is marked already in the early Canonical Abhidhamma of the Theravāda tradition. The Theravāda Abhidhamma in its scholastic analysis of the various conditions related in diverse ways to the production of the psycho-physical *(nāmarūpa)* process characterized *hetu* itself as a causal condition which could be referred to as *hetupaccaya* due to the specific nature of

5. *Sphutārthābhidharmakośavyākhyā,* ed. U. Wogihara (Tokoyo 1932 - 1936), p. 188.
6. *Hetur āsannah pratyayah: viprakrstāstu pratyayā eva: janako hetuh, pratyayas tu ālambanamātram iti apare. Paryāyāvetāv ity apare (Sphutārthā* p. 703).

the relation involved. Thus *hetu* came to be recognized as one of the variety of *paccaya* and was differentiated from other conditions such as *ālambana* (object) by characterizing it as the one which functions as the root or the primary cause.

The distinction between *hetu* and *pratyaya* appears to be more marked in the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma. The Sarvāstivādins were responsible for presenting a doctrine of six *hetu* and four *pratyaya*. Kalupahana believes that the Abhidharma teachers of the Sarvāstivāda tradition are most likely to have been the first to formulate a theory of causality with two aspects, *hetu* and *pratyaya* because it is a doctrine which fell in line with their metaphysical innovations (op. cit. p. 61). There is no doubt that the distinction is a result of later Abhidharma scholasticism although we cannot be certain as to whether it was a simultaneous development in all Abhidharma schools or whether the Abhidharma teachers of the Sarvāstivāda tradition were originally responsible for it.

A philosophical question which has drawn the attention of some recent writers on the Buddhist notion of cause is whether according to Buddhism the cause can be said to be necessarily connected with the effect. The term *avitathatā* which occurs in the Pali Canon (*S.* II, p. 26) to characterize the causal relation has been rendered into English as 'necessity'. The question arisess as to what kind of necessary connection is admitted in Buddhism between a cause and an effect. In Western philosophical discussions about the concept of cause prior to David Hume's analysis it was generally supposed by philosophers that there is a certain necessary or inherent connection between any cause and its effect. The necessary connection view prior to David Hume's analysis implied that the joint occurrence of cause and effect is not accidental but that the effect must happen in case the cause exists. David Hume claimed that there is no such necessary connection between any cause and its effect. Hume's main argument for this negative conclusion was that the idea of any cause is perfectly separable in our minds from its effect. What Hume claims is that there is no contradiction in supposing that A which is hitherto known to be the cause of B may on some future occasion not be accompanied by its customary effect B. There is no contradiction for example in affirming that water thrown on a flame increases the flame instead of extinguishing it. We can only observe that one event regularly follows aother, but we can never observe any tie between them. There is constant conjunction but no connection can be observed in the form of an impression.

Supposing certain conditions C are invariably conjoined with a certain event E while there are also certain other conditions Ċ which are also invariably conjoined with the the same event E. There seems to be a need to distinguish the causal conditions from the other conditions which may not exhibit a causal relation. Although Hume's point that the effect cannot be logically deduced from the cause, and that the idea of any cause is completely separable in our imagination from its effect is valid many recent and contemporary Western philosophers are quite willing to speak of the causal conditions of any event as those which are in some sense necessary for its occurrence. Philosophers who take this position speak of physical, nomological or etiological necessity which in their opinion is different from logical necessity.

Buddhism does not raise the question of necessary connection in the Humean sense at all because it does not seem to have explicitly made the distinction between purely formal and logical relations on the one hand and empirically discoverable causal relations on the other. The idea of logical necessity does not come into the picture at all. It is therefore a purely causal necessity that is affirmed in Buddhism (Jayatilleke, op. cit. p. 447). This becomes evident from Buddhaghosa's explanation of the term *avitathatā* which is translated into English as 'necessity'. Buddhaghosa says: "Since there is no failure, even for a moment, to produce the events that arise when the conditions come together, there is said to be necessity.[7]

It is to be noted that in the strict sense of the term *hetu* it was used in early Buddhism to refer to the sum total of conditions depending on which a given effect occurs. Explanations in terms of *hetu* in Buddhism were largely confined to the problems associated with man's liberation from his miserable predicament which Buddhism referred to as *dukkha*. In providing such explanations Buddhism highlighted certain crucial causal factors such as ignorance *(avijjā)* and craving *(tanhā)*. Buddhism recognized the fact that explanation in terms of *hetu* applies to any domian of human concern. It could, for instance, be applied to the social sphere in order to discover what causes and conditions are related to social harmony and stability or what causes and conditions are related to social unrest and instability. The point is that explanation in such terms was considered in Buddhism to be of immense practical benefit to man in contrast to explanations in terms of abstract metaphysical principles. Most of the causal factors that the Buddha has identified in connection with human happiness and misery are evidently factors having a psychological significance such as *phassa* (sense contact) *vedanā* (feeling) *tanhā* (craving), and *upādāna* (clinging). On account of this characteristic of the Buddhist concept of *hetu* it may be said to be closer to empirical, pragmatic and scientific notions of cause than to metaphysical ones.

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7. *Sāmaggim upagatesu paccayesu muhuttam pi tato nibbattanadhammānam asambhavābhāvato avitathatā. Vism.* p. 518.

The term *hetu*, in spite of its occurrence in the pre-Buddhist literature, was not as widely used as a philosophical term until the rise of Buddhism. The reason for this is that the term, when utilized in a strongly substantialist philosophical context, implied a "root" *(mūla)*, the essential and invariable cause of a "sprout" *(tūla, sunga)*,[1] a conntection which the traditional Brahmanical system of thought preferred to explain as a function of the "self" *(ātman)* and the Materialist schools conceived as "self-nature" *(svabhāva)*. Such a conception of "cause" could not be accommodated in a radically non-substantialist and empiricist philosophy like that of the Buddha. Yet, the Buddha, whose central tenet in philosophy is the "principle of dependent arising" *(paticcasamuppāda)*, needed to utilize this important term from current usage but also wanted to rid the term of its substantialist implications, a process popularly referred to as "pouring new wine into old bottles."

The Buddha used the term in two related senses, the ontological and the logical. The ontological sense often appears whenever a question is posed in the form: "What is the cause, what is the condition?" *(ko hetu, ko paccayo)*.[2] The logical implications are often apparent when the question is posed as: "What is the reason?" *(tam kissa hetu)*.[3]

For the Buddha, the more important was the use of the term in an ontological sense. After denying any permanent and essential entity called "self" *(ātman)* or substance or "self-nature *(svabhāva)*, if the Buddha had not focused upon the ontological relations between experienced events or phenomena, he would have failed to explain the percevied uniformities and be left with a conception of the world that is more like a sand-heap. Yet, as mentioned earlier, the term *hetu* used to explain that relation was loaded with substantialist meanings. In order to avoid such substantialist nuances, the Buddha used the term as a synonym for one of the terms which was more compatible with his own conception of a relation, namely, *paccaya* (Skt. *pratyaya)* meaning "conditon." Thus, in any investigation into the nature and functioning of phenomena, the question raised almost always is *ko hetu, ko paccayo* ("what is the cause, what is the condition?"). Whereas a substantialist or an essentialist would often look for a single essential cause, the Buddha, unrestricted by such a philosophical perspective, enumerated a whole set of conditions that is relevant to the context, even though the question itself is formulated in the singular. Thus, explaining the human personality as one that "has arisen depending upon a cause" *(hetum paticca sambhūtam*, note the use of the term *hetu* enabled the Buddha to retain some flexibility in enumerate at least four conditions, comparing them to the seed *(bīja)*, the field *(khetta)*, soil nutrition *(pathavirasa)* and moisture *(sineha)*.[4] Such a use of the term *hetu* enabled the Buddha to retain some flexibility in the explanation of the relations as well as the uniformities *(dhammatā)* conceived in terms of such relations. Theories that did not have such flexibility but upheld some form of determinism, especially those that left no room for human effort and moral responsibility, came to be designated *ahetuvāda* even though they were to admit some form of causation.[5] Materialist theories that recognized "self-nature" *(svabhāva)* and the Ājīvika theory of biological determinism *(niyati-sangati-vāda)* came under this category.

However, as speculations continued during the scholastic period represented by the Abhiddhamma, and the need for specifying the types of relations was felt, we find the scholastics enumerating four and sometimes twenty-four relations or conditions *(paccaya)*, the first of which was always *hetu-paccaya (hetu-pratyaya)* or "root-condition."[6] Despite the demarcation of the meaning of the term *hetu* in this context, the Abhidhamma avoided a substantialist interpratation of this condition by insisting upon the efficacy of the other conditions without which the *hetu-paccaya* itself would be inoperative.

The substantialist interpretation of the causal relations appeared for the first time in the Buddhist tradition as a result of the speculations of the Sarvāstivādins. They assumed that each causal relation possessed a unique or essential nature *(svabhāva)*. It is the Sarvāstivāda interpretation of the causal conditions *(pratyaya)* that became the target of Nāgārjuna's criticism. In the opening chapter of his celebrated work, the *Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā*, Nāgārjuna dismissed the non-Buddhist theories of causation by utilizing one single verse and devoted the remaining thirteen verses to the refutation of the substantialist version of the causal conditions *(pratyaya)* without abandoning the conception of conditions itself.[7] However, in spite of Nāgārjuna, the substantialist inter-

1. See David J. Kalupahana, *Causality. The Central Philosophy of Buddhism,* Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1975, pp. 8 - 11.
2. *Vin.* III, pp. 8, 105, 145; *D.* I, pp. 106 - 108, 144; II, p. 139; *M.* I. pp. 25, 27, 285 etc.
3. *D.* I, p. 18; II, p. 14; *M.* I, pp. 1, 31, 310; *S.* II, p. 24; *A.* I, pp. 8, 32 etc.
4. *S.* I, p. 134.
5. See *M.* I, p. 408; *S.* III, p. 73; *A.* II, p. 31.
6. See Kalupahana, *Causality,* pp. 163 - 176
7. See David J. Kalupahana *Nagarjuna: The Philosophy of the Middle Way,* Albany: The State University of New York Press, 1986, pp. 105 - 117.

pretation appears to have dominated the subsequent non-canonical literature, especially the Abhidhamma commentaries and manuals, a rare exception being the *Abhidhammamūla-ṭīkā* of Ānanda.

The second application of the term *hetu,* that is, in a logical sense, despite its occurrence in the early discourses where the Buddha's clarion call for rationality, embodied in the recurring question "What is the reason?" *(taṃ kissa hetu),* whether the question pertains to a discussion of the factual world or some issue relating to morals, did not gain much prominence until the time of Vasubandhu. It is possible to surmise that Vasubandhu's involvement in the logical enterprise was due to his being engaged in fierce philosophical debates with the non-Buddhist as well as the Buddhist substantialists. In addition to being the greatest Buddhist psychologist after the Buddha, he is also famed for his pioneering works on Buddhist logic. Even though his pupil, Dinnāga, has overshadowed him in this latter discipline, Vasubandhu himself can be considered the father of Buddhist logic.

Vasubandhu is credited with the formulation of the three characteristics *(lakṣaṇa)* or form *(rūpa)* of reason *(hetu)* which became a paradigm for the later Buddhist logicians and which bore his name as *Vāsubandhavaṃ lakṣaṇam.*[8] The three characteristics of *hetu* are

1. Thesis *(pakṣa)* to be established, e.g. The mountain is fire-possessing.
2. Reason or justification *(hetu)* which is an indication of the invariable concomitance of an event with another such that the event would not arise without the occurrence of that other. e.g. Because the mountain is smoke-possessing. Whenever there is a state of smoke-possessing, a state of fire-possessing must occur.
3. Exemplification *(dṛṣṭānta)* or that through which the invariable concomitance of the two is specifically mentioned e.g. As is the kitchen (positive example) and unlike in a lake (negative example).[9]

It may be noted that, even though the term *hetu* occurs in No. 2 above and is used to refer to the specific ontological connection, all three are referred to as characteristics *(lakṣaṇa)* or forms *(rūpa)* of *hetu.* Thus the term *hetu* comes to be synonymous with the very method of reasoning or logic. The *hetu-vāda* (opposed to *ahetu-vāda)* which absorbed the attention of early Buddhism is now overshadowed by *hetu-vidyā* ("the science of reasoning or logic"). Henceforward many works on logic were designated "Treatises on Hetu" as exemplified by works like *Hetubindu, Hetucakradamaru, Hetucakranirṇaya* and *Hetutattvopadeśa.* (Pl. XXXVI).

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HEVAJRA, an Indo-Tibetan Buddhist deity, described mainly in the *Hevajra-tantra* (q.v.). The cult of Hevajra's worship, specially in its *yab-yum (mithuna, yuganaddha)* form, i.e. in which he is in union with his *śakti* (female counterpart), was developed in the 11th and the 13th centuries in Bengal and in Tibet. As an emanation of the dhyāni-buddha Akṣobhya Hevajra belongs to the Dveṣa (wrath) family to which Akṣobhya and his emanations belong (See HERUKA).

With regard to the name Hevajra[1] it is of interest to note that *vajra,* meaning the thunderbolt or the diamond, which symbolises the indestructible nature of the ultimate truth and which is also the symbol of the *dveṣa* family of Akṣobhya, is accordingly made use of as a part of the composite name Hevajra. As shown by D. L. Snellgrove *(Buddhist Himalaya,* pp. 75 and 205) the name is merely an invocation of the final truth *(he, vajra).* According to the same authority *(Hevajra-tantra,* I, p. 10. n. 1) while the name is sometimes spelt as Harṣavajra meaning 'rejoicing vajra' it also occurs among the 108 names of Vajradhara in the *Tattvasaṃgraha-tantra.* Snellgrove further observes (ibid. p. 23), "To call anything the essence of Wisdom and Means as the *Hevajra-tantra* is called on its first page, is to claim for it the nature of supreme truth, and to resolve Hevajra's name into two parts HE meaning compassion and VAJRA meaning wisdon, is to identify him with the Supreme Being." In the ultimate analysis the term signifies the undifferentiated and indestructible nature of the absolute, pictorially conceived as the god Hevajra.

In the pantheon of Tantric deities Hevajra is classed as a tutelary god *(yidam).*[2] Chapter 5 of part II of the *Hevajra-tantra* describes him as dark in colour, as having sixteen arms, eight faces, four legs and terrible in appearence with his garland of skulls and the five symbolic adornments *(pañcamudrādhara)*[3] and as being

8. See Hajime Nakamura, *Indian Buddhism,* Hirakata City, Osaka Pref: Kansai University of Foreign Studies, 1980, p. 295.
9. See Stefan Anacker, *Seven Works of Vasubandhu,* Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1984, pp. 38 - 39.

1. Heruka is also sometimes used to designate Hevajra. But the term Heruka designates not a single divinity but a type, the class of fierce divinities and hence Hevajra is merely another form of Heruka (see D. L. Snellgrove, *Buddhist Himālaya,* p. 205).
2. See Alice Getty, *Gods of Northern Buddhism,* pp. 123 ff.
3. The five adornments are the circlet *(cakra),* earrings *(kuṇḍala),* necklace *(kaṇṭhī),* bracelets *(rucaka)* and girdle *(mekhalā).* These are said to possess purificatory powers as they symbolise the five dhyāni-buddhas: see text I, viii, 17 and II, vi, 1–4.

embraced, in the *mithuna* posture, by his female counterpart *prajñā* designated as Nairātmyā. The four *māras*[4] are represented as being trampled by him, under his feet. Fearful to fear itself[5] *(bhayasyapi bhayānakam)* he dances furiously *(tāndavānvita)* on a solar disc, with a crossed *vajra (viśvavajra)* on his crown and the body smeared with ashes and his mouth emitting the *hūm* sound.[6] His front face is said to be black, the right one white, the left one red and fearful and the one to the rear is distorted. The other faces are like those of bees with three eyes for each. While Hevajra and Nairātmyā remain in the centre of the *mandala*, which is described as square and with four portals and adorned with garlands and chains, the eight *yoginis* of the *mandala* of Hevajra are at each of the eight directions. They are Gauri in the east, Gauri in the south, Vetāli in the west, Ghasmari in the north, Pukkasi in the north-east, Śavari in the south-east Candāli in the south-west and Dombini in the north-west. These *yoginis* are two-armed and in a dancing position, having three eyes, wearing the five ornaments referred to earlier and bearing various implements in their hands. The skulls in Hevajra's right hands contain an elephant, a horse, an ass, an ox, a camel, a man, a lion and a cat. Those in the left contain earth, water, air, fire, moon, sun, Yama and Vaiśvānara. As he is in a dancing attitude he is possessed of the nine aesthetic pleasures *(navanātyarasa)* which are love *(srngāra)*, heroism *(vīra)*, loathesomeness *(bībhatsa)*, horror *(raudra)*, mirth *(hāsya)*, frightfulness *(bhayānaka)*, compassion *(karunā)* wonderment *(adbhuta)* and tranquillity *(śānta)*.[7] While enjoying great bliss *(mahāsukha)* in the company of *Nairātmyā*, he at the request of the latter, gives the all-important *Hevajra-mantra* and draws out the *mandala* himself. It is worth noting that detailed instructions are given as to the drawing of the painting of Hevajra. Some of the more interesting of these instructions are that it should be drawn by a person belonging to the tradition of the Hevajra's cycle *(samayicitrakārena)* and being a frightful picture it should be painted at a lonely spot at noon on the 14th day of the dark fortnight in a ferocious state of mind *(krūracittena)* from drinking wine *(madanapānatah)*[8]. As regards the writing of the text too it has to be done by one belonging to the tradition of Hevajra and neither the painting nor the text should be shown to strangers.[9] Answering a question by the *yoginis*, Hevajra explains the *mahāmudrā* or the great symbol which is the goddess *Prajñāpāramitā* herself. Being a physical description of the goddess it could be cited as a description of ideal female beauty (ii, viii, 2-7).

As Hevajra is a tutelary deity *(yidam: istadevatā)* the practical purpose served by him and his *mandala* is the facilitation of the practice of concentration, the process of which is described in great detail in chapter 3 of part I of the text which is summarised by Snellgrove in the following words, "After the preliminaries, the purification of the site and of one's own person, the evocation is begun. This may proceed in various ways in accordance with the meanings of the symbols suggested above. One may first envisage the syllable *RAM* which is the primeval fire. In this one evisages a crossed-vajra, symbol of the absolute centre, and then at the heart of this the syllable *HŪM* which is the essence of Heruka or Hevajra. One may complicate the process by envisaging this *vajra*, the adamantine essence, as first transforming itself into a protected palace, at the centre of which Hevajra is enthroned, or one may commence the whole process with the lotus in the stylised form of the triangle of origination."[10]

A word may be said here about the angry and frightening nature of Hevajra and other similar deities, collectively known as Herukas. Such figures in Indian Art, symbolise the fearful aspect of the process of enlightenment which in Gotama Buddha's case is expressed by his struggle with Māra and his hosts, while the dancing attitude symbolises rhythmic vibrations of the universe, as in the case of Śiva, the *natarāj*. The skull-cups and other war-like symbols, the fearful facial expressions etc. depict the inner struggle, the psychological war, which a person desirous of attaining enlightenment has to go through.[11]

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4. The four *māras* are *skandhamāra, kleśamāra, mrtyumāra* and *devaputramāra*.
5. Snellgrove observes: "The *Hevajra-tantra* belongs to the Vajra-family of which Aksobhya or one of his wrathful manifestations, Hevajra, Heruka or Samvara is the head. Wrath is therefore at the centre and the aspect of the divinities is wrathful." *Hevajra-tantra*, I, p. 30.
6. This is the seed-syllable *(bīja-mantra))* of Hevajra from which he manifests himself.
7. The aesthetic significance of the philosophical concept as well as of the pictorial representation of Hevajra and his troupe could be *seen from this reference to the nine aesthetic pleasures of the Indian tradition. Hevajra's dancing posture can be compared with that* of Śiva the *natarāj*, as symbolising the rhythm of the universe.
8. These details seem to smack of certain elements of black-magic involved in the rite.
9. This shows the secret nature of the Tantric circles as in the case of the *Guhyasamāja-tantra*.
10. *Hevajra-tantra*, I, p. 32. This *description* reminds one of the *sādhanas* of the *Sādhanamālā*.
11. For a detailed discussion of this point see Lama Anagārika Govinda's *Foundations of Tibetan Mysticism*, p. 198 f..

HEVAJRA-TANTRA, a Buddhist Tantric text in Sanskrit compiled in about the middle of the 7th century A.C. by Saroruhavajra (or Saroruha-siddha or Padmavajra) and Kampala.[1] What these two writers seem to have done was to put together in an anthoritative form a large amount of floating material dealing with tantric teachings. Once the text assumed its present form all the other sources that served as its basis disappeared leaving only the signs of such a tradition. This text gained popularity among the Indian Tantric Buddhists towards the end of the 8th century.[2]

The Hevajra-tantra opens with the familiar opening phrase of Buddhist sūtras *evaṃ maya śrutam* (thus have I heard). Hevajra (q.v.) addresses the opening chapter of the Tantra to the Bodhisattva Vajragarbha, who is the interlocutor. This Tantra is introduced as the most secret of all secret things *(guhyāt guhyatamam)*. In reply to a question of Vajragarbha the Lord explains that in the name Hevajra 'He' stands for compassion *(karuṇā)* and *Vajra* for wisdom *(prajñā)* thereby equating the name Hevajra with the final Truth as understood in Vajrayāna.

The subject matter of the text divested of the Buddhist elements, appears as a popular form of folk religion full of magic and going back to a very early period of human civilisation. The original source materials of these folk religious elements were composed not in pure Sanskrit but in some popular dialect which was turned into Sanskrit once the text assumed a Buddhist form. The passages that remain in the text in these dialectal forms bear testimony to this.

The arrangement of the subject matter too shows that this is a later collation. Lofty philosophical ideas are expressed side by side with magical teachings, and the topics are introduced without any plan. The two redactors, however, have been careful to present the text giving it authority with the least amount of editorial work.[3]

The philosophical basis of the Tantra is a combination of Yogācāra and Mādhyamika which also is the case with Tantric Buddhism in general. This is the basis on which reality *(tattva)* is presented as shown in the 5th chapter of book I. It opens by denying ultimate reality to both the subject and the object in every form of sense-perception. The ultimate undifferentiated reality, as aspects of which god, mantra etc. have their existence is here identified witht the Dhyāni-Buddhas and with all the prominent gods of the day - Vairocana, Akṣobhya, Amoghasiddhi, Ratnasambhava, Amithābha, Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Śiva, etc. on the grounds that the various aspects of final truth are represented by these gods.[4]

The Mādhyamika philosophical tenets such as the identification of the microcosm with the macrocosm and of saṃsāra with Nirvāṇa, the admission of Buddha nature in everything including the inanimate objects, are dealt with in the concluding stanzas (37 ff.) of the 8th chapter. Final knowledge is self-realisation (stz. 51) which once dawned cannot be obstructed by anything (stz. 52).

The 9th chapter also deals with philosophical subjects more or less common to Mahāyāna in general. True vision is obscured by ignorance. All things (i.e. sense-faculties, their objects, *skandha, dhātu* etc.) are pure in essence but this essential purity is obscured by the defiling ignorance *(ajñāna-kleśa)*. By personal realisation *(sva-saṃvedya)* the yogins should realise this fact, which is possible because in essence the entire world is of Buddha-nature *(Buddhamayam jagat)*. The objective world, represented by the six-fold sense-objects, remains unpurified to the *yogin* as long as he thinks dualistically as subject and object. Once he overcomes this weakness by self-purification leading to the realisation of non-duality, indulgence in sensual thinking and resultant conceptualisation becomes harmless as one ceases to think egoistically. This chapter ends also with the well-known Mādhyamika statement "that by which the world is bound, by that itself its bonds are released; but the world is deluded and knows not this truth and he who is deprived of this truth will not gain perfection."[5]

Ordinary saṃsāric existence is to be made use of for the realisation of the highest bliss. "By passion the world is bound, by passion the world is released." In other words it means that saṃsāra, when purified is Nirvāṇa, a theory meant to keep the *religieux* in touch with practical effort without making him slide into mere theorisation about life, purification and freedom. The wise man continues in saṃsāra but this saṃsāra is recognized as Nirvāṇa for he

1. These are two of the 84 Perfected Ones (Siddhas) of Tantric tradition.
2. *Hevajra Tantra* has been edited and translated by D.L. Snellgrove and published in two parts (I & II) as the 6th Volume of the London Oriental Series of the School of Oriental and African Studies, London University, 1959.
3. This is the reason why Edward Conze finds this Tantra to be of slight literary merit. cf. Edward Conze, *Buddhist Thought in India*, London, 1962, p. 271.
4. E.g. Viṣṇu represents all pervasiveness and Śiva propitiousness etc.
5. *yena tu yena badhyate lokah*
tena tu tena tu bandhanam muñcet
loko muhyati vetti na tattvam
tattvavivarjitaḥ siddhim na lapsyet II, chp. ii, stz. 49.

has brought this about by purification[6] (II, ch. IV, stz. 32 ff.).

The realisation of this final Truth "which should be individually realised, free from the ideas of oneself and others, pure and void as the sky, the essence supreme of existence and non-existence" is expressed through 'four joys' designated as *ānanda, paramānanda, viramānanda* and *sahajānanda*.[7] The fourth joy is described as supramundane and accordingly equated with the non-dual state of the absolute, the state of Enlightenment or Bodhi. Elsewhere (Bk. II, ii, stz. 52 ff.), this Final Bliss, designated as Great Bliss *(mahā-ānanda)*, is treated as the absolute from which the five great elements *(mahābhūta)* are said to evolve. In this symbolism the five Tathāgata families *(kula)* are given as representing each of the elements. The entire universe is represented as becoming evolved from the one absolute, the Mahāsukha or Great Bliss.

Although one transcends physical form in these progressive stages of spiritual experiences, the body is still necessary as the means towards the goal, for these experiences have to be attained through the body. Accordingly the Enlightened One has a form with arms and faces although in the highest bliss he is formless (II, ii, stzs. 35-43), thereby implying the cessation of individuality by the freed saint.

The ultimate essencelessness of all phenomena owing to their conditioned nature *(śūnyatā)* is explained at II, iii, stzs. 32 ff. All these are like the moon's reflection in water. All *dharmas* have to be conceived as the fire that cannot be located in any place — in the fire-sticks, hands that rub or in its action etc.

Buddha nature is present in all beings, gods, men...... all (II, iv, stz. 36). If not for the accidental defilements, all are Buddhas.[8] In other words a person who knows his own true nature is a Buddha. This inherent state of Buddhahood has to be realised by one's own mind and there is no other method.[9]

Maṇḍala Ritual: The *maṇḍala*-ritual which is essentially a method of acute concentration by means of seed-syllables, mantras, imagined divinities etc., is performed on the basis of these foregoing philosophical tenets. In the *Hevajra-tantra* the *maṇḍala* is that of Hevajra and his troupe of eight *yoginīs* or that of Nairātmyā, Hevajra's feminine counterpart, with her troupe of fifteen *yoginīs*.[10]

The *yogin* should begin his meditational exercise with the development of the four *brahmavihāras* (q.v.) followed by thoughts on the void *(śūnyatā)*, on seed-syllables *(bīja)*, on the physical manifestation of phenomena etc. idealised in the circle of divinities, and lastly this whole process is to be envisaged within one's own heart so that one oneself becomes the centre. One should continue this exercise in the way prescribed until one is capable of visualising and worshipping Hevajra with his eight *yoginīs*.[11] The Lord is to be envisaged as born from the syllable and having two forms as four-armed and six-armed, the former symbolising the destruction of the four Māras and the latter the six perfections. The corpse upon which he treads symbolises the three-fold world. Both forms are to be visualised as in *yab-yum* attitudes, the former embracing Vajravarāhī and the latter Vajraśṛṁkhalā.

The yogin's next task is self-consecration which is another important step in this process of meditation through symbols as described in the chapter that follows. (I, ch. iv). Here, too, the *yogin* has to visualise a seed-syllable is his own heart from which a ray of light is led out in the form of a hook with which all the Buddhas are drawn towards him. After worshipping them the *yogin* should beseech them to consecrate him, which they would accordingly do. Once this is done the presiding deity of the Heruka family (i.e. Dhyāni-Buddha Akṣobhya) would appear on the *yogin's* head indicating that Hevajra is revealed to him.[12]

The 6th chapter (Book I) continues with the details of the performance *(caryā)* of this ritual through which the practiser is expected to attain perfection *(siddhi)* with the help of Hevajra.[13]

6. II, chp. iv, stz. 32 ff.
7. These are explained at II, chp. ii, stz. 25 ff.
8. II, chp. iv, stz. 69
9. *na buddho labhati yatra*
   lokadhātuṣu kutracit
   cittaṁ eva hi sambuddho
   na buddho yatra darśitaḥ II, iv, 75.
10. Details of its lay-out are given at I, x, 2 ff.
11. The dress and other accourtrements to be worn and other implements to be used are prescribed.
12. For better success one is asked to perform it morning, noon and evening.
13. The claim that for some at least this whole ritual is merely a mental exercise appears to receive support from the *Hevajra Tantra*. It says
   Mantraśudhyā sthitā gītā
   nartanā bhāvanā smṛtā
   tasmāt gītañca nṛtyañca
   kuryāt yogī sadā sadā, I, vi, stz. 13.

He should be restrained regarding his food and drink. He is also asked to abandon desire and folly, fear and anger. He should forego sleep and uproot the nature of self before he begins the actual performance. Once he attains *siddhi* the *yogin* "wanders, filled with great compassion and released and full of of compassion for all beings he becomes a 'delighter in the drink of yoga.'[14]

After practising this meditation for one month continuously the *yogin* becomes qualified to have a female partner *(yoginī)* which symbolically means that owing to constant practice of meditation the *yogin* frees himself from sexual differentiation as male and female. This state is called *mudrā-siddha* (ibid. stz. 26).

An interesting feature in this system of meditation is the division of all individuals into five groups, which classification decides the type or maṇḍala suitable for a particular person (I, v, II, xi). According to this division, based undoubtedly on quite a sound concept of psychological ethics, every individual, by nature, belongs to one of the five Tathāgatha families *(kula)* represented by the five Dhyāni-Buddhas and their female counterparts. The *maṇḍalas* suitable for each person would have the Buddha of his family at the centre. This allotment to families is done on the basis of the predominance in each individual's nature of delusion *(moha)* wrath *(dveṣa)* passion *(rāga)*, envy *(īrsyā)* and malignity *(paiśunya)*, which classification reminds one of the six-fold division of all men in the Theravāda tradition as *rāga-carita, dosa-carita* etc. and the allotment of subjects of meditation accordingly (cf. *Vism.* p. 114) Thus, for meditational purposes, the yogin has to make use of the *mandala* suitable for his character with the help of his *guru.* This family division has another interesting aspect, namely the secrecy associated with it. Each family seems to have jealously guarded its own privacy and secrecy. For instance, chapter VII of Book I gives a list of gestures used by the members of the *hevajra-yoga* in their conversations in the presence of outsiders and members of other families. This was to prevent these outsiders from understanding them. In addition to these gestures they had their own code-languages designated as *sandhyā-bhāṣā.*[15]

The meeting of *yogins* and *yoginīs* for religious purposes is referred to several times. These gatherings appear to be folk-dances incorporated into Tantric Buddhism as could be judged from the language of such a song given.[16]

As the *maṇḍalas* of the Tantric Buddhist are entirely based on a complete system of symbolism, at times it becomes complicated to the average reader as could be seen in the 4th chapter of Book II. This complicated symbolism often uses sexual concepts as those of moments *(kṣaṇa)*, joys *(ānanda)* consecrations *(secana)* etc. (II, iii, stzs. 6 ff.). Another interesting feature in the *Hevajra tantra* regarding sexual symbolism is the fact that Hevajra gives explanations of various subjects while in various stages of sexual embrace with Nairātmyā.[17]

Mantras and the magic rituals found in the text also have to be regarded as elements of folk religion incorporated into Tantric Buddhism. Among such magic rites are those performed to drive away one's enemies, cause a city to tremble, purify sites etc. (I, ii, stzs. 1 ff.). Many similar rites are given in the sixth chapter of Book I and chapter i, ix and x of Book II.[18]

The 5th chapter of Book II assumes a special significance because in it Hevajra gives a picturesque account of himself reposing in bliss with Nairātmyā and of his *maṇḍala.*

As they remain in bliss there arise the troupe of eight goddesses from the directions allotted to them. Each of them implores the Lord to arise from that condition of bliss and activate himself for the welfare of the world which he accordingly does. On the request of Nairātmyā he next gives a special mantra and draws his *maṇḍala* himself.

The concluding chapter of the *Hevajra Tantra* is of interest because as the finale to the significant discourse Hevajra consecrates his interlocutor Vajragarbha "even as other bodhisattvas were consecrated by the past Buddhas." Thereafter, by way of recognizing Vajragarbha's maturity to attain wisdom he asks his dedicated pupil to accept the *'devī'* (goddess Prajñā), the giver of perfection and pay her due honour.

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HIEIZAN, honorific name of Mt. Hiei and later used as a synonym for the famous temple Enryakuji.

In 788 A.C. Saicho (Dengyo Daishi q.v.) being displeased with the prevailing conditions at Nara retired to the isolated Mount Hiei, situated close to Kyoto, to lead a life of solitude. Soon after settling down at Hiei he gathered a few sincere followers and managed to build a small monastery which later grew to become the famous Enryakuji.

14. *yogapānarato yogī* I, vi. stz. 26.
15. The secrecy is not confined to language and ritual practices but extends also to writing of books and painting of pictures. (II, vi, vii)
16. II, iv, stz. 6 ff.
17. See II, vi, stz. 1 ff. vii, stz. 1 xi, stz. 1ff. 10 ff.
18. These remind one of the contents of the *Atharvaveda.*

With the lapse of time more buildings sprang up and the Hiei mountain range was transformed into a vast monastic complex, comprising of a number of monasteries, sanctuaries, meditation halls and colleges. The slopes and valleys of Mt. Hiei were dotted with many thousands of such buildings and tradition says that at the height of its glory the number of buildings rose to three-thousand. It became the greatest centre of Buddhism developing numerous branches of Buddhist teachings.

Hieizan received royal patronage from the very beginning. Though Saicho preferred to keep himself aloof from politics and the imperial court he well realized the importance of royal patronage and hence, helped Kwammu to establish his capital at Kyoto. Since then, Kwammu considered Hieizan as the royal temple.

Subsequently, the establishment of a separate *kaidan*, hall set apart to perform the ordination ceremony, independent of those at Nara greatly enhanced the importance of Hieizan and helped it to produce many celebrated monks who were neither connected with nor obliged to the schools at Nara.

With its rise to fame Hieizan began to acquire wealth and property and consequently gained power in both ecclesiastical and political affairs. Saicho's followers were not quite bent on lives of solitude. Instead, they preferred to maintain close connections with the imperial court and to dabble in politics. In the meantime, rivalries sprang up between Hieizan and other centres such as Mii-dera which had earlier branched off from Hieizan. These rivalries prompted both Hieizan, Mii-dera as well as many other major monasteries to oraganize bodies of mercenaries known as *sohei*. Conflicts between these rival monasteries often became extremely violent and it is recorded that during the two centuries beginning from 1018 A.C. Mii-dera was burned down nine times by the monks of Hieizan.

These mercenaries were used not only to settle rivalries between monasteries but, often also, to coerce the government. Thus, for example in 989 A.C. the monks of Hieizan after refusing to accept the Emperor's nominee as their abbot, though it was customary for the Emperor to make such nominations, took up arms against the Emperor to instal their own candidate. These coercions became so frequent and violent that Emperor Shirakawa is said to have remarked that there were three things over which he had no control: the inundations of river Kamo; hazards of gambling and the monks of Hieizan. But, Hieizan had to pay very dearly for its involvement in politics. As a result of its joining hands with the enemies of Nobunaga, Hieizan was the first to taste defeat. Nobunaga [illegible] completely destroyed the Hieizan complex. Many of its inmates were mercilessly massacred [illegible] banished.

Iyeyasu, however, once again constructed a few monasteries but the number never increased over one hundred and twenty-five. Since its destruction at the hands of Nobunaga, Hieizan neither rose to its old heights of glory as a great centre of Buddhism nor became known as a political power to reckon with.

S. K. Nanayakkara

HIGHER ORDINATION or *Upasampadā* is the form of Ordination that confers full membership of the Order to a monk of the Buddhist community of monks *(saṅgha)*. The Pali term *Upasampadā (upa+sam+pad)* 'taking upon' or 'acquiring' technically denotes the taking up of the responsibilities of monkhood. It is by Higher Ordination that a monk becomes a full-fledged member of the community of monks.

The institution of higher ordination, however, has undergone several changes from its inception. Remarkably, the formation of the Order of monks and the laying down of a comprehensive set of disciplinary rules governing the monastic life, by the Buddha are unique features in Buddhist monasticism.

Buddhist Monasticism and Higher Ordination. The first chapter of the *Mahāvaggapāli,* the third book of the Buddhist monastic discipline traces the history of this cenobitic institution referring to numerous contributory factors that affected its evolution from the very earliest and simple beginnings upto the present procedural formalities of the Higher Ordination ceremony. It reveals how the territorial expansion and influx of new adherents who sought admission to the Order due to various reasons necessitated new procedural measures to be introduced for the healthy growth of the newly established monastic Order. Procedural acts pertaining to both Ordination *(pabbajjā)* and Higher Ordination *(upasampadā)* that evolved within the lifetime of the Buddha himself ensured the dignity and esteem of the community of monks.

It is plausible to assume that at the outset there could have been only a simple admission procedure called Ordination *(pabbajjā)* which in a later phase of the increasing popularity of Buddhist monasticism came to be differentiated from Higher Ordination *(Upasampadā)*. The *Mahāvaggapāli,* however, tracing the history of these two monastic institutions says that both Ordination and Higher Ordination had been conferred by the Buddha concurrently at the beginning when the five *pañcavaggiya* ascetics sought admission into the Order. Customarily, Higher Ordination is preceded by Ordination which points to the recognition of the former Ordination as an essential requirement of monkhood as a full member of the community.

The first, among the five ascetics who listened to the Setting in Motion of the Wheel the Dhamma, Kondañña who attained the first stage of sainthood begged of the Master: "O Lord! let me receive Ordination and Higher Ordination from the Blessed One." Thereupon the Buddha said "Come, O Monk, well taught is the doctrine, lead the holy life for the sake of the complete extinction of suffering." The Buddha's very form of address to Kondañña was adequate to confer both the Ordination and Higher Ordination on him. In this way Vappa and Bhaddiya as well as Mahānāma and Assaji respectively on two occasions begged for Ordination and in turn they also were admitted to the Order by addressing them, "Come O Monks" by the Buddha himself. In this way, according to the *Mahāvaggapāli,* the Buddha continued to exercise the privilege of admitting new disciples to the Order. Immediately afterwards, Yasa and his fifty-four friends were admitted to the Order by the Buddha following the same method (*Vin.* I. p. 12 f.).

Gradually, there was an increasing interest for the new movement and monks who set out in propagating the doctrine kept on bringing to the Buddha new candidates aspiring to Ordination from different parts of the country. In this connection, in order to lessen the difficulties that both the aspirants and the monks had to undergo the Buddha enjoined the monks themselves to confer both forms of Ordination by making the aspirant utter thrice the Threefold Declaration of taking refuge in the Buddha, the doctrine and the community of monks. Nevertheless, the Buddha reserved for himself the privilege of conferring Ordination and Higher Ordination with the formula: "Come, O Monks" and afterwards ordained three matted-hair ascetics along with their followers and later the chief disciples Sāriputta and Moggallāna in the same way.

Yet on a later occasion, with reference to a Brāhmana called Rādha who sought admission to the Order the Buddha enjoined the monks to confer Higher Ordination by a formal act of the Order with the motion followed by three announcements *(Ñatti-catuttha-kamma).* With some amendments and additions due to new situations the procedure prescribed came to be regarded as the standard ecclesiastical modus for bestowing Higher Ordination. To day not only members of all monastic traditions in Sri Lanka but also all the Theravāda countries follow the same method.

Essential Requirements for Higher Ordination. Regulations governing the Higher Ordination are scattered over many sections of the first chapter of the *Mahāvaggapāli.* Details pertaining to the institution as evolved in subsequent centuries are found in the commentarial works such as *Kankhāvitaranī, Samantapāsādikā, Vimativinodanī* and *Sāratthadīpanī.* The sanctity and the legitimacy of the act are guaranteed only by fulfilling the essential preliminary requirements. As enumerated by the celebrated commentator Buddhaghosa in the *Samantapāsādikā* they are fivefold, viz. (1) The purity and the eligibility of the person *(vatthu)* (2) The absence of the fivefold defects in bringing a motion *(ñatti)* (3) Avoidance of the fivefold wrong articulation and the utterance of the procedural act *(anussavana)* (4) Avoidance of the defects in settling boundaries of a chapter-house *(sīmā)* (5) Maintenance of the moral purity of the participating monks and the quorum *(parisā).*

When a novice is being vouchsafed Higher Ordination he is simultaneously made to be bound by 227 disciplinary rules including the seven settlements of legal processes *(satta adhikarana-samathā)* found in the monastic disciplinary code called *Pātimokkha.* Beside the specific rules prescribed in the *Pātimokkha* there are some other minor obligatory rules in the monastic discipline governing the monk's individual behaviour as well as his social relationship. Even a novice *(sāmanera)* who has received his ordination long time ago is made to disrobe and is ordained again before the Higher Ordination ensuring the sanctity of the conferment and the purity of the person concerned.

Elder Mahākassapa and Elder Sopāka are mentioned to have received their Higher Ordinations on two distinctly different methods. The acceptance of three plain expository sermons by Elder Mahākassapa (*S.* II, p. 220) was sufficient for him to be admitted whereas the solution of questions set by the Buddha to Elder Sopāka (*Thag. vv.* 480 f. *ThagA.* p. 477; *DhpA.* p. 176 f.) was adequate for him to be elevated to Higher Ordination. These two methods of conferment are called ***ovādapatiggahana** and **pañhabyākarana*** respectively.

As recorded in the *Bhikkhunī Khandhaka* of the *Cullavaggapāli* Mahāpajāpati Gotamī was conferred both Ordination and the Higher Ordination by her mere acceptance of Eight Strict Conditions *(attha garudhamma.* (*Vin.* II. p. 271). Again with reference to Addhakāsi, a former courtezan the Buddha empowered the monks to confer Higher Ordination even through an emissary. (ibid. p. 227). Before the decentralisation of powers pertaining to disciplinary matters there was an intermediate phase in the monastic Order of nuns where nuns were admitted to Higher Ordination following the formal act of procedure by nuns as well as by monks. (ibid. p. 274). As the motion and the announcement are pronounced eight times before both communities this particular method is called *Atthavācikā.*

As the foregoing discussion shows there were eight kinds of Higher Ordination during the time of the Buddha.

1. *Ehi bhikkhu* (come bhikkhu)
2. *Saranāgamana* (taking refuge in the three refuges)
3. *Ovādapatiggahana* (acceptance of advice)
4. *Pañhabyākarana* (answering questions)
5. *Atthagarudhamma* (acceptance of eight strict rules)
6. *Dūta* (through an emissary)
7. *Atthavācika* (by pronouncing eight times)
8. *Ñatticatuttha kamma* (by three announcements)

In course of time, the eighth came to be regarded as the one and only procedure for admitting a novice to Higher Ordination. It has been pointed out that the instance of empowering the Saṅgha for the conferment of Higher Ordination by a formal act of procedure is relatively early in the history of Buddhist Monasticism. The procedure to be followed in conferring Higher Ordination is found in a handbook called *Kammavācā,* which specifies the formal acts of the Order. (J. Dhirasekera, *Buddhist Monastic Discipline,* Sri Lanka, p. 10).

Eligibility and Admonition. With regard to the eligibility of the novice seeking Higher Ordination a monk appointed for the purpose instructs him. He is next led before the Saṅgha and the following questions are put to him.

1. Are you afflicted with the following diseases; leprosy, boils, dry leprosy, consumption and fits?
2. Are you a human being?
3. Are you a male?
4. Are you a freeman?
5. Have you no debts?
6. Are you not in royal service?
7. Have your mother and father given their consent?
8. Are you full twenty years old?
9. Are your alms bowl and your robes in due state?
10. What is your name?
11. What is your preceptor's name?

The negation of the first and the affirmation of the rest of the questions are anticipated (*Vin.* I, p. 94f.)

As soon as the conferment of the Higher Ordination is over the Saṅgha measures the shadow *(chāyā)* to reckon the time and tell him all the particulars pertaining to season *(utuppamāna),* what part of the day *(divasabhāga),* all details together *(samgiti)* and tell him further of all the four resources *(nissaya)* or the minimum requirements of a monk and the four prohibitions *(akaranīyāni)* or the acts not to be resorted to by a monk who has attained Higher Ordination (*Vin.* I, p. 96f).

See also EHI-BHIKKHU-PABBAJJĀ.

Pategama Gnanarama

HIMAVĀ (Var. Himācala, Himālaya, Hemavata, Himādri, Haimavata) — the name given in Pali and Buddhist Sanskrit texts to the Himalayan range of mountains which formed part of the nothern boundary of ancient Jambudipa (q.v.). Mention is made of this mountain-range in other non-Buddhist religious texts, too, such as *Atharvaveda* (XII. I, II), *Rgveda* (X. 121, 4) *Taittirīya Samhitā* (V, 5, 11) *Aitareya Brāhmana* (VIII, 14, 3), *Bhāgavatapurāna* (1, 13, 29), *Mahābhārata* and *Jambudīvapannatti,* a Jaina Text. According to the *Mahābhārata (Vanaparva,* chap. 253) this region was situated to the west of Nepal, and comprised the Kulinda-viśaya representing the region of high mountains in which the sources of the Ganges, Jumna and Sutlej lay. According to the *Mārkandeyapurāna* (54, 24; 57, 59) the Himalayan mountain (Himavat) stretched from sea to sea like the string of a bow.

The commentary to the *Suttanipāta (SnA.* 1. 66) states that this range of mountains is only one of seven such mountain ranges that lie beyond another mountain range by name Gandhamādana. The names of the other six mountain ranges mentioned along with Himavā are: Cullakāla, Mahākāla, Nāgapalivethana, Candagabbha, Suriyagabbha, and Suvannapassa. The extent of the Himalaya range of mountains is three hundred thousand leagues *(yojana),* with eighty-four thousand peaks, the highest peak being five hundred leagues (ibid. I, 224; II. 443). In Himavā are seven great lakes, each fifty leagues in length, breadth and depth. The seven lakes are: Anotatta, Kannamunda, Rathakāra, Chaddanta, Kunāla, Mandākinī and Sīhappapātaka. These lakes are always cool as they are never heated by the sun (*SnA.* II, 407). The commentary to the *Suttanipāta* (*SnA.* II, 437 says that five hundred rivers originate from Himavā, but according to the *Milindapañha* (p. 114) only ten of these rivers are regular in their flow, others being intermittent. The ten rivers mentioned in the *Milindapañha* as regular in their flow are: Gaṅgā, Yamunā, Aciravati, Sarabhū, Mahi, Sindhu, Sarasvati, Vettavati, Vitamsā and Candhabhāgā. A more comprehensive list of rivers flowing from Himavā is given in *Purānas (Mārkandeyapurāna* 57, 16-18). The names occurring in this list are: Gaṅgā, Sarasvati, Sindhu, Candrabhāgā, Yamunā, Satadru, Vitastā, Irāvati, Kuhu, Gomati, Dhutapāpā, Bahudā, Drsadvati, Vipāsā, Devikā, Ranksu, Niścirā, Gandaki and Kauśiki.

Reference is made to Himavā in many *Jātakas* (*J.* 1. 6, 7; II. 72, 262; III, 31, 119) and other texts, as the place to which ascetics retire when they leave household life, as Himavā is full of woodlands and groves suitable for hermits to live and meditate (*SA.* I, 345). The hermitage of Kapila was by the side of Himalaya, not far from the river Bhagirathi *(Saundarānanda Kāvya,* 1,5: *Divyāvadāna* p. 548). The hermitage popularly known as

Vṛśaparva's hermitage was near Mount Kailāsa in the Himalayas *(Mahābhārata, Vanaparva - CLVIII,* 11, 541-3). An ascetic named Nārada who lived in a cave by name Suvaṇṇaguhā in the Himalayas attained supernormal powers *(abhiññā)* through practice of meditation (*J. VI.* 56). The *Vidurapandita Jātaka (J. VI,* 256) speaks of four wealthy brahmins of Bārāṇasi who gave up their wealth and retired to the Himalayas to meditate. Occasional reference is also made in *Jātakas* to hermits and ascetis living in the Himalayas coming down to human settlements down below to procure salt and acid. (*J.* I. 505; II. 171).

Paccekabuddhas retire to a peak by name Mahāpapāta in the Himalaya range in preparation to final passing away there (*SnA.* I, 129), and *nāgas* go to Himavā to give birth to their young. The mountain range is often referred to as king of mountains *(pabbatarājā)* when it is used in similies (*S.* II, p. 137; *V.* p. 464; *A.* III, p. 311). Sīvali thera (q.v.) once went to Himavā from Sāvatthi with five hundred others and this journey took them eight days (*DPPN* s.v. Himavā, Sīvali).

During the time of Emperor Asoka of India the country around Himavā was converted to Buddhism by Majjhima thera who led a mission to the area after the third Buddhist Council. Others who accompanied Majjhima thera were: Kassapagotta, Mūladeva (Alakadeva), Sahadeva and Dundubissara (*Mhv.* XII, 41; *Dpv.* VIII, 10; *MT.* 317). It is recorded that the *Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta* was preached by Majjhima thera and eighty crores attained *Sotāpattiphala* after listening to the discourse. The five members of the mission individually converted five kingdoms and each member ordained one hundred thousand persons (*Mhv.* XII, 42 f.). It is also recorded in the *Mahāvamsa* (V. 25 f.) that deities regularly supplied from Himavā for Emperor Asoka's use, twigs of the *nāgalatā* creeper, healthful fruits, myrobalan, terminalia and mango fruit; while for the foundation laying ceremony of the Mahāthūpa (q.v.) in Anuradhapura, novices *(sāmaneras)* with psychic *(iddhi)* power brought sweet-scented *marumba (Mhv.* V. 25f.; XX. 9)

The *Kuṇāla Jātaka (J.* V. p. 412) was preached by the Buddha in the region of Himavā. The Buddha took the Sakyan princes there and showed them the various features, including many mountain peaks such as: Maṇipabbata, Hiṅgulapabbata, Añjanapabbata, Sānupabbata, and Phalikapabbata. On fast days the gods assemble in Himavā to hold discourses (*Sp.* IV. p. 759 - See *DPPN.* s.v. Himavā).

W. G. Weeraratne

HĪNAYĀNA, 'inferior vehicle', a term with pejorative overtones employed by the Mahāyānists, to collectively designate the earlier schools of Buddhism including the Theravādins, Mahāsaṅghikas, Sammitiyas and Sarvāstivādins. The component *yāna* in this term literally means the vehicle that carries the rider or traveller to his desired goal. In other words, it refers to the path *(magga, mārga* or *patipadā)* that leads the follower to his final goal, nirvāṇa. In order to attain nirvāṇa the disciples of the Buddha follow the 'vehicle' of the Noble Eightfold Path *(maggaṭṭhaṅgika-yāna, Thig. v.* 389; *aṭṭhaṅgikamagga-saṅkhāta ariyayāna: ThigA.* p. 257), which is sometimes called *brahmayāna* and *dhammayāna, S.* V. p. 5). Although the Noble Eightfold Path is thus infrequently referred to as a *yāna* 'vehicle', it is the *paṭipadā* 'path' followed by the disciple, or the *sāvakayāna* that is referred to as the "inferior vehicle" in contrast to the attainment of *bodhi* 'enlightenment' which is the superior *(mahā)* vehicle. This 'vehicle' of gaining nirvāna as a *sāvaka* (disciple) is considered inferior *(hīna)* by the Mahāyānists. The Mahāyāna ideal is the attainment of Enlightenment by fulfilling the obligations of a bodhisattva. The Mahāyānists maintain that the Hīnayāna culminates in arahantship whereas the Mahāyāna culminates in Buddhahood and derogatively refer to the former as *arhatyāna* or *śrāvakayāna* while the latter is called *buddhayāna* or *bodhisattvayāna.*

The terms Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna together with their synonyms are never used in the Pali texts or the Chinese *āgamas,* but almost all Mahāyāna texts use these terms. The earliest reference to the followers of the *śrāvakayāna* in Buddhist Sanskrit texts is to *hīnādhimuktika,* those emancipated by inferior means.

The origin of the term Hīnayāna and also the concept it represents is as obscure as the origin of Mahāyāna itself. In early Mahāyāna sūtras like the *Prajñāpāramitā,* the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka,* the *Avataṃsaka* we come across the terms *arhatyāna* and *śrāvakayāna* quite often, but the occurrence of the term Hīnayāna is very rare. In the *Pañcaviṃśati-sāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā,* we find the term used once only (Yueh Bundle, Vol. 8, p. 43a of Chinese Tripiṭaka; Ryukan Kimura, *A historical Study of the terms Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna and the Origin of Mahāyāna Buddhism,* Calcutta, 1927, p. 119), while in the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra* the term occurs twice only (*Sdmp.* 188, part I, p. 60; part II, p. 140; Kimura, p. 119). The use of the term is more frequent in the Mahāyāna Sūtras which are regarded as later compositions. In the *Suvikrāntavikrami-paripṛcchā* of the *Mahāprajñāpāramitā,* for example, it is said, "It indicates the supreme way for the men of Mahāyāna and does not preach the way of the Śrāvakas and the Pratyekabuddhas. It indicates the way of the śrāvakas so far as the men who are preaching Hīnayāna are con-

cerned, and shows the great way to one who desires to practise Mahāyāna (Yueh Bundle, Vol. 8, p. 67b; Kimura, p. 147). The *Avataṃsaka Sūtra* emphatically states that Hīnayāna be given up and Mahāyāna earnestly practised. (Tien Bundle, Vol. 9, p. 5b; Kimura, p. 148) while the *Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra* advises people to kindle the light of Mahāyāna and put down the light of Hīnayāna (Yueh Bundle, Vol. 5, 77; Kimura, p. 148).

Although the contexts in which the terms *śrāvakayāna* and *arhatyāna* occur in the early Mahāyāna sūtras imply the inferiority of the idea they represent, they are not quite adequate in expressing the idea fluently and completely; the terms are not evaluative or comparative in themselves. The term Hīnayāna seems to have been coined with the express purpose of condemning the mere attainment of nirvāṇa by arahants. For the Mahāyāna, becoming an arahant is the easy way out, evading one's responsibilites to future generations. The arahant is felt to be lacking in compassion.

Enlightenment, according to Mahāyāna does not mean simply the understanding of the Four Noble Truths. The Buddha was not merely enlightened in this sense, but literally omniscient. The enlightenment of the disciples was no more than the specific enlightenment which sufficed to produce freedom. The thought of enlightenment (*bodhicitta*, q.v.) in the Mahāyāna sūtras is restricted to the thought of becoming a Buddha; consequently it is a thought peculiar to the bodhisattva. The occurrence of this thought is said, in the *Ratnakūta Sūtra* (or *Kāśyapaparivarta*, ed. by Von Stael-Holstein, Shanghai, 1926, p. 123), to make the bodhisattva surpass all śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas. In accordance with this idea the sūtra (p.116) denounces the śrāvakas as not being true sons of the Buddha. Practically every Mahāyāna sūtra repeats this denunciation of the inferior (*hīna*) way of the disciples in harsh tones and at varying length, contrasting rather unpleasantly with the tolerance and understanding characteristically reflected in most early Buddhist texts.

The views of the Mahāyāna sūtras regarding Hīnayāna took definite shape at the hands of the Mahāyāna teachers who drew specific distinctions between the two *yānas* with regard to their theoretical, and practical application. There are six aspects according to them in which Hīnayāna is inferior to Mahāyāna.

1. One fundamental difference concerns itself with the nature of beings. All beings both wise and foolish according to Vasubandhu, are originally possessed of what is called *Buddha-svabhāva* or *Buddha-nature*, germ or potentiality that could be developed into Buddhahood. This *Buddhasvabhāva* is identical with *śūnyatā* and all classes of men come into being out of the same śūnyatā. Vasubandhu adds that the Sarvāstivādins, (i.e., Hīnayānists), are of the opinion that all human beings do not originally possess the *buddhasvabhāva*, but obtain it by religious practice (*Buddhasvabhāva Śāstra*, Sha Bundle, Vol. 2, p. 466 of Chinese Tripitaka; Kimura, p. 151).
2. The second point of difference pertains to the ideal. As all are possessed of this Buddha-nature, the ideal should be the attainment of Buddhahood. All should arouse the thought of enlightenment (*bodhicitta*) whereby all become bodhisattvas, and adopt the career of a bodhisattva (*bodhisattva-caryā*) which consists of perfections (*pāramitā*) culminating in the perfections of wisdom (*prajñāpāramitā*) which is Buddhahood. Mahāyāna sūtras are full of references to this point. The difference is that, since Hīnayāna does not consider this obligatory, Hīnayānists, it is alleged, are satisfied with the attainment of arahantship which, according to Mahāyāna, is the ideal to be adopted by those of low inclinations (*hīnādhimuktika*) whose aim is the mere attainment of nirvāṇa (*Sdmp.* pp. 102-103, 109, *vv.* 41, 42).

   Nāgārjuna points out that the buddhayāna which is the superior one is for universal benefit while the Śrāvakayāna which is inferior is for individual benefit. The former has been preached for both the bodhisattvas and the śrāvakas while the latter is meant for the śrāvakas alone; and not for the bodhisattva (*Prajñāpāramitā Śāstra*, commentary to *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra*, Wang Bundle, Vol. I, p. 29a of Chinese Tripitaka).

   It is this distinction which represents the practical and ethical aspect of the two *yānas* as claimed by the Mahāyānists, "the selfishness of the arhant and altruism of the bodhisattva", and hereby they contrive to establish the inferiority of the Hīnayāna.
3. The third point of distinction which flows from the first two points discussed above pertains to the freedom attainable in the two *yānas*. In the Hīnayāna the freedom is attained by the removal of hindrances of defilements (*kleśāvaraṇavimukti*) which in the Mahāyāna is attained by the removal of both the hindrances of defilements and the intellectual hindrances (*jñeyāvaraṇavimukti*). The former is attained by the śrāvakas while bodhisattvas attain both (*Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra*, Lai Bundle, Vol. 2, p. 67 of The Chinese Tripitaka; Kimura, p. 170).

Finally we come to the doctrinal differences found in the two systems. The doctrine preached in the *Śrāvakayāna*, says Nāgārjuna, is *śūnyatā*, unreality of the individual (*pudgala-nairātmya*) while in the Buddhayāna śūnyatā of the individual as well as of the dharmas (*dharmanairātmyatā*) is preached. (*Prajñāpāramitā*

Śāstra, Wang Bundle, Vol. I, p. 29 of Chinese Tripitaka). This implies that the understanding of unreality of the individual which is not the whole truth is sufficient for the attainment of arahantship while the understanding of the unreality of both the individual and the dharmas, which is the whole truth, is essential for the attainment of Buddhahood.

In principle, of course, the theory of bodhisattva on his way to buddhahood was nothing new. The conception is found in the earliest stratum of the Pali texts as referring to the Buddha before his enlightenment *(Mahāpadāna Sutta, D.* II, p. 1 ff.). In addition, jātakas relating to his previous lives seem to have been narrated by the Buddha himself. What is different is that, whereas for the early schools, the jātaka stories may be said to be purely descriptive and intended to inspire confidence in the Buddha, for the Mahāyāna the training of a bodhisattva is prescriptive, the way of the bodhisattva is substituted for, or at least held superior to, the Noble Eightfold Path. The monk should not aim at nirvāna directly; but at first becoming a Buddha, the highest possible attainment, he should save mankind.

All schools of Buddhism are agreed that the arahants are inferior to the Buddhas. Ipso facto it is inferred that the career of bodhisattvas is superior to that of arahants, but the progress in the path has been overlooked here. The fundamental difference between the two *yānas,* however, lies in the Mahāyānist proclamation of the bodhisattva career as the only ideal to be adopted by the true Buddhist and their disregard for the attainment of nirvāna by arahants as lacking in the altruism expected of a bodhisattva.

The aim of the followers of the Buddha, according to the early suttas preserved in the Pali Nikāyas and the Chinese *āgamas,* being the overcoming of *dukkha* (q.v.), which was assured by the attainment of arahantship which admirably served the purpose, there was no question of inferiority or superiority of the path trodden or the qualities attained. The goal is reached by the attainment of arahantiship no less than by ataining Buddhahood. The ideal was the realisation by oneself and in this very life of the emancipation of mind and heart *(ditthéva dhamme sayaṃ abhiññā sacchikatvā...... D.* I, p. 156).

This is what we gather from the early suttas. They do not speak of a bodhisattva-ideal, that all should attempt at becoming Buddhas. What is advocated in them may be gathered from sutta passages which outline the procedure in which a person realises nirvāna or attains arahantship. This procedure starts with gaining faith *(saddhā)* in the teacher (i.e., Buddha) on listening to his Dhamma, and has the following principal stages; renunciation *(pabbajjā)* in order to practise *brahmacariya, sila, samādhi, paññā, vimutti and vimutti-ñāṇa-dassana.* The person who has completed this process is said to have understood that rebirth has been destroyed, the higher life has been led, what had to be done has been accomplished, and there is no further tendency to bring him back to this state in samsāra. This process is well emphasized in early suttas such as the *Samaññaphala sutta (D.* I, p. 62 ff.).

This is the ideal advocated in the early suttas — putting an end to *dukkha* by attaining arahantship. The decisive factor in the characterisation of different Buddhist schools as Hinayāna, or Mahāyāna for that matter is the acceptance or otherwise of authenticity of the Mahāyāna sūtras. Those who reject their authenticity and with them their teaching that everyone should become bodhisattvas come under the broad category of Hinayāna including Theravāda or Sthaviravāda. Three main schools with their allied sects belong to this category; they are Theravāda school prevailing in Sri Lanka (Ceylon) and the two extinct schools of India, namely, the Sarvāstivāda and the Sautrāntika. As I-Tsing says, those who worship the bodhisattvas and read the Mahāyāna sūtras are called the Mahāyanists while those who do not perform these acts are called Hinayānists. (see MAHĀYĀNA).

Upali Karunaratne

HINDAGALA, a village in the Kandy District in Sri Lanka, well known for its Buddhist rock temple. According to S. Paranavitana, it is possible that the name Hindagala is derived from Inda-sāla and it may be presumed accordingly that the cave in ancient times, was named after a sacred place in India, celebrated in Buddhist legend and that the name of the cave was extended in application to the village *(University of Ceylon Review,* XVI, 1958, p.1 n.1). This temple is situated less than half a mile from the southern end of the Peradeniya University in Sri Lanka. A steep ascent of about 150 feet from the road leads one to the ancient rock-cave, provided with a drip-ledge *(katāra).* It was converted into a shrine room *(pilimage)* in the 18th century, by the construction of walls, in the interior. On the rock-roof of this shrine there are paintings in the Kandyan style of the 18th century. On the exterior of the wall are Buddhist paintings of modern times. The main interest lies in the substantial remains of pictorical art, assigned to about the 6th century (ibid., p.1). According to the *History of Ceylon* (ed. B.C. Ray, I, pt. ii, p. 408), the fragmentary remains of these paintings belong to about the 5th century and the pigments used and the technique followed are similar to those at Sigiri. The disposition of the figures gives an idea of the methods followed by the ancient artists. The line drawing is of more refined nature than at Sigiri and delineation of the

human figure in various attitudes and poses has been successfully tackled by the artist. (Pls. XXXVII - XXXIX).

The early painting depicts the Buddha surrounded by figures, presumably divine, in an attitude of veneration. As the Buddha is shown twice in the same scene, it is clear that the method of continuous narration, followed by the sculptors of Bharhut, Sanchi and the paintings at Ajantā, has been adopted by the artist *(UNESCO World Art Series, Ceylon paintings from temples, shrine and rock,* p. 24). Coomaraswamy has identified the scene as the Buddha's visit to Tusita heaven, preaching to his mother, born there as a deva *(History of Indian and Indonesian Art,* p. 165). But the principal celestial figure kneeling at the feet of the Buddha wears a peculiar head dress appropriate to Indra (Sakka) in early Buddhist art. S. Paranavitana, therefore, says that he identifies the scene as Indra's visit to the Buddha in the cave named Indasāla, a favourite theme with the early Buddhist artists of India *(Memoirs of the Archaeological Survey of India,* No. 54, pp. 48-9 and plate XLIV; Foucher, *L'art grecobouddhique du Gandhara,* Tome, I, pp. 492 ff.). The story relates how Indra, when his life and rule in heaven were drawing to a close, obtained an extension of his life as well as of the period of his office by paying homage to the Buddha. The heavenly musician Pañcasikha, acted as intermediary at this interview by singing a song about his love for a nymph, named Solar Brilliance (Suriyavaccasā) whose hand he had not been able to win, owing to her father's objections. Indra, gratified at the successful outcome of his visit to the Buddha, interceded on behalf of the heavenly musician so that he was united with his beloved. The youthful female figure, peeping from behind the head of the kneeling Indra possibly represents this mymph *(UNESCO World Art Series,* op. cit. p. 24).

On the whole there is not much information given about the Buddhist shrine at Hindagala. The two inscriptions found at the site which belong to the 6th or the 7th century, do not even mention its ancient name. According to Paranavitana the reading —*vataka-vahara* mentioned in the first inscriptiion, if tenable, may be the name of the ancient monastic establishment at this place. The purport of the second inscription was to record the construction of a shrine for a bodhi-tree, towards the expenses of which two persons had contributed in cash or in kind (S. Paranavitana, op. cit., pp. 2-3). There are four paintings of the cave temple at Hindagala, appearing in the *UNESCO World Art Series* published by the New York Graphic Society by arrangement with *UNESCO.*

1. Head of Buddha (Plate, XI)
2. Head of Sakka (Plate, XII)
3. Head of a divine attendant of Sakka (Plate, XIII)
4. Head of a divine attendant of Sakka (Plate, XIV)

N. Mudiyanse

HINDUISM is a term used by the western writers to designate India's most dominant religion including the social system and institutions moulded in accordance with the ideas and beliefs propagated by that religion. Unlike many other religions Hinduism is not a religion founded by a single person and, therefore, it has no particular founder as such, and consequently, its origin cannot be fixed to an exact period. As it is prevalent at present, Hinduism is that result of a gradual process of evolution through the assimilation of diverse elements belonging to a variety of religious and philosophical schools, different cultural milieux, varying social and economic conditions, customs, social institutions etc. Just as it has no exact period of beginning, there does not seem to be an end to it, too. This is, perhaps, why Hinduism is qualified as *sanātana dharma* - the perpetual doctrine.

When tracing its beginnings it appears that Hinduism has Vedic Brāhmanism as its core and basis (see s.v. BRĀHMANISM). It is clear that Hinduism accepts and upholds all the major features that characterize Brāhmanism. Two such basic features are (a) the acceptance of the Vedic scriptures as divine revelation *(śruti)* and (b) the strict adherence to the teaching regarding the social structure consisting of the four-fold division of society *(várna-dharma).* See CASTE. Similarly Hinduism upholds - though it is not strictly adhered to now - the doctrine pertaining to the four stages in life *(āsrama-dharma).* It is seen also that Hinduism accommodates most of the major Vedic gods. It accepts sacrifice *(yajña),* though with due modifications, as an essential and effective religious ritual. In general all forms of worship that prevail in Hinduism, its ethical teachings, mythology, cosmology, rites, rituals and customs could be traced back to Vedic Brāhmanism.

Being a perpetual system of religious thought Hinduism in its different phases of development from the Vedic times to the present day, has freely absorbed a large variety of religious beliefs, philosophical ideas, rituals and rites, some of which are complementary to each other and some opposed to each other. Thus, one finds in Hinduism ritualism and sacerdotalism as well as asceticism and yogic meditation, absolutism as well as theism. The syncretic nature of Hinduism is such that all these divergent aspects exist in total harmony with each other, as part and parcel of one unified system. This all accommodating syncretism of Hinduism has immensely contributed to its dynamism, growth and perpetuity.

Hinduism being a continuous, ever-growing 'process' and it also being syncretic in approach, is not a closed religion with all its doctrines fixed and finally settled. Hence, there is not much room in it for 'heresies', for all that it absorbs become an integral part of it. This is seen in every aspect of Hinduism.

The philosophy of Hinduism is the totality of Indian philosophy. It has drawn profusely from the *Upanisads* the *Bhagavadgita* well as the six systems of philosophy and thoroughly enriched itself. For example, from Nyāya it takes in logic and epistemology. For metaphysics it goes to Vaiśesika. From Sāmkhya it has absorbed the teaching regarding *Purusa* (spirit) and *Prakrti* (creative force). The place assigned to the *Veda* and the *yajña* (sacrifice) in Hinduism has ben much enhanced by the influence of Pūrva-mimāmsa and Uttara-mimāmsa. Yoga in Hinduism has been moulded after the yoga school of philosophy.

Hinduism has also enriched its philosophy by syncretizing the teaching of medieval Indian philosophers such as Sankara, Rāmanuja, Mādhava, Vallabha and others. Hinduism accepts Sankara's monistic view (Advaita-vāda) that the Brahman (the Abolute) alone is real while the ātman (individual soul) is not different from Brahman. According to him this impersonal, *nirguna* Brahman (the unqualified Absolute) becomes the personal, *saguna* Brahman, through encounter with *māyā*. Therefore, they are one and the same Brahman, the former appearing as the Absolute to the inititated and the latter as personal god to the average worshipper. This provided the philosophical basis for the identity of Absolute and personal God in Hinduism. The belief in the personal God underwent further development under the influence of the teachings of Rāmanuja who provided a metaphysical rationale for the *Bhakti (q. v.)* movement of Vaisnavaites. Unlike Sankara's Advaitavāda, Rāmanuja's Viśistādvaitavāda (qualified Monism), which made some distinction between the Individual Soul and God, emphasised the path of devotion (Bhaktimārga) and the need of God's grace for salvation. While accepting this view Hinduism also accommodated Mādhava's Dualism which makes an unequivocal distinction *(atyanta-bheda)* between the self (and the world) and God. The Vaisnavaite movement specially centering around the cult of Krsna, and Saiva-siddhānta movement are the outcomes of influence of these teachings.

In this process of syncretism, Hunduism accommodates the philosophical views of both Nimbākara which emphasises difference and non-difference *(bhedābheda)* as well Vallabha's pure Monism *(śuddha-advaita)*. The former holds that both the differenece and non-difference are real. Illustrating this Nimbākara says that the soul *(jiva)* and also the world are different from Brahman as they are endowed with natures and qualities different from those of Brahman. Yet they are also not different, for they cannot exist by themselves and hence they totally depend on Brahman. Vallabha asserts that Brahman as well as the entire world which he creates by the fiat of his will is real.

The process of assimilation and syncretization is continuing and this explains the parallel existence of absolutism and theism, of *nirguna* and *saguna* Brahman. Hinduism explains that it is the same impersonal absolute Brahman, the only real source of everything that appears as the personal, omnipotent, omnipresent, omniscient God when viewed from a comparatively lower level. He is the Lord, the Controller, the Ruler, generally referred to as either Iśvara or Bhagavān.

This belief in one personal god has, at a subsequent phase of development, turned into a concept of a Trinity *(Trimūrti)* consisting of three personal Gods Brahmā, Visnu and Siva.[1] Hinduism describes them as the creator, preserver and destroyer. Of these three Brahmā, perhaps as he did not possess the characteristic features that are conducive to the growth of a cult, did not rise to great prominence. Two equally important 'sects' have evolved around the other two Gods Visnu and Siva and they are, the Vaisnavite and the Saivite.

Catholicity of Hinduism enables the devotees of these 'sects' to hold their respective God as supreme, while maintaining allegiance to the other God. These two Gods are not considered as occupying rival positions, but are held to be complementary to each other. Visnu and Siva also known popularly as Hari-Hara, have now become the two principal Gods sharing between them the adoration and veneration of the Hindus. Of these two, in fact, it is the cult built around Visnu that became more popular, specially in his manifestation as Krsna. This development has been greatly facilitated by the doctrine of *avatār* (see AVATARA). According to this doctrine Visnu is said to assume different forms as and when occasion demands and appear in the world in order to overcome evil and establish good. The Vaisnavite Hindus consider Buddha himself to be an *avatār* of Visnu.[2]

1. Below this Trinity is a very vast pantheon of gods and goddesses and the origin of some of them could be traced to the early Vedic period. Around them is woven the fascinating mythology of Hinduism. At a later stage in close connection with Saivism, came into prominence Durgā or Kāli, the Sakti of Siva, and this appears to have led to the development of Saktism or Hindu Tantricism.
2. R.C. Majumdar says that this was a "well-conceived and bold stroke of policy which cut the ground from under the feet of Buddhism which was already losing ground and the ultimate result was the complete effacement of Buddhism from India as a separate sect." *Cultural History of India*, 2nd Ed., Volume IV, Calcutta, 1956, p. 48.

In keeping with the philosophical and theological developments referred to above Hinduism adopts three paths to approach the Impersonal Absolute or the Personal Divinity. These three paths are the *jñāna-mārga* or *jñānayoga* i.e. the path of knowledge the *karma-mārga (karmayoga)* the path of action and the *bhaktimārga (bhaktiyoga)* the path of faith. The aim of the *jñānamārga* is the understanding of the unity of the Individual soul *(pudgala ātma)* with the Absolute Universal soul *(Mahā-ātma, jagad-ātma)*.[3] *Karma-mārga* is the path that leads to the goal through the performance of one's duties in a selfless, non-egocentered manner, for it is held that it is attachment for fruits of one's tasks that keeps one in bondage to suffering.[4] The most popular of the three paths is the *bhaktimārga*. This is the practice of total self-surrender to the grace of God, constant devotion to and thinking of God, offering selfless love and total dedication to God.[5]

Underlying these three paths is the code of Hindu ethics which lays down norms of conduct based on *dharma* as conceived of in Hinduism. Ethical teachings of Hinduism are closely linked with the belief in karma and re-birth.[6] The belief is that one's destiny in the next life is decided by one's actions performed in this life, the general principle applicable being that good actions bring about rebirth in a good station and bad actions in a bad station in life.[7] *Ahimsā* (non-violence), *satya* (truthfulness), *indriya-nigraha* (sense-control), *dāna* (liberality), *asteya* (avoidance of stealing), *visaya-tyāga* (detachment), *dayā* (compassion), *ārjava* (rectitude), *sauca* (purity, meaning avoidance of vices), *ksamā* (fortitude in face of hardship) are some of the ethical qualities highly esteemed in Hinduism.[8] Cultivation of *śraddhā* (faith) and practice of *tapas* (asceticism) are both much emphasised.[9] The whole gamut of Hindu ethics is covered by the term *dharma*.[10] The purpose and objective of Hindu morality is to make the followers lead lives of duty *(dharma)*. It is taught in Hinduism that cultivation of morality is a prerequisite to tear asunder the veil of ignorance *(māyā)*.[11] For the Hindus a life of duty is lead not purely for the sake of leading a life of duty but in reality for the sake of God. Therefore to disregard duty *(dharma)* is to go against the dictates of God, which is a sin.[12]

The salient feature of the social philosophy of Hinduism is the *Varnāśramadharma* which deals with the classification of the members of society into four strata *(varna-dharma)* and the division of the individual's life into four stages *(āśrama-dharma)*. The origin of this doctrine too is traceable to the *Vedas*. The *Purusasūkta* of the tenth *mandala* of the *Rgveda* makes reference to this four-fold division of society. It takes place by divine ordination and, therefore, is inviolable. In later Hinduism this fourfold classification is explained somewhat differently. It is said that all human beings could be categorized into three types according to the dominant qualities in them. Those in whom purity *(sattva)* dominates are said to be the brāhmanas. The *ksatriyas* are those who have in them a high degree of worldiness *(rajas)*, while the *vaiśyas* have darkness *(tamas)* as their dominating quality. All the others who have no such distinguishing qualities are generally grouped in one broad category called the *śudras*, which again is sub-divided into a number of classes. This is an hierarchical arrangement at the top of which are the brāhmanas and at the bottom the sūdras.[13] It is also accepted in Hinduism that it is these dominant qualities that shape the individual's character, aptitude

3. The beginning of this path can be seen in the *Upanisads*.
4. *The Bhagavadgitā* very clearly enunciates this path.
5. For the Buddhist attitude to *bhakti* see BHAKTI in *EncyBsm.* II, p. 678 ff.
6. So are ethical teachings of Buddhism. But ethics as well as the doctrine of karma and re-birth in Buddhism markedly differ from those of Hindusim. For details see ETHICS, KARMA, REBIRTH.
7. This general principle is found in Buddhism too.
8. The basic ethical concepts and norms are common to both Hinduism and Buddhism. Yet the objectives as well as the paths through which these ethical ideals are reached considerably differ in the two systems.
9. Śraddhā (Pali *saddhā*) is found in Buddhism but its content is totally different from the Hindu concept. See FAITH, SADDHĀ. Extreme forms of *tapas* are compeltely denounced in Buddhism as leading to self-mortification *(attakilamathānuyoga)* which is one of the extremes that the Buddhists are advised to give up.
10. For the parallel Buddhist concept see DHAMMA I and II.
11. Buddhism, too, considers morality *(sila)* as the base of spiritual culture.
12. This is totally different from the Buddhist point of view. See ETHICS.
13. The social stigma that results from this doctrine of *varna-dharma* is refuted in Buddhism. Buddhism on the contrary upholds the oneness of mankind. See CASTE, HUMAN RIGHTS.

and also the profession. One becomes endowed with these dominant qualities by birth and hence birth becomes a deciding factor of one's social position.[14]

The four stages in life *(aśrama-dharma)* are *brahmacarya* (studentship) *gṛhastha* (householder) *vānaprastha* (anchorite) and *sanyāsin* (renouncer).

Hinduism also accepts four ideals or objectives of life *(puruṣārtha)*. These are *dharma* (unfailing performance of one's duty), *artha* (securing of one's economic welfare), *kāma* (enjoyment of worldly pleasures) and *mokṣa* (attainment of liberation). Successful fulfilment of these ideals is considered the purpose of life.[15]

The day to day life of a Hindu is full of rites, rituals and sacraments many of which date back to the Vedic period. Some of these are mandatory *(nitya)* and some optional *(kāmya)*. At present, however, only a few obligatory rites and rituals prevail. Sacrifice *(yajña)*[16] does exist, but on a moderate scale with necessary modification effected. Now *yajña* is more or less a *pūja*, a sacred offering.

The sacraments which are called *naimittikas* or more popularly as *saṃskāras* play a major role in the life of Hindus. These purificatory rites have a socio-religious significance and give important events in an individual's life the religions sanctity and spiritual value they require.[17]

S. K. Nanayakkara

HIRI-OTTAPPA are two terms that occur together in many a context in Buddhist literature regarding human conduct and these two terms refer to two emotive phenomena in the psychological process of human beings. The two terms are rendered into English generally, as 'shame' and 'fear' respectively but the two terms in Pali, in their usage in many Buddhist discussions, connote a wider and a developed meaning. They refer to two emotions cultivated by knowledgeable human beings who adhere to some form of ethical behaviour and these emotions are considered by the virtuous and the wise as the proximate cause *(padaṭṭhāna)* for a disciplined and cultured life. (*Vism.* pp. 8, 9). It is said that when there is *hiriottappa*, there arises in a person virtue *(sīla)*. In the absence of *hiriottappa, sīla* does not arise in a person, not to speak of its prevalence (ibid). Discussing these two terms further Buddhaghosa says: "shrinking or the irritation of the mind at the thought of immoral conduct is called *hiri* and hiri is a synonym for *lajjā* (shyness); trembling that takes place at the thought of the same immoral conduct is called *ottappa* and it is a synonym for fright" *(ubbega:* ibid).

Jātaka (J. I. 76) and the commentary to the *Dhammapada, (DhpA.* I. 76), discussing these two emotive phenomena in human beings, say that *hiri* or moral shame is based on one's own standard *(attādhipateyya)*, whereas *ottappa* or fear of evil is based on public opinion *(lokādhipateyya)*. Moral shame arises in a knowledgeable person on four personal considerations, namely, his birth, his age, his abilities and his education. Elaborating these four positions the *Jātaka (J.* I. 129) says "one avoids committing evil deeds such as killing and injuring living beings on the consideration that such acts are done by people of low birth, such as fisher folk, and hence it does not behove him, who is of high birth, to do such lowly things". Second consideration is regarding age. One may ponder thus: "Immoral conduct such as killing and injuring living beings is the way with the young and the immature. I am an adult mature in behaviour and so it does not behove me to indulge in such activities normally pursued by the young and the immature", and thus thinking, one may refrain from evil actions. Thirdly, one may ponder thus: "normally evil ways are pursued by those who have no discipline in arts and crafts. I am much accomplished and efficient in many fields and hence it does not behove me to engage in activities normally pursued by the weaklings", and thinking thus one may refrain from evil conduct such as killing and injuring living beings. Fourthly, one may ponder thus: "evil actions are done by the foolish and the ignorant, but the wise and the learned refrain from evil actions. So, it does not behove me who am learned and wise to engage in evil actions normally pursued by the foolish and the ignorant", and thinking thus one may refrain from evil actions. On the above four considerations one may develop moral shame *(hiri)* and refrain from evil actions.

14. Buddhism completely rejects this position and holds that one's social position is judged not by one's birth but by one's behaviour or actions.
15. The highest Buddhist ideal is the realization of Nibbāna. All other ideals are subservient to it, and should also be conducive to its attainment.
16. Sacrifice involving destruction of life is rejected by Buddhism. For Buddhist attitude regarding such sacrifices see the *Kūṭadanta sutta (D.* I). Some forms of *pūjā* in the sense of worship and offering to the Buddha, Sangha, etc. are also found in Buddhism.
17. There are no such specific purificatory rites in Buddhism. However, the blessings of the Buddha, the Dhamma and the Sangha are sought on important occasions connected with one's life.

One may refrain from evil actions and cultivate a sense of fear regarding such actions on account of public opinion too. One may ponder thus: "There are in this world brahmins and recluses and wise men possessed of miraculous powers, possessing the divine eye and the ability to know others' thoughts. They know from a distance or at close range what is going on in others' minds, and hence it does not behove me to harbour even an evil thought, for, they will come to know it", and thinking thus one may fear to entertain even a thought of malice and ill-will towards others, not to speak of physically killing or injuring living beings.

On several occasions the Buddha emphasised the importance of cultivating *hiri* and *ottappa* in one's thinking process if one is keen to lead a life harmless to one's own self and to others and positively beneficial to oneself and to others. *Hiri* and *ottappa* are referred to as white phenomena *(sukkadhamma)* and the absence of *hiri* and *ottappa (ahirika, anotttappa)* are referred to as dark phenomena *(kanhadhamma)*. Here white signifies that which conduces to happiness of beings and dark signifies that which conduces to degeneration and misery of beings. *Hiri* and *ottappa* are designated as factors that contribute to the decency and orderliness of society *(lokapāladhamma)*. The Buddha emphasises the utmost importance of these two psychological factors by saying that if not for them, there would not be considerations such as: "This is my mother; this is my father; this is my maternal aunt; this is my paternal aunt; this is my teacher's wife;" etc. and that people would lead promiscuous lives like cats, dogs, jakals, pigs etc. (*A.* I, p. 51).

Hiri and *ottappa* are reckoned as two out of five factors, the other three factors being faith *(saddhā)*, energy *(āraddhaviriya)* and wisdom *(paññā)*, that will ensure a bhikkhu heavenly bliss after death (*A.* III, 4), and a bhikkhu who is devoid of these five factors with regard to righteous behaviour *(kusaladhamma)* is considered a pauper *(daliddo)* and a destitute *(assako)* in the Order of monks (*A.* III. 352). In another context respect for *hiri* and respect of *ottappa* are reckoned as two out of six factors that will ensure progress for the bhikkhu in the Order of Monks, the other four being, respect for the teacher *(satthā)*, respect for the teachings *(dhamma)*, respect for the Order of monks *(saṅgha)* and respect for the training (*sikkhā* - *A.* III, 331), Again in the *Dīgha-nikāya* (II. 78-79) moral shame *(hiri)* and moral fear *(ottappa)* are mentioned along with five other factors, namely faith *(saddhā)*, much learning *(bahussutatā)*, energy *(āraddhaviriya)*, alertness *(upaṭṭhitasati)* and wisdom *(paññā)* as factors that will ensure progress *(vuddhi)* for a *bhikkhu* in the Order of monks.

W. G. Weerarame

HMAWZA, a small village in central Burma, on the river Irrawaddy (lat. 18.75° N, long. 95.25° E), six miles north of the modern town of Prome. This village and those in its neighbourhood are scattered over with remains of ancient Buddhist monuments, stone and metal sculptures, clay and terracotta votive tablets, and inscriptions. The discovery of funeral urns with Pyu writings and of other inscriptions in the Pyu language has enabled archaeologists to identify this site conclusively with the heart of Sriksetra, the ancient capital of the Pyus. These Pyus are the earliest inhabitants of Burma of whom local memory survives (cp. Reginald Le May, *The Culture of South-East Asia*, 45; D.G.E. Hall, *A History of South-East Asia*, 133).

Hmawza has provided the archaeologists with much valuable material for the reconstruction of the early history of Buddhism in Burma. It is significant that the finds so far discovered here date back to a period as early as the fifth century A.C. thus antedating the remains at Pagān by nearly six centuries. These fifth century finds at Hmawza provide the earliest historical evidence for the existence of Buddhism in Burma (D.G.E. Hall, loc. cit.)

If the remains of Hmawza date to the fifth century, then the Pyu city of Śrīkṣetra existed at that time or even earlier. A few literary accounts describe the city in glowing terms thus enabling the reader to visualise her glory at that time. *The Glass Palace Chronicle of the Kings of Burma* (p. 7) for instance relates a prophecy of the Buddha that 101 years after his parinibbāna a man named Dwattabaung would found the great city of Tharehkittara (i.e., Sriksetra) and that from his time Buddhism would flourish in that kingdom.

There are other contemporary records, much more authentic, since they were often made by eye-witnesses. Ptolemy, for instance, in the middle of the 2nd centry A.C. probably referred to it as Mareura Metropolis. Hsüan-tsang (Beal, *Buddhist Records of the Western World*, II, 200) and I-tsing (Takakusu, *A Record of the Buddhist Religion*, p. 9) in the seventh century make mention of it in their accounts. The most graphic account of the city, the king and his subjects is preserved in the Old History of the Tsang dynasty of the 8th and 9th centuries (See R.C. Majumdar, *Hindu Colonies in the Far East*, p. 230; Le May, op. cit. p. 45).

These literary accounts of the glory of the city of Śrī-ksetra have been strongly substantiated by the many archaeological finds at Hmawza and other villages in its neighbourhood. Existing remains of a massive city wall more than eight miles in circumference, and embracing an area larger than that of Pagān or Mandalay, and with internal and external moats, prove that the region of and around Hmawza had formerly been the site of a large city. It is significant that Môn inscriptions at Pagān even

as late as the reign of king Kyanzittha (1084-1112 A.C.) refer to it as the capital even after it was abandoned, thus showing its importance and greatness (cp. D.G.E. Hall, *A History of South-East Asia*, p. 133).

Inscriptional evidence of the existence of Buddhism here dates back to the fifth century. Funeral urn inscriptions in the Pyu language discovered at Hmawza name three Pyu kings Sūryavikrama, Harivikrama and Sihavikrama. These have been assigned to the eighth century. Three other names of kings who were possibly ruling here are mentioned in two inscriptions. One of these inscriptions, incised on three sides of the pedestal of a statue of the Buddha, mentions that a king named Jayacandravarman set up this inscription at the instance of his teacher, for the purpose of establishing peace between him and his younger brother Harivikrama and built two cities in one day for the two brothers. The other inscription on a cylindrical silver relic casket gives the names of its donors as Śri Prabhūvarma and Śri Prabhūdevi — probably a Pyu king and his queen.

The name-endings of these rulers, viz., Vikrama, Varman and Varma are, it has been observed, similar to those of contemporary rulers of south-Indian dynasties. The script of the Pyu inscriptions from Hmawza and its neighbourhood, in addition shows, according to scholars like Finôt, Duroiselle and Blagden, close affinities with the south-Indian alphabets, especially to the Kadamba script of south-India, of about the fifth century A.C. (Le May, *The Culture of South-East Asia*, p. 34). These factors have led to the assumption that the Pyu rulers of ancient Hmawza were either of south-Indian origin or were greatly influenced by south-India to the extent of adopting south-Indian names, and that the religion and culture of ancient Hmawza were greatly influenced, from at least the fifth century A.C. by the great religious and cultural centres of south-India, such as Amarāvatī, Nāgārjunikoṇḍa, Kañcīpuram, Kāveripattanam, and Uragapuram, where Theravāda Buddhism had established strongholds (cp. Ray, *Theravāda Buddhism in Burma*, May, op. cit. p. 34).

Of the ancient Buddhist monuments and sites in and around Hmawza the following list mentions the more important ones, excavated by the Archaeological Survey of India in the early years of the twentieth century.

1. Zegu Pagoda (East); (2) Thaunbyegon (site of 10000 pagodas of tradition); (3) Mōnthēmagon; (4) Singyidaing Pagoda; (5) Kanthonzindaung (a low range of hills to the south of Hmawza where every peak was once crowned by a pagoda); (6) Atwin Mōktaw Pagoda (the largest in Hmawza, traditionally assigned to a pre-Christian era); (7) Bèbè Pagoda; (8) Lemyethna Pagoda; (9) Yahandāgu Pagoda; (10) Bawbawgyi Pagoda; (11) Payagyi Pagoda; (12) Pyudaik Pagoda; (13) Myanksegu Pagoda; (14) Tkaukkyama Pagoda; (15) Mynibahu Pagoda; (16) Payama Pagoda; (17) Khin Ba's mound.

The pagodas in the above list, and numerous other mounds so far examined, reveal that they were of different shapes and types. Some were conical, some octagonal and others rectangular with a square base. Some, like those at Pagān have had a *vimāna* with thick walls, doors, windows and niches. The monument at Kalangôn had been beautifully decorated with sculptured terracotta plaques, like many of the later monuments at Pagān. Bricks were extensively used in the construction of these monuments. Ray (*Theravāda Buddhism in Burma*, 72) is of opinion that they resemble, in most respects, the contemporary Buddhist monuments in India. The Bawbawgyi Pagoda, for instance, is somewhat similar to the Dhamek stūpa at Sārnāth and in the Bèbè Pagoda is seen some similarity to the rectangular temples with *sikharas* in sculptures in Bihar and Bengal, thus indicating traits of east-Indian influence.

The large amount of objects discovered from these and other sites is of utmost importance as the main source for the study of the nature of Buddhism and the extent of its influence in the ancient Pyu capital of Śrīkṣetra. They provide the modern scholars with definite evidence of the Buddhist art in vogue in ancient Hmawza more than 1200 years ago, and the degree of skill which went into their execution (cp. May, op. cit. p. 48).

These objects could be broadly categorised as stone and bronze images, stone sculptures, terracotta tablets, votive offerings and inscriptions.

Images: There is a good number of them, mostly of the Buddha, some fairly large in size. Some of them seem to be of local origin, while others are evidently importations from India. Most of Buddha images are in the *paryaṅkāsana* with the right hand in the *bhūmisparśamudrā* and they seem to have belonged to the Theravāda school.

Sculptures: Among the sculptures from Hmawza are several, depicting scenes from the life of the Buddha, such as the offering of food to the Buddha by the two merchants Tapassu and Bhalluka, and of the four alms bowls by the four guardian deities to receive that food, the first sermon in the Deer Park at Sārnāth, the taming of the infuriated elephant Nālāgiri, the birth of the bodhisattva Gotama, conquest of Māra, and the twin miracle at Sāvatthi. Many of them show influence of the east-Indian Gupta style and can be assigned to the period from the 6th to the 9th centuries A.C. (Ray, *Theravāda Buddhism in Burma*; *ASIAR*. 1927-8; 127 ff.). Many other sculptured stone slabs from Hmawza do not depict any particular incident from the life of the Buddha but merely give him as the central figure, usually flanked by

other figures, sometimes identified as Avalokiteśvara and Nātha.

Of the sculptured slabs from Hmawza, one discovered from the Bébé Pagoda and another discovered from the Yahandāgu Pagoda are noteworthy. In the Bébé Pagoda a sculpture of the Buddha is shown as the central figure flanked by two other figures of disciples. In this sculpture it is the left hand, and not the right that touches the ground in *bhūmisparśa-mudrā*, probably a mistake of the local craftsman. In the Yahandāgu Pagoda sculpture eight Buddha images sit in a row, all with their right hand in *bhūmisparśa-mudrā*.

Another stele, unearthed near Hmawza in 1929 and described by Duroiselle as one of the most important finds in Burma so far made, shows a broken figure at the top and a group of worshippers below. Between this group and the broken figure is a Pyu inscription. The broken figure at the top could be identified as the Buddha or the Pyu ruler and it is, therefore, surmised that this sculpture shows the Pyus worshipping either the Buddha or their king (cp. May, op. cit. 47).

Terracotta Tablets: A large number of terracotta tablets have been unearthed from the ruins of this old capital. A good number of them are embossed with the well-known Buddhist formula beginning with *Iti pi so bhagavā araham*..... Some have short legends in Pyu. The script of most of them is east-Indian, of the 8th – 10th centuries. A few of these tablets represent gods and goddesses of the Sanskrit Buddhist pantheon. Excavations in a range of hills close to Hmawza, where several small mounds are found, yielded many terracotta votive tablets bearing short epigraphs in Nāgari characters. One of them represents a four-armed bodhisattva (*ASIAR*. 1926–7, 182 f.). A votive tablet from the mound known as Kan-wet-Khaung-kôn at Hmawza, somewhat broken in a corner, contains 83 small seated figures of the Buddha, meant to represent the One Thousand Buddhas (*ASIAR*. 1927–8, PL. LV, No. 6). These terracotta tablets were generally deposited as relics in relic-chambers of shrines. Wandering preachers and devotees, too, carried them when they went about. It appears that some of these tablets were locally made, while others were brought there from India.

Other Votive Offerings: A large number of votive offerings of different varieties other than terracotta votive tablets have been discovered in and around Hmawza, mainly from the relic-chambers of different stūpas. Most of the different finds of this group were discovered at a site known as the Khin-bhā-gôn, generally known as Khin Ba's mound, near the Kalagangôn village in the neighbourhood of Hamwza. These finds consist of sculptures and ornamental pieces in burnt clay and sandstone, many small votive stūpas and Buddha images in gold and silver, inscribed gold and silver plates, coins, crystal, jade and glass beads, glass and sandstone objects etc.

Inscriptions: Inscriptions form one distinct unit of Buddhist archaeological remains at Hmawza. The majority of the inscriptions is found on sculptured slabs, pedestals of Buddha-images, terracotta plaques, funeral urns and the like, but a few inscriptions of a more important type are incised on gold plates and on stones on which no sculptures are found and thus are inscriptions in the fullest sense.

A distinct feature of these inscriptions is that some of them are incised in Pyu or Pali or in both in a script closely allied to the Deccanese varieties of the Brāhmi script, especially the Kadamba script of the 5th century, while the others are incised either in Sanskrit, or in Pyu and Sanskrit in a script identified with later Gupta-Brāhmi of eastern India of about the 7th century (cp. Ray, *Sanskrit Buddhism in Burma*, 19). This distinct feature, it is surmised taken with the contents of such inscriptions indicates the nature of Buddhism that was practised at Hmawza in different times from about the 5th century up to about the 10th century.

Among the inscriptions of the former group there are two gold plates from Maunggan, a place near Hmawza, each containing three lines of writing from a Pali Buddhist text, in the Kadamba script of south India of the 5th century A.C. These were discovered in 1897. In 1910–11 two fragments of a stone inscription in Pali were discovered while clearing the debris of the Bawbawgyi Pagoda. The third piece which completes the inscription was discovered in the following year and it was found that the text of this inscription is related to the essentials of Buddhist psychology. In 1926 was discovered the most valuable record hitherto found in Hmawza, namely, a book of twenty gold leaves arranged like an old palm-leaf manuscript, placed within two covers, also of gold and tied together with a gold wire. Each of the twenty leaves within the two covering leaves is inscribed, on one side only, with nine extracts from different texts of the Pali canon. Another gold leaf, also datable to the 5th or 6th century A.C., was discovered in 1928–29 from the Kyundawza village, near Hmawza, containing the first line of the Pali stanza *Ye dhammā hetuppabhavā*.

All these Pali records mentioned above are in a script closely allied to the Deccanese varieties of the Brāhmi script of the 4th and 5th centuries A.C. and contain doctrinal passages from Theravāda Buddhism. In the light of these facts Ray (*Theravāda Buddhism in Burma*, pp. 33 ff.) has come to the following conclusions regarding Buddhism in ancient Hmawza.

1. Theravāda Buddhism was an already established religion in ancient Hmawza in the 5th century A.C.

2. Pali as the language of Theravāda Buddhism was known and understood at least by a certain section of the people in the capital, and Pali canonical texts were known and studied in their most abstruse aspects.
3. Theravāda Buddhism in Hmawza was nourished from the Andhra-Kuntala-Pallava region of the Deccan and south India, from such centres as Amarāvati, Nāgārjunikoṇḍa, Kañcipuram, Kāveri-pattanam and Uragapuram, where Theravāda Buddhism had established strongholds.

To the latter group, viz., inscription in Sanskrit or Pyu and Sanskrit written in a script identical with the Gupta-Brāhmi of eastern India of about the 7th century, belongs the bilingual inscription on three sides of the pedestal of a Buddha image, mentioned before. This record is composed in beautiful Sanskrit verse and is interspersed with Pyu renderings of the Sanskrit text. The most significant fact revealed by this inscription is that king Jayacandravarman, its author, patronised one of the northern schools of Buddhism whose canonical texts were probably written is Sanskrit.

Another Sanskrit inscription, on the pedestal of a headless Buddha image, contains the well-known Buddhist stanza in its Sanskritized version *ye dharmā hetuprabhavā....* The script of this record, too, is similar to that of the above, and the style of the image, too, indicates Gupta influence. A large number of terracotta votive tablets of this same art-tradition and incised with the Sanskrit version of this Buddhist stanza, too, has been found at Hmawza and these tablets, also have been assigned to the 7th and 8th centuries.

Ray *(Sanskrit Buddhism in Burma,* 21 f, 88), is of opinion that these images and tablets with Sanskrit inscriptions on them represent the Mūlasarvāstivāda form of Buddhism of the Hīnayāna school that was widespread in the Magadha region in north-eastern India in the 7th century, whence it had come to Burma about that time. This assumption is based on the language and the script of the inscriptions and the art tradition of the images and the sculptures and the locality to which they are related. Stray discoveries of Mahāyānistic images at Hmawza and its neighourhood tend to an identification of the above images and tablets, too, as representing Mahāyānism, but Ray *(Sanskrit Buddhism in Burma,* p. 22) is definite that none of the Mahāyāna images at Hmawza can be dated before the 8th or the 9th century A.C. Existence of Mūlasarvāstivāda in Hmawza, according to Ray (op. cit. pp. 22 ff.), during the 7th and 8th centuries is also affirmed by the account of I-tsing.

The existence of Mahāyānism at Hmawza at a later period is, however, proved beyond doubt by the discovery of terracotta votive-tablets with short epigraphs on them in eastern Nāgarī characters that can be assigned to the 9th, 10th and 11th centuies, and a few definitely Mahāyāna statues like the four-armed statuette representing Avalokiteśvara, standing. Mahāyānism seems to have appeared in Hmawza about this time from eastern India, where it had gained supremacy over Theravāda Buddhism. A large number of terracotta votive-tablets, which seem to have been brought to Hmawza by those professing this faith, contain the representition of the stading image of Tārā around which is inscribed in Sanskrit the well known Buddhist stanza *ye dharmā....* (Ray, *Sanskrit Buddhism in Burma,* p. 89).

It has been surmised that these inscribed stones, gold plates and other objects were enshrined in stūpas and other monuments and thus served as votive offerings. The texts of the Pali inscriptions discussed above do not agree word for word with the relevant passages of existing Pali texts and it is, therefore, suggested that the monks in ancient Prome had before them a parallel version of the texts that have not come down to the present day in Pali.

Archaeological finds at Hmawza reveal that Buddhism was not the only religion there in the early centuries of the Christian era. Brahmanical images of Viṣṇu, Gaṇeśa and Brahmā, discovered at Hmawza, and the remains of a phallus *(liṅga),* 14 inches high, discovered at Kalagangon, near Hmawza, show that Brahmanical cults, too, were practised in the ancient Pyu capital. But the fact, that the Buddhist finds are very numerous and that those of the Brahmanical faith are very few, indicates the predominance of Buddhism in the Pyu capital.

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H. R. Perera

HONEN (1133-1212) is a renowned Japanese monk, the founder of the Jodo or Pure-land school of Japanese Buddnism. Posthumously he was known as Enkwō Daishi.

Honen was born in 1133 in the province of Mimasaka where his father served as a petty official. When Honen was about eight years old his father was murdered by enemies. The tradition records that the father died bidding the son not to think of avenging his death but to enter the Order. Complying with his father's last wish and with his mother's blessings Honen entered the monastery

near his home and received training for about five years. The teacher was so deeply impressed by his pupil's capabilities that he sent him to Hieizan for advanced studies with a letter of recommendation in which he referred to Honen as an incarnation of Mañju (Mañjuśri). There is another tradition which says that Seishi (Mahāsthāmaprāpta) was incarnated in Honen. Not long after his arrival at Hiei, Honen, by his quick mastery of the Tripitaka, amply justified his former teacher's recommendation.

His knowledge of the doctrine and his erudition were such that if he so desired he could have attained to a very high position in the Hiei ecclesiastical hierarchy. Yet, instead of seeking high position he preferred a secluded life and completely devoted himself to religious study and prayer and sought inner peace.

Conditions at Hiei as well as the general state of Buddhism prevalent in the country were, from the point of view of Honen, most unsatisfactory. So was the general political situation. He felt that there was an almost unbridgeable gap between the ideal of monkhood and the lives led by monks at Hiei. He felt that the then prevalent form of Buddhism either tended to be superstitious or highly scholastic. Honen considered that superstition was solely meant to procure temporal well-being and that abstruse philosophical teachings of Kegon, Shingon and Tendai were beyond the grasp of many. Further, Honen was almost obsessed with the belief that that era was a period of great degeneracy *(mappo)* marked with political upheaval and mental and moral decline. From this presumption he concluded that under such difficult conditions one could not hope to find salvation through self-reliance *(jiriki)*, and therefore, should seek refuge in self-surrender *(tariki)* to the power of a Supreme Being.

It is evident that by this time the Amida cult was in the process of gaining ground due mainly to the efforts of Honen's predecessors such as Kūyā, Genshin, Ryonin and Zendō. Honen was particularly impressed by Zendo's work, the *Kangyosho* wherein he found the statement which stressed the importance of chanting the name of Amida with all one's heart. The *Kangyosho* assured that this act of chanting will make Amida, in accordance with his original vow, save all beings. Being convinced that this is the sole means of salvation he left Hiei for ever.

Honen was about forty years of age by then. For about two years he lived in seclusion chanting the *nembutsu*[1] and the more he engaged in this practice the more convinced he became of the fact that this is the best and the easiest way for salvation. By 1175 he started to preach about the new teaching openly, and this year is generally considered as the date of foundation of the Jōdo (q.v.) or the Pure-land sect. Living for the most part in Yoshimizu he began preaching the new doctrine, and the news of the teaching and the teacher began to spread rapidly throughout the country.

Honen epitomized the ethos of the period, and hence his teaching, which he considered as the solution to problems confronted by him, naturally had a general appeal. To many others who, like Honen, were disillusioned with the scholastic as well as mystic forms of Buddhism this was a simple, practical form of worship. Rapidly the followers grew in number. Many who were shocked by the sudden collapse of court life found solace in Jōdo. So did the militia and the ordinary masses who found Jōdo Buddhism to be close to their hearts. Besides these factors Honen's charismatic personality too, was instrumental in enlarging his circle of followers. Emperors Go-Shirakawa, Tukakura and for sometime Go-Toba patronised him. Quite a large section of the aristocracy was following him and Kanezane, the regent happened to be his chief patron.

By then Honen thought of putting down in writing the essence of his teaching. For this purpose he wrote a thesis titled *Senchaku Hongwan Nembutsushu* popularly known as *Senchakushu*. This he did not want published during his life-time. Yet he sent a copy of it to Kanezane who was most impressed by its contents. Therein Honen attempted to divide the prevalent forms of religion into two broad categories as Shōdo, the holy path which is difficult to be practised and Jōdo the common-path which could be followed easily by everybody. He also quoted extracts from numerous sources to prove that for the people of his period the latter, whose basic principle is the abandoning of *jiriki* and seking refuge in *tariki*, is the only way of salvation. Another well known work of his is the *Ōjō Taiyōshō*. Besides, he wrote numerous letters, the contents of which vividly reveal his extremely modest self-effacive and compassionate character.

The categorization of the prevalent forms of worship and the alternative form of worship put forward by Honen caught the fancy of the masses. Jōdo was close to all alike, irrespective of their education, wealth, social status or religious training. Jōdo followers swelled in number and consequently it posed a threat to the existence of other schools of Buddhism. Monks of Hiei petitioned their head requesting him to openly denounce Honen's teaching. Honen realizing the danger of clashing with established schools promptly cautioned his followers not to become over zealous and disparage other schools. He also admonished them not to misrepresent his teachings by saying that practice of virtue and morality is of no value to those who are devoted to the recitation of the *nembutsu*, for he found that some followers **who**

1. This is the name of the well-known formula *Namu Amida Butsu* meaning Homage to Amida Buddha.

misunderstood his teaching completely rejected the practice of ethics. The clamour for the persecution of Honen and his followers temporarily subsided. Yet, misdemeanour on the part of some of his followers created an opportunity for the monks of Kōfuku-ji to petition the ruler asking for Honen's punishment. To appease the Kōfuku-ji monks the ruler punished some of Honen's disciples and spared Honen.

However, an unfortunate incident that took place subsequently proved disastrous to Honen. It so happened that while the ex-emperor Go-Toba was away on a pilgrimage some of Honen's disciples conducted *nembutsu* recital ceremonies which were attended by two prominent ladies of the court. The two ladies being convinced of Jōdo became nuns. The rivals of the Jōdo school suggested to the ex-emperor that these two ladies entered the Order merely beause they were enamoured with Honen's two disciples Jurin and Anraku. Go-Toba, who was enraged, got these two monks executed and punished some others. Honen himself was ordered to be exiled to Tosa. However, Kanezane's intervention helped to change the place of exile to Sanuki which was not as remote as Tosa.

In Sanuki Honen spent his time visiting sacred places and dedicatedly chanting the *nembutsu.* When an amnesty was declared in 1207 to mark the occasion of the erection of a temple by Go-Toba Honen was permitted to come to Shikoku. There he spent about four years in the Kachiodera temple near Ōsaka. In 1211 Mitsuchika, who in keeping true to a promise made to Kanezane before the latter's death to look into Honen's interests, persuaded Go-Toba to waive completely the order of exile and permit Honen to re-enter Kyōto. Honen returned triumphantly and was greeted by a large gathering of followers and admirers. But by then Honen's health had badly deteriorated, and by the end of February of 1212 he was taken seriously ill. Shortly afterwards he died, and his remains were buried at Ōtani. Many attempts were made to destroy the tomb, and it is generally believed that his bones were finally deposited in the compound of the Nison-in temple.

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S. K. Nanayakkara

HONESTY *(ajjava, ujutā, ujukatā, ujubhāva),* uprightness or truthfulness and also fidelity in one's relationship with others, is a highly valued ethical virtue in Buddhism. Honesty in word, deed and thought is absolutely essential not only for the welfare of the individual but also for the good of society as well. If one's thinking is correct and straightforward it is natural that his words as well would be honest. One cannot be honest and straightforward unless one is fearless and to be fearless one has to be free from guilt which in turn means that one has to be righteous to be guiltless. Hence it follows that only a truly righteous person can be genuinely honest.

Honesty and justice are two very closely connected concepts or it may be said that honesty is a virtue belonging to the ethical *genus* justice. To be honest is to be just. And in the Buddha's teaching the concept of justice, in general, is expressed by the term *dhamma* or *dharma* to which one has to conform if one wishes to lead a life of honesty. The course of *dhamma* or of truth is a straight one and one cannot travel along it unless one is straightforward in one's thought, word and deed. Viewed from the angle of the Buddhist theory of causality, *dhamma* can be called the law of nature, by understanding the functioning of which and living in consonance with which one can lead the true life of honesty. To know the truth, to live according to it and to preach it if necessary *(yathāvādī-tathākārī)* would be an ideal state of honest living to which only Buddha and arahants can lay claim. But every human being has not only an individual but also a social obligation to lead an honest life, in whatever walk of life one may find oneself.

One cannot be honest in one's dealings with others unless one is honest to oneself and to be honest to oneself would be to be conscientious in his or her work whatever it may be. This cannot be done unless one has the courage to acknowledge one's defects and failures so that one may rectify them. A life of honesty, which is sometimes called *ujupaṭipanna* in Buddhism (*D.* I, p. 192; *S.* IV, p. 304; V. p. 343) and in which all fraudulent and crooked activities are discarded *(sabbajimhavaṅkakuṭila-bhāvāpagama: VvA.* p. 96; *Pug.* p. 59), like any other form of virtuous living, being a part of morality or *sīla,* cannot be regulated by any outward code of duties. This is because that true *sīla* in outward conduct is an expression of inward realisation of the value of *sīla,* for the practice of which no effort is needed on the part of the practiser.

One would merely end up as a good-hearted fool if one were to be merely honest without a true knowledge of what honesty means. Therefore before becoming honest one has to establish oneself on the correct philosophy of life *(sammādiṭṭhi)* and hence the maxim that honesty is the best policy has to be qualified in this light.

A. G. S. Kariyawasam

HOPE *(Sk. patthanā)*. It is human nature to wish for and hope for various things. People who are born in adverse circumstances always hope to be rich in the future in this life itself, or failing that, at least in the next life; people who are ugly hope to be beautiful and attractive; people who have no children hope for children; people who are not popular hope to be popular, and in this manner people live on hope eternally.

It has been believed from very ancient times that there are unseen powers that could fulfil hopes of beings on earth. During early Ṛgvedic times people believed that there were divinities of the wind, rain, the sun and the moon, dawn etc. and that these divinities presided over the destinies of man on earth and people believed that by praying to them and by placating them they could get their hopes fulfilled. A remnant of such beliefs is evident from the episode of Sujātā (*J.* I, p. 68) who had in answer to a prayer addressed to the presiding deity of a huge tree got a son and came there with a pot of milk porridge to be offered to the deity as a mark of gratitude. In the Brāhmaṇa period a marked development is seen in this field. Sacrifice played an important role in the religion of the time. Mantras and ritualism had developed to a very high degree and the correct performance of rituals was believed to have in it the efficacy of fulfilling the hope and aspirations of the performer of these rituals.

Buddhism rejected the idea of external forces that determine the life of beings on earth. It is man's actions that determine his life. If he selects the path of progress and does good and becomes virtuous he will be rewarded accordingly in this life and in the lives to come, and if he selects to act otherwise he will accrue to the fruits of his actions. In the *Metta Sutta (Sn.* v. 143) it is said that a man who has an aim to achieve something should work on that line diligently. In this respect the thoughts of men are important because all things are activated by thoughts *(cittena nīyati loko: S.* I, p. 39). The same idea is presented in the lines: "All phenomena have mind as their forerunner. Mind is the precursor of all things *(manopubbaṅgamā dhammā - Dhp.* v., 1). Thus in this particular context, hope, too, has a place in human conduct. In this world, when activities of beings are analysed, it is seen that it is some kind of hope that ultimately culminates in any action, for instance a man seeing another leading a comfortable life, living in a large mansion and going about in luxurious conveyances develops a desire to lead such a life himself and hopes to achieve his aim some day. If he desires to achieve it in this life itself he will follow a course of action by which he can acquire the means to achieve his end. If he cannot achieve it in this world and if he is too poor even to think of the means of achieving it, he will hope to achieve it in an after life and with that hope perform meritorious deeds that would help him to fulfil his hope in a future life.

Buddhism recognises the importance of a fervent hope in the lives of human beings. Normally after performing a good deed Buddhist devotees utter a stanza to this effect: 'By the power of this meritorious deed let me not come to associate with bad people; and let me associate the virtuous alone, till I attain nibbāna *(iminā puñña-kammena mā me bālasamāgamo - sataṃ samāgamo hotu yāva nibbānapattiyā)*, and when this hope is expressed in thought or word before a Buddha or a disciple of the Buddha, he too utters a statement "Whatever you wish for may it be soon achieved; let all your aspirations be fulfilled, like the moon on the fifteenth day *(icchitaṃ patthitaṃ tuyhaṃ khippameva samijjhatu — pūrentu sabbasaṃkappā cando pannaraso yathā-DhpA.* IV, p. 200)". Even in the case of a Buddha the course of action which culminates in the attainment of Buddhahood, starts with a fervent hope *(abhinīhāra)* to become a Buddha, which is expressed in the presence of another Buddha, who, knowing this would pronounce that the Bodhisatta's hope would be fulfilled during such and such a time in the distant future. Sumedha developed such a hope at the feet of Dīpaṃkara Buddha (*J.* i, 15 f.). *Avadānaśataka* contains stories about devotees who made various offerings to Buddhas and Pacceka Buddhas and hoped to become Buddhas and Pacceka Buddhas in the future. In the case of all of them, their future aspirations were prophesied (*Avs.* BST. No. 19, Chap. 1 & 3) by the Buddha at whose feet the resolution was made. The story of Suvaṇṇatilakā (*Rsv.* p. 74 ff.) illustrates how a fervent hope harboured after performing a meritorious deed was fulfilled in a later life. As a lay devotee she went to a temple and made an offering of flowers to the Buddha and hoped to be an extremely beautiful girl in her next life.

Hope or *patthanā* is not always accompanied by good or meritorious actions, and not always motivated by *tanhā* or desire to achieve things for one's own self. There are instances of *patthanā* being motivated by hatred or *dosa*, where people vow vengeance on others for harm done to them. A good instance is the *Kāliyakkhinī* episode coming in the *Dhammapadaṭṭhakathā* (I, pp. 47-51). A man brought a second wife as his first wife could not bear him a child. When the second wife was pregnant for a few months the first wife caused an abortion on her through fear that if a child was born to her she could become the husband's favourite. The same thing was done when she was with child for the second and third times and she died at the third abortion. While dying she vowed vengeance on the first wife and hoped that she in the next life would be born in a position to eat up the progeny of the first wife. Having died she was born as a cat in the same household. The husband who came to know about the whole affair beat the first wife to death and she was born as a hen in that same house. When the

hen laid eggs the cat devoured them and after some time she preyed on the hen herself. As the hen died in the grip of the cat she vowed vengeance on the cat. The hen was reborn as a leopardess and the cat as a doe. The leopardess ate up the young ones of the doe as they were born and finally ate up the doe herself. As the doe died she again vowed vengeance on the leopardess. In their next birth the leopardess was born as a young girl and the doe as a yakkhini. The young girl was married to a wealthy householder. When a baby was born to her, the yakkhini came and snatched it away. The same thing was done the second time also. The yakkhini came again when the third was born, but it was saved by the intervention of the Buddha.

It has become the custom of many present day Buddhists in Sri Lanka to appeal for help from gods and deities to get their hopes fulfilled, and in this respect prayers addressed to the god of Kataragama has become very common. His aid is sought for various things for success in business ventures, success in political struggles, success at examinations, recovery from ill health etc.

W. G. Weeraratna

HORNER, ISALINE BLEW (1896-1981), Buddhist scholar, editor and translator of Pali Texts and the most dominant figure of the Pali Text Society, London, from 1942 until her death. When Mrs. C.A.F. Rhys Davids, the widow of Professor T.W. Rhys Davids, the founder of the Pali Text Society (1881), died in 1942 Miss Horner became the Society's Honorary Secretary. From then on her scholarly activities were invariably linked with the Pali Text Society. On the death of Dr. W. Stede in 1959 she succeeded to the position of President which she held almost until her death. She was also Honorary Treasurer of the Society from 1959 and managed its finances so well that the publication programme of the Society continued very smoothly despite the large number of works published.

She was born in 1896 at Walthamstow in Essex to parents with a proud family history. At an early age when she was just twelve years old she had the opportunity of meeting Professor and Mrs. Rhys Davids which left a lasting impression on her. After leaving school in Surrey she entered Cambridge in 1914 and obtained her Tripos in the Moral Sciences in 1917. She was attached to the Yates Thompson Library at Newnham, her College in Cambridge from 1918 to 1921 and was made acting Librarian in 1920. In later life she bequeathed a well equipped wing named after her to the library (1962) where a bronze bust of hers now stands. In 1921 she made her first visit to Sri Lanka, also visiting India and Burma and returned to Britain in 1923 via Kenya and South Africa. It was during her brief visit to the Island that Buddhism first drew her attention. She rejoined Newnham as Librarian in 1923 and remained there until 1936. Her election to a Fellowship at the College helped her in her reorganization and expansion of the Library. She was on the governing body of the College from 1939 to 1949. She always enjoyed the duties of librarianship. She also built up an extensive library for the Pali Text Society round the splendid nucleus of the Chalmers collection which was presented to her by Lord Chalmers, her kinsman, in 1921. Her extensive knowledge of various aspects of librarianship, including conservation of manuscripts, selection and co-ordination for editorial purposes, was of immense value not only to the Pali Text Society's library but also to numerous young scholars who came to her for guidance.



Her actual study of Pali commenced with her being introduced to the *Dhammapada* by Dr. Kenneth Saunders during one of his visits to England. Her maiden research project, with Mrs. Rhys Davids' guidance, was her study: *Women under Primitive Buddhism* (published 1930). She was selected as the first Sarah Smithson Research Fellow in Pali during the course of this study. The gift of the Chalmers collection gave her an added impetus towards her further study of Pali. It was during the course of her assistance in the preparation of Chalmers' edition and translation of the *Suttanipāta* in the Harvard Oriental Series (Vol. 37, 1932) that she gained an early training in book production, proof reading, display, indexing and so on. The benefit of her

vast knowledge and experience gained with the passage of time was available to students of Pali all over the world including editors and translators for the Pali Text Society in the production of the large array of books during her tenure of office as Secretary and President.

It was due to her indefatigable labours and careful planning that the PTS has risen to such eminence even though its publications enjoyed great prestige among scholars from the very beginning and were looked up to by the world of learning. PTS volumes appeared with great regularity and in such large number over the last quarter of a century that perhaps no other series in the United Kingdom could rival its productivity. When the Society was in a bad way financially, it was her generosity that supported it. She even donated the proceeds of the sale of her house in Notting Hill Gate to the Society and created a special trust.

The original plan of the founder of the PTS was to publish the Pali Canon and the Commentaries in Roman script. This was later extended to the translation of the texts. A few Buddhist Sanskrit and Ardhamāgadhī texts were also published. Miss Horner inaugurated the publication of the Tīkās which has not made much progress after the initial publication. As a Centenary project she also commenced the series of translations to the commentaries starting with her translation of *Madhuratthavilāsini* (1978). From the time she took office as Secretary she saw to it that no book remained out of print for too long and brought out reprints at regular intervals. New editions of works published earlier too have appeared when facsimile reproductions were considered unsuitable. The entire series of Journals of the Pali Text Society which was concluded in 1927, was also reprinted in 1981 together with the addition of a centenary volume.

In more recent years she has revised a large number of older PTS editions adding notes on corrections to the text in additional pages in photographic facsimile reproductions.

A little known fact is her generosity extended to the several Buddhist temples in and around London and to overseas students who needed financial support. She advised, encouraged and inspired students and was ever ready to acknowledge where merit was due. She gained worldwide recognition as a pioneer and promoter of Buddhist studies. In recognition of her contribution to Pali learning the University of Ceylon conferred upon her the degree of Doctor of Letters *(honoris causa)* in 1964 and the British Government appointed her to the OBE in 1980.

Commencing with her maiden visit to Sri Lanka in 1921, when she first gained an interest in Buddhism, she has been visiting that country on many occasions. In 1950 she led the British delegation to the inaugural sessions of the World Fellowship of Buddhists held in Kandy. In the same year she delivered the Dona Alphina Ratnayake Trust lecture. Her visits made practically every other year continued until the late sixties. During her visits she made personal contact with leading monks and lay scholars.

She was ascetic in her way of life and her wants were few. She loved fresh air, sunshine and wide open spaces. She walked regularly, loved animals and plant life alike.

Commencing with her maiden publication, she has in her lifetime produced a number of major works including editions and translations of Pali texts among her learned contributions totalling over 200, inclusive of book reviews. The following is a selected bibliography of her major works based on that given in: *Buddhist Studies in Honour of I.B. Horner* edited by L. Cousins, A. Kunst and K. R. Norman.

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N. A. Jayawickrama

HŌRYŪJI. A Buddhist temple located to the southwest of Nara. It was originally built in 607 A.C. under the

patronage of Prince Shōtoku, Regent of Empress Suiko. The Hōryūji had been partly or wholly destroyed by fire in 670 and rebuilt shortly after the turn of the century. However, some of the buildings still standing today at the Hōryūji are said to be the oldest wooden buildings in the world.

Buddhist temples of this age were arranged in a pattern known as Garan. The Garan structures, though varied in number and arrangement, usually had certain common features: a roofed gallery in a square or rectangular form, with an entrance gate in the centre of its southern side enclosing the main compound of the temple; a golden hall (Kondō) to house the temple's principal images of devotion; a lecture hall (Kōdō); and at least one pagoda, a type of building derived from the Indian stūpa and originally intended to contain the relics of the Buddha or a Buddhist saint. At the Hōryūji there are two Garan structures; the 'Sai-in' Garan (Western Quarters) and the 'Tō-in' Garan (Eastern Quarters). The former includes such buildings as 'Nandaimon' (South Main Gate), Chūmon (Middle Gate), 'Kondō' (Main Hall or Golden Hall), 'Gojū-no-tō' (Five-storeyed Pagoda), 'Kairō' (Corridor), 'Kyōzō' (Sūtra Repository), 'Shurō' (Belfry), 'Dai-kōdō' (Lecture Hall), 'Shōryō-in' (Hall of Holy Spirits), 'Higashi-muro' (Eastern living quarters), 'Tsuma-muro' (Living quarters), 'Saigyō-in and Nishi-muro' (Western living quarters), 'Jikidō' (Refectory), 'Saien-dō' (West Octagonal Hall), 'Tōdaimon' (East Main Gate), 'Daihōzōden' (Treasure Repository) etc. The latter comprises 'Shikyakumon' (Gateway), 'Nanmon' (South Gate), 'Raidō' (Worship Hall), 'Yumedono' (Octagonal Hall), 'Kairō' (Corridor), 'Eden and Shariden' (Picture Hall and Sarira Hall), 'Shurō' (Belfry) etc. (Pls. XL – XLII).

However these buildings are not of the same period: for example, in the Western Garan, the Kondō, Gojū-no-tō, Chūmon, Kairō, and Higashimuro are said to belong to the pre-Nara period; the Kyōzō, Jikidō and Tōdaimon to the Nara period; the Dai-kōdō, Shurō and Tsuma-muro to the Heian Period; the Shōryō-in, Hosodono, etc. belong to the Kamakura period; the Nan-dai-mon to the Muromachi period.

In the compound surrounded by the corridors lie the Kondō on the east and the Gojū-no-tō (pagoda) on the west. It was formerly thought that the Garan lay-out of the Hōryūji had been prevalent even from the Asuka period along with the other type where the Pagoda and Kondō are arranged in-front-and-in-the-rear style seen, for example, at the Shitennōji temple. Researches based on all the evidence now available show that the Garan style at the Hōryūji does not go beyond the mid-7th century A.C and it is very much in consonance with the type of Ujidera temples which were built on a small scale by provincial clans during the Hakuhō period.

The Kondō, the main structure of the Western Garan at the Hōryūji, houses many archaic sculptures and frescoes. The trinity of figures in bronze, set in relief against flaming body halos, is placed on a platform. According to the inscription found behind the big halo, it was cast in 623 A.C. to commemorate the death of Prince Shōtoku. The central figure in the trinity is the historical Buddha Sākyamuni flanked by two attendant bodhisattvas. The Buddha is seated cross-legged on a higher dais. Features on the image such as an oval face, curved eyebrows, long shapely ears etc., give the expression of his extra-ordinary wisdom. The right hand is raised in *abhaya-mudrā* and it gives assurance against fear. The open palm is a sign of charity. Between fingers are seen webs which symbolically show that not a single being will be left out when the Buddha saves all in the world from suffering. Long nails are also another characteristic feature of the Asuka sculptures.

The Two attendant bodhisattvas stand on the lotus pedestals with the right hands upraised. Their attire in princely garb is reminiscent of that of Prince Siddhārtha before his renunciation. All these three figures of the trinity wear a mysterious smile generally known as the "archaic smile".

In the eastern chamber is housed a bronze figure of the "Yakushi-nyorai" (Skt. Bhaisajya-guru-vaidūrya-prabha). Although the inscription behind the figure mentions that it was cast in 607 A.C., all the available evidence points to the fact that the figure belongs to a later period than the Buddha Sākyamuni of the trinity, but the date of its casting is yet to be determined.

In the western chamber, we see a figure of 'Amida'. It seems certain that the figure was cast imitating the 'Yakushi' of the eastern chamber and its features definitely suggest that it is of later origin, probably of the Kamakura period.

The finest examples of painting from the Hakuhō period can be seen among the frescoes in the Kandō at the Hōryūji. Though these frescoes were badly damaged by fire in 1949, photographs taken earlier indicate that the large walls of the east, west and north were adorned with the Pure Lands of the Buddha Sākyamuni, the Amida Buddha, the Miroku (Maitreyya) and the Yakushi respectively. The lines depicting all these images are called wirelike *(tessenbyō)* in contrast to the alternately thick and thin lines. Red and green are the basic colours and a brilliant mixture of colours is achieved. These techniques are among the best examples of T'ang painting of China.

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T. Endo

HOSPITALITY, *(ātitheyya)*. Liberal entertainment of guests or strangers.[1] A salient feature of Buddhist social ethics, yet not a custom unique or original to Buddhism. As a custom widespread throughout the ancient world each nation, country or cultural group had its own rules of hospitality defined and established by tradition or by religion, political ideal and sometimes even by economic needs.[2] In India it received religious sanction from the earliest Rgvedic times and the offering of hospitaliby to a deserving guest was considered a sacred duty of household life. In the *Rgveda*, Agni (God of Fire), a god most intimately connected with the religious duties of a householder, and also regarded as the messenger of gods, is called the guest of men.[3] This divine character attributed to a guest is much more evident in the ***Atharvaveda***[4] where each act of hospitality is identified with some phase in the sacrifice to gods. "Have thy guest as thy god" *(Atithidevo bhava)* says the *Taittiriya Upanisad*[5] while another work calls him a synthesis of all gods *(sarvadevamayo 'tithih)*. Hospitality, according to Manu,[6] is one of the five great sacrifices that should be offered by a householder. It is called the sacrifice to human beings *(manusya-yajña)* or the respectful reception of brahamins *(brāhmya-huta)*. However, only the brahmins have the privilege of being guests *(atithi)*. The Ksatriyas, Vaiśyas and Śūdras also may be treated kindly by a householder but he is not obliged to offer hospitality to any one other than a brahmin. Others who cannot be treated as guests are, people seeking a livelihood through social intercourse, friends, relatives and teachers. Manu defines the term *atithi* as a brahmin who stays only for one night, for his stay *(sthiti)* is not long *(anityam)*. However according to other law books[7], *arghya*, offering meant for guests, can be made to a *snātaka*, a king, a teacher, an officiating priest, a friend, father-in-law, paternal uncle or maternal uncle. This offering should include a seat, water to wash the feet, *arghya* water, water for sipping, the honey mixture and a cow. Each item is accepted with a religious formula. The cow may be slaughtered or released according to the wish of the guest but the *arghya* should not be without flesh. Hospitality is a meritorious action which can result in wealth, fame, long-life and heavenly bliss, but on the other hand the adverse consequences of neglecting this duty are much greater. "A brahmin who stays unhonoured (in a house) takes away with him all the spiritual merit even of a man who subsists by gleaning ears of corn, or offers sacrifices in the five fires[8]." The very law of Karma has been nullified by carrying the rules of hospitality to absured extremes.

There is a number of terms corresponding to the term 'guest' used in Buddhist texts. The two words frequently used are *atithi* and *āgantuka*, the latter being more often used in reference to guest monks *(āgantuka-bhikkhu)*. The *Khuddakapātha* commentary defines *atithi* as a person with no fixed time to come or, as a guest just arrived *(KhA.* p. 222). But the interpretation of the *Vimānavatthu* commentary is different. It names two classes of guests *(āgantuka)*, *atithi* and *abbhāgata*. The former is either an acquaintance of the host, or a person who arrives at the house quite early before the meals are prepared, or else an invited guest. The latter is not an acquaintance of the host; he comes precisely at the meal time or comes without invitation (*VvA.* p. 24). The indication is in favour of the latter, for a woman who offered a chair to an *abbhāgata* is said to have been reborn in heaven and received a palace called Pīthavimāna (*Vv.*, p. 1). *Pāhuna* and *pāhunaka* are two other words used in the same sense and may also mean the food prepared for guests. The *Visuddhimagga* defines *pāhuna* as a food donation to visitors which is prepared with all honour for dear and beloved relatives coming from the four quarters (*Vism.*, p. 220). Yet another term, but seldom used is *aggha* (Skt. *argha*) which also means food prepared for a guest. There is no unanimity as to the definition of the term guest and one may be justified in including under the term a wide range of people from nearest and dearest relatives to complete strangers.

It was customary of the Buddha to exchange greetings and engage in pleasant conversation with his visitors. Often the Buddha himself, or a disciple of his was

1. *ERE.* 6, p. 797 ff. on Hospitality.
2. *Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences*, VII, 462-64
3. *The Hymns of the Rgveda*: tr. by R.T.H. Griffith: Vol. I, p. 409.
4. *CJSC.* I, p. 126 f. 'Divinity of the Guest' by H. N. Hocart.
5. G.A. Chandravarkar; *A Manual of Hindu Ethics* p. 20
6. *SBE.* XXV. pp. 87-88; 93-97.
7. *SBE.* XXIX. pp. 87 & p. 197 f.
8. Ibid. XXV. p. 93
9. W. Rahula: *History of Buddhism in Ceylon*, 181.

respectfully received at the dwelling of other recluses and brahamins (*M.* I, p. 514; II, p. 411). Respectful reception of guests seems to have been a custom common to the members of all the religious groups. Elaborate rules defining the duties of a Buddhist monk towards his guest are found in the *Vinaya Cullavagga:* A resident monk on seeing a senior monk approaching the monastery should prepare a seat, bring water to wash his feet, a foot-stool and also a foot-stand. He should go forward and receive his bowl and robe and then offer him a drink and if possible may wipe his sandals. The guest monk should be greeted and his lodgings arranged for him. He also should be given instructions regarding the proper and improper alms-resorts, washing and drinking water, privies and the agreements of the Order. A senior monk should give the necessary instructions from his own seat (*Vin.,* II, p. 207–211). The commentary explains that if the guest monk finishes the first drink then he should be offered more. His feet should be washed and applied with oil. Even in a large monastery one cannot refrain from attending upon a guest-monk who has come to him (*VinA.*, pp. 1281–82). According to the *Manoratha-pūrani* s monk who does not treat his guests properly will be known as unfaithful, ill-mannered, unpleasant and morose. Other monks would not visit their dwelling even if they pass by, which would be a great disadvantage for the residents, for they will be deprived of the association with learned monks. The *Dhammika Sutta* was preached to a monk who ill treated his guests and as a consequence was ousted from all the monasteries in a village by the lay devotees (*A.* III, p. 364). A guest is also one of the few laymen who can be medically treated by a monk. (*VinA.* II, p. 471).

The *Mūla-Sarvāstivāda Vinaya,* as it was practised in the seventh century India, ruled that a resident monk should go forward and welcome any stranger or guest coming to the monastery. This had to he done without any regard for the age of the visitor and the person who abstained from it deviated from the monastic rites and was considered guilty of breaking a *Vinaya* rule. The host should take the bowl and the water-jar of the guest, offer him a place to rest and a suitable drink.[10] The *Bodhi-sattva-Prātimoksa Sūtra* states that any person coming to the monastery should be treated as a guest. And, according to the *Brahmajāla-Sūtra* it is the duty of the host monk to invite the guest monks to participate in the religious ceremonies.

One of the five offereings that a layman has to perform with his righteously earned money is the offering of hospitality *(atithibali* – *A.* II, p. 68). A gift to a guest is called a timely gift (*A.*, III, p. 41) and the family in which meals are prepared in time have an advantage of feeding their guests in time (*A.*, III, p. 260). Hospitality is also one of the safest ways of depositing one's wealth for the future (*Khp.* VIII, vv. 6–7). A person who does not feed recluses and brahmins who come to the house at meal time is fit to be called an outcast *(vasala)* and even so is the man, who eats good food at others' houses, but does not entertain his own guests (*Sn.* vv. 128, 130).

Evidently the Buddha accepted the benevolent principle underlying all acts of hospitality but it is clear that he did not subscribe to the whole set of Brahamanical rules pertaining to it. Instead of connecting this custom with the worship of gods, an attempt has been made to give rational arguments in favour of it. A guest monk does not know the roads or the alms resorts, and tired as he is from his journey, it is troublesome for him to go for alms. Hence at the request of Visākhā, the Buddha allowed the monks to accept guest-food *(āgantuka bhatta, Vin.* I, p. 292). Nowhere in the Buddhist text has it been mentioned that distinctions of caste or creed should be observed in treating one's guests. The *Āgantuka Sutta* (*S.* V, pp. 51–52) refers to a guest house *(āgantuka-agāra)* where people of all castes can come and rest, and the Sarabhamiga Jātaka (*J.* IV, p. 274) asks one to give freely to all guests. Upāli and Siha (*M.*, I, p. 379; *Vin.* I, p. 236) two converts from Jainism were advised by the Buddha to continue their alms to the Jaina monks. All recluses and brahamins coming to his village are his guests *(atithi)* says the Brahamin Sonadanda and that he should respectfully attend to their needs (*D.* I. p. 117). Though coming from an unconverted brahamin this statement is an echo of Buddhist views rather than those of Brahamanism. For here all the recluses, who can be members of any caste, have been ranked as guests *(atithi).* But according to the Law of Manu only a brahamin can be called an *atithi* and a heretic should not be even greeted. The Brahamanic view that a neglected guest has the power to destroy one's merit and that all the requests of a guest should be fulfilled[12] are also not acceptable to Buddhism. No outsider has the power to destroy the merit of a person and the transgression of moral laws even for the sake of a guest cannot be justified. In he *Dhanañjāni Sutta* (*M.* II, 186 f.) Sāriputta advised the brahamin Dhānañjāni not to do evil even for the sake of a guest for his guest will not be there to defend him once he is reborn in hell. Futhermore, there are enough righteous ways and means by which he can perform his duties towards the guests. The guest *par excellence* is the disciple of the Buddha. The reason is not his birth but his lovable and endearing qualities, and moreover he is met

10. I-Tsing: *A Record of the Buddhist Religions.* Translated by J. Takakusu p. 124–126.
11. *SBE.* XXIX, p. 89.

only after an interval between two Buddhas *(buddhantara).* Hence the epithet *pāhuneyyo,* 'one fit to receive hospitality.'

C. Witanachchi

HOUSEHOLDER. See GAHAPATI.

HSÜAN TSANG (var. Hiuen Tsiang). A well known Chinese monk who visited India and traversed a large number of countries covering more than 50,000 *Li.* Though the dangers that he encountered were many he fulfilled his main objective undaunted by them. His contribution to the cause of Buddhism in general and to the Great Vehicle in particular is immense. For these and many other reasons he is held by the Chinese Buddhists in the highest esteem among the pilgrims of his calibre.

The following information on Hsúan-tsang's travels and his accounts of India and other countries which he travelled in his long journey is based mainly on two sources, namely, *Si-yu-ki, Buddhist Records of the Western World* an English translation of the Chinese version of Hsüan-tsang and *The Life of Hiuen-tsiang* an English translation of his biography written in Chinese by Shaman Hwui-li, a disciple of his. Among secondary sources the most useful treatise is *'On Yuan Chwang's Travels in India',* a critical study written by Thomas Watters in 1961. This work is based on Hsüan-tsang's *Hsi-Yu-Shi* (or *Si-Yu-Ki)* also entitled *Buddhist Records of the Western World.*

Hsüan-tsang was born in 603 A.C. in Chin-lu in the reign of Emperor Wen of the Sui dynasty and lived about sixty-five years. Opinions, however, differ regarding the exact years of his birth and death. His secular name was Ch'en-Chin and he was the youngest of four brothers. His father was Ch'en-hui who devoted himself to the study of Confucious' teachings. Even as a child Hsüan-tsang was unusually of grave temperament and intelligence. He did not enjoy the company of boys of his age nor did he appreciate their life style. His second brother, Chang-tse who had entered the Order previously took Hsuan-tsang to his own convent and made arrangements to impart instruction to him there.

Hsüan-tsang (= Ht.) was so studious that at times he studied without sleep and even food. At one hearing he is said to have comprehended a book thoroughly and after a second reading needed no further instruction. At the age of eleven he was versed in the *Saddharmapundarika Sūtra* and the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa.* At the age of thirteen he was admitted into the Order and was engaged in further studies.

The political situation in the country being unsatisfactory the two brothers went to Chang'an and from there again to Ch'eng-tu, the capital of Shu. There Hsüan-tsang followed lectures on the scriptures delivered by eminent scholars and in a few years he mastered the scriptures of various schools and earned a name as a scholar. It was about this time or a few years later that he came to be known by the appellation "The Master of the Law".

In the fifth year of Wu-te he received full ordination at Ch'eng-tu. He went to Chin-chow for further studies where he also conducted sermons as an advanced student. Scholar monks who gathered there as listeners treated him with great respect and admiration. Thereupon he went to Chaochow, Hsiang-chow and Ch'ang-an and studied the *Samyuktābhidharma-hrdaya,* the *Mahāyāna-sangraha,* the *Abhidharma-kosa* etc.

In a short time Ht. mastered all the theories of the different schools of Buddhism and was acclaimed as a great scholar. He found that Buddhist teachings he had learned, mainly those concerned with the theory of *Dharmalaksana* and the views held by the propounders of the *Mahāyāna-Sangraha* and those held by the followers of the *Daśabhūmivyākarana* were at variance. Moreover, he discerned many defects in the Chinese translations of the sacred books, and consequently he cherished the idea of going to India to learn at the feet of orthodox scholars. In this he was inspired to some extent by his forerunners Fa-hsien and Chi-yen who undertook similar tasks.

Overcoming many obstacles Ht., at the age of twenty-six years set forth from Chang-an and going through several provinces or countries came to Liang-chow where he received a companion to travel to the West. Despite the attempts of spies to detain him the governor of the province, Li-chiang, however, let him proceed on his journey. Some of the territories or countries which he traversed until he reached the borders of North India were Turfan (Kau-chang), Agni (O-ki-ni), Kuche (Kiu-chi) an oasis in the Gobi desert, Nujkend (Nu-chin-kien), Chaf (Che-shi), Ferghanah (Fei-han in Turkestan), Sutrishna (Su-tu-li-sse-na), Samarkhand (Sa-mo-kien), Kesh (Ki-shwang-na), Kunduz (Hwo), Bhaktra or Bactria (Fo-ho-lo), Bamiyam (Fan-yen-na) and Kapisa (Kia-pi-she).

His journey was beset with dangers and hardships. As the only guide given him to accompany until the last of the watch towers in sandy desert also deserted him he went on all alone. The worst experience encountered was in the heart of the Mo-kia-yen desert which extended for 800 *li.* One hundred *li* after entering the desert he lost his way. By accident his water bag gave way without leaving a drop of water in it and he had to spend four nights and five days in the desert without water.

At a later stage when wending their way up the snow-clad Ling mountain, and the snowy mountain (Hindu-kush) lying to the south of Balkh, twelve or fourteen of his companions and an even greater number of oxen and horses met with death.

Obstacles caused by robbers on his way to India and also in India itself were more than embarrassing. Even governors or kings of certain countries embarrassed him as he was proceeding towards India. Although very hospitable and respectful to Ht. the king of Kam-chang, Khio-wen-tai planned to detain him in his court as his spiritual head. Ht. got out of this grip only by the threat of fasting unto death. Another attempt to detain him was made by the Great Khan of the Turks. As will appear below, Ht. underwent another such experience in Eastern India as well.

Of the countries which were traversed by Ht. on his way to North India, Bhaktra (Po-ho-lo), Bamiyan (Fan-yen-na) and Kapisa (Kia-pi-she) were active centres of Buddhism. According to Ht. there were about three thousand monks of the Little Vehicle in Bhaktra. There was a scholar monk called Prajñākara who was versed in the three *piṭakas* of the Little Vehicle. Ht. was pleased with his explanation of the doctrine of that school.

Ht. reached Bamiyan crossing Hindu-kush. In both Bamiyan and Kapisa, there were several thousand monks of the Little Vehicle. In Bamiyan there were three imposing figures of the Buddha. One of these was a standing figure of about 140 or 150 feet high. Another figure of the standing Buddha measures 100 feet in height. An enormous figure of the recumbent Buddha depicting his 'Nirvāṇa' measures 1000 feet in length.

At a conference held in a temple of the Great Vehicle in Kapisa Ht. being thorough with the teachings of both schools, proved his superiority over all who participated in it. From Kapisa onwards his itinerary covered territories in North India of which the following place names are graphed by Ht. into a separate unit. Lamghan (Lan-po), Nagarahara (Na-kie-lo-ho), Gandhara (Kien-to-lo), Udyana (U-chang), Takshasila (Ta-ch'a-shi-lo), Urasa (Wu-la-sa), Kashmir (Kia-shi-mi-lo), Punach (Pun-nuh-t'so) and Rajapuri (Ho-lo-she-pu-lo). According to Ht. common people in the above territories differ to some extent from those of India in respect of manners, clothing and language.[1]

Nagarahara (Jelalabad) occupies a prominent place as a country possessing Buddha's relics. In Nagarahara or its neighbourhood Ht. rejoined his companions and went to Gandhara by the Khyber Pass. He gives the names of a number of sages and saints who composed śāstras there. Then he goes to describe the famous stūpa of 400 feet in height ascribed to king Kanishka. It was situated in Purushapura (Po-lu-shu-po-lo), the capital of Gandhara.

Either side of the river Śubhavastu (Su-po-fa-sa-tu) in the country of Udyana is said by Ht. to have been thickly populated by Buddhists in former days. At the time of his visit he saw the country depopulated. The few monks who were there at the time belonged to five different schools viz. the Dharmaguptas, the Mahīśāsakas, the Kaśyapīyas, the Sarvāstivādins and the Mahāsaṅghikas. Among the objects of worship are mentioned figures of Avalokiteśvara and Maitreya bodhisattva.

In Takshasila, Urasa and Kashmir, too, he saw various Buddhist sites. The chief monk in Kashmir was of high moral character and of remarkable intelligence. This monk explained many parts of the doctrine to him. This learned teacher was so impressed by Ht. that the latter was compared to Asaṅga bodhisattva in respect of his wisdom. According to Ht. Kanishka, convened an assembly, known to history as the Fourth Council, in the four hundredth year from the 'Nirvāṇa' of the Tathāgata. Ht. stayed for two years studying sūtras and śāstras.

Leaving Kashmir Ht. made his way to Punach and from there to Rajapuri. From Rajapuri he entered a different zone in North India arriving at Takka (Teheka) as its starting point. To the east of the town called Narasimha (Na-lo-sang-ho) he and the accompanying sāmaneras encountered a band of fifty robbers who robbed them of their belongings. However, a brahmin in the neighbourhood came to their help and they managed to escape with no loss of life. There he remained for one month, and for fourteen months in the kingdom of Chinapati (Chi-na-po-tai) studying various texts.

Before reaching the next important kingdom, Mathura (Mo-t'u-lo) he passed through the kingdoms of Jalandhara (She-lan-t'o-lo), Kuluta (Kiu-la-ta), Satadra (She-te-tu-lu) and Paryatra (Po-li-ye-to-to). An interesting custom of making offerings in honour of the disciples of the Buddha is said to have prevailed in Mathura. The followers of *Abhidhamma* made offerings in honour of Śāriputra, those who practised meditation....... in honour of Maudgalyāyana, the students of the sūtras...... in honour of Pūrṇamaitrāyaṇiputra, the followers of the *Vinaya*..... in honour of Upāli, the *bhikkhunis*..... in honour of Ānanda, the Śrāmaneras.... in honour of Rāhula and followers of the Great Vehicle.... in honour of bodhisattvas.[2]

1. *Si-yu-ki, Buddhist Records of the Western World (Records)* ed. Samuel Beal, New Delhi, 1981, Bk. II, pp. 68, 917; *The Life of Hiuen Tsiang (= The Life)* ed. Samuel Beal, New Delhi, 1973, pp. 57–72. The countries from Lamgham to Rajapuri both inclusive were not regarded by the people of India proper as forming parts of their territory (Watters, Thomas, *On Yuang Chwang's Travels in India*, pub. Munshi Ram Manohar Lal, Oriental Publishers and Booksellers, Delhi, 1961, p. 180, (Abbreviated as *Watters*).
2. *Watters*, pp. 302, 303; *The Life*, p. 77.

After Mathura he visited Matipuram (Ma-ti-pu-lo) which was ruled by a king of the Śūdra caste. He makes reference to Guṇaprabha the author of *Tattvavibhaṅga Śāstra* and to a learned doctor called Sanghabhadra who was versed in the Vibhāsā of the Sarvāstivāda school and who composed the *Kośa-kārikā*. Ht. stayed there for a few months and studied various texts under the eminent monk called Mitrasena.

On his way to Kapitha (Kis-pi-tha) also called Sankassa he had to go past Brahmapura (P'o-lo-hih-mo-pu-lo), Ahikshetra ('O-hi-shi-ta-lo) and Virāsana (Pi-lo-shan-na). Proceeding two hundred *li* towards north-west from Kapitha he reached Kanauj or Kānyakubja (Kie-jo-kio-she-kwo). Its capital borders on the Ganges on the west.[3] It was a busy centre of Buddhism and there were ten thousand monks who studied both vehicles very ardently. His account on Harṣavardhana or Harsha also called Śilāditya is of immense historical value.

Countries from Ayodhyā (O-yo-t'o) to Hiranya parvata (I-lam-na-po-fa-to) constitute another phase of his long pilgrimage. Six hundred *li* to the south-east from Kanauj is Ayodhya. Several thousand monks there studied both vehicles, and it is here that Vasubandhu and Asaṅga carried out their literary activities. When Ht. and his companions were going from Ayodhya to Hayamukha ('O-ye-mu-khi) along the course of the Ganges a gang of pirates took the crew captive. As worshippers of goddess Durga the pirates were looking out for a man of good form and comely features for sacrificing to the goddess. They earmarked Ht. as the most suitable person for the purpose and were about to kill him. Suddenly a typhoon arose smiting down the trees. Clouds of sand flew on every side and the lashing waves of the river tossed the boats to and fro. The pirates getting terrified at the calamity thought that it all happened due to the spiritual power of Ht. and came down in repentance and confessed their fault.

After this nasty experience Ht. went to Hayamukha and from there to Prayāga (Po-lo-ye-kia). He describes Prayāga, the confluence of two rivers, Gangā and Yamunā and the level ground of about fourteen *li* in circuit, to the West. From Prayāga he set out for Kausambi (Kiau-shang-mi) where he saw many *saṅghārāmas*, stūpas and a sandalwood image of the Buddha fashioned by king Udayana. According to Ht. there were about three thousand monks belonging to the Sammitīya school of the Little Vehicle in the Kingdom of Visākha (Pi-so-kia).

In Śrāvasti, the next important Buddhist centre he visited, there were several hundred *saṅghārāmas* belonging to the Sammitīya school. Sites connected with various incidents are described: for instance, the spot on which Aṅgulimāla gave up his evil acts and was converted, the convent where Brahmacāri heretics killed a woman and accused the Buddha of her murder, the venue in which the Buddha defeated all the heretics, the place where the Buddha met his father, king Suddhodana, for the first time since Enlightenment and so on.

From Śrāvasti he went to Kapilavastu (Kie-pi-lo-fa-su-tu) where the capital as well as some thousand villages were in a state of ruin. There he saw old foundations of the main palace of Suddhodana and the sleeping quarters of Queen Māyā etc. Hsüan-tsang's account of Kapilavastu and Kusinagara (Kushi-na-kie-lo) or Kusinārā is replete with accounts of the life of the Buddha before and after his Enlightenment, for example the place of his birth, prophetic pronouncement, sites of the Four Signs, Parinirvāna etc. According to Ht. the contemporary tradition has it that the Buddha's *Nirvāna'* took place on the fifteenth day of the latter half of the month of Vaiśākha. The Sarvāstivādins held that it took place during the second half of the month of *Kārtika* i.e. November.

Referring to the kingdom of Banaras or Bārāṇasi (Po-lo-ni-sse) he speaks of two schools of monks, one belonging to the Sarvāstivāda and the other to the Sammitīya school both belonging to the Little Vehicle. Important sites such as the venue of the Buddha's first sermon and his washing tank are mentioned in his account.

From Bārāṇasi he went to Ghazipur (Chen-chu) and then to Vaiśāli. There the capital city was in a state of devastation and ruin. The inhabitants at the time of his visit were very few in number. In a *saṅghārāma* there the Buddha is said to have recited the *Vimalakīrti Sūtra*. Three important places relating to his *Parinirvāṇa* are also mentioned.

On his way to Magadha (Mo-kie-to) he stoped at the town of Svetapura where he obtained the sūtra called the *Bodhisattva-piṭaka*. He had a high esteem for the people of Magadha. According to him there were about ten thousand monks mostly belonging to the Great Vehicle in Magadha. The capital of Magadha was desolate and in ruins. According to Ht. Asoka held a convocation of a thousand monks at a monastery called Kukkutārāma. This is an allusion to the Third Council held under the patronage of King Asoka. The monastery in question is named as Asokārāma in the *Dīpavaṃsa* and the *Mahāvaṃsa*, the two ancient Pali chronicles of Sri Lanka.

3. Watters argues that the direction shown in the text is wrong and it should be South East. He also argues that the river in question is not the Ganges but a tributary of that river (Watters, p. 340; cp. also *Records*, Bk. V. p. 207.

Referring to Nairañjāna and other important sites at Bodhgayā he mentions various beliefs regarding the Vajrāsana. One such belief holds that the site of the Vajrāsana was the centre of the universe. He says that the Bo-tree had been continually cut down and destroyed by the members of the royalty. Elsewhere he refers to one king named Saśāṅka of Karnasuvarna in Eastern India who destroyed the Bo-tree.[4] The following account of Ht. regarding the Bo-tree seems interesting in respect of rituals which developed in later times. "The Bo-tree sheds its leaves when the day of the *'Nirvana'* approaches and tender leaves begin to grow after this day. Every year on that day kings, ministers and magistrates pour milk on its roots, light lamps, scatter flowers and they go away collecting leaves.

The account on the Nālandā monastery gives some idea about its academic activities, maintenance, academic staff and student population, curriculum and residential quarters. It says that after the "Nirvāna" of the Buddha an old king of that country called Śakrāditya built this convent out of his great attachment for the Buddha. By the time of Ht.'s visit it had been about 700 years since its establishment. Thus its founding dates back to 1st century B.C.

His purpose of going to Nālandā was to learn the principles of the *Yoga-śāstra.* The chief monk Śilabhadra admitted Ht. as his disciple. Among the students there were many foreigners. According to Ht. of all the *saṅghārāmas* of India Nālandā Monastery was the most remarkable for its grandeur and height. Resident students numbered ten thousand. They studied the teachings of all the eighteen schools and also subjects such as the *Vedas,* the *Hetuvidyā, Śabdavidyā,* the *Cikitsāvidyā,* the works on magic *(Atharvaveda)* and the *Sāṅkhya* system. There were 1541 scholars who were versed in various branches of study. Within the temple hundred pupils were being arranged every day for preaching and students attended these and participated in discussions without fail.

As for the source of income of the Nālandā monastery Ht. tells us that there was a farm-house belonging to the monastery. The account does not say anything about the way in which the farm was run and how the income accrued to the monastery. There were other sources of income too. According to Ht. the king of the country remitted the revenue of about hundred villages for the endowment of the convent. Two hundred house holders in these villages contributed rice, butter and milk daily. Hence students had no complaints to make about their requisites.

In Rājagrha he locates many important sites connected with various episodes; for instance, the site of the stūpa where Devadatta in conjunction with Ajātaśatru rājā let loose the drunken elephant with intent to kill the Buddha. Referring to the Gṛdhrakūṭa (Ki-li-to-lo-kiu) it is said that while residing there the Buddha declared the *Saddharmapundarika (Fa-hwa),* the *Mahāprajñā (Ta-pan-jo)* and numerous other Sūtras.

His account on the First Council held in Rājagrha is rather misleading. It appears that he has incorporated into it certain details which deal with later councils. According to Ht. the collection of scriptures authorised by the Council came to be called *Sthavira* collection because Kāśyapa (Mahā Kassapa) officiated as the president of the assembly. As regards the emergence of the Mahāsaṅghika school Ht. informs us that monks who were excluded from the Council held by Mahā Kāśyapa assembled in Rājagṛha and made a collection of the doctrine in five *Piṭakas,* the *Sūtra Piṭaka,* the *Vinaya Piṭaka,* the *Abhidhamma Piṭaka,* the *Miscellaneous Piṭaka* and the *Dhāraṇī Piṭaka.* How this assembly got the name Mahāsaṅghika is explained as follows: "As in this assembly there were ordinary persons (Fan-fu) and holy men it was called the Convocation of the Mahāsaṅghikas.[5]

Having visited sacred places in the vicinity of Nālandā Ht. returned to the Nālandā Monastery again and studied several texts such as the *Yoga-śāstra,* the *Nyāyānusāra-sastra,* the *Hin-hiang-tui-fa-ming,* the *Hetuvidyā-śāstra,* the *Prāṇyamūla-śāstra-ṭīkā* and the *Sata-sastra.* Although he had studied the *Kośa-vibhāṣā* and the *Satpadābhi-dharma-śāstra* in different parts of Kashmir yet he studied them again at Nālandā Monastery. He also studied Brahman literary works and a grammatical treatise the author of which is not known. On the task of studying the Buddhist and Brahman texts he spent five years.

The next country he visited was Hiraṇyaparvata (I-lan-na-po-fa-to) where he stayed for one year and read the *Vibhāṣā* and the *Nyāyānusāra-śāstra* etc. From Hiranya-parvata he made his way to the kingdom of Champa where monks followed the Little Vehicle. This country was infested with wild beasts such as the elephant, wolf, rhinoceros and black leopard. Elephants in that country were used for drawing carriages.

Countries between Champa (Chen-po) and Samatata (San-ta-ch'a) form another phase of his long journey. He visited Hiranya, Kajughira (Ki-shu-ko-kie-lo),

4. *Records* Bk. viii, p. 121.

5. *The Life,* p. 117 cp. *Dīpavamsa,* H. Oldenberg, New Delhi, 1982, 5,30

Puṇḍravardhana (Pu-na-fa-tan-na) Karṇasuvarṇa (Kie-lo-ṇa-su-fala-na) before arriving at Samatata. Monks in Puṇḍravardhana belonged to both vehicles whereas those in Karṇasuvarṇa belong to the Little Vehicle of the Sammitiya school. Monks in Karṇasurvarṇa did not use either butter or milk in keeping with the traditional teachings of Devadatta. Immediately after his account on Samatata he refers to Pegu and Siam which, however, lay outside his itinerary.

Countries included in his itinerary in the East and South-east of India were Tāmralipti (Tan-mo-li-ti), Orissa, Kalinga (Kie-ling-kia), Southern Kosala (Kiao-sa-lo), Andhra (An-ta-lo), Dhanakataka (To-na-kie-tse-kia) and Chulya. All these countries had centres of Buddhism. He refers to an entrepot called Caritra *(Chi-li-ta-lo)* situated on the South-eastern frontier of Orissa.

Dhanakaṭaka, according to Ht. was once a reputed centre of learning, and learned men used to come and dwell there but at the time of his visit it was entirely desolate.

The Kingdom of Chulya may be identified with the Cōla Kingdom. He locates the Chulya Kingdom outside the Dravida (Dravida) country. What made him follow this description is not clear. The Cola Kingdom formed part of the Dravida country through the ages.

The next place he visited was the Kingdom of Dravida. The territory occupied by Dravida (Draviḍa) people could have consisted of several kingdoms or countries, but Ht. refers to it as forming one kingdom. However, the capital of that kingdom is named Kanchipura, the birth place of Dharmapāla Bodhisattva.

Whilst in Kanchipura Ht. met some three hundred monks from Sinhala. They informed him of the unsettled situation prevailing in Sri Lanka at the time. This dissuaded him from going there. His purpose of going to Sinhala was to get the Tripiṭaka explained according to the *Sthavira* school there and also to study the *Yoga Sāstra.*

Malakūta was the next important place he visited. He refers to Malayagiri which was well-known for sandalwood and the karpūra scented tree. After Malakūṭa (Mo-le-kiu-ch'a) he refers to Sinhala again. According to Ht. Sinhala was originally called Po-chu as it had many gems of a rare character. As for the origin of the Sinhala he narrates with slight variations the legend which traced the origin to a lion king and the murder of the lion by his son. According to Ht. it was the son of the lion who arrived in Po-chu and not his grandson Vijaya as recorded in Sri Lankan chronicles. A second theory about the origin of the Sinhala is narrated as follows: "But it is also said that Sinhala is the name of a merchant's son, who...... came to Po-chu island and slew the *Rakshasas* and established his capital in the country.

With regard to the teachings prevailing in Sri Lanka he adds that monks there follow the teachings of the Great Vehicle and they belong to the school of the *sthaviras.* He also refers to the schism which resulted in the division of the Saṅgha into two factions, the Mahāviharavāsins who were opposed to the Great Vehicle and the Abhayagiri-vāsins who studied both vehicles. His reference to a mountain named Laṅkāgiri may be the Samantakūṭa (Adam's Peak) and it was on that mountain the Tathāgata delivered the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra according to Ht.

Going two thousand *li* from Dravida he arrived at Konkanpura (Kin-na-po-lo) and from there to Maharashtra. He tells us that in a vihāra at Konkanpura there was a precious head-dress of Prince Siddhārtha. With reference to Maharashtra he says that the people of that country were a warlike nation. He cites in evidence the unsuccessful attempt of Silāditya rājā to subjugate Pulakesin. This king may be identified as Pulakesin II (609-642 A.C) of the Chalukyas of Vatapi in the Bijapur District.

Among the countries included in his itinerary to the West and North-west of Narmada were Broach (Baroche), Mālava (Mo-la-po), Brāhmaṇapura (K'ie-ch'a), Vallabhi (Fa-la-pi), Ānandapura, Surāshtra (La-sn-c'ha) Gurjjara (Kiu-che-lo), Ujjayin (U-che-yen-na), Chi-ki-to, Maheśvarapura, Surātha, Atyanabakela (O-tin-p'o-chi-lo) and Laṅgala (Lang-kie-lo) The last country is situated near the Great Sea towards the country of western women. If Mālavas were the people of Malava or Malwa in Central India as is generally taken the countries named about are not placed in right order Ujjayini which is the capital of Malwa is named after Surashtra and Gurjjara situated in Gujarat.

Of all the countries in India, Ht. had a very high opinion of Mālava and Magadha. He says that people of these two countries had the reputation of loving the study of literature, of honouring virtue, of polite language and refined speech. In Mālava there were twenty thousand monks studying the teaching of the Sammitiya school of the small vehicle.

We are told that going north-west from Langala he went to Persia (Po-la-sse) which lay outside India. It is said that the bowl *(pātra)* of the Sakyamuni Buddha was in the royal palace of the country. On its frontier is the city of Ormus (Ho-mo). The countries mentioned next are Babylon? (Fo-lin), an island called the country of the Western women, which is tributary to Fo-lin, Laṅgala, Pitasila (Pi-to-shi-lo), Avanda, Sindh (Sin-tu) Mūlasthānapura or Multan (Mu-lo-s'an-po-la) and Parvati.

If Avanda is to be identified with Avanti in Central India which seems probable in view of his descriptions of that country, it is difficult to place Avanda on the route followed from Laṅgala to Multan.

The country called Parvata was noted for renowned scholars. Ht. stayed there for two years and studied the *Mūlābhidharma-śāstra*, the *Saddharma-samparigraha-śāstra* and the *Praśikṣāsatya-śāstra* as preserved in the Sammitiya school.

From Parvata he returned south-eastwardly to Magadha and from there to the Nālandā Monastery. There was in Nālandā a renowned monk called Prajñabhadra who was versed in the Three *Pitakas*, *Śāstras* etc. Ht. remained there for two years and had his doubts cleared through discussions. He spent two more years studying several branches of study under a renowned lay scholar named Jayasena.

He is said to have been apprised of the time for his return journey in a dream by Maitreya Bodhisattva. However, he was delayed due to unavoidable circumstances. In the meantime, Śīlabhadra, the master of *śāstras* at Nālandā deputed Ht. to expound to the congregation there the *Mahāyāna-samparigraha-śāstra* and to comment on the difficult points of the *Vidyā-mātra-siddhi-śāstra*.

About this time Simharaśmi and Ht. held two different views about the principles of Yoga. Ht. proved more competent in the encounter and composed a *śāstra* in three thousand *ślokas* resolving the controversy. This work was later approved for study. At this time further disputes took place between the adherents of the two vehicles.

Monks in Orissa belittled the Great Vehicle and were used to calling it "Sky Flowers". But the king of that country had a high regard for the Great Vehicle and challenged the authority of the critics. Monks thereupon requested the king to hold a conference at which they would settle the issue. The controversy does not appear to have taken place at a conference as expected but it came to an end with the compilation of a book which was written by Ht. in refutation of the heretical views held by the monks of Orissa. The way he refuted heretical views made his fame so widespread that king Kumārarāja of Karṇasuvarṇa in Eastern India longed to have him as his spiritual head in his kingdom. When Ht. showed his reluctance for the third time the king turned furious and even went to the extent of threatening that he would destroy the whole of Nālandā Monastery in case his request was turned down. Although at last Ht. complied with the request of the king, Śīlāditya rāja's intervention enabled him to get out of another embarrassing situation.

Śīlāditya rāja on his part made arrangements to hold a conference for the exposition of the Great Vehicle and to refute the views of the followers of the Little Vehicle. Princes of eighteen countries were invited to participate in the conference. Renowned Buddhist monks, celebrated Brahmans, heretics, non-believers and secular persons attended the conference. For five days Ht. extolled the teachings of the Great Vehicle and no opponent had any opportunity to assert his views. Adherents of the Little Vehicle learning that their school was shattered plotted to kill him. The king, however, threatened to behead any one who made an attempt on the life of Ht. It is said that, at the end, large multitudes forsook the Little Vehicle and embraced the Great-Vehicle. When the conference was over Ht. made up his mind to go back to his country. But on a request made to him by Śīlāditya to witness the quinquennial distribution called *'Mahā moksa-pariṣad'* he had to postpone for ten days his return journey.

For his return journey Ht. chose to follw the nothern route in order to keep the pledge made by him to the king of Kan-chang that he would visit him on his way back. Getting out from the city of Prayāga he took the route which lay across Kausambi, Jalandhara, Siṃhapura, Taksaśilā and the river Indus. The boat laden with ola manuscripts and flower seeds capsized in the Indus and fifty manuscript copies and flower seeds were lost. From there he went past Lamghan (Lan-po), Varna, Avakan, the snowy mountains, Kunduz (Hwoh), Tukhara, Kuran, Bolor and Kashgar up to Khotan.

Of these countries Kashgar and Khotan were renowned centres of the Great Vehicle. Whilst in Khotan he states that he accomplished a journey of more than 50,000 li. His journey through various kingdoms took seventeen years. Here he faced the problem of transporting his books, images and such articles and sent a messenger to Kau-chang asking for help. Seven or eight months later transport facilities were arranged.

Among the books he brought were 224 sūtras and 192 *śāstras* of the Great Vehicle; 15 works of the same categories belonging to the Sammitiya School; 22 books of the same belonging to the Mahiśāsaka school; 67 books.... of the Sthaviravādin school; 17 works.... of the Kāśyapiya school; 42 works..... of the Dharmagupta school; 36 copies of the *Hetuvidyā Śāstra;* 13 copies of the *Śabdavidyā śāstra*. Altogether there were 520 copies comprising 657 volumes carried upon twenty horses.

Then he set upon the gigantic task of translating these books into Chinese. For carrying out this project he retired to the monastery of Hong-fu in Si-gan-fu. He completed the translation of 74 distinct works having 1335 chapters. He had moreover made a vast number of pictures and wrote with his own hands copies of various sūtras. When all these works had been finished he closed his eyes and lay perfectly still. "Having recited some verses in adoration of Maitreya, he gradually sank until the day of his demise on the 10th March, the 13th day of the year 664."

Hsüan-tsang's travel accounts which appear in the foregoing description furnish information on a wide

variety of subjects. Some of these such as physical barriers, the relative distribution of the centres of the Little and the Great Vehicle in and outside India, Buddhist monuments, hospitality shown in different countries, conferences, religious encounters have been surveyed in brief in the above account. Apart from these he presents a wealth of information on a wide range of subjects such as economic, educational and social conditons, religious practices, mannerism, customs administration and so on. He enumerates a number of ways of showing respect and paying homage that was prevalent among the people of India. Some such forms are:

(i) greeting with a kind of enquiry; (ii) reverently bowing the head; (iii) raising the hands to the head with an inclination of the body; (iv) bowing with hands folded on the chest; (v) bending a knee; (vi) kneeling down; (vii) going down on the ground on hands and knees; (viii) bowing down with knees, elbows and forehead to the ground and (ix) prostrating oneself on the ground.

Regarding the general education meant for Indians he describes that children in the beginning followed the 'Twelve Chapters' and at the age of seven they began to study the great treatises of the 'Five Sciences'. Some idea of Buddhist education may be gained from his description of Nālandā referred to earlier. But his estimation of the Brahmanic system of educating beginners is very high. Regarding the Brahmanic teachers he says: "These teachers explain the general meaning and teach them minutely, they rouse them to activity and skilfully win them over to progress, they instruct the inert and sharpen the dull. When disciples intelligent and acute are addicted to idle shirking the teachers doggedly persevere repeating instruction until their training is finished....."

Ht. states that differences among various schools of Buddhism were seen in their tenets and also in customs. According to Ht. different schools had their own tenets, and controversies ran high. As a result each of the eighteen schools claimed that each system was intellectually superior to others. Tenets of the Great and the Little systems differed widely. Certain concessions and gains were accorded to monks in keeping with their knowledge and where the spiritual attainments were high the distinctions conferred were extraordinary.

Referring to the three robes allowed for monks as their costume he narrates that different schools adhered to different styles having broad or narrow fringes and small or large folds. Ht.'s description about wearing *sanghāti* (seng-kio-ki) comforms to the present day practice of its wearing by monks in Sri Lanka and other Theravāda countries. As for the *antaravāsa*, (ni-po-so-na) the under-garment, he says that it was worn without a belt. Rather it was made into plaits and then secured by one of these plaits.

Regarding social organisation Ht. informs us that society consists of four caste groups. These four castes form classes of various degrees of ceremonial purity. The members of a caste marry within the caste. Relatives whether by the father's or mother's side do not intermarry and a woman never contracts a second marriage.

Speaking about the character of the Indian people he tells us that they were of hasty and irresolute temperament but of pure moral principles. They fear retribution for sins in future lives and take lightly their plight in the present life. They keep their sworn obligations.

His account on law and punishment too, is interesting. According to him the offenders who violate statute law were imprisoned for life. For offences against social morality, disloyalty and unfilial conduct the punishment was mutilation or banishment of the offender out of the country or into the wilderness. Other offences can be atoned for by paying a fine. He also describes the four ordeals by which the innocence or guilt of an accused person is determined.

For offences against the Vinaya, the community of brethren has a gradation of penalities. If the offence was slight a reprimand was ordered and the punishment became harsh according to the gravity of the offence. Expulsion from the community was the worst punishment meted out to the most serious offender.

As for the disposal of the dead and the performance of the last rites, there were three recognised customs. The first of these was cremation. The second was water burial, the corpse being put into a stream to float and dissolve. The third was burial in the wilderness, the body being cast away in the woods to be eaten up by wild animals.

The *Buddhist* brethren were forbidden to wail aloud over a departed one. On the death of a parent they read a service of gratitude to secure for the deceased person bliss in the next life.

If we are to depend on the records left by Ht. certain kings of the Gupta dynasty have patronised Buddhism. According to him Purugupta Vikrama Prakāśāditya, a brother of Skandagupta, Narasiṁhagupta Balāditya, son and successor of Purugupta, Tathāgatarāja Vainyagupta, another son of Purugupta and Vajira, a son of Narasiṁhagupta Balāditya patronised Buddhism. All these kings contributed to the promotion of Buddhist learning by building monastic establishments at Nālandā.

According to Ht. the worship of relics was widely practised in many Buddhist countries traversed by him and among these the most popular was the cult of the Tooth Relic of the Buddha. It was prevalent in Bhaktra; in an unnamed temple of a small valley situated to the east of the snowy mountain; Kashmir and Siṁhala. The next popular Buddhist cult was that of the Bowl-relic.

Purusapura, the capital of Gandhāra as well as Persia are mentioned as countries where the Bowl-relic was venerated. The following objects too were venerated: the sweeping brush made of *kuśa* grass in Bhaktra, the skull-bone at Hidda (Kilo of Fa-hsien) in Nagarahara (Jelalabad), the eye ball, the saṅghāti robe, and the staff at the same site and the garment washing stone obtained in Udyāna. A strong tradition about the Buddha presenting pieces of his nails and some hair to two merchants who offered him honey and rice cake is recorded by Ht. with regard to Bhaktra.[6] This is evidently based on the account in the *Vinaya Mahāvagga* where two merchants play a similar role at Bodh Gaya though no reference is made there to the presentation of nails to them.

On his way to India he passed through countries where Buddhism did not have adherents. Two such countries were Kan-chang and Sa-mo-kien. He succeeded in propagating Buddhism in those countries by delivering effective sermons. In the latter some devotees were so taken up with the teachings that they even entered the Buddhist Order. It was partly due to his evangelist endeavours that Buddhism which lay dormant after the age of the Guptas began to flourish during the reign of Harshavardhana. (Pl. XLIII).

Yatadolawatte Dhammavisuddhi

HUI-KE (487-593 A.C.). The second patriarch of the Ch'an (Zen in Japanese) School of Buddhism in China. He is also known as Seng-ke.

According to the biographies concerning Hui-Ke recorded in such works as *'Bao-lin-chuan'* Vol. 8, *'Xu-gao-seng-chuan' (Continued Records of Eminent Monks)*, Vol. 16, it is mentioned that when he was young he studied Confucianism. He also read widely in the works of Lao-zi and Zhuang-zi and the Book of Changes. Then he met Bodhidharma, the founder of Ch'an Buddhism, at Sung-lo at the age of forty-one, and followed him for four or five years until such time when he was convinced that he realised the essence of the doctrine taught by Bodhidharma. After his master's death, Hui-ke lived in seclusion in the vicinity of the Yellow River. Famous as he was for his erudition, he was visited by many monks and lay people alike for discussions on dharma.

In the year 534 A.C. Hui-Ke came to the new capital of the Eastern Wei Dynasty where he introduced and propagated the teachings of Ch'an Buddhism. However, as some could not grasp the profound teachings of Hui-Ke, unfair criticism was gradually levelled against him. Dao-Heng in fact called Hui-Ke's teachings "Demon's words" or "Māra's words" and with the intention of rebuking Hui-Ke, he dispatched his best disciple to him on a secret mission. But the result became contrary to Dao-Heng's plan. The disciple was fully converted to Ch'an after he had listened to Hui-Ke's preaching. After losing his best disciple, Dao-Heng's anger and hatred towards Hui-Ke increased, even to the extent of inciting and bribing government officers to do harm to him.

Since Hui-ke came under severe attack and criticism by some, he travelled to and fro in the province now called He-Nan. As a result, he did not have many followers, particularly in his old age. When Hui-Bu (518-587 A.C.), a famous scholar of the Sanlun school of Buddhism, went to the province, he paid a visit to Hui-Ke and asked about the doctrine of Ch'an. In 550 A.C., a reputed scholar Xiang sent letters to Hui-Ke in verse to seek advice and discuss the Ch'an Doctrine. Through these discussions Xiang benefited tremendously.

In the third year (574 A.C.) of the reign of Emperor Wu of the Northern Dynasty, the emperor, a fanatic follower of Confucianism, issued an ordinance to prohibit the study and practice of both Buddhism and Taoism. During this period, Hui-Ke tried very hard to preserve and protect the *Tripitaka* and Buddha statues as well. Subsequently he went south and lived on a mountain called Jin-zhou-wan-gong. It is on this mountain that he is reported to have passed the mystic method of his *Dhyāna* on to Seng-Chan, the third patriarch of the Ch'an school of Buddhism. When Emperor Wu relaxed his persecution of Buddhism, Hui-Ke returned to Ye-Du and finally passed away in 593 A.C.

According to the inscription entitled *'Hui-Ke's Stone Tablet* written by Fa-Lin during the T'ang Dynasty which is included in *Bao-Lin-Chuan,* Vol. 8 of Zhi-Ju, it is said that when Hui-Ke sought dharma from Bodhidharma, Bodhidharma told him that one who sought dharma would never consider one's body as his own nor life as his own. Hui-ke in order to show his determination then is said to have cut off his own arm, standing unmoved outside Bodhidharma's chambers for several days while it was snowing heavily. Through the instructions given by Bodhidharma, Hui-Ke was at last able to subdue inner conflicts arising within his mind. This anecdote became very popular in Ch'an Buddhism. However there is another version to this episode recorded in the *Biography of Hui-Ke* contained in the *Continued Records of Eminent Monks',* Vol. 16: "When Hui-Ke's arm was chopped off by robbers, he made use of *dharma* to calm his mind. Hence he did not feel any pain at all."

6. *The Life* p. 50.

Hui-Ke's doctrine of Ch'an Buddhism was based on the *(Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra)* which Bodhidharma specially favoured. The text emphasizes the prime importance of 'Reflection on Wisdom' and not the letters. Its main objective is to discard words and thoughts and meditation alone leads to its attainment. Hui-Ke believes that there is no difference between ignorance and wisdom. All *dharmas* should be understood in their true nature. There is no difference between us and the Buddha. Bodhidharma also believes that every living being has Buddha nature. If one can get rid of illusion and realize the ultimate truth, then common people and enlightened ones are one and the same.

References: Buddhist Association of China, edited: *Buddhism in China,* April, 1981. Hisao Inagaki: *A Dictionary of Japanese Buddhist Terms,* 2nd edition, Kyoto, 1985. Alicia & Daigan Matsunaga: *Foundation of Japanese Buddhism,* Vol. II, fourth printing, Tokyo, 1988. E. Dale Saunders: *Buddhism in Japan,* Tokyo, 1985.

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HUI-NENG (638–713 A.C.). The 6th patriarch of Ch'an Buddhism in China. According to his biography called 'The Sixth Patriarch's Platform Sūtra' written by his disciple, he was born in a poor family and, when still young, had to support his mother and himself by selling fire-wood after the father's death. One day when Hui-Neng was in the city, he heard the 'Diamond Sūtra' being chanted. This incident made him aspire to the Buddhist way. Upon hearing that there lived on a mountain a famous Ch'an master called Hung-jen, the 5th patriarch, Hui-neng went to meet him. This was when he was 24 years old. Hung-jen asked Hui-neng: "Lay disciple, where do you come from? What do you want from me?" Then replied Hui-neng: "I come from Lin-nan and I want to become a Buddha." "You are from Lin-nan. Then you are a barbarian. How can you become a Buddha?", said Hung-jen. Hui-neng then asked: "There are southern and northern people. But are there south and north in Buddha nature? The Buddha nature in you and me is one and the same. If you can become a Buddha, I, the barbarian, can surely become a Buddha." Hui-neng was then admitted into Hung-jen's discipleship and worked threshing paddy. Seven hundred disciples were learning Ch'an from Master Hung-jen at that time.

One day, Hung-jen wanted to test the disciples' comprehension and understanding of Ch'an with the intention of finding out as to who could be given the transmission of Dharma. He asked his disciples to write a verse each. Shen-hsiu, who was the most senior disciple among them, wrote a verse. Hung-jen acknowledged the spirit of Ch'an expressed in the verse and advised all to recite it. When, however, Hui-neng heard the verse being chanted, he realized that the verse was not upto the level to convey the gist of Ch'an Buddhism and then caused another verse of his own to be scribbled on the wall. Master Hung-jen saw it and called Hui-neng to his chamber. He then taught the entire doctrine of Ch'an Buddhism and presented him with the patriarchal robe and bowl. Hui-neng was advised by his master to return to the South but hide himself temporarily till the time was ripe.

Ten years after self-imposed exile in the South, Hui-neng came to Guang-dong where he was to meet a reputed Buddhist preacher called Yin-zhung. Upon realizing who he was, Yin-zhung invited him and inquired about Ch'an Buddhism. Then Yin-zhung summoned all the monks and made arrangements for Hui-neng to become a monk. Subsequently a famous Vinaya master Zhi-guang was invited to conduct an *upasampadā* ceremony for him. Two months later Hui-neng commenced preaching the Ch'an doctrine. Shortly afterwards he returned to the Bao-lin temple and since then preached for more than thirty years there.

During the reign of Zhong-zong, the emperor came to know about Hui-neng and in 705 A.C. invited him to the capital, which Hui-neng courteously declined by reason of his ill-health due to old age. In 712, Hui-neng returned to his native place and caused a pagoda called Bao-en to be erected there. He passed away in the Bao-en temple in 713 A.C. at the age of 76. He was given posthumously the title of 'Ch'an Master Da-jian'.

The Chinese Ch'an school of Buddhism relied heavily on the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* in the initial stages of its history for doctrinal arguments. The first two patriarchs, Bodhidharma and Hui-ke, used this sūtra as the major text of their school. However, it seems probable that the 'Diamond Sūtra' came to occupy an important place as a text of Ch'an Buddhism specially from the time of its third patriarch. Hui-neng, the sixth patriarch, in fact, used only the Diamond Sūtra for his doctrine. His aim was to abandon abstract intellectualism and point directly to one's nature for enlightenment.

Hung-jen, the fifth patriarch, had a number of capable disciples among whom were Shen-hsiu and Hui-neng who became responsible for the future course of Ch'an Buddhism in China.

Shen-hsiu who too claimed to the title of sixth patriarch was first ordained in 625 A.C. but it was not until he reached the age of fifty that he met Hung-jen and became his disciple. At the request of Empress Wu, he preached in the palace. He was later conferred the posthumous title of Ch'an Master Da-jian, which is often believed to be the first such award in China.

Shen-hsiu's school became later known as the Northern sect which was characterized as 'gradual enlightenment' while the Southern sect of Hui-neng emphasized 'sudden enlightenment'. The doctrines of the Northern sect were mainly taught and propagated among aristocrats of the North while the Southern sect was influential in and around Lin-nan. However, a dispute arose as to the legitimacy of the transmission of Dharma from Hung-jen and a disciple of Hui-neng named Shen-hui criticized and dismissed the Northern sect as 'illegitimate transmission and gradual enlightenment'. This incident took place in 730 A.C. and since then the Northern sect declined gradually.

Hui-neng's teachings on Ch'an Buddhism can be gleaned from the book — though later interpolations and additions are obvious — entitled 'The Sixth Patriarch's Platform Sūtra' compiled by his immediate disciple Fa-hai and re-edited subsequently by Shen-hui. This work became the major text of the school.

Hui-neng says that mind is pervading all over the realms of Dharma; it comes and goes freely without any obstacle. This is *prajñā*. All *prajñā* comes from one's nature and not from outside. If one realizes one's nature, he would suddenly become a Buddha. He further says that meditation and wisdom are the bases. Meditation is the essence. Wisdom is its function. They are one, like lamp and light. The nature of enlightenment is already there; and there is no difilement in us originally. If one realizes the nature of enlightenment, this is the sudden enlightenment. Hui-neng emphasized that one should not incline towards good or bad, nor should one set one's mind on nothingness; but learn more, hear more; realize his nature and comprehend the Buddha's teaching. He, therefore, encouraged the controlling of mind not only in sitting posture, but also while walking, standing, sitting and lying down. This attitude to Ch'an in fact was the major difference from that of the Northern sect which according to Hui-neng separated mind from object; therefore not giving rise to wisdom. He taught people to start from non-arising of thought and not to stick to a sitting posture alone in meditation.

References: Buddhist Association of China, edited: *Buddhism in China*, April, 1981. Hisao Inagaki: *A Dictionary of Japanese Buddhist Terms*, 2nd edition, Kyoto, 1985. Alicia & Daigan Matsunaga: *Foundation of Japanese Buddhism*, Vol. II, fourth printing, Tokyo, 1988. E. Dale Saunders: *Buddhism in Japan*, Tokyo, 1985.

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HUMANISM. Humanism is a view which upholds the dignity and value of man and considers his welfare in this life as primary. It thus purports particularly to do away with notions of any superhuman agencies playing a direct or indirect role in human life. Humanism holds that man is the measure and human welfare the end of all human activity. Erich Fromm, for example, writes, "Humanism...., is characterised by faith in man, his possibility to develop to ever higher stages, in the unity of the human race, in tolerance and peace, and in reason and love as the forces which enable man to realize himself, to become what he can be". (*Humanism and Psychoanalysis*. p. 69).

In the West, humanism was revived as a consequence of the Renaissance in the fourteenth century Italy and spread to other European countries. The Renaissance humanists thought that education in the liberal arts, particularly classical Greek literature, would help the development of a responsible individual and revive the spirit of freedom, which had been lost in the Middle Ages.[1]

The interest in the study of humanities centred on the Greek Classics, though it turned out to be not central to the ideal of humanism as it developed, points to the fact that while humanism had a resurgence in Renaissance Italy, its origins in the West could be traced back to the Greeks and Romans. Some consider that Christ and the early followers of Christianity were humanists (eg. Fromm, loc. cit.)[2]

With the advent of the Church authority and the setting in of the Middle Ages humanism ceased to be a force in the life of the European man, and individual man as man ceased to be his master.

Since the Renaissance, humanistic ideas germinated and developed in the works of many a European thinker. Thus, for example, the British philosopher Hobbes (1588–1679) argued for the legitimate rights of the individual and the basis of moral values as the common good and not an absolute or supernatural standard. The leaders of the French enlightenment of the 18th century emphasised man as part of nature and no mystery but that he is the highest value. The contention that the existing social, political and belief system deprived man of his birthright to individual freedom, happiness and pleasure was emphasised by them. Thus, for example, Rousseau (1712–78) begins his *Social Contract* with the words, "Man is born free; and everywhere he is in chains". Similar ideas were part of the German enlightenment, led by Lessing, (1729–81) Herder (1744–1803) and

1. The earliest beginnings in the West could be traced to Greeks and Romans, in particular to the Greek sophists in Athens of the 5th century B.C. Protagoras maintained that "Man is the measure of all things". Socrates in his study of man's nature also contributed to the humanist approach. The Romans too, continued the secular and rational approach to the study of human destiny and thereby were participants to the humanistic efforts.

2. See also Marx and Engels, *On Religion* p. 275. For a different view see M. Petrosyan, *Humanism*, p. 18.

others. Kant's (1724-1804) epistemology brings man to the centre of knowledge, and his ethics stressed the view that man should be the end and not the means and that one should not do unto others what one does not desire done to oneself.[3] This in effect amounts to saying that one should not cause suffering to others.

The humanism that emerged with the Renaissance had, as an integral part of it, a sense of freedom, freedom from the fetters in which medieval men were held by the Church, the Empire and the Feudal Lords, who were the perpetuators as well as the guardians of the order. Thus, as in the case of the Greek Sophist, the Renaissance humanism was an outcome of the reaction of the people to the establishment. This could be seen even in the sphere of religion, for Renaissance humanism was a prime force behind the Reformation. The early humanists were not anti-religious or anti-Christian but considered that the Scriptures admitted the necessity for earthly happiness of man and the value of man's work and his success in this life.

Humanism also helped the Renaissance scholars to break away from tradition by preparing the atmosphere for questioning Scholasticism and its wedlock, Aristotelianism. Together with this, by reviving the doctrines of Greeks like those of the Pythagoreans, humanism contributed to the birth of modern science. And the developments in science and technology, in turn, had much impact on the paths along which humanism flowed and evolved later on.

As a philosophy, by asserting the autonomy of the human being, his position as the source of truth as well as right, and human experience as the only and final arbiter, humanism has some of the attributes of what could be called a "scientific attitude". This characteristic is enhanced by its secular and liberal aspects. Further, humanism, aiming at the greatest good of man in this life, in the vein of utilitarianism which emerged later, recognized the value of pleasure in human life. This emphasis on pleasure, while contrasting humanism with medieval asceticism and linking it with the Epicureanism of the later Greeks, associates it with the foundational basis of much of contemporary life, particularly as it is lived in the developed countries.

Among the many versions of humanism, two strains which could appear almost antithetical seem to stand out; one associated with science, technology, materialism and the pursuit of pleasure referred to above, making some writers complain of the "arrogance of humanism"; the other a more spiritual, humanitarian and ethical strain of humanism sometimes with veiled versions of religion (e.g., theistic existentialism). Thus humanism as an outlook and a philosophy has continued in the West, essentially as an expression of the ethical attitude of middle class individuals who have ceased to have ties with traditional religion.

In general, certain activities, spearheaded by the United Nations Organisation, like the Human Rights Movement, Freedom from Hunger Movement, Women's Liberation Movement, the movements against discrimination on the basis of race, colour, sex etc. and the emphasis on provision of universal education, spread of science and technology may be considered as attempts to translate the spirit of humanism in the political and social sphere.

It is customary to associate the liberal democracies in the developed or developing countries with humanism. "Humanism is one of the vital religions.... It is the dominant religion of our time, a part of the lives of nearly everyone in the "developed" world......" writes David Ehrenfeld *(The Arrogance of Humanism* p. 3). He also says, "Humanism is at the heart of our present world culture" (*ibid.*, p. 20). Further a few philosophies, which have also political, social, literary or educational import, have associated themselves more specifically with humanism in one sense or other. Three of these are Marxism, Pragmatism and Existentialism.

From the Renaissance onwards, some thinkers who have been concerned with the burdens of the common man conceived the idea that justice and happiness could be achieved only by the abolition of private property. The British scholar statesman Thomas More (1478-1535), Italian philosopher Tommaso Campanella (1568-1639) and French philosopher François Fourier (1772-1837) are some of them. But the form of communism which attracted attention and interest and led to action was Marxism developed by Karl Marx, Friedrich Engles and later, by Lenin (1870-1924).[4] Marxism accepts the labour theory of the origin of the *human* being.

As labour dominated by private property makes it compulsory and work in not being a means of satisfaction to the worker becomes something external to the worker. The worker is made to sacrifice his essential being (i.e. labour) to his individual existence. To quote Marx, "It estranges man's own body from him as it does external nature his spiritual essence, his human being" *(Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts,* p. 72). This humanism seen in early Marx, some critics maintain, is not found in his later work, which is materialistic, and hence, according to them, antihumanistic.[5]

3. Cf. *Dhp. v.* 129
4. See Marx, *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, of 1844,* pp. 69-70, 95, 97, 102. George Novak, *Humanism and Socialism* pp. 20-21.
5. P. Bigo views alienation as the external attribute of mankind, and hence holds that alienation is the theoretical basis of humanism *(Marxisme et Humanisme,* Paris, 1953.

This attempt to associate alienation with the essence of man and as the basis of humanism possibly faces the charge that it aims at embedding the ideas of sin and condemnation in Christian theology in humanism. Marx does use the concept of alienation in his later works but he does not confine himself to it. Marxists maintain that Marx's view of freedom as created by activity creating "all-round development and flowering of man's individuality" and his idea "of the development of human energy as the end in itself of the future communist society" (Petrosyan, *Humanism,* p. 90) exemplify his humanism even in his later works.

Pragmatism too is concerned with humanism. Pragmatism[6] is broadly a version of empiricism and during the past century it has been associated with American philosophy. The association of pragmatism with humanism is mostly due to the work of William James who was both a psychologist and a philosopher. The philosophy outlined by James is humanistic in the sense that (human) experience is its means as well as end.

James notes that there is a wider sense of pragmatism, particularly held by F. C. S. Schiller (1864-1937) and subscribed to also by John Dewey as well as himself, which Schiller termed humanism.

Schiller's philosophy is called humanism and although it is also sometimes referred to as "personal idealism' it is akin to James' pragmatism. Schiller wrote that humanism admits, "every hypothesis as worth trying which has a human interest and appeals to any side of human nature *(Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics,* Vol. VI, pp. 830-31). He considers humanism as "a natural and logical development of pragmatic method in testing knowledge by its human value" *(loc. cit.).* He maintains that all truths are related to human purposes. Schiller notes that philosophic and literary versions of humanism have a common basis. He says, "By.... putting man into the centre of the intellectual universe and giving all science and literature a reference to human life and its purposes the philosophy connects with literary humanism" *(loc. cit.).*

Existentialism, like the humanism of William James and Schiller orginated as a reaction to the Absolution and Idealism of Hegel. It emphasises the concrete situation of man as its first major thinker Kierkegaard's (1813-55) work shows. It was also an attempt to grapple with the human condition in a world in which traditional religion was losing significance and influence as another existentialist philosopher, Nietzsche, (1844-1900) dramatically announced with his statement, "God is dead". And Jean Paul Satre writes, "Existentialism is nothing else but an attempt to draw the full conclusion from a consistently atheistic position *(Existentialism and Humanism,* p. 56).

Existentialism emphasises the fact that it is the decisions and actions of man which have ultimate significance and that man has no external authority (or reference) to fall back on. It also draws attention to man's freedom and individuality as well as his love and fraternity.

These characteristics align it, in general, with humanistic views; they could also be considered as a reaction aganist a society whose rationality, together with science and technology "de-humanizes" man, and hence, stands for humanism in one sense of the term, although "arrogant humanism", associates man with reason, science and technology.

It is of interest to note here that humanism, in a sense, links pragmatism and existentialism, through William James. James' philosophy had an existential element or tone, as the following quotation from Rollo May brings out: "His (i.e., James) whole system of pragmatism was based on his passionate concern for human need....."

James also fell into the existential tradition in his concern with *will.* As it was for Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche before him, for James also epistemology included will. That is to say, decision within oneself is "a necessary preliminary to the capacity to see truth......" (William James' Humanism and the Problem of Will — in *William James: Unfinished Business* ed., Robert B. Macleod.).

Existentialism has two forms: the atheistic and theistic. Jean Paul Satre, a leading exponent of atheistic existentialism in his *Existentialism and Humanism* writes, "...... the word humanism has two very different meanings. One may understand by humanism a theory which upholds man as the end in itself and as the supreme value......" (p. 54). This humanism the existentialist rejects, according to Satre. We cannot set up humanity as a cult.

Satre explains the sense of existential humanism in the following terms. "...... it is in projecting and losing himself beyond himself" (ibid. p. 55) that man makes himself to exist. 'There is no universe except universe, the universe of human subjectivity. This relation of transcendence as constitutive of man.... with subjectivity... it is this that we call existential humanism. This is humanism, because we remind man that there is no legislator but himself...." (pp. 55-6).

Theistic existentialism is probably humanistic in a more easily perceivable sense. Thus, one sees the existen-

6. Pragmatism is basically an epistemological or methodological position which outlines the means of gauging the meaning and truth of a statement. See C.S. Peirce, *Meaning of Truth.*

tialistic and humanistic ideals of love, fraternity and freedom integrated in the view of Gabriel Marcel who writes, "The freest man is also the most fraternal...... The fraternal man is linked to his neighbour..... The fraternal man...... is somehow enriched by everything which enriches his brother....... what is fraternity if not refusal of all forms of segregation? Again: fraternity implies a dynamism which is in fact that of love...." *(Existential Background of Human Dignity* pp. 147-48).

Buddhism and Humanism: Buddhism stands out as a religion and a philosophy which from its beginings over 2,500 years back was humanistic in many ways and in a variety of the senses that the term humanism has acquired. The characteristics in Buddhism which make it an outstanding case of Humanism are listed below.

A. i. There is no force in Buddhism, like a creater or preserver God, external to man, who has power and authority over human affairs or who sits in judgement over man (*M.* II, p. 68).

ii. Buddhism rejects determinism, naturalistic or otherwise, and hence man has freedom of choice and action (see DETERMINISM AND INDETERMINISM, FREE WILL)

iii. Man is thus the master of himself and each individual is responsible for his life and action (*Dhp.* v. 160).

iv. Being a human being is the most prized form of life. Although elements of Indian mythology have inescapably entered Buddhism, and the existence of heavenly beings like *devas* (gods) and *brahmas* is recognized in it, these beings are not "superior" to man as such. Their abodes could be more pleasurable and they may possess certain powers not possessed by man, but one has to be born a man to attain Enlightenment and become a Buddha. Thus Siddhartha Gautama had to leave the abode of *devas* and be born a human being to become the Buddha. All beings worship the Buddha and the arahants.

B. i. There is no Absolutism or extreme idealism or rationalism in Buddsim. Experience (of the individual) is the final arbiter and authority. The Buddha says, "Monks, do you not speak that which is known by yourselves, seen by yourselves, found by yourselves?" (*M.* I, p. 265).

ii. The empiricism (though in a sense broader than its contemporary Western form) and the human based "relativism" in Buddhism which would subscribe to humanism is seen for example in the *Sabba Sutta* (IV. p. 15) where the Buddha says "[illegible] the all.... and what brethren, is the all? It is eye and objects, ear and sound, nose and scent, tongue and savour, body and things tangible, mind and mental states..... This is what is called the all.... There is no other all.

iii. There is no dogmatism and intolerance of views in Buddhism. Free inquiry is encouraged and advocated in Buddhism as exemplified by the *Kālāma Sutta (A.* I, p. 188 ff.), where the Buddha says, "Do not go by what has been acquired by repeated hearing; nor upon tradition; nor upon rumour; nor upon what is in scripture;.... nor upon axiom; nor upon specious reasoning; nor upon bias...." This is, in spirit, similar to the scientific temper of modern age which has contributed to contemporary humanism (see DOGMATISM, EPISTEMOLOGY).

C. i. Buddhism contains much that went against the practices of the Brahmanic priesthood which was representative of the establishment during Buddha's time.

Buddha's period of activity, 6th century B.C., corresponds to the time of the Sophists and Socrates in Greece and Confucius in China and it was a period of enlightenment which heralded the beginning of humanism. Indeed, like the Greek Sophist, there was many a wandering ascetic, sceptic, and philosopher in India during Buddha's time, some of whom are recorded to have had dialogues with the Buddha. The *Brahmajāla Sutta (D.* I. p. 1 ff.) and many other discourses of the Buddha like the *Kaccāyanagotta Sutta (S.* II, p. 17 f.) are evidence of such diversity of view and debate. Buddhism was a humanistic outcome of such a period.

ii. Buddhism was not merely a reaction to the speculative philophies and controversies but also to the social system perpetuated by Brahmanism. Buddhism preached the equality of all men, irrespective of caste, creed, race or sex and this is a distinguishing characteristic of humanism. Thus, for example, Bhadant Anand Kausalyayan writes: "The Buddha *Dhamma* teaches right relationship between man and man in all spheres of life. The *Dhamma* is a social necessity, nay even a social responsibility of a cultured society." (see CASTE, EGALITARIANISM, HUMAN RIGHTS).

One serious criticism which the Brahmin levelled against the Buddha was that he preached that all the four varnas or castes were equally pure or that they had equal potentiality in them to become pure. This was in direct opposition to the brahmin view which held that there is a hierarchical gradiation in the varnas and this was not established by divine decree (cf. *M.* II, p. 147, *MA.* III, p. 408).

It was not only the *Śūdra,* who was denied the opportunity of education but all women, irrespective of their caste. So the majority in India, according to the Cāturvarṇa ideal of the Hindu society, was deprived of education. (Buddhism and other religions, pp. 128–9, in *Buddhism,* Panjabi University). It is of interest to note in this context of secular education and wisdom, that in the *Ummagga Jātaka,* Mahosadha, a farmer's son as a chaplain and minister of king Vedeha, is made to ridicule and humiliate the Brahmin advisers to the same king, led by Senaka.

Rhys Davids echoes the same view when he writes that the Buddha "ignores completely and alsolutely all advantages and disadvantages arising from birth, occupation or social status.....," (Dialogues of the Buddha; Part I, SBB, Vol. I, p. 102).

iii. This rejection of barriers like caste, the promotion of human effort leading to achievement as well as the assertion of supremacy of man over even kings of heavenly abodes is well exemplified by the story of Sunita in the *Theragāthā (Thag. v.* 620 ff.).

D. i. The principles of equality and democracy are best seen in the organisation of the Buddhist Order of the Saṅgha.

People of all castes were admitted to the Order. The monks and nuns visited the homes of people of all castes, high or low, for preaching as well to collect their meals. (cf. *Vin.* II, p. 239).

The Buddha's system of controlling *bhikkhus* was purely democratic. Though he was indeed the undisputed master of the *bhikkhus,* he never desired to use that authority over them" writes Rev. Walpola Rahula *(The Heritage of the Bhikkhu* p. 11). He also quotes Nalinaksha Dutt's observation: "Probably as a member of the clan which favoured democratic constitutions, Buddha became imbibed with democratic ideas. He wanted to see his Saṅgha grow on democratic lines and framed the rules accordingly" *(The Cultural Heritage of India,* Vol. I, p. 290). Again, R. K. Mookerji, for example, writes: "the Pali texts furnish interesting information of the Buddhist Saṅgha in strict and minute conformity with genuine democratic principles" *(Hindu Civilization,* p. 209).

ii. The humanistic influence of Buddhism in government and society is clearly seen by the practices and admonitions of the Buddhist Emperor Asoka, as seen by his edicts, which date from the 3rd century, B.C. He says in Pillar Edict IV: "It is most desirable that there should be absolute equality for all in all legal proceedings and the punishments awarded....." (Malalasekera and Jayatilleke, *Buddhism and the Race Question* p. 62). His Rock Edict XIII says "...Devānampriya desires that all beings be left unhurt, should have self control, have equal (impartial) treatment and should lead happy lives" *(ibid.* pp. 63-64).

In the Brahamagiri and Rupnath Edicts Emperor Asoka says: "Men in Jambudīpa, who were till now unmingled, have now been mingled with the gods..... Let the humble and great exert themselves to achieve the ideal.... May this spirit of exertion endure evarlastingly" *(ibid.* p. 63).

(E) Not only in basing his 'world-view' on human perception and thought, even in his contention that human conception has garbed the reality for man over and over again, Buddha's epistemological and ontological position comes close to views of humanists like William James. The 'subjective' beginnings of our world of objects is indicated, as Bhikkhu Ñāṇananda brings out beautifully, when he quotes passages like, *"Yaṃ vedeti taṃ saññānāti, yaṃ saññānāti taṃ vitakketi, yaṃ vitakketi, taṃ papañceti...."*.

"What one feels, one perceives; what one perceives, one reasons about; what one reasons about, one proliferates conceptually....." *(Concept and Reality* p. 5).

But this 'subjective' stage is surpassed, and an 'objective' stage, dependent on a conceptual system and the language takes over to give objectivity to objects. As Bhikkhu Ñāṇananda observes:

"The deliberate activity implied by the third person verb is seen to stop at *'papañceti'.* Now comes the most interesting process of cognition. *Apparently* it is no longer a mere contingent process, nor is it an activity deliberately directed, *but an inexorable subjection to an objective order of things.* At this final stage of sense-perception, he who has hitherto been the subject now becomes the hapless object.....

"...... What one proliferates conceptually, due to that, concepts characterised by the prolific tendency assail him in regard to material shapes cognisable by the eye, belonging to the past, the future and the present....

"Like the legendary resurrected tiger which devoured the magician who restored it to life out of its skeletal bones, the concepts and linguistic conventions overwhelm the worldling who evolved them" (ibid., pp. 5-6). One could see the humanism in this 'epistemology' when one compares it with some passages in William James' exposition of the view of humanism held by himself and the associated pragmatists:

"The greatest common sense achievement, after the discovery of Time and Space, is probably the concept of permanently existing things. When a rattle first drops out of the hand of a baby, he does not look to see where it has gone. Non-perception he accepts as annihilation until he finds a better belief. That our perceptions mean beings, rattles that are there.... becomes an interpretation so luminous of what happens to us that, once employed, it never gets forgotten.... the category of transperceptual reality is now one of the foundations of our life....

"This notion of *first* in the shape of a most chaotic — pure experience which sets questions of a *second* in the way of fundamental categories, long ago wrought in the structure of our consciousness and practically irreversible..... and of a *third* which gives, the detail of the answers in the shapes most congruous with all our present needs is, as I take it, the esence of the humanistic conception. It represents experience in its pristine purity to be now so enveloped in predicates historically worked out that we can think of it as little more than an *Other,* of a *That* ......

"For us,.... reality is an accumulation of our intellectual inventions, and the struggle for 'truth' in our progressive dealings with it is always a struggle to work in new nouns and adjectives while altering as little as possible the old" (Humanism and Truth, in *The Meaning of Truth,* p. 65).

Moreover, James and the pragmatist humanists, as indicated earlier, took the view that truth of a statement consists in its consequences, particularly their being good consequences. And the Buddha also asserted that the true is what is useful (Kalupahana, *Language, Truth and Culture in Buddhist Perspective,* p. 4), which suggests further parallels in these views.

(F) The humanism of Buddhism shines in its emphasis, analysis and solution of the human predicament. The Buddha saw the world as suffering *(dukkha). Dukkha* is an outcome of impermanence *(anicca)* and its corollary non-soul *(anattā)* and ignorance *(avijjā).* This despair, which resembles man's plight as seen in contemporary existentialist treatments, is met in Buddhism with a highly ethical and humanistic code of life. Eric Fromm wrote in his *Humanism and Psycho-analysis* (p. 262). "...... there has been a humanistic tradition for the last two thousand five hundred years. In antiquity, its representations were Buddha, the prophets of Israel, Socrates and Jesus Christ." Rainer Funk, in his *Erich Fromm: The Courage to be Human* (p. 122) explain Fromm's position thus. "..... the Buddha has no concern with philosophy or speculation. Rather, he inquires of human existence why it creates suffering and he understands that man's greed leaves him perpetually unsatisfied and deprives his life of meaning.

"This approach, which asks questions concering man's existence and its questionableness and then assigns answers to the questions to man himself, shows, according to Fromm, Buddhism's radical humanistic view of man... Fromm.... sees the life and teaching of Buddha as humanistic to the highest degree".

G. i. The ethical principles of Buddhism are also a clear indication of the humanistic outlook of Buddhism. Two of these principles are *mettā* and *ahiṃsā. Mettā* is loving kindness which the Buddhist is expected to extend to all beings, human and non-human. The principle of *ahiṃsā* exhorts that one should not hurt any being. These, coupled with the principles of *karunā (compassion), muditā* (sympathetic joy) and *upekkhā* (equanimity), make the Buddhist system of ethics generate tolerance and peace. Although Buddhism was a missionary religion from its very inceptions force was never used in the propagation of the *Dhamma.*

Buddhism is a religion and a philosophy which values life, particularly human life, and sees human life as possessing great potential. The Buddha advised the individual to look after himself and his interests (*Dhp. vv.* 160, 166).

Like Existentialism, Buddhism, particularly Theravāda, has been criticized as being a pessimistic doctrine. This seems to be an incorrect or rather, a superficial reading. Although there is suffering in the world, the Buddha was enunciating codes of conduct for both laymen (e.g., *Sigālovāda* and *Vyagghapajja Suttas)* as well as the *bhikkhus* to make a success of life by effort and achievement.

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R. D. Gunaratne

HUMAN RIGHTS. As a religion and philosophy dealing with the welfare of "all beings" *(sabbe sattā),* Buddhism is certainly concerned with Human Rights — and with much more. Its concern for human rights finds expression through the value system it upholds and considers salutary for mankind. Though not expressed as in present-day parlance, the careful student of Buddhism would not fail to note that the concepts and concerns of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 10th December, 1948, are enshrined in the teachings of the Buddha, as well. The basic principles of the declaration are fully supported and reinforced by Buddhist Canonical and historical literature. And it has been rightly observed that "few religious teachers had been as eloquent and explicit as the Buddha was in upholding values so akin to the modern concepts of Human Rights."[1] He expressed them in greater depth and in a richer tone.

Prior to this Declaration (in relation to which the Buddhist position ought to be examined) there have been attempts at declaring human rights such as the 'Magna Carta' by the English in 1215 and the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen by the French in 1789. However, it is only with the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations that "for the first time in history peoples of the world had a document...... declaring in simple and succinct terms the inherent civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights"[2] to which the whole of humanity is entitled, and thus the Universal Declaration "provides a yardstick by which men and women can judge for themselves the extent to which their rights and freedom are respected by their respective governments, organizations, groups or by other persons, and the degree to which they themselves are respecting the rights and freedoms of others."[3]

It is now over forty years since the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights was made; but human rights, as a concept, is still evolving,[4] and students of the subject now note with concern the limitations inherent in this Declaration.[5] While recognizing the importance of this Declaration "as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations"[6] it has also been observed that this document "tends to be juridical in its expression, individualist in emphasis and restricted in its perspective on community."[7] This is only one among many criticisms of the Declaration, but this is not to underestimate, even for a moment, its great value. However, though reluctantly, it has to be stated that the Declaration "lacks both depth of perception and insights which religion alone can give"[8] and when compared with what Buddhism has to say regarding the concerns of this Declaration, it needs expansion in its different dimensions. On this point, present-day's considered opinion from the Buddhist angle has the following to say:

> "It is our view that the modern concepts of these (i.e. human rights) are only an imperfect reflection of ideas and concepts which in their pristine form as expressed in the Dhamma were more humane, more philosophical and more just than anything which we, the moderns, can show. Of course, they operated

1. Ananda W. P. Guruge, Foreword to L.P.N. Perera, *Buddhism and Human Rights,* Colombo, 1991, p. viii f.
2. *Human Rights and Religions in Sri Lanka,* Sri Lanka Foundation, Colombo, 1988, p. xix.
3. *loc. cit.*
4. Cf. B.G. Ramcharan (Ed.), *Human Rights: Thirty Years after the Universal Declaration,* Commemorative Volume on the Occasion of the Thirtieth Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, The Hague, 1979, p. 7 f., pp. 41 ff.
5. ibid. p. 27 where a number of shortcomings in the Declaration are pin-pointed. For instance, it does not include "any article on the protection of minorities" and on the "right of petition even at the national level..... " (loc. cit). Also *vide Religion and Culture in the Development of Human Rights in Sri Lanka,* Sri Lanka Foundaton, Colombo, 1982, pp. 5 f., 18 & 111. On its legislative history *vide* Albert Verdoodt, *La Naissance et Signification de la Declaration universelle des droits de l'homme,* Louvain, 1964.
6. These words from the opening sentence of the Declaration itself have often been quoted by studentss of human rights to indicate the value of the Declaraton. Cf. B.G. Ramcharan, *op. cit.*, p. 3 f. Also *Religion and Culture in the Development of Human Rights in Sri Lanka,* Sri Lanka Foundation, Colombo, 1982, p. iii.
7. Ibid., p. iii, Also cf. B.G. Ramcharan, *op. cit.*, pp. 27 ff.
8. *Religion and Culture in the Development of Human Rights in Sri Lanka,* Sri Lanka Foundation, Colombo, 1982, p. xi, (Introduction).

in a particular social context, but a context which, particularly in this age of science and technology, is worth retrieving and re-establishing. In that context, man's view of the unvierse and his place therein, the assessment and appraisal of human life, now and hereafter, all of these contributed to give the concept of human rights an entirely different emphasis, a totally different sense of direction. In the process of time, in a retrograde movement, there has occurred a distinct shift of emphasis from those features that were grounded on selflessness and the belief in the perfectibility of the buman being to the present vociferous demand for individual rights of a legalistic nature, enforceable both against the State and our fellow-men. Such is not the concept in the Dhamma.... While appreciating the value of human rights in their present form, this difference has to be stressed, because it is a distinction of the utmost importance from the point of view of the Dhamma and it is the distinction that needs the greatest emphasis."[9]

In conclusion it has been observed that "the restricted nature of the impact of religious and philosophical thinking" on the present Declaration is best noted when looked at from a more universal angle, and that the unversality of the Declaration "is more in the desire to apply it universally rather than in any universal applicability inherent in it."[10] While this critique of the Declaration certainly deserves careful consideration, it is not inappropriate in this context if this Declaration, as it is, be considered in terms of the recognition and support which Buddhist thought, traditions, teachings and practices could provide.

The Buddhst view of human rights emerges from two basic assumptions-one philosophical and the other ethical. The philosophical assumption is that all human beings are born with complete freedom and responsibility. Not being the creations of a Creator, they are subject only to non-deterministic causal laws and their destinies are in their own hands. "One, indeed, is one's own master" *(attā hi attano nātho)*, says the *Dhammapada (Dhp. v.* 160). Human beings are, therefore, free to attain the highest, materially, mentally, morally and spiritually. The ethical assumption is more relevant at the social level. It is the insight that man and all other living beings desire happiness: *sukhakāmāni bhūtāni (Dhp. vv.* 131, 132). Thus, the Buddhist approach to human rights is more humanistic than legalistic.[11]

With these two basic assumptions Buddhism looks upon man as quite competent in the task of ensuring for himself and his fellow beings success and happiness in this world and in securing for himself his own ultimate emancipation from the turmoils of existence. Worldly success itself is expected to be righteously achieved (cf. *dhammaladdha, Sn.* p. 87), and the Buddha's teachings are partly directed towards this objective. It is here that human rights need to be seen in the social context. Worldly or mundane success in particular demands the reciprocal recognition of, respect for, and the observance of the rights of man.

While philosophical and ethical considerations of Buddhism gave rise to these humanistic concerns, they received a further impetus through kindred values generated by Buddhism by its reaction to the social problems of the day as found to exist in its very cradle.

The entire religious and social climate of North India during and after the rise of Buddhism and other allied religious systems had generally been one of reaction against limitations imposed on human rights by the then prevalent Brahmanical value system. The activities of the Buddha and his early disciples in this context, had been directed towards the acceptance and pratice of principles of human rights in a very practical way, not only as a desirable effort at social re-structuring, but also in recognition of its ultimate spiritual value.

Furthermore, Buddhist social philosophy demands that conditions in society should be conducive to the cultivation of the Buddhist social ethic (as required by the Buddhist moral life)- a social ethic to be achieved mainly through the economic and political needs of any given people.[12] And it has to be borne in mind that in this exercise, the identification, recognition, and effective implementation of human rights concepts have a major role to play, for, in the ultimate analysis, it is from the needs of a people that rights would emerge.

In this context, the Noble Eightfold Path, fundamental Buddhist concepts such as the *Pañcasīla* (the Five Precepts) and "that admirable virtue denoted by the Buddhist concept of Benevolence as broadly implied in loving kindness *(mettā)*, non-injury *(ahiṃsā)*, as well as.... the more apparent social virtues such as liberality *dāna)* which is the basis of altruism for the Buddhist, gratitude *(kataññutā)*, reverence *(gārava)*, courtesy *(peyyavajja)*, equanimity *(samānattatā)* humility, tole-

9. Ibid., p. 5 f.
10. Ibid., p. 18.
11. Cf. K.N. Jayatilleke, *The Principles of International Law in Buddhist Doctrine*, Extract from the *Rocueil des Cours*, Vol. II, (Private Circulation only), Leiden, 1967, p. 531.
12. Cf. O.H. de A. Wijesekera, *Buddhism and Society*, (Tenth Lecture under the Dona Alpina Ratnayake Trust), Colombo, 1982, p. 15; also *Ency B'sm.* Vol. IV, Fascicle 2, s.v. DEMOCRACY.

ration *(khanti-soracca)* and veracity or sincerity *(sacca)*"[13] — all constituting "the fundamental moral basis of man's relationship to his fellow beings"[14] -would serve to gear one's actions towards the acceptance of human rights. In fact, the Buddhist *Pañcasīla* could be looked upon as the earliest pronouncement on human rights in the history of mankind in that the *Pañcasīla* embodies a recognition of (a) the right to life, and (b) the right to property-two broad divisions within which all human rights could be reckoned. It is significant that the human rights listed in the Universal Declaration of the United Nations, when carefully examined, would fall into one or the other, or into both categories. In fact, in the process of securing the weal of mankind, as may be noted from the *Cakkavatti-sīhanāda Sutta (D.* III, p. 62f.) the ideal ruler (of mythical antiquity) - the *Cakkavatti* Monarch-is said to recommend the practice of the *Pañcasīla,* which means the observance of human rights. Thus, ideal Buddhist statecraft needs this recognition.

It has been indicated at the very outset that Buddhism is concerned with "all beings" *(sabbe sattā).* This is clear from the *Metta Sutta (Sn. vv.* 143-152). Accordingly, the Buddhist conception of rights together with the notion of its magnitude is quite magnanimous, extending, as it does, from the human plane to the animal kingdom. This could be gauged from the fact that the *Cakkavatti* Monarch is also said to provide ward and protection not only to man but also "to beasts and birds" *(miga-pakkhisu, D.* III, p. 61). Rights are not only for humans, but for other living creatures too. It is only in the 20th century that "animal-rights groups" have surfaced in a few countries. In keeping with the ideal Buddhist monarch's concern for the rights of both man and beast, in the Buddhist historical context, Asoka was the first monarch to adopt requisite measures.

The recognition and observance of human rights in a Buddhist context have to be effected mainly through the fulfilment of one's duties and obligations towards society. This is part and parcel of the Buddhist and Eastern ethos in general, while the term "rights" has vociferously surfaced in Western cultural contexts, since rights have been denied to man mostly in that part of the world. This was perhaps due to "an outlook nurtured on values which breed individualism and ethnocentricism and which therefore considers the world as having been given to one group to be thoroughly exploited for its own gain."[15] Recognition and the observance of rights through the discharge of duties and obligations bring social and moral ethics of Buddhism to the fore-front, and therefore discourses of the Buddha like the *Sīngālovāda Sutta (D.* III, p. 180 ff.) which deal with bilateral social relationships in a Buddhist context are of prime importance in this connection.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights comprises 30 Articles and before commenting on any from the Buddhist point of view their concerns may be listed as follows:[16]

* Articles 1 and 2 state the most important fact that all human beings, with no distinction whatsoever, are born free and equal in dignity and rights, and indicate the basic principles of equality and non-discrimination in the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
* Articles 3 to 21 are concerned with civil and political rights to which mankind is entitled. They deal with the rights to:

"a. Life, liberty and security of person;
b. freedom from slavery and servitude;
c. freedom from torture and cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment;
d. recognition as a person before the law;
e. equal protection of the law;
f. an effective judicial remedy for violation of human rights;
g. freedom from arbitrary arrest, detention or exile;
h. a fair trial and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal;
i. the presumption of innocence until guilt has been proved;
j. debarment from conviction for an act which was not a penal offence at the time it was committed;
k. freedom from arbitrary interference with privacy, family, home or correspondence;
l. freedom of movement and residence, including the right to leave any country and to return to one's country;
m. asylum;
n. a nationality;
o. contract a marriage and found a family;
p. own property;
q. freedom of thought, conscience and religion;
r. freedom of opinion and expression;
s. freedom of peaceful assembly and association;
t. participation in the government of one's country; and
u. equal access to public service in one's country."

13. O.H. de A. Wijesekera, *op. cit.*, p. 22.
14. Ibid., *loc. cit.*
15. L.P.N. Perera, *op. cit.*, p. 32.
16. This classification is modelled on the one adopted in Anton Fernando, *A Guide to Human Rights and the Humanitarian Law*, Colombo, 1990. What has been taken *verbatim* from this publication is indicated within quotation marks.

* Articles 22 to 27 are concerned with economic, social and cultural rights. They include the rights to:

"a. social security;
b. work and free choice of employment;
c. equal pay for equal work;
d. just and favourable remuneration ensuring an existence worthy of human dignity;
e. form and join trade unions;
f. rest and leisure;
g. a standard of living adequate for health and well-being (including food, clothing, housing and medical care);
h. security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other circumstances beyond one's control;
i. protection of motherhood and childhood;
j. education, with parents having a prior right to choose the type of education they consider suitable for their children;
k. participation in the cultural life of one's community; and
l. protection of the moral and material interests resulting from one's authorship of scientific, literary or artistic productions."

* Article 28 stresses the fact that every person is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in the Declaration can be fully realized.
* Article 29 points out that everyone has duties to the community, in which alone the free and full development of one's personality is possible, and indicates the limitations to one's rights and freedoms. It adds that rights and freedoms are also not to be exercised contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
* Article 30 states that nothing in this Declaration is to be construed as implying for any State, group or person, a right to do anything aimed at destroying the rights and freedoms set out in the Declaration. This concluding Article is necessary in view of the fact that mankind being so heterogeneous racially, culturally etc., there is always the possibility, among other things, of misinterpretations. This, therefore, is a precaution.

There is no gainsaying that Buddhist teachings have much to contribute towards the concerns of these Articles.[17] It is proposed to consider here, within available space, four Articles of the Declaration, viz. Articles 1, 2, 6 and 23, in the light of what has been already stated regarding human rights in the Buddhist perspective. They are being singled out since Articles 1 and 2 are basic to the rest of the Declaration, while Articles 6 and 23 are representative of the two divisions (1) civil and political rights, and (2) economic, social and cultural rights respectively, as already noted.

> **Article 1:** All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.

This Article is basic to all human rights and is in complete accord with Buddhist thought. In conception it is nothing new to Buddhism. As stated earlier, the Buddhist view of human rights emerges from two basic assumptions, one philosophical and the other ethical. Our concern here is the philosophical assumption. It upholds that every human being is born with complete freedom and responsibility. Human beings are not the handiwork of a Creator, and therefore they are subject only to non-deterministic causal laws operating in the Universe. Their destiny lies in their own hands. This freedom of human beings as commencing with their birth itself, and the recognition of their equality in dignity and rights by Buddhism are reflected clearly in the Buddha's emphasis on self-reliance, which he did by extolling what he called *attakāra* (personal endeavour), *purisakāra* (human effort), *purisathāma* (human strength), *purisaviriya* (human energy), *purisaparakkama* (human valour) and *purisadhorayha* (human responsibility). These human attributes are referred to, for instance, in the *Sampasādaniya Suttanta* of the *Dīgha-nikāya* (*D.* III, p. 113). Furthermore, this concept is reinforced by his maintaining that Buddhahood itself is within the reach of all human beings. The Buddha saw the perfectibility of human nature.

If one is one's own master, as the *Dhammapada* puts it (*Dhp. v.* 160), one is certainly born free, and if all human beings could attain Buddhahood, what greater equality in dignity and rights can there be?

Reason and conscience are recognized in Buddhism although the latter as understood today appears mostly as a non-Buddhist concept. "Reason" (cf. *dhammavitakka, A.* I, p. 254 or *dhammādhipateyya, A.* I, p. 147) and "conscience" (cf. *attādhipateyya, A.*, I, p. 147) more or less go together, constituting the awareness of right and wrong. Reason and conscience indicate the ability to judge the moral worth of one's own motives and actions, and opt for what is right and desirable both for oneself as well as for others. Together they partly constitute the "faculty of mindfulness" (*satindriya*) in human beings. Reason and conscience as understood in Buddhism could, to some extent, be seen from the *Kālāma Sutta* (*A.* I, p. 188 ff) which indicates the criteria for distinguishing between the "good" (*kusala*) and the "bad" (*akusala*) in the moral sense.

17. For a detailed treatment of these Articles, *vide* L. P. N. Perera, *op. cit.*, pp. 21 ff.

As for mutual relations between human beings, Buddhism goes much beyond the "spirit of brotherhood" (a key concept in the Article) to the realm of *Metta* *(maitri)* or "Universal friendlness" or "Loving kindness". This, embracing, as it does, every form of sentient existence, is certainly broader than any conception of a brotherhood. The term "brotherhood," furthermore, implies the recognition of a "fatherhood" and therefore an exclusiveness of a sector of humanity (which, certainly, is not intended in this Article)[18] are ideas unacceptable to Buddhism. "Buddhist thought, both in the realm of religion as well as philosophy, begins with an insight into a fundamental consideration that all life has a desire to safeguard itself and to make itself comfortable and happy. In the Buddhist religious life, the philosophy of *maitri* and *avihimsā*, universal love and non-violence, derives its validity from this position. Therefore, at the social level too, it is the responsibility of every member of society from the head of state downwards to contribute to the unimpaired operation of this principle"[19]

Regarding equality, however, it has to be realized that equality has been and is being circumscribed by limitations in actual application. The claim that all human beings are equal is more prescriptive than descriptive. It really means that there are various respects in which no difference ought to be made in the treatment of, or consideration given to, all persons, whatever differences referred to in the Buddhist texts as *puggalavemattatā* (cf. *D.* II, p. 152; *S.* II, p. 21; V, p. 200; *Sn.* p. 102) there may be, in their qualities and in their circumstances in life.

While recognizing such limitations, Buddhism posits a basic equality between all human beings in respect of their essential nature, and therefore sees all persons as equal in dignity and rights. This basic equality in respect of their essential nature stems, according to Buddhist thought, from a number of factors[20] of which the most significant are biological and anthropological. The biological factor is the argument that *homo sapiens* constitutes a single species in contra-distinction to other species to which the different kinds of fauna and flora belong. Arrived at from investigations different though, from present-day laboratory techniques, this conclusion is certainly in accord with the modern biological outlook which restores the view of the basic equality of all human beings. To speak of a difference between "man" and "man", says the *Suttanipāta*, is to speak in popular parlance: *vokārañca manussesu samaññāya pavuccati* *(Sn. v.* 611). The anthropological argument is best adduced by the *Aggañña Sutta* of the *Dīgha-nikāya*. In the beginning, says this *Sutta*, all human beings were "like unto themselves and not unlike" *(aññesam sadisānaññeva no asadısānam: D.* III, p. 93)[21], and also adds that this is the Universal Norm (cf. *dhammen'eva) and not contrary to it: (no adhammena:* loc. cit.). It states further that social distinctions arose in settled society through a division of labour as a necessity for its very existence culminating in a contract of society and a contract of government,[22] based on democratic concepts, reflecting the sense of equality that should exist among human beings. As a matter of fact, Buddhism seems to be the earliest among world religions to recognize the fundamental equality of all human beings, belonging, as they are, to one community in the sense that peoples' essential natures are the same whatever their individual differences, such as those due to heredity, environment and other factors, may be.

This sense of equality is further reinforced by the Buddhist view that all human beings, in the final analysis, face the same basic phenomena of birth, decay and dissolution, spelt out as the first Noble Truth, and that at the same time they are in a position to overcome these problems by attaining the very highest moral and spiritual level through a development of the human potential. Human life is so placed in the cosmic scheme of things, that human beings alone enjoy the best opportunity of transcending the unsatisfactoriness of existence into *Nibbāna* - the highest happiness. Human beings are equal in that they face the same basic problems and are endowed with a common but unique potentiality to attain the highest.

> **Article 2:** Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
>
> Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.

18. Prof. John, P. Humphrey (one-time Director, UN Division of Human Rights) in B. G. Ramcharan (ed.) *op. cit.* at p. 27, discussing the history of this Article, states, *inter alia*, that certain Articles "could have been better formulated and the document suffers from the inclusion in it of certain assertions which do not enunciate justifiable rights..."
19. *Religion and Culture in the Development of Human Rights in Sri Lanka*, p. 8.
20. Cf. K. N. Jayatilleke, *op. cit.*, pp. 515 ff.; G. P. Malalasekera and K. N. Jayatilleke, *Buddhism and the Race Question*, UNESCO, 1958, pp. 35 ff.; & *Ency B'sm.* Vol. V, Fascicle I, s.v. EGALITARIANISM.
21. v.l. *aññesam* (ibid., p. 93, fn. 12) should be preferred to *anaññesam* in the text of the *PTS* Edition, from which we quote.
22. According to authoritative studies, contract of government postulates as a pre-condition a contract of society. E.g. *vide* E. Barker, *Social Contract*, Oxford University Press, London, Reprint 1948, p. xii f.

Article 2 flows from the underlying principles of Article 1, and is the foundation for all the other Articles. Article 2 is also basic to the Declaration, in as much as it is a preamble to it — a preamble introducing the diversity in the human situation - a diversity within which all human rights need to be respected and recognized. For Buddhists, diversity is part of natural evolution and is not to be regarded as a problem. Man, as an "engineer" in nature, is expected to work out his emancipation within and through this diversity. As stated earlier, as a religion and philosophy concerned with "all beings" *(sabbe sattā)*, Buddhism does not recognize the distinctions referred to in this Article.

In the observations on Article 1, it was stated how and on what grounds Buddhism considers all human beings equal. It may be added here that this equality is said to be "in accordance with" the *Dhamma* in the sense of "Universal Norm" *(vide infra)* "and not contrary to it" *(dhammen'eva no adhammena, D.* III, p. 93). This would further mean that the equality implied is basic, fundamental and natural. Such a conception of equality requires that rights and freedoms should remain untrammelled by considerations such as race, colour, sex etc.

As Buddhism sees it, the human life-process operates through the "three doors" of mind, body and speech. Human endeavour or action (whatever its moral tone be) is mental in origin and manifests itself physically or verbally. Hence, as stated by the Buddha in his discourses like *Vasala (Sn. vv.* 116-142) and *Madhura (M.* II, p. 83), one is "heir" to one's acton *(kammadāyādo)* irrespective of such factors as race, colour, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Consequently these factors are not, in any way, countenanced in Buddhism, and rights and freedoms have to be exercised through appropriate action, i.e. through *sammākammanta* - the Buddhist social principles.

So is it with sex and language. With the fundamental equality of all human beings being granted, it will be superfluous to distinguish between the sexes. Women's potentialities are similar to those of man. While one may mistakenly see a patriarchal stamp in its attitude towards the "weaker sex" due to certain Buddhist monastic rules governing the life of nuns,[23] and while early Buddhism had to contend with an environment which, as a whole, was prejudiced against women, Buddhism saw no reason why women should be discriminated against, especially in matters of moral and spiritual uplift. Given the necessary pre-conditions, the Buddha asserts that a woman might do better than a man (cf. *S.* I, p. 86). In the Buddha's mind "there seemed to have been no real doubt .... as to the equality of the powers of man and woman."[24] Placing, as it does, man and woman on the same pedestal, Buddhism does not recognize rights and freedoms for the male which cannot be extended to the female. Indeed, as borne out by the *Therigāthā* women actually enjoyed a high degree of intellectual freedom under Buddhism, being able thereby to gain spiritual advancement on an equal basis.

The Buddha has also recognized one's rights and freedoms in one's quest for material *(attha)* and spiritual *(dhamma)* well-being. Looking at the matter from the point of view of language as a medium of instruction, he enjoined that one should learn his teachings "in one's own language" *(sakāya niruttiyā)*[25], and prohibited his disciples from presenting his teaching through any privileged linguistic medium of the day.[26]

In terms of religion, Buddhism extends to followers of all other religions the rights and freedoms that Buddhists would legitimately claim for themselves. In this, as in every other respect, Buddhism expects one to treat "the other" comparing the other to oneself: *attānam upamam katvā (Dhp. vv,* 129, 130). This principle is well brought out in the *Att'ūpanāyika-dhamma-pariyāya* envisaged in the *Veludvāreyya Sutta* of the *Saṃyutta-nikāya (S.* V, p. 352 ff.). In the Buddhist ethic, concern by every one for the rights and security of others is of prime interest. Consequently, the exercise by a person of his or her rights and freedoms is subject to the recognition of the rights and freedoms of others.

Finally, with reference to the first paragraph of this Article it has to be stated that one's political or other opinion, to judge from such discourses of the Buddha as the *Kālāma Sutta (A.* I, p. 188 ff.), is no bar to the enjoyment of human rights and freedoms. As for political opinion it should be clearly understood that early Buddhist literature shows no preference for any one form of polity over another. While the teachings of the Buddha are more consonant with democratic thought at its best, Buddhism would opt for any form of polity which, under given circumstances, would best enable the practice of its

23. The *Vinaya*, naturally, had to take cognizance of the weaknesses of the female sex. Hence the requirement that whatever is decided on ecclesiatically by nuns needs ratification by monks.
24. I. B. Horner, *Women under Primitive Buddhism*, London, 1930, p. 104.
25. The statement in the *Cullavagga (Vin.* II, 139), *anujānāmi bhikkhave sakāya niruttiyā buddhavacanam pariyāpunitum,* taken together with the Buddha's attitude towards language as revealed elsewhere (cf. e.g. *Aranavibhangasutta* of the *Majjhima-nikāya)* clearly implies that *sakāya niruttiyā* should refer to one's own language, and not to the Magadhan idiom, as assumed by the Commentator (*VinA.* 1214). It should also be noted that *saka nirutti* can be understood to mean the idiom in which the Buddha-word is expounded." E-in-C.
26. The allusion appears to be to the Vedic idiom, the language of the privileged at that time in North India.

social ethic, as the primary consideration was not so much the nature of the political and the economic setting but the practial application of the social ethic, which, of course, has to be effected mainly through the political and economic affairs of any nation.[27]

The second paragraph of this Article is intrinsically linked with the question as to where, in the Buddhist perspective, ultimate sovereignty lies. While Buddhism demands a realistic evaluation of the human situation and would acknowledge the fallibility of human institutions (for none, it would say, is imposed by an infallible external agency), Buddhism measures human affairs in terms of the Universal Norm *(Dhamma)* or principle of righteousness referred to, above. This conception of the Universal Norm means that in the Buddhist view, "ultimate sovereignty resided, not in any ruler, human or divine, nor in anybody governing the state, nor in the state itself, but in *Dhamma*, the eternal principle of righteousness"[28]. The *Dhamma*, in this context, should not be understood as signifying "some sort of mysterious entity, but that it is only to the extent to which states conform with *Dhamma*, in their internal and foreign policy, that a human being can achieve his legitimate aspirations for peace, prosperity and happiness."[29]

Since Buddhism credits the human personality with a dignity and moral responsibility it looks upon the human being as qualified to be vested with the sovereignty immanent in the *Dhamma*, in the management of human affairs. Buddhism, posits, as Jean Jacques Rousseau did much later, that the essence of human dignity lies in the assumption of man's responsibility for his own governance. Therefore, whatever be the form of polity to which a person may subscribe, from the Buddhist point of view, *for all practical purposes*, it is in man that the sovereignty inherent in the *Dhamma* lies. Thus, distinctions in the treatment meted out to persons under different forms of polity would be basically meaningless, certainly harmful, and definitely repugnant to Buddhist thought.

Article 6: Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law.

Article 6 asserts the worth of the individual irrespective of the circumstances of life in which the individual may find himself or herself placed, and is quite meaningful from the point of view of Buddhist ethics and the Buddhist notion of justice. What matters here is the "human-ness" (Pali: *manussattam)* of the individual concerned; and, as could be inferred from Buddhist monastic law (Vinaya), the idea of a person in the legal sense, whether in reference to the psycho-somatic personality *(nāma-rūpa)* of the human being or as the collective group personality of a corporate body, is also familiar to Buddhist thought. This Article, then, primarily constitutes the recognition of the worth of the individual as a human being, and as such, affirms the individual's right to be recognized as a person before the law.

A word is necessary on the Buddhist view of the law and the Buddhist approach to the same. As the road to *Nibbāna* lies not only through sylvan solitude but also through the highways of life, law-in the Buddhist view-exists in the interests of life and its supportive agencies. Law is man-made and in Buddhism it is a binding force since the fountainhead of the law is the *Dhamma* or the eternal *(sanantano)* self-operative Cosmic Principle of Righteousness, superior to and anterior to which nothing animate or inanimate could possibly exist.

The Buddhist approach to the law demands that the law be considered in relation to Buddhist ethics and Buddhist social philosophy. Although positivists would prefer to exclude such extra-legal considerations, it has to be clearly stated here that law becomes meaningful only on the basis of ethical ideals. Accordingly, Buddhism looks upon the law "as an instrument for achieving certain ends, which are held to be socially desirable. What these ends are, or should be, is a matter for ethics."[30] Buddhist ethics being based on the Buddhist view of Reality which, in turn, derives its validity from the Buddhist theory of Knowledge, the conception of law in Buddhism may be said to be ultimately grounded on Buddhist epistemological teachings.

For the present purpose it would suffice to state that the Buddhist attitude towards the law in general and towards legal dispensation in particular, stems from two conceptions: (1) that of the "Rule of Righteousness" embedded in the imagery of the *Dhammacakka* or the "Wheel of Righteousness", since sovereign authority in the Buddhist context is represented by the "Wheel", which is symbolic of the ongoing and expanding process of law and justice in the world, and (2) that of the "happiness and well-being of mankind" *(bahujanahita, bahujanasukha)*, which is unique to Buddhist thought.

Early Buddhist social teachings uphold the concept of a possessor of the "Wheel of Righteousness", a world ruler or Universal Monarch *(Rājā Cakkavatti)*, a righteous monarch *(dhammiko dhammarājā)* who rules with proper regard for the law *(dhammam garukaronto....)*, and among his duties is that of providing

27. *Vide supra*. fn. 12.
28. K.N. Jayatilleke, *op. cit.*, p. 478.
29. K.N. Jayatillke, *ibid.*, loc. cit. Also cf. T.W. Rhys Davids, *Dialogues of the Buddha*, Pt. III, (SBB. Vol. IV), London, Reprint 1965, p. 80, fn. 3. According to the Canonical texts, this eternal principle of righteousness is that adhered to by *Cakkavatti* Monarchs.
30. K.N. Jayatilleke, *op. cit.*, p. 447.

care and protection righteously *(dhammikam rakkhāvaranaguttim)* not only to human beings, irrespective of their level in society, but as noted earlier, even to beasts and birds *(migapakkhisu*; *D.* III, p. 61 *passim)*, thus giving full effect to the "Rule of Righteousness". This, when augmented with conception (2) above, has resulted in the idea of a "common good of all mankind" – an idea appearing for the first time in human thought. It follows that the idea of the "common good" must necessarily involve the right of recognition of everyone everywhere, as a person before the law, leaving no room for distinctions whatsoever. From the point of view of the law this is the ideal which should be aimed at. Thus, the "Rule of Righteousness" and the "well-being and happiness of mankind" are key concepts in the present context. However, if, in actual practice, there be instances where no justice is properly meted out, yet justice is to be expected in terms of "conditionality" or the law of cause and effect as discovered by the Buddha.

Buddhist teachings constantly harp on the value and dignity of the human being. Among two planes of existence, namely, the "human" *(mānusa)* and the "divine" *(dibba)*, in either of which one may work towards one's emancipation, a premium is placed by Buddhist thought on existence as a human being *(manussattam)* which is said to be achieved with difficulty *(dullabham)*. As stated in our observations on Article 1, human life is so placed in the cosmos that humans enjoy the best opportunity of transcendence from the unsatisfactoriness of existence into the state of *Nibbāna* – the highest happiness. The human plane is to be preferred to the divine, since the former offers a better opportunity than the latter to understand reality, which is essentially *dukkha* or suffering. While Buddhology asserts that Buddhas appear only in the human realm, Buddhist mythology refers to heavenly denizens looking forward to a "fortunate birth" *(sugati)* in the human plane (cf. *It.* p. 77). Moreover, the Buddhist religious life *(brahmacariya)* had been designed to lead one "in this world itself" *(ditth'eva dhamme)* to emancipation, and not to reach a heaven. It will be appreciated then, that in the Buddhist context, one needs adequate recognition as a person before the law, for mundane matters themselves need evaluation as a means to an end.

Thus, the worth of the individual taken in conjunction with the conception of the "Rule of Righteousness" and the idea of the "common good of mankind" demands that the problems of the weak, the down-trodden, the humble, the needy and the defenceless in society also require the care and attention of the law as extended to any other segment of society. If the rule and authority of the law are to reflect the "rolling on" *(pavattana)* of the *Dhammacakka*, recognition before the law is a basic human right, whatever the circumstances of a victim of discrimination may be.

Article 23:

1. Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment.
2. Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work.
3. Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection.
4. Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.

In the time of the Buddha people were largely self-employed, each in an activity very much determined by his or her caste, thereby participating in a sort of economic organization of society and providing for themselves as well as contributing to the well-being of the community. Buddhist texts reveal that it was a period of urban expansion in the Gangetic Valley with an evolving city-based mercantile class which also offered employment opportunities.

As for the caste system of the day, it is well known how the Buddha disapproved of it. As a matter of fact it contradicted the very basic principle of Buddhism that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and have the same rights, with no reservations at all, to strive along the Noble Eightfold Path to the ultimate attainment of *Nibbāna*.

The components of the Eightfold Path, apart from their deep and lasting spiritual implications, are not devoid of secular connotations which can be developed to suit changing conditions, keeping within the framework of their spiritual significance. In fact, the first five factors or steps of this Path are considered to be having a special lay significance (cf. e.g. *M.* III, p. 72), and two among them have a special relevance to the rights embodied in this Article. They are Right Action *(sammā-kammanta)* and Right Livelihood *(sammā-ājīva)*. While the former involves, among other things, abstaining from injuring or killing any being, theft, sexual misconduct, and falsehood (i.e. observance of the Buddhist moral or social virtues), the spiritual implication of the latter is that one earns one's living in a way beneficial, and in no way harmful, to other sentient beings. Right Livelihood also touches on Buddhist economics with the assumption that one needs to earn a living and therefore that everyone has an obligation as well as a "right" to work. In the present-day context with the increase of the power of the State and therefore its responsibilities to the people this would involve the right "to protection against unemployment". The principle of Right Action would, as far as employers are concerned 'be they individuals, Corporations or the State), involve the recognition that their employees are

not expected to work in conditions detrimental to their physical and spiritual well-being, and that they are not to be deprived (this would also amount to theft) of just and favourable remuneration so that they, and their families, can live in a manner in keeping with their human dignity. As a matter of fact, a very modern labour code, reflecting many of the Conventions of the International Labour Organization, can be developed on the application of the spiritual significance of the sum total of the elements of the Noble Eightfold Path to secular situations relating to the rights of labour.

That the points made above are in no way farfetched, can be seen from Buddhist texts like the *Dīgha-nikāya* and its Commentary. We had occasion to point out how, in a Buddhist context, rights are assured through the fulfilment of duties and obligations *(vide supra).* Accordingly, just and favourable conditions of work and just and favourable remuneration for workers are expected to be ensured through the fulfilment of the following five basic obligations towards labour:

a. Allocation of work to suit the employee's ability *(yathābalaṃ kammanta-saṃvidhāna: D.* III, p. 191). Expanding on this point the Commentator further advises that the work of the young should not be passed over to the aged, that of the aged to the young, or that the work-load be exchanged between the sexes *(daharehi kātabbam mahallakehi, mahallakehi kātabbam daharehi, itthihi kātabbam purisehi, purisehi kātabbam itthihi akāretvā: DA.* III, p. 956). This stipulation goes a long way in ensuring just and favourable conditions of work, and also gives recognition to one's ability and choice. This also shows concern for the fitness of the worker, respect for age and sex, and non-exploitation of female labour; night shifts for women are eliminated. Child-labour seems to be unknown.
b. Provision of food and wages ***bhatta-vetanānuppadānena** : D.* III, p. 191). Buddhism enunciates a unique wage policy. Explaining the obligation of the employer to provide "food and wages", the Commentator states that the circumstances of each person should be separately considered and that wages should be determined according to the number of dependants in the family *(DA.* III, p. 956). For instance a married man with dependent children *khuddakaputto)* should receive more than a bachelor *(eka-vihārī: DA.* III, p. 956). Such a policy would certainly, in accordance with Article 23.3, ensure for workers "just and favourable remuneration" so that they and their families can live "an existence worthy of human dignity." It is also stated that hardship to the worker should be avoided and that the worker should never be made to work free. This was one of King Duṭṭhagāmaṇi's particular concerns during the massive task of constructing the Great Stūpa at Anurādhapura (*Mhv.* xxx, *vv.* 15 & 17).
c. Ensuring the health-care of employees *gilān'upatthāna : D.* III, p. 191). Buddhism has, in this connection, been thinking centuries ahead of its time. It is only in the first half of this century that international Conventions were adopted relating to the health-care of the workers and to the protection of the workers against health-risks in the course of their work. Under conditions of ill-health, says the Commentator, the employee is relieved of duties and resuscitated with medical attention and necessary nutriment *(gilān'upatthānena ti aphāsuka-kāle kammaṃ akāretvā sappāya-bhesajjādini datvā patijagganena, DA.* III, p. 956). Today this would certainly include insurance against ill-health and other employment risks.
d. Establishing close comradeship with employees *(acchariyānaṃ rasānaṃ saṃvibhāga, D.* III, p. 191). This, literally means "by the sharing of unusual delicacies" with the employee. This would certainly push the spirit of comradeship to its peak, resulting in cordial working relations between employer and employee and the sense of a common humanity.
e. Recognition of the employee's right to leisure *(samaye vossagga, D.* III, p. 191). This implies fixed hours of work. Leisure is explained as two-fold: (1) Release from duties or work at specific times during working hours *(niccasamaye vossajjana, DA.* III, p. 956) and (2) seasonal leave granted for festival purposes etc. *(kālasamaye vossajjana,* loc. cit.).

Paragraph 2 of Article 23 enunciates everyone's right "without any discrimination..... to equal pay for equal work." The statement of this right had been called for in order to eliminate considerations such as those based on nationality, race, colour or sex, which for a long time did, and in some countries still do, determine wage structures. The implied emphasis is that the only criteria for determining wages should be the kind of work, its value to the community, the ability of the worker, and the quality of the work. Although this right is not expressed in these terms in any Buddhist text, it is quite clear that Buddhism, with its emphasis on the fact that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights, is totally opposed to any form of extraneous discrimination in wage structures.

As for the right (stated in paragraph 4) to form and to join trade unions it is evident that in the conditions of the time the need for such a right did not exist. The society of the period from the Buddha's day upto about 500 A.C. (within which period the Buddhist tradition developed, crystallized and enshrined within itself the concepts and

values dealt with in these observations) was non-exploitative, sharing the product of labour. Theories of "exploitation" and "surplus value" were also unknown at that time. Furthermore, the workers who were self-employed, particularly the craftsmen, had their guilds to protect their special interests.[31] There is also ample textual evidence to show that Buddhism being democratic in outlook recognizes "the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association" as upheld elsewhere in the Declaration.[32] This right coupled with the five principles mentioned above, referring to conditions of work and employer-employee relations, will demonstrate that, in present-day conditions, Buddhist teachings would certainly endorse the right of everyone "to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his (or her) interests."

In conclusion it can be stated that Buddhism is in full accord with the specific rights included in Article 23 and non-compliance with these rights would be a violation of relevant Buddhist principles.

It is from the point of view of its goal that Buddhism evaluates all action. Hence Buddhist thought is in accord with the Articles in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to the extent to which they facilitate the advancement of human beings towards the Buddhist goal, to attain which, of course, Buddhism compels none.

A right, as understood today, is an interest protected by law. And human rights, in the Buddhist view, are interests leading to the welfare of mankind *(bahujanahita* and *bahujanasukha)* - interests arising from the individual's "own needs" *(attahita)* and from his or her "sense of duty and obligation towards all sentient beings" *(parahita).* These needs are justified as long as such interests are not based, as Buddhism puts it, on greed or covetousness *(lobha)*, hatred or dislike *(dosa)* and delusion or bewilderment *(moha)* - the three unhealthy mainsprings of human motivation.

L. P. N. Perera

HUMILITY. The Pali equalent of this term is *nihatamāna* which means 'Suppressed arrogance.' *Māna* which is rendered into English as pride, conceit or arrogance is considered in Buddhism as an evil latent bias *(anusaya)* which obstructs a man from seeing the true nature of things (*M.* I, p. 486; *D.* III, p. 254). A person who is interested in his spiritual progress has to destroy this tendency in him in order to achieve the ultimate goal (*D.* III, p. 282). A perfected man is one who has destroyed this latent bias along with the biases of greed, hatred and ignorance (*Sn.* vv. 370, 469, 786). In the *Saṃyutta Nikāya* (IV, p. 203) the Buddha says that a man becomes conceited or arrogant because of his ignorance through which be harbours ideas of a permanent soul. So to do away with pride and conceit, a true vision of things is essential. A man becomes proud of family, clan, parents, complexion, wealth etc. But the Buddha says that it is only due to ignorance that a man becomes proud of them. Any of these things is not going to make a person a noble man. In the *Parābhava sutta (Sn.* v. 104) the Buddha says that people bring about their own downfall by disparaging relatives and other men, being conceited on account of birth, wealth etc.

Thus humility, or absence of pride, is regarded in Buddhism as a virture in man. A virtuous man should not compare himself with others and harbour ideas such as: 'I am inferior to him' or 'I am superior to him' or 'I am equal to him.' On the other hand he should be able to appreciate whatever is good in others and cultivate in him good qualities that are lacking in him. It is only a fool who will think that he alone is capable of doing various things and that others should follow his command (*Dhp.* v. 74). A man should be sympathetic, kind and friendly in disposition towards all beings (*D.* I, p. 4, 63, 171). These are the characteristic features of a man of humility. Such a man is loved by all, and all would like to associate him.

The Buddha is the best example one can think of, when discussing this virtue. Though he was born into a wealthy respectable family of Sakyan royalty, in the prime of his youth he realized that wealth and power are not going to make a man perfect and renounced all of them. He did not want to show to the world that he was superior to all in respect of wealth, family etc. and that the rest of the world was inferior to him. He preached to the world that all are equal in matters or birth, decay, death etc. (*M.* I, pp. 161-2) and that all experience these ever recurring miseries irrespective of the family to which they belong. He also found out that there is a way out of this suffering, and that every one can find his way out of it, if a particular line of action is followed. He did not become haughty because he found a way out of the suffering of *samsāra*. But on the other hand, he proclaimed to the world that he had found his way out of samsāra by following a certain line of action and that others, too, could do the same by following the right path. In respect of other arahants who realized the truth after the Buddha, he quite modestly said that all are equal in

31. Cp. however, the functions of the *pūga* , *gana* and *seni* in this context - E-in-C.
32. Article 20, which reads:
"1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.
2. No one may be compelled to belong to an association."

respect of the attainment of the goal, and that the only difference between himself and other arahants is that he was the pioneer on the path re-discovered by him, and that the others have come after him (*S.* II, pp. 105-6). He moved among all types of people and was equally disposed towards all of them. By example he convinced his disciples that a man's primary duty is to serve the world. For forty-five years he performed this duty, moving among all types of people. The Buddha as well as his disciples accepted food and other requisites from all classes of people, and they did not give special preference for meals from the rich and the mighty. They went from door to door begging alms, and food was placed into their begging bowls by the rich and poor alike. Sometimes extremely delicious dishes were put into the bowl by well-to-do people, and the next moment a poor man will put his share into it, and the Buddha as well as his disciples partook of this food with perfect equanimity. The same procedure was followed with regard to clothing and shelter. Even when an invitation for meals was made to the Buddha or the Saṅgha, no preference was given to invitations from the rich and well-placed people. One day they might be the guest of a king or a wealthy householder (*Vin.* I, p.35) and the following day they might be entertained for meals in a destitute's home or a beggar's haunt (*DA.* II, p. 545). In this way, by example as well as by precept, the Buddha and his disciples proved to the world the importance of humility.

W. G. Weeraratne

HUNG-I (1880-1942) was an outstanding modern *vinaya*-master of China. The surname of his lay family was Li and he was named Wênt'ao when young. His forefathers belonged to the P'ing-hu district of Chekiang province, but he himself was born in T'ien-tsin in 1880, his father, Li Hsiao-lou being a chin-szu or a holder of the doctor's degree and his mother surnamed Wang. During his boyhood, he studied under the tutelage of Yen Fan-sun, Chao Yu-mei and other well-known scholars of T'ien-tsin. At the age of eighteen, he married and his wife was surnamed Yu. Later when he entered the Nanyang College in Shanghai, he took another name Ch'eng-hsi. When he went to Japan he changed his name once more into An with a literary name Shu-t'ung and still another fancy name Haih-shuang.

During the Coup-d'ètat of 1898 that took place in the Manchurian court, he was suspected to be a colleague of K'ang Yu-wei and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and thereupon was obliged to take refuge in Shanghai where he entered the Nanyang College, receiving education under Ts'ai Tūan-pei. He joined with a number of artists in forming the Shanghai Club of Calligraphers and Painters and spent his leisure hours in artistic activities, producing a series of works, e.g. the *Li-lu-yin-p'u* (or Li's Seal-engravings), the *Li-lu-shih-chung* (or Li's Musical Couplets), *An Autobiography in Verse at my Twentieth year of Age*, and so forth. In the 4th moon of 1905, his mother died. He was then twenty-six and went to Japan where he entered the Art School in Tokyo, studying European painting and music, and in the meantime, he was interested in piano music and musical composition. During the period of his study abroad, he lamented the backwardness of Chinese arts at the time, so that he cooperated with a number of Chinese students in Japan to form an amateurish dramatic organization .....the Ch'un-lieu Club, giving theatrical performances of the famous European plays of "Uncle Tom's Cabin" and "La Dame aux Camélias" in which he impersonated the heroines himself. They were the first Chinese to act the modern drama. Besides these activities in learning, painting and performing dramas, he edited a *Miniature Periodical of Music*. Thus we see, in the early period of the introduction of the European arts of painting, drama and music into China, Hung-i's contributions were considerable.

After graduation from the Art School in 1910, he returned to China and worked as a teacher in the Engineering College of T'ien-tsin. In the spring of 1912, he went to Shanghai where he became a member of the Nan-shè Club. Later he joined the Pacific Journal, acting as the editor of literature and arts and took charge of the pictorial section. At the same time, he cooperated with Mr. Liu Ya-tsu and others in the formation of the Wên-mei Club and acted as the editior-in-chief of the Wên-mei Journal. In the autumn of that year, he went to Hangchou where he taught music and drawing in the Provincial Normal School of Chekiang. Afterwards, he became professor of arts in the Nanking Teacher's College. During his stay in Nanking, he cooperated with the members of the cultural circles to form the Wing Shè with the purpose of preserving the objects of Chinese art and culture.

In his teaching works, he advocated the so-called "speechless education", setting himself as the model for the pupils. In ordinary life, he stressed the cultivation of the aesthetic sentiment, and he himself did succeed in making considerably high attainments in the field of arts. In 1916, he chanced to read in a Japanese periodical an article on "fasting", which recommended the cessation of food-taking as a practicable method to renovate man's physical and mental conditions. With the purpose of carrying out a test with his own person, he took up abode in the Temple of Hu-p'o in Hangchou, where he fasted for fourteen days. Everyday he practised calligraphy as usual, and kept a special diary for his fasting. In the meanwhile, he attended the Ven. Fa-lun's sermons, and

fully appreciated the purity of the monastic life, which was a very important factor that eventually gave rise to his intention of renouncing the world.

On the 13th day of the 7th moon, 1918, he became a Buddhist monk in the Ying-hui Temple of Hu-p'o in Hangchou, the tonsure being performed by the Ven. Liao-wu and he took the religious name Yen-yin with a literary name Hung-i. He was then thirty-nine years of age. In the 9th moon of that year, he received the full ordination as a bhiksu in the Ling-yin Temple. After the ceremony was over, his friend Mr. Ma Yi-fu presented him a copy of the *Important Pratices and Meanings of the Disciplinary Regulations of Ling-fěng* and a copy of the *Orthodoxical Regulations for the Transmission of the Precepts Practised at Pao-hua Mountain.* These books aroused in him a feeling of deep regret that the rituals he practised at ordination had not been in accordance with the true rules. Thereupon he resolved to study the *vinaya* and to abide strictly by the pure discipline. This was the cause of his becoming a distinguished vinaya master of the age.

After being ordained, he began his itinerant life in various places, staying at different times in the Ching-yen Temple of Chia-hsing, the Yu-ch'üan Temple of Hangchou, the Ling-chi Temple of Pei-shan in Hsintěng, the Lien-hua Temple of Ch'üchou, the Ch'ing-fu Temple of Wěnchou, etc., and perusing extensively the works of the ancient masters of the Vinaya School, such as Tao-hsüan, Yüan-chao, Chih-hsü, etc. During his sojourn in Wěnchou, he completed *An Annotated Table of the Various Commandments for Bhiksus According to the Dharmaguptaka Vinaya.* The final manuscript was done with his own hand in very fine, regular handwriting, and was later published in Shanghai through the help of Upāsaka Mu Ou-ch'u. In the spring of 1927, he started his period of meditating in isolation in the Ch'ang chi-kuang Temple of Wü-shan in Hang-chou, where he studied the *vinaya* intensively. At that time, the provincial regime of Che-kiang had recently undergone some changes, and the newly established authorities were beginning to talk about the confiscation of temples for educational purposes, so that his friends, raised a fund to build a house for his residence on the Pai-ma Lake in Shangyil. To commemorate this event, Hung-i composed a couplet that reads thus:

Heaven always feels tender regard for the lonely herb
While in man's eyes the sun's oft more lovable before dusk.

Hence, he named his vihāra as the Wan-ch'ing-shan-fang (the Mountain Dwelling of the Setting Sun), and took another fancy name for himself as Wan-Ch'ing-lao-jen (the old man who enjoys the setting sun).

In the winter of 1928, he joined Yu Hsi-yin and others in a party for a proposed trip to Thailand, intending to see Buddhism in that country. They set out from Shanghai and passed Amoy, where Hung-i was asked to stay by the local monks and laity. The rest of his life, a period of more than a decade was spent mainly in southern Fukien, although he used to make occasional trips to the province of Kiangsu and Chekiang. On the 13th day of the 10th moon of 1942, he passed away in the Wan-ch'ing Vihāra in the Wěn-ling Alms House, a Buddhist philanthropic establishment in Ch'uan-chou, Fukien, at the age of 63. His intimate friends erected a stūpa for him in the Mi-t'o-yen of the Ch'ing-yūan Mountain, Ch'uan-chou and another in the Ting-hui Temple of Hu-p'o, Hangchou.

Hung-i's system of Buddhist thought consists in the advocacy of the theories propounded in the *Avataṁsaka sūtra* for the sphere of one's mental activities, the adherence to the *Dharmaguptaka-vinaya* for guidance in one's practice, and the achievement of the rebirth in the Pure Land as one's final fruition. He made intensive studies on the *Avataṁsaka* in all its different versions, and held Ch'ěng-kuan's *Commentary* on this sūtra in particularly high esteem. His two written works, *The Graded Introduction to the recitation and Study of the Avataṁsaka-sūtra* and *The Three Hundred Couplets Composed from the Sayings of the Avataṁsaka,* may serve to illustrate the intensity of his comprehension of the doctrine of the Hua-yen School. He obtained from Japan the Sanskrit text of the *Bhadracari-praṇidhāna*, a manuscript written by the Japanese Sanskrit Scholar Ji-un, and arranged to publish it with an introduction entitled *Private Researches* written by himself.

Among the old masters, Hung-i held Ven. Chih-hsū of the late Ming dynasty to be his model in inclinations and activities. Like Chih-hsü, he refused to take part in monastic administrative work, nor did he build up any retinue of disciples, but the object of his instruction was not limited to Buddhists alone. In 1921, he produced with his own hand a copy of the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-prātimokṣa-sūtra.* Afterwards, he turned to follow the *Dharmaguptaka-vinaya.* In the 2nd moon of 1931, when he was dwelling in the Fa-chieh Temple of Shang-yū, he made a vow before the Buddha to devote himself to the study of the South Mountain Vinaya (i.e. the vinaya prescribed by Tao-hsūan), and further pledged himself to receive the commandments for the Bodhisattva. On the 3rd day of the 5th moon of 1933, the anniversary of Ven. Chih-hsu's birthday, in the K'ai-yūan Temple of Ch'uan-chou, he composed for the vinaya learners a piece as a *Pledge to Study Vinaya* in which he wrote: "We resolve to conceive the great Bodhicitta to uphold Buddhism, and pledge ourselves to bring to light the vinaya of Nan-shan School that has been obscured and discontinued for more than seven centuries and work for its propagation in the world with a view to the revival of the Right Law and the re-ascendancy of the radiant sun of the Buddha." Here the change of his views concerning vinaya is discernible.

During the period between 1934-36, he obtained from Japan a collection of Buddhist scriptures of ancient editions. These enabled him to undertake the work of collating the celebrated "three great vinaya works of the Nan-shan School". In the meantime, he delivered a series of lectures in Anoy on the *Annotated Prātimokṣa* and the Revised *Karma* According to the Disposition of the Learners. His other written works on vinaya are the *Supplementary Explanations of the Commentary on the Pañcaśīla-rūpa-sūtra,* the *Jottings of Records on the Offences of the Sarvāstivāda-vinaya,* the *Extracts from the Sarvāstivāda-vinaya for Private Practice* (the title was later changed into *Vinaya for One's Own Practice, Miscellaneous Records from the South Mountain Vinaya Institute, An Abridged Resume of the South Mountain Disciplinary Rules for the Reference of lay Devotees* etc. Once he had a proposal to establish a South Mountain Vinaya institute for the propagation of the Dharmaguptaka-vinaya, which he failed to realise on account of certain practical reasons.

From his early youth Hung-i was very sensitive to impermanence, the painfulness and the voidness of life. Furthermore, the ideal of "propagating the vinaya when living and finding rest in Sukhāvatī after death", as was set forth by Ven. Chih-hsü, also had considerable effect upon his thought. In religious inclinations he tended towards the doctrine of the Pure Land School. In his reply to the Nien-fo-hui (the Society of invoking Amita of Ku-lang-haü) he wrote: "Of the various Buddhist doctrines, the one in which I have the deepest faith is the doctrine of the Pure Land; and of all contemporary masters the one whom I adore most is the Ven. Yinkuang. Besides keeping the routine course of invoking Amita's name, praying for the birth in the Pure Land, he also gave lectures on the *Amitayus-sūtra* and produced handwritten copies for circulation. He compiled the *Jotting Notes from the Commentary on the Principle of the Amitāyus-sūtra* and the *Questions and Discourses concerning the Pure Land* to praise the excellences of the Pure Land doctrine. At the same time, he initiated a method of invoking Amita by following the tick-tack of the clock, teaching people of distracted mind to keep pace with these rhythmic sounds in their practice of invocation.

The works edited by Hung-i include a *Collection of Buddhist Books* the Forst Set, in 4 volumes, published in Shanghai, 1937. After his death, his friends in Shanghai, both monks and laity, formed a Committee for the commemoration of Ven. Hung-i, and published *A Collection of Hung-i's letters* (1st volume) and *The Sermons of Hung-i.* They also compiled *A Chronological Biography of Ven. Hung-i, Selected Writings of Ven. Hung-i, His Abridged Resume of the South Mountain Disciplinary Rules for the Reference of Lay Devotees, Separate Notes Taken in the Course of Lecturing on the Annotated Prātimokṣa, Separate Notes Taken in the Course of Lecturing on the Revised Karma According to the Disposition of Learners* (with 31 other materials appended), and *The Collected Explanations of Japanese Writers on the Records of Aids to the Practices of the Dharmaguptaka-vinaya* in 10 vols. consisting of about 540,000 words) have been collated and published under the auspices of the Tripiṭaka Society in Shanghai.

Bibliography: *A Collection of Writings in Commemoration of Ven. Hung-i, A Commemoration Book of the Late Ven. Hung-i. Hsia Miensun Collection of Ven. Hung-i's Letters* (First set), Lin Tsu-ch'ing; A Chronological Biography of Ven. Hung-i.

Lin Tzū Ching

ICONOGRAPHY or *rūpabheda* is one of the six techniques pertaining to painting and sculpture followed by artists in representing bodily characteristics, poses, *mudrās, āsanas,* costumes, ornaments, symbols, mounts etc. of the figures they depict. From ancient times religious artists of Buddhist countries such as India, China and Sri Lanka have been following an advanced tradition of iconography when depicting various important members of the Buddhist pantheon. As Buddhist iconography is a vast subject covering a wide area of Buddhist art it is not possible to treat the subject fully in an article of this nature. Hence the scope of this article is limited to portray important iconographical features of the major figures of the Buddhist pantheon comprising the Buddhas, Dhyānibuddhas, Buddhaśaktis or Ḍākinīs, Bodhisattvas and their female partners and a host of divinities.

The Buddhas: It is very clear that the iconography of the Buddha images is influenced by Buddhology (q.v.) found in the Nikāya literature itself, and subsequently developed rapidly under the Lokottaravādins, a branch of the Mahāsaṅghikas. The Lokottaravādins conceived the Buddha as being supramundane, and therefore, his appearance and behaviour as a human being were considered as a mere convention, a sort of illusion. They held the view that only a mind-formed body *(manomaya-kāya)* of the Buddha appeared in the world of mortals, and hence, the human Buddha's physical form was not considered as representing the real Buddha who is supramundane. These views on Buddhology finally resulted in the Trikāya (q.v.) doctrine which postulates three different forms *(kāya)* of the Buddha. These are the Dharmakāya — the Body of the Law — which is the real essence of the Buddha; the Sambhogakāya — the Body of Bliss — in which form the Dharmakāya manifests itself amongst the Dhyāni Buddhas and bodhisattvas, and the

Nirmāṇakāya — the Manifested or Created Body, in which the Dharmakāya manifests itself among the mortals at different times under different names such as Krakucchanda, Kāśyapa, Gautama and so on. As both Sambhogakāya and Nirmāṇakāya are manifestations of the Dharmakāya all Buddhas are regarded as being the same, the Sambhogakāya and Dharmakāya representing how the Dharmakāya appears when viewed from two different levels of perception.

Thus Buddhology gave rise to two distinct categories of Buddhas namely the human Buddhas (mānuṣi-Buddhas: q.v.) and celestial Buddhas known as the Dhyāni-buddhas (q.v.) that appear among the bodhisattvas in higher planes of existence. This latter groupof Buddhas are extremely important in this context, for it is on them that the pantheon of Tantric deities is founded.

The Buddhology as found in the Nikāya literature itself endows the Buddha with thirty-two major marks of a Great Being (Mahāpurusa), eighty minor marks, four kinds of rays and numerous auspicious signs in the soles of his feet. The Lokottaravādins hold the view that all these are characteristics of Dhyānibuddhas which are subsequently attributed to the Mānusi Buddhas when the Buddha was conceived in anthropomorphic form. There is a marked difference in the way these two types of Buddhas are represented. The Mānusi-Buddhas are as a rule represented singly, whereas the Dhyānibuddhas are represented at times singly and at other times as being in union with their female counterparts. This latter type of representation is referred to as *Mahāmudrā* or *Yuganaddha* (Tib. Yab-Yum).

The artists have made every effort to depict most of the thirty-two major marks and eighty minor marks in the Buddha images. Details of some of the major marks so depicted are as follows:

The *uṣṇīṣa* is one such major mark. It is the cranial bump or the fleshy and bony protuberance seen in the head of the Buddha images of Mahāyāna tradition (Vol. II, Pl. XXII, IV, Pl. XX, Fig. 2, Pl. XXVIII). The Sinhala Buddhist tradition explain this *uṣṇīṣa* as the fully developed head with the full forehead that appears in the shape of a water bubble. This is why the Buddha images belonging to the Mahāvihāra tradition do not display such an abnormal cranial bump on their heads (Vol. III, Pl. XLIII, Fig. 1). The images belonging to the Abhayagirivihāra (q.v.) tradition, however, follow the Mahāyāna style and represent the cranial bump. This, however, is not referred to as the *uṣṇīṣa*, but as the *ketumālā*, the 80th of the minor marks as enumerated in the Sinhala Buddhist tradition.

The Buddha's hair is beautiful, tidy, soft, tender and glossy. It is dark blue in colour and is curling to the right. His head is like a water bubble in shape, round and well-formed like an unfolded umbrella. The forehead is like a golden frontlet used by the royalty. The white hair that appears between the eye brows, curling to the right is called the *ūrṇā*. The tapering, well-lined lengthy eyebrows appear like an arch in the palace of the king of the gods.

His eyes are blue in colour, elongated and big. They reflect the five stages of joy. Both eye-lids are shiny and clear. The eye-lashes appear completely round the eye and are like those of a black cow; bright and soft like those of a new born calf. The corners of his eyes are gold in colour and are full like those of a bull.

His prominent nose is long and straight. The mouth which is straight and long is deep and somewhat square. Lips are red in colour. Jaws are like those of a lion, the lower jaw being relatively fuller than the upper one. The well-formed cheeks are large, even and straight. His ears are long and beautiful.

The Buddha has a clear round neck. The rounded and full shoulders are even and well linked to his neck. In shape they are like an umbrella. His well proportioned, broad, full chest which is like that of a lion has a *swastika* sign on it.

The trunk of his body is well-formed and full, and appears like the trunk of a golden image, erect like the trunk of Brahmā. The faultless navel has its bottom turned right. The male organ of his, like that of a horse, is concealed in a sheath.

The Buddha's rounded beautiful legs are of equal size. The thighs are like the trunk of an elephant with calves like those of an antelope. The ankles are prominent. The projecting heels are divided into four parts, of which two are taken by the soles, one under the leg and the other projecting rearward. His feet have a level tread; they are soft and fine like heavenly garb; are straight and stand together. The upper part of his feet is thick and straight, full, high and proportionate. Soles are red, even, full and firm. His toes and fingers are compact and round, gradually tapering at the ends. The copper coloured glossy nails are raised.

His hands are long and hence, while standing, he can touch with either of his hands his knees without bending his body. There is no webbing between the fingers and toes, but they are set in straight lines like the meshes of a net. The arm-pits are full like pearls, the forearms are straight, long and full. The palms of his hands are red in colour like a lotus, and the palm lines are deep, long and straight. The lines on his fingers are similar to those on his feet.

He has seven convex surfaces on his body namely the back of his hands and feet, shoulders and the trunk.

Bones of his body are not visible. The chest and shoulder bones are full and level. The collar bones are

linked like a chain. His flesh is fine and soft. He is golden in complexion. His fine, soft, smooth skin is thin and does not gather dust or water. The face is like the full moon. He has a well formed, proportionate male personality.

Fourfold rays radiate from his body. The halo or the aura (q.v.) spreads a fathom around his body and hence called *vyāmappabhā* in Pali (Vol. II, Pls. XXII–XXIV). His bodily lustre *(śarīraprabhā)* issues forth in rays of blue, yellow, red, white, crimson and a combination of all these colours, spreading to a distance of 80 cubits. The nimbus *(raṃsijāla)* that radiates from his head appears as a disc at the back of his head. The rays issuing forth from the top of his head are called the *ketumālā* or *raṃsicūlāmaṇi*. This is also referred to as *siraspata* in modern Sinhala. (See MAHAPURISA LAKKHANA cf.Vol. III, Pl. facing p. 357)

From around the second half of the 5th century A.C. the same feature was added to the Buddha images of Sri Lanka and subsequently this feature was added even to Buddha images that belonged to an earlier period. This feature is the same as *ketumālā* found in Sri Lankan Buddha images and it is quite probable that the parallel feature found in Buddha images of South India and Thailand were influenced by the Sri Lankan tradition (Vol. III, Pl. XLIII).

Numerous auspicious marks are found on the soles of the Buddha's feet. At the beginning they were few, three or four in number. The *Apadāna* mentions the wheel *(cakka), the goad (aṅkusa)* and the flag *(dhaja)*. The *Buddhavaṃsa* gives a list of four namely, the flag, the goad, the *vajra* and the banner *(patāka)* and to this the commentary adds *vaḍḍhamānaka*.

There is a list of eight auspicious signs in the *Sārattha-dīpanī ṭīkā* referred to *aṭṭhamaṅgala* made up by six new items added to the flag and goad already referred to. The new marks are the conch shell *(saṅkha)*, the full vase *(puṇṇakumbha)* iron mace *(gadā)*, the symbol *sirivaccha* representing the goddess of prosperity namely Srī Devi, and the *swastika*. The last two are regarded as minor marks of the Buddha by Ratnākaraśānti in his *Sāratama*, a *Pañjikā* on the *Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra*. Mahāyāna works such as *Abhisamayālaṅkāra* refer to *śrivatsa, swastika* and *nandyāvarta* as marks appearing both on the palms and soles of the Buddha. In the Pali commentarial literature the number of auspicious marks rises to thirty-one. Later works such as *Jinālaṅkāraṭīkā* give a list of one hundred and eight marks (Vol. III, Pls. LXII–LXV). These are said to appear only on the foot prints of the Buddha.

Poses: Three main poses are noticeable in Buddha images. These are the seated, standing and recumbent poses. The walking pose is rare (See Vols. III, Pls. LI, LII, V, Pls. XIV, XV, XVII).

The standing pose is subdivided into three i.e. erect *(abhanga)* slightly bent *(samabhaṅga)*, and thrice bent *(tribhaṅga)*.

Āsana means both the position of legs and the seat. The *āsanas* of the first category are as follows:

(a) *Paryaṅkāsana*. In this the Buddha is seated with legs crossed, with the right over the left one. This position of legs is also referred to as *vīrāsana* and is peculiar to Buddha images of Sri Lanka. Some South Indian Buddha images that display this *āsana* appear to have been influenced by the parallel Sri Lankan images (Vol. I, Pl. III, Vol. III, Pl. LII, Fig. 1).

(b) *Pralambapāda āsana:* In this the Buddha is seated on a pedestal with his legs pendent (Vol. V, Pl. VI, Vol. II, Pl. VIII).

(c) *Padmāsana:* In this *āsana* the Buddha is represented as being seated with legs crossed, the right leg resting on the left thigh and the left leg resting on the right thigh, soles of the feet turned upward.

(d) *Sayanāsana:* In this the Buddha is in the recumbent pose lying on the right, both legs stretched, left on top of the right one, with one foot slightly drawn back.

The second category of *āsana* are:

(a) *Padmāsana: Padmāsana* means the lotus seat. In this the Buddha is either sitting or standing on the double petal lotus.

(b) *Vajrāsana:* When the Buddha is represented in his conquest of Māra *(māravijaya)* he is depicted as being seated on the *vajrāsana* or the seat marked with the *vajra*. In Sri Lanka the *viśvavajra* symbol is carved on the lower border of the dado of the throne.

(c) *Sayanāsana:* This depicts the Buddha in the recumbent pose on the couch.

Mudrā: This term denotes the position of fingers, and the images are supposed to 'speak' as it were by the use of *mudrās*. Following *mudrās* are found in Buddha images:

(a) *Dhyāna* or the *Samādhi mudrā:* When the Buddha is seated in the attitude of contemplation *(dhyāna)* his hands rest on the lap, palms turned upward (Vol. V, Pl. VII).

(b) *Abhaya mudrā:* This gives expression to the attitude of fearlessness and hence called Abhaya mudrā. The right hand is half raised with fingers straight or slightly bent inward. This is the *mudrā* of Dīpaṅkara Buddha, but it is assigned to Sākyamuni too.

(c) *Vitarka mudrā:* When the Buddha preaches he has his right hand half raised with the tip of the

forefinger touching the tip of the thumb and the rest of the fingers either erect or slightly bent inward.

(d) *Bhūsparśa* or *Bhūmisparśa mudrā:* In this the Buddha is seated cross legged with right hand, fingers pointed towards the earth, pendent over the right knee (Vol. III, Pls. VII-IX). This *mudrā* is connected with the event of the conquest of Māra *(māravijaya)* at the foot of the Bo-tree.

(e) *Dharmacakra mudrā:* the Buddha is seated with both his hands half raised one above the other to the level of the chest, fingers except the thumbs bent in. This attitude indicates the preaching of the first sermon called the Turning of the Wheel of Law *(Dhammacakkappavattana)* at Isipatana, Varanasi (See Vol. II, Pl. XXII, Vol. 3, Pl. XIVIII, Fig. I, Vol. IV, Pl. XXI, Fig. 1).

(f) *Varada mudrā:* The right hand, with figures stretched, pendent and palm turned frontward.

(g) *Pratigrahana mudrā:* This is a rare mudrā found in Sri Lanka Buddha images. This *mudrā* is found in Buddha images depicting the Buddha spending the seventh week after the Enlightenment. In this he is seated with the hands placed over the lap, palms opened and fingers slightly bent in. A male – probably one of the two merchant brothers who offered the first meal to the Buddha after his Enlightenment — standing by the side of the Buddha holds an almsbowl. The Buddha is depicted as being ready to receive the almsbowl, and hence, this mudrā may be called *pratigrahana mudrā*, or the receiving attitude.

(h) *Vajrahuṁkāra mudrā:* Dhyānibuddhas are represented with crossed hands, holding the *vajra* and the *ghanṭā*. The crossed hand position of Sri Lankan and Thai Buddha images may be a local form of the same *Vajrahuṁkāra mudrā*. Writers interpret this *mudrā* in numerous ways. For example, S. Paranavitana calls it *paradukkhadukkhita mudrā* "sorrowing for the sorrows of others". P. L. Prematilleke thinks that this is the mudrā of *animisalocana*, and Sirinimal Lakdusinghe connects it to the Buddha of the Ratanaghara, depicting the Buddha in the fourth week after Enlightenment. However, this *mudrā* is not peculiar to Buddhas. It has been found in other images as well. Gunapala Senadheera calls it a *swastika mudrā*. Buddha images with this *mudrā* seem to have been first produced in Sri Lanka and therefrom found their way to Thailand (cf. Vol. V, Pl. XVI).

Drapery: Images represent the Buddha as being draped covering either the left shoulder or both, and in some instance he is depicted with half covered right shoulder and fully covered left shoulder. In whichever form he is draped the lower edge of the *cīvara* ends about four inches above the lower edge of the under garment. In some instances the *saṅghāti* is seen hanging on the right shoulder (See Vol. IV, Pl. XXXV).

Dhyānibuddha: These are the five celestial Buddhas and they appear as anthropomorphic forms of the Dharmakāya in the minds of the meditators and serve as aids to meditation. Sukhāvatī is said to be their abode. Generally they are represented as being seated on a full blown double lotus, legs interlocked, with the soles of the feet turned upward, wearing a robe with right shoulder usually bare (Vol. IV, Pl. XLI). Each Dhyānibuddha has a Śakti or more precisely a Ḍākinī (q.v.). When represented in union with the Ḍākinī (i.e. is in *yuganaddha* or Tib. yab-yum) form. They appear dressed in princely attire, wearing a crown. Hence they are referred to also as 'Crowned Buddhas'. The *maṇḍala* of the five Dhyānibuddhas is said to represent the whole universe. The charts given below give iconographical details about the Dhyānibuddhas and their śaktis (See Vol. III, Pls. LXXIV, LXXV; Vol. IV, Pl. XXXIX).

FIVE DHYĀNIBUDDHAS

	Vairocana	*Akṣobhya*	*Ratnasambhava*	*Amitābha*	*Amoghasiddhi*
Colour	White	Blue	Yellow	Red	Green
Mudrā	Dharmacakra (*A*) Bodhyaśri (C)	Bhūmisparśa (*A* & *C*)	Varada (*A* & *C*)	Samādhi (*A*) Dhyāna (*C*)	Abhaya (*A* & *C*)
Symbol	Cakra (*A*)	Vajra (*A*)	Ratna (*A*)	Pātra (*A*)	Viśvavajra (*A*)
Āsana	Padma (*A*)	Padma (*A*)	Padma (*A*)	Padma (*A*)	Padma (*A*)
Vāhana	Lion (A)	Elephant (A)	Horse (A)	Peacock (A)	Dwarf/Garuḍa (A)
Direction	Centre	East	South	West	North
Consort	Locanā (A) Māmaki (C)	Māmakī (A) Tārā (C)	Vajradhātīśvarī (A) Locanā (C)	Pandarā (A) Prajñā (C)	Tārā (A)
Bodhisattva	Samantabhadra (A)	Vajrapāṇi (A)	Ratnapāṇi (A)	Avalokiteśvara (A)	Viśvapāṇi (A)
Mānuṣibuddha	Krakucchanda	Kanakamuni	Kāśyapa	Śākyamuni	Maitreya

(A) = *Advayavajrasaṅgraha* (C) = *Citrakarmaśastra* ascribed to Mañjuśrī

BUDDHA ŚAKTIS

	Locanā	*Māmakī*	*Vajradhātīśvarī*	*Pāṇḍarā*	*Tārā*
Colour	White (*A*)	Blue (*A*)	Yellow	Red (*A*)	Green (*A*)
Hands	2				
Symbol	Discus	Blue Vajra (*A*)	Jewel	Lotus (*A*)	Utpala (*A*)
Direction	SE	SW (*A*)	Centre	NW (*A*)	NE (*A*)

A = *Advayavajrasaṅgraha.*

In Tibetan Buddhism the *yi-dam* or tutelary deity (*iṣṭadevatā*) form of the Dhyānibuddha plays a very important role. In this form the Dhyānibuddha plays the role of protector and celestial teacher of meditating lamas. Each lama has his own *yi-dam* whose name he keeps a secret. If a lama fulfils his religious duties and obligation the *yi-dam* may appear to him in a dream or in a vision and reveal the truth. The iconography of the *yi-dam* form of the Dhyānibuddha is given in the chart below.

YI-DAM FORMS OF DHYĀNIBUDDHAS

	Vairocana	*Akṣobhya*	*Ratnasambhava*	*Amitābha*	*Amoghasiddhi*
Colour	White	Blue	Yellow	Red	Green
Āsana	Dhyāna	Dhyāna	Dhyāna	Dhyāna	Dhyāna
Śakti	Vajradhātīsvarī	Locanā	Māmakī	Pāṇḍarā	Tārā
Symbol	He holds *Ghaṇṭā* and *Cakra;* she the *Kapāla,* Cauri or *Cakra*	He holds *Ghaṇṭā* and *vajra;* she the *Kapāla* and *Vajra*	He holds *Ghaṇṭā* and *Ratna,* she holds *Kapāla* and *Katrika* or *Ratna*	He holds *Ghaṇṭā* and *Pātra;* she holds *Kapāla* and *Katrika* or *Cakra*	He holds *Ghaṇṭā* and *Viśvavajra,* she holds *Kapāla* and *Viśvavajra*

The Dhyānibuddhas are represented also in their Heruka (q.v.) forms. In such representations their iconography is different; often with an increased number of heads, and arms.

Mortal Buddhas: In the Theravāda tradition the mortal Buddhas are countless. Of these the names of twenty-eight past Buddhas are mentioned in texts. Some iconographic details of twenty-five of such Buddhas are given below.

MORTAL BUDDHAS

Buddha	*Height*	*Tree*
1. Dīpaṅkara	80 cubits	Pipphala
2. Koṇḍañña	88 cubits	Sālakalyāna
3. Maṅgala	88 cubits	Nāga
4. Sumana	90 cubits	Nāga
5. Revata	80 cubits	Nāga
6. Sobhita	58 cubits	Nāga
7. Anomadassi	58 cubits	Ajjuna
8. Paduma	58 cubits	Sona
9. Nārada	88 cubits	Mahāsona
10. Padumuttara	58 cubits	Salala
11. Sumedha	88 cubits	Mahānipa
12. Sujāta	50 cubits	Mahāvelu
13. Piyadassi	80 cubits	Kakudha
14. Atthadassi	80 cubits	Campaka
15. Dhammadassi	80 cubits	Ratta Kuravaka
16. Siddhattha	60 cubits	Kanikāra
17. Tissa	60 cubits	Asana
18. Phussa	58 cubits	Āmanda
19. Vipassi	80 cubits	Pātali
20. Sikhi	70 cubits	Puṇḍarīka
21. Vessabhū	60 cubits	Mahāsāla
22. Kakusandha	40 cubits	Mahāsirīsa
23. Konāgamana	30 cubits	Udumbara
24. Kassapa	30 cubits	Nigrodha
25. Gotama	18 cubits	Assattha

The *Citrakarmaśastra*, too, refers to the last seven mortal Buddhas referred to in the above list. Therein all seven Buddhas are represented as being seated. The bodhi-trees of Viśvabhū and Krakucchanda are given as Sarala and Nīpa. The Mahāyāna tradition, too, in general refers to these seven Buddhas and mentions also their female partners and accompanying bodhisattvas. The seven Buddha śaktis in order are Vipaśyantī, Sikhimālinī, Viśvadharā, Kakudhvatī, Kanthamālinī, Mahīdharā and Yaśodharā. The respective bodhisattvas are Mahāmati, Ratnadhara, Ākāśagañja, Sakamangala, Kanakarāja, Dharmodhara and Ānanda.

Future Mortal Buddhas. Pali canonical and commentarial literatures refer to only one future mortal Buddha (i.e. bodhisattva) and he is Metteyya (Maitreya). A text called the *Dasabodhisattuppattikathā* belonging to about the 12th century, gives the stories of ten bodhisattvas including Metteyya. According to this text the ten bodhisattvas are Metteyya, Rāma, Dharmarāja, Narada, Ramsimuni, Devadeva, Narasiha, Tissa, Sumangala and Dhammasāmi. Their heights in cubits as well as their bodhi trees are mentioned.

The *Nispannayogāvalī* gives two forms of Maitreya. In one form he is golden in complexion and has four hands. The two principal hands are in the dharmacakramudrā while of the remaining two, the right hand displays the varadamudrā and the left holds a nāgakeśara flower. The other form is yellow in complexion and has two hands. In the right he holds a nāgakeśara and in the left a bowl.

Unlike in the Theravāda in the Mahāyāna pantheon there is a host of bodhisattvas of varying importance in religious practices. These bodhisattvas could be broadly categorised into two as Dhyānibodhisattvas and non-Dhyānibodhisattvas. The five Dhyānibodhisattvas namely, Avalokiteśvara, Vajrapāni, Samantabhadra, Ratnapāni and Viśvapāni are regarded as spiritual sons of the five Dhyānibuddhas. They are of different complexion and display different symbols and *mudrās*. There is another group of eight great Dhyānibodhisattvas *(astamahābodhisattva)* usually depicted as standing on either side of the Buddhas. These eight are Avalokiteśvara, Vajrapāni, Ākāśagarbha and Ksitigarbha standing on the left; and Sarvanivaranaviskambhin, Maitreya, Samantabhadra and Mañjuśrī on the right. Of these Avalokiteśvara and Mañjuśrī are the two most important bodhisattvas with different forms of their own. Avalokiteśvara (q.v.) manifests himself in more than 108 different forms of which at least 15 are very important. Of these numerous forms 108 are of Indian origin. Few of them are of Sri Lankan origin. Mañjuśrī (q.v.) too has over 15 different important manifestations. There are both major and minor variations in iconography when they are represented in these different forms. Major forms in which they make themselves manifest would be dealt with separately under each name.

Besides, there are also a host of deities emanating from the Dhyānibuddhas. They form a major aspect of the Tantric Buddhist pantheon and the important ones among them too, such as Candamahārosana, Heruka, Hayagrīva etc. as well as important female divinities (eg. Bhrkutī etc.) would be dealt with separately under each head. See also ICONOMETRY.

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Chandra Wickramagamage

ICONOMETRY, technically referred to in Sanskrit as *pramāna*, deals with proportions or measurements a sculptor or a painter has to adopt when sculpturing or painting a human or any other figure.[1] Thus, though iconometry covers a very wide range of subjects the present article is limited to the iconometrical theory pertaining to the Buddha and bodhisattva images.

1. There are six such techniques to be considered. These are 1. *rūpabheda* (iconography) 2. *pramāna* (iconometry) 3. *bhāva* (display of sentiments) 4. *lavanayojana* (endowing with grace or beauty) 5. *sādrśya* (similarly with the real object or person) and 6. *varna* (analysis of colour).

There is no consensus of opinion regarding the exact period of time during which the Buddha came to be represented in an anthropomorphic form. While some place this event in the 3rd century B.C. others, specially archaeologists, prefer to place it in the 1st century B.C. What is evident, however, is that Buddhist artists who lived prior to this period had been conversant with iconometrical principles.

The period between the 3rd century B.C. and the 1st century B.C. is important for the reason that it is during this period that Buddhology rapidly developed, crystallized and got established. Iconometry as well as iconography has been influenced by Buddhology. Early beginnings of Buddhology (q.v.) could be traced to the life-time of the Buddha himself. Its gradual development is clearly reflected in the Pali Canon. A number of suttas in both the *Dīgha-nikāya* and the *Majjhima-nikāya* throw much light on this. The *Mahāpadāna Sutta* (*D.* II, p. 1 ff.) *Lakkhana Sutta* (*D.* III, p. 142 ff.) and the *Brahmāyu Sutta* (*M.* II, p. 136 ff.) make references to thirty-two 'Signs of a Great Being' *(Mahāpurisa-lakkhana)* which the Buddha is said to have possessed. The *Brahmāyu Sutta* records that the Buddha himself affirmed that he possessed in his body all these thirty-two 'Signs of a Great Being' (*M.* II, p. 143). It is seen that subsequently the Mahāsanghikas accepted this belief. Still later the Mahāyānists, while accepting those *Mahāpurisa lakkhanas,* put forward the view that it is not the *mānuṣi-Buddha* (i.e. the Buddha in the human form) who possesses these 'signs' but his *Sambhogakāya,* a manifestation of the *Dharmakāya* or the Body of the Law for the purpose of preaching to the bodhisattvas.

One of the earliest references that gives a clue to trace the beginnings of the iconometrical principles pertaining to the Buddha image is found among the above mentioned thirty-two *Mahāpurisa-lakkhanas.* Amongst them is one feature referred to as *nyagrodhaparimaṇḍala-kāya* (*D.* II, p. 18 etc.). This feature is explained as "The revered Gotama has the symmetrical proportion of a banyan tree — as is the height of his body so is the length of his arms when stretched out; as is the length of his arms when stretched out so is the height of his body." Perhaps this forms the basis of the iconometrical theory pertaining to the Buddha image.[2]

According to the above mentioned theory of symmetry the Buddha's height is equal to his fathom i.e. the distance from the tip of his middle finger of one outstretched hand to the other. Opinions differ as to what points are to be taken as demarcation of his height. One school of thought opines that it is the distance from the soles of his feet to the hair line on the top of his forehead. The other school holds that it is the distance from the soles of his feet to the top of the *uṣṇīṣa,* the protuberance on his head. Of these two views the former appears to be the earlier as well as the widely accepted one in Sri Lanka. Archaeological evidence reveals that artists in Sri Lanka have accepted and put into practice this view from about the 3rd century B.C. up to about the 13th century A.C. The Buddha images of Mathura school of the Gupta period too are on this line.[3]

How these artists decided as to what exactly is the distance from the tip of the Buddha's middle finger of one outstretched hand to the other is not exactly known. The Pali Canon refers to various measurements used to measure robes, beds etc. Two such measurements are known as *sugata-angula* and *sugata-vidatthi* [4] which mean the Buddha's own finger-breadth and the span respectively. Though one cannot say with any certainty, it is possible that at an early stage *vidatthi* and *angula* were adopted as units of measurement in making images. From evidence available at present what is quite clear is that the Buddhist sculptors and painters use a relative system of measurement in making sculptures and paintings. Their units of measurement are *tāla, angula* and *yava.* The relative proportions are as follows: eight *yavas* (barley corn) make one *angula* (i.e. a finger-breadth or one inch), and twelve *angulas* make one *tāla.*[5] As *tāla* formed the standard measurement this system of metrology came to be known as *tālamāna.*[6] From evidence available one can fairly certainly surmise that the Buddhist artists were the first to adopt this relative

2. Though one cannot say with certainty as to when this metrological principle originated, it is evident that this system of measurement was of universal acceptance, and the artists of both East and West, followed this. Even ancient artists of Egypt have followed this, thus proving its universality and also prevalence from very early times.

3. The latter theory is referred to in the *Śāriputra* and in such works as the Japanese work on iconometry, called *Ryo-do-kyo-sokuho;* the *Buddhapratimālakṣaṇa, Kriyāsamuccaya,* Hindu works such as *Silparatna* etc., too refer to it.

4. See *Vin.* III, p. 149; pp. 168, 173. The *PED.* explains *sugata-angula* as "a Buddha inch," *sugata-vidatthi* as "a Buddha span, a span of the accepted length". *Vidatthi,* that is the distance between the extended thumb and the little finger, in general, is an absolute unit of measurement which consists of 12 absolute inches. The *sugata-vidatthi* is said to contain 12 *sugata-angula.* Moggallāna in his *Abhidhānappadīpikā* equates it with *padesa, gokanna* and *tāla.* See further Chandra Wickramagamage "Early Buddhist Techniques of Painting and Sculpture," in *Ananda, Essays in Honour of Ananda W. P. Guruge,* 1990, Sri Lanka, p. 209 ff.

5. These proportions suggest that there is some relation between *tāla, vidatthi,* and *angula* system of measurement, and apparently *tāla* and *vidatthi* are identical as each is equal to 12 *angula.*

6. This system was evolved from the measurements that were obtained from the images *(bimba)* themselves and hence it is also referred to as *bimbamāna.*

system of *tālamāna*. The Hindu artist followed suit, and in later canons of Hindu iconometry the *tālamāna* system is regarded as the most important unit of measurement.

The term *tāla* occurs in both Pali and Buddhist Sanskrit literature. However, its use as a metrological technical term is rare in both Pali and Sanskrit Buddhist literature. There are at least three meanings in which the term is used. Firstly, it is used to connote the palm tree which is its basic meaning.[7] Secondly, in an extended meaning, it is used to connote, rather figuratively the height in space by comparing it to the height of a palm tree.[8] Thirdly, it is used to connote the metrological measurement, absolute or relative, used by artists in producing images.[9] What is clear is that, due to the absence of Pali works on iconometry (where the term could have been used in its technical sense of a metrological measurement) and also due to the preponderence of its use in its primary meaning of palm tree, its metrological connotation has been overlooked even in instances where it is used in such a sense.

It has been accepted as a rule that Buddhist images which are meant as objects of veneration must be made in keeping with the proportions laid down in canons of iconometry. It is seen that different proportions are given to Buddha, bodhisattva and divine figures. And these, too, vary according to different traditions and schools. In Mahāyāna Buddhism *uttamadaśatāla* — large ten *tāla* proportion (Fig. 1) is assigned to Buddha images, while *navatāla* — nine *tāla* (Fig. 2) is assigned to bodhisattva images and also the images of their śaktis (i.e. female counterparts). But in Sri Lanka, where Theravāda predominates, early Buddha and bodhisattva images were made in keeping with the *navatāla* proportions. This system continued up to about the 13th century A.C. Since then these artists too have adopted the *uttamadaśatāla* proportions for Buddha images. According to the *navatāla* proportions the height of the figure should be nine times the length of its face. According to the *uttamadaśatāla* the height should be ten times the length of the face plus four *angulas*. Both the Pratimānalakṣaṇa and *Ālekhyalakṣana*[10] give the *navatāla* proportions. The *Buddhapratimālakṣaṇa and the Śāriputra* give the *uttamadaśatāla* proportions for Buddha images, while the former prescribes *navatāla* proportions for bodhisattva images. The texts dealing with *navatāla* proportion appear to be older than those dealing with the *uttamadaśatāla*. Details of both proportions are as follows:

NAVATĀLA PROPORTION

Part of the Body	*Tālas*
Face	1
Neck	1/3
Neck to Chest	1
Chest to Navel	1
Navel to Penis	1
Thigh	2
Knee-cap	1/3
Shin	2
Head	1/3
Total	9

UTTAMADASATĀLA

Part of the Body	*Tālas*	*Angulas*	*Yavas*
Uṣṇīṣa	-	1	-
Uṣṇīṣa to hairline on the forehead	-	3	-
Face	1	1	4
Neck	-	4	-
Neck to Chest	1	1	4
Chest to Navel	1	1	4
Navel to Penis	1	1	4
Thigh	2	3	-
Knee-cap	-	4	-
Shin	2	3	-
Head	-	4	-
Total	10	4	

The Japanese text the *Ryo-do-kyo-sokuho* and the *Pratimāmānalakṣaṇam* prescribe 125 *angulas* as the full height of the *uttamadaśatāla* proportion. The *Śāriputra*, and the commentary to the *Kriyāsamuccaya*, however, give 124 *angulas* for the full height. These texts probably represent two different schools of iconometry.

All these texts give minute details of vertical, horizontal, and circumference measurements as well as the measurements of thickness. No matter whether the statue is large or small the proportion is the same. As these units of measurement are of a relative nature, the *tāla*, *angula* and *yava* pertaining to a small figure are smaller in size than those pertaining to a large statue.

Sculptors and painters of both India and Sri Lanka used a particular instrument to help them to place all limbs of the statue in correct positions. In India this is referred to as the *lambaphalaka*. In Sri Lanka the particular instrument used for this purpose is called the *lambatatuva*, a term derived from the one used in India.

7. *Vin.* I, p. 189, *J.* IV, p. 402.

8. *J.* IV, p. 467. f. also *PED, BHS, PTC* s.v. *tāla*. The possibility of *tāla* being a secondary derivative of *tala* (cf. *hatthatala*) cannot be ruled out.

9. See Moggallāna's *Abhidhānappadipikā* ed. W. Subhuti, Colombo. 1938, p. 40, *Lal* p. 154.

10. This text is available in two different editions. A Tibetan translation is found in the Tanjur (Otani ed. Vol. 143, No. 5807). The Ālekhyalakṣaṇa was found in Sri Lanka.

DETAILED MEASUREMENTS OF NAVATĀLA AND UTTAMADŚTĀLA

MADHYAMA-NAVATĀLA

Part of the Body	*1* *aṅgula*	*2* *aṅgula*	*3* *aṅgula*	*4* *aṅgula*	*5* *aṅgula*	*6* *aṅgula*	*7* *aṅgula*	*8* *aṅgula*	*9* *aṅgula*	*10* *aṅgula*	*11* *aṅgula*
Uṣṇīṣa	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Uṣṇīṣa – hairline on forehead	3	3			3	3		3			2
Face	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12
Neck	3	3	4	4	3	3	4	3	4	4	4
Neck–Chest	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	10	12	12	12
Chest–Navel	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12
Navel–Penis	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12
Thigh	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	24
Knee-cap	3	3	4	4	3	3	4	4	4	4	3
Shin	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	24
Ankle	3	3	4	4	3	3	4	4	4	4	3
Total	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108

1 = *Tāranātha*
2 = *Tson-ka-ba*
3 = *Bṛhatsaṁhitā*
4 = *Śukranīti*
5 = *Ryo-do-kyo-soku-ho*
6 = *Mānasāra*
7 = *Pratimāmānalakṣaṇa*
8 = *Devatāmūrti-Prakaraṇa*
9 = *Mayaśāstra*
10 = *Matsyapurāṇa*
11 = *Viṣṇudharmottarapurāṇa.*

UTTAMA-DAŚATĀLA

	1		*2*		*3*		*4*		*5*		*6*		*7*		*8*		*9*		*10*		*11*	
Part of the Body	*A*	*Y*	*A*	*Y*	*A*	*Y*	*A*	*Y*	*A*	*Y*	*A*	*Y*	*A*	*Y*	*A*	*Y*	*A*	*Y*	*A*	*Y*	*A*	*Y*
Uṣṇīṣa	1	3	1	3			1		1				4		4						1	3
Uṣṇīṣa – hairline on forehead	3		3		4		3		3		20		4		4		4		4		3	
Face	13	1	13	1	13		13	4	13	4			13	4	13	4	12		13		13	1
Neck	4	3	4	3	4	4	4		4	4	4		4		4		4		5		4	
Neck–Chest	13	3	13	3	13	4	13	4	13	4	12	4	12	4	12	4			16		13	4
Chest–Navel	13	3	13	3	13	4	13	4	13	4	12	4	12	4	12	4	40		12		13	4
Navel–Penis	13	3	13	3	13	4	13	4	13	4	12	4	12	4	12	4			12		13	4
Thigh	26	5	27		27		27		27		25		25		25		26		24		27	
Knee-cap	4	3	4		4		4		4		6		8		6		5		4		4	
Shin	26	5	27		27		27		27		25		25		25		26		24		27	
Ankle	4	3	4		4		4		4		6		4		6		8		6		4	
Total	124		124		124		124		124	4	124		125		125		125		124		124	

1 = *Vaikhyānasāgama*
2 = *Śilparatna, Kaśyapaśilpa*
3 = *Mānasāra*
4 = *Śāriputra*
8 = *Buddhapratimālakṣaṇa*
9 = *Pratimāmānalakṣaṇa*
10 = *Brahmayāmala Tantra*
11 = *Citrakarmaśāstra*

A = Aṅgula
Y = Yava

The *lambatatuva* has to be set according to the size and pose of the statue, and the plumblines are drawn from it. Hence this instrument has to be fixed a little above the head of the statue.

The correctness of the proportion of seated figures is determined according to a system of measurement known as *catur āna*. According to this system of measurement the distance between the two knees, the distance from the left shoulder to the right knee and the distance from the right shoulder to the left knee must be the same as the height from the *āsana* (seat) to the hair-line on the top of the head.

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IDDHI. The word derived from the Sanskrit *ṛddhi,* from root *ṛdh* to grow, to increase, to prosper, to succeed, to accomplish etc. is of frequent occurrence in Buddhist texts both in its primary meaning and in a special extended meaning. When used in its original meaning it connotes prosperity, affluence, success, splendour, high-position etc. In this sense it is almost synonymous with the word *ānubhāva* meaning majesty and power (*D,* II, p. 72; cf. *D.* I, p. 213; *M,* I, p. 152). The use of the word in a still more general sense is seen in such contexts where it is employed to bring out the meaning of prosperity in household-life, implying the possession of good food, expensive fine clothing, well-equipped residences (*A.* I. p. 145). Comely appearance, longevity, good health and popularity among the subjects are said to be the *iddhi* of a *cakkavatti-rājā,* a universal monarch (*D.* II, p. 177). Even the birds' ability to fly is said to be an *iddhi,* a special ability of theirs (*Dhp. v.* 175; *Vism.* p. 382). When used in its extended meaning it connotes the idea of psychokinesis. *Iddhi* in this sense is the first item in the list of five or six kinds of super knowledge or faculty (*abhiññā, q.v.*)[1].

Belief in psychokinesis is of pre-Buddhist origin. There is textual evidence to establish that from the Vedic period ascetic practices coupled with some form of meditation were considered as means of attaining these psychokinetic powers. The *Ṛgveda* alludes to the existence of such a belief (*Ṛgveda,* viii, cix, 6, x, cix, 4). The *Atharvaveda* says that goddess Aṣṭakā performing ascetic practices produced the greatness of Indra (*Atharvaveda,* iii, x, 12). The *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* (x, iv, 4, 2) says that Prajāpati by practising severe ascetic practices created stars from the rays of light that issued forth from the pores of his body (see *ERE,* VIII, pp. 255, 311, ff.). That the development of psychokinetic powers formed an essential part of the religious training of almost all pre-Buddhistic religious traditions is seen from frequent references made to sages (*ṛṣi*) and other religious personages who had gained proficiency in displaying miraculous powers.

There is positive evidence found in abundance in early Buddhist literature to show that the Buddha, too, not only affirmed the existence of such wondrous powers but himself mastered them and gained proficiency at displaying them whenever the need arose. Buddhism, too, admits that the attainment of *iddhi* is possible after bringing the mind to a high level of development through meditational practices.[2] The mind at this high level of development becomes concentrated, pure, cleansed, free from blemishes, purged of all adventitious defilements, supple, pliant, steady and unperturbed.[3] This state of the mind is referred to as the fourth jhānic attainment (*D.* I. p. 76). The commentarial tradition refers to this state of the mind as the basis of *abhiññā* (J. I. p. 88 cf. *Vism.* p. 384). When the mind has reached this state it could be directed towards the attainment of any of the six *abhiññā.*

It is seen that *iddhi* is not an automatic or a necessary product of the mind that has reached the state described

1. The six *abhiññā* are: i. *iddhividha* (kind of psychokinesis) ii. *dibbasota* (clairaudiance); iii. *cetopariyañāṇa* (telepathic knowledge); iv. *pubbenivāsānussatiñāṇa* (retrocognitive knowledge); v. *dibbacakkhu* (clairvoyance) and vi. *āsavakkhayañāṇa* (knowledge of the destruction of defiling impulses). For details see under each head word.

2. There was also a belief which held that wondrous acts (*iddhi*) could be accomplished with the aid of occult practices (*gandhāri vijjā*: *D.* I, p. 211).

above. The texts are very clear on the point that the meditator should intentionally turn his mind in that direction if he so desires *(sace ākaṅkhati: A.* III, p. 17–19; cf. also *Vism.* p. 378).

It is also seen that the Nikāya texts themselves speak of the cultivation of the bases of *iddhi* (i.e. *iddhipāda,* q.v.) as a pre-requiste for the attainment of *iddhi (S. V p. 276. Iddhipāda* are four in number and involve the cultivation of will-to-do *(chanda),* energy *(viriya),* mind *(citta)* and investigation *(vimaṃsā).* Even the pre-Buddhistic religious tradition appears to have considered them as pre-requisites for the accomplishment of *iddhi-powers (S. V.* p. 254) and perhaps, this concept belongs to the common religious background of ancient India. However, in Buddhism the role of *iddhipāda* was widened to help the achievement of spiritual power *(dhamma-iddhi)* leading to Nibbāna (cf. *S.* V. p. 258).

The commentarial tradition reveals a significant expansion of the process leading to the attainment of *iddhi.* Thus, the *Visuddhimagga* (chap. xii) details the eight attainments in each of the eight *kasiṇas* (q.v.), the fourteen ways of completely controlling the mind etc. which consist of the course leading to the successful accomplishment of *iddhi.*

The numeorus types of *iddhi* attainable by one who has gained proficiency are listed in the suttas. The stereotyped passage which enumerates different *iddhi* is as follows: "Being one he becomes many, having become many he becomes one again, he becomes visible or invisible; he goes unhindered to the further side of a rampart, wall or hill as if going through unobstructed space; he dives into and emerges from the solid ground as if he is performing that feat in water; he walks on water without breaking through as if walking on solid ground; he travels cross-legged in the sky like birds on wings; even the moon and the sun so potent *(mahiddhika)* and mighty *(mahānubhāva)* he touches and feels with his hands; he reaches in body even up to the world of Brahma[4] (*D.* I, p. 73).

The *Visuddhimagga (Vism.* p. 378 ff.) discusses the types of *iddhi* under ten different major heads one of which is 'iddhi by resolve' *(adhitthāna-iddhi)* under which are listed the above-mentioned varieties of *iddhi.* The *Patisambhidāmagga (Ps.* II, p. 205) list is quite similar to it while that in the *Atthasālini (DhsA.* p. 91) is somewhat different. The heads given in the *Visuddhimagga* and the *Patisambhidāmagga* are as follows: i. *adhitthānaiddhi* (*iddhi* through resolve), ii. *vikubbana (iddhi* through transformation), iii. *manomaya* (*iddhi* through the power of mind), iv. *ñānavippahāra* (*iddhi* through the extension of knowledge), v. *samādhivippahāra* (*iddhi* through the extension of concentration), vi. *ariya* (*iddhi* of noble ones), vii. *kammavipākaja* (*iddhi* born of consequence of *kamma*), viii. *puññavato* (*iddhi* of the meritorious), ix. *vijjāmaya* (*iddhi* through occult sciences); x. *tattha tattha* (*samā*) or *sammāpayogapaccayā ijjhanatthena* (*iddhi* through the right exertion applied in specific instances).

Even a casual perusal of these different types of *iddhi* convinces one that some of them are in no way connected to psychokinesis. In fact only the first three items of the list could be properly included under *iddhi* in the sense of psychokinetic power. Buddhaghosa himself makes such an observation (*Vism.* p. 384). These three are mainly concerned with levitation, transformation of oneself into different forms and creation, through the power of the mind, of another projection out of the normal form. How the jhānic process helps the accomplishment of such wondrous feats, specially levitation, is explained by the Buddha in the *Saṃyuttanikāya.* The Buddha says that when concentrating the body in the mind and the mind in the body, making the body dependent on the mind and the mind on the body one happens to dwell developing in the body a sense of lightness. And at such moments the body becomes extremely light, soft, pliable and radiant and with little effort it rises into the air from the ground (*S. V.* p. 282 f.). The *Visuddhimagga* describes the process in greater detail (*Vism.* p. 378 ff.).

Though *iddhi* is one of the *abhiññā* it is not considered a part of the Buddhist scheme of salvation leading to Nibbāna (*D.* III, p. 4). The early textual evidence makes it abundantly clear that it is not an attribute of the Arahant.[5] This is further established by the fact that Devadatta, (q.v.) who was not an arahant, was an adept in the display of psychokinetic powers *(iddhipātihāriya).* A majority of the arahants do not seem to have been inclined towards developing this ability as it did not in

3. The psychokinetic power attained through the jhānic process is regarded as a product of mind purged of all defilements. This power is lost as soon as the mind gets defiled once again. A striking example is Devadatta (q.v.) who lost all his previously acquired *iddhi*-power as soon as his mind became polluted with the envious thought of assuming leadership of the Sangha.

4. This list is not exhaustive. It appears that any wondrous feat that is apparently beyond the ability of human beings *(uttarimanussa dhamma)* falls under *iddhi* (cf. *Vin.* I, p. 25. *A.* III, p. 340; *S. I.* p. 144; IV, p. 290; *V.* p. 263).

5. Childers in his Pali Dictionary states, "Iddhi is a peculiar attribute of the arahants". Rhys Davids rightly points out that Childers gives no authority for his definition *(Dialogues of the Buddha,* pt. I, p. 272). Perhaps Childers may have been influenced by a mild indication to this effect in the *Visuddhimagga (Vism.* p. 376) which says that in the case of Buddhas, Pacceka Buddhas, chief disciples etc. these supernormal powers are brought to success simply with the attainment of arahantship.

any way help them to realise Nibbāna (cf. *S.* I. p. 191; II, p. 115 ff; *D.* III, p. 105).

Iddhi being beyond the range of ability of ordinary human beings (*uttarimanussadhamma: D.* I, p. 211; III, p. 3 f.) was generally considered a supernormal power, and those who possessed such powers were held in high esteem and veneration. This has been so even among the Buddhists, for even Devadatta, at one stage, was held in high esteem because of this ability. But it is clearly stated in Buddhism that all importance and significance attached to *iddhi* pertain to the mundane level and hence, it is described as a material accomplishment (*āmisa iddhi A.* I. p. 93) or a worldly accomplishment (*pothujjanika iddhi: Vin.* II, p. 183). The *Dīgha-nikāya (D.* III, p. 112) describes it as being sullied by defiling impulses (*sāsava)* and accompanied by material substratum (*sa-upadhika),* and therefore, ignoble (*anariya).* In contrast to this, accompalishments leading to Nibbāna are called *dhamma-iddhi,* and they are described as being devoid of defiling impulses (*anāsava),* without clinging (*anupadhika)* and hence noble (*ariya* cf. *A.* I, pp. 93-170).

Even this material accomplishment had been put into good use by the Buddha and some of his leading disciples, especially Moggallāna (q.v.). Thus, texts record the Buddha utilizing his *iddhi*-power to shatter the arrogance of Uruvela Kassapa (*Vin.* I, p. 24 ff.) and of his kinsmen (*J.* I. p. 88) and of the heretics (*DA.* I. p. 57) to bring about their well being. Moggallāna Thera is said to have been an expert in using *iddhipātihāriya* as a medium to win over people (*A.* I, p. 23; *BuA.* p. 31, see *DPPN.* Mahā-Moggallāna).

However, textual evidence clearly establishes that the Buddha while not over-utilizing *iddhipātihāriya* as a medium of teaching and conversion totally prohibited its use for publicity and personal gain. In fact the Buddha clearly percieved the dangers involved in the indiscriminate use of *iddhipātihāriya.* He foresaw that some would even accuse that such wondrous acts are being accomplished with the aid of magical charms (*gandhāri vijjā. D.* I, p. 211 f.). Therefore, he declared the display of such psychokinetic powers by monks for the purpose of impressing upon laymen, as an ecclesciastical offence (*āpatti: Vin.* II, p. 112). As the ability to perform such wondrous feats was regarded as a sign of holiness many may have laid false claims for such an ability. This perhaps is one of the reasons for promulgating the Vinaya rule which lays down that it is a *pārājika* offence to make false claims to *uttarimanussadhamma* involving such abilities (*Vin.* III, p. 91).

While discouraging and denouncing this type of *iddhi* which are categorized as material accomplishments (*āmisa-iddhi),* the Buddha encourages the successful fulfilment of spiritual accomplishment (*dhamma-iddhi).* In the *Sampasādaniya Sutta (D.* III, p. 113) the Buddha explains this kind of *iddhi* as follows: "This is when a monk can, if he so desires, remain unconscious of repulsion amidst what is repulsive, conscious of repulsion amidst what is not repulsive, or unconscious of repulsion amidst what is both repulsive and not repulsive or conscious of repulsion amidst what is repulsive and not repulsive or avoid both which is repulsive and not repulsive and remain neutral (*upekkhako),* mindful and self-possessed (*sato sampajāno).*

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IDDHIPĀDA, the base of psychokinetic power or spiritual success. These are four in number and are frequently referred to in the Nikāyas which speak of them as prerequisites for the accomplishment of *iddhi* (see IDDHI). The four *iddhipādas* are 1. base of *iddhi* consisting of concentration of will-to-do or zeal accompanied by striving (*chandapadhānasaṅkhāra - samannāgata - iddhipāda);* 2. base of *iddhi* consisting of concentration of effort .... (*viriyasamādhi°);* 3. concentration of thought ..... (*cittasamādhi°);* 4. concentration of investigation .... (*vīmaṃsasamādhi°).* The *Iddhipāda-saṃyutta* of the *Saṃyutta-nikāya* defines these as the path, the practice of which results in the accomplishment of *iddhi (S.* V. p. 27, cf. *Vism.* II, p. 385).

Available evidence leads to the inference that *iddhipādas* were in vogue and were used by religious personages in pre-Buddhist times (*D.* II, p. 213, *S.V.* p. 255 ff.). However, it appears that in pre-Buddhist times these were used almost solely as an aid to the accomplishment of psychokinetic powers which were considered as a hall-mark or necessary accompaniment of spirituality. The mental culture that resulted from the development of *iddhipādas* does not appear to have been considered important. However, a clear shift in emphasis is seen in Buddhism.

Buddhism does not consider the accomplishment of psychokinetic powers as being in any way helpful to the attainment of its goal. In fact, Buddhism labels them as mere wondrous physical accomplishments (*āmisaiddhi)* as opposed to a new type of *iddhi* which it refers to as *dhamma-iddhi* (i.e. wondrous mental accomplishment) leading one to Nibbāna. It appears that the Buddha seeing the high potential of *iddhipāda* as an aid for gaining mental culture and consequent spiritual growth, moulded them and geared them in this new direction making them function as preliminary steps for reaching the goal, Nibbāna (*S.* V. p. 258). Perhaps it is to this development in the new direction that is referred to when the *Saṃyutta* speaks of partial (*padesa)* and comprehen-

sive *(samatta)* development of *iddhipāda (S.* IV, p. 256 ff.). It may be that the partial practice of *iddhipāda* helped to develop psychokinetic powers, whereas the comprehensive practice enabled one to develop these powers as well as gain mental culture leading to Nibbāna. The commentary, however, takes this differently (*SA.* III, p. 251).

In Buddhism, therefore, mental culture resulting from the development of *iddhipādas* took precedence over the accomplishment of psychokinetic powers. Hence the culture of *iddhipādas* began to play an important role in the religious training. Thus, when a brahman called Unnābha questioned Ānanda thera as to the purpose for which the religious life is lived under the Buddha, the latter replied that it is for the purpose of abandoning desire. When questioned as to the way leading to this abandonment, venerable Ānanda answered that it is none other than the culture of *iddhipādas (iddhipāda-bhāvanā; S.* V. p. 272). The culture of *iddhipādas* came to be characterised as a means capable of completely destroying all the ills of life (*S.* V. p. 125). It is conducive to complete disenchantment *(ekantanibbidā)*, detachment *(virāga)*, cessation *(nirodha)*, tranquillity *(upasama)*, insight *(abhiññā)* enlightenment *(sambodhi)* and finally to the realisation of Nibbāna (loc. cit.).

Will-to-do or zeal *(chanda)*, effort *(viriya)*, thought *(citta)* and investigation *(vimaṃsā)* are the four factors of the predominance and preponderance on which depends the mental phenomena associated with it as well as the consequent actions of a being. Hence, their control and proper cultivation has a strong bearing on one's spiritual elevation. Therefore, it is not surprising to find the culture of *iddhipādas* being interwoven into the core of the Buddhist practice leading to Nibbāna. This interweaving has been effected through the Noble Eightfold Path *(ariya-aṭṭhaṅgika-magga)* which is named as the Path that leads to the cultivation of *iddhipādas (S.* V. p. 276).

The culture of *iddhipādas* is clearly enunciated in the Nikāyas. Thus, it is said that these should be developed so that they shall be neither sluggish *(atilīna)* due to indolence *(kosajja)* nor over strained *(atipaggahita)* due to excitement *(uddhacca)*, nor shall they be inwardly cramped *(ajjhatta-saṅkhitta)*, due to sloth and torpor *(thina-middha)*, nor outwardly diffused *(bahiddhā vikkhitta)* by their being concerned with the five desires *(pañcakāmaguṇa: S.* V. pp. 267, 277). When thus cultivated they make the mind become untrammelled and alert, leading it to brilliance.

When properly de.eloped the *iddhipādas* operate as antidotes to the five factors that go to weaken one's spiritual training *(sikkhādubbalyāni)*; function as aids that help to overcome the five fetters of the mind *(cetaso vinibandha: A.* IV. p. 164). Further they result in the non-arising of unwholesome mental states that had not yet arisen; for the abandonment of unwholesome mental states already arisen; for the arising of wholesome mental states not yet arisen and also for the stability, cultivation and increase of wholesome mental states already arisen (*S.* V. p. 268). Ānanda thera very lucidly explains how the culture of *iddhipādas* helps to abate desire. (*S.* V. p. 272).

The importance of the culture of *iddhipādas* in the scheme of Buddhist training is such that it is considered as being conducive to the realisation of Nibbāna. If however, its culture is neglected then the Noble Path that leads to Nibbāna also becomes neglected (*S.* V. p. 254).

With regard to the effects that accrue to a person who fully develops the *iddhipādas,* it is said that such an one, besides gaining proficiency in the display of psychokinetic powers *(iddhivikubbana)*, becomes also successful in this very life, in destroying the *āsavas,* in gaining insight into the truth and attaining freedom of mind *(cetovimutti)* and freedom through wisdom *(paññāvimutti)*. If, however, such a person fails to realise this goal in this very life and if there be any substrate left, he is assured of the state of a non-returner (*S.* V. p. 2828 ff.).

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IDDHIVIDHĀ. See IDDHI

IDEALISM. In the philosophical context, idealism and its adversarial theories, realism and materialism, are the results of a search for ultimate objectivity and certainty with regard to human knowledge and undertaking. However, idealism is a direct result of the distrust of the information provided by the senses and the consequent belief in the ultimacy of mind and spiritual values. As in the case of many other "isms," idealism exhibits a variety of forms. These include metaphysical idealism, epistemological idealism, transcendental idealism and absolute idealism.

In the early Indian philosophical context the search for objectivity and certainty led the Upaniṣadic thinkers to accept the belief in a permanent and eternal self *(ātman)* in the human person as well as in the objective world of experience.[1] The identification of the reality within the individual with the reality pervading other individuals as

1. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 1.4.1-10.

well as phenomena led to a conception of unity in the universe. This unity of the factual world was then identified with the ultimate value *(brahma)*, the source of the societal division into castes.[2] This conception of unity represents what may be called the metaphysical idealism. With this emphasis on ultimate unity and the gradual distrust of plurality, the Upanisadic thinkers were moving toward a transcendental idealism as they endeavoured to discover some form of knowledge that transcends ordinary sense experience. This was expressed by the parable of the two birds perched on the same branch, one enjoying the *pippala* fruit and the other simply looking on.[3] The former represents the empirical self enjoying the world of sensory experience, the latter the transcendental self which accounts for the unity of experience, a theoretical standpoint that is not much different from what has been proposed by the transcendental idealist in the modern world, Immanuel Kant.[4] As in the case of modern philosophy after Kant, in the Upanisadic tradition absolute idealism was lurking not too far in the horizon. Absolute idealism reached its culmination when the Upanisadic thinkers conceived of *brahma* as "pure cognition" *(vijñāna)* and bliss *(ānanda)*.[5] Arrayed against such idealism were the physical determinism of the Materialists and the biological determinism of the Ājīvikas.[6]

What was lacking in the Indian context before Buddhism is any speculation comparable to what is involved in epistemological idealism. A superficial consideration of some of the epistemological speculations in early Buddhism may lead to the conclusion that they are similar to those of the epistemological idealists of the Western world, especially George Berkeley. Yet there indeed are significant differences.

The epistemological idealist's main contention is whether sensory experience reveals the independent existence of matter, for every time we look for a material substance we end up with a perceptual sensation which is more subjective. For him existence is identical with perception. This may not be an unacceptable position for the Buddha who emphasized the idea that the world, its arising and ceasing, is within this fathom-long body associated with perception and mentation (*S.* I, p. 62; *A.* II, pp. 48, 50). The Buddha was prepared to go beyond the assertion that there cannot be experience of the world without sense contact *(phassa)* to make the claim that even a valid conception or theory is impossible independent of such contact (*D.* I, pp. 43-44). But the similarity between early Buddhism and epistemological idealism ends here. This is because Buddhism does not look for absolute certainty in sense experience and knowledge gained through such experience whereas epistemological idealism, seeking for such certainty, continued to raise further questions.

The first question is: Is there real matter or a material substance undiluted by and independent of sense experience? An epistemological idealist like Berkeley argued that the conception of matter as something existing independent of experience is a myth. He therefore characterized his theory as immaterialism. For the Buddha, the objectivity of matter need not be denied because the source through which we get to know matter is sensation. The object of knowledge and the source of knowledge need not necessarily be identical. Thus, while defining the experience of earth as coarseness *(kakkhaḷatā)*, water as fluidity *(āpogata)*, heat as caloricity *(tejogata)* and air as viscocity *(vāyogata)* (*M.* I, pp. 185, 421, III, p. 240), the Buddha was not willing to reduce earth, water, fire, and air to empty concepts. What he denied is that these objective elements depending upon which we have sensory experience possess some mysterious and underlying essence that makes them permanent and eternal compared to the sensations themselves which are obviously impermanent and changing. Thus, the very analysis of an object into substance and qualities where the former is conceived as the independent object while the latter represent the perceived characteristics, an analysis that contributed to persistent metaphysical debates later on in philosophical traditions both Eastern and Western, was avoided by the Buddha at the very outset. The Buddha realized that in the process which leads to genuine knowledge and understanding of the objective world restraint of the senses constitutes an important preliminary step. In explaining such restraint of the senses he argued that what is to be avoided is the grasping after substance or mysterious causes *(nimitta)* and qualities (*anuvyañjana: D.* I, p. 70; *M.* I, p. 180 ff.) In fact, as the description goes, the restraint of the senses *(cakkhusaṃvara)* does not involve any physical activity but simply the restraint of the perspective one adopts immediately after the external object has been perceived *(cakkhunā rūpaṃ disvā)*.

2. ibid., 1.4.10-17.

3. First occurring in the *Rgveda* 1.164.20, it was utilized by some of the *Upanisads*, *Mundaka* 3.1.1; *Śvetāśvatara* 4.6. and reads as follows: Two birds, close companions, occupy the same tree. One of them eats the sweet pippala fruit, the other, not eating, keeps looking on.

4. See Immanuel Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, tr. N. K. Smith, London: Macmillan, 1963, pp. 135 ff.

5. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 3.9.28; see also *Taittirīya Upaniṣad 2.5.1; 3.5.1.*

6. *See B. M. Barua, Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy.*

Secondly, the Buddha carefully avoided any commitment to either idealism or realism when he utilized the language of dependence in describing the process of sensory experience. The statement reads:

> Depending upon the eye and the visible form arises visual consciousness. The concomitance of the three is contact. Depending upon contact is feeling (*M.* I, pp. 111–112).

The important feature of this description is that it avoids some of the basic assumptions of the realist as well as the idealist. It differs from the realist's claim that the external object impinges on the sense organ or leaves an imprint on the mind which is a *tabula rasa*. It also differs from the epistemological idealist's description which begins and ends with a sense impression. Instead it asserts two conditions, first the sense organ and then the object of sense, without which no sense experience would take place. Furthermore, without contributing to any theory like epi-phenomenalism which would render consciousness a by-product of matter (the materialist taking the sense organ and object of sense to be constituted of matter), the above statement emphasizes the idea that consciousness arises depending upon the faculty and the object, instead of the latter generating the former. In other words, sense faculty and object are conditioning factors of consciousness *(viññāṇa)* which provide continuity in experience as it flows like a stream *(sota; D.* III, p. 105). Here again, the language of dependence excludes the possibility of understanding consciousness as something that occurs independent of a faculty and an object.

Finally, the Buddha was not troubled by the speculative question posed by the epistemological idealist as to whether an object exists when not perceived. It is one thing to assert that what exists is what is perceived through sense experience, and yet another to claim that existence is identical with perception. While perception gives us information about the existence of some object, it is not identical with the existence of that object so that when it is not being perceived it disappers into nothingness. For the reidentification of an object perviously perceived is the function of memory. The Buddha was a radical empiricist (q.v., Empiricism) and was not willing to dismiss memory as a totally invalid means of knowledge. As such he did not have to posit an all-perceiving Supreme Being whose perception accounts for the existence of the objective world when the mortals are not perceiving it, which was a solution to the problem presented by Bishop Berkeley. Yet this does not mean that the Buddha recognized as existing something that has never been perceived. To claim the existence of something unperceived *(adiṭṭhe diṭṭhavādī)* is said to contribute to suffering comparable to that of the purgatory (*A.* II, p. 227). A disclaimer to omniscience on the part of the Buddha, even though the faithful were to attribute it to him, is clearly evident from his discourse on "everything" *(sabbam; S.* IV, p. 14).

The epistemological standpoint adopted by the Buddha thus precludes the possibility of interpreting his doctrine as some form of idealism. Even if the epistemological reflections do not lend themselves to an idealistic interpretation, it could be argued that Buddhism cannot avoid an idealistic stance because of the need to explain morality and freedom. S. Radhakrishnan, who did not perceive any difference between Buddhism and Hinduism, especially in relation to the conception of nirvāna, referred to early Buddhism as Ethical Idealism. In the Western world, Kantian idealism is still appreciated because of its defence of freedom against the extremely popular theories of physical and natural determinism, these latter being outright materialistic. Admirers of Kant assume that since knowledge and freedom are closely linked, determinism and reductive materialism cannot be true. Since early Buddhism is neither deterministic nor materialistic it did not have to adopt an idealistic stance when explaining morality and freedom. The Buddha's doctrine of "dependent arising" *(paticca-samuppāda)* is formulated in a manner that avoids the extremes of eternalism and nihilism, determinism and indeterminism, fatalism and change. It is a middle standpoint. Its main feature is "conditionality" which also involves the renunciation of absolute certainty and equally absolute scepticism. This means that the Buddha was prepared to philosophize within a limited framework, hence the non-absolutist character of his views about knowledge and understanding as well as his conceptions of truth and reality. It was within such a context that he proposed a theory of morality and a conception of freedom *(nibbāna)*. Neither the theory of morality nor the conception of freedom are absolutistic for, as pointed out earlier, they were formulated in the background of a rather absolutistic metaphysical idealism as well as materialistic and biological determinism all of which he repudiated.

Buddha's conception of freedom is therefore to be understood in the background of his own conception of bondage. Freedom is sometimes referred to as transcending the world *(lokuttara)* which would mean that the world *(loka)* represents bondage. At other times it is described as the ending of the continuous life-process *(saṃsāra)*. A clarification of the meaning of the term "world" will shed more light on the term *saṃsāra* which was widely used in later Buddhism to refer to the state of bondage. According to an extremely important discourse, "The Discourse to Kaccāyana" *(Kaccāyanagotta-sutta)*[7], the world *(loka)* is one which is "bound by

7. *S.* II.17–18 quoted by the leading philosophers of the Buddhist tradition such as Nāgārjuna, see David J. Kalupahana, *Nāgārjuna. The Philosophy of the Middle Way*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986, pp. 9 ff.

approach, grasping, and inclination." The restraint of approach, grasping and inclination does not mean the total annihilation *(uccheda)* of the world of experience or the attainment of a permanent state of existence *(sassata)*. The same discourse states that human beings generally lean toward one or the other of these two states.[8] The elimination of greed *(lobha)*, hatred *(dosa)* and confusion *(moha)*, which is equated with freedom *(nibbāna)*[9] enables one to restrain one's perceptive regarding the nature of the world and continue to live therein without undergoing suffering. That restrained perspective also prevents him from grasping on to existence so that at the end of the present life the possibility of a future life is also eliminated. This is what is implied by the ending of the life-process *(saṃsāra)*. Thus, when a person attains freedom he does not have to remove himself from the natural process of dependence, but only abandon those perspectives that lead to grasping and the consequent suffering.

It is this non-absolutist conception of freedom that paved the way for an equally non-absolutist moral philosophy. Thus, early Buddhism did not advocate the idea that the good life has to be sacrificed at the altar of the moral life as the idealistic traditions of the East and West did. Here the middle path is between self-indulgence and self-mortification (*S.* V, p. 421) between craving for becoming and craving for non-becoming or suicide (*M.* III, p. 244). The moral life goes hand in hand with the good life in such a way that the person who practises it lives without hurting himself and not harming others (*M.* II, p. 114 f.). It is a life of peace or non-conflict *(araṇavihāra: M.* III, p. 230 f.) and is said to be the highest stage of morality and ultimate freedom. Thus, philosophically early Buddhism did not have to accept any form of idealism in order to account for morality and freedom. The renunciation of polar views relating to human life and spirituality enabled early Buddhism to adopt a more pragmatic approach.

However, such polar concepts did appear in the later Buddhist tradition, especially with the emergence of a transcendentalist conception of the Buddha. The earliest reference to such a view is to be found in the *Kathāvatthu* where Moggaliputta-tissa refutes the Lokuttaravāda that negated the historicity of the Buddha and proposed a transcendentalist view (*Kvu.* pp. 559–561). Interestingly the ideas refuted in the *Kathāvatthu* emerged with greater force in the *Mahāvastu* and the *Lalitavistara*, both works being looked upon as belonging to the Sarvāstivāda school. In fact, philosophically such a view can be linked to the Sarvāstivādins whose doctrine of the eternal nature of phenomena *(dharmasvabhāva)* is not a far cry from that of the Upaniṣadic theory of self *(ātman)*. The theory of substantial or essential existence *(svabhāva)* is a metaphysical attempt to unify variety and plurality. Sarvāstivāda may therefore be looked upon as the first step in the direction of metaphysical idealism. Metaphysical idealism reached a more sophisticated level in the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-sūtra* where unity is proposed at the conceptual level with the theory of "equality of all dharmas" *(sarva-dharma-samatā)*, the knowledge *(avabodha)* of which is said to constitute enlightenment or Buddhahood.[10] The conceptual absolutism of the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* placed the concept of Buddha at the pinnacle, down-playing the significance of the historical Buddha, the value of the early discourses, and the importance of the life of the early disciples who had attained freedom (*arhatva:* ibid. pp. 81–82). With development of such transcendentalism and absolutism one can notice a change in the moral philosophy as well. For example, the *Saddharmapundarika* is the first Mayāyāna text to justify self-sacrifice (ibid. p. 164). The sacrifice of one's psychophysical personality for the sake of the Buddha, the ideal, is justified by the fact that the former is utterly unreal while the latter is ultimately real. The moral ideal calls for the abandoning not only of the good life but even one's own personality. This idea pervades some of the Jātakas and the Avadānas as well.

The transition from metaphysical idealism to absolute idealism is met with in the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* wherein the famous doctrine of *citta-mātra* ("thought only") is elaborated in great detail.[11] Indeed it becomes the *locus classicus* of the school of Absolute Idealism *(Vijñānavāda)* that reduced the world *(loka)* to a mere apparition, an illusion *(māyā)*. The traditional identification of philosophers like Vasubandhu with this school has been questioned in recent times.[12]

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IDOLATRY, the worship of idols or material objects as representations of god. This feature in theistic religion

8. [illegible] *Dvayam Kaccāyana loko yebhuyyena atthitañ ceva natthitañ ca.*

9. S. [illegible] *rāgakkhayo dosakkhayo mohakkhayo idaṃ vuccati nibbānaṃ.*

10. Saddharmapuṇḍarīka (Vaidya edn.) p. 91.

11. Laṅkāvatāra (Vaidya edn.) pp. 51–52.

12. See David J. Kalupahana, *The Principles of Buddhist Psychology*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987; Stefan Anacker, *Seven Works of Vasubandhu*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1984.

has been adapted in Buddhist worship giving it a different value. The following statement regarding idolatry found in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (Vol. 12, p. 70; 1960) may be quoted here before proceeding to discuss the subject. "In an age when the study of religion was practically confined to Judaism and Christianity, idolatry was regarded as a degeneration from an uncorrupt primeval faith, but the comparative and historical investigation of religion has shown it to be rather a stage of an upward movement, and by no means the earliest." In Buddhism this practice has to be examined in relation to the images representing the historical Buddha or his predecessors, the future Buddha Metteyya, dhyāni-Buddhas (s.v.), Bodhisattvas (s.v.) and the multitude of other deities connected with the faith, specially in its later developments like the Mahāyāna and the Vajrayāna.[1] As we are concerned here with the place assigned to this practice in Buddhism, it would suffice to discuss the subject with reference to the image of the historical Buddha. The theories applicable to the worship of the Buddha-image in this sense would apply, *mutatis mutandis,* to the worship of these other images as well.

The use of images as objects of worship was a historical development in Buddhism in all its phases from about the beginning of the Christian era. The early phase remained aniconic in that whenever need arose to show the Buddha's presence it was done through symbols such as the bodhi-tree, wheel of the law *(s.v. dhamma-cakka),* foot-print etc. This practice may be explained as being due to the influence of the Buddhist concept of Nirvana with the attainment of which the existence of the individual as a separate entity ceases. This state was beyond definition as being inconceivable in human and mundane terms. Consequently, it was unrealistic and contradictory to portray a released saint who has transcended earthly existence in anthropomorphic form as an individual.

Two statements of the Buddha himself that could have confirmed and strengthened this view can be adduced from the Pali Nikāyas. The first of these is found in the ***Brahmajāla Sutta*** (*D.* I, p. 46 ff.) and runs as follows: "The body of Tathāgata, O bhikkhus, stands devoid of the roots for re-existence; gods and men see his body so long as it remains intact: on the dissolution of the body, beyond the end of his life, neither gods nor men shall see it." The second statement was made to Vakkali Thera (*S.* III, p. 120) who was all the time gazing at the Buddha's physical form in admiration and the Buddha advised him not to be attracted towards a body full of impurities *(pūtikāya)* but to 'see' him by understanding the Dhamma. From the first statement it follows that it is incorrect for the world to look forward to continue seeing the Buddha in his physical form as he, on being the Buddha, had cut off for good his roots in saṃsāra. And according to the second statement the source of inspiration for the disciple should be the Dhamma through which the Teacher continues to live and not the physical body which is perishable and full of impurities. It discourages the glorification of the body as an object of personal adulation.

This kind of discouragement of rendering any special honour or reverence to him in the form of a personality cult must have led his disciples to consider that it was safer and more appropriate to represent the Master through symbols. Moreover, during the last days of his life, the Buddha explained to an impatient Ānanda that the form of honour the disciples could confer on him after his passing away would be to erect a *stūpa* over his bodily relics and place garlands and lamps beside it in memory of the Master. Other forms of aniconic representation would have been devised as monuments in Buddha's honour increased and there was an evident scarcity of relics. And accordingly till about the beginning of the Christian era the Buddha was represented aniconically.

However, in course of time, perhaps with the theistic and devotional developments of the Mahāyāna around the first century A.C. aniconic symbols began to be replaced by an image. In this novel and important development of the production of cult-images, the piety of the broad masses must have played a vital role in that they began to treat the Buddha more as a merciful redeemer than a Teacher showing the way. It was difficult for the ordinary folk of lesser intellect to conceive the Buddha as a principle represented through a symbol. The attitude of personel devotion, as exemplified by the case of Vakkali Thera referred to earlier, that such people would inevitably develop, also must have made stronger this necessity for images. This image, it may be observed here too, was generally a symbol and not a portrait. Images are integrated into the narratives dealing with the life of the historical Buddha. This was easily done, once the dread or the dislike of human-representation of the Buddha was overcome.

Literary references clearly show that the showing of respect and honour to the Buddha in person was quite common when he was alive. Those who came to meet him first paid their respects to him before engaging in a conversation. This practice was repeated at the time of departure as well. It was natural that a Teacher like the Buddha should have been honoured in this manner.

1. It is sometimes suggested that in India idolatry originated with the Buddhists, for the most ancient images found there are Buddhist (*ERE.* vi, p. 122) while both in Hindi and Persian the word for image is *'but'* derived from the term 'Buddha' (B. Walker, *Hindu World,* Vol. I, p. 468: London George Allen Unwin).

Accordingly, even after his passing, his devotees continued the practice, first aniconically and later through icons. This fact is very well illustrated by the story that led to the planting of the Ananda bodhi-tree. The citizens of Sāvatthi who visited the Jetavana in the Buddha's absence, not knowing how to dispose of the offerings they had brought for the Buddha, heaped them near the door of the Budha's chamber. Anāthapiṇḍika reported the matter to Ananda, who in consultation with the Buddha decided to plant a seed from the bodhi-tree at Gayā at the entrance to Jetavana monastery. This was ceremonially done amidst a large gathering and thereafter, those who came there in the Buddha's absence made their offerings to the Ānanda-bodhi which was considered as representing the Buddha.

The worship of images could be meaningful when the image is made use of as an aid to meditation and other religious exercises, when it helps the devotee to focus his attention on the truths discovered and propounded by the Buddha. To such a devotee the image as an anthropomorphic symbol, represents the Teacher (for this reason it is called an *uddesika cetiya)* and is devoid of any value or power in itself, except in an artistic sense. Its significance, accordingly, lies in a kind of acquired association. The ritualistic veneration *(pūjā)* of an image in such a sense is, undoubtedly a useful religious exercise in that it helps the devotee to recollect the Buddha's greatness which in turn would inevitably inspire him to follow the Dhamma preached by him. Like all cetiyas, images too, inspire the worshipper and gratify his mind. Thus the individual automatically progresses towards the attainment of Enlightenment. Veneration of images in this sense is to be regarded not only as useful and necessary but also as a progressive feature in Buddhist religious practice. It is an aid to worship and meditation. In this sense the practice has to be kept distinctly apart from idolatry and one should be wary of such descriptions of Buddhism as "heathen idolatry" as was done by the early Chistian missioneries who came to Sri Lanka from the West.[2]

Idolatry, on the other hand, could become a degenerate form of religious practice if the image of the Buddha is regarded not as a memorial symbol or as an aid to religious exercises but as the "Buddha himself" and endowed with divine influence. It is in this sense that idolatry becomes objectionable, when the devotee believes that the real Buddha actually 'lives' in the image. Such belief is sometimes inevitable as an element in popular piety and it is such practice that could be conveniently labelled as image-worship or idolatry in a pejorative sense. It could degenerate itself into "pagan idolatry" if the devotee confirms himself to the worship of the image as his main religious practice without practising the Dhamma.

But a factor common to both these higher and lower forms is the service the image performs as a reminder and a source of inspiration for the devotee by generating a feeling of respect and reverence for the Teacher. They also become helpful to the devotee by making it possible for him to approach the Teacher in a visible sense of closeness to Him.

It is not possible to assign the exact date at which the Buddha began to be represented and honoured through images. In the olden Buddhist sculpture at Bharhut and Sanchi of the second century B.C., the Buddha himself is not depicted although various other deities are portrayed in anthropomorphic form. It seems that the Buddha-image began to appear with the beginning of the Christian Era, although its existence prior to the date cannot be disproved. However, it should be mentioned here that according to the *Kāliṅgabodhi Jātaka* (*J.* IV, pp. 28–30) the Buddha-image *(paṭimā)* belongs to the *uddesika* (memorial or the last category of the three-fold division of Buddhist shrines (Cetiya s.v.), accepted as such by the Buddha himself.

It is of interest to refer here to a somewhat legendary account of the first instance of a Buddha image recovered by the Chinese pilgrim Hsüan Tsang. According to his account the Buddha himself not only approved the making of his images for memorial purposes, but also the showing of honour to them. The Chinese pilgrim records[3] that in a monastery at Kosambi there was a sandalwood image of Gautama Buddha with a stone canopy above it. It was put up by king Udena of Kosambi during the 3-month absence of the Buddha when he had ascended to the Tusita heaven to preach the Abhidhamma to the deities including his mother. The king had persuaded Arahant Moggallāna to transport by his spiritual powers an artist to the heavanly world to observe the likeness of the Buddha and take note of the sacred marks on his body. He had a statue carved out accordingly and when the Buddha returned from the Tusita heaven the statue "rose and saluted him" and the Buddha then addressed the statue in the following terms: "The work expected from you is to toil in the conversion of heretics and to lead future generations in the way of religion."[4]

2. See *Buddhist Commission Report,* All Ceylon Buddhist Congress, 1956 (Sinhala), p. 67.

3. Samuel Beal, *Chinese Accounts of India,* Vol. II, p. 254.

4. When King Pasenadi of Kosala heard what *Udena* of Kosambi had done, he too got a sandalwood copy of this image made for the Jetavana monastery during the same period of Buddha's absence (ibid. I, p. 26), which agrees with the story of the *Kosalabimbavaṇṇanā* given below

According to another version of the same story preserved in Pali entitled *Kosalabimbavannanā*, "Account of the Kosala image."[5], once king Pasenadi of Kosala went to the Jetavana to meet the Buddha with flowers, incense etc. As the Buddha had left the monastery he, along with many others who had gone in like manner, left all the articles of offering in the monastery and returned home. On the following day the king met the Buddha and informed him of what had happened and indicated his wish to make a statue of the Buddha to be honoured in his absence. The Buddha not only approved the idea but instructed as how to do it as well. Thereupon the king got a beautiful statue made out of sandalwood. The Buddha was pleased with the work and is said to have made the same statement to the statue as recorded by Hsüan Tsang in the above instance. The description contains a number of Pali stanzas extolling the merits of making Buddha images and the writing of books on the Dhamma.

Whether the incidents recorded in these references are historically true or not, the statement said to have been made by the Buddha to the statue is significant because it is intended to make a case for the making of and worship of Buddha images in the manner earlier described. In this qualified sense idolatry can be looked upon as a feature of Buddhism as has also been proved historically up to the present day.

A. G. S. Kariyawasam

IGNORANCE. See AVIJJĀ

ILLUSION consists essentially of an erroneous interpretation of some external object which is then mistaken for something other than it actually is. It seems probable that certain illusions are generated by conscious wishes, and that the error of mistaking one object for another is due to the desire to see some specific object. But when an experience in the senses is not based on an external factual object, it is called a hallucination. An illusion, therefore, is a deception which has its basis in actuality and which may be a misinterpretation of a fact, e.g., a *fata morgana* or mirage, an optical illusion, a misinterpretation of an actual experience.

But if the imposition is without physical or imaginary ground, one speaks of a delusion, e.g., the illusion that all phenomena are based on a substance (noumenon), that all living beings are individual entities with a permanent soul *(atta)* etc.

Heretical views and speculations *(miccha-ditthi)* are usually based on delusion *(moha)*, particularly on the erroneous view of self-delusion *(sakkāya-ditthi)*. Whereas an illusion can easily be rectified by a correct interpretation of fact or experience, a delusion, being a view which is baseless, blocks the very entrance to the path of perfection and is one of the cardinal mental states lying at the root of all unskilful action. See MOHA.

H. G. A. van Zeyst

ILL-WILL (Pāli *byāpāda, vyāpāda*, cf. *dosa, patigha)* is evil feeling or intention towards another, malevolence, enmity or dislike. It is an unskilled or unwholesome *(akusala)* state of the mind and also one of the five hindrances *(pañca nivarana)* that obstruct the growth and cultivation of the mind. It is enumerated as the ninth in the list of ten unwholesome actions *(dasa-akusala kamma)*. The causal genesis of ill-will is discussed in the *Saṃyutta-nikāya* (I.p. 151). It is said that because of the element of ill-will *(vyāpāda-dhātu)* arises perception of ill-will *(vyāpāda-saññā)* and because of this arise thoughts of ill-will *(vyāpāda-sankappa)*, because of thoughts of ill-will arises desire for ill-will, and through this arises a burning passion *(parilāha)* for ill-will, this gives rise to a quest for ill-will. Pursuing a malevolent quest the worldling indulges in wrong conduct in deed, word and thought. Therefore, it is a root cause of unwholesome action *(akusala-mūla)*.

The *Sāleyyaka Sutta* (*M.* I. p. 287) very succinctly explains the strain of thoughts that arise in a mind that is affected by ill-will. It says that a person with such a mind thinks, "Let these beings be killed or slaughtered or annihilated or destroyed or may they not exist at all."

Thus it is seen that harbouring of ill-will is harmful to both oneself and others. It is said that one who harbours ill-will will certainly fall into a woeful state after death (*S.* IV, p. 343).

The antidote to a mind afflicted by ill-will is the cultivation of *Brahmavihāra* (q.v.). This is illustrated by the Buddha in the *Mahārāhulovāda Sutta* (*M.* I. p. 424 ff.)

5. This discourse is recorded as having been delivered by the Buddha at the request both of Ānanda and Pasenadi. The *Kosalabimbavannnā*, assigned to the 13th or the 14th century (DPPN. I, 698), is available in Sinhala (with the metrical portions given in Pali as well), edited by Rev. A. Gunananda, 1926; Colombo: it is a 10 page booklet available at the Colombo Museum Library: the story invites comparison with that of the Anandabodhi (s.v.). See also ICONOGRAPHY, ICONOMETRY.

Addressing Rāhula the Buddha says, "Develop the (mind) cultivation that is loving kindness *(mettā)*. For, from developing this that which is ill-will *(byāpāda)* will be got rid of. Develop mind cultivation that is compassion *(karunā)*. For, from this that which is harming *(vihesā)* will be got rid of. Develop mind cultivation that is sympathetic joy *(muditā)*. For, developing this that which is aversion *(arati)* will be got rid of. Develop the mind cultivation that is equanimity *(upekkhā)*. For, developing this that which is sensory reaction *(patigha)* will be got rid of. See DOSA, DVESA, ENMITY, VYĀPĀDA.

A. G. S. Kariyawasam

IMAGE, BUDDHA: Where and when the first Buddha image was made has been the subject of a protracted controversy. In recent times, however, the tendency has been to support the view that the first Buddha image was made in Mathura, (Cribb, Joe. The Origin of the Buddha Image — Numismatic Evidence, *South Asian Archaeology,* Cambridge, 1981, p. 237). Even in pre-Christian times, Indian sculptors with considerable skill and virtuosity, had created significant sculptures, as exemplified by the remains of Bharhut and Sanchi and when the demand for a tangible and concrete object of worship by Buddhists became irresistible, Indian sculptors and their patrons ignored the existing taboos against making images of the Buddha, and proceeded to make these images, which perhaps, were made in the 1st century A.C. both in Gandhara and Mathura. It would appear, however, that the first representations of the Buddha are to be found in some coins issued by King Kaniṣka (A.C. 78–144).

After the Buddha image had been fashioned for the first time at Mathura and in Gandhara, two schools of Buddhist sculpture with distinct characteristics were soon established in these two regions.

The Mathura Buddha statues were usually made of red sandstone found in its vicinity. The head of the Buddha is shown as shaven and never covered with curls except in later specimens. A distinguishing feature of these figures is that the *uṣṇīṣa,* the protuberance that appears at the top of the head, takes on the shape of a snail, *kaparda.* The ūrṇā, the curl of hair appearing on the forehead of the Buddha, is placed between the eyebrows, immediately above the upper end of the nose.

In seated Buddha images of this type the right hand is in the *abhaya-mudrā,* the gesture of assurance, in which the palm of the raised right-hand either faces the viewer or is turned to the left-hand side of the statue. The left-hand rests on the left thigh, slightly above the knee. The figure is invested with a simple halo around the head, and is seated on a lion throne, with the Srī Mahābodhi under which prince Siddhartha attained to Buddhahood, in the background.

In standing figures the Buddha's right hand is shown again in the *abhaya-mudrā,* while the left-hand is shown holding the left hand folds of the robe just above the waist.

In both types of the statue the robe is shown attached to the body, except above the left shoulder where thick schematic folds are shown in profusion. In the Gandhara type of Buddha statue generally the face took on a classical aspect with a pure oval shape regular features, eyebrows curving over the straight nose, wavy hair and a calm expression (Hallade, p. 79). Its main features are essentially Indian. In standing Buddha figures, the robe covers both shoulders, with folds cascading downwards in a schematic pattern. They are usually placed on lotus pedestals, and lacking in height appear to be rather stocky. The head and shoulders display the same characteristics as appear in seated figures. A common feature of the seated Buddha figures of the Gandhara School is the lifeless character of the folded legs, a feature, perhaps, indicating that the Gandharan sculptors were not quite familiar with the postures adopted by Indians when engaged in meditation.

In appearance the two types of the Buddha statue are markedly different. The influence of Hellenistic sculpture is quite apparent in Gandhara figures, while in the Mathura figures, the main features are characteristically Indian, accentuating the frailty of the drapery and giving the face a roundness typical of the Mathura School, (Hallade, p. 78).

One of the earliest representations of the Buddha appears on a gold coin issued in the reign of the Kuṣāna Emperor Kaniṣka. In this coin the Buddha is shown in a standing posture, in very low relief, with a raised line around the body to represent light emanating from his body. On the Buddha's right hand side appears the word *Boddo,* in Greek characters inscribed vertically (Rowland, Benjamin, *The Art and Architecture of India,* Penguin Books, 2nd Ed. 1956 (1) pl. 30 H). Often early figures of the Buddha appear in a relic casket of King Kaniṣka and another relic casket from Bimaran (Rowland, B. *op.cit.* (i) plate 38). The so-called Bodhisattva dedicated by Frair Bala is also considered by some to be one of the earliest figures of the Buddha (*ibid.* plate 45). According to John Marshall one of the earliest Gandhara Buddhas is to be seen on display at the Rijksmuseum Voor Volkskunde at Leiden (Hallade, *op.cit.* p. 80). This Buddha head is covered with wavy hair and surmounted by an *uṣṇīṣa* similarly treated (Hallade, *op. cit.* plate 57).

The two colossal seated Buddha figures at Bamiyan, one measuring 125 feet and the other 175 feet in height

may be considered offshoots in the Gandharan style influenced by Sassanian styles. The same could be said in regard to the small seated Buddha statue, approximately 40 cm. in height, now on display in the Kabul Museum and the similar statue exhibited in the Musée Guimet, Paris, both discovered in Fondukistan (Hallade, *op.cit.* plate xvi and plate 175) respectively. In the former figure the robe covers only the left shoulder and hangs loosely in ample folds. The right hand is shown in the *abhaya-mudrā*, while the left hand rests on the lap. The latter figure shows the Buddha in the *dharma-cakra-mudrā* (the attitude showing the Buddha preaching the *Dhamma-Cakka Sutta* at Isipatana).

The Gandhara style of sculpture lasted till about the end of the sixth century. Before it went out of vogue, it produced, adapting also some of the stylistic features of the Mathura School, the style of sculpture known as the Āndhra Style.

The Andhra style appears mainly in the Buddha images and bas-reliefs found at the sites of the well-known stupas of Amarāvati and Nāgārjunakoṇḍa in South India. The style was also adopted in Buddha statues found at Nāgapaṭṭinam and in some places such as Anuradhapura and Dambulla in Sri Lanka.

As has been pointed out by Benjamin Rowland these images carved from limestone are characterised by a rather stiff hieratic quality. The bodies have something of the fulness of the Mathura type, while the drapery, usually represented in a series of lines or ridges, appears to be a conventionalization of the Gandhara formula (Rowland, B. *op.cit.* (II), p. 12).

In the Andhra style itself, however, there are very marked differences that may be mentioned here. In the early examples of this type, such as for example in a high relief of the Buddha (on display in the British Museum) represented in a standing posture, the head is round and covered with curls of hair regularly arranged around the head. The body is erect and stiff and there is hardly any differentiation of the several parts. The robe is draped on the body, exposing the right shoulder and is indicated by a few diagonal grooves. A broad fold of the robe is placed over the left hand resting against the chest. A large part of the under-garment is exposed below the lower edge of the upper robe. These features invaribly appear in the standing figures of the Buddha made in the period 4th – 5th century A.C. in the Andhra region, (Coomaraswamy, A. K. *op.cit.* Pl. XXXIII, 137–139. There are however instances where a standing Buddha figure has both shoulders covered with the robe as in Gandhara statues, with the schematic folds of the robe arranged down the length of the statue (Coomaraswamy, Pl. XXXIII, 137). The Buddha is presented in the same sartorial style in bas-reliefs (Coomaraswamy, Pl. XXIII, 141).

Gupta Period: The Gupta style of sculpture came into vogue about the middle of the fourth century A.C. As far as the Buddha image is concerned it was clearly a blending of the Mathura style with that of Gandhara. Buddha images of the Gupta period are characterised by an elegant and and pleasing appearance. The Gupta sculptor's aim was to produce an image that gave expression to the Buddha's spiritual attainments while creating a work of art that was aesthetically most satisfying. The Standing Buddha from Mathura, now in the Indian Museum, Calcutta, is perhaps one of the best examples of this type of Buddha image. The robe in this statue covers both shoulders and its folds are shown as raised lines arranged in an attractive pattern. It is attached to the body whose contours can be seen through the robe which gives the impression of being made by a very thin material. The face of the statue is triangular and the head is covered with curls of hair turning clockwise. The *uṣṇīṣa* is shown quite prominently as a semi-globular appendage in the top of the head. The head is surrounded by a halo consisting of several circular bands decorated with floral designs the centre piece being a full blown lotus, right behind the Buddha's head (Rowland, B. *op.cit.* Pl. 80). A statue of the Buddha, almost a replica of what has been described above, is a headless figure, made of red sandstone, from Mathura, (Seckel, Dietrich. *The Art of Buddhism*, Methuen, London, 1964, Plate 14). The left hand of this statue holds the hem of the robe and judging from the Sultanganj figure described below, the right hand of which the forearm is completely destroyed, should have been shown in the *abhaya mudrā* (Pl. XLIV).

Another notable example of a Buddha figure of the Gupta period is a copper image from Sultanganj, now in the Birmingham Museum. In respect of the main features it resembles closely the stone image from Mathura described above. In this figure the right hand is shown in the *abhaya-mudrā*. The left hand hangs down with the forearm stretching forward holding the hem of the robe. The robe covers both shoulders and its folds are indicated by means of thin lines inscribed in a schematic pattern. The features of the body can be clearly seen through the robe, as in the statue from Mathura described above.

Of seated Buddha figures of the Gupta period perhaps the most notable example is the figure discovered at Sarnath, now on exhibit in the Museum there, (Coomaraswamy A. K., *op.cit.* (i) Plate 161). Here the Buddha is seated on a throne, with legs crossed so as to show the soles of both feet to the viewers. The hands are held in front of the body in the *dhamma-cakka-mudrā*. The head is covered by curls turning clockwise, with the *uṣṇīṣā*, shown prominently on the head around which is again a highly decorated halo. Two *Vidyādharas* appear

on either side of the halo. The robe is shown by the hem appearing around the neck by a fold hanging down from the right forearm and by the edges of the inter and the inner robe shown on the shins (Coomaraswamy, ibid.). On the front socle of the throne are depicted a wheel on either side of which devotees are shown paying homage to it, together with two antelopes on either side of the wheel, facing each other. The *mudrā*, the wheel and the antelopes unmistakably indicate that this statue is intended to show the Buddha preaching his first sermon at Isipatana in Benares. Another figure with similar artistic merit is the head and torso of the Buddha now in the Mathura Museum, (Halliade, *op.cit.* Pl. 142). In this fragment, however, the robe which covers both shoulders, is almost completely attached to the body with scarcely a fold shown except around the neck, where the edge of the robe is represented by a semicircle, made of two raised lines.

Two or three Buddha statues assigned to the seventh century may be mentioned here, as they perhaps represent the last flickers of the Gandhara style. They are the figures discovered at Fondukistan in Afghanistan and now on exhibit in Museums in Europe and in Kabul.

The first of these is a highly decorative fragment of a figure from the waist upwards, now on exhibit at the Musée Guimet (Rowland, B. *op.cit.* (1) Pl. 62A) (Pl. XLV). The head of the figure which is somewhat effeminate and is covered with curls of hair turning clockwise, leaving a very high forehead. Around the neck is placed a striking necklace consisting of a wide band with tassels hanging at regular intervals. The torso is draped in a cape like blouse, consisting of three triangular flaps adorned with rosettes in relief. The edges of the triangular flaps which are decorated with a bead pattern are also tasselled. Underneath the cape can be seen the regular robe whose ample folds are shown on the trunk and on the arms, in the form of shallow grooves. The ears are long and pierced, and are adorned with circular earrings.

The other two statues of note are both seated figures. The first of these, now on exhibit in the Kabul Museum, is seated with legs disposed in a relaxed position, unlike in statues where the legs are placed in quite a rigid position. Only the left shoulder is covered by the robe which hangs down in schematic folds over the chest. The right hand is held up in the *Abhaya-mudrā*. The left hand rests on the lap. The third statue is shown in a rigid *padmāsana* position. The robe which is represented in loose folds covers both shoulders not unlike in seated Gandhara figures. The expression on the face is a lively one, the eyelids cut sharply to join the nose ridge. There is a prominent *uṣṇīṣa* on the head. The hands are held in the *vitarka-mudrā*, the attitude of exposition. In all these statues, the influence of the Gandhara School is palpably noticeable.

When the rule of the Guptas came to an end in India Northern and Central India came under the kings of the Pala and the Sena dynasties. They were Hindus by religion, but allowed Buddhists who were scattered about India to carry on with their religious activities unhindered. They belonged to a sect called the Vajrayāna, which was an off-shoot of the Mahāyāna which was the dominant religion in some parts of India. Vajrayāna required its adherents to engage themselves in meditation, which required some form of concrete object as an aid to their meditation. Hence the appearance of a class of black stone stelae containing a figure of the Buddha or of a Bodhisattva who figured in their pantheon, which included scores of Bodhisattvas and their female aspects the *śaktis*. The Bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara's female aspect was the well-known deity Tārā.

It is clear that the Buddha images made in the time of the rulers of the Pala and Sena dynasties inherited many of the characteristics of the Gupta images. As stated above the images were bas-reliefs sculpted on stelae, generally, with a raised outer frame, containing on a small scale one or two characteristic incidents which could identify the event the sculptor intended to depict, the Buddha again appearing as the central figure. The standing Buddha from Biharail, Rajshahi District in North India, displays unmistakable Gupta characteristics. The face is triangular and the hair is shown in circular curls. The *uṣṇīṣa* is prominently placed on the head. The robe is attached to the body, disclosing all the limbs, while the outer robe hangs down like a loose cloak, (Banerjie, Plate XI (a)). A more advanced type of standing Buddha appears in a stelae in the Indian Museum, Calcutta, (Banerjie, *op.cit.* p. xxiii (b). In this figure the Buddha is invested with all the characteristics mentioned above such as the robe attached to the body and the cloak-like outer robe, with two additional features, namely, a decorative border to the hem of the robe around the neck and high crown on the head, which is an essential feature of an *abhiṣeka* Buddha, a concept peculiar to the Vajrayāna sect of Buddhism. With the commencement of the Muslim invasions of India in the eighth century, Buddhism and its temples came under attack and therewith it ceased to play any significant role in the religious life of the people of North India and Bihar.

In the Andhra region in the South, however, in centres such as Amarāvatī, Nāgārjunakoṇḍa and Nāgapaṭṭinam Buddhism continued to be a living religion, creating the circumstances necessary to the evolution of a Buddha image with characteristics peculiar to it, different from any type of Buddha image that appeared in India earlier.

In this type of Buddha image, the robe is draped over the front of the body and carried over the left shoulder, a

part falling over the folded left arm and held in place by the left hand. The folds of the robe are marked by shallow grooves that fall diagonally across the body. An invariable feature of these statues is the under-robe shown below the lower hem of the outer robe. One of the earliest examples of the Andhra type of Buddha statue is the standing Buddha assigned to the third century, now on display in the Musée Guimet, Paris. In this statue, standing before a *toraṇa* the body is almost like a solid block of stone, without any demarcation of the different parts of the body, such as the waist. The right hand is damaged, but almost certainly displays the *abhaya-mudrā*. The left hand is folded back with the hand resting on the chest. The robe, indicated by some shallow lines drawn diagonally across the body, is folded over the left hand and hangs down almost reaching the hem of the inner robe, of which a large portion is exposed below the outer robe. An example of a somewhat later date is a headless statue from Nāgārjunakoṇḍa, where the body is shown more naturally, with waist clearly demarcated. The folds of the robe are in the form of shallow continuous lines incised diagonally across the body (Rowland, *op.cit.* p. 71 (A) Pl. XLV). There are also examples of standing Buddha figures, in which both shoulders are covered with the folds of the robe shown as semi-circular parallel lines drawn from the whole body. This type of figure, perhaps has been influenced by Gandhra prototypes (Coomaraswamy, Pl. XXXIII. 137 and 141).

A very striking bronze image in the standing position, probably from Nāgapaṭṭinam may be mentioned here. The head is oblong and is covered with circular curls, with an *uṣṇīṣa* crowned by a symbolised flame. The right hand is in the *abhaya-mudrā,* while the left hand is shown holding the hem of the robe, (Zwalf, W. ed. Buddhism: *Art and Faith,* London, 1985, p. 147). The robe is attached to the body, which is clearly shown through the robe, with some pleats at the bottom. The influence of the Gupta style of sculpture is apparent in this statue. It has been assigned to 11th–12th century.

A rare example of a sturdy bronze statue of the Buddha in the Andhra style is on exhibit in the Government Museum, Madras. The basic features of the Buddha statue of the Andhra style can be seen in this sculpture which is of considerable artistic merit. In place of the usual *abhaya-mudrā* in the right hand and the left hand raised holding the robe in place or holding the left hand in front of the left part of the breast, here the hands are shown in what may be considered the *kaṭaka-mudrā* or the *vitarka-mudrā*. Here the right hand is stretched forward with the fingers slightly bent, while in the left hand the forearm is turned towards the right with the fingers bent in a half-closed fist, showing the Buddha in an attitude of arguing or emphasising a point. The statue is on the whole, well-proportioned and elegantly finished (Jermsawatdi, Plate 9).

Sri Lanka: According to the *Mahāvaṃsa* the Buddha image had been in existence as early as the regin of King Devanampiyatissa, (250–210 B.C.) but this information appears in a part of the chronicle *Mhv.* XXXVI, 128–129) which records the achievements of King Jeṭṭhatissa (A.C. 266–276) and much credence cannot be placed in this statement. Images of the Buddha are also referred to in the account of the construction of the Mahāthūpa at Anuradhapura *(Mhv.* XXX, 72–73) but again this statement cannot be regarded as trustworthy, as this event had taken place some considerable time before the Buddha image appeared in India. The oldest image of the Buddha found in Sri Lanka, however, appears to be the standing Buddha found at Maha-iluppallama, near Kekirava in the Anuradhapura district. This statue is made of South Indian marble and could only have been imported from the Andhra region. It has also the distinctive features that characterise the Amarāvatī school of sculpture.

Perhaps some of the oldest Buddha images found in Sri Lanka had been placed around the Ruvanväli-sāya at Anuradhapura. They are now housed in the verandah of the small shrine room at the southern entrance to the precincts of the *stūpa*. Some more statues of the same type are exhibited on a specially made platform near the Pabaluvehera at Polonaruwa. Judging by the arrangement of the robe, the demarcation of the waist, with, in some instances, a belt being seen through the robe and the undergarment appearing below the hem of the outer robe, these statues must be reckoned as being of a later date than the statue in the Musée Guimet and may be assigned to about the fourth century A.C. Similar statues of the Buddha are found at the Dambulla-vihāra and a particularly large standing Buddha in the grounds of the Srī Mahā Bodhi at Anuradhapura, of a slightly later date, perhaps are the seated Buddha from Toluvila, now in the Colombo Museum, the three seated Buddhas in the vicinity of the Abhayagiri stūpa and the seated Buddha at the Asokārāma at Pankuliya, in Anuradhapura about two miles to the north of the Abhayagiri stūpa. The Toluvila seated Buddha, which is 5 ft. 9 in. in height is certainly a very impressive work fashioned in the *dhyāni-mudrā,* i.e. in an attitude of meditation, with folded legs the right placed on the left. The hands rest on the lap with the right hand on the left and the palms turned upwards. The robe is totally attached to the body, only feint hem being shown across the chest. The face shows a placid and calm expression with the eyes turned towards the tip of the nose. The contours of the body, on the chest and the waist are shown clearly. It is indeed the work of a master craftsman for it is only such a sculptor who could have conceived and executed such a piece of flawless art (Pl. XLVI).

A similar seated Buddha figure of considerable artistic merit is on exhibit at the Museum of Archaeology at Anuradhapura. It had been found at Tirappan-kadavala near Horovpotana. Like the seated Buddha from Toluvila this statue too is in the *dhyāni-mudrā*. Though the statue has undergone considerable weathering, traces of the folds of the robe can still be noticed on the left flank. Owing to weathering, details on the face have been rendered obscure but as a whole the figure has been well modelled and is an impressive work of art that is capable of inspiring feelings of faith and spiritual elevation in the worshipper (Pl. XLVII).

The image at Paṅkuliya appears to be *in situ* and some of the remains of the original image house are yet to be seen around the image. The figure is seated with legs crossed, the right resting on the left. The right hand is in the *abhaya-mudrā*, while the left hand is folded and held up with a closed fist, indicating that the Buddha is engaged in the exposition of the dhamma. The face has been rendered full with a rare expression of serenity and inner contentment. This statue has been assigned to the seventh or the eighth century on the basis of an inscription in the flight of steps leading to the shrine where the statue has been installed. But it may well belong to a somewhat earlier period. (Fernando, p. 12, Pl. XLVII).

About the middle of the Anuradhapura period i.e., about the sixth century, colossal statues of the Buddha were set up at Avukana, Sasseruva and Maligavila. The first two of these statues have been carved out of living rock, with a thin strip attaching the statue to the rock. Of these the statue at Avukana, which measures 38 ft. 10 in. is basically similar to the Andhra standing statues of an earlier age. The robe covers only the left shoulder over which it is held in position by the raised left hand. The right hand is raised with the palm facing the left hand side of the statue. The *siraspata* on the *uṣṇīṣa* is a later replacement (pl. XLVIII).

The statue at Sasseruva is carved of a rock, like the Avukana statue, with the difference that the former is carved inside a rectangular box-like area excavated in the rock. The robe whose folds are here indicated by means of shallow grooves, covers only the left shoulder. The palm of the right hand is partly turned towards the front. A *siraspata* which had been placed on the head appears to have been dislodged, leaving an empty circular socket. Over each of these statues there had been a shelter to protect the statue from the weather (Pl. XLIX).

The statue at Maligavila is a free standing sculpture and measures 37 ft. from head to foot. The robe covers only the left shoulder and its folds are indicated in the same manner as in the Avukana statue. However, the right hand, with the lower arm including the palm, is held down straight with the latter turned to the left. The *uṣṇīṣa* has not been provided with a *siraspata*. It is the only colossal statue in Sri Lanka constructed as a free-standing sculpture, but it was not provided with a foundation of adequate depth, resulting in its crashing down into pieces.

Metal Statues: Only a few of the metal Buddha images, probably made in considerable numbers in the Anuradhapura period have survived in the ravages of time. A specimen of unusual artistic merit is a seated Buddha from Badulla, now on exhibit at the National Museum, Colombo, the right hand being in the attitude of exposition, *vyākhyāna-mudrā* and the left hand holding the hem of the robe. The face is youthful in appearance and is characterised by an expression of utter calm and contentment. A socket meant for the *siraspata* appears in the centre of the *uṣṇīṣa*. This statue has been assigned to the fifth or the sixth century. (Devendra, D. T., *The Buddha Image and Ceylon*, Kandy, 1957, Pl. XIV).

Another Buddha statue of the same period, but in the standing position, had been discovered at a place called Viharagala, near Horovpotana in the North-Central Province of Sri Lanka. The face is full, with eyes half closed. The right hand is in the *abhaya-mudrā*, but turned half way to the right. The fingers are slightly bent, unlike in Avukana Buddha, rendering this statue more realistic. There had been a *siraspata* on the *uṣṇīṣa*, but is missing today leaving an empty base. The folds of the robe are shown as raised lines with regular flat spaces between.

A seated Buddha statue not unlike the Toluvila Buddha has been found at Seruvawila in the Eastern Province. It is in the *dhyāni-mudrā*, but is seated on the coils of a cobra, with a fan-like arrangement of nine cobra hoods around the head. There is hardly even a trace of the robe. (Devendra, D. T., *op.cit.* Pl. XVI).

Two seated bronze Buddha statues of a later date, perhaps of the tenth century, were found in one of the *vāhalkaḍas* of the Ruvanvalisaya at Anuradhapura and at an unspecified place at Mädirigiriya near Polonnaruwa. A bronze statue of great distinction of the Buddha, in the standing position found at Mädavacciya can also be assigned to this period, i.e., about the sixth century (Uduvara, Pl. 9). The head as well as the body of this statue has been modelled with great skill. The right hand is in the *abhaya-mudrā*, the palm and the fingers being shown realistically, without that stiffness that appears in several statues of this type. The folds of the robe appear as raised lines with spaces or with slightly curved spaces, in cross section in between. The chest and the waist have been very elegantly rendered.

The first of these two statues is a well-proportioned and dignified figure in which details have been rendered obscure because of weathering. The robe covers only the left shoulder and appears to be attached to the body without any folds. The *saṅghāṭi*, i.e., the folded outer

robe placed over the left shoulder, can still be clearly seen and indicates a date towards end of the Anuradhapura period. The head is covered in curls, with an *uṣṇīṣa* in two tiers. The eyes are closed befitting a statue in the *dhyāni-mudrā* (Devendra, D. T., *op.cit.* Pl. XV).

The Buddha from Toluvila is seated, on a two tiered lotus seat, in the *dhyāni-mudrā*. The robe, as usual, covers only the left shoulder, with folds in the form of raised lines. The face has been skilfully modelled with sharp features. The *uṣṇīṣa* appears to have been provided with a *siraspata* now missing (Devendra, D. T., *op.cit.* Pl. XVII). These two may be dated in the tenth or the eleventh century.

Owing to the dislocations caused in the kingdom of Anuradhapura by Tamils in the Chola country in South India, the capital of Sri Lanka was moved from Anuradhapura to Polonnaruwa. In the new capital King Vijayabahu I (A.C. 1056-1111) and King Parakramabahu I (A.C. 1153-1186) set in process an extensive programme of building, including image houses.

In perhaps the most magnificent image house so-built named Lankatilaka was installed a standing Buddha image, now heavily damaged, in a pose not unlike that of the Avukana Buddha. In the image house called the Tivanka Image House, befitting the image installed therein, the standing image, again heavily damaged, is bent at the neck, the waist and the knees, giving the image a dynamic form. In their original condition these two magnificent images would certainly have inspired a high sense of religious fervour and awe in the devotees. The most impressive Buddha images of the Polonnaruwa period (A.C. 1056-1215) however are to be focussed at the Uttararama (the Northern Temple) or the Gal Vihara situated in the northern part of Polonnaruwa.

This complex of images consists of a seated figure at the left, (from the point of view of the devotee) another seated figure inside a chamber excavated in the rock, a standing figure and finally a figure in the recumbent position (Paranavitana, S., *Art and Architecture of Ceylon*, Polonnaruwa Period, Art Council of Ceylon, 1954 Plates 59-62 (Pl. L).

Buddha figure on the left is in the *dhyāni-mudrā* and is positioned with a *makara-toraṇa* behind it. Miniature figures of Buddhas in the *dhyāni-mudrā* have also been carved, two figures on either side. This figure measures 46 ft. from head to foot and this large size of the figure combined with the virtuosity displayed in its design and execution presents a truly magnificent conception of the intellectual and spiritual qualities of the Buddha.

To the right of the seated Buddha figure described above is an excavated cave, called the Vidyādhara-guhā inside which has been sculpted a seated Buddha figure in the *dhyāni-mudrā* with a *makara-toraṇa* in the background, and with two *bodhisattvas* on either side fanning the Buddha with a *cāmara* (yak-tailed fan). It would appear that the whole group has been conceived as a *maṇḍala* seated in front of which devotees could engage themselves in meditation (Fernando). The third figure in the group is a standing figure of the Buddha, with hands laid across the breast. The head is well-modelled and is quite similar to that of the seated Buddha in the Vidyādhara-guhā. The last of the group is a recumbent figure of the Buddha slightly over forty-six feet in length, realistically rendered (Pl. LI).

Consequent to invasions from South India, the capital of Sri Lanka was moved from Polonnaruwa successively to Dambadeniya, Yapahu, and to Gampola where King Bhuvanekabahu IV (A.C. 1344-1359) built two image houses, each with a seated Buddha statue in the *dhyāni-mudrā*, made of brick and plaster. These statues, however, were plastered and painted in the eighteenth century in the contemporary style. The large recumbent statue in the image house at Räs-vehera has been also similarly treated.

A statue of exceptional merit now in the Royal Scottish Museum, Edinburgh, which is also been assigned to the fourteenth century is a solid cast bronze statue of the Buddha seated on a two tiered lotus seat. It measures 49.5 cm. in height. The robe which covers only the left shoulder is shown as being attached to the body. The hem of the upper robe is shown across the breast, while the hems of the outer robe and under-robe are shown on the shins. The head and the body have been very skilfully modelled imparting to the statue a dignified and imposing presence (Zwalf W. *op.cit.* p. 152).

At the beginning of the sixteenth century Sri Lanka was invaded by the Portuguese followed after a century and a half by the Dutch and after another nearly one hundred and fifty years by the British. Owing to the disturbed conditions created by these invasions, it would appear that the Sri Lankan artists, who had created in the past Buddha figures of exceptional artistic merit, ceased to be inspired adequately to produce sculptures of any significance in the history of Buddhist art.

An attempt was made however, in the reign of King Kīrti-Śrī-Rājasiṃha (A.C. 1747-1782) to revive Buddhism. Old temples in various parts of the Island were repaired and restored and new ones built where needed. Buddha images, in all the three positions, some of colossal dimensions, are to be found in these new or newly repaired image houses in places such as Dambulla, Degal-doruva, Ridi-vihara and Mulkirigala. The folds of the robes in these statues are represented by raised lines placed close together in a wavy pattern on the trunk and in more or less straight lines closely fitting the limb or

part of the body covered by the robe. A seated bronze image of the Buddha at the Lankatilaka-vihara near Gampola, is perhaps a good example of this type of Buddha image. In this statue the robe covers only the left shoulder as usual. The folds of the robe are indicated by raised lines placed close together in a rhythmic pattern. The hair is represented by circular button like curls and the head is crowned by a lyre-shaped *siraspata*. The ***sanghāṭi***, placed over the left shoulder, is represented by a band reaching almost up to the waist, (Mudiyanse, Nandasena. *The Art and Architecture of Gampola Period*, Colombo, 1964. Figs. Nos. 1-3 and 11). Usually these seated Buddha statues are framed in an elaborate *makara-toraṇa* (Pls. 10-14) (Pl. LII, LIII).

A good example of this type of elaborate Buddha image is at the Danagirigala vihāra about twelve miles south east of Kegalle, in the Sabaragamuwa Province. The Buddha figure here is placed on a *padmāsana*, which rests on a projecting *āsana*, with a series of mouldings. The Buddha sits in the *dhyāni mudrā* with hands placed the right upon the left. The hair on the head is represented by circular curls and a lyre shaped *siraspata* appears on the head. The folds of the robe are shown as closely placed lines in relief, as is usual in Buddha images made in the eighteenth century.

The robe covers only the left shoulder over which the ***sanghāti*** has been placed as a prominent band. The statue is framed in an elaborate *makara-toraṇa* with an awe-inspiring ***kīrti-mukha*** surmounting it. Over the two arms of the ***makara-toraṇa***, on either side of the ***kīrti-mukha***, stand four deities: two on each side. Gods Skandha and Śakra appear on the left while Brahma and Viṣṇu stand on the right, from the point of view of the devotee. Over the ***kīrti-mukha*** is an unfurled umbrella, around which can be seen the branches of the Śrī Mahā Bodhi in a highly symbolic form. The design and execution of this seated Buddha are indeed a most magnificient achievement of the eighteenth century Sri Lankan sculpture.

In image houses recently built or repaired, Buddha statues have been executed in all kinds of styles fancied by sculptors and painters, including even the Gandhara style.

Myanmar (Burma): Traditionally it is believed that Buddhism was introduced to Burma, then known as Suvaṇṇabhūmi, in the third century B.C. by the missionaries of the Indian Emperor Asoka. But the earliest evidence available suggests a point of time in the fifth century as the date of the introduction of Buddhism to Burma, (Coomaraswamy A.K. *op.cit.* p. 169). At first it was at Thaton in South Burma that Buddhist activities were initiated but later in the ninth century Pegu, slightly north to Thaton, also became a centre of considerable religious activity.

The earliest Buddha images made in Burma appear to have been palpably influenced by the traditions of Indian sculptors of the Gupta period. This influence is clearly to be seen in a gilded Buddha image assigned to the seventh - eighth century, installed in the Ananda temple in Pagan in Central Burma. In this statue in the standing position the hair is shown in curls with high bun like *uṣṇīṣa*. The robe covers both the shoulders with a broad and highly ornate *sanghāṭi*. The upper robe, attached to the body from the neck down almost to the ankle is stretched out on either side of the waist and the legs, to form something like a cloak. The right hand hangs down in the *varada-mudrā*, while the left hand hangs down by the side of the body, (Hallade, *op.cit.* Plate 35). A similar statue, but obviously of a later date, is to be seen in the Zhweizigon Pagoda in Pagan, Central Burma. In this statue too the robe is attached to the body and the outer robe is shown on either side of the body like a cloak as in Gupta Buddha figures, for example, the Buddha from Sultanganj (Rowland *op.cit.* Plate. 85) (Pl. LIV). A noteworthy feature of this sculpture is the high and pointed extension of the *uṣṇīṣa*. which contrasts with that of the statue at the Ananda temple referred to above.

An outstanding image of great artistic merit is a seated Buddha image of bronze installed at the Ananda temple in Pagan. It has been also assigned to the 12-13th century. This seated figure, which measures 34 cm. in height, is a very elegantly fabricated piece of sculpture. The head is triangular in shape, with eyes half closed. The robe is attached to the body, the only indication of the presence of a robe being the hem across the chest, and around the shins, and the *sanghāṭi* falling from the left shoulder to the centre of the chest. The figure shows the Buddha in the *bhūmi-sparśa-mudrā* which is intended to represent the Buddha at the moment of his victory over the forces of Māra, inviting the earth with his right hand to bear witness to his attaining to Perfect Enlightenment, (Zwalf W. *op.cit.* p. 162).

A similar statue but on a very much larger scale is to be found installed in the Ananda Caitya in Pagan, showing clear signs of the influence of Pala and Sena sculpture. (Coomaraswamy, A.K. Plate CIV). Even upto modern times, it is remarkable to note the persistant influence of Gupta and Pala sculpture on the Buddha statues of Burma. This influence can be seen in a stele from Pagan, now in possession of the Archaeological Survey. The stele which is no more than a few centimetres in height, illustrates in its main figure the attainment of enlightenment by the Buddha, who is seated in the ***bhūmi-sparśa-mudrā*** under the Bodhi tree whose branches form, as it were, a garland around the Buddha. Around this are shown in a smaller scale several incidents in the life of the Buddha such as his birth and *parinirvāṇa*, (Griswold Alexander B. et al. *Burma, Korea, Tibet,* Methuen, London, 1964, p. 53) (Pl. LIV). In modern statues of the

Buddha decoration is carried to an excess, even to the extent of setting the hems with pieces of mirror. A good example of this type of ornate Buddha figure from Mandalay is assigned to the nineteenth century. In this statue in the standing position, and made of wood, lacquered and gilt, the robe covers both shoulders. The head is well moulded with a large *usnīsa* on the top and around it is a decorated band marking the edge of the head of hair. The face is serene and is moulded with rare virtuosity. Several highly decorated folds of the robe hang down from the left shoulder upto the waist. The lower part of the robe is stretched out symmetrically on either side of the legs, the left hand holding the robe in position. The right hand hangs down the palm being in something like the *abhaya-mudrā.* The figure stands on an open lotus; Zwalf W. *op.cit.* p. 163).

Thailand: There is no doubt that Buddhism reached Thailand (earlier known as Siam) in the early centuries of the Christian era, though its earliest material remains can be dated only in the sixth century. In the earliest surviving images of the Buddha Gupta influence is only too apparent to need further explanation. Perhaps one of the earliest examples of a Buddha statue in the standing position is a partly damaged specimen now in the Nelson Gallery in the U.S.A. (Rowland, B. *op.cit.* p. 71). It measures 130.80 cm. in height. The head is oblong, being narrower at the chin. The hair is represented as curls, and is crowned by a pyramidal *uṣṇīṣa.* The eyes are almost closed. Hands have been damaged from above the elbow and it is not possible to determine the *mudrā* in which the icon has been cast. The robe, which presumably covers both shoulders is attached to the body and the outer robe appears on either side of the body as a cloak just as in Gupta statues. The sculptor has attempted to invest this statue with a touch of realism, in showing the folds of flesh on the abdomen. Two other standing Buddhas of the same period are now on exhibit in the Cleveland Museum of Art in America (Rowland, B. *op.cit.* (2) p. 72) (Pl. LV) and the similar figure now on exhibit in the National Museum, Bangkok (Rowland (i) p. 63). In the first statue the head is triangular and the curls are represented by large button-like projections. The *uṣṇīsa.* is relatively high and is built in two steps. The eyes are open and the mouth quite wide with thick lips. The robe is attached to the body with many folds being shown on the body and appears on either side of the body as a cloak, showing its unmistakable affinity with classic Gupta sculpture. Both hands are raised and are cast in the *abhaya-mudrā.*

The second statue is from Ayodhya the capital of ancient Siam. The head is covered by thick curls turned clockwise. The *uṣṇīṣa.* is mildly conical. The robe is draped over the body closely attached to it, but showing itself on either side of the body as in contemporary Gupta images. The expression on the face is calm, the eyes being almost closed. As both hands in this statue are damaged, it is not possible to identify the *mudrā* in which the hands are positioned. Another standing Buddha figure of the same period is an exhibit in the Art Museum, Seattle (Rowland, B. *op.cit.* (1), p. 154 (Pl. LV). The two arms are severely damaged, and the legs below the knees have been severed and are missing. The curls on the head are shown as turned anti-clockwise. The face is well modelled and sharp featured. The eyes are half-closed. The lips give the face an expression of firmness and an individual character.' The robe is attached to the body, appearing only on either side of the body as in Gupta statues of India. The whole body is well modelled.

In the tenth century Thailand was invaded by the Khmers and the consequent phase of art in this country can only be regarded as a period when Cambodian influence was predominant. The Buddha figures of Thailand made during this period can hardly be distinguished from Cambodian figures and are characterised by very straight overhanging brows, pointed noses and broad pointed chins as well as a fondness for a particularly elaborate conical *uṣṇīṣa.* A typical example of this style of Buddha image is a seated figure from Lopburi, now on display in the National Museum, Bangkok, (Rowland, B. *op.cit.* (1), p. 166) (Pl. LVI). The hair is represented in this statue by the usual circular curls and the head is surmounted by a three-tiered *uṣṇīṣa..* The robe is attached to the body and covers only the left shoulder with a wide hem across the chest. The wide *saṅghāṭi* falls at an angle from the left shoulder. The legs are also crossed with the right leg placed over the left. These are all characteristics of a Buddha figure in the *dhyāni-mudrā.* Two or three centuries more were to pass before Thai sculptors could develop what may be called a truly national style in the sculpture of the Buddha image. This new national style is characterised by the arched eyebrows, the exaggerated almond eyes with the double upward curve in the lids, the hooked sharp nose and the rather small and delicately modelled lips. A head of the Buddha from Chiengmai, perhaps, best exemplifies this type of statue which was in vogue for a few more centuries. The head is covered in very prominent curls turned to the left. The arched eye brows join the nose ridge in one curved sweep which in its simplicity is quite striking. The nose is hooked. The ears which are as usual quite long are curved outwards. The face is full and contended (Rowland, B. *op.cit.* (1) Pl. 167) (Pl. LVI). Of a slightly later period is a somewhat effeminate head of the Buddha now on display at the Museum of Fine Arts, Boston, (Rowland, B., *op.cit.* (1), Pl. 168) (Pl. LVII). What is peculiar to this statue is a wide and flat ***uṣṇīṣa,*** with provision for a *ketumālā* (Sinhalese, ***siraspata*** which is placed on the crown of the head of the Buddha statue, to symbolize the rays of light emanating from the crown

of his head). The curls of hair on the head are represented by small hemispherical studs. The forehead is narrow and gently merges into the eyebrows. The eyes are thin and curved and in conformity to the literary metaphor, are like the petals of the blue lotus. The nose is sensitively modelled and so are the lips forming a narrow mouth. A more ornamented type of Buddha was also produced in Thailand during this period. In this type of statue the *uṣṇīṣa* is usually arranged in two or three tiers, with other additional ornamentation in the form of bands above the forehead. The lips are wide and prominent.

A head from a Buddha statue of the thirteenth century and another of a slightly later date may be referred to as examples of this type of image, (Zwalf, W. *op.cit.* p. 177, Nos. 249-250). Two statues, one seated and the other in the standing position which have hardly suffered any damage may give an idea of the Buddha statues of this period. In the first of these two statues cast in bronze in the *bhūmisparśa mudrā* or as the Thai's call it, in the *māravijayamudrā*, the Buddha is seated with legs crossed, the right leg resting on the left. The right hand rests on the upper end of the right shin, while the left hand rests on the lap (Rowland, B. *op.cit.* (2) p. 74) (Pl. LVII). The head is oblong and the hair on the head is represented by curls turned to the right. On the crown is an *uṣṇīṣa*. topped by a flame-like *siraspata*, (Fernando P. E. E. *op.cit.* pp. 1-6). The forehead is narrow and the eye brows sharply demarcated. The eyes are closed. The mouth is small and well-formed, the lips being quite prominent. The shoulders are unusally wide. The robe which covers only the left shoulder adheres to the body, only the hem being shown across the chest and around the shins. The breasts are prominent with the nipples in high relief. The *saṅghāṭi* is laid across the left side of the chest in an arch and terminates in two triangular extremities. The second statue, also in bronze, is unusual, in that both hands of the Buddha are shown in the *abhaya-mudrā*. The Buddha wears a crown on his head and wears a broad necklace around the neck. The robe is attached to the body upto the waist around which is an ornamented broad girdle. Four hems gathered together between the legs, fall half-way down the shins in a straight line. The outer robe appears on either side of the body as a cloak, in a manner reminiscent of Gupta Buddha statues of Northern India.

A Buddha image cast in a rare pose is a figure presented in a walking position, now probably in private hands, (Zwalf, H. *op.cit.* p. 180). The head of the Buddha is triangular in shape, with curls covering the head and a tiered *uṣṇīṣa*. The robe is attached to the body but the *saṅghāṭi* is shown prominently diagonally across the chest. As in other Gupta statues, the robe is shown on either side of the body like a cloak, with appropriate adjustments. The right hand is in the *abhaya-mudrā* while the left hangs down passively by the side of the body.

As time passed, it would seem, Thai sculptors made the Buddha statue more and more decorative even to the extent of placing a crown on the head, perhaps in response to the demands of the Mahāyāna sect.

One of the more important products of this period is a bronze seated figure of the Buddha from Northern Thailand. On the head is placed a very elaborate crown and no hair, either in the form of curls or otherwise, is shown. The robe is attached to the body, but the upper hem of the robe is shown across the chest and is out of proportion to the trunk which is decorated with a four petalled flower. The *saṅghāṭi*, relatively quite broad, is shown hanging down from the left shoulder. The right hand is placed on the upper right shin. The Buddha is seated on a lotus seat placed on a hexagonal pedestal and wears arm-bands and bangles (Zwalf, W. *op.cit.* p. 181).

There are other statues which are much more ornate than the statue described above, so much so that they can be easily mistaken for representations of Bodhisattvas or secular members of royalty. A typical example of this variety of statue is to be found in the Stöcker Collection, Amsterdam.

In this statue the head is oblong with sharply differentiated features. The right hand is shown in the *abhaya-mudrā*, while the left hand hangs down touching the hem of the outer robe which appears on either side of the body like a cloak. The chest is covered with a wide spreading necklace, with an eight petalled flower hanging from it. Around the waist has been wound a profusion of tasselled chains with a decorated central band running down from the waist in front. The outer robe is placed on either side of the body like a cloak as in Gupta statues. The eyes are turned towards the earth, almost closed. (Seckel, D. *op.cit.* p. 183) (Pl. LIX). A similar statue, fashioned on very much more chaste lines is a bronze standing Buddha of the sixteenth century, now in a collection in America (Rowland, B. *op.cit.* (2) p. 77) (Pl. LVIII). The statue is cast in bronze and measures 71.25 cm. in height. In this statue too the head is crowned with a six tiered conical *uṣṇīṣa*. The eyes are stylised and almost totally closed, and the face is oblong and full. A richly ornamented broad necklace is girt round the neck, with a central medallion falling on the chest. The robe is attached to the body and covers both shoulders. It appears on either side of the body as a cloak, again in a manner reminiscent of Gupta statues. The right hand is in the *abhaya-mudrā*, with the palm facing the viewer. The left hand hangs down in one sweep without any signs of being bent. A girdle placed around the waist holds the robe in position.

A head of the Buddha now in a museum in Munich has been fashioned in a somewhat different manner (Seckel, D. *op.cit.* p. 181) (Pl. LIX). The head is round and the face is full, investing it with an almost flabby appearance. It is crowned with a crown in the centre of which stands a four tiered *uṣṇīṣa*. The eyes are almost fully closed and are highly stylised as is the mouth with thick lips, (Seckel, D. *ibid.*). In recent times the Buddha image in Thailand has undergone but a few modifications, always retaining, however, its ethnic features.

A bronze seated Buddha with a mannered appearance merits reference here because of its peculiar characteristics. The statue is from Northern Thailand and measures 35 cm. in height (Zwalf, W. *op.cit.* p. 181). The head of the Buddha is crowned with an eight petalled flower in the centre of the forehead. On the top of the crown is a miniature *stūpa* of the type found in Thailand. What is quite striking in this statue is the bloated chest on which is placed again an eight petalled flower. The robe is attached to the body, and covers only the left shoulder. A broad *saṅghāṭi* hangs from the left shoulder terminating at waist level. Two decorative arm bands are placed in the upper arm with a third arm band on the right wrist. The statue is cast in the *bhūmisparśa-mudrā*. It sits on a lotus seat placed on a hexagonal pedestal. A Buddha image of outstanding merit as a work of art is a bronze figure from Dvāravatī assigned to the period 6th-12th century. It is a figure cast in the standing position and measures 68 cm. (Seckel, D. *op.cit.* p. 291, 295, Pl. 11) (Pl. LX). The head is carved with curls, with a high *uṣṇīṣa*. The face is round and full, with a gentle smile playing on the lips. The forehead is narrow and the eyes are placed at a slight angle betraying Mongolian influence. The robe is attached to the body and covers both shoulders. The chest is gently differentiated from the flanks. Both the right and the left hand are held in the *vitarka mudrā*. The robe is draped over the body as in Gupta images of India. It is indeed a work of high artistic quality, conceived and executed by a master sculptor.

Cambodia and Laos: Buddhism was introduced to Cambodia in the middle of the fifth century replacing to a large extent Brahmanism which had been introduced to this country about the first century (Sunghatissa, p. 65). It reached Laos a few decades later. It was in its Hīnayāna form that Buddhism was introduced to Cambodia in the first instance.

Buddhims in Cambodia reached its zenith of popularity in the twelfth - thirteenth century in the reign of Jaya Varman VII who was responsible for the construction of numerous magnificent viharas and temples.

One of the oldest Buddha images to be found in Laos, is a standing figure of the Buddha, well known as the Dong Duong Buddha, which has been assigned to the third century by Coomaraswamy, but this date is clearly too early for this statue, when it is compared with some of the Andhra statues assigned to this period (Rowland, B. *op. cit.* (1) p. 137) (Pl. LXI). It is a bronze figure cast in a style and *mudrā* of its own. The hair is represented by curls while a low *uṣṇīṣa* adorns the crown of the head. The face is round with a prominent *ūrṇa* on the forehead. The eyes are open and are represented by simple lines. The shoulders are rather wide, only the left shoulder being covered by the robe. The folds of the robe are represented by raised lines arranged in a rhythmic pattern, leaving a relatively thin shag at the lower hem. The right arm is stretched forward from the elbow, the hand being shown in a modified form of the *abhaya-mudrā*, while the left hand is stretched out in a nonconformist manner with the three central fingers folded inwards. The two hands in this statue perhaps complement each other in a *vitarka-mudrā*, more lively than in similar statues found elsewhere. Of a very much earlier date, probably of the third century, is a bronze standing figure of the Buddha, discovered in Java (Seckel, D. *op.cit.* p. 169).

As a whole the statue is relatively attenuated and mannered. The right hand is in the *abhaya-mudrā*, while the left is in the same stance as in the Dong Duong Buddha. The head is covered with curls, the obtrusive golden *uṣṇīṣa* being clearly a later addition. The robe covers only the left shoulder, the folds being shown as gentle convex waves, demarcated by thin raised lines. These folds, however, are shown only on the left shoulder and on the left leg with the shag above the right ankle. The eyes are open and the nose quite sharp and unusually prominent. Though it was discovered in Java, it is more likely that it had a South Indian origin.

As the Dong Duong Buddha and the Buddha from Java described earlier are of doubtful origin, Buddha statues which can be considered genuinely Cambodian appear only in the twelfth century when the great temple at Angkor was established. "It is to the close of this epoch", says Seckel, "that we owe the charming classical Buddha and Bodhisattva heads, which admittedly became rigid in the course of time owing to constant repetition" (Seckel, D. *op.cit.* p. 55). Whole images are rare and the high artistic qualities of these images can only be judged by the few heads that have survived various vicissitudes the country has passed through. A Buddha head made of limestone, now in the Fogg Art Museum, U.S.A., perhaps, is typical of the figures produced during this period, amply illustrating their high spiritual and mystical quality (Rowland, B, *op.cit.* (2), p. 73) (Pl. LXI). Curls of the hair on this head are represented by semispherical studs, in place of the usual spirals. Eye brows are gently differentiated leading on to the upper lids which are fully closed in an attitude of meditation and total withdrawal from affairs of the world. The nostrils are wide, above a wide mouth, with a gentle almost imperceptible

smile playing on prominent lips. The face is full but not flabby.

A similar head of the Buddha but with some differences is in the Philadelphia Museum U.S.A. (Rowland, B. (1) *op.cit.* Pl. 157). The head is covered by curls of hair, turning right and is topped by a high *uṣṇīṣa*. The hair is separated from the face by a tape-like edging, which is absent in the head described above. The eyes are half closed and there is an expression of complete self-absorption in the face.

There is also a much more ornamented type of Buddha image of which only heads have survived. In a typical example, now on exhibit in the Musée Guimet, the head is triangular in shape, with a narrow chin. The hair is not shown in the form of curls, but is represented by a broad decorated band round the head, with a sharp conical *uṣṇīṣa* (Swann, Paterc. Pl. 76). The eyebrows are linked together in the shape of a double bow. The eyes are like lotus petals and the nose is delicately modelled as if the sculptor was closely following the metaphors often found in Indian literature. Pendent ear-rings adorn the ears. In some other type of head, the forehead is shown as an arch with symmetrical sides, above which the hair is shown as curls. On the crown of the head is an *uṣṇīṣa* conical in shape and covered with curls of hair. The curls, the mouth and the hair are all highly stylised.

A Buddha figure in Cambodia, that deserves special notice, perhaps, is the statue known as the Buddha of the Bayon. This presents the Buddha seated cross-legged and engaged in meditation, on the coils of a cobra, (Rowland, B. *op.cit.* (I), Pl. 158). The hair is represented by curls arranged with the shape of a padded cap around the head with a high *uṣṇīṣa*. The eyes are closed and are turned downwards. A hood consisting of seven cobra-heads shelters the Buddha seated on the uppermost coil of a three-coiled cobra. It is worth pointing out here that the Buddha is seated in the *paryaṅkāsana*, that is with the right leg placed on the left. The robe is attached to the body. Another Buddha figure, showing the Buddha sheltering under the expanded hood of seven cobras is a figure from Binh Dinh, (Coomaraswamy A.K. *op.cit.* Pl. CXIV). Presenting in sculpture the incident when the Buddha sheltered himself under the hood of a cobra named Mucalinda, this profusely decorated figure is seated in the *dhyāna-mudrā*. The seven cobra heads that form the large hood that shelters the Buddha are highly decorated with a necklace round each head. The Buddha's head is also crowned with a four-tiered crown very elaborately decorated. The eyes are open and the mouth quite wide as in most statues in Laos. Around the neck is a broad necklace in three strands. On the upper arms are elaborate armlets and above the wrist are two bangles. The robe is attached to the body, but the hem across the chest and a part of the *saṅghāṭi* resting on the chest are clearly visible. This is a type of Buddha image peculiar to Mahāyāna places of worship. This figure is assigned to the twelfth century.

Java: Buddhism was introduced to Java and other parts of Indonesia about the fifth century A.C. but Buddhist remains surviving there can only be assigned to about the eighth century, when the great Buddhist shrine, Borobudur was established. Here in all its tiers scores of Buddha images, mostly seated, but in diverse *mudrās* were set up for the benefit of devotees. In these sculptures the all pervasive influence of Gupta sculpture can be noticed even at a casual glance.

One such statue in which Gupta influence is readily noticed is a statue in the upper terrace of the Borobudur monument. It is seated with crossed legs and the soles turned upwards. The hands are in the *vitarka-mudrā*. Hair is presented in the form of curls turned rightwards, with a three-tiered *uṣṇīṣa* on the head and an *ūrṇā* on the forehead. Facial features are clear-cut and sharp, reflecting a firmness of mind. The body is softly modelled and the robe is attached to the body, the only indication of there being a robe are the broad pleated hems on the shins, (Rowland, B. (1) Pl. 184) (Pl. LXII).

A Buddha head from Borobudur, presenting a different aspect, needs to be referred to here to indicate the variety of Buddha figures at this stupendous edifice. The head of this statue with a two-tiered *uṣṇīṣa* is covered with curls turning left and is long in shape. On the wide forehead is a rather large *ūrṇa*. The eyes are half-open. The nostrils are wide and the lips thick and prominent (Coomaraswamy, A. K. *op.cit.* (1) Pl. XXVIII).

A bronze seated Buddha with a *makara-toraṇa* at the back is certainly an early example of this type of Buddha figure. The Buddha is seated in the *bhūmi-sparśa-mudrā*, the right hand not only resting on the right knee but actually covering it. The head is triangular in shape, a characteristic trait of Gupta statues, and covered with curls as in other statues described above. The robe is attached to the body, with hems across the chest and over the ankles. The upper part of the chest is quite wide, in contrast to the unusually thin waist. The Buddha is seated on a two tiered lotus, placed on a pedestal with two lions lying in front (Zwalf, W. *op.cit.* P. 187).

A Buddha statue, in a pose not frequently met with, is located in a temple called Caṇḍi Mendut. The Buddha is seated in the European fashion, with feet resting on a pedestal, in a manner reminiscent of some Buddha figures at Ajaṇṭā, (Coomaraswamy, Pl. CXVIII). There is a high *uṣṇīṣa* on the head of the statue which is provided with a halo around it. The figure is quite sturdily modelled. The hands are represented in the *vitarka-mudrā*. The statue is dated with late eighth

century. Two artefacts in the form of Buddha figures of great historical significance may be referred to here, particularly in view of the scanty attention paid to them by scholars who have studied the history of the Buddha image. The first of these is a partly damaged bronze figure from South Celebes, in Indonesia. In this both hands below the wrist have been severed and so are the legs from above the knees. The head is round and very carefully modelled, with hair presented in the form of curls. The robe covers only the left shoulder and folds of the robe are represented by two closely placed grooved lines, as in the statues of Sri Lanka in the Polonnaruwa period. The contours of the body are softly indicated. The eyes are fully opened (The Buddhist Council of Ceylon, *Buddha Jayanti Souvenir,* p. 96). This figure can be dated approximately in the tenth century.

The other Buddha figure of which only the head has survived has been found among some Aztec artefacts, unrecognized till now as the head of a Buddha. The head is oblong approaching a square form. The hair is represented by diagonal lines. The *uṣṇīṣa* is quite prominent but flat. The eyes are fully open and are diagonally presented, indicating perhaps some Chinese influence (Valliant, G. C. *The Aztecs of Mexico,* Pelican Books, 1950, Pl. 15).

A bronze seated figure of the Buddha has also been found in the island of Helgo with several relics from the Viking period, (Bronsdted, p. 165), while a similar statue of bronze has been unearthed at a place called Upland, north of Upsala in Sweden.

China: The Chinese people became familiar with Buddhism about the first century, but it took some time before it could obtain a foothold on the country as a whole. Because of the inaccessibility of China from India owing to the mountain barriers provided by the Hindukush it was the Gandhra traditions that first penetrated into China through Central Asia. The first Buddha images were made in China in the middle of the fifth century.

Perhaps the first Buddha image made in China is a bronze standing figure of the Buddha measuring 29 cm. (Rowland, B. *op.cit.* (2) pp. 82, 83) (Pl. LXII). The whole body of the Buddha is surrounded by a halo of light with stylised flames issuing out of the periphery. There are two concentric decorated bands of light around the head. The robe, cascading down in ample folds in the Gandhara style covers only the left shoulder. The right hand is held up in the *abhaya-mudrā* while the left is held down in the *varada-mudrā.* The Buddha stands on a lotus turned upside down. The head is covered by large curls with an *uṣṇīṣa,* which is relatively large and flat. Altogether the head appears to be too large in proportion to the height of the figure.

If an inscription incised on its back can be considered authentic, a seated gilt bronze statue now in the Young Memorial Museum in San Francisco, antedates the statue described above by a hundred years (Rowland, B. *op.cit.* (2), p. 84 (Pl. LXIII). This statue dated A.C. 338 displays clear Gandhara characteristics. The hair is shown in groups of strands of two or three hairs with spaces between them. The *uṣṇīṣa* is low. The eyes are narrow and crudely fashioned. The robe covers both shoulders and folds are arranged symmetrically on either side of the body. The hands are held together in front above the lap, with the back of the hand visible to the devotee.

Of a slightly later date is a stele containing a figure of the seated Buddha (Rowland, B. *op.cit.* (2), p. 85 (Pl. LXIII). The hair is shown as studs in very low relief, with a flat *uṣṇīṣa.* The robe is indicated by a few grooved lines, one down the right hand, another down the left side of the body and a few over the lap and over the left hand. The right hand is in the *abhaya-mudrā* and the left rests on the left leg. The whole figure is typical of the crude statues produced in China, in imitation of Gandhara models in the final years of their decline.

A very elaborate colossal image of the Buddha was made in A.C. 576 at a monastery called Hoin Chanhi Ta Fu in Chekiang in China by a sculptor named Se Yung (Buddha Jayanti). The image is in the *dhyāni-mudrā.* The head is rectangular with half-closed eyes and firm prominent lips. An *ūrṇa* adorns the forehead. The robe covers both the shoulders, but exposing the central part of the chest down to almost the level of the navel. The robe of which the folds are shown in a highly stylised manner covers both hands up to the wrists. A halo appropriately painted on the wall behind the statue adds to the majesty of the main figure.

A remarkable marble statue made in the year A.C. 585, now in the British Museum, measures 5.78 m. in height (Zwalf, W. *op.cit.* p. 201). The lower arms and the feet are missing, but otherwise the statue has been well preserved. The head is oblong and exceptionally well modelled. The hair on the head is shown as stylised lines rhythmically placed. The forehead carries in the centre a large *ūrṇa.* The eye brows and the eye lids are sharply cut while the nose and the mouth have been handled with great delicacy. The robe covers both shoulders, exposing the upper part of the under-robe which is held in place by two ribbons tied one beneath the other. The folds of the robe are shown by means of their raised lines symmetrically cut on the surface of the body. The statue has been sculpted with great dexterity and taste, conferring on it an expression of tranquillity and calm. The statue represents the Buddha Amitābha of the Mahayanists.

A Buddha statue depicting the *mahā-parinibbāna,* the Great Demise, in an unusual manner is an earthenware plaque measuring 18 cm. in height (Zwalf, W. *op.cit.* p. 201). In this plaque assigned to the latter part of the 6th century the Buddha is seated in the *dhyāni-mudrā,*

between two ornate pillars supporting an arched *torana*. Beside the two pillars are two *sāla* trees with branches falling symmetrically over the two arms of the arch. The Buddha's head is surrounded by a halo. The robe covers only the left shoulder and is represented by a few thick folds. Curls are not shown on the head, which has again a bare flat *uṣṇīṣa*. The eyes are closed and together with the hands and legs appropriately disposed, present the Buddha as an ascetic engaged in deep meditation.

By about the latter part of the fifth century Chinese sculptors adopted a new style of presenting the robe in Buddha statues. The new style attempted to show the folds of the robe in schematically arranged raised lines. One of the earliest examples of Buddha statues executed in the new style is a figure of the Buddha Maitreya (dated A.C. 486, (Rowland, B. *op.cit.* (2) p. 87) (Pl. LXIV). Semi-circular strands of hair vertically arranged represent the head on which is placed a similarly fashioned *uṣṇīṣa*. The robe covers both shoulders with a semi-circular series of folds arranged round the neck. The right hand is raised with fingers stretched out while the left hand is held down, with the fingers stretched out, the two hands forming together a lively gesture of preaching. The various parts of the body are differentiated with precision through a flimsy robe which is attached to the body. This style of presenting the robe appears with various modifications to be the dominant style of drapery in Buddha figures during the next few centuries.

In the sixth century, Chinese Buddha statues began to assume a decidedly florid style, not only in the body of the Buddha but also in the haloes with which most of these figures were invested. A figure of the Buddha Maitreya dated A.C. 538 is a typical example of this type (Rowland, B. *op.cit.* (2), p. 88) (Pl. LXIV). It stands on a fully open lotus with the flame symbol peculiar to the Chinese, surrounds the body of this statue while another circular halo decorated with a floral pattern appears around the head. The hair on the head as well as on the *uṣṇīṣa* is represented by irregular wavy lines. The eye brows are sharply cut and the eyes are closed. The face conveys an expression of firmness. The right hand is in the *abhaya-mudrā*, while the left displays the *varada-mudrā*. The robe covers both shoulders, with wide folds cascading down up to knee-level. A series of these parallel swallow-tail type of hems flares out from knee-level downwards. The statue is flawlessly executed by a master sculptor with a sure hand (Rowland, B. *op.cit.* (2), p. 88) (Pl. LXV). A Buddha statue with unusually soft facial features is a seated figure assigned to the seventh–eighth century. The Buddha seated in the *padmāsana* style wears a robe covering both shoulders with a broad decorative hem across the chest exposing a large part of the left side of the chest. The hair on the head is not shown in the form of curls, but in the form of a smooth cap closely fitting the head, with a similar flat low *uṣṇīṣa*. A gently benevolent expression appears on the face. What is particularly noticeable in this statue is a thin *saṅghāṭi* hanging down from the left shoulder, perhaps an early occurrence of this feature on a Buddha statue. The folds of the robe are represented by thin raised lines with mildly convex spaces in between. The lower right arm is missing but probably had been cast in the *abhaya-mudrā*. The left hand rests on the left thigh in quite a realistic manner. The statue is well proportioned and has been executed with great virtuousity, giving expression to the Buddha's gentle and benevolent nature.

A Buddha statue from the Cave Temple at Lung-Men, of about the same period, displays features not often seen in Buddha statues in China or elsewhere (Rowland, B. *op.cit.* (2), p. 89) (Pl. LXVI). The Buddha is seated on what appears to be a stone seat, with legs crossed but with feet on the ground. The hair is shown as a close fitting cap, without any curls being shown. The *uṣṇīṣa* is damaged but probably was similarly treated. The right hand is in the *abhaya-mudrā*, while the left hand rests on the left knee. The face is full and a gentle smile appears on the lips. The robe covers both shoulders, exposing on the chest parts of an under garment. The folds of the robe with a broad hem are represented in a crude manner by shallow grooved lines, falling down from the shoulders upto knee level. In spite of the rough hewn character of the statue the beatific smile on the delicately modelled lips seems to make up for any shortcomings in the execution of the sculpture.

One of the most impressive Buddha figures of this period appears as a bas-relief on a lime-stone stele measuring 95 cm. in height (Rowland, B. *op.cit.* (2) p. 91). The Buddha stands in the centre of the stele with two attendant deities on either side. On either side of the Buddha's body are line drawings of seated Buddha figures and on the edges in two broad bands are stylised flames in flat relief. Hair on the head is shown as wavy lines. A large *uṣṇīṣa* with a flower-like arrangement of hair in front adorns the head. The robe covers both shoulders with folds presented in the form of two closely placed raised lines appearing on the arms, the chest and on the legs below the knees which are prominently shown through the flimsy robe. Below the broad lower hem of the outer robe are two stylised hems of two under garments. The Buddha's right hand is in the *abhaya-mudrā*, while the left hand is held down with the fore-arm resting on the waist. The eyes are almost closed and a contended and a beatific smile plays on the lips (Pl. LXVI).

A standing Buddha statue of striking simplicity, measuring 128 cm. is now in the possession of an American Museum (Rowland, B. *op.cit.* (2) p. 94) (Pl. LXVII). It is a staid figure with clean lines. The hair on

the head is represented by curls with an *uṣṇīsa* hardly differentiated from the head. The eyes are half-closed. The robe covers both shoulders, each shoulder being covered by a separate arm of the robe. The robe is attached to the body, though the waist band can be seen through the robe which appears to be one of the finest quality. The legs are differentiated. The lower arms have been severed and the *mudrās* of the hands cannot be ascertained, though most probably the right hand would have been in the *abhaya-mudrā* and the left in the *varada*. The statue is carved out of limestone. There is hardly anything peculiarly Chinese in the statue though Gupta inspiration is quite evident.

The head of a Buddha statue of the late sixth or seventh century, however, shows that Chinese sculptors attempted during this period to simplify the Buddha statue further. Here the head is shown as a smooth cap with the face full and the lips delicately shaped. The robe covers both shoulders, over an inner jacket the front of which is heavily decorated with various designs including the *swastika* in the centre of the chest. The right hand carries a globe in front of the chest while the left is held down, the lower arm held diagonally against the side of the trunk. The robe cascades down the body with three broad hems one beneath the other. As is to be expected the Tun-huang caves in North West China contain numerous figures of the Buddha, some of them relatively well preserved. One example of such a figure is a seated Buddha from Cave No. 45, which is assigned to the seventh century approximately (Seckel, D. *op.cit.* p. 193). The Buddha here is seated with legs crossed on a seat covered with a red cloth. Around the Buddha's head is a circular halo and covering the Buddha's body is another larger halo. The outer-most border of the halo is decorated with symbolic flames of fire. The head and the *uṣṇīṣa* are covered with curls, all painted in white. The eyes are open. Both shoulders are covered by the robe, leaving a portion of the chest exposed. The portion of the robe covering the upper part of the body from the waist upwards except the left hand, is coloured blue, while the rest of the robe is painted. The right hand is held out with the palm facing outwards, the thumb, the forefinger and the middle finger raised in an attitude of admonition, while the other two fingers are turned downwards. The left hand is held down, with the palm and the fingers resting on the left knee (Pl. LXVIII).

Two statues assigned to the Ming Dynasty (A.C. 1368–1644) display remarkable similarities in form though far apart in respect of date of fabrication. They are both made of bronze and gilt. The first of these dated A.C. 1396, is a standing figure, with the right hand in the *varada-mudrā*. The left hand is folded and the fore-arm rests on the waist, the palm and the fingers being completely destroyed. The head with an *uṣṇīsa* hardly perceptible is covered with curls. In the centre of the relatively narrow forehead is an *ūrṇa*. The eyes are a similar flat bump to represent the *uṣṇīsa*. The eyebrows and the eyelids are similarly reduced to simple shapes with a horizontal sash to represent the half-closed eye. The mouth is narrow with firmly delineated lips. Despite its simplicity the head, as it is, is quite impressive.

Inspite of the attempts at simplication, a highly decorative style seems to have come into vogue in the fashioning of Buddha figures about the beginning of the twelfth century. The swallow tail hems of robes re-emerged again and are fully employed in figures made during this period and after, though less ornate statues too continued to be made.

A good example of the first type of Buddha figure is a standing Buddha dated A.C. 1107 (Rowland, B. *op.cit.* (2), p. 99). The head of this statue is covered with independent curls arranged in horizontal lines ending in a straight line over the forehead, with which the patches of hair on each side form a right angle. The eyes are closed and slightly slanted. The cloak-like outer robe covers both shoulders, leaving the chest completely exposed, showing a *swastika* in the centre in very low relief. Below the *swastika* and around the waist is a broad band serving the purpose of a belt to hold the skirt like robe which consists of an upper part and a lower part. In the upper part folds are shown as garlands round the neck (Pl. LXVII).

The second statue is largely similar to the first, with the difference that the exposed area on the chest is irregular in shape and almost the whole of the right arm stretched downwards, is bare. Both statues stand on open lotuses (Zwalf, W. p. 208, p. 209). The disproportionately long right hand is intended to reach out to souls destined for the Western Paradise (Zwalf, W. *op.cit.* p. 209).

A seated Buddha statue made of wood lacquered and gilded appears to have set a new fashion in the designing of Buddha statues. This statue assigned to the latter part of the seventeenth century is seated on a two tiered open lotus (Zwalf, W. *op.cit.* p. 212). The head is covered with stud-like curls, with a flat *uṣṇīsa* lightly demarcated from the head. An *ūrṇa* appears in the centre of the forehead. The eyes are almost closed and are slightly slanted. The mouth is delicately modelled, but with a firm and determined expression. The hands are raised in the *dharma-cakra-mudrā*. The robe which covers only the left shoulder is decorated with linear patterns.

The re-emergence of a type of Buddha statue that was in vogue in the fifth century can be noticed at the end of the Ming period, 16th-17th century. A statue in the Detroit Institute of Arts, (U.S.A.) would serve as a good example of this type of sculpture (Rowland, B. *op.cit.* (2), p. 100) (Pl. LXIX). The hair on the head, the highly mannered drapery and even the *mudrās* in this statue are

unexpectedly archaic and hark back to the work of the early centuries. There are no curls on the head; instead the hair is shown as a stylised mass, with an *ūrṇa* on the forehead. The *uṣṇīṣa* is wide and relatively high and is also marked by another *ūrṇa*. The head is square in shape with the facial features demarcated with a softness that invests the face with an expression of inner peace. The robe covers both shoulders, first with a collar-like arrangement of circular folds placed close together, from other folds in the form of raised lines hang downwards on either side of the chest, with a series of circular and parabolic folds covering the centre of the chest. Similar folds cover the thighs up to the knees, which are smooth, being free from folds. Beneath the knees the folds appear around the legs. The right hand shows the *abhaya-mudrā*, in a modified form, with fingers stretched. The left hand hangs down with the palm and fingers visible to the viewer. Beneath the lower hem of the outer robe can be seen two hems with vertical folds arranged in a regular pattern. The hems that hang down from the right and the left hand show an undulating pattern reminiscent of ancient Indian statuary. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Buddha statue underwent further changes, in that the profuse folds appearing in the type of statue described above were reduced in number, but still arranged in the same rigid pattern of the earlier statues, (Rowland, B. *op.cit.* (2), p. 103 (Pl. LXIX).

Korea: The year A.C. 372 is traditionally recognized as the date when Buddhism was introduced into Korea, the whole peninsula being converted to Buddhism by the end of the sixth century. Owing to internal turmoil and invasion, most of the Buddhist temples were destroyed and whatever archaeological remains have survived can only be assigned to the eighth century.

One of the earliest figures of the Buddha in Korea is, in fact, a larger-than-life bas-relief carved on a rock at Sosan, South Ch'ungch'ong province (Griswold, Alexander B. *et al. op. cit.* p. 79, Pl. 3). The bas-relief is assigned to the close of the sixth century. There are no curls on the head, being shown as a smooth cap fitted on to the head. The *uṣṇīṣa* is low but wide and is treated in the same manner as the head. A double halo appears around the head, the inner halo takes the shape of an open lotus while the outer halo takes the shape of a leaf. In this halo the border is decorated with the Chinese flame symbol. The eyes are fully open and as in most Chinese sculptures the mouth has been delicately handled. The robe covers both shoulders, leaving a triangular space open from the neck line down to the centre of t[illegible] attendant deities stand on either side of [illegible]

Perhaps [illegible] earliest free standing Buddha figures mad[illegible] of the Silla period (Rowland, B. [illegible] XX). As a whole the figure is squat in appearance. The head of the statue is covered with independent curls with a flat *uṣṇīṣa* rising unobtrusively from the top of the head. The forehead is narrow and marked with an *ūrṇa* in the form of a small circle. The eyes are closed and only slightly slanted. The face is full and expresses a sense of inner contentment, with a delicately modelled mouth. The folds of the robe are reduced to a minimum, more prominently around the waist and on the pubic region, with few folds around the shins below the knee. The figure stands on a full blown lotus. The right hand of the statue shows the *vitarka-mudrā* and the left hand is folded at the elbow and stretched out with the palm and fingers held in a nondescript manner.

Japan: There is hardly any consensus among scholars regarding the date of the introduction of Buddhism to Japan, but it is generally believed that this took place in the first part of the sixth century. The date of the formal introduction of Buddhism to Japan is, however, the year A.C. 552. In the early years, as is to be expected, Buddhist art in Japan was to a large extent influenced by that of China and Korea, but in course of time indigenous ideas asserted themselves on this art, investing on it a specifically Japanese character.

A seated Buddha figure dated A.C. 628 is a good example of this blending of Chinese and Japanese characteristics, (Rowland, B. *op.cit.* (2), p. 109). Here the Buddha is seated on a seat covered with a cloth with highly ornate folds. The curls of hair on the head of the Buddha are arranged in horizontal lines, with a relatively flat *uṣṇīṣa*. The right hand is shown in the *abhaya-mudrā* with the left hand cast in the *varada-mudrā*. The robe covers both shoulders exposing the chest, so as to show the upper part of the under garment held in position by a belt tied with a bow knot. The head is oval in shape and the face displays a placid and serene mind, with an almost imperceptible smile on the lips. The whole figure together with two attendant Bodhisattvas is supported from behind a large, and highly ornate halo, in which seated Buddha figures and stylised flames of fire are symmetrically arranged to re-inforce the effect created by the main figure (Pl. LXX).

A partly damaged standing Buddha displaying unmistakable signs of Chinese influence is a figure assigned to the ninth century. It is a sturdy figure measuring 290 cm. and the peculiar arrangement of the folds of the robe which set off the physical features of the figure, invests it with an expression of the mystery and power residing in the deity by an overwhelming suggestion of power implied in its titanic form and weightiness (Rowland, B. *op.cit.* (2), p. 112). Though headless, it is indeed a very awe-inspiring piece of sculpture (Pl. LXXI).

Another massive standing figure with similar characteristics is in the Genko-ji Temple belonging to the Heian period (A.C. 794–1185). The hair on the head of this statue is represented by studs placed in parallel horizontal lines. The head is in shape square, with a forehead marked by an *ūrṇa*. (Irie, T. *et al., op. cit.* p. 22). The eyes are almost closed. The robe covers both shoulders leaving a large portion of the chest bare. The folds of the robe are all concentrated on the lower abdomen and on the left hand, which holds a vessel. The right hand is in the ***abhaya-mudrā***, with the palm and fingers facing the viewer. This again is a powerful and awe-inspiring figure (Pl. LXXI).

A very elaborately ornamented seated Buddha figure of the eighth century can be seen in the Toshodai-ji Temple. The figure is seated on an open lotus, with a back-rest decorated with scores and scores of small seated Buddha figures arranged close together in groups. The Buddha's hair is represented as separate studs and the *uṣṇīṣa* is similarly treated. The eyes are fully closed and the mouth is closely set. The flat chested body is only partly covered by the robe which covers both the shoulders. The two hands do not conform to any traditional *mudrā* but unmistakably show that the Buddha is engaged in an act of explaining the dhamma.

An imposing Buddha figure of the Nara period, i.e., eighth century, is a seated figure of bronze, measuring 262 cm. enshrined in a temple called Kaniman-ji (Irie, T. *et al. op. cit.* p. 6). The hair on the head and on the *uṣṇīṣa* are represented as a rough surface in contrast to the face which is absolutely smooth and highly polished. The eye brows are sharply demarcated, with the eyes fully closed. The robe covers both the shoulders, with a few flat folds shown hanging down from the left shoulder. The hand is raised in an attitute of exposition, with the palm stretched outwards and the thumb and the fore-finger held together (Pl. LXXII).

A rare type of Buddha figure appers in a scene depicting the *parinibbāna*, the passing away, of the Buddha at Kusinara (Irie, T. *et al. op. cit.* p. 7). The whole sculpture is made of stucco. Here the Buddha is shown as lying on a bed on his right side. Five royal figures stand behind the recumbent Buddha while two monks are seated close to the Buddha's head and two others close to his feet. All these monks are shown in attitudes of deep mourning. A Lay figure is seated between these two groups of monks, trying to console them. The Buddha's figure is clearly archaic, without any characteristic that may be described as essentially Japanese. The scene is quite realistically depicted (Pl. LXXII).

A well-preserved seated bronze figure of the Buddha, found in the Yakushi-ji Temple, is a rather flamboyant creation, with a large back rest adorned with seated Buddha figures in high relief and floral patterns. It is 254.7 cm. in height and should serve as a very elegant product of the sculptors of the Nara period (Irie, T. *et al op. cit* p. 16) (Pl. LXXIII).

The Heian period of Japanese history encompassed a period of nearly four hundred years from A.C. 794–1185. A characteristic feature of the Buddha figures of this period is the exaggerated flabbiness of the face. Most of the images are cast in a *mudrā*, where the folded fingers of the two hands and with the thumb are placed close together, somewhat in the manner of the *dhyāni mudrā*. As in the earlier figures in the Nara period those of the Heian period are also sturdily constructed as it were in conformity with the concept of *mahā-puruṣa*, 'great being'. Some of them are provided with back rests adorned with complicated floral designs.

Some of the Buddha statues of the early Heian period can be seen in the Jingo-ji Temple. Notable among them is a seated figure (Irie, T. *et al. op. cit.* p. 20) (Pl. LXXIII) of the Buddha, with a highly ornate back-rest, painted in gold. The halo around the head seen on the back-rest is flanked by flames of fire carved in the traditional style. The robe covers both the shoulders, leaving a large portion of the chest bare. The eyes are quite open. The right hand shows the *abhaya-mudrā*, while the left rests on the left leg. The folds of the robe are somewhat restricted in number. The facial features have invested the face with, perhaps, an unintended awesome aspect. Another statue in the Jingo-ji Temple, constructed in the standing position, (Irie, T. *et al. op. cit.* p. 21), while displaying the awesomeness already referred to, is invested with a lofty head of hair, represented by the same type of spiralling studs is quite prominent (Pl. LXXIV).

Somewhat different in form and execution is a wooden standing figure of the Buddha of the ninth century. The head is shown as a smooth cap, with some vertical lines, with a flat *uṣṇīṣa* similarly treated (Rowland, B. *op cit.* (2), p. 115). The eyes are closed and the mouth is narrow but well formed. The robe covers the shoulders, leaving the chest and the upper abdomen exposed. A broad band representing the hem of the robe hangs down from the shoulders in an ovaloid form. The limbs of the Buddha are well differentiated with the under garment below the upper robe. The hands have been severed and the *mudrās* in which they were presented cannot be determined.

Another awesome figure of the Buddha of this period is a seated figure in the Toadai-ji Temple. The robe covers both shoulders with soft folds in profusion over the wrists, the lower abdomen and the folded shins. The right hand is shown in a modified form of the *abhaya-mudrā*, with fingers irregularly placed. The left hand is placed on right knee, with the palm folded over the left shin, quite close to the knee, (Irie, T. *et al. op. cit.* p. 13, (Pl. LXXIV).

Buddha figures of the late Heian period are found also in the Jouri-ji Temple and the Byo-do-in Temple. In the latter temple is a seated figure of the Buddha, with hands held close together resting on the lap, somewhat in the manner of the *dhyani-mudrā* (Irie, T. *et al. op. cit.* p. 13). A halo appears around the body and another around the head, the statue and the haloes all resting in front of a screen decorated with the flame symbol.

In the Kamakura period which followed the Heian period some Buddha figures display a faithful preference to Chinese forms, a good example of this type of statuary being a standing Buddha in the Saidai-ji Temple (Irie, T. *et al. op. cit.* p. 7. The rippling drapery is quite reminiscent of the drapery in some Chinese sculptures. Chinese influence can also be traced in sculptures such as the standing Buddha in the Todai-ji Temple (Irie, T. *et al. op. cit.* p. 10), which is a very imposing and dignified sculpture comparable to the most significant Chinese sculpture of the same class. A rare seated Buddha figure of the same period with some unusual features is to be found at the Todai-ji Temple mentioned earlier. The hair shown in the form of studs covers a head that is clearly out of proportion to the body. It is like a solid thick helmet placed on the head. The eyes are closed and the face is full and placid. The figure is draped in a cloak, with thick folds placed vertically on the body, while the part of the robe covering the legs is almost flat except in the front. The statue is seated on an open lotus.

Thus during a period of about fourteen centuries, the Buddha statue which originated in India in the first century traversed the whole of South and East Asia, retaining its original iconographic characteristics but undergoing appropriate modifications in external features to suit traditions and sentiments peculiar to the people of each country.

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P. E. E. Fernando

IMAGE-FORMATION, a mental faculty forming images of external objects which are not present to the five physical senses. It is sometimes called, though not quite accurately, the creative faculty of the mind. Creation in the fullest sense is origination without precedence. And, as there is no idea in the mind which was not prior in the senses *(nihil in intellectunis prius in sensu),* mind cannot be called creative in the fullest sense, although images perceived in the senses may be regrouped by the mind which thereby forms new mental images, which is imagination, or new mental concepts, which is ideation.

The process of formation of images or concepts is referred to in Buddhist psychology as 'mental formations' *(saṅkhāra),* the fourth of the five aggregates *(pañcakkhandha)* which constitutes the individual process of conscious living. It follows immediately after impressions (feelings or sensations: *vedanā*) and perceptions *(saññā),* all of which are highly complex processes. Colour is not perceived without form, but imagination can either retain the form and change colour, or *vice versa,* or change both.

The main difference, therefore, between impressions and ideas is that impressions are reproductions and ideas

are reconstructions, re-formations, compositions. Imagination, then is a reconstructive process of earlier impressions, a process of association and dissociation of ideas, in which memory, recollection and reflection play an important part. It is an aspect of actuality, which is individualistic, for it is an individual reaction to an individual process.

Perception *(saññā)* is not preceded by any conscious process. This can be experimentally proved in perceiving ambiguous figures, in which either the black or the white areas can be seen as the figure, the other forming the background, without any process of rationalisation. The perception is conditioned by sensations, but imagination or formation of images is subsequent.

When an interpretation of perception, i.e., a concept of the sense-impression, is not obvious, a probable and familiar solution or explanation will be adopted, and thereby one may not perceive the event as it occurs, but as 'it makes sense'. And that is imagination.

Such imaginative interpretation is primarily a memory-image, although not a mere revived impression. The newly received sensation *(vedanā)*, after it has been cognized through perception *(saññā)* in a general way, is now being conceived and formed *(saṅkhata)* in which presentation the old and the new are blended in cognitive representation and reconstruction.

In fact, all recognition involves a high degree of imagination, for without the recall of an earlier image-formation, called grasping the past *(atītaggahaṇa)*, it would be impossible to classify and name any new impression. Clasification is the grouping into a higher order or class, on the collective grasping of what belongs together *(samudayaggahana* or *samūhaggahana)*, by means of which clearer understanding of the individual object is obtained. It is this grasping of the meaning or essential nature *(atthaggahana)* which leads to the naming *(nāmaggahaṇa)* of the object.

This entire process of recollection, association, classification, discrimination, judging and identification lies between perception *(saññā)* and consciousness *(viññāna)* and is so complex that it is rightly called *saṅkhāra* or ideation or image-formaiton.

Of the six particular concomitant mental factors *pakiṇṇakacetasika* it is initial application *(vitakka)* or direction of mind which operates most actively in the process of imagination and is found indeed in 55 various classes of consciousness. It greatly contributes to reasoned thinking in such processes with its characteristics of directing and guiding the imagination in its image and name-finding process.

H. G. A. van Zeyst

IMAGE HOUSE. See PATIMĀGHARA

IMAGES See ICONOGRAPHY, ICONOMETRY, IDOLATRY.

IMMORTALITY, usually designated by the Pali term *amata* and the Sanskrit terms *amṛta* or *amṛtatva*, is the condition of being free from death and rebirth, and hence a state of durability and non-change, a state of lasting security.[1] The belief that there could be some kind of eternal existence after the dissolution of the physical body is almost universal. The fate of man after death has been one of the biggest problems that man has faced and attempted to solve. Various peoples, in keeping with their culture, civilisation and religious background, have given various explanations to this problem, and the condition of immortality and how it could be realised occupies a very significant place in these deliberations. The difference betwen Buddhism and other systems of thought on this question lies mainly in the Buddha's denial of a soul *(ātman* or *attā)*.

The concept of immortality invariably directs our attention to questions of death and the life after death. The moment immortality as a realisable state is accepted ordinary physical death does not become the end of empirical existence. If physical death is not the end of ordinary life what happens to the life-force (designated as *viññāna* or consciousness in Buddhism and soul in other systems) of the dying individual?

Buddhism offers comprehensive solutions to this and allied problems. The solutions Buddhism offers were the result of a long process of thinking on the problems by the Buddha himself and various thinkers that preceded him. The questions of rebirth and of *karma* and the availability of a state free from the effects of life's conflicts had been treated by many of Gotama's predecessors. Gotama with his empirical approach to the problem presented an

1. *Na jāyati na jīyati na mīyati' ti amatan' ti vuccati* (*KhpA*. p. 180. Similarly at *DhpA*. I. p. 228).

explanation different from the ones current at the time. He put forward a system of practical ethics leading the individual to a state free from the vortex of life and death and this state is described as the state of immortality, Nibbāna.[2]

In almost all the religious traditions of the world, including that of India's non-Buddhist tradition, it is accepted that there is a soul which is permanent, unchanging and indestructible (See ANATTA). The *summum bonum* of those teachings is that it is possible for this soul to attain immortality. But Buddhism stands as a unique system of thought by denying the existence of such an unchanging and perdurable entity within or without the human personality, acting or initiating action as it pleases. The solution that Buddhism offers lies in the realisation that all existence is subject to change, decay and death and once this true nature of things *(yathābhūta)* is practically realised the person is said to become one with that state free from birth and death *(amatapada)*. It is this state of immortality which is generally designated by the term Nibbāna, which is characteristically described as unborn *(ajāta)*, unbecome *(abhūta)*, unmade *(akata)* and uncompounded *(asaṅkhata Ud.* pp. 80-1). And as the individual has no 'soul' as such, the moment he realises this state he becomes one with it and hence immortal. He gets lost in immortality as it were.[3] He escapes the bonds of *saṃsāra* which is the born *(jāta)*, the become *(bhūta)*, the made *(kata)* and the compounded *(saṅkhata)*.

Immortality is realised by practical experience and not by speculating about it. From a pragmatic point of view the actual problem of man is his afflictions in ordinary life and his efforts have to be directed towards solving the problem at hand without resorting to metaphysical speculations about the immortal state of the saint. Buddha's reply to brahman Unnābha's question as to what lies beyond Nibbāna was that, the question goes too far and it cannot be answered. He further says that the purpose of living the holy life is to attain Nibbāna, with Nibbāna as its goal and end (*S.* V. p. 218). Thera Mahākassapa is represented as declaring to Sāriputta that the Tathāgata has left unanswered *(avyākata)* as to whether he exists *(hoti)*, exists not *(na hoti)*, both exists and exists not, neither exists nor exists not after death, because such a declaration is not conducive to the realisation of the state of immortality (*S.* II, pp. 222-3). About the existence and non-existence of a Tathāgata after death bhikkhunī Khemā replies that such questions are irrelevant (*S.* IV, pp. 374).[4]

Buddhism teaches that continuity of consciousness of the individual *(cittasantāna)*, which is constantly changing does not come to an end with physical death of the individual.[5] Its subjection to change and hence to birth and death can only be eliminated by realising the state of enlightenment *(sambodhi)* and release *(vimutti)*. The person who has realised this state has gone beyond the possibility of accumulating any rebirth producing *kamma* and as such he has realised the state of immortality in that very life itself. He lives in the world without being a victim of its vicissitudes. He does not accumulate fresh *kamma* and, therefore, his consciousness is free from defilements and is pure in its unconditioned natural state *(pakatipabhassara)*[6]. As the cause of the accumulation of fresh *kamma* is destroyed his consciousness has become immune to internal and external defilements. This state of purity, of knowledge and of insight is the immortal state of Nibbāna from where no relapse is possible. And what is meant by physical death is the destruction of the structure that embodies this consciousness. Rebirth is the re-embodiment of this consciousness after the collapse of its previous tenement. And this re-embodiment is possible only so long as this consciousness is burdened, defiled and darkened by the accumulation of *kamma*. Once these defilements are removed from it, it remains pure and enlightened in its immortal state.

After his realisation of this state Gautama Buddha is said to have made the significant statement recorded in the Piṭakas (eg. *Vin.* I, p. 7; *M.* I, p. 169; *D.* II, p. 39), "Open are the doors of immortality, let those who have ears give up their credulity," and it was with these words that he began his career as religious teacher. By referring to his realisation of the state of immortality as 'opening the gates' to that condition the significant idea is expressed that it is by untying the ties and unlocking the locks of our hearts that men can open themselves to truth and immortality.

A question could be raised whether this possibility of man to realise the immortal state that is present in every individual means the presence of any unchanging and permanent entity like a soul. But Buddhism denies

2. Hence *amata* or *amṛta* is one of the most frequent epithets of Nibbāna. For references in literature see *PTC*.

3. Note the Pali expressions *amataparāyana* (*S.* V. p. 218) and *amatogadha* (*S.* V. pp. 41, 54).

4. See also the *Cūlamālunkyasuttanta:* (*M.* I. pp. 426-32).

5. Perhaps it is this undying consciousness in its unconditioned state that is referred to by the author of the *Kaṭhopaniṣad*(I, ii, 18) when he says that the soul which is unborn, eternal, and everlasting is not slain when the body is being slain.

6. Compare the statement "I am pure by nature", *svabhāvaśuddho'ham* which is a *mantra* used by the esoteric Buddhists. See *An Introduction to Buddhist Esoterism,* B. Bhattacharyya, pp. 106, 7.

entirely the presence of such an entity that experiences the activities of the individual. The state of immortality as understood in Buddhism is entirely an impersonal state where the idea of selfhood *(asmimāna)* is completely eradicated, and Buddhism denies the presence of an agent or a performer maintaining that there is only action but no actor. Hence Buddhism does not accept a personal soul that becomes immortal, but a state of immortality, impersonal and absolute. In the ultimate analysis this concept of action without an actor in the human personality seems to be the real difference between the Buddha's concept of immortality and that of the Upaniṣads.[7]

The concept of immortality is inevitably connected with the concept of time and space in that the achievement of immortality means the conquest of time as well as of space. Those who have achieved immortality are beyond the effects of time in its division into past, present and future. See also AMṚTA.

A. G. S. Kariyawasam

IMPERMANENCE (Pali: *anicca;* Skt. *anitya*) is one of the three characteristics *(ti-lakkhaṇa)* or universal characteristics *(sāmañña-lakkhaṇa)* of all 'things' *(sabbaṃ)* or all phenomena *(sabbe dhammā)* i.e., things or processes either human or divine, animate or inanimate, organic or inorgnic and mental or physical (*M.* III, p. 218; *S.* III, pp. 132f., 225; IV, p. 28; *A.* I, p. 152; *V.* p. 182). The other two characteristics of this triad are conflict or non-satisfactoriness *(dukkha)*[1] and no-self or non-substantiality *(anatta).* Of these, impermanence is the most basic characteristic while the other two are more like its corollaries (*S.* III, p. 67). Buddhism presents impermanence of phenomena as an ever-valid, universal objective fact (*M.* I, p. 220; *S.* III, p. 133; *A.* IV, p. 286).

Early texts explicitly and repeatedly draw one's attention to this objective fact and also point out that all things are impermanent because they are characterised by appearence or birth *(uppāda)*, change or transformation *(thitassa-aññathatta)* and disappearance or destruction (*vaya: S.* III, p. 38). Whatever is born is said to be impermanent since whatever is born is sure to perish (*A.* IV, p. 187). Whatever is subject to decay is also impermanent (*S.* I. p. 186). Similarly whatever is compounded, made to be dispositionally determined *(saṅkhata* or *saṅkhāra)*[2] too is impermanent (*M.* I. p. 350; III, p. 108; *A.* V, p. 343 ff.) Thus, impermanence appears almost as a collective term for arising and passing away of things *(uppāda-vaya:* cf. *D.* II, pp. 157; *S.* III, p. 146). The *Paṭisambhidāmagga* (*I.* p. 191) clearly defines it in this manner *(uppāda-vayaṭṭhena aniccā).*

In later Buddhism, specially in the Sarvāstivāda school, the process of change was logically analysed and consequently impermanence came to be explained in terms of nascent *(jāti)*, static *(sthiti)*, decay *jarā)* and cessant *(nāsa)*'moments' *(kṣaṇa).* This fourfold sub-division was brought about by taking change or transformation *(thitassa-aññathatta:* Skt. *sthityanyathatva)* as signifying two separate 'moments' as static and decay. The Sautrāntikas too, accepted this theory of moments *(kṣaṇa-vāda).* However they accepted only *uppāda* and *vaya* and rejected *sthitikṣaṇa* (static moment). The Theravāda commentators too referred to three moments as *uppāda, ṭhiti* and *bhaṅga* (destruction).[3]

7. *Ātman* of man as doer and experiencer is described in the *Kathopaniṣad* II, iv, v.3: "What is there unknowable to that *ātman* by which man cognises form, taste, smell, sounds and sexual joys? This indeed is that". The Buddhist view as opposed to this is expressed in the *Visuddhimagga* (*HOS.*), p.517.

1. *Dukkha* is a term that is difficult to be translated. In ordinary usage it means suffering, pain, sorrow, misery etc. But it also has a deeper philosophical meaning which connotes unsatisfactoriness, conflict etc. In this essay the term is used to convey the general as well as the philosophical meaning.

2. *Saṅkhāra* is another extremely complex Buddhist philosophical term pregnant with meaning. There are at least five nuances of meaning discernible according to the context in which the term occurs. These five shades of meaning are: i. *saṅkhāra* as one of the five aggregates constituting the human personality. In this context it connotes psychological tendency or mental disposition. ii. As a factor responsible for bringing about rebirth it is a force or a drive. iii. As habitual tendency it refers to cumulative effects of bodily, verbal and mental action. iv. It is also used almost as a synonymous term for *cetanā* (volition). v. It stands for all phenomena or things determined by human dispositions or represents any object of human desire or longing. In this sense it is synonymous with the term *saṅkhata* (made-to-be, compounded, arranged, dispositionally determined). On this see further, David J. Kalupahana, *Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism.* Univ. Press of Hawaii, Honolulu, 1975; *Philosophy East & West* 27, No. 4, Oct. 1977, 'Notion of Suffering in Early Buddhism compared with some reflections of early Wittgenstien' by David J. Kalupahana, and also O. H. de A. Wijesekera, *The Three Signata, anicca, dhukkha, anatta,* Wheel Publ. No. 20, Buddhist Publ. Society, Kandy, Sri Lanka.

3. On the development of the theory of impermanence see David J. Kalupahana, *Buddhist Philosophy, a Historical Analysis,* Univ. Press of Hawaii, Honolulu, 1976.

The above account outlines very briefly the early Buddhist theory of impermanence and its later developments. However, Buddhism did not treat this theory in abstract. Being pragmatic and utilitarian in approach, and hence primarily being concerned with man and his emancipation from his samsāric existence to which he is bound due to his clinging to 'things', Buddhism did make a special attempt to apply this theory to the individual. This was for the purpose of illustrating man's own impermanence and thereby pursuading him to give up clinging to what is impermanent. With this purpose in view the individual is analysed into five components which are called the five aggregates of clinging *(pañcupādānakkhandhā)*. These are: material form *(rūpa)*, sensation *(vedanā)*, perception *(saññā)*, mental formations, psychological tendencies or dispositions *(saṅkhāra)*, consciousness *(viññāna)*. In brief the individual is referred to as a heap of processes or dispositions *(saṅkhārapuñja: S.* I, p. 135) all of which are impermanent (*S.* III, pp. 41, 67, 179, 196 ff.). In fact the Buddha points out that it is these sensorial aggregates that cause continuity of samsāric existence (*M.* I, p. 191; III, p. 288f; *S.* I, p. 135). Hence, according to Buddhism, the highest consummation of spiritual life results from the perfect understanding of the impermanent nature of these sensorial aggregates (*M.* II, p. 237). This is why the Buddha declared that the key to the complex problem of samsāric existence lies within this fathom-long body itself (*A.* II, p. 48; cf. *D.* II, p. 67; *S.* I, p.41; IV, p. 138).

One might wonder why this objective fact of impermanence of all things is stressed so much in Buddhism. It is because this objective fact, the recognition of which according to Buddhism is the basis for emancipation, is constantly overlooked by all worldlings. Hence it is repeatedly emphasised and a dictum of great ethical import drawn from it namely, that whatever is impermanent is non-satisfactory *(yad aniccaṃ taṃ dukkhaṃ: S.* II, p. 53; III, pp. 67, 181), and therefore one should necessarily develop dispassion *(virāga)* towards them. As seen from early texts Buddhism very clearly states that desire, attachment, involvement and entanglement in regard to the five sensory aggregates is the arising of all misery or suffering *(dukkha)* connected with samsāric existence (*M.* I, p. 191). To extinguish craving or desire *(rāga, taṇhā)* one has to cultivate dispassion *(virāga)*. An impetus towards this direction is given by pointing out the non-satisfactoriness that lies behind all things.

However, the statement that whatever is impermanent is non-satisfactory *(yad aniccaṃ taṃ dukkhaṃ)* appears to be somewhat of a generalisation based on the preponderance of *dukkha* over *sukha* (happiness) in worldly existence. And further, this generalized statement also suggests that all things at all times cause *dukkha* to all alike. But on the contrary day to day experience shows that this is not so. A thing that causes pain and unhappiness to one could be a source of pleasure and happiness to another. Similarly, the very thing that gives happiness at one particular moment could turn out to be a cause of unhappiness at another moment and so on. Therefore, it is seen that impermanency by itself is value-neutral objective fact. Thus it is clear that *dukkha* is not an intrinsic characteristic or quality of impermanence. Besides, if the statement whatever is impermanent is unsatisfactory, *(yad aniccaṃ taṃ dukkhaṃ)* is considered as an equally valid objective fact like the other universal characteristic of all compounded things namely, that all compounded things are impermanent, *(sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā)* then it would be necessary to concede that Buddhism completely rejects any form of enjoyment *(assāda)*. But this too, is not so. On the contrary, Buddhism grants that there is enjoyment *(assāda)*. Yet at the same time it does not fail to point out that enjoyment too, is impermanent, and therefore, sure to disappear. Loss of enjoyment is a cause for unhappiness and this, Buddhism points out, is the evil consequence *(ādinava)* of enjoyment; and hence, the injunction to detach *(nissarana)* oneself from all forms of enjoyments (*M.* I, p. 5; *S.* III, p. 27ff.). As enjoyment *(assāda)* is necessarily followed by its evil consequences *(ādinava)* it could be reasonably assumed that the sum-total of all experience of an individual amounts to *dukkha*. Hence the special emphasis on this aspect.

It is apparent that while 'impermanence' is an objective fact, non-satisfactoriness *(dukkha)* is a personal experience. Now a problem arises as to how an objective fact can turn out to be a source of *dukkha*. A clue to the solution of this problem is found in the brief statement made by the Buddha that 'whatever is felt or experienced, that pertains to *dukkha (yaṃ kiñci vedayitaṃ taṃ dukkhasmiṃ: S.* II, p. 53). Here, too it is not a denial of experiencing enjoyment but an affirmation of the unsatisfactoriness that lies behind the impermanency of such a joyful experience. From this it is quite clear that *dukkha* is a subjective experience caused by one's process of sensory perception. This is why the Buddha has repeatedly pointed out in a number of his discourses that most of the miseries and sufferings experienced by one are due to one's distorted process of perception. Hence much attention is paid to the perfect understanding of the process of sensory perception, so that one may be wary of how one is bound to get deceived through one's distorted process of perception. The *Madhupiṇḍika Sutta* (*M.* I, p. 111-112) analysing this process of perception shows how it begins on an impersonal tone and then with the arising of feeling or sensation *(vedanā)*, turns into a personal, deliberate act and how almost simultaneously, the ego-consciousness intrudes and shapes the whole process into a highly ego-centric one culminating in the generation of obsessions *(papañca)*. Further, it illustrates how with the

predominence of obsession this process finally becomes inexorably subjected to an objective order of things. With the intrusion of ego-consciousness *(ahamkāra, mamimkāra)* obsessions such as craving, conceit and dogmatic-views *(tanhā, māna, ditthi)*, which are just three aspects of ego-consciousness, come into action. These are further aided and propelled by one's general instincts such as desire to live *(jīvitukāma)*, desire for immortality *(amaritukāma)*, desire for pleasure *(sukha-kāma)* and aversion for suffering *(dukkha-patikūlatā: S.* IV, p. 172). Being goaded by these obsessions and instincts one fails to see things as they are or as they have come to be *(yathābhūta)*. Craving *(tanhā, rāga)*, detestation, hatred *(dosa)* and confusion *(moha)* become the guides of one's preception and all things begin to signify these mental dispositions (cf. *M.* II, p. 298; *A.* V, p. 108 f.). With this distorted and warped process of perception one begins to perceive permanence in the impermanent *(anicce niccasaññī)*, satisfaction in what is unsatisfactory *(dukkhe sukhasaññi)*, substance in what is non-substantial *(anattani ca attā ti saññī)* and pleasant in what is unpleasant *(asubhe subhasaññī: A.* II, p. 25). Perceiving thus one evaluates things in terms of desirable and undesirable, attachment and aversion in so far as things affect and influence one's life. In this process of evaluation things get determined by one's mental disposition *(sankhāra)* and are made-to-be compounded, planned or arranged *(sankhata)* in accordance with one's likes and dislikes. This distorted view of things which holds everything as permanent and satisfactory does not persist for long. Quite often it comes into conflict with the true nature of things namely, that things are impermanent. The effect of this conflict is devastating for, it shatters the illusory sense of permanence and satisfaction and brings one face to face with the impermanence of things which one has overlooked due to distortion *(vipallāsa)* of perception. Herein it is quite clear that it is not impermanence of things in general that causes *dukkha*, but the impermanence of things which are made-to-be objects of one's desire and longing, of things which are dispositionally determined (*sankhata* or *sankhāra: Dhp. v.* 203) by an individual.

Just as Buddhism teaches that things are impermanent and that there is arising of *dukkha* it also teaches that there is the cessation of *dukkha* caused by impermanence. It is said that whatever is of the nature of arising is also of the nature of ceasing (*M.* I, pp. 48, 350). This is applicable to the arising of *dukkha* too. The process that leads to the cessation of *dukkha* is very clearly enunciated in Buddhism. This is nothing other than the perfection of one's process of sensory perception (*A.* IV, p. 138). To perfect one's perception one has to eliminate ego-consciousness *(ahamkāra, mamimkāra, asmimāna)*. This will bring about the pacification of all ego-centered, goal-directed volitional activities *(sabbasankhārasamatha* or *upasama D.* II, p. 199, cf. *Dhp. vv.* 368, 281) and flush out of the mind all its dispositions *(visankhāragatam cittam: Dhp. v.* 154. This, in other words, is the complete elimination of craving *(rāga, tanhā)*, hatred or aversion *(dosa)* and confusion *(moha: S.* IV, p. 362) which brings about supreme inward peace *(ajjhattasanti: Sn. v.* 837). When the mind is thus freed of all mental dispositions, things impermanent that come within the sphere of one's sensory perception will not obsess, confuse or overwhelm him. He will remain steadfast, seeing the objective fact of passing away of things (*A.* IV, p. 404). Though faced with worldly phenomena *(lokadhamma)* his mind will remain steadfast (*Sn. v.* 268). Thus, he will remain in the world amidst all phenomena yet being untouched by them. (*A.* II, pp. 38-39). See also ANICCA, CHANGE and DUKKHA.

S. K. Nanayakkara

IMPURITY. Defilement or uncleanliness in the figurative or moral sense; also the agent causing such defilement. The Pali term for its opposite or positive concept of purity being *suddhi*, the term *asuddhi* is used to denote impurity. *Mala* is another Pali word often used to denote this idea.

The Buddhist idea of Nibbanic freedom could be described from one angle as the state of highest purity or purity in the absolute sense *(paramavisuddhi)*. This has been stated by the Buddha himself when he explained his attainment of Enlightenment as the attainment of highest purity, "By following the path of Enlightenment consisting of morality, concentration and wisdom, I have attained to the state of absolute purity"[1]. Elsewhere he has expressed the same idea: "Strenuous, energetic and ever-strong in effort, one reaches the state of absolute purity"[2]. In another place Elder Mahākappina also makes a similar statement, "As for me, I am purified through absolute purity."[3]

Thus, in Buddhism, final emancipation is envisaged as absolute purity *(paramavisuddhi)* in the sense that it is a state free from everything that is profane. From this, it

1. *sīlamsamādhim paññañ ca maggam bodhāya bhāvayam, patto'smi paramam suddhim* (*S.* I, p. 103).
2. *āraddhaviriyo, pahitatto niccam dalhaparakkamo pappoti paramam suddhim* (*S.* I, p. 166).
3. *atha kho aham visuddho paramāya visuddhiyā* (*Vin.* I, p. 105).

follows, that the keynote in Buddhist religious practice is to make a progressive effort to rid oneself of the impurities that stand on the way to this state of purity. This effort has to be made by each individual until the attainment of absolute purity in Nibbāna.

When complete release from the bonds of saṃsāra and the accompanying Enlightenment are collectively envisaged as purity in the absolute sense, it follows that what obstructs the realisation of this ideal must be collectively designated as impurity.

Impurities in this sense are a part of saṃsāric life, their degree of prevalence varying from person to person, depending on the level of spiritual attainment of each individual. The immoral man is "filled within with impurities".[4] The aim of religious life is to achieve freedom from them. This was the concept of purification which had become a major theme in the religious life of ancient India. This purity was sought after by all the religious sects of the period through diverse methods.

What are the impurities that harass the saṃsāric being? These could be explained as the factors which obstruct spiritual progress and bring about the degeneracy of the human mind thereby taking the individual further and further away from the goal of freedom. So long as the mind is defiled and polluted no spiritual progress can be made. Out of the many synonyms that are used in literary works to designate these factors, the following may be cited as the most important terms: *kilesa, āsava, mala, aṅgana, saṅkilesa, upakkilesa, kalusa, rajas, asuci* etc.

These are impurities inherent in the saṃsāric life of the individual and also in the actions performed by him. The path of purification leading to complete freedom from them is what is emphasised in Buddhism as the noble path *(ariya-magga)* travelling along which should be the main duty and responsibility of the disciple.

The terms denoting impurity are all antonyms for purity *(suddhi* or *visuddhi)* and they convey the idea of impurity in its different nuances. Thus the terms *kilesa* or *upakkilesa* or *saṅkilesa*, all are derived from the verbal form *kilissati* (becoming impure) as opposed to *sujjhati* or *visujjhati* (becoming pure). Thus *kilesa* are the factors that defile pure life — *brahmacariya*. The term *āsava*, coming from *sru* to flow, basically means "inflows or influxes" i.e. ethically impure ideas that find their way into the mind. These inflows take place through the sense-doors when they are allowed to function unguarded and uncontrolled. The term *mala*, coming from the root *mal*, to stain, primarily has the idea of stain, blemish, slur etc. This term refers to those stains or taints or blemishes that spoil the beauty of pure life or thwart the path to Nirvāna. Ignorance of the true nature of life *(avijjā)* is called the 'worst of taints' *(avijjā paramaṃ malaṃ: Dhp. v.* 243), as it is the root cause of all impurities. Accordingly, the Buddha's disciples are given the advice "Rid yourselves of this one taint and become taintless O bhikkhus".[5]

Impurities that arise from the deeds of the evil-doer will destroy him like the rust that arises from iron and eats itself away (*Dhp. v.* 240). This means that by doing impure actions one destroys oneself i.e. digs up his own roots (*Dhp. v.* 247). All evil actions are, indeed impurities both here and hereafter (*Dhp. v.* 242). It is the nature of the world that impure life is easy whereas pure life is difficult (*Dhp. vv.* 244-5). It is a very common phenomenon in life that people see the impurities of others but fail to see their own: such a person's impurities keep on increasing (*Dhp. vv.* 252-3).

These impurities that stain and defile human character cannot be removed overnight. Their removal is a gradual process which has to be patiently practised. This technique is aptly compared to that of a smith removing the dross of silver. The gradual and the slow nature of the process is emphasised when it is said that it is gradual *(anupubba)* and to be done in degrees and that too from moment to moment *(thokathokaṃ khaṇe khaṇe: ibid. v.* 239). And for the patient man who continues the process with perseverance that reward is assured as it is stated: "Purged of impurities and passions, thou shalt not come again to birth and old age" (ibid. *v.* 238) and "shalt enter the divine state of the *ariyas*" (ibid. *v.* 236): i.e. he shall be assured of deliverance. Therefore, the wise man should purge himself of his mental impurities.[6] It is such a person who could be described as *pure (suddha)* and free from all blemish *(anaṅgaṇa: Dhp. v.* 125).

It is important to examine the manner in which impurity takes place. A very general statement regarding this aspect of the problem that is found in the Nikāya texts is "The mind which in its true nature is pure and resplendent becomes soiled by the impurities that invade it from without".[7]

How does the mind become impure through those adventitious defilements: This advent of impurities generally takes place at saṃsāric level when the sense-doors are not well-guarded. This human weakness is

4. *antokasambu saṃkiliṭṭho* (*S.* I, p. 166).

5. *etaṃ malaṃ pahatvāna nimmalā hotha bhikkhavo* (*Dhp. v.* 243).

6. *pariyodapeyya attānam-cittaklesehi paṇḍito* (*A.* V, pp. 232, 253).

7. *pabhassaram idaṃ bhikkhave cittaṃ tañ ca kho āgantukehi upakkilesehi upakkiliṭṭhaṃ* (*A.* I, p. 10).

generally rendered by the term *pamāda* "dalliance" or "negligence". (ibid. p. 11). which is accordingly described as the "path to death" (*Dhp. v.* 21). As it is repeatedly explained in Buddhist texts one must first establish oneself in morality or *sīla* and continue to develop self-purification with perseverance, till complete purity is achieved. It is this all-important message that is conveyed to the Buddhist practiser by the three concepts of morality *(sīla)*, concentration *(samādhi)* and wisdom *(paññā)*. If the sense doors are not well-guarded with ever present mindfulness *(sati)*, impure thoughts are bound to invade the mind and drag the individual deeper and deeper into saṃsāra. With perfect self-control one has to overcome the evil tendencies of the mind so that its impurities are gradually eliminated till it becomes completely free from them. This is the main responsibility of all those who profess to follow the Buddha's teaching.

All the virtues that come under the important concept of *sīla* are meant for the purpose of purging the human mind of its impurities. These *sīlas* have been quite rationally explained as having two aspects, positive and negative, *(cāritta* and *vāritta)* in the sense that those impure actions that should not be done are called 'negative' *(vāritta)*, "to be avoided" while those pure actions that should be done are called 'positive' *(cāritta: Vism.* p. 11).

The idea of impurity in Buddhism could be classified from another angle by applying it to the constituents of the Noble Eightfold Path which is the Path of deliverance as taught in Buddhism and described as "right" *(sammā)* while their opposite aspects are described as "wrong" *(micchā)*. What the term *micchā* (wrong), conveys here is tantamount to "impure", applicable to each of the eight members of the Path eg. *micchā-diṭṭhi* would be 'impure view' etc.

Another related concept is that of the seven stages of purity *(satta-visuddhi)*, which too teaches how to avoid seven stages of possible impurity. These deal with morality *(sīla)*, mind *(citta)*, view *(diṭṭhi)* etc. and the purity in each of these means the removal of every form of impurity from each of them. Yet another important classification of impurity is based on greed *(lobha)*, hatred *(dosa)*, and delusion *(moha)* which are presented as the root-causes of every form of psycho-ethical impurity *(akusala-mūla: M.* I. p. 47).

There is a stock passage in the Nikāyas which is quite comprehensive in enumerating the impurities meant here. The passage runs as follows: "a certain person is immoral, or of evil habits, impure, of conduct that is open to suspicion, covert in his doings, though not being a monk claiming to be one, though not being chaste claiming to be so, inwardly impure, completely soiled and turned putrid.'[8]

The Buddha's view of psycho-ethical impurity is well-expressed in this passage which shows that immorality and hypocrisy are its two main traits. Its occurrence as well as its removal is the personal responsibility of the individual[9], and as the well-known *Dhammapada* stanza says, avoidence of all evil, development of all that is good, and purification of the mind is the advice of all the Buddhas." (*Dhp. v.* 183).

A. G. S. **Kariyawasam**

INA SUTTA. While the Pali canon abounds in suttas pertaining purely to doctrinal themes, there are also a number of suttas dealing with mundane matters, along with moral subjects. *Iṇa Suttas (A.* III, p. 351 ff.), is such an one. As the name of the Sutta indicates it deals with the problem of debt *(iṇa)*, not only in the material sphere, but also in the moral sphere.

The Sutta is important, for it traces the cause of mundane suffering to poverty. In this respect it echoes the view put forward in the *Cakkavattisīhanāda Sutta* which posits poverty as a primary cause of moral decline and social unrest.

The *Iṇa Sutta* begins by pointing out that poverty is a woeful condition in this world for all pleasure seeking folk. The Sutta then gradually enunciates the ensuing evil consequences of poverty. It shows how poverty leads to indebtedness, indebtedness to increase of interest on borrowings, accumulation of debts to default in payment and default in payment to accusation, and subsequently how the person subject to poverty becomes an object of public redicule, harassment and punishment.

The Buddha compares moral poverty and its adverse effects to material poverty and its evil consequences. He says that the plight of a man who lacks faith in wholesome things, who is not sensitive to right things, who has no fear of blame concerning evil actions, no energy and enthusiasm for wholesome things and no knowledge of right things is comparable to that of a materially poor person. A person who is morally poor is prone to misbehave in thought, word and deed and undergo suffering, just as an individual who is materially poor.

8. *pāpadhammo, asuci, saṅkassarasamācāro, paṭicchannakammanto, assamaṇo samaṇapaṭiñño abrahmacārī brahmacāripaṭiñño, antopūti, avassuto, kasambujāto: Vin.* II, p. 236 *S.* IV, p. 180; *A.*II, p. 240 etc.

9. *suddhi asuddhi paccattaṃ na aññamañño visodhaye* (*Dhp. v.* 165).

While the *Iṇa Sutta* describes woes that befall an individual who runs into debt, the *Aṇaṇa Sutta (A.* II, p. 69 f.), which as the name indicates is the opposite of *Iṇa Sutta*, brings out the happiness enjoyed by one who is free from debt. Therein unindebtedness is declared to be a primary cause of happiness.

S. K. Nanayakkara

INCANTATIONS. See DHĀRAṆĪ, MANTRA.

INCARNATION. See AVATĀRA, DALAI LAMA.

INDAKHĪLA. See INDRAKĪLA.

INDETERMINISM. See DETERMINISM and INDETERMINISM

INDIA See SUB-CONTINENT OF INDIA

INDIVIDUAL *(puggala, satta, nāmarūpa, sakkāya)* as a single being or individual character or a human being as an individual or as a social entity. In general, the individual in this sense could be defined as "each separate organic entity". Without entering into a discussion of the problem of countless organisms and their inter-relations, what is intended here is to discuss the problem of the "person" or a "being" or the "individual" as a concept. Accordingly, this becomes an attempt to analyse and investigate the "human person" from the Buddhist viewpoint or in other words to examine a philosophical and a scientific background of the theory of the individual from the Buddhist angle. According to Buddhism, there are several important aspects to this problem. The most significant of them is the absence of a permanent entity underlying man as an unchanging, spiritual and immortal soul as taught in many religious systems. Related to this same doctrine of a soul or more correctly, as a concept from which such a belief in a permanent soul results, is the illusion of the "ego" or the "I-concept". Both aspects are actually one, the difference between the two being the angle from which it is viewed.

According to Buddhism, the individual is a psycho-physical causal process which is analytically explained as formed out of the five aggregates *(pañcakkhandha* Skt. *pañca skandha)* and synthetically explained in the formula of Conditioned Genesis *(paṭiccasamuppāda)* as an everchanging and mutually conditioned series of phenomena. Both explanations deal with the theory of impersonality in two different ways. The gist of both explanations is the absence of a lasting entity within the individual that could be described as a soul, and that the personality-belief is a mere illusion. However, the complex nature of the structure of this concept is quite clear. According to the *khandha* (q.v.) theory, the individual is analysed into five constituents which when combined together appear as the individual. But, in reality, these aggregates, either collectively or individually, have no 'real' existence because there is no permanent core underlying them as a soul; there is only a ceaseless continuity. Thus, as their "existence" is merely a psycho-physical causal process with only an apparent and delusive permanency, the designations given to this combination of aggregates such as 'I', 'you', 'he', 'god' etc. "are expressions, designations, usages and conceptualizations of the world which the Tathāgata makes use of without being led astray by them".[1] Hence, in the ultimate sense *(paramattha)* there exists only as actuality, ever changing physical and mental phenomena, coming into being and disappearing every moment. These five aspects, into which the individual is analysed, are designated as aggregates of grasping *(upādānakkhandhā)* in the sense that it is to these groups that the so-called individual clings, thinking them to be his 'ego' - *attā*.[2] These five are (*S.* III, p. 47): corporeality group *(rūpakkhandha)*, feeling-group *(vedanā°)*, perception group *(saññā°)*, mental formation group *(saṅkhāra°)* and consciousness group *(viññāṇa°)*.

When the individual is conceived as the coming together of these five aggregates, the resultant concept of a 'being' is called *sakkāya* - group of existence - in the sense of the normal individual or the physical personality, the rational self. Thus it becomes clear that it is a name for the five aggregates conceived collectively as the apparent individual. "Sakkāya, O Visākha, is said by the

1. *Lokasamaññā, lokaniruttiyo, lokavohārā, lokapaññattiyo, yāhi Tathāgato voharati aparāmasaṃ: D.* I. p. 202.
2. *rūpaṃ me attā....... vedanā me attā.... M.* I. p. 232.

Buddha to be a name for the five groups as objects of clinging."[3]

Buddhist texts enumerate twenty forms in which this delusion of the personality or individuality could be had. These are obtained by applying 4 types of that belief to each of the five aggregates in the following manner: (as applied to *rūpa):* the belief that the individuality *(atta)* is (i) identical with each of the five aggregates (01–05), (ii) that it possesses each of them (06–10), (iii) that in it is contained each of them (11–15), and (iv) that it is contained in each of them (16–20).[4] Buddhism excludes all these posibilities and concludes that there is no lasting or perdurable element in the human individual. The 'I-concept' is only a delusion resulting from the ignorance of these facts. It is the same important truth that is taught in the Buddha's *anattā* or 'no-soul' doctrine which is a unique feature of his teaching.

According to the axiom of *tilakkhaṇa* – the three signata – also the individual is void of any kind of permanent soul. The three signata taught in Buddhism are *anicca* (impermanence) *dukkha* (pain) and *anatta* (no-soul). The *anicca* and *anatta* theories directly imply soullessness.

The holy life *(brahmacariya)* is said to be impossible in Buddhism until the individual ceases to believe in a permanent soul and begins to regard life as a psycho-physical process of incessant becoming as shown in the theory of conditioned genesis – *paṭiccasamuppāda*. The Buddha clarifies this position regarding the individual when be says: "Verily, if one holds the view that the soul *(jīva)* is identical with the body, in that case the holy life is not possible or if one holds the view that the soul *(Jīva)* is something quite different, in that case also the holy life is not possible. Both these extremes the Perfect One has avoided and taught the doctrine in a middle way which says 'on ignorance depends karma-formations, on karma-formations depends consciousness etc.' "[5]

This shows that the individual according to Buddhism is not a 'being' *(satta)* but a 'becoming' *(bhava)* composed of mind and matter *(nāma-rūpa)*. He is an incessant psycho-physical flux.

An examination of the theory of Conditioned Genesis makes this clearer. The story of the individual as related in this formula begins with *avijjā* or ignorance of the true facts of life. This is only a convenient starting point but not a first beginning, for as existence is conceived as a cycle *(cakka)*, with ever-recurring birth and death, no first beginning can be seen in it.[6] Owing to man's delusion of a personal self and of the ignorance of the realities of existence he continues in this cycle as a victim of his own volitional activities *(kamma)*. Through this *avijjā* are produced the *saṅkhārā* or mental formations. These in turn produce consicousness *(viññāṇa)* which becomes responsible for the next link, the psycho-physical personality *(nāma-rūpa)* or the 'individual' as generally understood. Now this individual becomes full-fledged only with the formation of the six sense-organs, the sixth of which is the mind. At this stage he comes into contact with the external world through the six bases *(saḷāyatana)* and as a result of this contact he experiences feeling *(vedanā)* of various types. Feeling results in craving *(taṇhā)* which in turn conditions clinging *(upādāna)*. This is the condition which is responsible for continuous becoming *(bhava)* of the individual. Thus is brought about rebirth *(jāti)* and all its evils like old age *(jarā)* disease *(vyādhi)* death *(maraṇa)* etc.

Thus the individual being which lives in the world as a rational self could be described as a product of *avijjā* and *kamma*. Also, he must get over them if he were to conquer suffering. Holy life in Buddhism is meant for this end. And as there is no unchanging core similar to a soul in the individual, he is capable of changing completely until he achieves full freedom from all samsaric suffering.

The ego-concept, *(sakkāya-diṭṭhi)*, which stands on the way to the achievement of freedom, cropping up constantly like a perennial obstruction, and which also is the concept that leads to the belief in a permanent soul within the individual, is a mere delusion which has to be got over by constant effort. This is the 'self-realisation' taught in Buddhism, which is given as the highest aim of man.

The fact that what appears as the individual is merely a temporary and changing combination of a number of conditions is rather dramatically expressed in a dialogue between Māra, the Evil One and the Nun Vajirā. Māra questions her as to who the creator of the individual

3. *pañca kho ime āvuso Visākha upādānakkhandhā sakkāyo vutto Bhagavatā: M.* I. p. 299.
4. i. *rūpaṃ attato samanupassati*
   ii. *rūpavantaṃ vā attānaṃ....*
   iii. *attani vā rūpaṃ.....*
   iv. *rūpasmiṃ vā attānaṃ.... M.* I, p. 300; *S.* III, p. 3, 46 etc.
5. *tam jīvaṃ taṃ sarīranti vā bhikkhū diṭṭhiyā sati brahmacariyavāso na hoti: aññaṃ jīvaṃ aññaṃ sarīranti vā bhikkhū diṭṭhiyā sati brahmacariyavāso na hoti, ete te bhikkhū ubho ante anupagamma majjhena tathāgato dhammaṃ deseti. avijjāpaccayā saṅkhārā* etc. *S.* II. p. 62.
6. *pubbā koṭi na paññāyati: S.* II. p. 178.

(satta) is. Vajirā explained to him that there is no such thing as an individual or a person but merely a collection of ever-changing aggregates *(khandha)* illustrating her explanation by the simile of the chariot which is merely a name for a collection of parts (*S.* I. p. 134 f). This illustration is elaborated in greater detail in the *Milinda-pañha* where Nāgasena points out that when a person is meant by giving him a name it does not denote a soul but is simply an apellation for the five aggregates which constitute the individual (*Miln.* p. 25 ff).

What has been said so far shows that the Buddhist concept of the individual or the person is a definite theory, the essence of which is that this apparently changeless entity is in reality a changing combination of a number of conditioned factors, be it as *nāma* and *rūpa*, or the five aggregates or the *paṭiccasamuppāda* complex.

Thus it is seen that this individual does not remain the same for two consecutive moments showing that his is not a static being as he appears to be but a bundle of perpetual becoming *(bhava-santati)*. His spiritual constituent *(nāma)* and the physical frame *(rūpa)* are linked together by the laws of causation. Thus he is entirely phenomenal and empirical, governed by casual laws and devoid of any extra-phenomenal soul.

As the ego-concept of the individual is only a delusion, the agency of actions he performs, the ownership of the things he possesses etc. cannot be attributed to any particular element within him. That is why it is said:

For there is suffering, but none who suffers
Doing exists although there is no doer
Extinction is, but no extinguished person
Although there is a path, there is no goer.[7]

There is no performer of kamma
Or one who reaps the kamma-results
Phenomena alone flow on -
No other view than this is right.[8]

The sense-organs and their objects have a functional interdependence between them, without the presence of any agency anywhere. Realisation of this fact amounts to release from the bonds of existence.

In this *khandha*-complex called individual the samsaric continuity through death and rebirth is maintained by means of consciousness *viññāṇa)*, which is one of the five *khandhas*, and accordingly an ever-changing aggregate and not a soul. It survives death, and propped by the force of kamma, assumes another birth and in this manner the individual continues his samsaric sojourn till he realises Nibbāna. The significant point to be understood here is that although the individual is only a changing bundle of aggregates without a permanent soul, his moral responsibility for the actions he performs is asserted definitely and clearly for there is continuity amidst this change. It is taught that his continuity is inevitably maintained with his identity as the inheritor of his kamma. It is a changing process, for the being that is born into the new life is neither the same nor different from his predecessor.

What happens to the individual in Nibbāna is best illustrated by the analogy of fire, which is extinguished in the absence of fuel: similarly the so-called individual's kammic force of continuity is arrested in the absence of the rebirth-producing "fuel" of craving *(taṇhā)* in its diverse forms. Hence there is no 'abiding being' who attains personal Nibbāna, there being only a realization.

Despite the *anattā* or no-soul theory, the individual as a concrete being with moral responsibility and identity in continuity after death is always maintained in Buddhism. A very lucid presentation of this important and abstruse subject is found in the ***Bhāra Sutta*** of the *Saṃyutta-nikāya* (*S.* III, p. 25), where the individual *(puggala)* is described as the carrier of the weight of the five aggregates, *(bhārahāra)* described earlier. Here the term *bhāra* means 'weight' meaning the weight of the five aggregates, whose combination 'creates' the individual, who accordingly, becomes its 'carrier'. Hence the term *bhārahāra* meaning 'carrier' of the 'weight' becomes quite an appropriate term to mean the samsaric individual in the Buddhist sense. This explanation would be clear enough for those who find it somewhat difficult to conceive the reality of the conventional individual without investing him with a soul.

In a discussion of the concept of individual in Buddhism an important fact that emerges is that unlike in theistic religions, he is not created by someone like a Creator God, but is self-originated. The *paṭiccasamuppāda* theory denies any possibility of a first cause such as God or even first beginning. The other important fact that follows from this important teaching is the individual's own responsibility for achieving release from the bonds

7. *dukkham eva hi na ko ci dukkhito*
kārako na kiriyā va vijjati
atthi nibbuti na nibbuto pumā
maggam athi gamako na vijjati: *Vism.* p. 513 (PTS)

8. *kammassa kārako natthī*
vipākassa ca vedako
suddhadhammā pavattanti
eva'taṃ sammadassanaṃ: ibid. p. 602.
attā hi attano nātho: *Dhp.* stz. 160.

of existence, which he has to do through his own efforts guided, of course, by the Buddha's teaching. The independence or rather the supremacy and the responsibility of the individual in this regard is of utmost significance in Buddhism.

Even as a social animal with his rights and duties and working towards the goal of freedom from bondage, the individual has to lead a life of independence in views and activities in the sense that he has no blind faith in any one and should not be a tool in the hands of others. The individual himself is his lord and master, for he is an "end in itself and a source of value in his own right." [9]

A. G. S. Kariyawasam

INDO-GREEKS. The term Indo-Greek is generally used to denote people of Greek origin who first lived in Bactria and later extened their political power into the north-western region of India sometime in the second century B.C. Although it has been stated that the Indo-Greeks were descendants of the Greek people who settled down in Bactria and the neighbouring areas during the times of Alexander and his Selucidian successors, this theory has now been successfully disproved. In fact, there is evidence to believe that long before Alexander's invasion of India, there were people of Greek origin living in areas just outside the western boundaries of the Indian subcontinent. The *Majjhima-nikāya* mentions Yavana (a term used in early Indian literature to denote people of Greek origin, but in later times it covered many foreign groups who came from the west of India) along with Kamboja as two of the sixteen *mahā-janapadas* which were flourishing at the time of the Buddha, while the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, the famous grammar by Pāṇini, a work assignable to the fifth century B.C., also speaks of Yavana and Kamboja as two of the *janapadas*. Classical Greek writers also refer to some Greek colonies such as Nysa which Alexander came across immediately before he entered India. It is possible that these Greek colonies were started by the Achaemenid rulers of Iran who were intent on dispersing the Greek states in Asia Minor out of political considerations. The Greek population in these areas must have been strengthened under Alexander and Selucidian emperors.

A large part of our knowledge about the Indo-Greeks comes from numismatic sources, while the works of some classical writers such as Justin, Strabo, Polybius, Apollodotus and a few others also provide some supplementary information. Among the Indian sources, the *Milindapañha*, the *Mālavikāgnimitra* of Kalidāsa, the *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali and a few *Purāṇas* are of some significance. Two inscriptions which have direct relevance to the Indo-Greeks have also been found. At a glance, they may look an impressive array of sources, but most of the literary sources, in fact, contain very little information, sometimes a solitary stray reference, pertaining to Indo-Greek history. In these circumstances, one is compelled to fall back heavily on the numismatic material, however uncertain and flimsy the data that may be gleaned from it as a result of the inherent defects in this particular type of source. Hence, the history that is based on such sources is bound to be incomplete and in most instances, sketchy.

Bactria which was once included in the eastern part of the Macedonian empire later came under the wings of Selucidian dominion. However, the Bactrians' relationship with their Selucidian masters was an uneasy one all along, and during the time of Antiochus II (261-246 B.C.) the Bactrians, under the leadership of one Diodotus, revolted against the Selucidians and achieved independence sometime in 250 B.C. Diodotus was succeeded by his son Diodotus II, but after some years he was ousted by one Euthydemus. Meanwhile, the then Selucidian emperor Antiochus III, in order to recapture the lost territoty, launched an invasion of Bactria, but even after a long siege of the capital of Bactria, failed to defeat Euthydemus. Eventually, a peace agreement was arrived at in 208 B.C., ending the feud and also effectively removing the persistent threat of the Selucidian invasion of Bactria. Euthydemus was succeeded to the throne by his son Demetrius. The friendly relations that existed between Bactria and the Selucidian empire precluded the possibility of any Bactrian expansion towards the west and the only direction in which Demetrius could expand his kingdom was southward.

In the meantime, the political climate in India was fast changing after the death of Asoka. His death was followed by a period of internecine rivalry among his descendants and an intense competition for the Maurya throne, resulting in political turmoil and paving the way for the disintegration of the empire. About fifty years after Asoka's departure, the throne was usurped by Puṣyamitra Sunga, the army commander of the last Mauryan emperor Brhadratha.

As may be inferred from the numismatic sources, Demetrius, after becoming ruler of Bactria, was busy widening the borders of his kingdom. W.W. Tarn, in his pioneering study on the Indo-Greeks, *The Greeks in Bactria and India*, held the view that Demetrius, the son of Euthydemus, was the first Bactrian ruler to invade India, and that his invasion went as deep as the Gangetic

9. e.g. Kant's definition of *persons:* 'they are ends-in-themselves and sources of value in their own right' quoted in *The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*, ed. by Paul Edward, Vol. VI. p. 110.

plain. K.P. Jayaswal and R.C. Majumdar, too, subscribed to this theory, citing some Indian literary and epigraphic data in support of their arguments. However, Tarn's theory is solely based on a very ambiguous statement of Apollodorus of Artemita, quoted by Strabo and Justin. In this statement Apollodorus says that more tribes were subdued by Menander and Demetrius than by Alexander. However, it has no reference whatsoever to any particular areas conquered by Demetrius. After a careful study of all the relevant sources, A.K. Narain in his work, *The Indo-Greeks,* has very convincingly pointed out that there is no evidence to believe that Demetrius, the son of Euthydemus, had any opportunity to invade India. In fact, no coins that can definitely be assinged to this ruler have been found in any territory to the east of Hindukush, and this stands in support of Narain's argument. Narain also shows that the Greek writers were confused by the fact that there were two kings bearing the name Demetrius, whose regnal-periods were not chronologically far removed from each other.

Nevertheless, the coins of the second Demetrius (Demetrius II) depict marked differences from the coins of Demetrius, the son of Euthydemus (Demetrius I), and his coins have been found in the Kabul region as well. Another point that needs to be taken note of with regard to his coins is the use of bi-lingual legends (Greek and Indian) suggesting some close association with India. A comparison of the coin types of the two rulers would also lead to the assumption that Demetrius II did not belong to the family of his namesake. Conversely, the coins of Demetrius II bear a close resemblance to those of another ruler named Antimachus who bore the title Theos (god).

Antimachus Theos appears to have been an earlier member of the family of Demetrius II; perhaps he established himself in the north while Euthydemus was busy in the south or came to the scene soon after the latter's death. Thus Antimachus may have been able to expand his realm gradually into the Kabul valley and to the upper Indus area. He was the first Indo-Greek ruler to have issued the square type coins on the Indian model and according to Narain, the first *Yavana* ruler to cross the Hindukush to the South. It is also possible that he annexed Bactria to his domain, presumably after the death of Demetrius I. Antimachus Theos must have reigned until about 180 B.C.

Demetrius II appears to have followed the policy of Antimachus Theos of expanding his realm further into India. From the available numismatic evidence it is apparent that he was in control of an area up to Gandhāra. Yet, while he was busy conquering Indian territory, much of his home territory in Bactria was lost to one Eucratides who, according to Justin, was a great king ruling over thousand cities. He is also described as a contemporary of Mithradates I of Parthia who ascended the throne c. 171 B.C., and this provides acceptable data for Eucratides too. Some bilingual coins issued by Eucratides have been found in the Kabul region, suggesting his authority over that area. According to the classical accounts, he also was in control of Paropamisadae, Aria, Arachosia, Drangiana and Gandhāra. Thus, he was able to bring a fairly large area, both in India and outside, under his authority, but his effort of building up an Indo-Greek empire was foiled by his own son who murdered him on his return from India.

Numismatic evidence of two other rulers is forthcoming: namely Pantaleon and Agathocles, who appear to have had some relationship to Demetrius I. The coin types of Agathocles and Pantaleon are also very similar in many respects, including their style, legends and symbols. And the coins of both of them, in turn, bear close resemblance to the coins of Demetrius I. Therefore, it is believed that Pantaleon and Agathocles were brothers and that Demetrius I may have been their father. The two brothers appear to have begun their career in Arachosia, but, later extended their realm to the Kabul region where their later coin types have been found. It has been suggested that they reigned concurrently sharing the kingdom, but some coins issued by Agathocles have also been discovered in Taxila, pointing to his rule there. This fact, and the absence of Pantaleon's coins in Taxila, have been interpreted as an indication of the possibility of Agathocles outliving is brother and extending the Indo-Greek power into the Taxila region.

The chronology of their reigns may be arrived at by a comparison of their coins with those of Demetrius II. It has been argued that the two brothers belonged to a later period than Demetrius II, and therefore, their reigns as falling within the period between the death of Demetrius and Eucratides' invasion of India. It is also possible that at least Agathocles, who appears to have had a longer reign, lived even after Eucratides' invasion, and this may explain the latter's failure to conquer Gandhāra.

The above delineations would have revealed that by the time of Pantaleon and Agathocles the Indo-Greeks had been able to extend their rule, first from Bactria to the adjoining region of Arachosia and Seistan, and then spreading southward to Kabul and Gandhāra. Then they took control of certain parts of Sind. Though this appears to be a vast area, the spread of Indo-Greek power in this whole regions cannot be attributed to one or two ruling families. In fact, a number of ruling dynasties were involved in this long process in which stiff competition for power and inter-family rivalry was a common phenomenon. For the very same reason, none of these ruling families could make much headway in bringing the entire area under one flag, though several attempts were made by some rulers like Demetrius II and Eucratides; but their successes were short lived.

The death of Eucratides and the consequent power struggle among the Indo-Greeks provided ideal conditions for the rise of another strong ruler. It was in this setting that we see the rise of Menander who is described in Indian as well as in Greek sources as the greatest of all Indo-Greek rulers. He is the only Indo-Greek ruler to be mentioned by name in Indian literature. There is little doubt that he is Milinda, the *Yavana* king referred to in the famous Buddhist work *Milindapañha*. The works of Strabo, Justin and the *Periplus of the Erythrian Sea*, too, contain references to Menander. Above all, thousands of coins issued by Menander, discovered in a wide area, and an inscription issued by one of his regional officials also provide useful information for the study of the career and achievements of this monarch.

E.J. Rapson thought that Menander was a contemporary of Demetrius, and W.W. Tarn, going even further, thought that Menander succeeded Demetrius as ruler of the Indo-Greeks. The only basis for Tarn and Rapson to express such views was the above-mentioned statement of Apollodotus in which both Demetrius and Menander are mentioned together. As pointed out earlier, this is a very ambiguous statement on which much reliance cannot be placed. On the contrary, numismatic evidence seems to show that Menander has to be placed much later than Demetrius I and even later than Pantaleon and Agathocles. Numismatic evidence also indicates that Menander's queen was one Agathoclea, who is believed to have been the daughter of Agathocles. If so, his marriage to the daughter of a king who controlled a considerable part of the Indo-Greek kingdom must have helped him a great deal to consolidate his position as an Indo-Greek leader. After a careful study of all available sources, A.K. Narain has arrived at the conclusion that Menander must have ascended the throne sometime around 155 B.C.

From the *Milindapañha* we learn that Menander was born in a village named Kalasi not far from Alasandā, and two hundred *Yojanas* from Sāgala (identified as modern Sialkot in Pakistan). The geographical distribution of his coins helps to form a fair idea of the extent of his kingdom. The large number of Menander's coins that have been found in the Kabul valley, with 521 from Mir Zakah alone, is definite evidence of his rule over the region. The discovery of the famous Bajaur casket inscription of Viyakamitra, a local governor under Menander, and some hoards of coins in the adjoining areas, bear testimony to his control over the Swat valley as well. His kingdom also included areas such as Paropamisadae, Arachosia, Gandhāra and Taxila. It is difficult to ascertain the southern boundaries of his kingdom, but according to the *Periplus*, Menander's coins were in circulation in Barigaza (identified as Broach, south of Gujarat). Yet this is not a definite indication of his rule there. Strabo, again quoting Apollodorus states that the Greeks conquered Patalene (lower Indus), Saraostes (Saurāṣṭra ?) and Sigerdis, but again there is no hard proof that these regions were under Menander or any other Indo-Greek monarch.

The absence of any appreciable number of coins issued by Menander in areas to the east of the Ravi river points to the possible eastern boundary of the Indo-Greek kingdom during his time. Nevertheless, it does not mean that the Indo-Greeks did not attempt to venture beyond the Ravi river, for several Indian sources refer to one or more invasions carried out by the *Yavanas* and one of them into the Gangetic plain. The *Mālavikāgnimitra* of Kālidāsa speaks of a clash between the *Yavanas* and the Suṅgas during the time of Puṣyamitra, whose reign has been placed between 187-151 B.C. The *Mahābhāṣya* of Patāñjali and the *Yugapurāṇa* refer to a *Yavana* invasion into the Gangetic plain. The invasion mentioned in the *Yugapurāṇa* went as far as Pāṭaliputra but the invaders were not successful in conquering any territory. Though some scholars prefer to attribute this invasion (or invasions) to Demetrius, the son of Euthydemus, it is difficult to assume as shown before, that he had any opportunity to invade India. Hence, we have to agree with Narain, in whose opinion the *Yavana* invasion of the Gangetic plain took place in the time of Menander. In spite of the fact that the invasion of the Gangetic valley did not produce any positive expansion of Indo-Greek territory under Menander, the Indo-Greek kingdom included such areas as Badakshan, the Kabul valley or Paropamisadae, the Ghazni area or northern Arachosia, west of the Indus or western Gandhāra, the Swat valley, east of the Indus or the Taxila region and the Jammu-Sialkot region.

There is little doubt that Menander's regin marked the climax of Indo-Greek power in India; but not long after his death (c. 130 B.C.), signs of dissension in the kingdom were quite visible. Menander was succeeded by his very young son, Strato I, but at the beginning, the actual reins of power were in the hands of Agathoclea, the widow of Menander. Those who succeeded Strato were weak rulers, and this gave an opportunity for other ambitious leaders to try their luck, thus bringing in more chaos, ultimately breaking up the kingdom built up by Menander.

Of the many Indo-Greek rulers who came after Menander, only one other ruler is mentioned in the Indian sources. He was Antalcidas, whose envoy Heliodoras to the court of Bhāgabhadra, (probably a later Sunga ruler) erected the famous Garuḍa Pillar at Besnagar near Bhilsa. However, many areas which were formerly under the Indo-Greeks were now fast falling into the hands of a group of new conquerers. The Śakas who had a Central Asian origin, together with the Pahlavas of possible Parthian and Iranian connections,

pushed the Indo-Greeks out of Bactria and Kabul, extending their realm into virtually every area that the Indo-Greeks had held. The last-known Indo-Greek ruler was Hermaeus, whose reign ended probably in the middle of the first century B.C.

Several scholars have attempted to interpret many aspects of Greek influence on India as results of Alexander's invasion, but it must be pointed out that the Macedonean monarch's campaign in India was of very short duration, and was confined to a small area in the extreme north-western corner of the subcontinent. Even those areas that were conquered by him soon fell into the hands of the Mauryas, thereby depriving any reasonable opportunity for a longlasting impact. Thus, if Alexander's invasion had any impact on the course of Indian history, it was bound to be of very limited nature. On the other hand, it would be extremely difficult to distinguish between such effects and those of the later periods. It is also noteworthy that the rule of the Indo-Greeks lasted close to two centuries, extending over a considerable territory both in India and outside. As shown above, some Indo-Greek rulers managed to lead military campaigns deep into the Ganges valley. Others, like Altialcidas, sent emissaries to neighbouring Indian rulers, thus suggesting good relations between the two parties.

The Indo-Greeks, though they preserved and cherished Greek culture, were not at all averse to local cultural and social influence. At least some of them became converts to Indian religious like Buddhism and Vaiṣṇavism. Menander became a Buddhist while Heliodorus, the envoy of Antialcidas was a Vaiṣṇava by faith, a fact he did not fail to give wide publicity by mentioning it on the Garuḍa Pillar at Besnagar.

The *Milindapañha* is very emphatic on the point that King Milinda, identified as Menander, after a long and arduous debate with Thera Nāgasena, was ultimately convinced of the infallibility of the Buddha-*dhamma* and became a convert. It also says that, towards the end of his reign, Menander handed over the kingdom to his son, became a Buddhist monk and eventually attained arhantship. Scholars like Tarn question the authenticity of the story, accepting Plutarch's statement that the king died in a camp. Whether he became a monk or not, there can be little doubt about his conversion to Buddhism, and again, it came through conviction. In this regard, another statement made by Plutarch also merits special attention. He says that when Menander died, different cities in his kingdom put forward claims to his remains, and only with difficulty came to terms, agreeing that they all get equal portions of his ashes, and having got their portions, erected monuments to him in all cities. This incident immediately reminds us of the story found in the *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta* regarding the distribution of the Buddha's relics. The two stories, in many respects, are identical in content. It is quite apparent that Menander was loved by many and that his remains were in great demand. G. Woodcock thinks that the monuments thus erected must have been *stūpas,* following the Buddhist tradition. What is unmistakable however in the incident recorded by Plutarch is its essential Buddhist character.

Menander's association with Buddhism is also attested to by the wheel sign found in some of his coins. Certain scholars have argued that the wheel-symbol did not necessarily denote the *Dharmacakra,* but was used as the sign of a *cakkavatti.* Even if this argument is accepted, there is no denying of the fact that even the *cakkavatti* concept was primarily of Buddhist origin. It must also be noted that Menander's local administrators such as Viyakamitra too, were patrons of Buddhism, as is evident from the Bajaur casket inscription. There are several traditions in Tibet and Southeast Asia connecting Menander with Buddhist monuments in Central Asia and Indo-China. Above all, it is a fact, as A.K. Narain puts it, that if Menander is known in Indian tradition, it is because of Buddhist literature.

The Indo-Greek rule brought India and the outside world, particularly Central Asia and the West, much closer than before, thereby making the way open for the exchange of ideas, cultural traits, movement of people and accelerated trade and commercial activity. In the same way that the Indo-Greeks were amenable to the Indian culture and tradition, they were also responsible for introducing certain features of Hellenistic and Central Asian culture to India. It has been stated that the Gandhāra school of art was introduced and nurtured by the Indo-Greeks. It is also often stated that in the Gandhāra sculptures of the Buddha and other prominent personalities in Buddhism were portrayed in the same manner as gods of the Greek pantheon such as Apollo. This observation may be true of the early works of the Gandhāra school, but the large majority of the sculpture belonging to this school depicts a distinctly Roman influence as well.

One field in which the Indians borrowed heavily from the Indo-Greeks was the art of minting coins. The thousands of neatly minted coins of the Indo-Greeks were closely imitated and followed by the later Indian rulers. Some of the Greek legends found in the Indo-Greek coins were reproduced by the Sakas and the Kuṣāṇas in their coins. Similarly, the Greek language continued to flourish in North Western India long after the disappearance of the Indo-Greek rule. It is also believed that the Indo-Greeks were largely responsible for the Greek influence in fields such as Indian philosophy, medicine, astronomy, astrology, drama, geometry and science. The Indian acceptance of the Greek leadership in some of these fields is aptly epitomized in the words of the anonymous author of the *Gārgi Saṃhitā,* who was

incidentally, not a great enthusiast of the Greeks. He says 'The *Yavanas* are barbarians yet the science of astronomy originated with them and for that they must be reverenced like gods'.

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P.V.B. Karunatilaka

INDOLENCE. Buddhism emphatically declares that man is his own master and that he is solely responsible for his destiny. The Buddha admonishes his disciples to be a refuge unto themselves and never to seek refuge in anybody else (*D.* II, p. 100; *Dhp. vv.* 160, 380). The Tathāgatas merely show the path and each individual has to put forth effort and follow the path. (*Dhp. v.* 276). It is natural for a religion which rejects the belief in an external refuge to reject indolence, also as an obstacle to an individual's progress. Thus, Buddhism considers indolence to be a hindrance to both spiritual and secular progress (*A.* V, p. 136, 159). The emphasis laid on personal efforts and exertion (Pali, *viriya, vāyāma* Skt. ***vīrya, vyāyāma)*** as well as on diligence (Pali, ***appamāda,*** Skt. ***apramāda)*** further clarifies the Buddhist attitude towards indolence. The *Vinaya-piṭaka* (II, p. 2) also records instances where the Buddha emphatically denounced indolence.

Writers in English use the term indolence in a very general way to connote different aspects of indolence which are referred to by different terms in Pali and Sanskrit Buddhist texts. Indolence is of two types, i.e., physical and mental. Though the particular phraseology used both in Pali and Sanskrit Buddhist texts does not strictly maintain this distinction, the contexts reveal such a distinction (eg. the terms *kosajja* and *ālasya* are used in conntection with both physical and mental indolence).

It is said that an indolent *(kusīta)* monk becomes of fearful heart (*A.* III, p. 183); that all indolent *(kusīta)* people cannot comprehend the doctrine. Indolence *(kosajja)* amounts to waning in the teaching and discipline *(dhamma-vinaya* (*A.* V, p. 159); it brings about other bad conditions for, an indolent person cannot abandon flurry *(uddhacca),* lack of self control *(asamvara)* and indiscipline *(dussīla; A.* V, p. 146). Indolence *(ālasya)* is an obstacle to the acquisition of wealth (*A.* V, p. 136). Indolence *(niddā, tandī;* Skt. *nidrā, tandrā; lit. sleep* and weariness) should be got rid of by those who are intent on attaining Nibbāna (*Sn. v.* 942). Indolence, in this case connoted by the term *pamāda,* is a blemish *(rajo: Sn. v.* 334). Indolence *(thīnamiddha;* generally trsl. as sloth and torpor) is one of five hindrances *(nīvaraṇa)* which bring about a morbid state of mind accompanying physical sluggishness. *(Nett.* 86, *Nd.* II, 290; *Dhs.* pp. 1156, 1236). *Pamāda, thīna-middha, tandī* are some of the conditions that weaken one's mind *(Miln.* 289).

Inspite of the fact that at times the same term is used to connote both physical and mental indolence it could be said that such terms as *kosajja,* (Skt. *kauśīdya), kusīta, ālassa, ālasya, tandī, niddā* and so on are predominantly used to connote physical indolence whereas the terms *pamāda* and *thīna (-middha)* are always used to denote mental indolence.

It may so happen that an individual who is physically very energetic and active may be mentally indolent and a mentally active person may be physically indolent. Sometimes physical indolence may be due to mental defects and mental indolence may be the result of physical weakness. Whatever the cause is, both types of indolence are obstacles to one's worldly and spiritual progress, and from a purely religious point of view mental indolence is a far greater obstacle.

Physical indolence often obstructs one's worldly progress and this could be got rid of by putting forth effort *(viriyārambha: Nett.* p. 27). Mental indolence prevents one from attaining Nibbāna. Buddhism accepts seeing through knowledge *(ñāṇa-dassana)* and not believing through faith *(bhatti).* Mental indolence *(pamāda, thīna-middha)* is a great obstacle to the cultivation of this ability of seeing through knowledge (*Sn. v.* 1033). Therefore, mental indolence should be got rid of by cultivating diligence *(appamāda)* for all wholesome mental qualities are rooted in diligence (*A.* III, p. 449; V, p. 21).

S.K. Nanayakkara

INDONESIA

Introduction: Images of the Buddha of Amarāvatī type from South-Eastern India, perhaps going back to the third century A.C., have been found in different parts of

Indonesia. In 414, the Chinese Buddhist pilgrim, Fa-hsien, returning from India, visited Java and found some traces of a Buddhist presence, while in A.C. 424, Guṇavarman, prince of Kashmir, preached Buddhism in Java before going on to China. More substantial evidence of Buddhism in Indonesia comes from the sixth century, and by the end of the seventh, the religion was flourishing in Śrīvijaya in the Palembang region of South Sumatra. With the rise of the Pāla dynasty in Bengal and Bihar in the middle of the eighth century, Mahāyāna Buddhism became important in East and South-East Asia, principally through the influence of the great university of Nālandā in Bihar. In Central Java, the Sailendra dynasty built Borobudur or Barabuḍur (q.v.), the greatest Buddhist munument in the world, as well as other sanctuaries; and Mahāyāna Buddhism of the Avataṃsaka school became dominant in Java, when it had already been well established in China and Japan.

Buddhism continued in Sumatra for many centuries: but in Java, at the end of the ninth century, the Śailendras were eclipsed, and it is not until the thirteenth century, in the east of the island, that evidence for Buddhism again becomes strong. By this time it had acquired a Tantric character, and was much mixed with Śaiva Hinduism. In this form it was also to be found in Bali, and in Minangkabau in Central Sumatra.

Under the pressures of Hinduism and later of Islam, Buddhism in Indonesia declined, but it appears to have contributed a permanent, though largely unacknowledged element in Javanese mysticism. Coedès characterizes Indonesian Buddhism as having a tendency towards the mysticism of the Vajrayāna school, to syncretism with Hindu cults, and as attaching especial importance to the redemption of the souls of the dead, which gave Javanese and Balinese Buddhism the character of a cult of the ancestors. Through their long links with Indonesia, the Chinese brought their own syncretistic version of Buddhism, with popular ceremonies associated with their temples. In modern times, and especially since Indonesian independence, there has been some revival of Buddhism in Indonesia in both Theravāda and Mahāyāna forms. The restored Borobudur has become a national monument, a centre of pilgrimage and an object of world-wide fame.

Śrīvijaya: The history of the Liang dynasty of China speaks of Kaṇḍali, usually identified with Palembang, as a centre of Buddhism, which sent embassies to the Chinese court in 502, 519 and 520 A.C. Towards the end of the seventh century, the kingdom of Śrīvijaya was founded, based on Palembang, and Buddhism was dominant there. At first, the Mūlasarvāstivāda of the Hīnayāna, using Sanskrit for its scriptures, was the main sect. We have the evidence of the Chinese pilgrim scholar, I-tsing, who went to India to study and translate the Buddhist scriptures, and spent several years in Sumatra. In A.C. 671, on his first journey to India, he spent six months in Śrīvijaya learning Sanskrit, and reported that there were a thousand Buddhist monks in the city. After spending six years at the university of Nālandā, he came back to Śrīvijaya, where he stayed from 685 to 689, copying Buddhist Sanskrit texts, and translating them into Chinese. He returned to Canton to recruit four assistants, and then came back to Śrīvijaya. He sent his manuscripts to China in 692 and finally returned there in 695.

For this same period, we have the evidence of four Old Malay inscriptions, two found in Palembang, one from Karang Brahi on the Batang Hari river, and one from Kota Kapur of the island of Bangka, which speak of a Buddhist kingdom of Śrīvijaya, that had conquered Jambi and Bangka, and was preparing an expedition against Java. Little in the way of architectural remains has been found in or near Palembang: but Buddhist images, though of a slightly later period, have been found there. These include Bodhisattvas, especially Avalokiteśvara, so confirm the presence at this later period of Mahāyāna Buddhism in Śrīvijaya.

The Śailendras of Java and the Mahāyāna movement: The patronage of Mahāyāna Buddhism by the Pāla kings of Bengal from the middle of the eighth century, and especially their support for the university of Nālandā in Bihar, greatly extended the influence of Mahāyāna Buddhism in the countries of East and South-East Asia; and the university of Lalitagiri in Orissa, which flourished in the eighth century and was near the ports of embarcation for the east, probably also contributed to this.

In Central Java, the Śailendra dynasty came into power towards the end of the eighth century, continuing for nearly a hundred years and promoting Buddhism, until in 864 A.C., they gained control in Sumatra and made Śrīvijaya their centre.

In 778 A.C., the Śailendra ruler, Panangkaran, founded the temple of Kalasan (near the present-day Yogyakarta), as a sanctuary of the goddess Tārā, the consort of Avalokiteśvara. At Kelurak nearby, an image of Mañjuśrī was installed, which had been made by a master craftsman from Bengal. Buddhist sculpture in the Sailendra kingdom was influenced by the style of Lalitagiri, and in the casting of bronze images especially by Nālandā.

Borobudur and other Buddhist monuments of Central Java: Borobuḍur was the greatest architectural achievement of the Śailendras, and is the largest and most complex Buddhist monument in the world. The construction belongs to the early part of the ninth century, and according to de Casparis, was probably consecrated about 824 A.C. In plan, the building is a square *maṇḍala,*

with sides 123 metres long, erected over a low hill. Above the base there are four galleries, and above these, in three concentric ranks, a series of 72 open-work stūpas, surrounding a larger cental stūpa. Along each side there are 108 Buddha images in niches, while the 72 stūpas also contain Buddhas, making 504 in all. According to the Mahāyāna doctrine, these are the Buddhas of the directions, who oversee the creation, as follows:

East : Akṣobhya, the Imperturbable, who touches the earth in witness, *(bhūmisparśa-mudrā)*.

South : Ratnasambhava, the Bright Jewel of Compassion, whose hand gesture is that of granting boons, *(varada-mudrā)*.

West : Amitābha, the Buddha of Boundless Light, who holds his hands together on his lap in meditation, *(dhyāna-mudrā)*.

North : Amoghasiddhi, the Buddha of Boundless Success, who holds up his right hand in a gesture of dispelling fear, *(abhaya-mudrā)*.

Centre : Vairocana, the Buddha of Perfection, in the stūpas, who holds his hands before his chest in the gesture of preaching, or turning the wheel of the law, *(dharmacakra-mudrā)*.

In Javanese Buddhist literature, it is Vairocana who most often appears as teacher, as the object of worship and as saviour.

The base of Borobudur is known as the *kāmadhātu*, the region of desire. Its walls are illustrated by a series of reliefs, now hidden from view, representing worldly existence, with scenes to illustrate the teachings of the Buddhist Sanskrit text *Karmavibhaṅga*, which describes the cause and effect of good and evil deeds. There are 160 panels, showing lively scenes of contemporary daily life, and graphically portraying punishments in hell for various misdeeds.

The four galleries above the base form the *rūpadhātu*, or region of form, and have reliefs illustrating various Buddhist themes and texts, both on the main walls and on the balustrades:

First gallery : *Lalitavistara:* the life of the Buddha up to the time of his enlightement; on the main wall, upper register, 120 panel *Jātakas* (mostly selected from the *Jātakamālā)*, stories of the previous births of the Buddha, and *Avadānas*, stories of Buddhist saints; on the main wall, lower register, and the balustrade, altogether 720 panels.

Second gallery : *Gaṇḍavyūha*, the story of Sudhana, the son of a rich merchant who wanted to become a Bodhisattva, and to this end, with the help of Mañjuśrī and Maitreya, on a pilgrimage in search of perfect wisdom. This is one of the principal texts of the Avataṃsaka sect. (Main wall). On the balustrade the series of *Jātakas* and *Avadānas* is concluded.

Third gallery : The *Gaṇḍavyūha* is continued on the main wall and balustrade

Fourth gallery : The *Gaṇḍavyūha* is continued on the balustrade and the main wall, where also the concluding hymn, the *Bhadrā-cāri*, dedicated to Samantabhadra, is illustrated. The *Gaṇḍavyūha* is depicted in 460 panels.

The prominence of the *Gaṇḍavyūha* and its hero, Sudhana, is proof of the dominance of the Avataṃsaka school in Central Java. This sect was favoured in China in Tang times from about 640 A.C., near Changan; it spread to Japan, where the school was known as the Kegon, and its principal temple is the Todaiji in Nara, which has the largest Buddha image (Vairocana) in the world, unveiled by the ruler in 752 A.C. Another major text of the Avataṃsaka school is the *Daśabhūmīśvara*, which is a treatise on the ten ascending stages through which one must pass in order to attain to Buddhahood, beginning with meditation on the Buddha and ending with the endowment of manifold attributes of wonderful power. Though this text is not illustrated at Borobudur, it is perhaps significant that the monument itself has ten stages from its base to the crowning central stūpa, the *arūpadhātu*, or region of formlessness. (See *EncyB'sm.* Pls. LIII – LVI).

On the way to Borobudur is the beautiful and important temple, *Candi Mendut* (q.v.) of the same period, which has fine panels of *Pañcatantra* stories and perhaps of unidentified *Jātakas*, and inside has three great figures of the Buddha, flanked by Avalokiteśvara and Vajrapāṇi, perhaps the noblest presentation of this group to be seen anywhere in the world. Nearby is the smaller *Candi Pawon* (q.v.), also beautifully decorated; it is dedicated to Kuvera, the deity of riches.

In the Prambanan area, just to the east of Yogyakarta, there are several important Buddhist temples of the late eighth and early ninth centuries. *Candi Kalasan* (q.v.), 778 A.C., has already been mentioned. *Candi Sari* and *Candi Plaosan* (q.v.) are both monastic temples of modest dimensions. *Candi Sewu* (q.v.) consists of a central cruciform temple, with 240 smaller shrines around it. This complex forms a *maṇḍala* 250 metres square, and like Borobudur, was dedicated to the five Buddhas of the directions. It is however erected on a flat plain, and its appearance is crowded and somewhat confused.

The Śailendras of Sumatra: Balaputra, the son of the Śailendra king Samarotungga, rebelled and was ousted from Java in 856 A.C.; but he had married the daughter of the ruelr of Śrīvijaya, and himself gained power there; henceforward, the Sailendra Buddhist monarchs reigned from Palembang. He entered into an alliance with Devapāla, the Pāla ruler of Bengal (r. 853–893 A.C.), and strengthened links with Nālandā, where he built a monastery for Sumatran student pilgrims.

In the eleventh century, Śrīvijaya was in relationship with the Coḷa kingdom of South India, and the king of Śrīvijaya built a *vihāra* for pilgrims in Negapatam in 1006 A.C. However, in the next decade, the Coḷas attacked Śrīvijaya, which in turn became allied to the Javanese kingdom under Airlingga (r. 1019–1049 A.C.). right until the thirteenth century, Śrīvijaya remained a major centre of trade, was famous for camphor and maintained a powerful fleet. Throughout this period it continued as an important centre for Buddhist studies. At the end of the fourteenth century, it split into three parts, approximating to Palembang, Jambi and Menangkabau.

Tantric Buddhism in East Java and Bali: From 1222 to 1282, the principal power in East Java was Singosari, and both Hinduism and Buddhism were practised in their Tantric or magico-mystical form; the cult was syncretistic, the Buddha being often identified with Śiva. From Singosari comes an image of *Prajñāpāramitā,* as a beautiful goddess, now in *Candi Jago* (q.v.) at Tumpang, near Malang, probably built 1270–1280 A.C., as a monument to king Viṣṇuvardhana of Singosari, and was dedicated to Tantric Buddhism. Among the reliefs around the temple are panels illustrating the story of *Kuñjara-karṇa,* who gained salvation through the help of Vairocana. The main icon was of Amoghapāśa, a form of Avalokiteśvara, who rescues the perishing with his noose *(pāśa);* his attendants are Sudhana (thus indicating the continuity with the Borobudur tradition), the horse-necked Hayagrīva, and the goddesses Tārā and Bhṛkuṭī. Their worship was a late development of the Avataṃsaka cult in Nālandā, and was also to be found in Nepal. The rituals are called *vrata,* and include the use of *maṇḍalas* and *dhāraṇīs,* and the recital of Buddhist didactic stories of the Avadāna type, such as the *Kuñjarakarṇa.*

Buddhism of a similar character was practised in Bali, and is described by C. Hooykaas in his book *Balinese Bauddha Brahmans.* In it, he explains the ceremony, important for the Balinese, of the daily adoration, and the preparation of Holy Water *(tīrtha)* by the Buddhist priest. In the book, *Stuti and Stava,* Goudriaan and Hooykaas include forty Buddhist hymns and prose *dhāraṇīs* used in Bali. Nine of these are in praise of the Buddha, five of the Buddhas of the Directions *(tathāgata),* three of the three jewels *(triratna,* the Buddha, the law and the monastic community), five to various Tārās or female divinities, including Prajñāpāramitā, the embodiment of supreme wisdom, while others are dedicated to Vajra, the diamond-thunderbolt, to Bhairava, the angry god, and to Yama, the ruler of the underworld. At least half a dozen of these hymns are known and are in use in Nepal.

Later Tantric Buddhism in Sumatra: In 1275 A.C., Kertanagara, the last king of Singosari, sent an expedition to Malayu in Sumatra. This has been variously interpreted, but it probably took place in the course of an alliance against Śrīvijaya, by which Malayu gained its independence. In 1286, Kertanagara sent an image, a portrait of his father, but in the form of Amoghapāśa, together with copies of other images from Candi Jago, for worship in Malayu. In 1294, the expedition returned to Singosari, with two princesses from Malayu: one became the mother of Ādityavarman, who later became king of Malayu. Ādityavarman placed an image of Mañjuśrī in the courtyard of Candi Jago in 1343 A.C. In 1347, he was in Jambi as king of Malayu and had the Amoghapaśa image erected in a Buddhist temple there. Later he had himself portrayed as Mahākāla, the god of death. This image was brought from Eastern Java to Padang Roco in Central Sumatra, and is three metres high; it now stands in the Museum Pusat in Jakarta.

There are many brick-built sanctuaries of this period in Central Sumatra. They are called *biaro* (i.e. *vihāra* – monastery). They are to be found at Tarung-tarung, Pancahan, Lubuk Sikaping, Galugur and Rangkinang in the Padang Highlands. There are also stūpas at Tanjung Medan and Muara Takus, where small gold plates with mystic syllables *(bīja)* have been found. In Central Menangkabau, there are inscriptions of Ādityavarman, and in the Batanghari District a number of brick ruins, including the sanctuary of Padang Roco. In Tapanuli, there are many brick *biaros,* with fragmentary images, and there is an important *biaro* at Si Pamutang at the mouth of the Panei river, with several ruins, encircling wall and images. At Gunung Tua Tonga, there are terraces with ruins and sculptured panels.

Javanese Buddhist Literature: There never seems to have been Javanese translations of any of the Buddhist canonical books, though there is evidence that Buddhist Sanskrit literature was known, and Sanskrit hymns and *dhāraṇīs* were used. So far, only one Javanese Buddhist doctrinal text is known, the ***Kamahayanikan.*** There are also several Buddhist didactic stories of Avadāna type in Old Javanese, as well as Buddhist law books.

The *Sang Hyang Kamahayanikan* is written in Old Javanese prose. It mentions Sindok, king of Eastern Java, who ruled from 929 to 947 A.C. The contents are doctrines of Mahāyāna Buddhism, and the text includes numerous Sanskrit ślokas, which are explained in Old

Javanese. Many of these describe the orientation of the Buddhas of the directions, and some of them agree closely with the disposition of the images at Borobudur. In addition, instruction is given on the development of *samādhi*, contemplation. It is divided into two parts, called *Mantranāya* and *Krama ning Pancatathāgatajñāna*. It begins with an account of the various orders of Buddhas, past, present and future, then the ten *pāramitā*, the four *yoga*, four, *bhāvanā*, four *āryasatya*, the *mudrā* of the Śakyamuni, the five *skandha* and the *Śaktī*.

The *Sutasoma kakawin* is an Old Javanese poem in Sanskrit metres, in 198 cantos. It has a remote resemblance to the *Mahāsutasoma-jātaka* (Fausböll No. 537). In the Javanese poem, the demon Puruṣāda had made captive all the kings of India and had conquered Ratudharma. Prince, Sutasoma, a previous incarnation of the Buddha, conquered Puruṣāda with the help of a relative, Prabhu Maketu. Puruṣāda had wanted to eat the flesh of his captives; in the end, Sutasoma was prepared to offer his own body: but Puruṣāda repented and set the princes free. The author was Mpu Tantalur of Majapahit, who wrote this work about 1370–1380 A.C.

The story of *Kuñjarakarṇa* exists in Old Javanese both in prose and in a later poetic version. It is also illustrated on the panels on Candi Jago of about 1270–1280 A.C. It tells how Kuñjarakarṇa was saved from the torments of hell and restored to life through following the teachings of Vairocana on the good law *(sudharma)*. Later he went to tell how his friend, the Yakṣa king, Pūrṇavijaya who suffered from leprosy, was cured of his illness and granted salvation by the same means. There may be a tenuous connection with the story of Kuñjarakarṇa, prince of Taxila in the *Aśoka-avadāna;* but the tale of Pūrṇavijaya is to be found in the *Mahāpratisāra-kalpa*, one of the five texts of the *Pañcarakṣa*. The text contains terminology of the Avataṃsaka school.

The tale of *Bubukṣah and Gagang Aking* is of two brothers who learnt to become ascetics, and is generally reckoned to be of Buddhist origin. Bubukṣah (= glutton) in spite of his profession, ate meat and drank toddy, while Gagang Aking (= dry stalk) was assiduous in his religious practice. Batara Guru sent Kālavijaya, in the form of a white tiger *(macan putih)* to test the two. Gagang Aking was afraid, but Bubukṣah offered his body to be eaten. Then the white tiger told them who he was, and took them to heaven, where Bubukṣah enjoyed the highest bliss, but Gagang Aking was given an inferior position. The story may be compared with the *Vyāghrī-jātaka* (*Jātakamālā* 1).

The *Vighnotasava* and the *Bratāśraya* are two Old Javanese poems relating the same story. Jinavikrama, or king Suprasena of Vallabha was at war with the Yakṣa king Vighnotsava, who having vanquished all the other kings, came to attack Vallabha. In the end, the Yakṣa was subdued and became a disciple of the Buddha.

In the *Singhalanggala*, Cayapuruṣa, prince of Svetanādipura, and a follower of Śiva, desired the princess of Kāmarūpiṇī, who was a Buddhist of the land of Singhalanggala, but failed to overcome her. Then his brother, Lakṣmīkirāṇa, a follower of Viṣṇu, attacked Kāmarūpiṇī, but also failed. Ratih, with her Vidyādharis, came to help Kāmarūpiṇī, while Cayapuruṣa joined forces with his brother. In the end, Śiva himself came between them. The story is thought to be an allegory of the struggle between Hinduism and Buddhism.

Kidung Dadang Dudang is a Middle Javanese poem from Bali, in Balinese *tengahan* metres, which tells of the wanderings of Ki Dadang Dudang and his wife, Ni Randi Randu, in search of salvation. From a *paṇḍita*, the husband learns various *vrata* or ceremonials of merit to overcome evil. In the end, he and his wife meet Vairocana in heaven.

The *Dharmopapati* ia a Javanese Buddhist law book from Bali, beginning with an invocation of the Buddha. It contains many legal maxims relating to special cases, with the amounts of fines for various offences.

Undoubtedly, more Buddhist literature will come to light in the course of examining Javanese manuscripts. The *Canṭakaparva*, an Old Javanese encyclopaedic dictionary and compendium of tales, contains many references to Buddhist stories, and may provide a lead for such an investigation.

Buddhist Art in Indonesia: The architecture of the temples of Java, whether Hindu or Buddhist, appears to have been influenced by the styles of South India. However, Buddhist images, both in stone, such as those of Borobudur, and also the many bronzes, owe most to Eastern India. Some Gupta bronzes have been found in the outer islands, such as the Buddha from Sikendeng, Sulavesi, perhaps of the fifth century A.C., and the one from Kota Bangun in Borneo of the ninth century. The Sambas treasure, a collection of small gold and silver images from West Borneo, may have been made in the tenth century in Java. A considerable number of small bronze images of Pāla type, like those of Nālandā, have been found in Java.

The main archeological sites of Indonesian Buddhism have already been discussed. In Java they belong to two principal periods: the Śailendra of the eighth and ninth centuries A.C. in the centre of the island, where there are close affinities with Indian models, both in the architecture, and in the treatment of sculpture; while in Eastern Java, from the eleventh to the fourteenth centuries, indigenized forms, with elaborately decorated buildings, often decorated with relief panels in an artificial and non-naturalistic style, became the dominant forms. As far as Buddhist art is concerned, the most important

sites and images of this second period are of the thirteenth century in the kingdom of Singosari.

In Sumatra, the Śrīvijaya-Śailendra art, strongly influenced by the Central Javanese style, persisted from the eighth to the thirteenth centuries. Thereafter, in Central Sumatra, the usual Buddhist forms were brick-built vihāras and stūpas, with plastic influences from Singosari.

Some of the largest Buddhist images, and low-relief illustrated panels, are still to be found on site; but many of the most important images, as well as the extensive collections of small Buddhist bronzes can be seen in the museums of Java, including the Museum Pusat, Jakarta, the Museum Sana Budaya at the Kraton or palace of Yogyakarta, the Museum Raja Pustaka and Museum Kraton at Surakarta, and the Museum of the Archaeological Department at Prambanan, near Yogyakarta. In Europe, the most important collections are at the Rijksmuseum voor Volkenkunde (the Ethnological Museum) in Leiden, and the British Museum, London, the latter including many items from the collection of Sir Stamford Raffles.

Buddhist Doctrine in Indonesia: Until a much more detailed examination is made of the archeological sites, and of the iconography of Indonesian Buddhist images, and the content of Javanese Buddhist literature, it will not be possible to give a comprehensive and authoritative account of this subject. We have however broad indications of the history and character of Buddhism in the region. Borobudur embodied the ideas and teachings of the Avataṃsaka school, and there are other evidences that this continued domimant for some centuries. In later times, Tantric Buddhism of the Vajrayāna school was favoured. In Java and Bali this became much mixed with Śivaite Hinduism, so that in the end the Buddha became equated with Śiva, and the cult became completely syncretistic. At Singosari in Java, and at Malayu in Sumatra, one of the most important Tantric cults was that of Amoghapāśa, a form of Avalokiteśvara with a noose in one hand, symbolizing his work of saving those who would otherwise have perished. This cult probably originated in Bihar, and is also to be found in Nepal.

The *Sang Hyang Kamahayanikan* is the one complete Buddhist doctrinal text in Old Javanese which has so far come to light. It may perhaps be compared with the *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha* of Asaṅga, the founder in the fourth century A.C. of the Yogācāra school. His work, which is an abridgment of the Mahāyāna doctrine, explains the ten qualities of the words of the Buddha. In the *Sang Hyang Kamahayanikan,* a prominent place is given to the Ten *pāramitā,* or perfections, which have a similar character. Historically, the Yogācāra was the antecedent of the Avataṃsaka school, which was established in China in the seventh century, whence it spread to Japan in the eighth, and was intellectually one of the most advanced forms of Mahāyāna Buddhism; so the faith of the Śailendra may have proceeded from, or at least been influenced by this Chinese movement. Its texts, however, were Sanskrit, from India.

The principal text of the Avataṃsaka school was the story of Sudhana in search of perfect knowledge illustrated in the upper galleries of Borobudur. This tells how while the Buddha was residing with Samantabhadra and Mañjuśrī, he taught them mystical attainments, and they were joined by a multitude of monks, with whom Mañjuśrī started on a journey to Southern India. On the way he met the young man Sudhana and told him about the Buddha. Sudhana praised him and set out on a quest for knowledge *(bodhi).* He visited various teachers in Southern India, finally meeting Mahādeva of Dvārāvatī, who sent him north to Magadha to meet the wife and the mother of the bodhisattva Gautama, and they in their turn sent him back to Mañjuśrī. At each stage, Sudhana had increased his spiritual knowledge. Finally, Mañjuśrī sent him to Samantabhadra, from whom he received full and perfect knowledge. The text is completed by the hymn known as the Bhadracāri, in which Samantabhadra's teaching is set out.

The *Daśabhūmīśvara* complements and explains this teaching. It is an abstract treatise on the ten stages one must pass through to attain Buddhahood. Each stage is called a *bhūmi* (which here might be rendered 'level of attainment'), including meditation, simplicity with compassion, mental elevation, religious concentration, purification of the mind, equanimity, steadfast progress, understanding, perceiving the minds of others, and the attainment of wonderful power.

In Old Javanese literature, besides the *Sang Hyang Kamahayanikan,* some of the Buddhist stories contain doctrinal sections. Both the prose and poetic versions of the *Kuñjarakarṇa* include sections of teaching given by Vairocana in response to the enquiries first of Kuñjarakarṇa, and then or Pūrṇavijaya. These include elements of the sacred law *(sudharma),* the doctrine of the five *ātma,* corresponding to the five senses, and the conquest of desires. In one section of the prose text, the Buddha is overtly identified with Śiva.

The cult of Amoghapāśa (q.v.) was practised in the Singosari kingdom, particularly at Candi Jago, and in Malayu under Ādityavarman. Amoghapāśa is a form of the Bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara, usually depicted with eight arms; in one of the right hands he holds a noose *(pāśa),* from which he derives his name. He is accompanied by the goddesses Tārā and Bhṛkuṭi, (q.v.) the guardian Hayagrīva (q.v.) ('horseneck'), and the pilgrim Sudhana, thus linking up with the Avataṃsaka school. In Nepal, the worship of Amoghapāśa is conducted on the eighth day of the lunar month, and the ritual is called

Aṣṭamivrata (rites of the eighth day). The principal texts are the *Upoṣadha-avadāna* and the *Vīrakuśa-avadāna*, both being extracts from the *Divya-avadāna*. The worship takes place in groups led by a Vajrācārya priest, with *pūjā* offerred to the *maṇḍalas* of the Buddha, the Dharma, the Saṅgha and Amoghapāśa. It is not known whether this corresponds to the worship as it was practised at Candi Jago, but it is a possibility, and should provide a starting point for investigation.

Modern Buddhism in Indonesia: The open practice of Buddhism in Java has not existed since the downfall of the kingdom of Majapahit, and the establishment of Islam. from the fifteenth century. In Bali, Buddhism survived because the Balinese rulers employed Buddhist Tantric priests for certain court rituals, and in recent times there have been a few practising Buddhists. In Java, there has been a modern revival of Buddhism, which may be accounted for partly by the persistence in a hidden and unacknowledged way of Buddhist ideas in Javanese mysticism, partly by the presence of the Chinese community, with its popular ceremonies associated with their temples, and partly by the interest and pride in the Buddhist monuments of Java, especially Borobudur, which is looked upon in independent Indonesia as an important part of the national cultural heritage, and which has attracted world-wide attention both of the conservationists and also the tourists. In Bali, the study of Indian texts, both Hindu and Buddhist, has been one aspect of a religious revival, which seeks to encourage more informed and intelligent understanding of the inherited culture.

Bechert, 1988, notes that the revival of Buddhism in Java and Bali is a recent phenomenon, characterized by the influence of the Theravāda, the restructuring of traditions of Chinese origin, and attempts to revive ancient Javanese traditions. The theosophical Society of Java was founded by Madame Blavatsky in 1883, and had some influence, but the first truly Buddhist group was the Javanese branch of the International Buddhist Mission from Thaton in Burma, established in 1929. More influential was the visit of the Sinhalese monk, Narada Maha Thera, in 1934. Also in 1934, the Sam Kauw Hwee was founded by Kwee Tek Hoay (1886-1952) for the regeneration of Chinese Buddhism in Java. In 1953, Boan An, a member of the Sam Kauw Hwee went to Burma to study *vipassanā*, (insight meditation) under Mahasi Sayadaw. Boan An was ordained a *bhikkhu* in Burma in 1954, and took the name of Ashin Jinarakkhita. He returned to Java and became the most influential Buddhist teacher for a long period, bringing with him the Theravāda form of Buddhism both in precept and practice.

With the independence of Indonesia, the adoption by the state of *Pañcasīla*, not in its classical Buddhist sense of a personal morality, but with the meaning of the fivefold principles of the state monotheism, humanism, nationalism, democracy and social justice, presented a problem for Indonesian Buddhists of Theravāda persuasion. Since their system was nontheistic, it could not be directly harmonized with the first of the five principles of Indonesia, belief in the One Supreme God, a requirement incumbent upon its citizens. This led to controversy during the period 1965-1974. Jinarakkhita's response to this difficulty was to interpret the term *Sang Hyang Ādibuddha* in the *Sang Hyang Kamahayanikan* as referring to God, but this did not satisfy the strict Theravāda, so led to a division. Nevertheless Buddhism has continued to progress in Indonesia, and there are now about a million adherents there. Currently there are seven sects:

1. Majelis Buddhayāna Indonesia (syncretist following of Jinarakkhita)
2. Majelis Paṇḍita Buddha Dhamma Indonesia (Theravāda)
3. Majelis Dharmadūta Kasogatan (Revived Old Javanese Buddhism)
4. Majelis Buddha Mahāyāna Indonesia (Chinese)
5. Majelis Paṇḍita Buddha Maitreya Indonesia (Chinese messianic)
6. Majelis Āgama Buddha Nichiren Shoshu Indonesia (Reformed Buddhism of Japanese type)
7. Majelis Rokhaniwan Tridharma (Chinese traditional Buddhism accommodated to Tao and Confucianism).

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INDRA. See SAKKA.

INDRABHŪTI, a fairly important Tantric writer regarded as a *siddha* (perfected one) in the Trantric tradition. Styled as Mahācārya, Oḍiyāna Siddha etc. he was the king of Uḍḍiyāna[1] and : assigned to the early part of the 8th Century A.C. Regarded as the disciple of Anaṅgavajra he was also the father of Padmasambhava, who is important in the introduction of Buddhism to Tibet, and the brother of Lakṣmīṅkarā regarded as one of the 84 siddhas and as the authoress of the Trantric work *Advayasiddhi*

Indrabhūti is regarded as the author of not less than 23 works preserved in the Tibetan Tengyur. Two of his works are available in original Sanskrit. One is the *Kurukullāsādhana* preserved in the *Sādhana-mālā* (GOS. II, pp. 351-3) and the other *Jñānasiddhi (published as volume XLIV of the GOS.)*

With regard to Indrabhūti's contribution to Tantric Buddhism the following words (from N. K. Sahu's *Buddhism in Orissa,* published by Utkal University, 1958, p. 167) may be quoted: "The Tantric ideology which was unfolded from about the time of Saraha attained its highest development in the writings of Indrabhūti, whose famous work *Jñānasiddhi,* asserts that emancipation cannot be obtained simply by *mudrā, mantra* and *maṇḍala* unless a deeper knowledge of the five Tathāgatas or the Dhyānibuddhas be attained by the *sādhaka* and also that neither the learned nor the fool can get rid of *saṃsāra,* if he is devoid of this Buddha knowledge."

A. G. S. Kariyawasam

INDRAKĪLA. The word *indrakīla* (Pali *indakhīla*) literally means Indra's post. It has a long history spanning over twenty centuries and is attested in Pali, Sanskrit and Sinhala Literature. Over the period of time it has come to mean three different objects: (a) a post, stake, pillar or column generally erected at the entrance to a city or village, (b) a stone pillar set up in the interior of the dome of a *stūpa,* and (c) a prominent ritual object set up in the *parittamaṇḍapa* of Sri Lanka.

In Pali canonical literature *indakhīla* appears in the sense of a pillar firmly planted in the ground. It occurs in similes denoting stability without any reference to its exact location.[1] The *Mahāsudassanasutta*[2] refers to a similar pillar as *esikā,* and its *ṭīkā*[3] explains it as an *indakhīla.* A passage in the *Aṅguttaranikāya*[4] speaks of an *esikā* which stands in a frontier city of the kingdom and it is said to be deeply embedded, well dug in, immovable and unshakable. The *Pācittiyapāḷi*[5] explains the *indakhīla* as a threshold, but it does not mean any and every threshold. It only means the threshold to a king's household.

According to the commentary of the *Paṭisambhidāmagga,*[6] *indakhīla* is a threshold to a village or city. The *Khuddakapāṭha Aṭṭhakathā*[7] refers to the *indakhīla* as a large slab of stone or a pillar made of hard timber pressed into the ground at the threshold of a city by digging to a depth of 8 or 10 cubits and this serves to mark the city limit. The *Manorathapūraṇī*[8] gives the following description of an *esikā:*

1. Spelt also as Oḍiyāna or Oḍḍiyāna and regarded as a *pīṭha* or a place of pilgrimage in Tantric Buddhism. This place has not yet been identified with certainty. While it is generally identified with Orissa some believe it to be a part of Bengal. A discussion on this is found in Sahu's work (pp. 152 ff.) quoted above and in B. Bhattacharyya's *Introduction to Buddhist Esoterism,* pp. 44-6. See also *GOS,* XLIV, Introduction, pp. xi where the entire list of works attributed to him is given.

1. *S.* V. p. 444; *Dhp.* v. 95; *Sn.* v. 229; *Thag.* v. 663.
2. *D.* II, p. 171.
3. *Dīghanikāya-Aṭṭhakathā-ṭīkā, (=DAṬ),* II, p. 28
4. *A.* IV, p. 106
5. *Vin.* II, p. 160
6. *PsA.* p. 349
7. *KhpA.* p. 185
8. *AA.* IV, p. 53

The *esikātthambha* is made of bricks, stone or some hard, well seasoned timber such as *khadira.* When it is erected for protection of the city it is planted outside the city, when it is for ornamentation it is planted inside. When constructing it with bricks, a large deep pit is dug and filled with bricks (up to ground level) and above (ground level) it is made octagonal in shape and is painted white. It is polished and painted to such perfection that when elephants rub their tusks against it, the paint does not chip off. Stone pillars etc. are also octagonal in shape. If the pillars are eight cubits high, four cubits are embedded underground and four cubits remain visible above ground. It is the same with pillars 16 or 20 cubits high. In all cases half the length of the pillar remains buried underground and half remains visible above ground. They stand forming a zigzag pattern *(gomuttavaṅkā).* Therefore it is possible to utilise the space in between them for some purpose by flanking them with timber *(padaracayaṃ katvā).* The pillars are decorated with beautiful drawings and flags are hoisted on them.

It can be gathered from these Pali literary sources that the *indakhīla* refers to a firm pillar which stands as a symbol of royal authority at the entrance to a city, village or palace. It also functions as a symbol of stability and marks the limit.

The word *indrakīla* is attested in a number of Buddhist Sanskrit texts with the following meanings:

(a) a threshold slab, a stone embedded in the ground at the entrance to a city, palace or harem;[9]
(b) a pillar firmly planted in the ground; and it is used in similes denoting stability and immobility.[10]

Thus the symbolism of the *indakhīla* contained in Pali literature is further substantiated by Buddhist Sanskrit literature.

Sinhala literature[11] too contains several references to the *indrakīla* and most of them confirm the conclusions arrived at through Pali and Buddhist Sanskrit literary sources. Further there is a clue to the existence of a practice of worshipping the *indrakīla,*[12] and the *Saddharmaratnāvaliya*[13] furnishes conclusive evidence when it says:

> Even though small children dirty the *indrakīla* erected at the city gate by putting rubbish, discreet ones offer incense and flowers to it.

This practice seems to be a very ancient one, for it finds mention even in a Tamil poem entitled *"The Grassland of Madurai,"* which is said to have been written in honour of a second century Pandyan king named Neduñjeliyan, but which, according to Basham, may be assigned to the third or fourth century. In describing a city it states:

> The poet enters the city by its great gate, the posts (Tamil, *netu nilai,* meaning tall column) of which are carved with images of the Goddess Lakṣmī and which is grimy with ghee, poured in oblation upon it to bring security and prosperity to the city it guards.[14]

This aspect of the *indrakīla* as an object worthy of honour is certainly an advancement on the concept of *indrakīla* as revealed from Pali and Sanskrit sources. The belief that a deity resides in it seems to have contributed to the practice, and according to the Tamil poem cited above it is Lakṣmī, the Goddess of Prosperity that is incumbent in it.

The *indrakīla* seems to share some characteristic features with Mount *Meru* which is said to be submerged in the ocean to a depth of 84,000 *yojanas* and it rises above sea level to an equal height of 84,000 *yojanas.*[15] The *indrakīla* is also a post embedded in the ground to a depth equal to its height above ground. Mount *Meru* is the symbol par excellence of stability and the *indrakīla* is also a symbol of stability. It is also possible to equate the *indrakīla* to Mount *Meru* with evidence from literary sources. Lexicons such as *Vācaspatyam*[16] and *Śabdārtha Ratnākaraya*[17] identify *indrakīla* with Mount *Mandara.*

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9. *Divy.* pp. 250, 544, *Avadānaśataka,* ed. J. S. Speyer, 2 Vols., St. Petersberg; 1902, 1906, Vol. I, p. 109.
10. *Mhvu.* Vol. I, p. 292; Vol. II, pp. 261, 262, *Avadānaśataka,* Vol. I, p. 223
11. *Pūjāvaliya,* ed. K. Nanavimala, Colombo, 1965, pp. 243, 296, 582
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12. *Dhampiyā Aṭuvā Gāṭapadaya,* ed. D. B. Jayatilaka, Colombo, 1932, p. 156
13. *Saddharma Ratnāvaliya,* ed. D. B. Jayatilaka, 1928, p. 488 - *nuvara vāsala kerē hiñdavū indrakīlayaṭa bāladaruvō kuṇukasala damā apavitra keret da danno suvañda mal ādiya pudat da ....*
14. A. L. Basham, *Wonder that was India,* London, 1954, p. 203
15. *SnA.* II, p. 443; *Vism.* I, p. 206
caturāsīti sahassāni ajjhogāḷho mahaṇṇave accuggato tāvad eva sineru pabbatʼuttamo.
16. *Vācaspatyam,* ed. Taranatha Tarkavacaspati, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Work No. 94, Varanasi, India, 1962, s.v. *indrakīla.*
17. *Śabdārtha Ratnākaraya,* ed. B. Revata, Colombo, 1929

According to the *Mahābhārata*[18] gods churned the ocean with *Mandāra* as the churning staff. But classical Sinhala poems such as the *Muvadevdāvata*,[19] *Haṃsa Sandesaya*[20] and *Guttilakāvyaya* refer to Mount *Meru* as the churning rod. Classical Sinhala lexicons such as *Ruvanmala*[22] and *Purāṇa Nāmāvaliya*[23] also give *Mandara* as a synonym for *Meru*. Therefore the equation becomes possible:

Indrakīla = *Mandara*, *Mandara* = *Meru*, therefore *indrakīla* = *Meru*.

Now *Meru* is the hub of the universe and it is said that Indra's (Sakka's) heaven is situated on it. Therefore *indrakīla* too could share the centre symbolism of Mount *Meru*.

When the foregoing survey of the concept of *indrakīla* through Pali, Sanskrit and Sinhala literary sources is summarised it reveals itself as a synthesis of the following symbols:

(a) Symbol of stability
(b) Symbol of authority
(c) Symbol of the limit
(d) Symbol of the centre.

Paranavitana, in his *Stūpa in Ceylon*[24] states that there is an octagonal stone pillar weighing about 20 tons referred to as the *indrakīla* by the monks of the present day, set up in the interior of the dome of the *stūpa*. He observes:

> "These huge pillars served no structural purpose and the labour entailed in hauling them to great heights and setting them up must have been undertaken because they were considered absolutely necessary, according to the religious beliefs of the times, to give the *stūpas* their sacred character."

The *Divyāvadāna*[25] which gives a unique description of the constructional details of a *stūpa* states that a pillar called *yūpayaṣṭi* was set up in the interior of the dome. *Yūpa* in the Vedic tradition was the sacrificial post to which the animal sacrificed was tied, and it was believed to be a path leading to heaven.[26] For the Vedic sacrificer the *yūpa* was a symbol of the Universal Tree or the World Axis[27] which holds up the heaven with its summit, fills the air with its branches and steadies the earth with its foot.[28] It is possible to surmise that the *yūpa* is the proto-type out of which the concept of the *indrakīla* evolved in the Buddhist tradition. The change of nomenclature from *yūpa* to *indrakīla* is significant, for, it seems to have been necessitated by the inadequacy of the symbolism of the *yūpa* when the setting changed from a sacrificial tradition to an Enlightenment-centred tradition. E. R. Goodenough formulates the following functional principle in the diffusion of cultures:

> When symbols are borrowed from older customs and traditions the value remains constant, but the symbols themselves are intellectually justified in conformity with the tenets of the borrower.[29]

Therefore the Centre symbolised by the *indrakīla* is neither the World Axis which unites the world with heaven for the Vedic sacrificer, nor Mount *Meru* of Hindu mythology, but the *Bodhimaṇḍa*, the place where the Buddha attained Enlightenment.


The *Bodhimaṇḍa* is said to enjoy universal centrality, for the *Dīghanikāya-Aṭṭhakathā-Ṭīkā*[30] and the *Mahābodhivaṃsa*[31] call it the navel of the earth. Therefore the *indrakīla* with its centre symbolism is most appropriate for its representation. The *Bodhimaṇḍa* is also said to be the only steadfast place in the whole world of change, for, it alone remained unmoved even at the moment of Enlightenment[32] when the entire world shook with a tremendous roar. Hence the suitability of the *indrakīla* with its symbolism of stability to represent the *Bodhimaṇḍa*. According to the *Pūjāvaliya*, the *Bodhi-*

18. *Mahābhārata*, Tr. P. C. Roy, *The Mahābhārata*, Culcutta. 1956, Vol. I (Ādiparvan), Sec. 18. 1112
19. *Muvadevdāvata*, ed. D. G. Abayagunaratna, Colombo, 1923, p. 94
20. *Haṃsa Sandesaya*, ed. C. E. Godakumbure, Colombo, 1953, p. 104
21. *Guttilakāvya Dīpanī*, ed. D. C. Disanayaka, Colombo, 1957, p. 255
22. *Ruvanmala Saha Piyummala*, ed. Batuvantudave, Colombo, 1892, p. 187
23. *Purāṇa Nāmāvaliya*, ed. H. Jayatilaka Appuhamy, Colombo, 1882, p. 108
24. S. Paranavitana, *The Stūpa in Ceylon*, Memoirs of the Archaeological Survey of Ceylon, Vol. V, Colombo, 1946, p. 38
25. *Divy.*, p. 244
26. *Bhūridattajātaka*, *J.* VI, p. 203
27. Mircea Eliade, *Images and Symbols: Studies in Religious Symbolism*, tr. P. Mairet, London, 1961, pp. 44 - 45
28. *Ṛgveda*, tr. R. T. H. Griffith, *The Hymns of the Ṛgveda*. 4 Vols. Benares, 1882-1892, III.8.3, *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, tr. J. Eggeling, *The Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, 5 pts. *SBE*. Vols. 12, 26, 41, 43, 44, Oxford 1882-1900, III.7.1.4.
29. E. R. Goodenough, *Jewish Symbols in the Graeco-Roman Period*, Vol. 12, Bollingen Foundation, New York, 1953, Vol. 12, pp. 72-73, 133
30. *DAT.* II, p. 28
31. *Mhbv.* p. 50
32. *DAT.* II, p. 28
33. *Pūjā Valiya*, p. 182

maṇḍa is a great fortress protected by the majestic wall of the ten *pāramitās*, extending up to the cupola of the *Brahma* world like the hollow of a drum. Even *Māra* with his vast array of forces could not get past this formidable barrier as it was the Buddha's authority that held sway there. According to the *Mahābodhivaṃsa*[34] the majesty of the space so demarcated is such that not even the flying elephant of a *cakkavatti* king or even Sakka himself can fly over it. Thus it becomes quite clear that the *indrakīla* with its composite symbolism of the centre, stability, limit and authority either ritually recreates the *Bodhimaṇḍa*, or projects the site of its construction to the *Bodhimaṇḍa*. The sacred character which the *indrakīla* confers on the *stūpa* as well as the *parittamaṇḍapa* is this ritual recreation of the *Bodhimaṇḍa*, or the projection of the site concerned to the Victorious Centre of the earth where all Buddhas conquer evil and attain Enlightenment.

The *indrakīla* of the *parittamaṇḍapa* is made with a straight freshly cut branch of a *sūriya* tree (Thespesia populnea) about 6 feet in length. It is covered over with a stiff, white, new cloth pleated lengthwise and is tied on to the branch in a couple of places so as to leave the cloth puffing out in between the knots. At the top, the cloth opens out to form a sort of fan. This structure is fixed in between the two centre chairs called *yuga puṭu* which are themselves tied together, in the *parittamaṇḍapa*. Behind this stands a small arecanut palm to which is tied a fully opened coconut flower.

A *sūriya* branch has been used in the construction of the *indrakīla* most probably to represent the *Bodhi* tree, as the Ficus religiosa which is the most distinguishing feature of the *Bodhimaṇḍa*. It is not possible to use the branch of a Bodhi tree even to adorn the *parittamaṇḍapa* because injuring a Bodhi tree is considered a grave sin. A *sūriya* branch has been substituted because the *sūriya* leaves somewhat resemble the *Bodhi* leaves. But what is more important is that the *sūriya* tree is designated by almost identical names in Sanskrit, Pali, Sinhala and even Tamil. The Sanskrit terms *aśvattha*, *kapītana* and *plakṣa* are used to designate both the *Ficus religiosa* and the *Thespesia populnea*.[35] The latter is commonly called *gadrabhāṇḍa* in Sanskrit and this has been equated with aśvattha in lexicons.[36] In Pali *gardabhaṇḍa* and *kapītana* have been used synonymously meaning *Thespesia populnea*.[37] In Sinhala äsaṭu is the derivative from *aśvattha* while *tel äsaṭu* means *Thespesia populnea*.[38] The Tamil equivalent of *aśvattha* is *aracu* while *Thespesia populnes* is called *pūvaracu* which literally means 'flowering *aśvattha*.'[39] Therefore it is not surprising that the *Thespesia populnea* has been used to substitute the invulnerable *Ficus religiosa* for the construction of the *indrakīla* in the *parittamaṇḍapa*.



Indrakila in the Piritmaṇḍapa.

34. *Mhbv*. pp. 35, 50, 79; *J*. IV. p. 232
35. *Sanskrit - English Dictionary*, ed. M. Monier Williams, O. U. P., London, 1960, s.v. *aśvattha, kapītana, plakṣa.*
36. *Śabdakalpadruma*, ed. R. Radhakantadeva. Chowkhamba Sanskrit Seires Work No. 93, Varanasi, India, 1961, s.v. *aśvattha, gardabhaṇṭi Viśv·ṇh.*
37. *Abhidhānappadīpikā*, W. Subhuti, Colombo, 1921, 592
38. J. M. Seneviratna, Some ancient plants and trees of Ceylon, *in Ceylon Antiquary and Literary Register*, Vol. VII, pt. II, Oct. 1921, p. 102. *Pañcikā Pradīpa*, ed. R. S. Dharmarama, Colombo, 1896, p. 116
39. H. Trimen, *Handbook of the Flora of Ceylon*, 5 Vols., London, 1893-1900, s.v. *Ficus religiosa, Thespesia populnea,* T. B. Worthington, *Trees of Ceylon*, Colombo, 1959, s.v. *Ficus religiosa* and *Thespesia populnea.*

The fan-shaped structure made of cloth appears to represent the *dhammacakka* perhaps following the ancient practice of the aniconic representation of the Buddha with an empty throne distinguished by the *dhammacakka* on an ornamental pillar, as for example can be seen in the details of the *Amarāvatī Stūpa*[40] sculpture.

Thus the *parittamaṇḍapa* distinguished by the *indrakīla* is the ritual recreation of the *Bodhimaṇḍa*, and the *dhammacakka* and illuminations in the *parittamaṇḍapa* seem to constitute the visual representation of Enlightenment. See also PARITTA.

(For more details see: Lily de Silva, *Paritta*, Spolia Zeylanica, Vol. 36, Part I, National Musiums of Sri Lanka, Colombo, 1981, Cp. also 'An Indrakīla at Ruvanväli Säya in Anuradhapura,' by P. E. E. Fernando, in ***Pratidāna Mañjarī, Papers on Buddhism and Sri Lankan Studies in Commemoration of Gate Mudliyar W. F. Gunawardhana***, Ed. Hiran Jayasuriya, Sri Lanka, 1987, pp. 27-35.)

Lily de Silva

INDRIYA, controlling factor or faculty, a name given in the Buddhist texts to twenty-two psychological and corporeal phenomena which perform particular functions in the mundane and supra-mundane life of individuals. These phenomena occur in other classifications, found in the Abhidhamma, and there they are treated from different standpoints. In this classification, their indriya-aspect is brought out.

These phenomena are called faculties because they exercise a dominating, governing or controlling influence over the mental factors, associated with them, and over simultaneously arising corporeal phenomena. This is indicated by Buddhaghosa (*Vism.* p. 491 f.) by reference to the derivation of the word *indriya* from *inda* (Skt. *indra*) meaning lord. Thus *indriya* means lordship, sovereignty; it is the ability to make all that is connected with it to follow it in their own career. The faculties are not the powers of phenomena, but phenomena which are powers.

The twenty-two faculties may be classified, on the basis of their nature, into five groups: namely, (1) perceptual; (2) physical; (3) sensational; (4) spiritual and (5) supra-mundane.

(1) The first group consists of the six sense-faculties, namely that of the eye *(cakkhu)*, ear *(sota)*, nose *(ghāna)*, tongue *(jivhā)*, body *(kāya)* and mind *(mano)*, which constitute the so-colled personality *(attabhāva)*. (2) The next group consists of three material qualities; femininity *(itthindriya)*, masculinity *(purisindriya)* and vitality *(jīvitindriya)*; the first two material qualities designated as *bhāvarūpa* (*Abhs.* 27) determine the sex of the individual whereas the third gives life to it.

Out of these nine *indriyas* consisting of the perceptual (6) and physical (3), only the mind is psychological while the others are material *(indriya rūpa: Abhs.* 28). The first five together with the sixth regulate or control the five senses; the seventh and the eighth control the primary and secondary characters of either sex and the ninth keeps the co-existent qualities of body from decay.

With these nine *indriyas* the living being, the so-called individual, is complete and is in a position to communicate with the external world and to react to external stimuli. (3) The third group consisting of five kinds of sensations, namely, bodily pleasure *(sukha)*, bodily pain *(dukkha)*, gladness *(somanassa)*, sadness *(domanassa)* and neutral sentations *(upekkhā)* explains the different reactions of the personality to external stimuli. Thus these three groups, consisting of fourteen *indriya* faculties may be considered as sentient existence *(saṃsāra)*.

(4) The fourth group, consisting of five faculties, namely, faith *(saddhā)*, energy *(viriya)*, mindfulness *(sati)*, concentration *(samādhi)* and wisdom *(paññā)*, constitutes attributes of the path leading to release from sentient existence, i.e., emancipation. These faculties may, therefore, correctly be described as ethical or spiritual faculties.

(5) The last group consisting of three faculties, namely, the assurance 'I shall know what I did not yet know' *(anaññātaṃ ñassāmītindriya)*, the faculty of highest knowledge *(aññindriya)* and the faculty of him whose knowledge is made perfect *(aññātāvindriya)* is the fruit of the path described as the five spiritual faculties under the fourth group (*Vism.* p. 482).

The six sense faculties are the six internal spheres *(saḷāyatana)* given in the formula of dependent origination; they arise depending on mind and matter *(nāma-rūpa-paccayā saḷāyatanaṃ)* and they give rise to contact *(saḷāyatana-paccayā phasso)*. Here the eye-faculty *(cakkhundriya)*, is not the power of the eye *(chakkussa indriya)*, but the eye which is a power *(cakkhum eva indriyaṃ)*. Thus the eye controls sight, ear hearing, and so on, because each sense depends upon its organ. If the organ be weak, the sense is weak.

40. J. Burgess, *The Buddhist Stūpas of Amaravati and Jaggeyyapeta in the Krishna District*, Archaeological Survey of Southern India, n.s. Vol. I, Madrass Presidency, Plates XII, XXIII, fig. 2, XIV, fig. 1, XL. fig. 3.

The first five sense-faculties are corporeal while the last one is mental. They perform the function of perception in which the mind occupies the pre-eminent position. The five corporeal sense-faculties, different in range and scope, do not react to the range of one another. The mind is the repository of these five faculties, and mind reacts to their range. (*M.* I, p. 295; see ĀYATANA).

This mind which is identical with consciousness *(mano, citta, viññāṇa)* is a controlling faculty *(manindriya)* also on account of its pre-eminent position among the mental factors *(cetasika)* associated with it. These factors, among them also there are other faculties, by fulfilling their own particular tasks, serve, at the same time, the purpose of the general function of mind which consists in discriminating objects. Besides, in the sense of the already given general definition of *indriya*, there is also implied the control exercised by mind over certain corporeal phenomena. The conscious intention accompanying and directing purposeful bodily movements *(kāyaviññatti)* and vocal utterance *(vacīviññati)* may be cited as an example. This *indriya* quality of mind, as manifested in a certain control over matter, is capable of far-reaching development. It reaches its peak in one of the four bases of psychic power *(citta-iddhipāda)*. It is this aspect of mind, namely its controlling power, which is the starting point of these developments. It is true that not only the faculty of mind, but also the five spiritual faculties and the intensifying factors of absorption *(jhānaṅga)*, namely joyful interest *(pīti)* etc. as well, form the foundation on which the lofty structure of a spiritually developed consciousness can be built; but, a very active part in that development is ascribed to the mind. The developed mind represents an eminently activating and mobilising force against the tendencies to stagnation and inertia of nature.

The activating and thereby governing influence of mind is due to its indriya-aspect, i.e., consciousness considered as a controlling faculty; in other words conscious control. This general aspect of mind forms the basis on which other activating and controlling factors, like mindfulness etc. might be successfully developed.

The second group consists of three physical faculties. vitality *(jīvitindriya)*, femininity *(itthindriya)* and masculinity *(purisindriya)*. The sense-faculties which the *Visuddhimagga* (p. 418) has described as personality *(attabhāva)* are said to be dependent on *āyu* (*M.* I, p. 295) which is identified in the *Papañcasūdanī* (*MA.* II, p. 349), with *jīvitindriya* i.e., vitality, the faculty of life.

There are two faculties by the name of *jīvitindriya:* One is psychological *(arūpa-jīvitindriya* or *nāma-jīvitindriya)*. The other is physical *(rūpa-jīvitindriya)*.

Psychic life *(arūpa-jīvitindriya)* is one of the seven mental factors *(cetasika)* described as universal, i.e., common to all types of consciousness *(sabbacitta-sādhāraṇa)*. The activities of will and the rest of the concomitant properties are due to the psychic life which infuses mental life into one and all. It is the persistence *(āyu)* of mental states. When it is present, the mental states occur, go on, continue and subsist. It governs all associated states in the characteristic of ceaseless watching over the co-existent states (*DhsA*. p. 149).

The other life-faculty, physical vitality *(rūpa-jīvitindriya)*, is one of the twenty-four kinds of derived matter, and gives life to matter. Just as psychic life, the physical life, too, has the characteristic of maintaining conascent kinds of matter. Its function is to make them occur. It is manifested in the establishment of their presence. Its proximate cause is the primary elements that are to be sustained. Although it has the capacity consisting in the characteristic of maintaining etc., yet it only maintains conascent kinds of matter at the moment of presence, even as water sustains lotuses and so on. Though phenomena *(dhammā)* arise due to their own conditions, it maintains them, as a wet-nurse does a babe. It occurs itself only through its connection with the states that occur, like a pilot. It does not cause occurrence after dissolution because of its own absence and that of what has to be made to occur. It does not prolong presence at the moment of dissolution, because it is itself dissolving, like the flame of a lamp when the wick and the oil are consumed. But it must not be regarded as devoid of power to maintain, make occur and make present, because it does accomplish each of these functions at the moment stated (*DhsA.* p. 323).

The other two physical faculties, namely femininity *(itthindriya)* and masculinity *(purisindriya)* which are described as material qualities of sex *(bhāvarūpa)* are stated by which femininity and masculinity of the so-called personality can be distinguished (*Abhs.* p. 27).

The femininity-faculty *(itthindriya)* has female sex as its characteristic; its function is to show that a particular individual is a female; it is manifested as the reason for the features, marks, signs, work and ways of the female (*Dhs.* p. 633; *Vism.* p. 378).

'Feature' is shape: the shape of woman's body, hands, feet, neck, breasts etc. is not like that of a man's. The female lower body is broad, the upper body is less broad. The hands and feet are small; the face is small. 'Mark' is the recognisable sign. The female breast is prominent; the face is without beard and moustache. 'Work' is action; in youth women play with tiny shallow baskets, pestles and mortars, dolls and weave string *(mattikā-vāka)* 'clay fibre'. 'Ways' are modes of going etc. There is a want of assertion in women's walking, standing lying down, sitting eating and swallowing *(ibid)*.

These feminine features etc. are not femininity *(itthindriya)*; they are products of *itthindriya*. When there is the

seed, the tree grows because of the seed, and is replete with branches and twigs, and stands filling the sky; so when there is a feminine controlling principle called femininity, feminine features etc. come to be.

The *itthindriya* should be regarded as the seed; it is not known by visual cognition; but only by mind-cognition. But feminine features etc. are known by visual as well as mind-cognition (*Dhs.* p. 633, *Vism.* p. 378).

And it is the same with the masculine controlling faculty *(purisindriya)*. Masculine features etc. are the opposite of the feminine. Man's upper body is broad, the lower body is less broad; his hands and feet are large; the face is large; the breast flesh is less full; beard and moustache grow. The manner of hair-dressing and the wearing of clothes are not like those of women. In youth they play with chariots and ploughs etc., make sand-banks and dig ponds. There is assertion in their walking etc., (*Dhs.* p. 633; *Vism.* p. 378).

The masculine controlling faculty has the characteristic of indicating the state of a man; function of showing 'this is a man'; and its manifestation lies in the masculinity in features etc. *(ibid.)*.

Both femininity and masculinity come into being during the appearance of the first inhabitants of this cycle *(kappa)*; subsequently they arise at conception. Matter coming into being at conception fluctuates; during its growth it changes its features; and matter coming into being during growth does likewise, and that is the cause of the change of sex. Of the two, the male sex is superior, feminine sex is inferior. Therefore, the former disappears through grossly immoral conduct; the latter may be brought about by weak morality. But in disappearing the latter does so by weak immorality, the former may be brought about by strong morality. Thus both disappear through immorality and may be brought about by morality (*DhsA.* pp. 321 ff; *Vism.* p. 378).

The third item of this group is vitality which gives life to the so-called individual. There are two faculties by the name of *jīvitindriya:* one is psychological and is called *arūpa-jīvitindriya* which gives life to the mental side of the individual while the other, called *rūpa-jīvitindriya,* is material and gives life to the physical side of the individual (*Dhs.* §. 19, p. 625; *Dhs.A.* §. 5, p. 149, 323; *Vism.* p. 418; *Abhs.* p. 6, 27; *Abhvt.* p. 16, 68).

Out of the nine faculties so far described, eight are material and are named (*indriya-rūpa: Abhs.* p. 28); mind the sixth faculty, being psychological. The first five regulate or control the five senses; the seventh keeps the co-existent qualities of body from decay; and the eighth and the ninth control the primary and secondary characters of either sex.

With the nine faculties, the personality, a living being, is complete and is in a position to communicate with the external world and to react to external stimuli. This reaction is explained under sensation *(vedanā)* which is of five kinds. These five kinds of sensation are also termed faculties *(indriya)*. They are the faculty of pleasure *(sukhindriya)*, of pain *(dukkhindriya)*, of joy *(somanassindriya)*, or grief *(domanassindriya)* and of neutral sensation *(upekkhindriya)*.

Pleasure is a faculty *(indriya)* because when a pleasurable mood arises it dominates one's whole being. It suffuses all the other associated qualities, and enlivens the accompanying bodily activity. This is true of the other faculties as well.

The faculty of joy *(somanassa)* is identical with that factor of absorption *(jhānaṅga)*, which is called *sukha,* but it is stronger and more enduring when linked to a high degree of intensifying interest *(pīti)*, another factor of absorption.

The faculty of psychic vitality, too, is enlivened by interest and transmits this intensifying effect, received from interest, to physical vitality, too. In old and sick people, for example, vivid interests, whether in persons, affairs or ideas, may prolong life by giving them incentive to muster all physical and mental powers of resistance. On the other hand, old or sick people quickly deteriorate when they lose interest in life owing, for example, to the death of a beloved person or to a disappointment.

These feelings constitute the second of the five groups of existence, namely, *vedanākkhandha,* and one of the seven mental factors *(cetasika)* which are described as universals, like psychic life *(arūpa-jīvitindriya)*.

The five kinds of sensations *(vedanā)* are one's reactions to experiences which may be derived from one's association with the external world. These reactions may lead to various mental states, both good *(kusala)* and bad *(akusala)*, such as kindness and hatred. The individual is free to make his own choice between good and bad. The discrimination between good and bad and the correct path avoiding bad and cultivating good are discussed under five items called the spiritual faculties. They are faith *(saddhā)*, energy *(viriya)*, mindfulness *(sati)*, concentration *(samādhi)* and wisdom *(paññā)*. (*S.* V. pp. 193-205; *Ps.* II, pp. 1 ff; *Vbh.* p. 123). These are described as faculties and are identified as attributes of the path leading to emancipation. *Saddhā* is faith in the perfect Enlightenment of the Buddha and the efficacy of the Path he discovered. *Viriya* is energy which is of four kinds; i.e. an attempt at originating *kusala,* at cultivating *kusala* that has already originated, at preventing *akusala* from originating and at putting an end to *akusala* that has already originated. This fourfold energy, otherwise called *sammā-padhāna,* is identical with *sammā-vāyāma* of the eightfold path. *Sati* is mindfulness and awareness in contemplating on body, sensations, mind and mind-objects, it is also called *satipaṭṭhāna* and is identical with

sammā-sati of the eightfold path. *Samādhi* is concentration of mind associated with wholesome consciousness which eventually may reach the absorptions *(jhāna)*. This is identical with *sammā-samādhi* of the eightfold path. *Paññā* is wisdom, insight into the Four Noble Truths, and is identical with *sammādiṭṭhi* of the Eightfold Path. All these are types of wholesome consciousness *(kusala-citta)*. They are called *(indriya)* because they master their opposites, that is, they keep them under control. Faith brings lack of faith or doubt *(vicikicchā)* under control; energy controls indolence *(kosajja)*, mindfulness controls heedlessness *(pamāda)*, concentration controls agitation *(uddhacca)* and wisdom controls ignorance *(avijjā)* (*VibhA*. pp. 125-29).

These five faculties may be considered the individuals' potentialities in the spiritual sphere. It is these potentialities that form the object of the Buddha's particular knowledge called *indriyaparopariyattañāṇa*. It is said that the Buddha understands, by this knowledge, the extent to which these spiritual faculties of individuals are developed or degenerated (*MA*. II, p. 29-30).

In order to perform their governing and controlling functions the faculties require a high degree of strength and intensity which is imparted to them by the intensifying factors of absorption, which are their supporting conditions.

Faith has a controlling influence on character when the factors of absorption, joyful interest *(pīti)* and pleasure *(sukha)*, themselves possess a considerable degree of intensity. It is from joy that faith derives a good part of its conquering power, and it is keen interest that makes for the constancy of faith. Furthermore, faith is only able to become exclusive devotion when there is also a high degree of mental one-pointedness *(cittassa ekaggatā)* which is identical with concentration *(samādhi)*. For the faculty of wisdom to comprehend its objects fully, keenness of interest must be highly developed by the two intensifying factors of absorption, thought-conception *(vitakka)* and discursive thinking *(vicāra)*. For the unfolding of the faculties of energy, mindfulness and concentration, a high degree of stimulating interest is required, in order to intensify their activity. On the other hand, when mindfulness and concentration are progressing well, their part is to sustain and increase interest by preventing it from fading away.

The five spiritual faculties, together with the corresponding five spiritual powers *(bala)*, continue the work begun by the factors of absorption. They increase the agility and pliancy of the mind and its capacity to effect deliberate inner changes. These last features are the bases for any mental and spiritual progress. It is mainly owing to the operation of these five faculties and powers that noticeable transformations of character, conduct, ideas and ideals are made possible. Sometimes it even appears as if quite a new personality has emerged.

If, on the other hand, the intensifying and controlling factors are weak or partly absent, a general heaviness and unwieldiness of the mental processes will result; the force of habit predominates, changes and adaptations are undertaken slowly and unwillingly and to the smallest possible degree; thought is rigid, inclining to dogma.

As far as the cultivation of these five spiritual faculties is concerned, one must see that they develop evenly; their uneven development is somewhat dangerous. If a single faculty is developed exclusively while the others, especially the counterparts, are neglected or suppressed, that faculty may develop a tendency to dominate others. Excessive faith, for example, may weaken wisdom, and strong energy may weaken concentration. In each case the balance is disturbed and harmonious development impaired. This shows the importance as well as the wisdom of insisting on the harmony of faculties *(indriya-samatta)*. It is the faculty of mindfulness that watches over harmonisation of the other four faculties, and so is the chief control over the other four faculties.

The importance of intensity of these faculties is emphasised by repeating them under the name of powers *(bala)*. The five factors corresponding to the five faculties are called powers when they become unshakable by their opposites: so, for example, when faith is unshakable by lack of faith or *vicikicchā* 'doubt', it is called a power; and so on (*DhaA*. S. 124).

The five faculties and powers are simply two different aspects of the same qualities. Their nature is basically one, though their functions are different.

The last but not least are the three faculties which are described as supramundane. They are the results of the cultivation of the five spiritual faculties. They are types of intuitive knowledge possessed by "Āryas" in the different stages of spiritual attachment. The achievement of these three amounts to the realisation of the truth which is the *summum bonum* of Buddhism.

The first is the faculty of assurance: 'I shall know what I did not get know *(anaññātaññassāmītindriya)*, which arises at the moment of stream-entry *(sotāpatti-magga)*; the second is the faculty of the highest knowledge *(aññin-driya)* which arises at the next moment, i.e., on realising the fruit of stream-entry *(sotāpatti-phala)*; the third is the faculty of him who knows *(aññātāvindriya)* which arises at attaining arahantship.

Upali Karunaratne

INDRIYA-BHĀVANĀ SUTTA, the last sutta of the *Majjhima Nikāya (M.* III, pp. 298-302). The sutta

embodies a discussion that took place between the Buddha and Uttara, the young disciple of Pārāsariya, a brahamin teacher. The venue of the meeting was Mukheluvana in Kajangala.

Uttara, the youngster, paid a courtesy call on the Buddha and while the two were engaged in pleasant conversation, the Buddha asked Uttara whether his teacher advocates any course of development of the senses *(indriyabhāvanā)*. To this Uttara answers in the affirmative and continues to say that his teacher advocates that one should not see material forms *(rūpa)* with the eye, one should not hear sounds with the ears. The Buddha points out to Uttara that in such circumstances the blind and the deaf have to be reckoned as those who have well developed sense faculties, for they never see forms with their eyes nor hear sounds with their ears. Uttara could not meet the Buddha's argument and was silent. At this point the Buddha addresses elder Ānanda and says that the method of development of the senses in the Buddha's dispensation is quite different, and on Ānanda's request the Buddha describes his method of development of the senses. The Buddha says: "When a bhikkhu sees a form with his eyes there arises in him either a liking to it or a dislike to it or a mixed feeling of liking and disliking. When such a feeling rises in him he is aware that such feeling has risen in him and that such feeling is transient, gross and is dependent on causes, and to maintain equanimity on such occasion conduces to tranquillity. When he contemplates in that manner the feelings of liking, disliking or the mixed feeling of liking and disliking disappear and equanimity remains. The same applies with regard to the ears and sounds, the nose and the odours, the tongue and the savours, the body and tactiles and the mind and concepts. This thought process takes place in a flash in a man with developed senses."

This discussion brings out the differences between an ordinary man and a man who is spiritually advanced. The ordinary man utilises his senses to derive sustenance for his living while psychologically becoming attached to or repelled by objects of the senses. But a man with cultivated senses, too, utilises his senses to derive sustenance for his living while psychologically maintaining complete tranquillity through non-attachment to or non-conflict with sense objects, by reflecting on the true nature of sensual pleasures.

The Buddha further shows the difference in behaviour between a trainee *(sekha)* and a perfected man *(asekha)* when confronted with sense experience. When, in the mind of a trainee, a pleasant feeling or an unpleasant feeling or a mixed feeling of pleasantness and unpleasantness arises, he is troubled about it *(aṭṭiyati)* is ashamed of it *(harāyati)*, loathes it *(jigucchati)*. But when such feeling arises in a perfected man *(asekha)*, if he desires thus: 'May I abide not perceiving impurity in impurity', he abides there not perceiving impurity. If he desires: 'May I abide perceiving impurity in purity', he abides there perceiving impurity. If he desires: 'May I abide not perceiving impurity in impurity and in purity,' he abides there not percieving impurity. If he desires: 'May I abide perceiving impurity in purity and impurity,' he abides there perceiving impurity. If he desires: 'May I having avoided both impurity and purity, abide in equanimity, mindful and clearly conscious,' he abides there in equanimity, mindful and clearly conscious.

There is reference made in the *Theragāthā* commentary to a thera Pārāpariya who was taught the *Indriyabhāvanā Sutta*. It is further said in the *Theragāthā* commentary that this thera learnt it by heart and pondering over it, attained insight. The *Theragāthā (vv.* 726 ff.), gives a summary of the musings of Pārāpariya which led to his attainment (see DPPN. s.v. Indriyabhāvanā Sutta).

W. G. Weeraratne

INDRIYA-PACCAYA is one of the twenty-four *paccayas* enunciated in the *Paṭṭhānappakaraṇa*, a Canonical Abhidhamma Text of the Pali tradition.[1] The term *Indriya-paccaya* is a compound used to indicate a specific relation under the system of correlation known as the *Paṭṭhāna-naya* i.e. the method upheld in the above mentioned text. It undertakes to explain the Buddhist concept of causality in a comprehensive way. As such it is mentioned in the early writings as a synonym with other terms expressing causal relation.[2] It is usually translated into English as "condition".

In the course of time during the evolution of Buddhist thought on causality the term began to be used in a significantly different sense. It is generally admitted that the Buddhist teaching on causality is most comprehensive and thus assumes the status of a central truth. Thus it is said that one who sees it sees Buddhism.[3] But the formula of the twelve terms had a limited purpose namely to explain the origin and cessation of *dukkha*. This was expressed in the form of "various stages of *dukkha* in their dynamic aspect."[4] But from the point of view of

1. Tikap. p. 1
2. *Vism* p. 532
3. *M.* I, pp. 190 1
4. W.S. Karunaratne, *The Theory of Causality*, Sri Lanka, 1988, p. 35

understanding the phenomenon of causality the most important consideration was not the stages themselves, but the causal relation between them. The theory of *paccayas* was conceived to fulfil this need. The function and, for that matter, thesignificance of *paccayas* lies with this consideration.

The first member of the compound, the term *Indriya* is a pre-Buddhist Indian term and has originated in the context of God Indra, as it is evident from the *Ṛgveda*. Its meaning was gradually extended and later came to be used to connote the idea of lord and dominance among other things. In the present use Buddhism seems to retain the extended sense and as such it closely resembles another *paccaya* i.e. *adhipati*.[5]

The term *Indriya* is used in Buddhist Texts of the Suttapiṭaka and Abhidhammapiṭaka to refer to twenty-two terms.[6] They are the following: (1) Eye *(cakkhu)* (2) Ear *(sota)* (3) Nose *(ghāṇa)* (4) Tongue *(jivhā)* (5) Body *(kāya)* (6) Mind *(mano)* (7) Femininity *(itthi)* (8) *Masculinity (purisa)* (9) *Vitality (jīvita)* (10) Bodily Pleasant Feeling *(sukha)* (11) Bodily Pain *(dukkha)* (12) Gladness *(somanassa)* (13) Sadness *(domansssa)* (14) Equanimity *(upekkhā)* (15) Faith *(saddhā)* (16) Energy *(viriya)* (17) Mindfulness *(sati)* (18) Concentration *(samādhi)* (19) Wisdom *(paññā)* (20) The assurance "I shall know the unknown" *(aññātaññassāmītindriya* (21) The faculty of Highest Knowledge *(aññindriya)* and (22) The faculty of Him who knows *(aññātāvindriya)*. Of these the two faculties of sex (7, 8), though designated as *indriyas*, are not treated as *indriyapaccaya*. Thus *indriyapaccaya* consists of twenty items.

For the non-recognition of the two faculties of sex as *indriyapaccaya* the following reason has been adduced by the commentators.[7] An element of existence material can rightly be called an *indriyapaccaya*, if it does not cease to be active under any circumstances. But at the initial stage of the embryonic growth, although the faculty of masculinity and the faculty of femininity are present they do not bring about the manifestation of sex differences. So these two were left out.

Buddhaghosa in his *Visuddhimagga* offers the following explanation with regard to the function of *indriyapaccaya* in different situations.[8] The twenty items which assist in the sense of predominance are faculty conditions. The first five are conditions only for immaterial states, the rest are conditions for material and immaterial states. The eye faculty is condition for the eye consciousness element and for the states associated with it. In the same way faculties of the ear, the nose, the tongue, the body are conditions for their respective consciousness elements and for the states associated with them. Then the material life faculty is a condition as a faculty condition for the kinds of materiality due to the performance of kamma. Then again the immaterial faculties are conditions as faculty conditions for the states associated with them and for the kinds of materiality arisen thereby.

Thus by the expression *Indriyapaccaya* is meant a condition that comes about through the participation of one or more of twenty *indriyas*. Generally speaking it can be described as that condition which exercises a dominating influence over the items related to it.

Senarat Wijesundara

INDRIYAPAROPARIYATTAÑĀNA (var. *indriyaparopariyatti, indriyaparopariya*), insight into the functioning of the five spiritual faculties of other beings, is one of the ten intellectual powers *(dasa-bala)* of a Buddha (*M.* I, p. 70; *A.* V, pp. 34, 38; *Vbh.* 340 ff. *Netti.* p. 101). It is one of the fourteen kinds of knowledge that constitute the knowledge of the Buddha (*Ps.* I, p. 133). By this knowledge the Buddha understands the extent to which the five spiritual faculties, namely, faith *(saddhā)*, energy *(viriya)*, mindfulness *(sati)*, concentration *(samādhi)* and wisdom *(paññā)* of beings are developed or degenerated (*MA.* II, 29–30); in other words, he understands by this knowledge the people's potentialities in the spiritual sphere.

A detailed description of this knowledge is not found in the early Nikāyas; it is in the *Vibhaṅga-Pakaraṇa* of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka that we come across one. Buddhaghosa, too, while commenting on this knowledge in his *Papañcasūdanī* (*MA.* II, pp. 29–30) refers the reader to the *Vibhaṅga* (pp. 340 ff.) which treats comprehensively on this knowledge.

The objects of this knowledge, as given in the *Vibhaṅga*, include: (1) *āsaya*, meaning speculative views such as eternalism and nihilism held, as well as the position of conditionality taken up, by persons; and lust for sense-pleasure and inclination to renunciation; sloth and torpor, as well as enthusiasm of persons; (2) *anusaya*, meaning seven latent tendencies or predispositions, of persons; (3) *carita*, the threefold motive-force of persons, namely, the motive force which is morally good, the motive force which is morally bad and the motive force which is steadfast; and (4) *adhimutti*, intentions which are low or noble, of other beings. This knowledge thus

5. D.J. Kalupahana Causality: *The Central Philosophy, of Buddhism*, The Unior Press, Hawaii, Honolulu, 1975
6. Nyanantiloka, *Buddhist Dictionary* (1980) p. 178
7. Y. Karunadasa, *Buddhist Analysis of Matter*, (1988) p. 138
8. *Vism.* pp. 538–539.

throws light on the diversified nature of persons and makes a distinction between persons who are capable and those who are incapable of realising the truth. By this knowledge the Buddha also sees beings whose mind is slightly defiled *(apparajakkha)* or much defiled *(mahārajakkha)*, beings whose spiritual faculties are dull *(mudindriya)* or sharp *(tikkhindriya)*, beings of good disposition *(svākāra)* and of evil disposition *(dvākāra)*, beings who can be easily convinced *(suviññāpaya)* and those who are hard to be convinced *(duviññāpaya)*, in short beings who are capable *(bhabba)* and those who are incapable *(abhabba)* of realising the truth (*Vbh.* p. 340–2).

It would appear from this description that *indriyaparopariyatta-ñāṇa* is the knowledge into the nature of other beings; it is by this knowledge that the Buddha understands whether or not a particular individual is capable of attaining Nibbāna *(upanissayasampanna)*. This knowledge is, therefore, very useful for a teacher whose sole aim was to help others realise the truth; for he could select the worthy persons and instruct them according to their temperaments and abilities.

The ten intellectual powers *(dasabala)*, of which *indriyaparopariyatta-ñāṇa* is one, are generally considered as qualities possessed by the Buddha. The last three of the ten intellectual powers, called *tivijjā*, namely, (1) *pubbenivāsānussati-ñāṇa*, insight into one's own previous existences, (2) *dibba-cakkhu*, clairvoyance or *cutūpapāta-ñāṇa*, insight into death and rebirth, according to kamma, of other persons and (3) *āsavakkhaya-ñāṇa*, insight into the destruction of cankers, however, are types of insight possessed by all arahants. We also find an arahant-disciple of the Buddha, Anuruddha, claiming for himself not only the *tivijjā*, but all the ten intellectual powers (*S.* V, p. 303–6). The *Paṭisambhidāmagga*, on the contrary, expressly says that *indriyaparopariyatta-ñāṇa*, one of the ten intellectual powers, claimed also by Anuruddha, is, together with five other types of knowledge, a monopoly of the Buddha (*cha ñāṇāni asādhāraṇāni sāvakehi: Ps.* I, p. 133). In reconsidering these two contradictory statements Buddhaghosa says that the ten intellectual powers possessed by some disciples of the Buddha are not perfect; only those of the Buddha are perfect (*SA.* III, p. 263). The difference between the identical qualities possessed both by the Buddha and by the arahants seems to be a matter of degree, and not a matter of kind. The Buddha's range of wisdom is more extensive and intensive than that of the arahants (*VbhA.* pp. 372–3).

We find the *indriyaparopariyatta-ñāṇa* of the *Vibhaṅga* divided in the *Pattisambhidāmagga* into two types of knowledge, namely (1) the *indriyaparopariyatta-ñāṇa* and (2) the *āsayānusaya-ñāṇa* (q.v., *Ps.* I, pp. 121–4). The method of treatment as well as the terminology itself used in the two texts are identical. Agains, in the *Saddhammapajjotikā*, these two types of knowledge have been identified with the *Buddha-cakkhu* (*NdA.* II, p. 383). The *indriyaparopariyatta-ñāṇa* of the *Vibhaṅga* is, therefore, identical with the *Buddha-cakkhu* of the *Saddhammapajjotikā*. But the *Buddha-cakkhu* of the earlier texts (*D.* II, pp. 38–9; *M.* I, p. 169; *Vin.* I, p. 6) is identical with the *indriyaparopariyatta-ñāṇa of the Paṭisambhidāmagga* (I, p. 121), and the *āsayānusaya-ñāṇa* of the *Paṭisambhidāmagga* (I, p. 123) is identical with *indriyaparopariyatta-ñāṇa* of the *Nettippakaraṇa* (p. 101).

Thus, there seems to be a confusion among the scholiasts about the *indriyaparopariyatta-ñāṇa*, the *āsayānusaya-ñāṇa* and the *Buddha-cakkhu*. These three types of knowledge may be considered one and the same, for all of them throw light on the functioning of the spiritual faculties of beings.

Upali Karunaratne

INDRIYA-SAMATTA, equilibrium *(samatta)* of faculties *(indriya)*, related to the five spiritual faculties, namely, faith *(saddhā)*, energy *(viriya)*, mindfulness *(sati)*, concentration *(samādhi)* and wisdom *(paññā)*. (See INDRIYA). This equilibrium is indispensable for the realisation of the spiritual attainments, for, when one faculty becomes strong and the others weak, the weak ones do not perform their respective functions. If, for example, the faculty of faith is stronger than the others, then the faculty of energy cannot perform its function of exerting, the faculty of mindfulness its function of establishing, the faculty of concentration its function of not distracting and the faculty of wisdom its function of understanding. Vakkali could not attain insight on account of his extreme faith (*S.* III, pp. 119–24; *ThagA.* II, p. 147; III, p. 208). The case is the same with other faculties, too. Soṇa Kolivisa was unable to attain arahantship on account of his excessive energy (A. III, pp. 274 ff.). So was Ānanda (*VinA.* p. 12) Only later, when they were able to rid themselves of excessiveness in faith and energy were they able to win insight and attain arahantship.

Of these five spritual faculties, there were, in particular, two pairs in each of which both faculties should well counterbalance each other, namely, faith and wisdom on the one hand and energy and concentration on the other. For excessive faith with deficient wisdom leads to blind faith whilst excessive wisdom with deficient faith leads to cunning. In the same way excessive energy with weak concentration leads to restlessness whilst excessive concentration with deficient energy leads to indolence.

Though for both faculties in each of the two pairs an equal degree of intensity is desirable, mindfulness should

be allowed to develop to the highest degree of strength (*Vism.* p. 129 f.).

Upali Karunaratne

INDRIYA-SAMVARA, 'restraint of the senses', also referred to as *indriyesu guttadavāratā*, meaning 'the state of having the doors of the senses guarded', is a quality mentioned in numerous sutta passages which describe the ethico-intellectual process that culminates in the destruction of *āsavas* (q.v.), i.e., in the absolute freedom, in the religious sense (*vimutti*, q.v.). It is an essential link, though preliminary, in that process without which no progress could be effected. It is closely connected with *sīla* (q.v.), in fact, it is sometimes considered as an aspect of *sīla*, i.e., as one of its four kinds described as purity (s.v. *catupārisuddhi-sīla*). Another quality that goes hand in hand with *indriya-saṃvara* is mindfulness and awareness (*satisampajañña* q.v.).

What particular link does *indriya-saṃvara* constitute in that process may best be gathered from its description given in the *Sāmaññaphala-Sutta* (*D.* I, p. 62 ff.) and the *Mahātaṇhāsaṅkhaya Sutta* (*M.* I, p. 267 f.). The process begins with the conversion of a person on listening to the teaching of the Buddha. After developing faith in the Buddha he renounces household life and becomes a monk in order to practise the noble way of life (*s.v. brahma-cariya*). The preparatory stage of this noble life consists of good behaviour in both word and deed. This is *sīla* which includes restraint according to the *Pātimokkha* (q.v.), good conduct, seeing danger in the smallest wrong, training in the precepts and the purity of livelihood (*D.* I, p. 63). The next stage is *indriya-saṃvara* which is followed by two further stages of mindfulness (*sati-sampajañña*) and contentment *santuṭṭhi*: *D.* I, p. 71). When the monk becomes possessed of these qualities, he retires to a suitable place and starts meditating. He gets rid of the five mental hindrances (*nīvaraṇa*) and attains concentration of mind (*samādhi*). On attaining concentration of mind he applies and directs his mind toward knowledge and insight (*ñāṇa-dassana*) and attains it. It is this *ñāṇadassana* that effects the destruction of the *āsavas* and thereby produces absolute freedom (*D.* I, pp. 71-84).

What is meant by *indriya-saṃvara* has been explained in a short passage in the same sutta (*D.* I, p. 70) which is repeated in several other suttas (*M.* I, pp. 269; 346; *S.* IV, pp. 104; 112; 176; *A.* V, p. 206). The passage may be rendered as:

"When he (the monk) sees a material object with his eye, he is not entranced by its general appearance (*nimitta*) nor by its particular features (*anvuyañjana*). He sets himself to restrain that which might (in the normal circumstances) give occasion for evil states such as covetousness (*abhijjhā*) and dejection (*domanassa*) to flow in over him so long as he dwells unrestrained as to his faculty of sight. He keeps watch over his faculty of sight and he attains to mastery over it;" (and this is repeated with regard to other five sense faculties as well) and endowed with this self restraint, so noble, as regards the faculties he experiences, within himself, a sense of ease into which no evil state can enter. Thus it is that the monk becomes guarded as to the doors of his senses" (*D.* I, p. 70 etc.).

Buddhaghosa explains *nimitta* as sign of woman or man or any sign that serves as a basis for defilement such as the sign of beauty, etc. and *anuvyañjana* is explained as any constituent part or function classed as hand, foot, smile, laughter, talk, looking ahead, looking aside etc. which has acquired the name "particular" (features) because of its particularising defilements, because of its making them manifest themselves. Further, he says that when the monk sees such an object he apprehends neither the signs nor the particulars of it; he stops at what is merely seen (*UdA.* p. 8).

The process is explained briefly in the *Saṃyutta Nikāya* (*S.* IV, p. 125) where it is said that when the objects, both attractive and repulsive, that come in contact with the senses do not take possession of the mind (*tvāssa phussa phussa cittaṃ na pariyādāya tiṭṭhati*), and due to wise attention (*yoniso manasikāra*, *D.* III, p. 288), effort is initiated, mindfulness established with no confusion whatsoever, and consequently, the body becomes calm and the mind tranquilled. In this instance the sense objects not taking possession of the mind represents *indriya-saṃvara*.

When some external object comes in contact with the relevant sense-organ, it is natural that the person concerned pays attention to it. A person, for example, sees a human figure, he is naturally inclined, in normal circumstances, to find out whether that particular figure represents a man or a woman; whether or not it looks beautiful; whether or not its different parts and the movements are aggreeable. This is a natural reaction on the part of the person who sees it. This is referred to, in the texts, as *indriya-asaṃvara*, lack of restraint as regards the faculties, the opposite of *indriya-saṃvara*.

Indriya-asaṃvara is condemned on the ground that it gives rise primarily to two passions, namely covetousness (*abhijjhā*) and dejection (*domanassa*; *D.* I, p. 70 etc.). On seeing an object, as has already been observed, the person concerned apprehends the signs and particulars of it; he feels attracted if the object is beautiful. And he dwells without mindfulness ... and derives a feeling — pleasant, painful or neutral. He delights in that feeling; welcomes it and persists in clinging to it while enjoying it (*M.* I, p. 266;

III, pp. 209; 287; *S.* IV, p. 119 f.). If, on the other hand, the object is disagreeable and repulsive, he resents it; he hates it (ibid.). All these are passions, defilements of the mind which constitute a hindrance to spiritual progress.

The entire system of Buddhist ethics is based on sense-perception, since evaluation as good and bad, in the ultimate analysis, stems from attitudes adopted towards objects perceived. We know from other contexts that the phenomenon called contact (*phassa*, q.v.) that obtains in a perceptual process gives rise to sensations (*vedanā*, q.v.). After *vedanā* comes perception (*saññā*, q.v.), thought conception (*vitakka*, q.v.), obsession (*papañca*, q.v.) etc. in one context (*M.* I, pp. 111–112) and craving (*taṇhā*, q.v.), clinging (*upādāna*, q.v.) etc. in another context (*S.* II, p. 73), both leading to serious involvements and complications referred to as ill (*dukkha*), (*M.* I, p. 266; III, p. 287 f.). It may be pointed out that *vedanā* might also lead to ill-will (*vyāpāda*) or malice (*dosa*), instead of *taṇhā*. The significant fact is that the stages upto *vedanā* are common to any process of perception. If nature takes its normal course, then the result will be lack of restraint as regards the senses (*indriya-asaṃvara*) with *vedanā* giving rise to covetousness (*abhijjhā*) or ill-will (*vyāpāda*) etc. and ultimately leading to serious complications and involvements.

Indriya-saṃvara is a diversion from this normal course. The initiative in this connection has, therefore, to be taken during the *vedanā*-stage of the perceptual process. It is the most difficult step to be taken towards noble religious life; it is the path against natural tendencies swimming against the current (*paṭisotagāmī*, *S.* I, p. 136; *A.* II, p. 6), as it were. It links its base in mindfulness and awareness developed on the basis of *sīla* (*A.* V, pp. 114, 137). It is also the most essential link between *sīla* and *samādhi*, touching both and constituting the transition from the former to the latter and, once this is accomplished half the problems of the noble life is solved.

When a person succeeds in restraining his senses, it is said, he experiences within himself a sense of ease into which no evil state can enter (*ajjhattaṃ avyāseka-sukhaṃ paṭisaṃvedeti*, *D.* I, p. 70). The arising of this sense of ease (*sukha*), the most important result produced by *indriyasaṃvara* is referred to in a different process, also leading to absolute freedom. In this process, *sukha* leads to *samādhi* (*D.* III, pp. 241, 288; *M.* I, p. 37). This *sukha* does not mean pleasure derived from sense-experience, but a particular kind of feeling of ease derived from *indriya-saṃvara*, refraining from apprehending signs and particulars of objects perceived and thereby being freed from immediate consequences of sense-experience, i.e., being freed from arising of passions such as *abhijjhā*, (covetousness) and *vyāpāda*, (ill-will) or *domanassa*, (dejection) which in the normal circumstances invariably accompany sense-experience.

The purpose served by *indriya-saṃvara* thus becomes very clear. The faculty (*indriya*) that produces absolute freedom (*vimutti*) is insight (*paññā*). *Paññā* dawns in a mind which is calm and tranquilled by *samādhi* (concentration). Calmness and tranquillity of the mind is possible only when the mind is not disturbed by external stimuli, because it is the latter that makes the mind wander. *Indriya-saṃvara* as the quality that prevents the mind from being disturbed by external objects with which a person comes in contact through the senses and also as the quality that immediately leads to *indriya-bhāvanā*, i.e., the disappearnace of likes and dislikes and neutrals and the arising of equanimity (*M.* III, p. 299), is an essential condition in the path to absolute freedom.

Upali Karunaratne

INDRIYASAṂVARA-SĪLA. See CATUPĀRISUDDHA-SĪLA, and SĪLA.

INDUCTION. See LOGIC and INFERENCE.

INEFFABILITY. The basic etymological meaning of 'ineffability' which derives from Latin *effari* (*effabilis*) is 'unutterable'. The prefix 'un' and suffix 'able' suggest certain limits or impossibilities believed to exist in our linguistic expression. The impossibilities involved here may be either psychological or logical. If it is the former, which seems to be the case with some religious, mystical and occult traditions, the impossibility is due to one's being highly affected by an extraordinary experience or a phenomenon. This situation seems to have nothing much to do with the nature of language or, sometimes, even with the phenomenon involved. But it says something about the state of the mind of the person affected. However, if the impossibility is what we called 'logical', the roots of the difficulty go to the very nature of the phenomenon and the human linguistic capacity (language). For example, if there is something unknowable in principle it must also be ineffable in principle. Or, if there are limits to language, what lies beyond such limits must be ineffable. As some religionists believe, the phenomenon of religious experience occupies such a realm we use the term religious experience to refer to the ultimate goals of all major religions of the world. Whereas the psychological impossibility is 'local', the

logical impossibility, if such a thing exists, must be universal.

The ineffability believed to be associated with religious experience has been understood variously. In a well-known analysis of religious experience (*Varieties of Religious Experience*. New York: Modern Library, 1936), William James takes ineffability as the most distinct characteristic of mystical religious experience. In elaborating on this, James says that "the subject of it [experience] immediately says that it defies expression, that no adequate report of its contents can be given by words" (p. 371). James compares this experience to one's experience of love or that of music which would not make sense to one who has not himself been in love or has not got an ear for music. However, as James' analysis itself shows, this kind of 'ineffability' is associated with any experience, for, whereas one's experience is personal the language one uses to describe the latter is general. This is not to say that language cannot describe this experience. The fact that one who has not experienced something cannot get an idea of it when described by one who has experienced it is not a problem of language. Therefore what William James refers to as ineffability is not the one we are concerned with in this context.

The ineffability as understood in the present context is due to the transcendental nature of the experience which, because of its very nature, cannot be communicated by means of language. A contemporary example of this type of characterization of religious experience is the one made by Rudolf Otto (*The Idea of the Holy, London:* Oxford University Press, 1950). He describes the religious experience as the feeling of 'mysterium tremendum' (numinous dread) and further says that this feeling refers to something 'wholly other' or something that transcends ordinary human experience and hence human linguistic capacity. In Otto's view, religious experience is 'non-rational' in the sense that it cannot be defined, presented or analyzed by means of concepts. The impossibility involved in this context has been described by Otto as 'ineffable' by which he means the belief that the experience "completely eludes apprehension in terms of concepts" (p. 5). Otto thought that the ineffable transcendental is a universal characteristic of religious experience and that "there is no religion in which it does not live as ther real innermost core, and without it no religion can be worthy of the name" (p. 6). What Otto contrasts is two ways of interpreting religion, mystical and rational of which the respective characteristics are the absence and the presence of rational discourse, conceptualization and effability.

Whether religious experience is uniform or multiform has been a matter of debate for some time. Otto's represents the view that religious experience, in some essential sense, is uniform. However, more recently, some students of religion have identified two major forms of religion, namely, those that have transcendental God as the centre of their religious experience (theism: e.g. the religions of the Judeo-Christian tradition) and those that have what is called undifferentiated unity as the content of religious experience (e.g. non-dualism of Hinduism *a la* Śaṅkara and monism of Plotinus and certain Mahāyāna schools of Buddhism).

It is interesting to note that, in each tradition, its *summum bonum* has been characterized as ineffable. In classical Hindu tradition such statements as the following: "Wherefrom words turn back, together with the mind, not having attained" (*Taittirīya Upaniṣad* ii. 4), "There the eye goes not, speech goes not, nor the mind, we know not, we understand not how one could teach it" *(Kena Upaniṣad i. 3)* and "Not by speech, not by mind, not by sight can it be apprehended" *(Kaṭha Upaniṣad* II.3.12) give expression to its belief in ineffability. In Neo-Platonism of Plotinus, a kind of experience which is beyond any form of duality or multiplicity is talked about, and about this experience, Plotinus says that "it can neither be spoken nor written about" *(The Enneads* IV.9.4). In the theistic tradition, Pseudo-Dionysius stands out among the early Christians who asserted the religious ineffability without reservation. Among his writings, *The Mystical Theology* remains a brief but succinct and forceful statement of the ineffability of the theistic religious experience. There he says: "The fact is that more we take flight upward, the more our words are confined to the ideas we are capable of forming; so that as we now plunge into the darkness which is beyond intellect, we shall find ourselves *not simply running short of words but actually speechless and unknowing"* (emphasis added) (chapter 3).

One might say that, being a mystic, Pseudo-Dionysius is not a representative case. But the situation does not change even with non-mystic theologians. St. Thomas Aquinas is a good example of a main-stream Christian theologian who confirms the transcendence of God and believes that ineffability follows from that characteristic of God. Aquinas' claim of the ineffability of God rests on the assertion that human beings cannot know God in his essence. The two kinds of congnitive powers human beings possess in Aquinas' view – sense and intellect — are capable of giving them only the knowledge of material objects and abstract ideas; but the 'angelic knowledge' alone can know God in his essence. However, unless bestowed upon by God himself, human beings do not have such a capacity. In order to have the angelic knowledge God has to unite himself with the created being, and since this is impossible so long as one is attached to a human body what this ultimately means is that it is impossible for us to know God (see The *Summa Theologica (O.* 12: Article. 4 & 6). This implies that God is in principle unknowable and hence ineffable.

The unknowability and the resultant ineffability must not be understood as referring to the quite normal and trivial situation characterised by the fact that we cannot say anything about which we do not know. Ineffability resulting from lack of information bears no philosophical significance. However, the ineffability involved in the theistic claim underlies two interesting and mutually related metaphysical and epistemological claims, and these claims betray a kind of unknowability in a serious sense: The metaphysical claim is that there is some phenomenon, God in this context transcends human experience (= the Transcendental). The epistemological claim is that there are certain inevitable and unsurpassable limits to human cognition and human language. Thus the belief in unknowability and ineffability associated with the theistic religious experience underlies certain concerns regarding the allegedly inherent deficiency in human nature, on the one hand, and the belief in the magnitude of the Transcendental, on the other. The monistic ineffability claim is based on the belief that the experience involved is wholly different and occupies a realm of existence distinct from our ordinary experience. It is believed that the very nature of the said experience defies any articulation or expression by means of linguistic concepts. Here again we can see that similar metaphysical and epistemological claims are involved. In sum, the most important aspect of this way of understanding religion is the belief that religion involves a Transcendental which is ineffable.

Ineffability in Buddhism

The non-theistic character of Buddhism has posed some difficulties for those who wish to identify a God-like Transcendental in it. While some hold that the Buddhist religious experience (nirvāṇa) is a moinst-type transcendent experience, some others hold that all forms of religious experience including that of Buddhism involve an ineffable Transcendental which is equivalent to neutral Brahman or God-head.

A case in point is John Hick's view presented in his *An Interpretation of Religion* (New Haven: Princeton University Press, 1989). For Hick, all forms of religious experience, whether they are theistic or monistic, are different responses to what he calls "the Transcendental" or "the Real". Some such experiences as Allah, Yahveh or Indra are personal characterizations or "personae" whereas such others as Nirvana, Satori and Brahman are impersonal characterizations or "impersonae" of the Real. The Real itself is unknowable and ineffable (p. 246). This interpretation brings all religions, including Buddhism, under one roof, namely, that of the ineffable Transcendental.

The interpretation of the Buddhist religious experience as involving an ineffable Transcendental has its advocates among both philosophers of religion and Buddhist philosophers. Certain contemporary philosophers of religion, Rudolf Otto and John Hick, for example, come to hold this view as a necessary entailment of the larger belief that all religions ultimately involve a 'non-rational' or ineffable Transcendental. For Buddhist philosophers, the belief is more a matter of the weight of internal evidence. Therefore what is more significant in the present context is to examime some of the internal evidence produced, particularly, by Buddhist philosophers in order to support their belief.

Ineffability in Early Buddhism

In the present context, what we mean by 'early Buddhism' is the world-view presented in the three *piṭakas* (collections) preserved by Theravādins. We draw particularly from their *'Sutta Piṭaka'* (the collection of discourses in the five *Nikāyas)* for it contains the most relevant material. The most well-known statement in the Pali canon which is often referred to in support of the transcendental view of nirvāṇa is the following statement at *Udāna* p. 80 and *Itivuttaka* p. 37:

> Monks, there is a not-born, not-become, not-made, not-compounded *(ajāta, abhūta, akata, asaṅkhata).* Monks, if that not-born, not-become, not-made, not-compounded were not, no escape from the born, become, made, compounded *(jāta, bhūta, kata, saṅkhata)* would be known here. But monks, since there is a not-born, not-become, not-made, not-compounded, therefore an escape from the born, become, made, compounded is known.

This statement is understood as referring to a state (experience or a realm of existence) which does not share any characteristic of what belongs to the world, namely, born, become, made and compounded. What has been described by these terms is believed to constitute a separate ontological state which is transcendental. Since language is believed to be valid or applicable only within the realm of what is born, become, made and compounded the transcendental state, by implication, is also believed to be ineffable.

Whether or not early Buddhism acknowledges an ineffable state depends on whether or not it understands nirvāṇa as a transcendental (beyond experience and cognition) state. The above statement, translated in that manner, suggests that nirvāṇa was taken to be such a state. However, the interpretation of the statement is a matter of controversy. Rune Johansson who made an interesting study of nirvāṇa on the basis of the Pali canon *(Psychology of Nirvana,* London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd. 1969. p. 55) has pointed out that the most important term (=nirvāṇa) is missing in the passage and that the key terms of the passage are rather ambiguous in meaning. Johansson thinks that the passage can well be interpreted as a description of nirvāṇa in experiential

terms. David J. Kalupahana, taking a similar stand, thinks that the past-participles used in the statement indicate events that have already taken place, and says that "their nominal forms-birth *(jāti)*, becoming *(bhava)*, making or doing *(kamma)*, and dispositions *(saṅkhāra)* - explain the world of bodage and suffering" *(A History of Buddhist Philosophy: Continuities and Discontinuities* Honolulu: The University of Hawaii Press, 1992. pp. 92-3).

The following statement could be viewed as supplying more compelling evidence in support of the ineffable, transcendental nature of nirvāṇa:

> In so far only, Ānanda, can one be born, or grow old, or die, pass away or reappear, in so far only is there a pathway for verbal expression *(adhivacanapatha)*, in so far only is there a pathway for terminlology *(niruttipatha)*, in so far only is there a pathway for designation *(paññattipatha)*, in so far only is there a sphere of knowledge, in so far only is the round of saṃsaric cycle kept going for there to be designation of the following, namely, the psycho-physical personality *(nāmarūpa)* with consciousness *(viññāṇa)*.

Although the statement does not make a specific reference to nirvāṇa, by showing that human suffering, saṃsāra, language and the psycho-physical personality are coextensive, one could conclude that language is applicable only within the realm characterized by those phenomena. The obvious contrast is nirvāṇa, which may be understood as lying beyond all linguistic conventions.

A similar interpretation has been advanced on certain statements regarding the nature of the post-mortal condition of the arahant. One such statement occurs in one of the dialogues between the Buddha and Vacchagotta. The latter asks the Buddha where the arahant is born after his death. The Buddha tells him that the expression that "he is born" does not apply to the arahant. Then Vacchagotta asks, whether, in that case, the arahant is not born, both born and not born or neither born nor not born. The Buddha says that none of these descriptions would apply to the arahant. Now, to Vacchagotta who gets confused by this response, the Buddha says that just as it is inappropriate to ask to which direction a fire which burned depending on fuel and extinguished due to lack thereof has gone, even so it is inappropriate to ask where the arahant who has exhausted all 'fuel' is born. The Buddha further says:

> Just so, Vaccha, the form by which one would like to designate the tathāgata, that form of the tathāgata is given up, its root broken, uprooted like a palm, free from further growth or renewed existence in the future. The tathāgata is free from everything called form. (The same is repeated for the rest of the aggregates). the tathāgata is *deep, immeasurable, unfathomable, like the deep ocean* (emphasis added) *(Majjhima Nikāya* I. pp. 486-7).

It is believed that the above account including, particularly, the ocean-simile portrays the state of the arahant as transcendental. The following statement which occurs in the *Suttanipāta* (v 1076) has been also understood as supportive of this way of thinking. Note that the statement makes a specific reference to language:

> There is no measure for one who has reached the end. He does not have that with which one would speak about him. When all the conditions are destroyed, all ways of speech too are destroyed.

The above statement has been made by the Buddha on being asked whether the arahant who has reached the end does not exist or whether he exists eternally. It is clear that the Buddha does not give any categorical answer either affimative or negative. Taking into consideration the nature of the Buddha's response to the question one could well argue that the Buddha did mean a state which goes beyond the limits of language (ineffable state). However, on the other hand, one could equally well make a rebuttal by pointing to the reason behind the Buddha's reluctance to use any categorical statement, namely, that he would be misunderstood as advocating some kind of nihilism or eternalism. One could further support this argument by showing that the statement can be interpreted as a plain description of the afterdeath condition of the arahant who does not produce any further psycho-physical personality for he has uprooted the casues thereof, and therefore that language does not play a role for the obvious reason that there is no psycho-physical personality to be described by language.

The fact that the after-death status of the arahant is a subject among the 'unexplained questions' *(abyākata:* Pali, *avyākṛta:* Sanskrit) has also been taken as an added support for this position. In his *Central Philosophy of Buddhism* (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd. 1955) T.R.V. Murti translates *avyākṛta* as 'inexpressible' which gives the impression that these questions partain to something which cannot be expressed by language. In this sense, the term has been understood as the Buddhist equivalent of the Hindu *avācya* or *anirvacanīya* which refers to the impossibility of describing the ultimate reality by means of language. However, the term *avyākṛta* does not mean 'inexpressible' but 'unexpressed' or 'unexplained' since its grammatical form is a past participle. Many reasons have been adduced by modern scholars as to the Buddha's silence on the *avyākṛta* questions. However, what we must not overlook here is that the reason given by the Buddha himself is based on pragmatic considerations. Here there is no allusion whatsoever to any difficulties he eccountered in describing what is 'transempirical'.

It is somewhat misleading to say that the Buddha was silent about these questions. What is true of the situation is that he did not give any categorical answer for the questions. Nevertheless, the Buddha did talk about these

questions, and he did explain why a categorical answer was not possible. As we will see later, in the Mahāyāna tradition, a form of silence has been attributed to the Buddha which he is claimed to have used as the most effective way of communicating some of his teachings. So far as the evidence in the Pali canon goes, we may say that there are no instances where the Buddha made recourse to such a silence as a means of teaching his doctrine.

The fact that, in the 'unexplained questions', the four positions regarding the after-death state of the arahant are presented in terms of *catuṣkoṭi* or the four-cornered logical predication has also been taken as suggestive of a transcendental state. Among the four positions, the first three are understood as asserting a positive, a negative and the conjunction of both positive and negative (contradictory) respectively. The fourth which seems to deny both positive and negative disjunctively, (e.g. neither the arahant is and nor he is not) has baffled many students. A popular way to make sense out of this seemingly paradoxical situation is to say that it refers to the transcendental state which is beyond any linguistic expression. The meaning of the negation of both negative and positive statements has been taken to imply the inapplicability of language.

However, looking from another view-point, the alleged paradoxicality of the statement is due to the belief in the absolute character of the concept of truth which is the basis of the two-cornered logic from where partial truth is excluded. However, for those who believe that certain states of affairs are too complex to be predicated of either negatively or positively, such statements as the fourth are not paradoxical. Thus the curious negation involved in the fourth statement of the tetralemma regarding the after-death status of the arahant can be interpreted as an effort to avoid both eternalism and nihilism respectively.

Usually this 'negative dialectic' is understood as implying the *via negativa* or the use of negative language to describe what is believed to be beyond description. As in the case of the well-known Upaniṣadic injunction *neti neti*, the idea is that we cannot say what the Transcendent is, but only what is it not. It is also believed that paradoxical statements characterized by oximorons and contradictory statements allegedly necessitated by the 'identity of opposites' *(coincidentia oppositorum)* are the results of the ineffable nature of the Transcendent. However, looking at their literature, it does not seem that the early Buddhists encountered a similar difficulty in describing nirvāṇa which necessitated for them to use such devices as the *via negativa*, paradoxes or contradictions.

Certain meditative states associated with the early Buddhist path of purification might be interpreted as involving some sort of ineffability. Two such instances are: the second *jhāna* which is devoid of *vitakka* and *vicāra* (understood as initial and discursive thought) and *saññā-vedayita nirodha samāpatti* or the attainment of cessation of perceptions and feelings. Among the characteristics of the first *jhāna* are initial and discurisve thought. According to the *Cullavedalla-sutta* M. I. p. 301), these two are called 'activities of speech' *(vacī-saṅkhāra)* for 'having first had initial and discursive thought, one subsequently utters speech'. Since the second *jhāna* is attained 'with the subsiding of initial and discursive thought' it is characterized by the absence of any psychological verbal activity. What this seems to suggest is that there is such an undifferentiated or unified state of mind which is not disturbed by external sense objects. Thus *jhāna* or the absorption of mind in the Buddhist sense is not an experience of some kind of transcendental and mystical reality which is beyond communication. Therefore the absence of initial and discurisve thought in the second *jhāna* does not indicate that *jhānic* experience is ineffable.

The attainment of cessation *(nirodha-samāpatti)*, the highest state of jhānic experience referred to in the Buddhist tradition has been sometimes interpreted as an ineffable state. This interpretation is based on the fact that the attainment of cessation is described as devoid of all physical, verbal and mental functions. However, this situation is due to the cessation of everything that is perceived and felt. According to the Buddhist analysis of the empiric individuality, the existence of subject is dependent on the existence of object or the external world which is the object of sensory experience. In the attainment of cessation, what takes place is an intensive form of aloofness of subject from object which causes a temporary suspension of the external world. This results in the cessation of the physical, verbal and mental activities which is almost tantamount to the cessation of the subject of cognition. There is no reason to interpret this state as ineffable for the absence of speech is a result of the absence of the conditions necessary for verbal behaviour.

It is interesting to note that in the Pali canon there is no term which directly connotes the idea of ineffability. However, some (N. Dutt, *Early Monastic Buddhism.* Calcutta: Calcutta Oriental Book Agency. 1960. p. 290. and E. Conze, *Buddhist Thought in India.* London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd. 1962. p. 76 & pp. 292–4) have taken *'atakkācavara'* – 'beyond reasoning'-*M.* I. pp. 160–175) as implying the ineffable nature of nirvāṇa. This interpretation is sought to be justified by the fact that the four-cornered logical predication does not apply to the after-death state of the arahant. Since the propositions in the tetralemma are supposed to exhaust all predicative possiblities, it is argued that whatever cannot be so predicated is also 'beyond dialectic'. (Note the significance of the term dialectic which refers not merely

to reasoning in a narrow sense but to linguistic involvement in a broader sense).

This interpretation may be challenged (as in the case of K. N. Jayatilleke: *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge* London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd. 1963. p. 431) on the ground that *'takka'* in the early discourses is not dialectic but logical reasoning which was used by the professional debators at the time of the Buddha in order to refute their opponents. The Buddha rejected the exclusive authority of reasoning in determining truthfulness of a statement on the ground that there can be a well-argued falsehood (see *Sandakasutta, M.* I. pp. 513-24) as in the case that there can be a logically valid but unsound argument. Furthermore, what has been described (in the *Ariyapariyesanasutta)* as *atakkāvacara,* nirvāṇa and the dependent nature of reality, involve much more than logical resoning; they have to be realized by following the ethical path laid down by the Buddha. Therefore *atakkāvacara* does not necessarily refer to the so-called 'beyond-dialectic' nature of the Buddhist religious experience.

Another term believed to have a closer affinity with the idea of ineffability is *nippapañca* (Sanskrit: *niṣprapañca).* Accordingly *papañca* is sometimes translated as concept or language. Its negative form *nippapañca* is therefore taken to refer to the non-conceptual character of the nirvanic experience. A well-argued presentation of this view is found in Bhikkhu Ñāṇānanda's *Concept and Reality* (Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society. 1971). Ñāṇānanda's interpretation is based on the following statement occurring in the *Madhupiṇḍikasutta* of *Majjhima Nikāya* in which the dependent origin of suffering is explained:

> *Cakkhuñcāvuso paṭicca rupe ca uppajjati cakkhuviññāṇaṃ. tiṇṇaṃ sangati phasso, phassa-paccayā vedanā, yaṃ vedeti taṃ sañjānāti, yaṃ sañjānāti taṃ vitakketi, yaṃ vitakketi taṃ papañceti yaṃ papañceti tato nidānaṃ purisaṃ papañcasaññā saṅkhā samudācaranti atītānāgatapaccuppannesu cakkhuviññeyyesu rūpesu.*

Ñāṇānanda translates the passage as follows:

> Visual consciousness, brethren, arises because of eye and material shapes; the meeting of the three is sensory impingement; because of sensory impingement arises feeling; what one feels one perceives; what one perceives, one reasons about; what one reasons about, one proliferates conceptually *[papañceti];* what one proliferates conceptually, due to that concepts characterized by the prolific tendency assail him in regard to material shapes cognisable by the eye... (p.4)

Here the pivotal term *'papañca'* has been translated as 'conceptual proliferation', and this translation is sought to be supported by the idea that the passage traces the origin of suffering to the conscious activity of perception which includes three stages, namely, 'perceives' *(sañjānāti),* 'reasons about' *(vitakketi)* and 'proliferates conceptually' *(papañceti)*. On Ñāṇānanda's interpretation, the cause of suffering is conceptual proliferation which an enlightened person would not engage in. Accordingly Ñāṇānanda takes the achievement of the final goal as a result of "gradual elimination of concepts" or "the deconceptualization of the mind" (p. 27) "by controlling its [of *papañca]* gate-ways of *'vitakka-vicāra'*" [initial verbal dispositions] (p. 29).

According to Ñāṇānanda's interpratation, nirvāṇa is a state in which the recipient would not permit any conceptual activity for he has controlled the doors of sense perception which cause verbal dispositions and conceptual proliferation. This state may be described as ineffable in the sense that the said state is marked by the utter absence of any form of conceptual or linguistic activity.

The validity of this conclusion largely depends on how one tends to interpret the state of the arahant or the nature of nirvanic experience. Since the arahants seem to live a normal life, Ñāṇānanda has to show how an arahant would engage in any thinking or talking after his attainment. Also he has to show that the early Buddhist literature uses the term *papañca* as an umbrella-term to cover all forms of conceptualization, whether good, bad or neutral.

So far we have discussed the key passages in the Pali canon which have been interpreted as supporting ineffability of the nirvanic experience. The discussion shows that the interpretation of these crucial passages is by no means conclusive. The position we discussed at the beginning of this essay, namely, that all religions have something transcendental as their ultimate goal implies that early Buddhist nirvāṇa too is such a transcendental state. When the idea of transcendence is understood as transcending human experience and cognition, what is transcendental becomes necessarily ineffable. This position has to be supported by evidence; but the crucial evidence remains inconclusive. Due to the self-same inconclusiveness of the evidence, the opposite position, namely, that early Buddhism rejects ineffability, too cannot be established. Therefore, it is clear that we cannot decide one way or another solely on the basis of the above-discussed instances.

What could be a better alternative is to see how far we can build a consistent intepretation of the text *as a whole.* The way to do so is, first, to form a general theory about the nature of the Buddhist philosophy, and then to see whether the text could be read to suit such a theory. If the bulk of the text can be interpreted according to such a theory we will be able to ignore the few instances that cannot be so interpreted. Although the initial formation

of such a theory is, ultimately, dependent on reading of the text itself, the final result will be a compromise between the two. A theory of this nature would serve as the criterion in determining whether or not early Buddhism accepts an ineffable position in its experience. If the text can be read consistently to render a 'transcendental' interpretation it would help establish that early Buddhism accepts ineffability of nirvāna. If it can be read to render an 'empirical' and 'naturalist' interpretation it would help establish that early Buddhism rejectss the ineffability of nirvāṇa. The decision depends on the degree of consistency and cogency of each interpretation.

In this regard, it would be worthwhile to mention that the early Buddhist literature allows an 'empiricist' interpretation more than it would allow a transcendental one. The fact that early Buddhism emerged as a reaction to the Brahmanic transcendentalism (belief in transcendental and ineffable Ātman and Brahman) and the presence therein of a marked empirical tendency could be cited as supporting such an interpretation. This could be further supported by the fact that early Buddhism had adopted a 'naturalist' attitude to language which was marked by the belief that language is a convention of the world and that it must be used with caution (*D.* I. p. 202)

This statement underscores the the belief that we can adopt a convention to talk about any of our experiences, nirvānic or otherwise. In a system where the existence of things is explained as causally conditioned *(paṭicca-samuppanna)* there cannot be room for an uncaused Transcendental. Therefore it seems that there is ample room in early Buddhism for a non-transcendental, non-ineffable and 'naturalist' interpretation of religious inter pretation. This brings us closer to the belief that early Buddhism does not accept an ineffable position in its religious experience.

Ineffability in Later Buddhism

Although it is true that early Buddhism did not develop a theory of transcendentalism around nirvāṇa, (or even around the Buddha for that matter), there is a sense in which nirvāṇa was considered 'transcendental'. The use of the term *lokanirodha* as another expression for nirvāṇa is a case in point. Here the term is understood not in a literal sense to mean the cessation of the world, but in a figurative sense to mean the transcendence of the world. There are also instances where the arahant is described as 'born in the world, living in the world, yet standing above the world'. The well-known lotus-like life of the arahant is understood in a similar sense. Nevertheless, this state cannot be described as transcendental in the regular sense for the early Buddhists did not consider this state to be beyond human cognition or language.

The Pali term which came to be used in the sense of beyond or transcending the world is *lokuttara*. It seems to be a coinage on the part of the Theravādins. Nevertheless, it is clear from Buddhaghosa's account of nirvāṇa in the *Visuddhimagga,* (PTS, pp. 506-9) that the Theravādins' belief in the transcendence of nirvāṇa did not require them to adopt a belief in ineffability. The reason may be that their idea of transcendence was not different from that of the early discourses.

This situation seems to have undergone some considerable changes towards the time of the Mahāyāna proper. The focus gets shifted from nirvāṇa to the absolute and transcendental nature of the Buddha and his teaching. The development of a form of transcendentalism around the personality of the Buddha can be seen in the *Lalitavistara* which is believed to be a text belonging to Sarvāstivādins. However, the culmination of this trend is seen in works like *Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra* which "seems to arrive at the ultimately incorruptible and eternal and all-pervading concept of Buddha" (D. J. Kalupahana. op. cit. p. 173). Along with the transcendental conception comes the idea that the Buddha transcends everything that is worldly including language.

In some of these later traditons, there is a popular belief that the Buddha did not even speak one single word. The *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* contains the following discussion:

> Again Mahāmati said: It is said by the Blessed One that from the night of the Enlightenment till the night of the Parinirvāṇa, the Tathāgata in the meantime has not uttered even a word, nor will ever utter; for not speaking is the Buddha's speaking. According to what deeper sense is it that not-speakig is the Buddha's speaking? The Blessed One replied: By reason of the two things of the deeper sense Mahāmati, this statement is made. What are the two thing: they are truth of self-realization and an eternally abiding reality. According to these two things of the deeper sense the statement is made by me (D.T. Suzuki. *The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra.* London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd. 1932/1973 pp. 123-4).

In the course of further explanation, it is stated tht "the realm of self-realization is free from words and discriminations, having nothing to do with dualistic terminology" (ibid. p. 124), and that the eternally abiding reality needs no explanation for it is there whether the Buddhas appear or not.

The above explanation of the Buddha's silence on the nature of the ultimate goal clearly shows how in the schools of Mahāyāna the difference between saṃsāra and nirvāṇa came to be understood: the former as dualistic, pluralistic and could be comprehended by language and the latter, as monistic, unitary and could not be comprehended by language. We cannot fail to notice the similarity of this situation with that of Hinduism where

an undifferentiated unity between Ātman and Brahman is upheld. In both systems, language has been understood as an obstacle which prevents us from gaining a direct insight into reality. Therefore language came to be described as *saṃvṛti* in the later schools of Buddhism. As B.K. Matilal *(Perception: An Essay on Critical Indian Theories of Knowledge* Oxford: Clarendon Press 1986, p. 310) says "the idea is not that we are supposed to be aware of occasional linguistic snares while doing philosophy; rather our entire language is a snare or a colossal maze that 'conceals' reality completely."

A more philosophical statement of this new trend is seen in Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā* (Dharbhanga: The Mithila Institute. 1960. p. 159) where *prapañca,* which, according to the Theravāda commentarial tradition, meant defilements in general, is taken to mean language. Once this interpretation got established, the Buddha came to be understood as 'one who transcends language' *(prapañcopaśama).* This development may well be understood as admitting into the Buddhist tradition a full-fledged theory of ineffability which was not available in early Buddhism.

As a general philosophical claim, the validity of the thesis of ineffability has been questioned on logical grounds. It is argued that if something is truly ineffable one cannot say anything about it including that it is ineffable for saying so too is saying *something* of it. However, in the present context we are not concerned with these logical aspects. What is significant in the present context is the fact that certain religionists claim that their experience is ineffable. This may well have been based on some misunderstanding of the nature of language, and, perhaps, even on a misunderstanding of the experience itself. Nevertheless, it is religiously significant that a particular experience has been characterized in that way. A positive conclusion emerging from this claim is the awareness of the limitations of the knowledge based on language in bringing about the ultimate goal. All major religions are in agreement in holding that we have to go beyond such knowledge to achieve the ultimate goal. At least in the early Buddhist tradition the transcendence of language-based knowledge does not mean that nirvāṇa is a state which cannot be described conceptually. What this seems to mean in the Buddhist tradition is that one has to achieve the goal by following the ethical path laid down by the Buddha which requires both knowledge and practice. In certain Zen Buddhist traditions, what is called 'koan' or short aphorisms may be understood as serving a similar purpose, namely, to direct one's mind to 'insight' *(vipassanā)* for which knowledge derived from language is only a necessary but not a sufficient condition.

Asanga Tilakaratne

INFERENCE. Two forms of inference have been generally recognized by the major philosophical traditions and philosophers. One starts with a universal proposition and moves on to a conclusion which refers to a particular, hence called deductive. The other begins with premises involving particulars and moves on to a universal statement; therefore claimed inductive reasoning. This movement, which is called to be based upon a logical implication, is what gives it the name inference (from Latin *in + ferre,* lit. "to ferry or carry over"). While the metaphysicians the world over depended mostly on the former in order to propound their theories modern scientists often rely upon the latter. The reason why science depended heavily on induction is because prediction was a major part of the scientific enterprise.

However, in modern Western philosophy, as a result of the development of essentialism starting with David Hume through Bertrand Russell, questions have been raised about the validity of inductive inference. According to Hume, if events are known through immediate sense impressions which are atomic and distinct, the relationship between two events is simply an imagination. If so induction cannot be the foundation of a valid form of knowing. Russell, who remained faithful to the Humean atomism, was therefore compelled to argue for the objectivity of both the relata and the relation while retaining their distinctiveness. The pursuit of the reality of a relation independent of the relata compelled Russell to rely heavily on logical analysis. This made him one of the founders of symbolic logic.

The Buddha, as an empiricist (*s.v.* art. EMPIRICISM), could not rely upon deductive inference, which, in the Indian context, was referred to as *tarka* (Pali, *takka*). According to him, deductive inference is unreliable because it focusses upon the form *(ākāra)*[1] to the neglect of the content. He therefore adopted inductive inference, but avoided the pitfalls the classical as well as modern essentialists ran into. He was able to do so because he was an empiricist of a different sort. In the first place, he explained experience in a non-essentialist way. Without assuming the object of experience to be given in an immediate atomic impression, he spoke of the conditions depending upon which an event occurs. This was his radical empiricism. The Buddha recognized related

1. M. I.170.

events rather than events and relations. In presenting such a description of experienced events, he was moving backward, that is, defining the effect in relation to the conditions or the context. For this he utilized one phrase "the dependently arisen" *(paticcasamuppanna)*. It is interesting to note that Ānanda, one of his constant companions, referring to this statement once remarked, "It is wondrous, Sir, it is unusual, Sir, that through one word all meaning would be expressed" *(ekena padena sabbo attho vutto bhavissati)*.[2]

Secondly, by describing a relation *(paccaya)* as part of experience, the Buddha was able to have more confidence regarding the nature of the relation itself than the essentialists, some of whom, as mentioned earlier, either denied it or sought different means of knowing it. The past experience of a relation is still not an absolutely foolproof condition for predicting the future. The Buddha therefore abandoned the hope of predicting something with absolute certainly, a hope that continues to keep the modern scientific enterprise energized. He remarked:

> Beings, dominated by prediction *(akkheyya)*, established upon prediction, not understanding prediction, come under the yoke of death. However, having understood prediction, one does not assume oneself to be a fore-teller. When such a thought does not occur to him, that by which he could be spoken, that does not exist for him.[3]

On the one hand, this is a staggering blow to the belief in absolute laws formulated in the predictive sciences or systems of thought. On the other hand, it is not a total rejection of prediction, as the essentialist Hume proposed, but an appeal to understand the nature, function and limitations of prediction and utilize it in a restrained and useful manner.

Thus, the processes of experience and induction are not sharply distinguished. It is significant to note that the Buddha refers to both of them as knowledge *(ñāṇa)*. The former is knowledge of dependently arisen phenomena *(paticcasamuppanna dhamma)* where the phenomenon is emphasized; hence called knowledge of phenomena *(dhamme ñāṇa)*.[4] The latter is knowledge of dependent arising *(paticcasamuppāda)* where dependence is highlighted; hence called inductive knowledge *(anvaya ñāṇa)*.[5] It is also noteworthy that the implications of the two phrases, the 'dependently arisen' and the 'dependent arising' are retained in the general formulation of the principle as "When that exists, this comes to be" *(imasmiṃ sati idaṃ hoti*[6] or *asmin satidam bhavati*[7]) where 'that' *(asau)* refers to the past and 'this' *(idam)* implies the present.

It is on the basis of the principle of dependent arising, which is grounded in experience, that the Buddha made inductive inferences into the obvious past and the future *(atītānāgate nayaṃ neti*.[8] Because of the limitations of inductive knowledge the Buddha was not committed to absolute predictability. In the absence of absolute predictability he was not willing to subscribe to or assert any absolute truths. He condemned those who argued that "This alone is true, anything else is false" *(idam eva saccaṃ mogham aññaṃ)* as empty-headed persons *(moghapurisā)*.[9] The principle obtained through induction is only a regularity, not an absolute law.

Inductive knowledge, referred to above, seems to have been distinguished from inference *(anumāna)* which came to be popular among the later Buddhist and Hindu epistemologists. There are only two references to *anumāna* in the early discourses, even though it became the key term for inference of any sort later on. The first and the most prominent is in the Discourse on Inference *(Anumāna-sutta)*, translated by Miss. I.B. Horner as "Discourse on Measuring in Accordance with."[10]

> Therein, your reverences, oneself ought to be measured *(anuminitabbaṃ)* by oneself thus. That person of evil desire and who is in the thrall of evil desires, that person is displeasing and disagreeable to me; and similarly, if I were to be of evil desire and in the thrall of evil desires, I should be displeasing and disagreeable to others.[11]

This measuring is an inference, drawing a deduction, making an evaluation or a calculation. It is a guessing game, more like the probability of induction in C.S. Peirce.[12]

2. S. 2.36
3. ibid., 1.11
4. ibid., 2.58
5. ibid.
6. M. 1.262-264; S 2.17, 20, 23.
7. Pratītyasamutpāda-sūtra in Epigraphia Indica, Delhi: Government of India, 1931, vol. 21, p. 197
8. ibid.
9. M. 1.169
10. The Middle Length Sayings, London: Pali Text Society, 1967, 1.124
11. M. 1.97
12. Philosophical Writings of Peirce, selected and edited by Justus Buchler, New York: Dover, 1955, pp. 174-179

The second is a rather terse statement where the passive verb *anumīyati* occurs:

> Whatever.... one leans on to, that is being measured; whatever is being measured, by that reckoning (or conceiving) takes place.[13]

The implication is that the measuring takes place not on the basis of experience or observation but in terms of one's leanings *(anusaya)* whether it be likes or dislikes.

Atomistic explanation of experience soon emerged in the Buddhist tradition giving rise to the very same epistemological problems that confronted modern Western essentialists. The Sarvāstivādins and the Sautrāntikas were the forerunners of this speculative enterprise.[14] The terms for experience and reason also had to be changed in order to reflect this new perspective. The term *pratyakṣa* (lit . "before the eye") replaced *dhamme ñāṇa,* and the term *anumāna* took the place of *anvaye ñāṇa.* The struggle to explain the relationship between two events continued in both traditions, the Buddhist and the non-Buddhist. The non-Buddhist philosophers, especially the logicians and the linguists, being compelled to respond to the atomism *(paramāṇuvāda)* of their own making (Vaiśeṣika) as well as of the Buddhist opponents (Sautrāntika), argued: "If we shall be able to show that the universal is real, then the apprehension of the characters (by which we determine objects of 'differentiating perception') will have these real universals for its objects, and will be perceptual apprehension because (they are) produced by (contact between) sense organ and the object."[15] Such as independent and strong universal becomes necessary only when the experienced event is deprived of its relational aspect. The recognition of this real universal is reflected in the syllogisms used by the Brahmanical logicians during the early period.

1. This mountain is fire-possessing (= demonstrandum)
2. because it is smoke-possessing (= justification)
3. as a kitchen (= positive example) and unlike a lake (= negative example)
4. this is so (that the mountain is smoke-possessing)
5. therefore that is so (that the mountain is fire-possessing).

While some of the Buddhist idealists like Asaṅga retained the five-step syllogism, we find the famous Vasubandhu, one of the first logicians in the Buddhist tradition, reducing it to three steps. They are as follows:

1. This mountain is fire-possessing (= demonstrandum)
2. because of its state-of-possessing-smoke and whenever there is a state-of-possessing-smoke there is a state-of-possessing fire (= justification)
3. as in a kitchen (= positive example) and unlike in a lake (= negative example).[16]

Scholars who have examined Vasubandhu's contribution to logic seem to have done so without paying attention to the theory of inference in early Buddhism. Thus, Stefan Anacker, who has studied Vasubandhu's philosophy in detail, believes that Vasubandhu dropped steps 4 and 5 of the syllogism because they were redundant.[17] This is actually not the case. The reason why Vasubandhu dropped them is because, as a faithful disciple of the Buddha, he could not accept the implication of the steps 4 and 5. We have already seen that the Buddha's description of the principle of dependent arising represents a movement from the past to the present, from that *(asau)* to this *(idam).* It is more likely that Vasubandhu was aware of the Buddha's view that any predictive statement cannot end up with a strong assertion: "This, therefore, that," becasue the inductive knowledge *(anvaye ñāṇa)* does not provide for such absolute certainty.

However, if the Buddhist is to make any valid reference into the future without the benefit of incorruptible univrsals he needs to ground himself in experience. Again steps 1 and 2 of the syllogism are too strong for him. Step 1 describes what is to be proved or demonstrated, that is, the mountain is fire-possessing. This fact is not given in experience. The justification for this inference may appear to be the perception of smoke. Yet, the justification does not allude to the fact that the inference is based on previously perceived relationship between fire and smoke which allows us to make the inference. Instead we have the assumption of a real universal betweeen fire and smoke. When Vasubandhu provided and extended the definition of step 2, he was trying to replace the real universal with a previously perceived relation between smoke and fire. In other words, he is attempting to ground the inference in past experience, leaving room for the possibility of the smoke being produced by other circumstances as well. As such, the validity of the inference is a possibility, not a certainty. The only way in which the inference could be rendered a certainty is by establishing the real universal through the insertion of a

13. S. 3.36-37. *Yaṃ kho..... anuseti, tam anumīyati, yaṃ anumīyati, tena saṅkhaṃ gacchati*
14. See my Buddhist Philosophy. A Historical Analysis, Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1976, pp. 100-104
15. Nyāya Kandali of Śrīdhara Miśra, quoted in H. N. Randle, Indian Logic in the Early Schools, (Indian edition), New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1976, p. 131
16. See Vādavidhi 5, translated by Stefan Anacker, Seven Works of Vasubandhu, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1984, p. 39
17. ibid., p. 31

contraposed universal. In that case, Vasubandhu's step 2 should read as follows:

2. because of its state-of-possessing-smoke, for whenever there is a state-of-possessing-smoke there is a state-of-possessing-fire (a universal) and whenever there is no state-of-possessing-fire there is no state-of-possessing-smoke (a contraposed universal).

Vasubandhu did not do so. Hence it is clear that Vasubandhu was primarily interested in retaining inferences of limited validity based upon the observation of related events without allowing room for that relation to be made an incorruptible universal.

Vasubandhu's immediate disciple, Dignāga, picked up the cue from his teacher and compiled his *magnum opus*, the Pramāṇasamuccaya, which not only made him the father of Indian logic but was also responsible for the unprecedented avalanche of philosophical treatises by his Brahmanical opponents who were threatened by it.

Dignāga noticed that the Buddhist traditon, beginning with the Buddha himself, recognized universal statements. For example, the Buddha asserted that "all dispositions are impermanent" *(sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā)*. [18] He also realized that such statements neither implied absolute and incorruptible universals nor did they serve as major premises of deductive arguments. They were generalizations with limited application based upon concrete experiences or were inductive inferences. Therefore, he proceeded to formulate a syllogism in order to explain the nature of such generalizations.

1. This is impermanent. (Statement of the object of proof).
2. This is a product. (Statement of reason)
3. Whatever is a product is impermanent. (A universal statement.)

This universal is confined to observed particulars that are related. Therefore it is limited in its applicability. With such limitations it cannot serve as the major premise of a deductive argument and provide for the sort of certainty that one generally expects from a deduction. However, knowing that his absolutist and essentialist adversaries were intent on regarding the universal to be incorruptible, he presented them with a way of achieving such incorruptibility. In that process he was actually undermining the very absolutist or essentialist enterprises. This is his famous theory of exclusion *(apoha)* presented as the fourth step of the above syllogism.

4. Whatever is not impermanent is not a product. (A contraposed (negative) universal statement.)

This, as we noted earlier, was not attempted by Vasubandhu. What it does to the universal statement is that it restricts the meanings of concepts to such an extent there is only a difference in terms but identity of meaning. In other words, the universal statement is reduced to a tautology, the term 'impermanent' is rendered identical in meaning with the term 'produced' and are constituents of a statement comparable to the statements, "All bachelors are unmarried men." or "All brothers are male siblings."

For Dignāga, experience *(pratyakṣa)* and inference *(anumāna)* are valid sources of knowledge *(pramāṇa)* as long as they are not expected to provide for certainty. The search for certainty destroys both experience and reason leaving us with one escape route, namely, transcendentalism, which, in its turn, signals the death of concepts, language and communication. This is the story of philosophy in the Western world immediately following Russell and (early) Wittgenstein and Buddhist thought after Dignāga.

D. J. Kalupahana

INFINITY. The idea of the infinite, as understood in Buddhism, could be expressed in several ways such as infinite life, infinite light, infinite time or absolutely as the endless and the beginningless. From a pragmatic point of view the ralisation of the beginning and, therefore, the endless nature of all phenomena in the ultimate sense could be called the realisation of the infinite. In *Mahāyāna* Buddhism this concept of the infinite is graphically expressed by the term *śūnyatā* meaning the great void. The more conservative term Nibbāna or Nirvāṇa implies the concept of infinity in the sense of the cessation of all dualities and resultant conflicts. Therefore the realisation of *Nirvāṇa* would be, as the Tantric Buddhists very often maintain, the realisation of the infinite nature of phenomena. It is seeing Nirvāṇa in saṃsāra. It is seeing the infinite in the finite. It is the realisation in one's own intuition, the state of non-duality *(advaita)*. Once this condition is attained the adept sees that there is no duality and, therefore, he sees the absence of any difference between two phenomena in the ultimate sense. For him the appearance of duality is only relative and this is the state wherein he transcends all illusion *(māyā)* or ignorance *(avidyā)*. All sounds, all forms, all tastes, all colours are to him various diversified concepts of the one infinite. In this sense the infinite could be 'split' into infinite aspects, thereby creating infinite dimensions and qualities. The world of relativity in which innumerable

18. Dh. 277

diversifications are found, is thus symbolic of the infinite possibilities that are found in the infinite.

The idea of infinite can be seen from two different angles as the one that seems to be endless and the one that seems to be complete. The idea of mathematical infinity could be cited as an example for the former type. For instance if we start the mathematical series of 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.... we can never conclude it since there is always the possibility of adding one more[1]. The only way to complete the series would be to wind up the effort with a zero from where the beginning was made. Here the zero stands as the sign of infinity prior to any division is made. This shows that the infinite itself could be divided infinitely and the only way to conclude this possibility of division is to come back to the starting point and to leave the infinite undisturbed.[2] This principle could be applied not only to mathematics but to any field. The fundamental fact which is hereby proved is that the infinite has within it infinite possibilities of division and, therefore, any effort to find a first beginning or an ultimate end of anything would be meainingless. Looking at the infinite from the other angle, namely that of completion, the circle could be cited as an example. As the circumference of a circle is complete, it too could be called infinite, for it has neither a beginning nor an end. This too shows the fundamental fact that the infinite becomes finite only when attempts are made to find a beginning somewhere.[3]

It is this idea of the infinite that runs through not only Gotama's teaching but also the whole of Indian philosophical tradition in general. The *Upaniṣads* understood this state as the impersonal Brahman whereas the Buddhists called it Buddhahood or Nirvāṇa[4] the differences between the two systems notwithstanding. However, one of the most fundamental differences between the two systems that needs reference here is that whereas according to the Upaniṣadic monism this concept is referred to as one without a second *(ekam eva advitīyam)* the Buddha understands it not as one but in a negative way as the state free from duality. However, in Śankara's Vedānta this monistic concept is replaced by the idea of non-duality *(advaita)* as in Buddhism.[5] The danger of describing the ultimate principle as one is obvious. In the first place it is self-contradictory to describe infinity as one, for the moment 'one' is talked of, division and separation are implied. Here it is not 'one without a second' but the absence of any division as one or as many. This shows that the idea of innumerability that is so frequently found in Indian religious literature has to be accounted for not as a sign of ignorance of mathematics on the part of the ancient Indians but as the result of the knowledge of this philosophical truth. And the deep significance attached to the sign *'bindu'* (O), as a symbol of the infinite, in Tantric Buddhism is also a result of this philosophical attitude

While the concept of infinity as the undifferentiated pure principle is thus granted, this infinity can be conceived in an infinite series of dimensions. The concept of time can be taken as an example. Thus, time, undivided into past, present and future, is also infinite. Events are marks or divisions in it. Eventless time, like signless space, is infinite. It is this idea of infinite time that is symbolised by the concept of the Buddha Amitāyus (infinite duration) in Mahāyāna. If light be taken instead of time the same principle is applied and the Buddha Amitābha is conceived as the Buddha of infinite lusture.[6]

The experience of infinity in the practical sense is the breaking down of all limitations and bondage and it was this unique experience that is taught in the realisation of Nirvāṇa or Buddhahood as the state free from dualities. Lama Anagarika Govinda *(Foundations of Tibetan Mysticism*, p. 24) observes: "There are many infinites as there are dimensions, as many forms of liberation as there are temperaments. But all bear the same stamp. Those who suffer from bondage and confinement, will experience

1. The idea of infinity in relation to this kind of relative concepts is discused in detail in *One, Two, Three.... Infinity* by George Garnow, Macmillan & Co. Ltd., London, 1962. For a collection of various methods of numercial computations as found in Buddhist literature; see William Montgomery McGovern, *A Manual of Buddhist Philosophy*, I, pp. 39 ff.).
2. But the tendency of any organism is to divide, split and to multiply. The overcoming of this tendency also could be described as the conquest of infinity.
3. This is why this existence is said to be without end or beginning *(anamatagga)* in Buddhism, (*S.* II, pp. 178, 187) and the speculative effort to find a beginning would lead only to insanity. The term *anamatagga*, which is, of course, misrepresented as ***anavarāgra*** in BSK., means of inconceived (—able) = *ana (like in anabhāva)* + *mata*=*agga* end.' The individual who realises this state would find both the beginning and the end of the universe in his own heart. It is for the same reason that phenomenal existence is depicted as a circle *(saṃsāra-cakra)*.
4. See the ***Kevaddha Sutta*** of the *Dīgha Nikāya* (I. 211 ff.) where the Buddha says that the four elements do not find a footing *(na gādhati)* in the mind of the saint who has realised Nirvāṇa, for his consciousness in invisible, infinite and all radiant *(viññāṇam anidassanaṃ anantaṃ sabbato pahbaṃ)*. Cp. also *Sn.* 1076 where he is said to be beyond measure and beyond description. See also *S,* IV, 376. These ideas easily gave rise to concepts like Amitābha in later Mahāyāna.
5. The Buddha is called the teacher of non-duality. *(advayavādin)*.
6. Compare also the Theravāda concepts of the Appamāṇābha (of infinite lustre) and Appamāṇasubha (of infinite goodness) gods. Buddhas and arahants are also referred to as having attained to the immeasurable *(appameyya)*. See the ***Appameyya Sutta*** of the Aṅguttara Nikāya (I, 266). The four *brahma-vihāras* (s.v.) are also called the boundless states *(appamāṇā)*.

liberation as infinite expansion. Those who suffer from darkness, will experience it as light unbounded. Those who groan under the weight of death and transitoriness, will feel it as eternity. Those who are restless, will enjoy it as peace and infinite harmony. Thus the experience of infinity was expressed by the early *Vedas* in terms of cosmology, by the *Brāhmaṇas* in terms of magic ritual, in the *Upaniṣads* is terms of idealistic monism, in Jainism in terms of biology, in Buddhism in terms of psychology (based on the experiences of meditation), in Vedantism in terms of metaphysics, in Vaishnavism in terms of *bhakti* (mystic love and devotion), in Shaivism in terms of 'non-duality' *(advaita)* and asceticism, in the Hindu *Tantras* in terms of female creative *śakti* of the universe, and in Buddhist Tantrism in terms of the transformation of psycho-cosmic forces and phenomena, by penetrating them with the light of transcendental knowledge *(prajñā)*."

A. G. S. Kariyawasam

INSIGHT, is explained as originally meaning internal sight, i.e. sight with the eyes of the mind, but subsequently analysed as sight or seeing into a thing or subject. It is occasionally used also as understanding, and wisdom. Among the main meanings listed are the following: 1. internal sight, mental vision or perception, 2. glimpse or view beneath the surface, the faculty or power of thus seeing, 3, mental looking *to* or *upon* something *(The Shorter Oxf. Eng. Dictionary*, 3rd ed.).

Herein, too the term insight is considered in these senses with greater emphasis on its penetrative quality. However, it should be borne in mind that there is yet another important qualification added to this. Here it is considered purely in relation to its soteriological function, i.e. only as far as it pertains to final release *(vimutti)*.

A number of terms are quite often used in Buddhist literature to connote this sense. The terms that occur frequently in Pali Buddhist literature (often with their parallels occurring in Sanskrit Buddhist literature) are *abhisamaya, abhiññā, aññā, dassana, ñāṇa, paññā, vijjā and vipassanā* [1] connoting the sense of insight either in their extended meanings or in one of their numerous shades of meanings. Besides these, such terms as *cakkhu* (eye) and *āloka* (light) are also used in a metaphorical sense to convey the same meaning.

Insight in Buddhist terminology means sight into things as they are *(yathābhūta:* literally 'as they have come into being'), and hence, its content is knowledge resulting from seeing things as they are *(yathabhūta-ñāṇa)*. Thus, insight is not knowledge in the general sense, but penetrative knowledge acquired as a result of not looking *at* but looking *through* things. What is meant by 'things'? Things are all phenomena, all sensory objects, all forms we see, all sounds we hear, all smells we smell, all flavours we taste, all objects we touch and ideas we cognize. Seeing these things as they are means seeing them in their true nature, seeing them not merely in the way they appear, but in the way they really are. i.e. understanding them as being impermanent, *(anicca)*, unsatisfactory *(dukkha)* and without an enduring entity or essence *(anattā)*. All that is impermanent, unsatisfactory and without an enduring entity is subject to rise *(udaya)* and cessiation *(atthagama, vaya)*, and hence the power of insight *(paññābala)* is explained as sight into the arising and ceasing *(udayatthagāmihiya)* of things (*A.* III, p. 2), and further described as the ariyan penatration which leads to the total elimination of unsatisfactoriness *(ariyāya nibbedhikāya sammādukkhakkhayagāminiyā....* ibid.) From this it becomes evident that insight is the profound understanding regarding the Four Noble Truths *(catu-ariyasacca)*, namely unsatisfactoriness *(dukkha)* the cause of this unsatisfactoriness *(samudaya)*, the cessation of this unsatisfactoriness *(nirodha)* and the path leading there-to *(magga)*. The Buddha's first discourse *(Dhamma-cakkappavattna Sutta)* itself makes it clear that this is what is meant by insight. A number of suttas in the *Saṃyutta-nikāya* specifically explain insight in this sense (*S.* II, p. 4; IV, p. 256; V, p. 429). The *Kiṃsuka Sutta* (*S.* IV, p. 191 f.) states this same fact differently. One of the explanations given therein is that insight becomes fully purified when one understands the fact that whatever is of the nature of coming into being is also of the nature of ceasing to be *(Yaṃ kiñci sumudaya-dhammaṃ sabbaṃ taṃ nirodhadhammaṃ)*. This however, marks that first or initial stage of insight and is referred to by the name of *dhammacakkhu* (q.v.) or insight or vision into truth. This explanation succinctly sums up the content of the knowledge gained on seeing things as they are *(yathābhūtañāṇa)*.

Though this fact, that whatever is of the nature of coming into being is also of the nature of ceasing to be, is a universally applicable law, those who gain insight into it are few and far between. The worldlings are for the most part of unwise reflection *(ayonisomanasikāra)*, and hence, their sight gets clouded by ignorance *(avijjā)*. Ignorance means lack of insight, and according to Buddhism it is the primary cause that binds man to the conditioned existence of saṃsāra. Release from this bondage could be had only by dispelling ignorance through the acquisition of insight into the nature of things.

1. These terms are treated separately

Buddhist texts show also that unwise-reflection *(ayonisomanasikāra)* is the cause of increase of the five impediments *(pañcanīvaraṇa: S. V,* pp. 64, 102 f.) which weaken knowledge *(paññāya dubbalīkaraṇa : M.* I, pp. 181, 270, 276, 521) leading to insight. When overwhelmed by ignorance and these impediments, one's perception *(saññā),* consciousness *(citta)* and views *(diṭṭhi)* get perverted by the four depravities *(vipallāsa).* Consequently, one regards what is impermanent *(anicca)* as permanent *(nicca),* what is unsatisfactory *(dukkha)* as satisfactory *(sukha),* what is devoid of an abiding entity *(anattā)* as being with an entity *(atta)* and what is foul *(asubha)* as fair *(subha: A,* II, p. 52). Misled by these depravities one regards the five aggregates, which constitute all physical and mental phenomena of existence, as one's ego. This emergence of the personality view *(sakkāya-diṭṭhi)* gives rise to lust *(taṇhā),* conceit *(māna)* and biassed view *(diṭṭhi),* which further warp and distort one's perception.

To free oneself from this web of ignorance one has to gain insight, one has to replace false-view *(micchā-diṭṭhi)* by right-view *(sammā-diṭṭhi).* [2] The theoretical content of *sammādiṭṭhi* or right-view is no doubt embodied in the Dhamma. Therefore, the disciple who is genuinely interested in the attainment of his goal takes to the study of the Dhamma (*M.* I, p. 134).[3]

By wisely reflecting on the Dhamma one gradually comprehends the law of Dependent Origination *(paṭicca-samuppāda* q.v.). When one's understanding of this law grows one's perspective undergoes a change enabling one to avoid entanglement in false views and speculative therories that force one to lean on either of the two extreme views, namely that everything is *(atthi)* or that everything is not *(natthi).*[4] With the comprehension of this law one abandons both these extremes and gains insight into the fact that there is only coming into being *(uppāda)* and ceasing to be *(vaya)* of all phenomena.

In the *Kīṭāgiri Sutta (M.* I, p. 479-80) it is clearly stated that such insight *(aññā)* cannot be had all at once. It may be that one occasionally gets a flash of insight into the impermanence of all phenomena. Generally such flashes of insight are mere intellectual experiences and as such not powerful enough to burn all cankers *(āsava)* born out of one's cumulative experiences in *saṃsāra.* A person gaining such flashes of purely intellectual experiences is aptly compared to a thirsty person stranded in a desert path, who sees a well but finds no rope or drawer of water and hence, finds himself not in a position to touch water physically (*S.* II, p. 118).

For insight to be goal-oriented one should, without directing one's exertion on purely intellectual lines, strive spiritually too, thus bringing about also one's moral culture, for moral culture is nothing but a practical expression of one's right understanding. The *Mahāvedalla Sutta (M.* I, 294 f.) cites moral culture *(sīla)* as one of the five conditions necessary for the proper development of insight. The *Soṇadaṇḍa Sutta* (*D.* I, p. 124) specifically states that moral culture *(sīla)* and knowledge *(paññā)* go hand in hand (cf. also *A.* I, p. 102; III, p. 19). *Cūḷasāropama Sutta* (*M.* I, p. 200 f.) enumerates moral culture *(sīla),* concentraiton *(samādhi)* and knowledge *(paññā)* as the factors constituting the path leading to the attainment of insight. This path is none other than the Noble Eight-fold Path *(ariya-aṭṭhaṅgikamagga)* which provides the necessary scheme of mental and physical training, treading which one is able to free the mind of cankers, thus enabling one to clarify one's vision, tearing asunder the veil of ignorance *(avijjā).*

However, there are no short-cuts on this path, and as stated above, the Buddha does not say that insight could be had all at once. Though the moment of culmination of insight may occur suddenly the process leading to it is a gradual one, and hence described as a gradual training *(anupubba-sikkhā),* gradual-doing *(anupubba-kiriyā)* and gradual-practice *(amupubba-paṭipadā).*

The *Kīṭāgiri Sutta (M.* I, p. 479 f.) describes how one treading this graduated path gains insight. This succinct account says how one who has faith *(saddhā)* approaches a teacher, listens to the Dhamma, bears it in mind, examines and approves it; how there being approval of the dhamma desire arises to exert oneself, to go deep into the dhamma and realize the highest truth *(saccaṃ sacchikaroti)* and gain insight into it by having penetrated with his wisdom *(paññāya ca naṃ ativijjha passati).* The *Cahkī Sutta (M.* II, p. 174) further elaborates this explanasion by detailing the stages in this process of verfication of the truth. The *Gaṇakamoggallāna Sutta*

2. Right-view is regularised vision obtained through correct knowledge *(sammā-paññā: S.* II, p. 17); as the *Saṃyutta-nikāya* (III, p. 51; iv, p. 142) explains right-view is seeing impermanence of all phenomena. This is also clear from the *Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna Sutta (D.* III, p. 311)

3. According to the *Mahāvedalla Sutta (M.* I, p. 294) *sammā-diṭṭhi* is also said to have its origin both in correct-reflection *(yonisomanasikāra)* on the part of oneself and instruction received from others *(parato ghosa).* This Sutta further states that right-view when assisted by moral conduct *(sīla),* learning *(suta),* discussion *(sākacchā), tranquillty (samatha)* and penetrative insight *(vipassanā)* leads to the fruit of freedom of mind *(cetovmuttiphala)* and the advantage thereof and also to the fruit of freedom through knowledge *(paññāvimuttiphala)* and the advantage thereof.

4. *Dvayanissito khvāyaṃ Kaccāyana loko yebhuyyena atthitañ ca natthitañ ca : sabbam atthīti kho Kaccāyana ayaṃ eko anto sabbam natthīti ayaṃ dutiyo anto, ete te Kaccāyana ubho ante anupagamma majjhena Tathāgato dhammaṃ deseti : S.* II, p. 17.

(M. III, p. 1 ff.) gives a still further account elaborating on both the intellectual and ethical aspects of this path. However, it is made quite clear that the existence of the path and even the presence of a competent teacher does not guarantee that all will gain insight, for insight in the final analysis, is solely due to one's own personal effort and has to be had personally. One should have sincerity of purpose, mental capacity, dedication and ability to follow properly the instruction (cf. *M.* II, p. 44; III, p. 4 f.); and it appears that the time taken to gain insight depends purely on these personal aptitudes and capabilities.[5]

Suttas such as *Kīṭāgiri* show how 'treading this graduated course one converts faith *(saddhā)* into insight *(paññā)*. The first sign of falling into the proper track leading to insight is seen when one, after thorough investigation, gets convinced of the truth embodied in the Dhamma. Many suttas describe, in a stereotyped way, this initial bent towards the Dhamma. The following passage describes how a brahman named Piṅgalakoccha drew closer to the Dhamma when the latter grasped what the Buddha said! "It is wonderful good Gotama, it is wonderful. It is as if good Gotama one might set upright what has been upset or disclose what has been covered, or might point the way to one who has gone astray or might bring an oil lamp into the darkness so that those with eyes might see material forms; even so is Dhamma made clear in numerous ways...." (*M.* I. p. 205).

To proceed from the initial sage one has to bring about simultaneously mental and moral culture, and gradually wean the mind of defilements which constitute emotional factors as well as mental and physical lassitude that prevent the mind from being concentrated. Concentration of the mind is important for, according to Buddhism, insight results from mental concentration. The *Saṃyutta-nikāya* (II, p. 30) says that concentration is the causal factor *(upanisā)* of insight *(yathābhūtañāṇa)*. This is further emphasised in the *Aṅguttara-nikāya* (III, pp. 19, 200) where it is said, "...... in the absence of right mental concentration and in the case of one not endowed with right mental concentration the cause is absent (for the production of) the knowledge and insight of things as they really are." The five impediments *(pañcanīvaraṇa)* that prevent the mind from getting concetrated, too are, therefore, listed as causes for the lack of knowledge and insight (*S.* VI, p. 126 f.)[6] The operational process shows that when these defilements are eliminated the mind becomes fit for concentration. But as the Aṅguttara-nikāya (I, p. 254 f.) shows the defilements that have to be got rid of by one who is engaged in developing the higher mind *(adhicitta)* are said to be threefold, as gross *(oḷārika)*, medium *(majjhimaka)* and subtle *(sukhuma)*. The gross defilements consist of misconduct with regard to body, speech and mind *(kāya-duccarita, vacī-d⁰, mano-d⁰)*; the medium are sensuous thoughts *(kāmavitakka)*, thoughts of ill-will *(vyāpada-v⁰)* and thoughts or cruelty *(vihiṃsā-v⁰)* and the subtle consist of attachment to one's race *(jāti)*, country *(janapada)* and egotism, superciliousness or arrogance *(avaññatti)*. When these are got rid of righteous thoughts *(dhamma-vitakka)* only remain, and the mind becomes fixed within *(cittaṃ ajjhattaṃ santitthati)*. Thus it is clear that to gain concentration both the impediments that weaken wisdom and the defilements that obstruct ethical growth have to be flushed out of the mind. When this is accomplished and the mind is raised to a high pitch of development making it supple, pliant, steady, unperturbed (*D.* I, p. 76) and lustrous, and when it is concentrated for the destruction of the defiling impulses (*A.* III, p. 16 f.), and attaining supreme perfection of equanimity and mindfulness (*M.* I, p. 367), it becomes possible to have clearer insight into the nature of things. This high pitch of development of the mind which is marked by these characteristics is generally referred to as the fourth jhanic stage. But it does not, however, mean that one who is engaged in developing the higher mind in order to gain insight should necessarily go through the whole jhanic process in order to achieve the goal.[7]

When one has attained this high state of mind culture, one's mind, just as a clean cloth without stains takes dye easily, becomes receptive to higher teachings i.e. teachings regarding the Four Noble Truths (*M.* I, p. 480; *Vin.* I, p. 16). This basic understanding of the Four Noble Truths brings about a marked break from the normal line of thinking and perception, and thenceforth one begins to see things in their true nature as *anicca, dukkha* and *anatta.* The impact of this new vision is so profound that the Buddha generally compares it to the case of a congenitally blind man who, as soon as he gains eyesight, becomes disillusioned about the greasy, grey cloth which has been passed on to him as a beautiful, speckless piece of cloth (*M.* I, p. 511). The pervasiveness of this vision is succinctly described in the texts, once again in a stereotyped passage which runs as follows "as a clear cloth without black speckles will easily take dye, even, so while the householder .... was *(sitting)* there on the very

5. Those who gain insight are broadly divided into two categories i. those of quick-insight *(khippa-abhiññā)* and ii. those of sluggish-insight *(dandha-abhiññā* : *A.* II, p. 149).
6. Seven *bojjhaṅgas* are listed as causes for the arising of insight (*S.* V, p. 126). See also BOJJHANGA.
7. Texts refer to "dry-visioned" *(sukkha-vipassaka)* ones whom the commentaries (*SA.* II, p. 127) describe as those having little use of *jhānas (nijjhānaka)* in gaining insight.

seat Dhamma-vision *(Dhamma-cakkhu)*[8] dustless, stainless, arose in him: whatever is of the nature of coming into being is also of the nature of ceasing to be. The householder.... being one who has seen the Dhamma *(diṭṭha-dhamma)*, attained the dhamma *(patta-dhamma)*, known the dhamma *(vidita-dhamma)*. plunged into the dhamma *(pariyogāḷa-dhamma)*, who has crossed over doubt, put away uncertainty..... (*M.* I, p. 380; *D.* I, p. 110. *Vin.* I, p. 12). But this attainment of insight into the true nature of things *(yathābhūta-ñāṇa)* or *yathābhūtañāṇa-dassana)* is only a means and not the end itself, for even such a profound vision is not powerful enough to destroy all cankers *(āsava)* without leaving any residue. However, once insight into the true nature of things is attained the end is assured for it is said, a person in the satate of meditative concentration knows and sees what really is. A person who sees thus does not need to make any effort of will *(na cetanāya karaṇīyaṃ)* to feel disinterested and renounce, for it is the nature of things *(dhammatā esā)* that he who sees thus feels disinterested; similarly one who has renounced does not need an effort of will to gain knowledge and insight of emancipation *(vimuttiñāṇadassana)*. It too follows in the natural sequence (*A.* V, pp. 3, 313).

What is really meant here is that once a person has reached the *dhammacakkhu* stage in the path of realisation of true nature of things, he is bound to proceed to attain final release by further sharpening his insight until it becomes powerful enough to destroy all cankers completely. Earliest textual evidence suggests that this is accomplished by further reviewing the stage of insight one has already reached by "thus seeing and thus knowing" *(yathādiṭṭhaṃ yathāviditaṃ bhūmiṃ paccavakkhantassa:* Vin. I, p. 17). Subsequent canonical descriptions of this process of spiritual progress explain step by step how one who has reached the fourth jhanic stage obtains the threefold knowledge *(tisso vijja)* that constitutes the attainment of insight leading to final release. It is said that, when the mind has reached the fourth jhānic stage one could direct it to obtain knowledge and insight *(ñāṇadassanāya abhinīharati abhininnāmeti)*. The three types of knowledge acquired for this purpose are (i) insight into one's manifold past existences *(pubbenivasānussati ñāṇa)* (ii) insight into decease and rebirth of beings *(sattānaṃ cutūpapātañāṇa)* and (iii) insight leading to the destruction of cankers *(āsavānaṃ khayañāṇa)*.

It can be reasonably presumed that by the time of the attainment of the fourth jhāna one has acquired a thorough understanding of the Four Noble Truths. The three knowledges *(tisso vijja)* are utilized to personally verify this understanding, and internalize the truth. Insight into one's manifold past lives *(pubbenivasānussati-ñāṇa)* and insight into decease and rebirth of others *(sattānaṃ cutūpapātañāṇa)* enable one to realize personally *(sāmaṃ)* that one oneself as well as others are subject to birth and death in accord with one's karma. Once this is thoroughly understood, one directs one's mind to gain insight into the destruction of cankers *(āsavakkhayañāṇa)* i.e. insight insight into the Four Noble Truths and to its corollary that there are cankers *(āsava)*, the cause of the cankers, cessation of cankers and the path leading thereto. Knowing thus and seeing thus, i.e. gaining insight into it, one's mind gets freed from cankers of sense pleasures *(kāmāsava)* cankers of becoming *(bhavāsava)* and cankers of ignorance *(avijjāsava)*. This in fact is the highest point or culmination of insight, for when perceived with this insight, already strengthened and thoroughly clasified by the personal verification of the truth that everything is subject to birth and death, and therefore, impermanent *(anicca)*, unsatisfactory *(dukkha)* and devoid of an abiding entity *(anatta)*, all cankers that persist due to the false belief in a permanent entity or self *(attā)* get completely destroyed *(paññāya c'assa disvā āsavā parikkhīṇā honti:* cf. *M.* I, pp. 175, 204, 477 f.).

The attainment of this state of insight is in other words the attainment of final release. As soon as all cankers are thus destroyed one obtains a sort of retrospective vision of this final release and this is referred to as the *vimuttiñāṇadassana.*[9] The canonical texts contain two stereotyped passages describing the content of this retrospective vision. One of these runs as follow: "There arose in me the knowledge and insight *(ñāṇadassana)* that my emancipation is unshakable, that this is the last birth and that there is no further birth."[10] The other is as follows: "When this is released there arose in him the knowledge" that he is 'released'. And he knows, Rebirth has been destroyed; the higher spiritual life has been fulfilled; what had to be done has been accomplished; and there is nothing further for this condition." The *Cūlasaccaka Sutta (M.* I, p. 235) says that a monk with his mind freed thus, becomes possessed of three superior attainments - things which are not excelled by anything else: insight which is not excelled by anything else *(dassanānuttariya)*;

8. *Dhammacakkhu* connotes either the path of *sotāpatti* (stream winner), *sakadāgāmi* (once-returner) or *anāgāmi* (non-returner: *VinA.* V, p. 971). See further DHAMMA-CAKKHU. *Vin.* I, p. 17 refers to this stage of insight as learner's stage of insight and knowledge *(sekha-ñāṇa, sekha-dassana)*.
9. Commentaries define this on *paccavekkhanāñāṇa*, retrospective insight or knowledge (*MA.* I, p. 127; cf. *AA.* V, p. 1).
10. *Ñāṇañca pana me dassanaṃ udapādi : Akuppā me vimutti, ayam-antimā jati, natthidāni punabbhavo ti.*

of the Path *(patipadānuttariya)* and freedom *(vimuttā-nuttariya)*.

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INSTANT AWAKENING. The question, whether the attainment of enlightenment is instantaneous or gradual, did not arise in early Buddhism. Pali Buddhist texts seem to suggest that though the actual attainment of enlightenment is instantaneous it really is the result of a gradual training pursued through ages. This question gained importance in Mahāyāna Buddhism and it is discussed in such texts as the *Gandvyūha* and the *Lahkāvatāra Sūtra* (see *EncyBsm,* I, pp. 139 f.; H. Dumoulin, *A History of Zen Buddhism,* London, 1963, p. 48). These textual references show that while some held that the attainment of enlightenment is instantaneous, others regarded it as gradual.

It is this distinction that led to the establishment of two different schools of Ch'an Buddhism, one preaching instant-awakening and the other preaching gradual-awakening. The former was founded by Hui-neng and it is called the Southern School of Ch'an Buddhism. The latter was founded by his contemporary Hsen-hsui and it is known as the Northern School of Ch'an Buddhism. These two schools of Ch'an Buddhism spread into Japan, too and are known as Rinzai and Soto respectively. See ABRUPT DOCTRINE.

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INSTINCTS, the innate tendencies that propel living beings to act and behave in a particular way. Being innate tendencies they are not based on reason and logic but on natural or inherited impulses or inner drives which are extremely complex both in their variety and in type. When one attempts to understand instinct from the point of view of Buddhist psychology one has to enter the field of ethics. This has to be understood in the light of the Buddhist theory of *kamma* and ignorance *(avijjā)*, or, in general, it is a problem that can be clearly understood in the light of the Buddha's teaching of causality. Buddhism teaches that there are certain causes and conditions according to which the individual passes from birth to birth. Unskilled kind of activity *(akusalakamma)* increases the burden and the suffering of the individual whereas skilled kind of activity *(kusalakamma)* conduces to the alleviation of one's suffering and the easing of the burden. One path leads to downfall and degeneration and the other to freedom and enlightenment.

Death and rebirth are two stages in this process. Nibbāna or the unconditioned is the state of release from this unending process. Until and unless this state of release is achieved every individual is subject to this process of change and evolution. And the term instinct indicates certain tendencies that make people behave in a particular manner. According to the Buddhist theory of kamma, an individual's behaviour is conditioned by kamma and the theory of cause and effect, and the type of kamma that a person had been accumulating in the past conditions his present condition and his behaviour depends on the nature of this present birth. Therefore, his inherited kamma, combined with many other factors such as the natural laws *(niyāma-dhamma)* and the environment in which he was born and bred, will be responsible for his instinctive behaviour. When morally considered, these instincts that he has inherited from his past can be either wholesome *(kusala)* or unwholesome *(akusala)*. Thus considered the character of an individual could be said to depend on the type of instincts that may be predominant in a person and also on the way in which he exercises them. A person whose kamma is wholesome *(kusala)* would exercise his instincts usefully whereas one of unwholesome kamma would exercise his instincts in the opposite way. The path of training taught in Buddhism teaches how to oversome the evil tendencies of one's instincts so that one can divert the course of one's life on the correct path. While the proper functioning of the instincts is necessary for the continuation and preservation of life, it is their undisciplined exercise that has to be avoided if the individual were to lead a useful life. If the instinct of hunger were to be taken as an example we know that it is such an important instinct in life that no form of life can continue without satisfying it. But the satisfaction of this instinct needs much discipline without which one would be unable to maintain physical and mental health. This applies to all the the instinctive needs of life and it is their restraint that is needed if one were to lead a useful life. In the ultimate analysis the need to continue living is the most fundamental of all the instincts and all the other instincts are various aspects of this fundamental instinct. What is taught by the all-important form *sīla* or morality in Buddhism is the proper exercise of these instincts leading to freedom and knowledge. And it is also important to note that this tendency for the achievement of freedom and knowledge is also an instinct. It is when propelled by this instinctive urge that geniuses work towards their goal with perserving effort as Gotama himself did. Such men see this state of release

11. *Vimuttasmiṃ vimuttam iti ñāṇam hoti, khiṇā jāti vusitaṃ bramacariyaṃ kataṃ karaṇīyaṃ nāparam itthattāyāti* pajānāti.

and knowledge, called Nibbāna or *bodhi* in Buddhism, through their intuition, which is another term for instinctive knowledge. The total removal of ignorance as taught in Buddhism would lead to the complete re-discovery of this unconditioned state or for complete self-realisation and the ability or the inability of a praticular individual to achieve this end, which would be instinctively felt, depends on one's kamma, the working of which one has to understand, and manipulate his life in such a way so that the end may be realised.

A. G. S. Kariyawasam

INTENTION. See CETANĀ.

INTROSPECTION, the observation by an individual of his own mental processes and hence it could be defined as systematic self-observation. When the states of our consciousness *(cetasika)* become the object of our own consciousness *(viññāṇa)* the phenomenon could be called introspection. This tendency of the mind to look at its own working, as a natural phenomenon of the human mind, is designated as *mano-viññāṇa* or mind-consciousness in the Buddhist analysis of mind. Being conditioned thorugh the sub-conscious mind *(bhavaṅga-mana)*, the mind object *(dhamma)* and the accompanied attention *(manasikāra)*, this mind-consciousness arises: (*Vism.* XV, section 39). In this analysis this mind-consciousness is merely a natural phenomenon as a particular characteristic of the thought process and if it be designated as introspection it has to be understood in that sense. But introspection in the sense of the investigation of one's own mind for the particular purpose of discovering what is happening there, although can be called *manoviññāṇa* in a sense, is really an aspect of *bhāvanā* or mental development wherein one investigates one's own mind, finds out how it works and, on the basis of the law of casuality *(paṭiccasamuppāda)* one directs the working of the mind in the way one wants. In Buddhist physchology this mental exercise is found incorporated in right effort or *sammā-vāyāma,* a process through which certain states of consciousness which are unskilled and unprofitable *(akusala)* are eliminated so that skilled and profitable states *(kusala)* might take their place. In this sense introspection actually becomes restrospection, for in the temporal sense, it is the past that is investigated. When this kind of introspective mental exercise with cleansing the mind as its aim progresses, the practiser is said to come to a stage wherein his mind would develop extra-sensory forms of perception *(abhiññā)*. This exercise may be called that of developing the higher mind *(adhicitta)* and the theory behind the practice, as it was practically demonstrated by the Buddha, was that when the mind is cleansed of its impurities *(citte parisuddhe pariyodāte: D.* I, 76) it becomes enlightened so that light dawns[1] and things are seen in their true nature *(yathābhūta)*. Herein lies the epistemological value of introspection. The Buddha's struggle for six years was mainly based on this kind of introspective psychological war wherein he waged a victorious war over the evil tendencies of the human mind. Hence the purpose of introspection in Buddhism is to purify the mind so that its true nature is discovered by removing the veil of ignorance that prevents it from seeing the true nature of things.[2]

A. G. S. Kariyawasam

INTUITION or intuitive knowledge *(abhiññā, vijjā, vipassanā, paññā* etc.) is the direct and immediate knowledge of things obtained without the external aids of reasoning and logic.[1] From the Buddhist point of view the practical realisation or the experience of ultimate reality, consisting of enlightenment and release, is possible only through intuition.[2] While normal sense-perception

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1. Compare the Buddha's claim in his first discourse that on the realisation of truth, light *(āloka)* dawned upon him concerning things not learnt before (*S.* V, 422).

2. Introspection *(manoviññāṇa)* could become an obsession *(papañca)* if the mind and its meeting with the mental objects *(dhamma)* are not properly analysed and understood as explained in the *Madhupiṇḍikasutta (M.* I. 108-14) and it is the overcoming of such obsessions that is expected to be achieved by meditation *(bhāvanā)* leading to knowledge and insight.

1. It is intuition as a general concept that is discussed in this essay. For different types of intuitive kowledge as taught in Buddhism see ABHIÑÑĀ.

2. In this respect see Sir Charles Eliot's observation on Indian religion; "India's greatest contribution to religion is not intellectual as the mass of commentaries and arguments produced by Hindus might lead us to imagine, but the persistent and almost unchallenged belief in the reality and bliss of certain spiritual states which involve intuition". *Hinduism and Buddhism,* I, xcix.

is not able to confer this saving knowledge of the true nature of all phenomena *(yathābhūtañānadassana* or *vimuttiñāṇadassana)* neither logic nor reasoning can grant it. It has to be intuitively realised and that only by the wise *(dhammo atakkavacaro paṇḍitavedanīyo M.* I. p. 167). The use of the term *vedanīya* in this phrase as well as the term ***veditabba*** in the phrase *paccattaṃ veditabbo* ***viññūhi,*** expressing the same sense as the earlier phrase, is significant for the idea under discussion. The term expresses the idea of practical experience as distinct from intellectual understanding through reasoning and logic. Acquisition of knowledge from external sources such as normal sense perception, from scriptures etc. is not the same as the experience of truth leading to release of mind ***(cetovimutti).*** In this sense this latter kind of knowledge could be called extra-sensory and paranormal *(atik-***kanta-mānusaka).**

Knowledge cannot have genuine value unless it releases man from ignorance *(avijjā)*. Accumulation of knowledge would be a mere burden if it is devoid of this practical value. Hence attachment to theories *(diṭṭhi q.v.)* is deprecated in Buddhism. The validity of theories has to be practically demonstrated.

Intuitive realisation and experience of knowledge and release are an ability inherent in all beings but found in varying degrees among individuals. In some people it may be atrophied and in some capable of expressing itself. It is covered by the darkness of ignorance and only those who have less dust in themselves ***(apparajakkha)*** can develop it leading to the dawn of the intuitive eye of wisdom ***(ñāṇa-cakkhu).*** This ability of the human mind is generally called *upanissaya* in the Theravāda tradition and *bodhicitta* in the *Mahāyāna* tradition. People in whom this faculty is capable of full development are generally designated as geniuses whose privilege seems to be their ability to see the goal by intuition so that they may work towards it. Religious teachers and philosophers who have been moral and intellectual guides in the world are the historical examples for this phenomenon. In the case of Gautama Buddha this intuitive urge which led him to his great achievement is clearly seen from his career and achievements. And when he realised the saving knowledge and released himself he did so intuitively. For it is well-known that after exhausting all systems of religious training that were prevalent in India at the time he gave up the habit of seeking the help of others and decided to be his own guide, and accordingly, he followed his intuitive urge and achieved success. Hence he is given the epithet self-made *(svayambhū).*

It is an admitted fact in Buddhism that even if one were able to achieve this intuitive realisation, all are not capable of putting it across to others logically and consistently. Hence is found the concept of pacceka-buddha as distinguished from sammā-sambuddha. Thus the value of logic and reasoning assumes importance in this respect. Unless the rational features of the mind are also developed along with the intutive knowledge, full enlightenment cannot be granted. In this respect S. Radakrishnan *(Indian Philosophy,* I, p. 179) observes: "Intellect need not be negated but has only to be supplemented. A philosophy based on intuition can throw light on the dark places which intellect is not able to penetrate. The results of mystic intuition require to be subjected to logical analysis. And it is only by this process of mutal correction and supplementation that each can live a sober life. The results of intellect will be dull and empty, unfinished and fragmentary without the help of intuition — while intuitional insight will be blind and dumb, dark and strange, without intellectual confirmation."

It took a very long time of training and perseverance for Gautama Buddha to realise the Four Noble Truths and the causal law governing all phenomena. Although the dawn of truth is depicted to have occurred suddenly it had a very long period of preparation in which intuition led the way and meditation and introspection played a key role.[3]

T. R. V. Mūrti *(The Central Philosophy of Buddhism,* Chapter 8) offers us a useful discussion on the concept of *prajñā* in Buddhism as intuition. He observes: "Non-dual knowledge is contentless intuition. Nothing stands out against it as another confronting it. It is thus always described as *advaya* (non-dual), ***advaidhīkara*** (non-bifurcated). It might be truer to say that the absolute or the entire reality is its content and not any particular limited object. On this account, the *Prajñāpāramitā* texts speak of the intuition as unfathomable ***(gambhīrā),*** immesurable *(aprameyā)* and infinite ***(asaṃkhyeyā),*** it is really inexpressible, too deep for words, too universal for distinctions to apply."

The teaching that mystic realisation goes beyond logic and reason has given an element of mysticism into it. But the Buddhist answer to this problem is to leave such problems unexplained maintaining that such truths are uncommunicable. This has given the concept of the unexplainable ***(avyākata)*** in Buddhism which simply implies that certain higher truths cannot be grasped by logic and reasoning but have to be individually ***(pac-***

3. Compare the following statement of the Buddha occurring in the *Majjhima Nikāya,* I, p. 479 f. 'I do not say that one can obtain the final knowledge *(aññārādhanā)* at the very beginning: it has to be had by gradual training, *(anupubbasikkhā)* a gradual mode of action *(anupubba-kiriyā)* and conduct *(anupubbapaṭipadā).*

cattam) experienced. In a sense it is teaching by silence when the occasion demands it.

A. G. S. Kariyawasam

IPPEN (also known by the epithet Yūgyō Shōnin: 1239-89 A.C.) was the founder of the *Ji-shū* sect in Japan. He was originally a Tendai priest named Chishin. Not being content with its teachings, he studied under Shōtatsu. Having sat in meditation for hundred days at the Shinto shrine at Kumanojinja in Kii province, he claimed that the Buddha Amida's (Amitābha's) teaching was revealed to him directly by the indigenous deity, Kumano-Gongen, who is again identified with the Buddha Amida himself. (C. Eliot, *Japanese Buddhism,* London, 1935, p. 386; M. W. De Visser, *Ancient Buddhism in Japan,* Vol. I, Leiden, 1936, p. 339). His teaching is said to be based "on the verse he gained there and says that in the Nembutsu, there can be no thought 'he' or 'I' "(S. Hanayama, *A History of Japanese Buddhism,* Tokyo, 1960, p. 79).

Ippen travelled so widely through Japan preaching and encouraging the practice of chanting, that he came to be popularly known as Yūgyō Shōnin (the Itinerant Priest). He had preached the saving grace of the *Namu Amida-butsu* (veneration to the Buddha, Amida) formula. He had inscribed that formula in an innumerable number of cards, which he extensively distributed as a means of propagating the Amidist gospel.

The method of propagation he followed was by registering the names of those who confessed devotion to the grace of the Buddha Amida and his name in assembly. It is recorded that during his itinerancy Ippen had thus registered more than two million and a half persons (M. Anesaki, *History of Japanese Buddhism,* London, 1930, pp. 186 f.). Being engaged on his missionary errands, he had covered nearly the whole of Japan, doing miscellaneous relief work...." a feature of his religious activity differing from Hōnen's quietism and representing the new ethos of the Kamakura period. Another peculiarity in the teaching of Ippen was the exhortation that every utterance of Buddha's name be accompanied by the idea of the last moment of life close at hand and that, therefore, the act of devotion be a preparation for death at any moment" (ibid. p. 187).

Besides asserting the futility of faith to effect salvation, Ippen denounced it as an activity of the corrupt human mind. Instead he advocated the mere repetition of Amida's sacred name, without concern for anything that comes from oneself. It is believed that his "theories were probably influenced by Zen, which was affecting Japanese thought at that time" (C. Eliot, op. cit., p. 274). Hence some place him among "those who studied Zen to find a rapproachment between Zen and the Pure Land School" (A. W. Watts, *The Way of Zen,* Gt. Britain, 1957, p. 128 f.).

Ippen stressed that the sect he founded was the proper one that suited the times in which he lived. Hence it came to be known as the *Ji* (Time) or *Jishū* (Sect of the Times). Neverthesess, according to some, it was called thus because "it inculcated pious thought at every moment and also because the service (i.e. practising of Shen-tao's *Ojō raison,* a hymn in worship of Amitābha) to be held regularly six times a day was considered to be essential to salvation" (M. Anesaki, op. cit. p. 187; also see S. Hanayama, op. cit., p. 79; M. W. De Visser, op. cit., pp. 339 f.). His time theory seems to be based on the Lotus Sūtra.

Jishū school, which held the the Buddha Amitābha as the object of adoration, adopted the expression of the blissful feeling in the form of dancing as a part of worship; hence it is also known as the *Yugyosha* or the Yuyaku-Nembutsu (i.e. the Dancing Nembutsu). Eliot (op. cit., p. 385) observes that though the school founded by Ippen was not important, it is interesting, since it indicates the strength of the Amidist movement. The founding of the sect, which is incidentally the last of the Amida sects, marks the extreme development of Ryōbu-Shintō.

Although the *Joshū* sect is slowly declining, it still exercises a considerable influence among the lower classes (C. Eliot, op. cit., ,pp. 385 f.). Besides the Shojokoji temple at Fujisawa near Kamakura, which this sect has as its headquarters, it claims 424 temples and lists nearly 45,000 adherants (cf. S. Hanayama, op. cit., p. 106).

In 1886 A.C. Ippen was awarded the posthumous title of Ensho Daishi (according to C. Eliot, op. cit., p 274; Enshō Shōnin) "Great Master of Universal Enlightenment".

C. S. Ranasinghe

1. Ippen believed that all Shinto gods were manifestations of the previous Buddhas (cf. E. Dale Saunders, *Buddhism in Japan,* Philadelphia, 1964, p. 201).

IRIYĀPATHA *īryāpatha, airyāpatha)* is a compound term[1] which literally means 'mode of movement'. From this literal meaning developed the notion of 'deportment' or 'demeanour' that becomes known by the movements of one's body, i.e. by the postures of the body. Therefore the term *iriyāpatha* came to be used to connote the usual four postures of the body namely, standing, sitting, walking and lying down.[2]

While Buddhism emphasises purity of inward behaviour, it does not fail to stress the importance of outward behaviour of a person, whether lay or clergy. In fact much importance is attached to the adoption of a proper demeanour, specially with regard to the deportment, one should adopt in keeping with one's vocation. Reference is made to pleasant, acceptable *(pāsādika, pasanna)* deportment, and its opposite.[3] Monks are specially advised to follow a demeanour that is in keeping with the monkhood.[4]

Pleasant demeanour of religious men is one of the major factors that attract the attention and admiration of the public. This is a universal feature that is valid for all times and all climes. There are numerous references to instances where kings and the public, out of admiration and respect for such exemplary demeanour on the part of religious men, paid honour and provided them with all the requisties (*J.* I, p. 66, 237, 444, 590; IV, 130 etc.). Good, acceptable demeanour is such a necessity, a fruitful means of procuring sustenance that pseudo religious men at times even resort to hypocrisy and fake good outward behaviour. Such instances of old are recorded (see *Vism.* p. 26; *MA.* III, p. 4).

These *iriyāpatha* or postures of the body play also a major role in the practice of meditation. These four postures being the four usual movements of the body that a person could adopt in any of his bodily functions, it is apparent that meditation too, has to be practised while being is one of these postures.[5] Of these, too, sitting posture is the one that is commonly adopted in meditation. Even the Buddha when meditating under the Bodhi-tree adopted this posture.[6]

The four *iriyāpathas* play a very significant role in the practice of *satipaṭṭhāna,* specially with regard to the practice of Contemplation of the Body *(kāyānupassanā D.* II, p. 292; *M.* I, pp. 56-57). In this the meditator is instructed to be mindful of the four postures of the body. The practice is described as follows. A monk when he is walking comprehends, 'I am walking'; or when he is standing comprehends, 'I am standing still', or when he is sitting comprehends, 'I am sitting', or when he is lying down comprehends, 'I am lying down'. So, however, his body is disposed he comprehends that it is like that *Middle Length Sayings I,* pp. 72-73). This mindfulness regarding the postures of the body leads the meditator to reflect deeply on the nature of the body, both internally and externally, and consider how the body comes to be *(samudaya)* and how it passes away *(vaya).* The meditator's awareness that 'the body exists' arises to the extent necessary just for knowledge, just for reflection.

This meditation on the iriyāpatha is for the purpose of disabusing the mind of the meditator of any false notion of a soul. This purpose is clearly seen when the sutta states that when the meditator is so aware he fares along independently and without taking hold of anything in the world.[7]

Senarat Wijesundara

1. On the derivation of the term see *PED, CPD* and *BHS.* The term *catucakka* occurring at *S.* I, p. 16 is defined in *SA.* I, p. 53 as *iriyāpatha;* cf. *ApA.* p. 237.
2. See *M.* I. p. 120; *S. V,* p. 78; This usage is very common both in Pali and Sanskrit Buddhist Literature; see *CPD* and *BHS* for numerous references. The term *iriyāpatha* may connote either all the four or some of the four postures. *(Vism.* 396; *MA. V,* p. 49). Quite often the numerical adjective *catu* or *catur* is added or the postures are severally enumerated. These four postures are commonly adopted in Buddhist iconography (q.v.).
3. See *Thag.* vv. 432, 927. cf. *AA. I. 145. Vassasatiko-thero viya pāsādikena iriyāpathena; DhpA.* II, p. 140; *na tav'assa cīvarapattagahanaṃ vā iriyāpatho vā pāsādiko hoti.* See also *Sikṣ.* p. 348.
4. *Sn.* v. 385, *iriyāpathaṃ pabbajitānulomakaṃ sevetha.* cf. *M.* II, p. 135. See also *BHS* for numerous Sanskrit parallels.
5. This does not mean that these four postures totally eshaust all posible postures of the body. What is meant is that these are the usual four postures. Whatever posture that falls outside these four is regarded as unusual. For example, it is said that venerable Ānanda gained emancipation as he was about to lie in his couch and this position is described as one that does not come within the usual four postures of the body. *(DA. I,* p. 10, *catuririyāpathavirahitaṃ; cf. MhV.* iii. *V.* 25 *iriyāpathato muttaṃ arahattaṃ apāpuṇi).* As used in the *Metta Sutta (Sn. v.* 151) it seems to connote the idea of 'always', 'constantly.'
6. See *J.* I, p. 71; in fact this posture usually referred to as *'pallanka'* is prticularly recommended for certain types of meditation, especially for *ānāpānasati,* for it facilitates breathing. However, a meditator has a certain amount of discretion in the adoption of postures, and he could change postures according to his convenience.
7. *Anissito ca viharati na ca kiñci loke upādiyati: MA.* I, p. 250 explains that he fares along being not dependent on craving, dogmatic belief etc. and without taking hold of any of the five aggregates as 'this is my self' etc.

ISĪ, Skt. *ṛṣi* derived from the root *ṛṣ* or *dṛś* 'to see' means a sage, seer, saint or a holy-man. These were profoundly wise men of great religious devotion with abilities of thinking, endowed with highly supernatural powers. In the Vedic tradition, they were primarily a class of seers who were the composers and the singers of the sacred hymns. They, either alone or with others, invoked the deities in rhythmical speech or song, especially in song of a sacred character.

In early mythical systems, they constitute a peculiar class of beings as distinct from gods, men and asuras. According to the orthodox Hindu ideas they were the inspired personages to whom these hymns were revealed. They were regarded as holy sages whose deeds were narrated as if they were the deeds of gods or Asuras (*Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*, i, 17, ii, 19 etc.). In the Ṛgveda, (i, 1, 2; 45, 3; VII. 43, 13 etc.) reference is often made to previous singers and the contemporary poets (Macdonell, A. A., *Vedic Index*, I, p. 115; London, 1958). "The *Ṛṣi* was the most exalted of the Brāhmaṇas' (ibid. p. 116). During the Vedic period these sages were attached to the houses of the great, the petty kings or the nobles of the royal household. These hymn-singers were regarded by the later generations as patriarchal sages or saints, occupying the same position in Indian history as the heroes and patriarchs of other countries.

The sages of ancient India are typified by a particular group of seven ṛṣis (*sapta ṛṣayaḥ* or *saptarṣyaḥ*). These seven are mentioned in the *Ṛgveda*, and the later *saṃhitas* and enumerated also in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* as Gotama, Bhāradvāja, Viśvāmitra, Jamadagni, Vaśiṣtha, Kāśyapa and Atri. The *Mahābhārata* mentions the names of the seven ṛṣis as Mārici, Atri, Aṅgiras, Pulaha, Kratu, Pulastya and Vaśiṣtha. Three other names of sages are added to the latter list in *Manusmṛti*, viz. Pracetas or Dakṣa, Bhṛgu and Nārada and they are called the Prajāpatis or patriarchs. It is believed that these ten were created by Manu Svayambhū for the production of all other beings including gods and men. The *Atharvaveda* contains a large list of sages such as Gaviṣthira, Kutsa, Kakṣīvant, Kaṇva, Medhātithī, Triśāna, Uśāna, Kāvya, Mudgala etc. (Macdonell, A.A. op. cit. p. 117). According the Buddhist texts (*D.* I, pp. 104, 238; *A.* III, p. 24), there are ten (divinely) inspired singers or composers of the Vedic hymns in Brahmanic tradition (*brāhmaṇānan pubbkā isayo mantānam kattāro pavattāro*) namely Aṭṭhaka, Vāmaka, Vāmadeva, Vessamitta, Yamataggi (Yamadaggi), Aṅgīrasa, Bhāradvāja, Vāseṭṭha, Kassapa and Bhagu.

Ṛṣis of ancient Indian society are classified into three main sections namely, *Devarṣi*, *Brahmarṣi* and *Rājarṣi*. Sometimes to this list are added four other categories namely, *Maharṣi*, *Paramarṣi*, *Śrutarṣi* and *Kāṇḍarṣi*. In the Buddhist texts we come across the terms such as *Deva isi*, *Brahma isi* and *Rāja isi*. Sakka is described as a divine sage (*Deva isi*) in the *Mogharājamāṇavapucchā* of the *Suttanipāta* (*v.*1116) and in the *Assalāyana Sutta* (*M.* II, p. 155) seven brahmin sages are mentioned.

The sages in general could again be divided into two classes, as those who represent an academic tradition and those who represent a religious one. We could regard the sages like Aṭṭhaka as academic sages. The life of a religious sage in ancient India has been described by the Buddha in the following manner, in the *Brāhmaṇadhammika Sutta* of the *Suttanipāta* (*v.* 284):

Isayo pubbakā āsuṃ saññatattā tapassino
pañca kāmaguṇe hitvā attadattham acārisuṃ

"The sages of yore had abandoned the pleasures of the five senses and were self restrained and intent upon moral goodness". In this Sutta Buddha describes and explains the change wrought in these sages later on by seeing the riches of kings and how they influenced the king to make sacrifices of living creatures. At the beginning these sages had no wealth in gold or corn, but their wealth was meditation, which they practised perfectly. The people used to prepare food for them with utmost faith and they held them in high seteem. These sages who were well protected by the Dhamma (*dhammarakkhita*) went round for alms from house to house. For forty-eight years they practised juvenile clebacy (*komārabrahmacariya*; see *Brahmacariya*) and they were in search of the sciences. They were of exemplary conduct and did not marry a woman outside their own caste.

These sages seem to have practised chastity and virtue, rectitude, mildness, penance, tenderness, compassion and patience. The Buddha says: as time passed by these sages changed their attitude towards life with the rapid growth of the prosperity of the king. With their instructions King Okkaka introduced the sacrifice (of animals such as cows) and they received much wealth from the king. It may be because of this degeneration of the life of the religious sages that the Buddha defends himself in his discourse to the brahmin Doṇa in (*Doṇasutta, A.* I, p. 223 ff.), explaining why he does not salute the aged brahmins. He says that the brahmins of his day merely repeat the ancient collection of mantras, hymns and sayings of those brahmin sages of old like Aṭṭhaka etc. In the *Caṅkī Sutta* (*M.* II, p. 170) and in the *Subha Sutta* (ibid. p. 200) the Buddha declares that the words of the brahmin sages are like a line of blind men (*andha veṇi*). He says, not one of these sages through seven generations has realised through his own super knowledge the advantages of the truth, austerity, study of the Vedic hymns and renunciation.

The sages in India seem to have resided in leaf-huts on the sea-shore (*isayo sāmuddakā; S.* I. p. 227) and in the wild-forests (*isayao āraññakā;* ibid. p. 226). They were

possessed of such great supernatural powers, that once it is said when there was going to be a war between gods and Asuras they quickly, as a strong man might stretch out his bent arm, or bend in his arm stretched out, vanished from their leaf huts, appeared before Sambara, the Lord of Asuras to ask for their protection (ibid. p. 227).

The ideal concerning the *ṛsi* which continued during the later period probably could be traced back to the ideal of the *muni* which seems to have existed during the pre-Vedic period in Indian society. At that time there had been a class of munis who were regarded as ascetics commanding great supernatural powers. The *muni* was of restrained character and was interested to learn the nature of Brahman, the Absolute, by study, sacrifice, penance, fasting or faith. The archaeological findings of the Mohenjodaro and Harappa cultures of the pre-Vedic period reveal that the *munis* resided in Northern India. "There is more than one representation on seals from Mohenjodaro and Harappa of a male god, horned and three faced sitting in the position of a yogi, his legs bent in double, heel to heel and surrounded on one seal by four beasts, the elephant, the tiger, the rhinoceros and the buffalo, with a couple of deer by the throne at his feet". (Piggott S., *Prehistoric India,* Penguin Books 1950, p. 202). The ṛsis who lived in Northern India, probably would have penetrated into the South after the Mohenjodaro and Harappa civilizations were over-run by invading Aryans. The reference to the dark sages *(kaṇha isi)* in Buddhist literature (*D.* I. p. 97) probably proves the idea mentioned above. In tracing the lineage of the Kaṇha isi, the Buddha explains it thus in the *Ambaṭṭha Sutta (D.* I, p. 87 ff.): Once when the youth Ambaṭṭha started reviling the Sakyans as menials, the Buddha traced his lineage to his ancestor who was an offspring of a slave girl. Because of his devilish appearance he was called Kaṇha and hence, the family name *Kaṇhagotta.* Kaṇha later became a mighty seer. The sage Asita mentioned as Kaṇhasiri in the *Nālaka Sutta* of the *Suttanipāta (v.* 689) could also be listed as one of the dark sages. The Kaṇha isis were powerful, both physically and spiritually. According to the *Assalāyana Sutta (M.* II, p. 154 ff.) the brahmin sages held the view that they alone were the highest class of men and the legitimate sons of Brahmā. At that time the sage Asita-Devala (Kaṇha isi) appeared before them and shouted at them. The latter cursed him with the intention of shrivelling him into a cinder, but the more they cursed him, the more handsome and comely grew Asita-Devala.

The Pali commentators in defining the term 'isi' have tried to suggest an etymology of ethical significance to this term. Thus the *isi* is being described as one who seeks for such qualities as meditation *(jhānādīnaṃ guṇānaṃ esanatthena isi; PvA.* p. 163), perfect conduct such as the aggregate of virtue *(asekkhānaṃ sīlakkhandhādīnaṃ esanatthena isi;* ibid. p. 265 *DhpA.* IV, p. 232) and restraint and constraint *(yamaniyamādīnaṃ esanatthena isayo: PvA.* p. 98).

In Buddhist India an *'isi'* was considered as one who was dedicated to his spiritual values and who aspired to attain higher spiritual attainments. Among them are listed the Buddhas, the Paccekabuddhas and the arahants. According to M.A.G. TH. Kloppenborg, in general the term *isi* seems to be applied in Buddhist texts to ascetics (the words *samaṇa, muni, tāpasa, jaṭila* and *Pacceka-buddha* occur as synonyms, see *Pv.* 32; 64; *PvA.* 163; *ND.* 2, 108; *ThagA.* III, 82; *The 82; The Paccekabuddha,* Leiden, 1974, p. 31, footnote, 100).

Gotama Buddha is listed as the seventh of the great sages *(isisattama; M.* I, 386; *S.* I, p. 192; *Sn. v.* 356; in the sequence of Vipassin, Sikhin, Vessabhū, Kakusandha, Koṇāgamana, and Kassapa Buddhas. A Buddha is described as outstanding among isis, a bull among them *(isi nisabha; Sn. v.* 698). In the *Uruvelavagga of the Aṅguttarā nikāya* (II, p. 24) he is again referred to as the most calmed sage *(santo samayataṃ isi),* and in the *Suttanipāta (v.* 1126) he is described as the sage of exemplary character *(sampannacaraṇam isiṃ).* In his conversation with the Buddha, the deity Susīma refers to Sāriputta as an isi (*S.* I, p. 65). In the *Isigili Sutta (M.* III, p. 68) the Paccekabuddhas are referred to as isis. This mountain was so called because it swallowed up the sages *(isī gilatīti Isigili).* It is said that five hundred sages lived at this place. Isipatana was so called because sages, on their way through the air, (from the Himalayas) alight here or start from here on their aerial flights *(Isayo ettha nipatanti uppatanti cāti Isipatanaṃ).* These sages (paccekabuddhas) having spent seven days in contemplation come to the habitation of men through the air in search of alms. They descend to earth at Isipatana (*MA.* II, p. 387; *AA.* I, p. 347). Jetavana which was frequented by the bhikkhus and the arahants is also being referred to as a resort of the isis *(Jetavanaṃ isisaṅghanisevitaṃ: S.* I. p. 33). Dhamma is described as the banner of the sages in the *Aṅguttara-nikāya* (I, p. 24).

Historically considered, the category of *ṛsi* appears to have been subsumed in Buddhist literature under that of the Paccekabuddha. There are several noteworthy parallels between the Vedic ṛsi and Buddhist Pacceka buddha. They are essentially self-enlightened; they are singularly free from dogmatism and they neither owe allegiance to a system nor follow spiritual achievements. The Buddhist genius for accommodation found a convenient way in which it could be categorised in relation to a plurality of spiritual ideals. It is very likely that the trinity of Buddhist ideals consisting of the Buddha, Pacceka-buddha and Arahant was historically prompted by the presence of the category of ṛsis, a category that is clearly proved to be pre-buddhistic.

Paccekabuddha and Arahant share many parallels, the most fundamental being that they are both enlightened figures, the former owing it to himself alone, the latter recognising his indebtedness to the Buddha. The fact that the concept of the Pacceka-buddha did not undergo elaboration or doctrinal development but remained static in the course of the evolution of Buddhist thought more than justifies the conclusion that it was nothing more than an accommodation of a historical phenomenon within the pale of Buddhism.

Indumathie Karunaratne

ISIPATANA, (Skt. Ṛṣipatana; vars. °paṭṭana, °patana, °pahana, °bharana, °vadana), a place near Bārāṇasī, the site of the famous Deer Park (Pali Migadāya; Skt. Mṛgadāva). Edgerton takes Isipatana to be the name of the Deer Park itself *(BHS.* s.v.). But from textual evidence it appears plausible to hold that Isipatana was the name of the locality in which the Deer Park was situated. Isipatana is identified with the modern Sārnāth, six miles from Vārāṇasī. Cunningham found the Migadāya represented by a fine wood, covering a distance of about half a mile, extending from the great stūpa of Dhammek in the north to the Chaukundi mound in the south (ASIAR. I, p. 107).

The name Isipatana[1] shows that the place was connected with *isis, ṛṣis* or sages. Numerous Sanskrit and Pali texts attempt to explain the origin of the name on the basis of this connection. The *Mahāvastu* (I, p. 359) says that it is so called because the sages fell there *(ṛṣayo' tra patitā ṛṣipatanaṃ). Lalitavistara* (p. 14) carries this explanation still further. A Pali source says that Isipatana was so called because sages on their way through the air (from the Himālayās) alight here or start from here their aerial flight *(isayo ettha nipatanti uppatanti cāti Isipatanam: MA.* II, 188). In another place it is said that the paccekabuddhas having spent seven days in contemplation in the Gandhamādana, bathe in the Anotatta lake and come to human habitations through the air, in search of alms. They descend to earth at Isipatana (*MA.* II, p. 188; *AA.* II, p. 180, adds that sages also held *uposatha* at Isipatana). Sometimes the paccekabuddhas come to Isipatana from Nandamūlaka-pabbhāra (*AA.* I, p. 338, *PsA.* III, p. 609). The Migadāya was so called because it was a wild life sanctuary, where the deer were allowed to roam about there unhindered.[2] (*AA.* II, p. 180; *MA.* II, pp. 65, 188; *J.* I, pp. 145 ff.).

Though one cannot attach much importance to these explanations, it is quite apparent from the name as well as from the description of the place occurring in texts, that Isipatana was frequented by sages. It is quite probable that this locality became a popular resort of the sages even before the rise of Buddhism. The *Udapāna-dūsaka Jātaka* (*J.* II, pp. 354 ff.) mentions that there was a very ancient well near Isipatana which, in the Buddha's time, was used by monks living there. This points to the fact that before the Buddhist monks made it their resort, this place was inhabited by others, most probably by sages, as the name suggests.

In ancient times Isipatana may have been a shady forest within which was the reservation for deer (Migadāya). It is conjectured that the presence of deer suggests that the site may have been a forest area reserved for the king of Vārāṇasī to hunt (cp. A. Foucher, *The Life of the Buddha,* Wesleyan University Press p. 140 f.). But this does not seem very probable, for had it been so, the sages would not have found it a congenial place for contemplation and peaceful dwelling. It is apparent that in the 5th century B.C. Isipatana was considered to be an ideal resort for those who sought solitude and wished to engage in austere practices and gain spiritual advancement. It may be the reason why the group of five ascetics, the Pañcavaggiyas, after leaving Gotama, when he gave up his severe penances, at once resorted to Isipatana, which was some leagues away from Uruvelā (*J.* I, p. 68; *Lal.* p. 193).

The importance of Isipatana for the Buddhists is not due to its association with the sages. They regard it as a sacred place mainly because the Buddha preached his first sermon, i.e., the *Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta,* to the Pañcavaggiya bhikkhus who happened to be there.

It is said that the Buddha preached his first sermon on the full-moon day of Āsaḷha (June–July).[3] After the

1. The origin of the name is not quite clear. It may be conjectured that the Pali name Isipatana is derived from the Sanskrit name Ṛṣipattana (or °paṭṭana) meaning the (city of ṛṣis cp. Deva-° Dharma-°.', Monier Millians *Skt. Eng. Dict.* p. 579-. The Pali commentators who define the name preserve the word *isi* and equate it with *paccekabuddha* and *arahant*, a fact which suggests that the original name may have begun with the term *ṛṣi*. Most probably Sanskrit Ṛsipatana is due to the later Sanskritization of Pali Isipatana. Once the name Isipatana (Ṛsipatana) became established numerous fanciful definitions were put forward to explain the name, completely ignoring the posibility that Pali *patana* may be connected to Skt. *pattana* or *paṭṭana* meaning city.
2. Hsüan-tsang, quotes the *Nigrodhamiga-jātaka* to account for the origin of the name Migadāya. According to him the Deer Park was the forest gifted by the king of Vārāṇsī of the Jātaka, where the deer might wander unmolested (S. Beal, *Records of the Western World* II, p. 50).
3. *Vin.* I, 10 f.; on this occasion 18 koṭis of Brahmas and innumerable gods gained realization of the truth (*Miln.* 20); (cp. *Miln.* 350). *Lal.* (296 f.) gives details of the journey. The Buddha, having no money with which to pay the ferrynan, crossed the Ganges through the air. When Bimbisāra heard of this, he abolished the toll for ascetics.

conversion of the Pañcavaggiyas the Buddha stayed on in the Deer Park discouring to them further and gradually making them attain arahantship. Then, as the rainy season came the Buddha decided to spend the first rainy season of his career as a teacher in the Deer Park itself (*BuvA*. p. 4). Thus, Isipatana came to be associated with two important events of his life.

When the Buddha was staying in the Deer Park, Yasa, the son of a wealthy merchant of Bārāṇasī, disgusted with worldly life, one day at dawn approached the Buddha and confided in him his problem. The Buddha preached to him and enabled him to attain arahantship (*Vin.* I, 15 f.). The Buddha stayed on further and converted Yasa's parents and his companions. The rainy season came to an end and the Buddha decided to leave Isipatana and go towards Uruvelā. It was then that the Māra confronted the Buddha and declared that the latter was not yet freed from his snares. But the Buddha refuted this and Māra had to go away discomfited (*Vin.* I, 20 f.). The texts record a similar event that took place when the Buddha was staying at Isipatana on another occasion (*Vin.* I, 22; *S.* I, 105 f.).

Isipatana had been the venue of numerous discourses delivered by the Buddha. Besides the *Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta,* mentioned above, he preached the *Anattalakkhaṇa Sutta (Pañca Sutta: S.* III, 66 f.), the *Rathakāra* or *Pacetana Sutta (Cakkavatti Sutta, A.* I, 110 f.), the two *Pāsa Suttas (S.* I, 105 f.), the *Samaya Sutta (A.* III, 320 ff.), the *Kaṭuviya Sutta (A.* I, 279 f.), a discourse on the *Dhammadinna Sutta (S.* V, 406 f.). Some of these were delivered on his first visit and some on later occasions. This shows that the Buddha visited Isipatana a number of times. It seems to have been customary with the Buddha to stay, except on very rare occasions, in the Deer Park at Isipatana when he visited Vārāṇasi. (See *A.* I, 110, 279; III, 392, 399; *S.* I, 105, V, 406). On one of his visits to Isipatana he passed the rule prohibiting the use of sandals made of palmyra leaves (*Vin.* I, 189) and on another occasion he instituted the rule forbidding the use of certain kinds of flesh (*Vin.* I, p. 216 ff.).

Some of the most eminent members of the Saṅgha seem to have resided at Isipatana from time to time, discussing abstruse doctrinal problems. Among such recorded discussions at Isipatana are several between Sāriputta and Mahākoṭṭhita and one between Mahākoṭthita and Citta-hatthisāriputta (see *S.* II, 112 ff.; III, 167 f.; IV, 162 f., 384 ff.; *A.* III, 392 f.).

Mention is also made of a discourse in which several monks staying at Isipatana tried to help Channa in his difficulties (*S.* III 132 f.). The commentary says that when the penalty of *brahma-daṇḍa* was passed on Channa, whereby all monks were forbidden to have anything whatsover to do with him, he wandered away to Vārāṇasī and lived in the Deer Park at Isipatana.

Isipatana, once the popular resort of the sages, became a monastic centre in the Buddha's time itself. The great events connected with the place imbued it with much sanctity. Later Pali Buddhist tradition weaved around it other details increasing and further establishing the sanctity. Thus, the tradition narrated that all the Buddhas preach their first sermon at the Migadāya in Isipatana; that it is one of the four unchanging spots *(avijahitaṭṭhāna),* the others being the *bodhi-pallaṅka,* the spot at the gate of Saṅkassa, where the Buddha first touches the earth on his return from Tāvatiṃsa, and the site of the bed in the *Gandhakuṭi* in Jetavana. *(BuvA.* 131; *DA.* II, 424). Further it is said that it is the custom of all the Buddhas to go through the air to Isipatana to preach the first sermon. Gotama however, walked all the way, eighteen leagues, because he knew that by so doing he would meet Upaka, the ājīvaka, to whom he could be of service (*DA.* II, 471). The past history of Isipatana, too, was narrated. Thus, the tradition held that in the past ages Isipatana sometimes retained its own name,[4] but more often it was known by different names. Thus in Vipassī's time it was known as Khema-uyyāna (*BuvA.* 237 ff., 252 *DA.* II, 471).

Isipatana remained an important monastic centre even after the Buddha's time. According to the *Mahāvaṃsa,* there was a large community of monks at Isipatana in the second century B.C. For, we are told that at the foundation ceremony of the Mahāthūpa in Anurādhapura, twelve thousand monks were present from Isipatana led by elder Dhammasena (*Mhv.* xxix, *v.* 31).

Even during the seventh century Isipatana seems to have flourished as a monstic centre. Hsüan-tsang found, at Isipatana, fifteen hundred monks studying the Hīnayāna. In the enclosure of the Saṅghārāma was a vihāra about two hundred feet high and strongly built. In the centre of the vihāra was a life-stze statue of the Buddha turning the wheel of the law. To the south-west were the remains of a stone stūpa built by Asoka.[5] In front of it was a stone pillar to mark the spot where the Buddha preached his first sermon. Nearby was another stūpa on the site where the Pañcavaggiyas spent their time in

4. For example in the times of Phussa Buddha (*Buv.* xix, *v.* 18), Dhammadassī (*BuvA.* 220) and Kassapa (*BuvA.* 263). Kassapa was born there (ibid. 263).

5. *Divy.* (389-94) mentions Aśoka as intimating to Upagupta his desire to visit the places connected with the Buddha's activities, and to erect stūpas there. Thus he visited Lumbinī, Bodhimūla, Isipatana, Migadāya and Kusinagara; this is confirmed by Aśoka's lithic records e.g. Rock Edict, viii.

meditation before the Buddha's arrival and another where five hundred paccekabuddhas entered Nibbāna. Close to it was another building where the future Buddha Metteyya received assurance of his becoming a Buddha (S. Beal, op. cit. pp. 45 ff.; see also *DPPN.* s.v.).

S. K. Nanayakkara

ISLAND HERMITAGE. The Island Hermitage is a Theravāda Buddhist monastery in the "Forest Dwelling" *(araññavāsī)* tradition. It was founded in 1911 by the venerable Nyanatiloka Mahāthera as a secluded place to live the life of a monk, study and meditate in the Buddhist tradition. Currently, in 1992, Venerable Anuragoda Piyaratana Mahāthera is the chief monk in residence, while the incumbent Venerable Vajirārāma Siridhamma Mahāthera lives in Kandy.

The Island Hermitage is located in Ratgama Lake, a salt-water lagoon about two kilometers from the coast near Dodanduwa, Sri Lanka. It is 105 kilometers south of Sri Lanka's principal city, Colombo, and about 12 kilometers north of the provincial capital, Galle.

The hermitage actually consists of two islands: Polgasduwa and Metiduwa (or Meddeduwa). They are low, wooded islands with a shady, park-like atmosphere, no more than a few hundred meters across in any direction and now connected by a short causeway of earth, mangroves and bricks. Polgasduwa (Cocunut Island) was the original site. As the hermitage grew, Metiduwa (Clay Island) or Meddeduwa (Middle Island) also became part of the hermitage.

The Island Hermitage was the first centre of Theravāda Buddhist study and practice set up by and for Westerners. Its many prominent residents, monks and laymen, have progressed from Buddhist studies and Pali translations to actual meditation practice, from merely hearing and knowing about Buddhism to actually living and experiencing the Dhamma. Thus, the Island Hermitage forms an essential link with Theravāda Buddhism in the West.

The history of the Island Hermitage starts with the saintly and scholarly Venerable Nyanatiloka Mahāthera. Born on February 19, 1878 in Wiesbaden, Germany, Aston Walter Florus Gueth travelled to India with the hope of learning more about Buddhism. From India he proceeded to Sri Lanka and then Burma. He was greatly influenced by Bhikkhu Ananda Metteyya, the first British Buddhist monk who kindled in him a desire for ordination. After ordination as a novice in 1903, he received full ordination *(upasampatā)* in 1904 from Venerable U Kumara Mahāthera. Thus, he became the first Buddhist monk of German origin.

Ven. Nyanatiloka returned to Sri Lanka in 1905 where he continued his studies and practice of meditation in a small island off the southern coast near Matara. There he also received his first students. Over the next few years, he visited Burma, Germany, Switzerland, Italy and North Africa spreading the Dhamma. He also lived in Lausanne, Switzerland in a small house, built by a Swiss engineer, Monsieur Bergier. In this first Buddhist Monastery in Switzerland, he conferred the *pabbajjā* ordination as a novice on European soil to a German named Bartel Bauer who assumed the name Venerable Kondanno.

Ven. Kondanno then went to Sri Lanka and, while travelling by train, noticed a little island in a lagoon near the village of Dodanduwa. He then informed Ven. Nyanatiloka, who had also returned to Sri Lanka, about the island. When Ven. Nyanatiloka saw the uninhabited island it appealed to him at once. On this island of Polgasduwa was established the Island Hermitage on July 9, 1911, when five simple wooden huts *(kuṭi)* built by lay supporters were formally occupied.

Among the early Western residents were the Venerables Vappo (who died in 1960 after spending much of his monk's life at the Island Hermitage), Mahanama, Assaji and Bhaddiya. The founder *dāyaka* or lay supporter was William Mendis Wijesekara. He and other lay supporters from around Dodanduwa conveyed alms food and other requisites to the hermitage by boat every morning. As the hermitage gained a reputation as the abode of pious Western monks, hundreds of devotees were attracted on full moon *(poya)* days. Even Western visitors started arriving, including Alexandra David-Neel, the French Tibetan Buddhist, and Paul Dahlke, the German Buddhist writer, in 1912. In 1913 a *dānasālā* (refectory) was constructed.

It was not until 1914, however, that the Island Hermitage at Polgasduwa actually came into the legal possession of the Sangha, having been bought and donated with money from Ven. Nynatiloka's Swiss supporter, Monsieur Bergier. Since that time, though interrupted by two world wars, Western as well as Sinhalese monks and laymen have lived, studied, practised, and spread the Dhamma from the Island Hermitage.

Ven. Nyanatiloka served as the first abbot of the Island Hermitage from its inception in 1911 until his death on May 28, 1957. During his tenure, the Island Hermitage grew into the most significant and vibrant centre for the study, practice and spread of Theravāda Buddhism for the Western world. Many famous and lesser known monks were ordained or spent their time at the Island Hermitage. Hundreds of laymen stayed at the hermitage, and thousands of lay men and women visited and supported the hermitage. Thousands more read the

writings of or heard the Dhamma from the Island Hermitage's residents. Therefore, it is possible here to give only a sketch of the significant persons and events after the Island Hermitage was founded.

In 1914, two young Tibetans, brothers of the scholar Kaji Sandup, arrived at the Island Hermitage and took Theravāda ordination. The younger brother stayed on in Sri Lanka and, under the name of Mahinda, became a famous poet in the Sinhalese language, with his poems still included in Sinhalese school books.

Likewise in 1914, a young Sinhalese, Rajasinghe, was ordained a novice at the age of 14 with the name of Nyanaloka. He grew up to become a monk of true nobility of character and appearance. Ever helpful, he was deeply devoted to his revered teacher, nursing him in times of illness, attending to all administrative tasks of the hermitage and guiding the first steps into monkhood of young Western entrants who called him their "Sangha Mother". After Ven. Nyanatiloka's death in 1957, he succeeded him as the abbot of the Island Hermitage until his death in 1976.

On the outbreak of World War I in 1914, the German monks were first permitted to stay at the Island Hermitage under surveillance. However, after four months, they were taken into civil internment in Sri Lanka and then sent to Australia. When Ven. Nyanatiloka was finally able to return to Sri Lanka in 1926, he found his beloved Island Hermitage in utter ruin and had to rebuild it all anew.

Soon new huts were being built for the newcomers who started to arrive again from all over the world. A few of the better-known residents during this period between the wars can be mentioned here.

In 1928, E. L. Hoffmann, who became Lama Anagarika Govinda, came and lived for some time at the Island Hermitage, studying Pali. A very dedicated German monk, Nyanadhara, was ordained and lived at the Hermitage until he died on a trip to Burma in 1935.

Another earnestly striving monk was Nyanasisi, who received ordination in 1937 together with the German Jew Siegmund Feniger, who is still living as the Venerable Nyanaponika Mahāthera. The Venerable Nyanasisi passed away in 1950. The Ven. Nyanaponika became the closest presonal disciple of Ven. Nyanatiloka, the editor of his works, and his literary heir.

The Venerable Nyanasatta Mahāthera of Czechoslovakia was ordained in 1939. Shortly after his ordination, he went to Bandarawela where he established the Verdant Hermitage. He had several publications in Esperanto as well as English to his credit. He returned to the Island Hermitage in 1981 for the last few years of his life and passed away there in 1984.

Probably the most important Sri Lankan monk to come to live at the Island Hermitage during this time was the Venerable Soma Mahāthera who returned to Sri Lanka in 1937 after his ordination in Burma in 1936. He was born Victor Pulle of Roman Catholic parents on December 23, 1898 and died on February 23, 1960.

Although primarily known for his scholarly works, in his later years the Ven. Soma's thoughts turned more to poetry.

As soon as the restoration of the Island Hermitage was completed and it was making rapid progress the Second World War broke out in 1939. The Ven. Nyanatiloka and his German disciples were again interned in camps first in Sri Lanka and then in India. They were allowed to return in 1946.

This time, on Ven. Nyanatiloka's return, he found the Island Hermitage in a well-preserved and even improved condition, thanks to his devoted Sinhalese disciple, the Venerable Nyanaloka Mahāthera, who had looked after the place well, despite the great difficulties he had to contend with during the long war years.

The hermitage was officially enlarged after World War II to include the adjacent small island of Metiduwa (Meddeduwa) which had been used for some time, but was now acquired and donated by Lady Evadne de Silva, a long time supporter of Ven. Nyanatiloka.

In these post-war years, the Island Hermitage also started the Island Hermitage Publications with the purpose of making known works principally by Ven. Nyanatiloka and his pupils on the authentic teachings of the Buddha. They published Ven. Nyanatiloka's *Buddhist Dictionary* and Ven. Nyanaponika's *Abhidhamma Studies* in 1949.

Also in 1949, two Englishmen arrived at the Island Hermitage and received ordination as Bhikkhus in 1950. Osbert Moore who became Venerable Nanamoli and Harold Masson who became Venerable Nanavira met as English army officers during World War II, at which time their interest in Buddhism began. They shared a flat in London after the war and then came to Sri Lanka together to become monks. Each was a genuine monk embodying the virtues extolled by the Buddha. The Ven. Nanamoli became a great scholar and translator of some of the most difficult Pali texts of Theravāda Buddhism and died suddenly two weeks after Ven. Soma, who had given him unfailing assistance in Pali. Ven. Nanavira left the Island Hermitage in 1957 to live in solitude in a small hut in Bundala, where he died in 1965.

In 1951, Ven. Nyanatiloka and Ven. Nyanaponika were invited from the Island Hermitage to Burma by the Burmese Government to discuss preparations for the Sixth Buddhist Synod. They both returned to Burma to

participate in the opening ceremony in 1954 as the first and only Western Bhikkhu members of a Buddhist Synod. However, Ven. Nyanaponika had to go alone for the closing ceremony, due to Ven. Nyanatiloka's increasingly ill health.

From late 1951 until he peacefully passed away in Colombo in 1957, Ven. Nyanatiloka spent most of his time at the Forest Hermitage in Kandy. After an official state funeral at Independence Square in Colombo, his ashes were brought back to the Island Hermitage and interred near his *kuṭi* with a monument on which is engraved the famous stanza of Assaji which had brought Venerable Sāriputta to the Dhamma:

"Of things that proceed from a cause,
Their cause the Tathāgata proclaimed;
And also their cessation.
Thus taught the Great Sage."

The Ven. Nyanaponika also moved to the Forest Hermitage in Kandy in 1952 and still lives there. Among his various services to the cause of Dhamma, the most outstanding has been the establishment of the Buddhist Publication Society in Kandy which is now one of the major institutions in the world disseminating the message of the Buddha to 85 countries through its publications, entitled the "Wheel Publications" and the "Bodhi leaves", as well as numerous full-size books.

Ven. Nyanaloka took over officially as the second abbot in 1957 and served in this capacity until his own death on February 22, 1976. Although he was not a prolific translator and writer like his predecessor, the Island Hermitage, under his leadership, continued attracting both monks and laymen. A few notable names from the pages of the Visitors' Book are: I.B. Horner, former president of the Pali Text Society; Aung San, first president of Burma; Paul Debes, German meditation teacher; and R. D. Laing, British psychiatrist. As can also be seen from the Visitors' Book, Ven. Nyanaloka opened the hermitage to tourists, thus exposing many people from around the world to Theravāda Buddhism and the life of forest monks.

Another resident and visitor was the British Buddhist writer Francis Story or Anagarika Sugatananda. He had met the Venerables Nyanatiloka and Nyanaponika at the Sixth Buddhist Synod. His ashes and memorial stone are just behind Ven. Nyanatiloka's. Two other memorial stones complete the Island Hermitage's small burial ground: one for the Venerables Nyanaloka, Soma, Nanamoli and Nyanavipula with the inscription "Meetings End in Partings" and the other for a Brahmacāri S. Onowski boru August 20, 1913 and died December 17, 1963.

Since February 25, 1976, the Venerable Anuragoda Piyaratana Mahathera has served as the third abbot or chief monk in residence at the Island Hermitage. Under him, the Island Hermitage, like other monasteries in the Forest Monk tradition, has been helping to preserve a little of the earth's remaining tropical rain forests in the face of the mounting pressures of the modern world.

The Island Hermitage still safeguards the original natural environment and ecology of the area, except for the snakes, which have disappeared since the arrival of a family of mongooses in 1986. In fact, the trees are now much older and bigger, providing an umbrella for the life teeming in the shade beneath their branches. It would be necessary to be an expert in plants, animals and insects to be able to name all the types of life at the hermitage, but anyone quickly notices the coconut, mangrove, bamboo, jak fruit, papaya, jasmine, hibiscus and other native trees, bushes, ferns, vines, flowers and weeds, along with the multitude of birds, bats, iguanas and monitors, mongooses, centipedes, snails, mosquitoes, ants, and all the other small and large life forms of the tropical rain forest.

As part of maintaining the natural beauty and ecology of the Island Hermitage and the Forest Monk tradition, tourists are no longer allowed to simply drop in at the hermitage. Now, visitors need to write in advance to receive personal invitations which permit them to arrive by Island Hermitage boats for a day visit or a longer stay.

Also due to Ven. Piyaratana's and the Island Hermitage's efforts, Ratgama Lake and its islands were declared a natural reserve where fishing is no longer allowed since a visit in 1986 by the then Sri Lankan Prime Minister Ranasinghe Premadasa. The few boats that now paddle slowly and quietly on the lake only ferry people and supplies to and from the islands.

At present, the only intrusions from the outside world are occasional loudspeakers blaring from nearby villages along the lake's shore. Otherwise, the Island Hermitage is still a true natural refuge where men live in harmony with nature and life is very similar to what it was when the hermitage was founded in 1911.

Although there have not been any great scholar-monks in residence in recent years, the Island Hermitage does still have one further great asset for those inclined to study: a well-stocked library with a fairly full collection of Pali texts in Roman Script and English translations of the Buddhist scriptures.

At present, there are only a few Western monks at the Island Hermitage — perhaps only one or two at any given time — who take care of themselves in their quest to learn and practise the Dhamma. There are also usually two or three Sinhalese monks, three to five foreign and Sinhalese novices and one or two laymen in residence. Two or three caretakers cum boatmen also live at the hermitage.

Nine *kutis* or huts, including one under construction, a *sīmā*, an unused *vihāra*, and a meditation hall are spread over Polgasduwa. There is also the small burial ground with four memorial stones near Ven. Nyanatiloka's *kuti* on Polgasduwa. Five *kutis*, a boat house and a former colonial mansion now serving as the *vihāra*, *dānasālā* (refectory), kitchen and library are situated on Metiduwa. The *kutis* are simple but adequate, well screened to protect against mosquitoes, and fairly well spaced for privacy. Some have attached toilets and walkways, but most have no electricity. There are several wells and toilets also scattered on the paths around the islands.

The daily routine includes voluntary group sitting in the meditation hall from 4.30 to 5.30 AM and from 8.30 to 9.30 PM. Breakfast is at 6.00 AM and the main meal at 11.00 AM. Food is still brought by boat by lay supporters from around the lake each morning. If lay supporters are present at the main meal, the Ven. Piyaratana administers the Three Refuges and Five Precepts followed by a Dhamma talk. There is *gilanpasa*, usually a cup of tea served around 6.30 p.m. Otherwise, time is spent studying and practising the Dhamma in the quiet and seclusion of the Forest Monk tradition.

Recently, Ratgama Lake's third island, Parappuduwa (Pebble Island), which had been leased to Ven. Nyanaloka during World War II but used only as a no-man's-land and cremation ground for Island Hermitage monks, became "Nun's Island" for women following the ten precepts and to study and practice the Dhamma. Although the Nun's Island has no official connection with the Island Hermitage, the Committee of the Parappuduwa Nun's Island and Meditation Centre gained its inspiration from the Island Hermitage and, after constructing buildings, opened the Nun's Island on September 9, 1984. Thus, the Island Hermitage continues to influence and inspire others to study and live the Buddha's teachings in close harmony with nature as envisioned by its founders in 1991.*

ISSĀ, envy, along with selfishness or avarice *(macchariya)* is treated in Buddhist psychology as one of the basic hindrances to progress and as such it is an unwholesome mental factor *(akusala-cetasika)*. Its basic meaning is defined by Buddhaghosa in the following words "It has the characteristic of being jealous of others' success. Its function is to be dissatisfied with that. It is manifested as repulsion from that. Its immediate cause is another's success. It has to be regarded as a fetter *(saṃyojana: Vism.* XIV, section 172).[1]

According to the practical ethics of Buddhism the higher life as taught in it is lived for the overcoming of diverse fetters that stand on the way of one's progress, and envy is one of the strongest of such fetters[2] that is hard to be overcome. Owing to the diversity of causes one cannot give a definite cause as being responsible for this evil state of mind but as it is the angry feeling that another person possesses and enjoys somethings which the envying person does not have, it could be said to be dependent on ambition and discontent.[3] The envious person is pained at seeing another have that which he wants for himself. Another's enjoyment or happiness is a sickening sight for such a person and he attempts to spoil and destroy it and, therefore, if he sees the other in a miserable situation he feels happy. Owing to his envious attitude he cannot enjoy even what he has. Whatever fortune he himself has he loses because of this evil mental state. He enjoys the misery of others and, therefore, there is an element of sadism also in it. This shows that envy constitutes an anti-social factor making the peaceful co-existence of individuals difficult, for most social problems have envy as their cause.

Careful reflection would show that although people wish to live in peace and amity they find it difficult to do so in practice because envy and selfishness are at work in the sub-conscious and the unconsious parts of their minds. Unless and until the mind is cleared and purified of them these evil *(akusala)* tendencies will continue to influence the individual and his society through their unconscious operations. It is this fact that is brought forth in the *Sakkapañha Suttanta* of the *Dīgha Nikāya* (II, p. 276 ff.) where Sakka, the king of the gods, approaches the Buddha and asks him the reason as to why that gods, men etc. although willing to live without hatred, enmity, injury and malignity, nevertheless live in enmity, hatred and hostility. The Buddha at once tells him that it happens so because of their being bound by

* This article was compiled by Island Hermitage residents from materials in the Island Hermitage library. Assistance rendered by Ven. Ñāṇasanta and Mr. Mark Bullock to obtain this article is much appreciated. E-in-C.

1. A similar definition is found at *Puggala-paññatti*, pp. 19 and 23.
2. In addition to the above reference of Buddhaghosa to *issā* as a *saṃyojana* or a fetter, *issā* and *macchariya* are given as the 6th and the 7th fetters in a classification of seven *saṃyojanas* at *A.* IV, 8.
3. Envy in this sense may be distinguished from jealousy which means the apprehension and fear that one may be supplanted in the love and favour of another.

fetters of envy and selfishness *(issāmacchariya-saṃyojana)* the cause of which is given as likes and dislikes *(piyappiya-nidāna)* which are caused by desire *(chanda)*. Desire in turn is traced to reflective-thinking*(vitakka)* which is a result of the ideas and considerations of differentiation *(papañca-saññā)*. The overcoming of this last has to be achieved by the avoidance of all actions that lead to the increase of evil *(akusalā dhammā)* and the cultivation of all actions that lead to the increase of good *(kusalā dhammā)*.[4]

A. G. S. Kariyawasam

ISSARANIMMĀṆA-VĀDA. See CREATION

ISSARASAMAṆA-VIHĀRA (var. Issarasamaṇārāma, Issarasamaṇaka, Issaranimmāna-vihāra, Isurumuniya), one of the monasteries at Anurādhapura in Ceylon, built by king Devānampiya Tissa (250-210 B.C.), on the spot where prince Ariṭṭha dwelt with his five hundred followers after having received their ordination from Mahinda (*Mhv.* xx. 14; xix, 66). The building of this monastery was the seventh of the great undertakings of Devānampiya Tissa (*Mhv.* xx, 20).

One of the eight saplings from the bodhi-tree at Anurādhapura was planted at the Issarasamaṇa-vihāra (*Mhv.* xix, 61; *Mbv.* 162; *VinA.* I, 100). King Candamukha Siva (43-52 A.C.) built a tank near Maṇikāragāmaka and gave it for the use of the vihāra (*Mhv.* xxxv, 47), while king Vasabha (67-111 A.C.) built in the monastery an uposatha-hall (*Mhv.* xxxv, 87) and King Vohārika Tissa (209-31 A.C.) constructed a wall round it (*Mhv.* xxxvi, 36). King Kassapa I (473-91 A.C.) restored the buildings and enlarged the grounds. He also bought villages which he presented to the monastery for its maintenance. He had two daughters, Bodhī and Uppala-vaṇṇā, and he gave their names and his own to the vihāra. When the king wished to hand over the vihāra to the Theravāda monks they refused to accept it, fearing the reproach of the people that it was the work of a parricide. Then the king dedicated it to the image of the Buddha and the monks accepted it saying that it belonged to their Master (*Mhv.* xxxix, 10-14).

According to the *Mahāvaṃsa Ṭīkā* (pp. 407, 652) the vihāra was also called Kassapagiri, probably after its restoration by Kassapa I, mentioned above. The Kassapa-giri-vihāra to which king Jeṭṭha Tissa III (628 A.C.) dedicated the village Ambilāpika and king Dāṭhopatissa II (659-67 A.C.) the village Sena (*Mhv.* xliv, 98; xlv, 27; xlviii, 24) may be identified with this monastery (*EZ.* I, 216). It had originally been called Issarasamaṇa,[1] according to the *Mhāvaṃsa Ṭīkā* (p. 416), because of its association with the five hundred noblemen *(issaradārakā)* who joined the Order with *Ariṭṭha*. The *Ṭīkā* (p. 607) adds that Sāliya, son of king Duṭṭhagāmaṇī, enlarged the vihāra out of the tribute brought to him by the men of his tributary villages to the south of Anurādhapura. He used to observe the *uposatha* on holy days at the vihāra and spend the day in the Mahindaguhā there.

The Issarasamaṇa-vihāra, thus described in the literary works, was until recently identified with the beautiful rock-monastery in the Mahāmeghavana, and to the south of the city of Anurādhapura. It has now been found that this identification was incorrect and that that site is, in fact, identifiable with the southern Meghagiri-vihāra (see *JCBRAS.* VI, Special Number, p. 148). On the other hand, there is an abundance of epigraphical material which positively identifies the forest-bound cluster of rocks at Anurādhapura adjoining the highroad to Kuru-ṇāgala, and about a mile to the south-west of the sacred bodhi-tree with the Issarasamaṇa-vihāra of the literary sources. This monastic site was also wrongly identified as Vessagiri (q.v.) of the chronicles.

Of the inscriptions which led to this revision of identification there are some 1st-3rd century rock inscriptions *in situ* (yet unpublished), referring to the place as Isiramaṇa CJSc. II, 162; presumes that Issarasamaṇa in the chronicles is a learned, but inaccurate restoration of this old name to Pali from which the modern Sinhalese name Isurumuṇi phonetically developed.[2]

The main interest of the ruins of this monastery lies in the twenty-three rock-caves in three groups of boulders of gneiss rock standing close to one another in the vicinity

4. The practice of the middle path *(majjhimā paṭipadā)* is recommended for the overcoming of *issā* and *macchariya* at *M.* I, pp. 15-6. Mental concentration *(samādhi)* is recommended for the same at *A.* I, p. 299.

1. The *Bāhiranidāna* of *Samantapāsādikā (VinA.* p. 100) Refers to this monastery as Issaranimmānvihāra. N. A. Jayawickrama *(Inception of Discipline and Vinaya-Nidāna, SBB.* xii, p. 117, note 103, 4) observes that in all other Pali sources the name occurs as Issarasamaṇārāma.

2. N. A. Jayawickrama (op. cit. p. 118) observes; "There, however, is still a possibility of the popular identification being correct if the sixth century inscription followed those of the first century in interpretting Isiramaṇa as Issarasamaṇa for the term Isiramaṇa is certainly a more elegant cpd. in Pali than Issarasamaṇa and the Chroniclers would certainly have preferred it if it was known to them. The sixth century inscription is more reliable as the term Isiramaṇa may have been an epithet and not a name."

of the modern highway. Apart from these caves there are other structural remains such as the ruins of a breached dāgäba on the summit of one of the rocks (described as Rock A) and some pillars.

The rock-caves served as cells for the hermit monks, and in them, just below the drip-ledge *(kaṭārama),* are found short donative inscriptions in the *Brāhmī* script of the Asokan type. These inscriptions could be ascribed, palaeographically, either to the period of king Duṭṭhagāmaṇi (161–137 B.C.) or to an earlier date and are classed among th earliest inscriptions of Ceylon (*EZ.* I, 10 ff.). The following examples would indicate the nature of their language and contents.

1. *Damarakita-tera(śa)*
   Agata-anagata-catudiśa (sa)gaśa
   Aṇikata[3]-Sona-pitaha bariya(u)paśika-Ti(śa)ya leṇa

"The cave of the female devotee Tiśa (Tissā) wife of the father of Anikaṭa-Soṇa (is dedicated) to Dhammarakkhita thera (and) to the (Buddhist) priesthood of the four quarters, present and not present."

2. *Parumaka-Paḷikada bariya*
   parumaka-Śirikita-jhita upaśika-Citaya leṇa
   śagasā catudiśa

"The cave of the female devotee Cita (Citrā), daughter of His Eminence Sirikiti wife of His Eminence Palikada (is dedicated) to the (Buddhist) priesthood of the four quarters."

3. *Yahaśini[4] (śamaṇa)ya leṇa agata-anagata-catudiśa-śagaśa.*

"The cave of Yahaśini (samaṇa) is dedicated to the Buddhist priesthood of the four quarters, present and not present."

Among the donors named in these inscriptions there are several males, a few females and one monk. Names of fathers and husbands of donors are also sometimes mentioned. Several of these persons bore the title of *parumaka* meaning chieftain. The caves are usually dedicated to the monks of all the four quarters, but in one instance the name of an individual monk, viz. Dhammarakkhita, is also mentioned. It has ben suggested that all these donors and their relatives belonged to one family (*EZ.* I, 18 ff.).

Apart from these cave-inscriptions, there are also a few rock-inscriptions engraved on the surface of the boulders. These have been assigned to a later period than the cave-inscriptions. One of them, assigned to the second century A.C. records the donation of a cell to an individual named Asalaya. Another rock-inscription of nine lines probably belongs to the period from the fourth to the ninth century A.C. and is too shallowly incised to permit any reading (*EZ.* I, 21 f.).

Four other rock-inscriptions engraved on the eastern face of rock B and assigned to the period between king Kassapa I (473-91 A.C.) and king Kumāradāsa (508-16 A.C.) are similar in their contents, viz., the obtaining of freedom by certain individuals named in the inscriptions. In one case, it is mentioned that this was done by paying one hundred *kahāpaṇas* to the monastery. These four inscriptions reveal the fact that Buddhist monasteries in Sri Lanka of this time, owned serfs both male and female (*EZ.* IV, 128 ff.).

Inscriptions of some Sinhalese kings recording endowments to this monastery are also found at the site. Of them, a fragmentary inscription of king Sirināga II (240-42 A.C.) records a grant of certain irrigation tanks and villages by his father, presumably to the monastery on the site, i.e., Issarasanaṇa-vihāra. Of the places mentioned in this inscription Maṇikāragāmaka-vāpī is possibly the one mentioned in the *Mahāvaṃsa* (xxxv, 47) as having been granted to the Issarasamaṇa-vihāra by king Candamukha Siva (*EZ.* Iv, 218 ff.).

The two slab-inscriptions of Mahinda IV, mentioned above, record the benefactions of this ruler to the inmates of this monastery. The longer one of these records is in the form of an edict issued in the ninth year of his reign. Its main purpose was to provide, in perpetuity, a definite supply of water from the Tissa tank for the purpose of irrigating the lands adjoining the monastery. The order was made, as stated in the inscription, when the monks of the monastery, headed by the steward of the Mahamevnā Fraternity complained to the king. The other record, of the tenth year of the king's reign, records certain injunctions with regard to the gift of food, clothing, cattle and land to this monastery (*EZ.* I, 23 ff.).

The Jetavanārāma slab-inscription (*EZ.* I, 213 ff.) of this ruler further records that he repaired the Kassapagiri-vihāra and built a great edifice *(mahāpāsāda)* in Inssarasamaṇa-vihāra (Isurmaṇu-veher). Both references are possibly to this monastery.

H. R. Perera

IṢṬA-DEVATĀ, sometimes referred to as *abhīṣṭa-devatā* is a chosen, favourite god; a god particularly worshipped

3. Aṇikaṭa could also mean "a soldier of high rank" (from Pali aṇīkaṭṭha).

4. The name probably is Yasassinī, a nun *(samaṇā),* and not a monk *(samaṇa).* If it is 'of the monk', the Sinhala should be "samaṇaha". The text has 'samaṇa(ya), which is same as *samaṇāya* (f).

and looked upon as the spiritual guide, inspirer and guardian angel by one who adopts him as one's *iṣṭa-devatā*. It is customary to refer to to *iṣṭa-devatā* as tutelary god in English. But this term does not fully convey the exact nature and function of the *iṣṭ-devatā* as understood in later Buddhism. It is a fact that is as much as an *iṣṭa-devatā* provides protection he is also a tutelary god. But this is only one of his functions and certainly not the most important one. There are other types of gods normally referred to in Sanskrit as *rakṣā-devatā* (Pali, *ārakkha-devatā* or *rakkhā-saṃvidhāna devatā)* who are specifically assigned with the task of providing protection to the worshippers. The river-gods, tree-gods and the like belong to the same class. The *iṣṭa-devatā,* too, may originally have been a class of guardian deities who merely looked after the general well-being of the suppliant. Later, most probably due to religious influence, they were also assigned with the task of providing spiritual guidance and inspiration and this became their most important function.

The *iṣṭa-devatā* are not referred to in Pali Buddhist texts. The belief in *iṣṭa-devatā* seems to have crept into Buddhism from the popular beliefs at a time when the faith in gods and their influence over men as well as the belief in spiritual contact between gods and men had gained much importance in Buddhism. The concept of *iṣṭa-devatā* finds an important place in Mahāyāna Buddhism. It appears that numerous eminent Mahāyāna scholars have placed themselves under the spiritual guidance and guardianship of particular *iṣṭa-devatā*. Asaṅga was one such scholar. He had Maitreya as his *iṣṭa-devatā (EncyBsm.* II, p. 135). This belief in *iṣṭa-devatā* gained more importance after the development of Tantrism in which initiation, and spiritual contact with particular gods played a very important role.

In Tibet, too, a similar belief is very prominent. There, this class of gods is referred to as *yi-dam.* Every lama has to put himself under the protection of a special *yi-dam.* To make himself acceptable to a particular *yi-dam* a lama has to meditate and practise asceticism. If a lama happens to succeed in acquiring the guidance of a *yi-dam,* the deva will reveal himself to the lama. This revelation takes place when the lama is in a proper meditative state. A *yi-dam* may be chosen for a particular enterprise or else for a life-time. It is also possible to choose several *yi-dam* at a time, a development which seems to have taken place in Tibet. However, it is important that the choice should be kept a secret if it is to be really effective. Even laymen could place themselves under the guidance and protection of a *yi-dam.* For this the services of a lama are necessary as laymen cannot appeal directly to a *yi-dam.* A *yi-dam* is normally more effective when worshipped in the company of his Sakti.

(For details see YI-DAM).

S. K. Nanayakkara

ĪŚVARA. The concept of Īśvara as the material as well as the efficient cause of the universe, the mediator who reveals the absolute impersonal world principle (i.e., the Brahman) could be traced to the Upaniṣadic philosophy. However, whether the origin of this concept is anterior to the origin of Buddhism or whether it is coeval with the origin of Buddhism is not quite certain. It is quite clear from Upaniṣadic literature that this concept was evolved out of the concept of the unqualified, impersonal, absolute world principle *(nirguṇa Brahman).* It was held that this *nirguṇa Brahman* in association with *Māyā,* which is its own inscrutable power, becomes the qualified impersonal world principle *(saguṇa Brahman).* In Upaniṣadic thought itself this *saguṇa Brahman* assumed the form of a personal god. Thus, the *saguṇa Brahman* was described as the divine Providence which determines the course of the universe, the Lord *(Īśvara)* the Great Lord *(Maheśvara),* Siva, Rudra, Īśāna and so on. The creation, preservation and destruction of the universe is attributed to this Īśvara.

Of these two aspects of Īśvara namely, the qualified impersonal world principle and personal god, it is the latter that is found referred to in early Pali Buddhist texts. Therein the personal creator god is referred to as Issara who is treated as being identical with Brahmā. The Buddha quite explicitly rejects and refutes the belief in a creator god. (see CREATION).

A concept similar to that of Īśvara as described in the *Upaniṣads* and Vedāntic texts is found in the later Mahāyāna conception of Tathāgata. As it is the case with all types of absolutisms the Mādhyamikas and the Vijñānavādins, too, felt the need for a mediator who reveals the Absolute. On the one hand, the Absolute, too, is unable to declare itself. Therefore, a mediator became essential in both Mādhyamika and Vijñānavāda. Just as Īśvara is a manifestation of the impersonal absolute world principle *(nirguṇa Brahman),* Tathāgata, too, is a manifestation of the Absolute, i.e., *Śūnya* or *Prajñā.* But there are certain marked differences, too, between Īśvara and Tathāgata. For instance, Īśvara, for the purpose of revealing the true nature of the Absolute, does not assume the form of a man. But the Tathāgata does assume the form of a man and leads a life in conformity with the general modes of human life. The functions of creation, preservation and destruction of the universe are not attributed to the Tathāgata. But instead, the theory of karma is put forward to account for them.

The concept of Īśvara plays a major role in the Aiśvarika doctrine of Nepalese Buddhism. This may be due to the fact that Nepalese Buddhism has absorbed much from the cult of Siva which is of special importance in Nepal. According to the teaching of the Aiśvarika doctrine when all was void *(śūnya),* the sacred syllable ōm became manifest and in that syllable Īśvara (identified

with the Ādi-Buddha), by his own will, revealed himself in the form of light.[1] This Īśvara, the self existent great being, for the purpose of creation, became Pañca-jñānātmika (possessing five kinds of knowledge). By separate acts of meditation he created the five Dhyāni-buddhas who became the immediate source of the five elements *(pañca-bhūta),* five faculties *(pañca-indriya)* and five spheres of perception *(pañca-āyatana).*

The *Svayambhū-purāṇa,* an important text of the Aiśvarika school, teaches that he is the essence of both *pravṛtti* (the state in which intellectual essence exists mixed with matter) and *nivṛtti* (the state in which intellectual essence exists separate from matter). In the *nivṛtti* state he is formless. But in the *pravṛtti* state he is one with everything, being the ultimate source of every thing. An aspirant rises to the state of divinity and finally gets absorbed into Īśvara by grasping this real nature of Īśvara. See AISVARIKA DOCTRINE.

S. K. Nanayakkara

ITALY. In Italy, knowledge of Buddhism goes back to the times of the Roman Empire and its contacts with the Hellenistic kingdoms of Asia Minor, which entertained close connections with the culture of the East, and in particular with Buddhist culture. This can be seen from the accounts of Plutarch, Strabo, from the Indo-Greek text *The Questions of King Milinda,* dating from the 1st century C.E., as well as from the traces of Eastern thought in Hellenistic philosophy.

From the fall of the Roman Empire to the beginning of the second millenium C.E. contact seems to have been only very occasional, but with the progressive opening of the Silk Road, that stretched all the way from Venice to *Cathay,* some forms of Buddhism began to be known through travellers' reports. As a well-known example of this is Marco Polo's *Il Milione,* where, in writing about his return from Mongolia after a visit to Sri Lanka, he refers to a certain Sergamo (Sakyamuni) who, "if he had been a baptized Christian would surely have been a great saint before God", and tells some stories about his childhood which are the same as found in the *Buddha-carita* tradition.

During the period of the rise of humanism and the Italian Renaissance we have no evidence of any knowledge of, or particular interest in, Buddhism, but a more systematic exploration of Eastern thought started with the Counter-Reformation, when the Church of Rome began to devote increasing attention to the evangelization of the East. Thus we have, in the 16th and 17th centuries, a number of Jesuit missionaries sending back information on Buddhism. These reports were mostly not very favourable, especially as regards the liturgy of Lamaism, which was often regarded as a demoniacal parody of Catholic liturgy. The first missionary expeditions, initiated by St. Francis Saverio, were directed first to Japan in 1549, and from there to China, where father Matteo Ricci (1552–1610) spent many years of his life and acquired a thorough knowledge of the language. Father Ricci lived at the imperial court and adopted its customs and way of life in an effort to understand that world from within. On his return to the West, he translated and commented on a number of very important Chinese texts, so that he can rightly be considered the first European Sinologist. Another highly significant figure was Father Ippolito Desideri of Pistoia, who took an unprejudiced view of Tibetan Buddhism and studied it closely during his stay in Ladakh and Tibet from 1715 to 1721. He produced the first translation of *Lam rim c'en mo,* the great compendium of Tsong Khapa, for the purpose of refuting it from the Christian point of view. Desideri had a thorough knowledge of Mahayana Buddhism, and what he has to say about it in his *Nuovo Ramusio* can still be read with interest today. Still in the field of Sinology, we also have the Franciscan Father Basilio Bollo, who compiled the first Chinese-Latin dictionary in the 18th century (published only in 1812 in Paris by Des Grigues), and Father Zottoli's five volume *Cursus Literaturea Sinicae,* published in Shanghai between 1878 and 1885. In Naples, a "Collegio dei Cinesi" had been founded in 1732, which in the course of time was to become the present "Istituto Universitario Orientale".

It is not until the end of the 19th century, and the beginning of the 20th, that we find in the academic circles of the new united Kingdom of Italy, established in 1870, the first stirrings of serious interest in Oriental studies, following upon similar initiatives in other European countries. Sanskrit language studies were already represented in Italian universities, for instance in Turin, where Gaspare Gorresio translated the *Rāmāyana,* and A. Severini and C. Puini were active at the Royal Institute for Higher Studies. Puini, an eminent Sinologist, translated the *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra* from Chinese (1911). In Florence there was an Italian Asiatic Society (1886–1935), but its activities were still very marginal as compared to the work being done in this field in other European countries such as Great Britain, France and Germany. As for the practice of Buddhism, it is only with the work of De Lorenzo (1871–1957) that it can be said to have come

1. It should be noted that even this connection between the sacred syllable ōm and Īśvara could be traced to Upaniṣadic philosophy. According to Upaniṣadic thought ōm is the mystic syllable par excellence. As its monotonous repetition had the power of bringing about concentration, it was made the object of meditation and came to be considered as the most natural expression for Īśvara.

into being. De Lorenzo, far from being a philologist or an orientalist, was Director of the Institute of Geology and Professor of Physics at the University of Neples. He translated the *Majjhima Nikāya* from K. E. Neumann's German translation, published in Austria, was converted to Buddhism and made a public profession of faith shortly before his death.

The knowledge of Buddhism in Italy, however, owes the greatest debt to the major scientific achievements of Giuseppe Tucci (1894-1984). Tucci was not only a conscientious scholar and someone who respected and appreciated the spiritual values of Buddhism, but he also trained a whole school of Orientalists who have subsequently made valuable contributions to the dissemination of scientific knowledge of Buddhism in Italy and in the world. Tucci, inspired by a deep personal interest in Vajrayāna Buddhism, was a prolific worker in many related fields. He spent long periods in the East, taught at the universities of Santiniketan and Calcutta from 1925 to 1930, travelled extensively in Nepal and carried out eight scientific expeditions in Western and Central Tibet, visiting some previously unexplored areas and collecting a wealth of historical information and literary and artistic materials which he then studied in depth and published in a series of volumes issued under the imprint of the Academy of Italy. He directed five archaeological campaigns in the Swat valley (Pakistan) and three in Afghanistan. He translated classics such as the *Bardo Thosgrol* and many of his works were published in seven volumes under the title of *Indo-Tibetica* (Rome, 1932-1941) as well as in individual publications such as *Tibetan Painted Scrolls* (Rome, 1949), *Teoria e Pratica del Mandala* (Rome, 1969) and *Die Religionen Tibets* (Stuttgart, 1970). Tucci, in addition to studying Tibetan culture in depth, did much to help in its preservation by saving thousands of manuscripts from destruction in the period immediately preceding the Chinese invasion. These are now preserved at ISMEO (Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente) in Rome, an institution which was founded by Tucci, who was also its first President, in 1948. ISMEO today has branches in Milan and Turin (CESMEO) as well, and is carrying on its founder's programme of work by supporting research by young scholars on Oriental disciplines, and financing a variety of activities including archaeological field research, such as the above mentioned expeditions in the valleys of Swat (where Indo-Greek culture had flourished) and others in China and South-East Asia, research by Eastern art historians such as the late Prof. M. Bussagli, and also anthropological expeditions, for instance those conducted by R. Mastromattei to investigate the influence of shamanic rituals on the practices of lamaism in the Himalayas.

In addition to Tucci and De Lorenzo, other important 20th century scholars include: P. E. Pavolini, who combined a profound knowledge of both the ancient and modern languages and literatures of the Indian subcontinent with a broad philosophical approach and a subtle appreciation of works of art, and was the author, amongst others, of *Buddhismo* (1898), *I manoscritti indiani della Biblioteca Nazionale di Firenze* (1907), *Mille sentenze indiane* (1927); E. Formichi, Professor of Sanskrit at Pisa and Rome, who also taught at Santiniketan and whose book *Il pensiero religioso dell'India prima del Buddha* reveals great mastery of the subject, L. Sauli, E. Frola, V. Talamo; P. Filippani Ronconi and R. Gnoli who at various times translated the *Dīgha Nikāya* and the *Khuddaka Nikāya* from Pali as well as sections from the Sanskrit canon.

In Rome Tucci's successor in the Chair of Religions and Philosophies of India and the Far East is Corrado Pensa, who has carried on the tradition of lively interest in Buddhist spirituality not only in the academic field, but also at the practical level, as a meditation teacher and leader of one of the insight meditation *(vipassanā)* groups in Rome that practices in the Theravāda forest tradition. Pensa is the author of several works on Buddhism and can be regarded as typical of a new kind of Orientalist who, starting with historical and philological research has moved on to the realm of religious and spiritual experience, thus blending intellectual endeavour with meditative practice. In Turin, a group of scholars under the guidance of Oscar Botto, author of several works on Buddhism (e.g. *Il Buddhismo,* 1959) are working on various aspects, including the study of Pali and Sanskrit texts. In Naples, at the Oriental Institute, we find the Tibetan Namkhai Norbu, invited there by Tucci in 1960, who is actively engaged in promoting the knowledge of Tibetan language and culture in Italy. From 1976, Namkhai Norbu has also been the leader of a lay community in the Dzong Chen tradition, with a centre in a secluded part of Tuscany, at Arcidosso on the slopes of Mount Amiata. The whole tradition of Tibetan studies in Italy owes much to the pioneer work of Tucci and of L. Petech, the historian, who laid the foundations for a remarkable development of Italian Oriental studies.

In philosophical studies, some interest in Buddhism began to emerge at the turn of the century. The philosopher P. Martinetti, for instance, was lecturing on "Indian Wisdom" at Milan University by the early years of this century. His interest in Indian thought had probably developed through his study of Schopenhauer, but he did tend to interpret Hinduistic and Buddhist teachings on the basis of Western philosophical concepts and categories which were not relevant to them and did not facilitate their understanding. To turn to more recent times, during the sixties Giogio Colli showed specific interest in Buddhism, generated no doubt by his work on Nietzsche, on whom he is a recognized authority. In Padua, G. Pasqualotto has specialized in the relationship

between Western and Eastern thought, having made a thorough study of the connections between Nietzsche and Zen, and Heidegger and Zen. The Venetian school of Cacciari and Severino has also produced some interesting research along similar lines.

In psychology, Buddhism has met with a ready reception both on the part of many practising psychologists and in academic circles. In recent years, in fact, interest in Buddhism at universities, both in Italy and in other Western countries, has spread from the specific field of Oriental studies to other sectors such as Psychology. This has involved the development of an experimental approach, and a new interest in meditative practice which was originally shunned by traditional Orientalists locked in their historical and philological approach. This opening up of a new prospect in psychology and psychotherapy, which is an integral part of the contemporary cultural scene, has led to considerable interest in the experimental field. Today, no treatise on psychology is complete without a chapter on meditation, and there are many scholars who combine strict experimental research with a genuine deep interest in Buddhist religious experience. In this connection particular mention should be made of the work of C. Pensa, already briefly referred to above. Pensa started as a traditional Orientalist, then followed a full course of training as a Jungian analyst, became a member of the International Association of Analytical Psychology and is also very closely linked —as will be seen later — with the Insight Meditation Centre in Barre (Massachusetts, USA). In his work, Pensa establishes close links between Western psychology and Buddhist meditative practices. Another important figure in Italian psychology is Riccardo Venturini, Professor of Clinical Psychophysiology at Rome University. For over twenty years Venturini has been pursuing the study of states of consciousness in the double context of Western Psychology and Eastern traditions, with particular reference to the effects of meditative practice. He has developed the knowledge and practice of this subject not only through his own considerable work, but also by training a significant numbet of researchers working alsong the same lines who collaborate with him in research projects and also as members of various Buddhist movements and religious associations for peace, such as the World Conference of Religions for Peace (WCRP).

BUDDHISM IN ITALY TODAY — From the point of view of actual practice, Buddhism is a relatively recent phenomenon in Italy. Leaving aside De Lorenzo, who was the pioneer in spreading knowledge about Buddhism in Italy with his *India e buddhismo antico* in 1926, and —to some extent — Tucci, whose *Buddhismo* was also published in 1926, a more generalized knowledge and, subsequently, practice of Buddhism began to develop only after the Second World War and, more specifically, in the late sixties and early seventies. In the sixties, L. Martinelli founded in Florence the "Associazione Buddhista Italiana", which had links with the London Buddhist Society and with the Buddhist Publication Society in Kandy, and launched the first Italian Buddhist review, named *Buddhismo Scientifico* (1967). It is also mainly due to his efforts that, more recently, a pagoda has been opened in the Tuscan countryside, near the village of Pieve a Socana, with facilities for individual retreat in the various Buddhist traditions and, at the present time, there is a Ch'an monk in residence.

Tucci's invitations brought some Tibetan refugees to Italy, prominent amongst them geshe Jampel Senghe, who worked for years at ISMEO in Rome and founded a group in the Gelugpa tradition, "Samantabhadra", which is still active today in Rome, with a resident lama, under the spiritual guidance of Dagpo Rinpoce.

The largest Buddhist institution in Italy also belongs to the Gelugpa tradition. This is the "Lama Tsong Khapa" institute di Pomaia, near Pisa, founded in 1976 by lama Thubten Yeshe and lama Zopa Rinpoce within the framework of the FPMT (Foundation for the Preservation of Mahāyāna Tradition). This Foundation is an association of Gelugpa centres established by lama Yeshe, which recognized the Dalai Lama as its supreme authority and lama Zopa as the spiritual guide of all associated centres. The institute in Pomaia is the focal point of a Buddhist community composed of Tibetan teachers and translators, Western monks and nuns and lay persons. There is a lama in residence throughout the year who teaches and advises on meditation. The institute was created for a dual purpose: to give inspiration and spiritual guidance and to provide a practical facility for the organization of study courses, seminars, lectures and other activities. It also publishes a periodical, *Siddhi* which, apart from being the means of communication for promoting the centre's activities, also provides a forum for the publication of articles on various aspects of practice.

The "Ghe pel ling" centre in Milan is similar in nature, though it operates in an urban context. This centre is linked to the "Tharpa Choeling" Monastery and Study Centre in Le Mont Pelerin, in Switzerland, originally under the leadership of the late Geshe Rabten and connected also with the great "Rikon" Monastery for Tibetan refugees on the Swiss Alps. Other Tibetan centres, both in the Gelugpa tradition and in the Kagyu tradition of Kalo Rinpoce are found in various localities in Northern and Central Italy, such as the already mentioned group led by Namkhai Norbu with headquarters in Arcidosso (Tuscany). This, known as the "Shang Shung Institute" is both a centre for retreats, encounters and seminars and also a publishing firm

producing Tibetan texts in translation and a bilingual English-Italian review called *Merigar*. No Buddhist centres can be said to exist in the South, with the exception of a small group in Sicily, centred round the Japanese monk Morishita of the Nipponzan Myohoji Order. They are peace activists and intend to build a pagoda in Comiso, near a NATO base.

Zen and Theravāda traditions are also represented in the Central and Northern parts of the country. The Italian Zen Association has its headquarters in Salsomaggiore, in the Shobozan Fudenji Monastery, under the leadership of a disciple of Deshimaru, ven. Fausto Taiten Guareschi, who founded this permanent community in 1984. It has a number of affiliated centres in other parts of Italy (Rome, Milan, Rimini, Vercelli, etc.). The Association publishes books on Zen and also a review, *Zen*, circulated to all members, which is specifically devoted to the Soto tradition and publishes articles and teachings by masters in that tradition. There are other Soto Zen centres in Milan, and a group named "Stella del Mattino" (Morning Star), also of the Dogen school, near Fano (on the Adriatic coast, near Urbino), and they are all gradually expanding their activities.

More recently the Theravāda tradition has also come to Italy, with several groups and activities inspired by different teachers. In the North, there are groups in the Burmese tradition of U Ba Khin: one follows the teachings of ma Sayama, another those of S. N. Goenka (Vipassanā Italia, Cinisello Balsamo, Milan) and a third one those of John Coleman (Insight Meditation Centre, Ponte dell'Olio, Piacenza), all three teachers having been originally trained by U Ba Khin personally. Just South of Rome, at Sezze, there is a monastery, Santacittārāma, in the tradition of the late Ajahn Cha, under the spiritual guidance of Ajahn Sumedho. There are monks in residence and the abbot is an Italian Theravāda monk who has lived and worked in South East Asia. The monastery is supported by the embassies of Sri Lanka, Thailand and Burma, as well as by donations from lay followers and provides a meeting place for Asian Buddhists in Rome and Naples. Italy, unlike France and Great Britain, never had any colonies in Asia and did not therefore, until now, have any very large numbers of Asians living in the metropolitan territory. In recent years, however, this state of affairs has changed owing to immigrants coming to Italy from Asia in search of work. It is now estimated that there are some 10,000 Buddhists from Asia living in Italy, mainly in the major cities. The embassy of Sri Lanka, in particular, felt that there was a need to provide this new community with an opportunity to practise their religion and, with the assistance of the Maitreya Foundation (to which detailed reference is made below) it has been possible to establish this centre for Buddhists in the Theravāda tradition.

Another very active group of Theravādin inspiration in Rome is the "Associazione per la meditazione di consapevolezza" (Insight Mediation Association), known as A.Me.Co., initiated and guided by Corrado Pensa, already mentioned earlier on. A.Me.Co., founded in 1987, has links with the Insight Meditation Center of Barre (Massachusetts, USA), a leading Western centre of the Theravāda tradition and, like it, takes its inspiration from the Burmese tradition of Mahasi Sayadaw and the Thai forest tradition, of which the late Ajahn Cha was one of the foremost exponents. The purpose of A.Me.Co. is to provide organizational support for the teaching and practice of vipassanā meditation in a lay context under the guidance of qualified teachers. The Association organizes seminars, urban retreats and courses both for beginners and for advaced meditators on a non-denominational basis and, more particularly, with an inter-religious orientation, that is to say in a manner receptive to the experience of other religious traditions. The readiness to inter-religious dialogue is one of the basic characteristics of this group, as well as the close attention paid to the connections with psychology and to the interaction between Buddhist practice and psychotherapeutic action for progressive personal growth, harmony and a full acceptance of things as they are *(yathābhūta)*.

Rome is also the seat of an institution of great importance for Italian Buddhism: the Maitreya Foundation, whose founder and current president Vincenzo Piga has been and continues to be one of the most active and important personalities of Buddhism in Italy. Vincenzo Piga, a journalist by profession and formerly Italian representative in EEC (European Economical Community) Committees in Brussels, has devoted his life to laying the foundations for the development of Buddhism in Italy by furnishing assistance to centres, publishing the reivew ***Pāramitā – Quaderni di Buddhismo*** now already in its tenth year and promoting the establishment and recognition by Italian authorities, of the Italian Buddhist Union (UBI). With the Mairtreya Foundation, which he has himself endowed with financial means, Vincenzo Piga has created an inter-Buddhist structure for the purpose of promoting the study and understanding of Buddhist culture in all its traditions, the practice of the corresponding meditative techniques and the comparative study of this culture in relation to the culture of the West, especially in the fields of psychology, theology and philosophy. The Foundation is active not only in Rome, but also in other Italian cities, promoting seminars with qualified teachers, inter-religious dialogue, the publication of Buddhist texts, as well as giving prizes for university theses on Buddhist subjects and providing financial assistance to centres. Vincenzo Piga's activities have been of fundamental importance for the dissemi-

nation and consolidation of Buddhism in Italy, provides a forum for all Buddhist schools and endeavours to encourage encounters with the disciplines of psychology and science and to develop interreligious dialogue, a matter of fundamental importance in a country like Italy, seat of the Catholic Church for almost two thousand years. At present, inter-religious dialogue with representatives of the Catholic Church is proving very fruitful, with many mutual exchanges in relation to monastic practices and meditative experiences, but there have nevertheless been contrary reactions in some sectors of the Vatican Curia, as evidenced by the warning letter issued by Cardinal Ratzinger in 1990. Especially in Italy, Buddhism in inter-religious dialogue represents an invitation to overcome all temptations to "apportion" areas of religiosity and a call to go beyond the niceties of diplomacy and mere tolerance to engage in a living dialogue conducted as a mutual reassesment of traditions, in the common search for true coexistence in religious experience.

Another undertaking where Piga's contribution has been of crucial importance has been the establishment of the Italian Buddhist Union (UBI. i.e. Unione Buddhista Italiana) in 1985 and its formal recognition by the Italian authorities in 1989. UBI is a member of the European Buddhist Union (EBU), representing 25 Italian Buddhist centres of all traditions and some 30,000 practising Buddhists, and it is recognized as their official representative in dealings with the Italian state. Every year, the festival of Vesak is celebrated by a gathering of UBI members in one of the centres, which contributes to the development of an ever broader and more solid common foundation for all traditions of Buddhism in Italy.

A brief mention should also be made of Buddhist schools in the Japanese Niohiren tradition, which have gained substantial numbers of adherents, especially in Northern and Central Italy. These groups, very closely tied to the Japanese tradition, do not adhere to the UBI and are not disposed to have dealings with other Buddhist persuasions or to engage in inter-religious dialogue.

Finally, a brief reference to the production of works on Buddhism and of Italian translations of canonical and classic, texts, which has gained significant impetus in recent years, thanks in particular to the effort of some major publishers (UTET. Mondadori, Rizzoli, Ubaldini) in bringing out both scientific works and books of interest to the general public. There are now available reliable Italian translations of the *Dīgha Nikāya* (E. Frola), the *Khuddaka Nikāya* (P. Filippani Ronconi), the *Majjhima Nikāya* (De Lorenzo), as well as a number of texts from the Sanskrit canon (R. Gnoli) and also of some non-canonical works, such as *The Questions of King Milinda* (M.A. Fala'), *Buddhacarita* (Formichi) and *The Tibetan Book of the Dead* (G. Tucci). Further efforts are needed, however, to produce more scientifically reliable Italian translations of basic texts.

For the general public, many important works by masters of all Buddhist traditions have been translated and published. This has made Buddhism accessible to large sectors of the public and contributed to the increase in numbers of practising Buddhists in Italy.

Maria Angela Fala'

ITI-VUTTAKA, meaning "Thus said (statements)": name of a canonical text, the fourth book of the ***Khuddaka*** *Nikāya,* and thus called because every sutta begins with the phrase *vuttaṃ hetaṃ bhagavatā....* meaning 'thus said the Buddha', This work consisting of discourses mainly addressed to bhikkhus (bhikkhunis are referred to once only in § 69) is a collection of sayings dealing with ethical matters and occasionally with doctrinal problems. Thus it contains pithy sayngs on lust, hate, delusion, anger, good conduct as well as on Nibbāna, existence and non-existence and so on. It is not a continuous work and, therefore, there is hardly any sequence in contents.

It contains short suttas interspersed with prose and verse and hence cited as an illustration of ***geyya*** by the commentators in their explanation of the nine ***ahgas.*** It is in the main divided into 112 suttas which are grouped under four *nipātas* (sections) divided into ***vaggas*** (chapters). The ideas are expressed partly in prose and repeated in verse in about fifty instances. An idea briefly expressed in prose is sometimes amplified in verse. In a few instances only one verse has relevance to the prose narration while there are several verses which have no connection whatever with the prose. At times the prose and verse portions supplement each other whereas there are also instances in which the prose represents an independent sutta while the verses that follow it are only remotely connected with it. In a few cases the prose and verse contradict each other.

It is generally held that the verses form the nucleus of the work, while the prose portions, which are meant to introduce and explain the verses, were added by the redactor to serve as a commentary on the verses. The prose written in didactc style is simple but inelegant and abounds in repetition of formulas and phrases. The verses, too, are garbed in simple language. But they, too, reveal a lack of internal rhyme. They are composed mainly in śloka meter of an irregular type.[1] There is much

1. For details regarding the metre see *JAOS. vol.* 28, pp. 317 ff.

repetition. In some cases the phraseology is almost identical and in others there is repetition word for word.[2]

Figures of speech are rather rare and the few that are present are not particularly vivid. For few of the best metaphors see §§ 28, 29, 75, 76, 100. The work also contains resumés *(uddāna)* of contents in verse which attempt to sum up the topics that are dealt with in the text. These verses refer back to the prose portions, and therefore, when the prose and verse of a section happen to be different in subject matter the topics dealt with in verse are not touched upon in the *uddānas* suggesting that the early editor of the text looked upon the prose as the nucleus of the anthology. The verses however, are conjectured to be more primitive on the analogy of a similar collection *Udānapāḷi* where the prose serves as a *nidāna* to the *udāna* verse.

The Buddhist tradition, as it normally does with regard to all canonical texts, regards the whole *Iti-vuttaka* as containing sayings uttered by the Buddha *(Buddha-vacana).* Modern scholars do not endorse this tradition and prefer to regard it as a collection of sayings, which may also include sayings of the Buddha, put together by some unknown redactor who wrote the prose portions to serve as a commentary on the verses. Winternitz suggests that expressing an idea first in prose and then garbing it in verse or commencing the presentation of a doctrine in prose and then continuing it in verse was an old form of Buddhist composition and that texts having this form were collected in the *Iti-vuttaka.* He is also of opinion that when this was being done even prose texts and verses which were taken from elsewhere were also combined on the same pattern and inserted into the *Iti-vuttaka* collection possibly by the first compiler himself but perhaps not till later.[3] G.C. Pande says that the *Iti-vuttaka* reveals either two or three different strata. According to him the first two *nipātas* belong to the same stratum and consist of the earliest elements. The third *nipāta* has both early and late matter. In his opinion the fourth is quite late, for its contents are doctrinally more advanced and its composition is also partly dependent on the preceeding suttas and the *Aṅguttara-nikaya.*[4] A comparison with the extant Chinese version, too, proves this point.

The Chinese version is by Hsüan-tsang and consits of seven fascicles. The work is divided into three sections called *Eka-dharma-khaṇḍa. Dvi-dharma-⁰* and *Tri-dharma-⁰.* These are further divided into chapters. The *uddānas* are also found. In the main the Chinese version agrees with the Pali. Out of the 112 suttas the Chinese version has 65. But the Chinese version contains also suttas not found in the Pali original. The whole of the fourth *nipāta* is wanting in the Chinese version which is based on a Sanskrit rendering called *Iti-vṛttaka* which is presumsbly lost.[5] (For a very detailed account see J.H. Moores's trls. of *Iti-vuttaka* under the title, *Sayings of* the Buddha, New York, 1908, Intro.).

S. K. Nanayakkara

I-TSING (I-ching), whose original name was Chân and who had the literary appellation Wan-miṅ is a well-known Chinese traveller, a junior contemporary of Hsüan-tsang, who visited India in the latter part of the 7th century and travelled widely studying Buddhism and collecting Buddhist scriptures.

I-tsing was born in 635 A.C. in Fan-yang (modern Cho-chou) during the reign of T'ai-tsung, 627–49. At the age of seven he started to learn under two renowned teachers namely, Shan-yü and Hui-hsi who lived in a temple on the mountain T'ai in Shan-tung. He was, probably, taught various aspects of Chinese literature. At the age of twelve, laying aside secular studies he completely devoted himself to the study of the Buddhist canon. At the age of fourteen he entered the Order, and received full ordination when he was twenty having Hui-hsi as his Karmācārya. Hui-hsi was greatly responsible for moulding his future. Hui-hsi stressed the importance of adhering firmly to the noble precepts of the Buddha and at the same time pointed out the fact that the Buddha's teaching was being misrepresented in China.

Following the advice of his revered teacher, I-tsing devoted five years to the study of Vinaya. After this he also learnt larger sūtras and practised certain ascetic practices *(dhutaṅgas).* Persuaded by his teacher he went to eastern Wei to study Asaṅga's work on Abhidharma. From there he went to Ch'ang-an to study two texts, namely the *Abhidharma-kośa* of Vasubandhu and the *Vidyāmātratā-siddhi* of Dharmapāla. While staying at Ch'ang-an he seems to have been greatly influenced by Hsüan-tsang's travels. The grand funeral ceremony accorded to the great traveller, too, may have prompted I-tsing to emulate Hsüan-tsang's career.

2. cp. verses on pp. 9 and 109; *vv.* on pp. 15 f. and 52; *vv.* on pp. 28 and 29; 2 lines of the 2nd verse on p. 32 and 2 lines of the verse in p. 46, p. 40; last verse on p. 45 and second verse on p. 90.
3. M. Winternitz, *A History of Indian Literature,* II, pp. 88 ff.
4. Regarding the stratification of the *Iti-vuttaka* and also on its dependence on *A.* see G.C. Pande, *Studies in the Origins of Buddhism,* University of Allahabad, 1957, pp. 63 ff.
5. See *JPTS.* 1907, pp. 44 ff.; cp. Nanjio, No. 714 where the text is referred to as *Mūla-vastu Sūtra;* Taishō, No. 765, 5.

He returned to Fan-yang in 670 A.C. and sought the advice of his teacher about his plan to visit India. Being encouraged by him, I-tsing set off to India in the following year, thus fulfilling a desire he first formed when he was just eighteen years old. Though a number of monks agreed to accompany him, finally only a young priest, called Shan-hiñg of Tsin-chou, accompanied him. Even he, after coming up to Sumatra, had to return to China owing to illness.

I-tsing reached Kwan-tung and managed, with the help of Fêng Hsiao-ch'üan, his chief benefactor, to embark on a ship. After about twenty days of sailing he reached Bhoja (the country of Śri-Bhoja = Malayu). There he disembarked and stayed for about eight months enjoying the hospitality of the king. In the meantime, he began to learn Sanskrit. From Bhoja he went to Ka-cha where he did not stay for long. Setting off from there he passed the country of the naked people (Andamans) and after about two and a half months of sailing in the north-western direction he reached Tāmralipti in Eastern India. There he met Ta-ch'êng-têng (Mahāyānapradīpa), a pupil of Hsüan-tsang and from him he further gained knowledge of Sanskrit and grammar. I-tsing, accompanied by Ta-ch'êng-têng, set out towards the west. Many merchants, too, joined them as fellow travellers. I-tsing was taken ill on the way and thereby failed to keep pace with his fellow travellers. When trudging alone he was set upon by bandits. However, he managed to escape and later disguising himself by smearing mud all over his body (this he did in order change his complexion for, he had heard a rumour that bandits used to kill fair complexioned men and offer them as sacrifice to gods) he resumed his journey and joined the company of his friend, Ta-chêng-têng. Later he arrived at Nālandā and also worshipped the Mūlagandhakuṭi. He also visited the Gṛdhrakūṭa mountain and the Mahābodhi vihāra. There he offered a robe to the Buddha image and also offered numerous other gifts that he had brought from pious devotees in China. Being eager to visit other sacred places he proceeded to Vaiśālī and Kuśīnagara. He visited the Deer Park, too, and ascended the Kukkuṭapādagiri near Gayā.

For ten years (675–85) he lived in the Nālandā-vihāra learning Buddhist texts. His main intention was to collect, as much as possible, Buddhist texts to be taken to his motherland. Therefore, while being engaged in religious studies he devoted his time to collect important Buddhist scriptures. He finally managed to gather Buddhist texts consisting of about five hundred thousand verses *(śloka)* and, taking these, he started his journey back to Tāmralipti. On his way back, too, he was set upon by bandits and it was with great difficulty that he escaped death. Having embarked from Tāmralipti he passed Ka-cha and reached Bhoja. The event that took place after he reached Bhoja is not quite clear. I-tsing had to stay for sometime in Bhoja. Whether he stayed of his own accord or whether he was forced to stay owing to unfavourable weather conditions is not explicitly stated. It appears that I-tsing seems to have cherished a liking to Bhoja for, of Bhoja he himself says thus: "In the fortified city of Bhoja Buddhist priests number more than 1,000, whose minds are bent on learning and good practices. They investigate and study all the subjects that exist just as in the middle kingdom (Madhya-deśa, India); the rules and ceremonies are not at all different. If a Chinese priest wishes to go to the west in order to hear (lectures) and read (the orginals), he had better stay here one or two years and practise the proper rules and then proceed to central India." *(A Record of the Buddhist Religion as Practised in India and the Malay Archipelago,* by I-tsing; trsl. by J. Takakusu, Oxford, 1896, Intro. xxxiv). It may be that I-tsing felt that Bhoja, owing to its proximity to Kwang-tung, the town of his chief benefactor, and also owing to its congenial atmosphere for the study of Buddhism, was the ideal place to stay for sometime and proceed with the work of copying the sūtras. Therefore, he intended to send a message through a merchant to his friends at Kwang-tung asking for paper, ink and money to hire scribes. However, this he could not accomplish. The merchants found the wind favourable and decided to sail to Kwang-fu. I-tsing, had to abandon his plan to stay in Bhoja, and sailed with the merchants to Kwang-fu.

I-tsing had spent almost eighteen years visiting sacred places, studying Buddhism and collecting Buddhist texts. Yet, after reaching Kwang-fu in 689, he felt that some important texts were still wanting. Therefore, he was anxious to go again. As he was then fairly old, being fifty-five years of age at the time, he wanted someone else to accompany him so that he would be able to entrust the books if something unexpected happened to him.

In 689 he again set sail in a merchant ship, accompanied by a monk, named Chêng-ku (Sālagupta), who was also an adept in Vinaya studies. Starting from P'an-yü, they sailed in the direction of Campā with the intention of reaching Bhoja after a long voyage. Besides Chên-ku, three other monks seem to have accompanied I-tsing. One of them was Tao-hung. All four of them studied sūtras at Bhoja. While staying in Bhoja I-tsing met Ta-ts'in, and through him sent a message to the emporor requesting him to build a temple in the west. He also sent translations of numerous sūtras and śāstras and also some works of his own.

This time I-tsing returned to his native country in 695 after being away for nearly six years. He brought along numerous other Buddhist texts and also a plan of the *Vajrāsana* (Diamond-seat) of the Buddha. After returning he was busy imparting the first hand knowledge he had gathered. He strove hard to give a true interpretation

of the doctrine. He engaged himself for twelve years translating fifty-six works in two hundred and thirty volumes. He translated all the texts of the Vinaya of the Mūlasarvāstivāda school, to which he himself belonged. He, also, founded a new school for the study of this branch of Buddhist literature in China. I-tsing died in 713 at the age of seventy-nine years. His life and his works were much commended by the emporor Chung-tsung, his contemporary, in the preface to the *Tripitaka Catalogue.*

A list of the fifty-six works translated by I-tsing is given in the Nanjio's catalogue (Appendix, II, No. 149). Some of these translations are the *Vajracchedikā-prajñā-pāramitā* (No. 14), the *Suvarṇaprabhāsottamarāja Sūtra* (No. 126), the *Mahāmāyūrī-vidyārajñī* (No. 306), *Sarva-pañcaskandhaśūnyatā Sūtra* (No. 634), *Mūla-sarvāstivāda-saṅghabheda-vastu* (No. 1123), *Mūla-sarvāstivāda-vinaya-saṃyukta-gāthā* (No. 1141), *Prajñapti-hetu-saṅgraha Śāstra* (No. 1228), *Nāgārjuna-bodhisattva-suhṛllekhā* (No. 1441).

I-tsing is, also, credited with the compilation of five other works (see *Nanjio,* Appendix, III, No. 33). One of these is the *Tâ-thâṅ-si-yü-chiu-fâ-kâo-sǝh-chahâṅ* (Memoirs of emient priests under the great *Thâṅ* dynasty, 618-907, A.C., who visited the western region or India and its neighbouring Countries, to search for the Law). This work which consists of two fascicles mentions fifty-six priests who went to India or its neighbourig countries in the 7th century; it also mentions the four companions of I-tsing on his second voyage. An extract from this has been published by Beal in the *JRAS. 1881, pp. 558-72 (Nanjio,* No. 1491).

Another work of I-tsing is the *Shwo-tsui-yâo-hhiṅ*-fâ (Rules for the important practice of confessing crimes and faults). The two works, *Shen-yuṅ-sân-shui-yao-hhiṅ-fâ (Rules for an important practice of the use of three kinds of water)* and *Hü-miṅ-fâṅ-shaṅ-kwêi-i-fâ (Rules for letting living things go for the sake of the preservation of their lives)* are also attributed to I-tsing. All these works are rather short and run into five, four and three leaves, respectively (*Nanjio,* Nos. 1506, 1507, 1508).

His most important work appears to be the *Nân-hâi-ki-kwêi-nêi-fâ-chuân (Records of the "inner law" or religion, sent from the south sea country through one who returns to China).* This work consists of four fascicles divided into forty chapters. This is a work on disciplinary matters or vinaya based on the *Vinaya Piṭaka* of the Mūlasarvāstivāda sect. It is this work that J. Takakusu has translated under the title *A record of the Buddhist Religion as practised in India and the Malay archipelago.* A cursory glance through the work reveals its importance as a book of discipline. Besides incorporating material gathered from the *Vinaya Piṭaka* of the Mūlasarvāstivādins and also describing practices he himself had seen, I-tsing also attempts to correct certain misinterpretations of the Vinaya rules as they were held in China. It should be borne in mind that one of the main purposes of his travels was to gain first-hand information on Buddhism and to prevent it from being misinterpreted in China. It is with this purpose in mind that he himself undertook the translation of fifty-six important Buddhist texts and also compiled a few other works. The accuracy of his translations not only reveals the zealous effort he has put forth in rendering difficult Sanskrit Buddhist works into Chinese, but also bears evidence to the fact that he was successful in dispelling many misconceptions with regard to important tenets of Buddhism. His works shed much light on the state of Buddhism in India and its neighbouring countries in the 7th century. They supply us a wealth of information regarding numerous sacred places, numerous Buddhist teachers, Buddhist texts that were held in high esteem during the time, and also regarding various Buddhist practices of different sects.

S. K. Nanayakkara

JAGADDALA, name of an aincient university in the Varendra Kingdom (North Bengal), a feudatory state of the Pāla kings). It was the outcome of royal benefactions, like the other famous Buddhist seats of learning, in India.

The famous historic epic *Rāmacarita* of Sandhyākara-nanda, written in the eleventh century A.C., mentions Jagaddala as a great Buddhist monastery — "Jagaddala-mahavihāra," wherein the cults of bodhisattva Lakeśa and Tārā (probably Avalokiteśvara and Tārā) had prevailed. (The *Rāmacarita* of Sandhyākarananda edited by R. C. Majumdar, R. Basak and N. Banerji, Calcutta 1939).

The vassal kingdom of Varendra, where Jagaddala was situated, was powerful enough to revolt successfully against its overload, the Pāla king. The epic Rāmacarita itself describes Varendra as a rich and powerful country which factor indicates that Jagaddala, the Mahāviāra of the Varendra kingdom could be no less famous an institution than its rival seats of learning like Vikrama-śilā and Odantapuri, patronised by the Pāla kings of Bengal. However, with the fall of Varendra back again to the Pāla dynasty, Jagaddala had experienced the glorious days of its development, under Pāla patronage. This was the period during which the capital of the Pāla kings was shifted to Varendra, in the reign of king Rāmapāla (circa 1084-1130 A.C.), where he built his new metropolis and named it Rāmāvatī as if to eclipse the glory of another famous city in East India, namely, Amarāvatī of the Andhra kings.

Jagaddala University was associated with a number of famous scholars of the time whose names are known to us from the colophons of their works, both in Sanskrit and in Tibetan. To mention a few, Vibhūticandra who bore the title Mahāpaṇḍita, Dānasīla, Subhākara and Mokṣakaragupta, a master of logic, who had written the Sanskrit work *Tarkabhāṣā* (R. M. Mookerji, *Ancient Indian Education,* London 1952, p. 595).

With the invasion of Moslems in the 13th century, Jagaddala, like many other religious sites in India, was destroyed. But in its short life it has made substantial contributions to learning. After the destruction wrought in by the Moslem conquests many scholars who dwelt at Jagaddala escaped to Tibet and continued to further their scholarly pursuits.

It is probable that Jagaddala was a seat of Mahayana Buddhism, as Mahayana, and especially Tantrayana, was prevailing in the Bengal area during the period Jagaddala existed.

A. D. T. E. Perera

JAGGAYYAPETA, an ancient Buddhist site in the lower valley of the Kṛṣṇa river, in the region of the Andhra kingdom of ancient India. Jaggayyapeta came into prominence in the latter half of the 19th century, after the discovery of some remains of a very early Buddhist stūpa at the site.

Jaggayyapeta lies about 30 miles north-west of Amarāvatī (q.v.), with which it was contemporaneous. Both sites lie opposite to each other on either side of the Kṛṣṇa river. Scientific excavation at the site was undertaken by James Burgess as early as 1882 (see *Archaeological Survey of India, 1882).* But unfortunately before the site was brought under conservation by government authorities, it had fallen prey to the ruthless hands of treasure hunters and others who were ignorant of the value of these antiquities. Not only Jaggayyapeta, but almost all the other ancient monuments in the Kṛṣṇa valley, have suffered the same fate, when these remains have been used as quarries for brick and marble, not only by local residents but also by Government Public Works Engineers.[1] In spite of this almost obliteration, it is possible from the existing records to gain a fair idea of the style of the stūpa at Jaggayyapeta.

The stūpa at Jaggayyapeta, has been plundered of its rail, and of much of the marble casing of its basements: the dome has been destroyed, and the relic casket dug out before it was surveyed in 1882. The basement of the stūpa was 31½ feet in diameter and portions of the remaining facing, chiefly on the south side where slabs on the projection for the support of the five stelae *(āyaka khamba),* bore archaic sculptures in the carvings in very low relief, and of these, the most perfect one was found lying on its face at the north gateway by Burgess. Some letters of the Maurya type are found on other slabs. At the gates were tall pillars, and on portions of three pillars from the east gate there was an inscription written in characters which belong to the pre-Christian or early-Christian Brahmi. The procession path *(pradakṣiṇā-patha)* had been about 5 feet wide surrounded by a rail or wall, which has disappeared altogether.[2]

Jaggayyapeta was a centre of intensive cultural and religious activity during the days of the Andhra kings of the Ikṣvāku dynasty. Its close proximity to Amarāvatī, and other important sites like Bhattiprolu, Gudivala, Ghaṇṭasālā, Nālandā, Goli etc., points to a flourishing centre of Buddhist cultural activity that spread along the valley of the Kṛṣṇa river in the few centuries that preceded the Christian era and continued thereafter for several hundred years more.

Of the southern Buddhist Cultural sites in the Kṛṣṇa valley, Jaggayyapeta has been assigned to the earliest phase, that is, the first or second century B.C. as the centre which had fore-shadowed the emergence of the school of Amarāvatī Art. Scholars are not hesitant to date Jaggayyapeta as contemporary with Bharhut and Buddhagayā, that is, in the first three centuries B.C.[3]

Jaggayyapeta is an important landmark in the evolution of Buddhist Art in India and especially in South India. Jaggayyapeta sculpture is purely of Indian origin. The marble decorative slabs of the Jaggayyapeta stūpa, are not as heavy or stiff as the Bharhut, Sāñci or Buddhagayā bas-reliefs. The human figure is represented with more elegance and refinement at Jaggayyapeta. The sinuous figures with slender and refined limbs as found in the marble slabs from Jaggayyapeta which resemble most of the early Ajantā representations could be said to belong to an unsophisticated indigenous Indian style.[4] These sculptures serve to contrast the indigenous Indian forms with the Hellenistic Kuṣāna Art of Gandhāra and Mathurā. It is the remoteness of the Kṛṣṇa valley centre

1. *Madras Government Orders* No. 467, 30th April 1888, p. 15; J. Fergusson, *History of Indian and Eastern Architecture,* London 1910, p. 82; Percy Brown, *Indian Architecture* Bombay, 1959, p. 37.
2. J. Fergusson, op.cit., p. 83; Burgess, *Buddhist Stūpas of Amarāvatī and Jaggayyapeta* pp. 107f.)
3. H. Zimmer, *The Art of Indian Asia,* New York, 1955, p. 349).
4. Ludwig Bachhofer, *Early Indian Sculpture,* Paris. See also H. Zimmer, op. cit. p. 349.

from the busy cultural centres of Indo-Hellenic Art in the North, which were always susceptible to influences from outside elements, that helped to preserve and promote such masterful styles in the Southern part of India.

In the formative period of the Buddhist stūpa, Jaggayyapeta stands pre-eminent as the precursor of the unique type of stūpa that originated in the South, including the stūpas in Sri Lanka. The dome with decorative slabs affixed to the drum, carved out in white marble, contrasts with the sandstone carvings in the northern stūpas at Sāñci etc. Of the marble slabs that once decorated the Mahācetiya of Jaggayyapeta only a very few are extant today. The style of decorating the superstructure with marble slabs, was followed with meticulous care in the Amarāvatī Stūpas and at other sites in the Andhra country.[5] The projecting platform with five stelae *(āyaka khamba)* at the four cardinal points of the stūpa is a style peculiar to southern stūpas.[6] The Jaggayyapeta stūpa gives the earliest evidence for this unique feature of stūpa building.[7] See also DHANYAKATAKA.

A. D. T. E. Perera

JĀGUḌA, (var, Jaguḍa, Juguḍa) an ancient country in Northern India. In Sanskrit epic and purānic literature[1] Jāguḍas are referred to as a northern nation, through whose country the Indus flows. In the *Mahābhārata* Jaguḍas are mentioned along with Yavanas, Harahunas (Huns?), Chinas, Tukhāras and Sindhavas, thus indicating their North Indian origin. Watters takes Tsu-ku-to of the Chinese pilgrims, in north India as Sanskrit Jaguḍa.[2] Cunningham[3] derives Tsan-ku-ta from Greek Arachosia; Arokhaj or Rokhaj of the Arabs. Arachosia of the Greeks comprised a considerable portion of eastern Afghanistan. The name Arachosia is usually derived from the Vedic/Avestan, Sarasvati/Haraquaiti, the original Sarasvati river in the northern regions of India (river Indus according to Monier Williams, see his *Sanskrit English Dictionary),* before the migration of Indo-Aryans to Kurukṣetra, where they named a local sacred river after their original Sarasvati.[3]

The indentification of Jāguḍa with the kingdom of Tsanukata of the Chinese Buddhist pilgrims and with present Arachosia (southern portion of Afghanistan) has now ben accepted as correct by several scholars.

According to Hsüan-tsang, the kingdom of Tsu-ku-cha was ruled by a Buddhist king in the 7th century A.C. The kingdom was about 7000 li in circuit (i.e. about 1167 miles). It had two capitals, well fortified. The first Ho-si-na and the other Ho-sa-la, both of which were about 30 li round each (i.e., about 5 miles). There were several hundred saṅghārāmas with about 1000 bhikkhus who studied the Mahāyāna. There were some ten stūpas built by Asoka-rāja there; and several Deva temples, in which members of various denominations dwelt together. The tīrthaka heretics who worship the Deva Kshuna (Ts'eu-na) principally, were very numerous here (S. Beal, op.cit. pp. 471f.).

The account given by Hsüan-tsang as to the prosperity of the kingdom and the strength of fortification of the two towns in Tsaukuta is worth investigating. According to Hsüan-tsang, winter wheat was grown in great abundance here; shrubs and trees grew in rich variety and there was plenty of flowers and fruits. The soil was favourable for the yo-kin (tumeric) plant (S. Beal, loc. cit.). When the Mohammedans first invaded this region Ghazni was a wealthy intrepot of the Indian trade. Because of the very strategic value of the kingdom it had been continuously devastated by invading armies. The Buddhist as well as other religious monuments could not have withstood the pillage of these invaders. Apart from the Huna invasions of North India, history bears evidence of the incessant battles fought within the precincts of Ghazni or Ho-si-na of Tsau Kuta, and when the Moghal king Babar took possession of the city in the 16th century A.C., it was a wretched stretch of land, barren and completely devasted.

A. D. T. E. Perera

JAINISM. Jainism is one of the three most important indigenous Indian philosophical and religious systems with a history of over two and a half millenia. The other two are Buddhism and Hinduism.

The term "Jainism" is derived from *"Jina"*, meaning conqueror, an honorific, similar to Buddha, by which its

5. Percy Brown, *Indian Architecture,* Bombay 1959 p. 37.
6. In Sri Lanka this was further elaborated in the so-called Vāhalkaḍa construction; see Percy Brown, op. cit. p. 37, plate CL.
7. P. R. Ramachandra Rao, *The Art of Nāgarjunikonḍa,* Madras 1956, p. 17, footnote 6, J. Burgess, op. cit., pp. 110 f., plates LXII, LXIII, EI, X pp. 139 f.; H. Ludres, *List of Brāhmī Inscriptions* Nos. 1202-1204.

1. *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa* lviii, 40; *Vāyu* P. xiv, 199; *Matsya P.* cxiii, 43; *Mahābhārata,* Vana Parvan li, 1991.
2. Watter's translation of Yuan Chwang, II, p. 226.
3. *Cunningham: Ancient Ceography of India* ed. S. M. Sastri, Calcutta, 1924, pp. 45 f. and p. 73.

multiple founders are known. Adherents, called *Jainas* or *Jains* number a little over three million (i.e. 3.15 million = 0.48% the total population) according to the Census of India of 1981. The Jaina organizations, however, offer different figures going upto twelve million. Jainas live in all parts of India. But Jainism has not been propagated outside the Indian sub-continent.

For the whole of their shared history in India, Jainism co-existed with Buddhism and interaction between them finds ample reference in the literatures of both religions.

Antiquity of Jainism: Jainism is claimed to be one of the most ancient religious systems in that as many as twenty three Jinas or Tirthankaras are recognized as having preached the doctrine pior to Vardhamāna Mahāvira or Nigantha Nātaputta, the contemporary of the Buddha. The Jinas or Tirthankaras so designated as they had conquered themselves through perfect knowledge and gained absolute freedom from the bondage of *karma* and as they had founded the four *tirthas* or orders of monks, nuns and male and female disciples.

According to Jaina tradition, the universe and its creation are eternal and infinite and are divided into two eras (kalpas), viz. Avasarpini or descending era sub-divided into six ages, i. Susama-Susama (happy-happy), ii. Susama (happy), iii. Susama-Dusama (happy-unhappy), and vi. Dusama-Dusama (unhappy-unhappy), and Utsarpini or ascending era sub-divided into six having the same names in reverse order. In the Avasarpini era, people attain all the pleasure and happiness at the starting point which reduce gradually upto the last era. The Utsarpini era commences with the utmost sorrowful condition and ends with the most pleasant age. The first three divisions of the Avasarpini era and the last three of the Utsarpini era are collectively called the Bhogabhūmi (age of happiness and contentment) where the people achieve and fulfil their requirements from Kalpavṛkṣa (wishing tree).

During the Karmabhūmi (age of action), the people learn to work, toil, write, trade, educate and indulge in art etc. The inventors of this age are called Kulakāras: (legislators and founders of cilvilisation) who are said to have appeared in the first of these last three ages or in the fourth age. The number of kulakāras varies in ancient Jain literature, but ordinarily the number is given as fourteen.

Nābhirāya, the father of Ṛṣabhadeva is said to be the last one. These kulakāras changed the old order and invented a number of new methods for evolving a civilization and educating the people in various ways. The kulakāras are said to have adopted three types of *daṇḍanīti* (punishment), viz. admonition *(hakāra)*, warning *(mākāra)*, and the reprimand *(dhikkāra)*. The first five kulakāras found it enough to rebuke the wrongdoer with "Ha". The next five kulakāras had the need of "Mā" to reinforce the effect of disapproval. The remaining kulakāras added "Dhik" (abhorrence) to the existing code of penalties. The Fourth Age is supposed to be when Tirthankaras and other great personages take birth. At its beginning, regular laws were laid down by Tirthankara Ṛṣabhadeva and his son Bharata. Mahāvīra, whose *Parinirvāṇa* is dated in 527 B.C. was the last Tirthankara. The Fifth Age commenced a few years after Mahāvīhara's *Parinirvāṇa* and is believed to last 21,000 years.

Jaina scholars have traced plausible indications and references to ancient Kulakāras and Tirthankaras in Indian historial tradition. Nude figures and figurines, found in the pre-historic Indus valley sites like Mohenjo-daro and Harappa are interpreted to be Jaina statues of Tirthankaras, on account of their remarkable resemblance to the polished stone torso of Jaina saints of the 4th century B.C. found at Lohanipur (Patna). *Ādipurāṇa* (3, 211-212) refers to Kulakāras as Manu and the Vedic tradition of Manvantaras, fourteen in number, is explained as reflecting the fourteen Kulakāras. *Vrātya-kāṇḍa* of the *Atharvaveda* is similarly interpreted to describe Jaina religious life as propounded by *Ṛṣabha-deva*. Moreover, the account of a Muni in the *Ṛgveda* (10, 11, 136.2-3) is explained as representing in every detail a Jaina sage.

The historicity of the second to the twenty-first Tirthankara, however, has yet to be established. The twenty-second Tirthankara, Ariṣṭanemi or Nemināth is said to be meant in the *Ṛgveda* 7, 32-20 and the *Yajurveda* 25, 28. The next Tirthankara, Pārśva is undoubtedly a historical personage who flourished 250 years before Mahāvīra.

The last or the twenty-fourth Tirthankara, Vardhamāna Mahavira, was a contemporary of the Buddha and finds mention in Buddhist literature as Nigantha Nātaputta. His followers are called Niganthas (Pali) and Nirgranthas (Sanskrit) in Buddhist works.

Jainism and Buddhism. Both Jainism and Buddhism belong to the Śramaṇa tradition, which, it is amply proved, had been at variance with the Brahmanical tradition. (cf. the expression *samaṇa-brāhmaṇa* as reflecting the totality of the population devoted to spiritual matters). The Jaina view is that the Śramaṇa tradition had taken root in the Indian sub-continent long before the Brāhmanical tradition was introduced with the coming of the Vedic Aryans. The fundamental difference is that the Vedic Brāhmanical cult invoked the authority of the *Vedas*, placed its foremost emphasis on rites and ritual and based a social stratification on birth, whereas the Śramaṇa tradition ignored, if not rejected, the *Vedas*, upheld the path of moral, mental and spiritual develop-

ment, founded on non-violence and truth, and admitted everyone irrespective of caste, creed, colour or social position to pursue the spiritual goal of salvation and deliverence from the cycle of birth and death (saṃsāra).

Sharing thus a common tradition, Buddhism and Jainism utilize many terms in common such as the following, even when the concepts behind them might be wholly or slightly at variance: *dharma, saṅgha, arahanta, saṃsāra, karma, ratanatraya, nirvāṇa*. Jina has often been used to designate the Buddha in Buddhist literature. They share the same cosmology and present the identical Hindu gods of the time as partial to the teachings of each system. Many ethical terms and concepts are held in common and defined in identical words.

As elaborated by Gunapala Malalasekera (*DPPN* s.vv. *Nigaṇṭha*, and *Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta*) and Bhag Chandra Jain (*Jainism in Buddhist Literature*, Nagpur, 1972) each system has its own specificity not only in emphasis but more importantly in the way of life each advocates. A fundamental doctrinal difference relates to the concept of a permanent soul (*ātman)* in Jainism as contrasted with the Doctrine of *Anatta* (q.v.) in Buddhism.

If the Buddha and his followers felt that the discipline imposed by Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta, referred to in Buddhist literature, as *Catuyāmasaṃvara*, the fourfold discipline of restraint, was too stringent, in contrast to the Buddhist concept of the Middle Path, Mahāvīra and his adherents expressed their shock and disbelief as regards the apparent laxity of the Buddhist way of life, specially as far as meat-eating was concerned. (cf. *Dīgha-nikāya* III, p. 48ff. Also Beni Madhav Barua, *History of Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy*, Culcutta, pp. 378 ff.).

The Buddhist canonical literature records many instances when Nigaṇṭhas entered into debate and discussion with the Buddha. Some of them were really encouraged by Mahāvīra himself to do so. Although the subject-matter of the debates themselves is recorded only very sketchily and, as such, an in-depth analysis of the points of differenc cannot be made, the very fact that these two contemporary teachers exchanged views and experiences — though not directly — could have had a significant impact on the evolution of both religious systems. Evidence, however, exists that some of the more stringent rules of *Vinaya* came into existence as a result of the more rigid norms of discipline of the Nigaṇṭhas (e.g. non-injury to plants). The Buddha himself had once expressed a favourable impression of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta. (*Majjhima-nikāya* I, 3, II, p. 214 ff.). Equally significant is the fact that a special dispensation was given in relation to the entry of Nigaṇṭhas into the Buddhist Saṅgha (*Dīgha-nikāya* I, p. 177 and *Sumaṅgalavilāsinī*, II, p. 363). This is indicative of a closer relationship between them.

History of Jainism. A hundred years after Mahāvīra's *Parinirvāṇa*, a twelve year famine in the northern region is said to have prompted Bhadrabāhu to send a part of the Saṅgha (Order) to Southern India, particularly Karnataka where Jainas flourished under the leadership of Viśākhācārya. The Maurya emperor Candragupta is believed to have joined them. Another group of the Saṅgha went to the Sindhu region under the leadership of Sthūlabhadra who found the need to relax traditional practices. Both groups came back to Magadha as soon as the famine came to an end. The former, who stuck strictly to the regulation of nudity and prescribed the ancient methods of begging and eating food came to be known as *'Digambara'* (the sky-robed). The latter, who continued to live under famine conditions and changed their ways became known as *'Śvetāmbara'* (the white-robed). Thus the main cause for the schism in the Jaina Order was the attitude to traditional norms of conduct. A third section of the Order named *'Yāpanīya'* reached Southern India via Mathura of the Surasena region and tried for centuries to reconcile the two divergent sects, though without success. The Yāpanīyas preached the conduct of Digambaras and favoured the progressive attitude of Śvetāmbaras. They used to live naked, worship nude images, adore Mayūrapiccha, according to Digambara tradition, whereas they believed in Strīmukti, Kevalikavalāhāra and Savastramukti which resemble the Śvetāmbara tradition.

The Digambara sect is said to have remained intact upto Lohācārya, 685 years after Mahāvīra's Nirvāṇa and was not divided into Gaṇas, Kulas and Gacchas. Thereafter came into being the Ārātīyas, the knowers of a part of Aṅga-pūrvas. By that time some changes had naturally taken place in the Order according to social needs and eventually new Saṅghas arose. Vanavāsīs became Caityavāsīs. The monks who were in favour of severe penance started new movements against the Caityavāsīs and other companion sects the so called Jainābhāsas by Devasena. The Ārātiya and Sivagupta sects created Gaṇas and Saṅghas at the time of monks' congregation held at Mahānāmagiri with a view to avoid further relaxation of norms of conduct.

The Bhaṭṭāraka (saffron-robed) tradition was started in the 13th century A.C. at Maṇḍapadurga (Rajasthan) by Vasatakīrti who allowed one garment to be kept. They worship Kṣetrapālas and Jinas with their follower deities. The relaxation in conduct was not accepted by a section and ultimately Banārasīdāsa in the 17th century A.C. started a new sect called "Vidhimārga" or "Adhyātmī" around Agara and Jaipur. It is generally referred to as "Terāpantha" (Thy-way). The Bhaṭṭārakas accepted this nomenclature in a mocking spirit and called themselves Vīsapanthī, a little higher than Terāpanthi. Another Pantha or sect named "Tarānapantha" was also started in

the 15th-16th century A.C. by Taranaswāmī who advocated worshipping only the Āgamas (scriptures), and not the idols.

The Svetāmbara sect too was divided into Gaṇas, Kulas, Gacchas and Āākhās. Caityavāsī sect, in 355 A.C. stood up against the Vanavāsīs and preached that one can stay in the temples and accept donations for one's protection. Haribhadrasūri may be considered a representative of those who were against the Caityavāsī practices. Jinapatisūri, Jinaballabhasūri etc. followed Haribhadrasūri and exposed the Caityavāsi conduct in their works like *Saṅghapattaka*. Kharataragaccha was divided into nine types of Gacchas. In 1228 A.C., due to the observance of the Ayambila penance by Jagaccandrasūri, Jaitasimha, the king of Newar named the Saṅgha "Tapogaccha", which became a separate Sect. Afterwards his pupil Vijayacandrasūri preached that a monk can accept a number of clothes, clarified butter *(ghṛta)*, milk, vegetables, fruits and meals brought by nuns.

Then the Sthānakavāsī sect was started against the Caityavāsī tradition by Lokāshaha, a resident of Ahmedabad of Gujarat province who recognised 32 Āgamas as the main source of his sect. Then Labaji made an improvement in the Lokāshahagaccha tradition and started the Dhundhiyā-pantha in 1652 A.C. The Terāpantha sect is derived from the Sthānakavāsī sect. Bhikkhana founded it in 1760 A.C. One who followed the five Mahāvratas, five Samitis and three Guptis is called Terāpanthī. Ācārya Tulasi, the founder of Jaina Vishva Bhārati, is at present Head of the Terāpantha. There was another sect named Saṃvegī started in the same province by Vijayadevasūri in Śaka Era 1682.

Jaina Scriptures. The Jainas have their own scriptures called Āgamas or Śrutas which are believed to be directly derived from the Tīrthaṅkara. The Āgamas are divided into two, viz. Sūtrāgamas and Arthāgamas. The sermons of the Tīrthaṅkaras are called Arthāgamas and the Sūtras written about them are named Sūtrāgamas.

Like the *Tipiṭaka* of the Buddhists, they are called *Gaṇipiṭakas*. Agamas are a composed form of Aṅgas and Pūrvas. Pūrvas are no longer in existence.

The scriptures currently in use are derived from Tīrthaṅkara Mahāvīra. The Pūrvas are included in Dṛṣṭivāda which is briefly divided into five parts, viz. Parikarma, Sūtra, Pūrvagata, Anuyoga and Cūlikā.

Due to the tradition of oral transmission additions and omissions were inevitable. These were examined at Councils called Vācanās, like the Buddhist Saṅgītis, held at Pāṭaliputra, Mathurā and Valabhī. The Third or Fourth Vācanā was held 980 years after the Nirvāna of Mahāvīra at Valabhī under the presidentship of Devardhigaṇi Kṣamāsramaṇa who compiled and wrote down the available scriptures.

It may be mentioned here that no reference to these councils is made in Digambara traditional literature. In its view the original Āgamas went into oblivion 683 years after Mahāvīra's Nirvāṇa. The Śvetambara tradition does not refute the view but states that even if the original form of the Āgamas is changed, their scriptures cannot be completely rejected and ignored.

The Jaina Scriptures are divided into several parts, viz. i. Aṅgapraviṣṭa and Aṅgabāhya, ii. Kalika and *Utkalika*, iii. Aṅga, Upāṅga, Chedasūtra, Mūlasūtra, Prakīrṇaka and Cūlikā, iv. Kṛta and Niryūhana, v. Caraṇakaraṇānuyoga, Karaṇānuyoga, Caraṇānuyoga and Dravyānuyoga. The Svetāmbara Āgamas are found in a Prākrit called Ardhamāgadhi. The Dīgambara Āgama literature is found in Sauraseni Prākrit. The Āgamas can also be, therefore, divided into two classes viz. *Ardhamāgadhi* and Sauraseni.

The Mūrtipūjaka Śvetāmbaras recognize 45 or 84 Āgamas while the Sthānakavāsīs and Terāpanthis accept 32 Āgamas. On the other hand, the Digambaras are of the view that the original Āgama became extinct. In their place, they recognize the works of Pushpadanta, Bhūtavali, Kuṇḍakuṇḍa, Vaṭṭakera, Śivārya, Umāswāmi, Samantabadra, Akalaṅka and other Ācāryas as the Āgamas.

There is no controversy between Dīgambara and Śvetambara traditions about the twelve Aṅgas, viz. Āyāraṅga, Sūyagaḍaṅga, Ṭhāṇānga, Samavāyāṅga, Viyahapaṇṇatti, Nayadhammakahāo, Uvāsagadasāo, Antagaḍadasāo, Anuttarovavaiyadasāo, Panhavāgarānāim, Vivāgasūyam and Diṭṭhivāya.

Jaina Philosophy and Psychology: *Theory of Anekāntavāda* in Jaina philosophy is based on the nature of reality considered through non-absolutism *(Anekāntavāda)*. According to this view, reality possesses infinite characteristics which cannot be perceived or known at once by any ordinary man. Different people think about different aspects of the same reality, and therefore, their partial findings are contradictory to one another. Hence they indulge in debates claiming that each of them is completely true. The Jaina philosophers thought over this conflict and arrived at a Non-absolutistic standpoint with its two wings, Nayavāda and Syādvāda. Proper understanding of the co-existence of mutually opposing groups through these principles rescues one from conflicts. Mutual cooperation is the law of Nature *(parasparoparopagṛho Jīvanam - Tattvārthasūtra,* 5.21). Life, itself, cannot be properly understood without the philosophical notions of a real standpoint *(niścayanaya)* and a practical standpoint *vyavahāranaya)*.

The Jainas believe that a substance is dynamic *(pariṇāmi)* in character. It means a thing is eternal from a real standpoint and momentary from a practical standpoint. Causal efficiency, according to them, is possible neither in a thing which is of static nature *(kūṭasthanitya)* nor in a thing which is incongrous with the doctrine of momentariness *(kṣanikavāda),* but it is possible only in a thing which is permanent-in-change *(pariṇāmanaśila).*

According to Jainism, an entity has infinite characteristics which are divided into two categories, viz. Universal and Particular. Reality is universalized-cum-particularized along with substance with modes *(dravyaparyāyātmaka).* Here *dravya* represents the Universal character and *paryāya* represents the particular character of a thing. For example, a jar is made of gold which can be changed into several shapes, while preserving gold as a permanent substance. They are mutually interdependent, identical and separate from each other.

The nature of reality, according to this theory, is permanent-in-change. It possesses three common characteristics such as *utpāda* (origination), *vyaya* (destruction) and *dhravya* (permance through birth and decay). It also possesses the attributes *(guṇas)* called *anvayī,* which coexist with substance *(dravya)* and modifications *(paryāya)* called *vyatireki,* which succeed each other. Productivity and destructivity constitute the dynamic aspect of an entity and permanence is its enduring factor.

Nayavāda (the theory of partial truth) is an integral part of the conception of *Anekāntavāda.* It provides the scope for acceptance of different viewpoints on the basis that each reveals a partical truth about an object. It recognizes the imperative necessity to understand one's different interests and inclinations in a different light on the basis that there could be a valid truth in each of them. *Naya* investigates analytically a practicular standpoint of the problem in all respects in the context of the entire reality. But if anything is treated as the complete truth, it is not *naya,* but *durnaya* or *nayābhāsa* or *kunaya.* For instance, "It is" is *naya,* and "It is and is only" is *durnaya,* while "it is relatively *(syāt)*" is an example of *Syādvāda.*

Syādvāda investigates them into a constant and comprehensive synthesis. The prefix *"syāt"* in Syādvāda represents the existence of these characterisitcs which, through not perceived at the moment, are present in reality. The verb *syāt* is used as an indeclinable and stands for multiplicity or multiple character *(Anekānta).* Syādvāda upholds relative expression about the nature of reality and discouraging the attitude of "only" as exemplified by the use of *eva.* It promotes the attitude of humility. tolerance and justice and respect for the other's point of view. Akalaṅka thinks of Syādvāda as a way which considers reality in a positive *(vidhimukhena)* and a negative *(niṣedhamukhena)* manner without incompatibility in a certain context. There is no violation of the Law of Contraditions, as the dual character of entities exists in repect of its own individuality and does not exist apart from and outside this nature *(sarvamasti svarūpena pararūpena nāsti ca).* In a relativistic standpoint, both being and non-being can exist together.

Dravyas or Tattvas: *Dravya* in Jainism is of six kinds, namely, *jīiva* (soul), *ajīva* (non-soul), *dharma* (principle of motion), *adharma* (principle of rest), *akāśa* (space), and *kāla* (time). The first five types of Dravyas are called *astikāyas* (those that exist and have different *pradeśas* or areas like a body) and the last is called *anastikāya.*

According to another classification it is of three kinds, viz. *sakriya* (active), *niṣkriya* (inactive) and *sakriya-niṣkriya.* The *akriya dravyas,* which have the capacity of moving from place to place, are *pudgalas* or *jīvas. niṣkriya dravyas* are space and *kāla, akriya-niṣkriya dravyas* are those realities which move about without themselves undergoing changes or motion.

In another classification, the *dravyas* or *tattvas* are divided into seven categories, viz. *jīiva* (soul), *ajīva* (non-soul), *Āsrava* (inflow of karmic matter into the soul), *bandha* (bondage of soul by karmic matter), *saṃvara* (stoppage of the inflow of the karmic matter), *nirjarā* (shedding of karmic matter), and *mokṣa* (liberation of soul from karmic matter).

Conception of Soul (jīva): Acording to Jaina philosophy soul is eternal, uncreated and beginningless. It has life, consciousness, *upayoga* (knowledge and perception) and is potent. It performs actions, and is affected by their results, is conditioned by its own body (characteristic of contraction and expansion), is incorporeal and is ordinarily bound with *karma.* In addition, it is capable of becoming free from the defect of *karma,* gets to the highest point of the universe, knows all and perceives all and obtains the transcendental bliss ever-lasting *(Pañcāstikāya,* 27-8). The nature of soul is considered dual in character. According to the realistic standpoint, it remains the same under all states, while according to the practical standpoint, it is transferred into modes and thus becomes different in number, place and form etc.

The souls are of two types, namely *Saṃsārī* (transmigrating beings) those who undergo the cycle of wandering into births and experience the fruit of *karmas,* and *Mukta,* the emancipated souls. The transmingrating souls are of two kinds, *trasa* (mobile) and *sthāvara* (immobile). The *sthāvara* are further divided into five kinds, viz. earth, water, fire, air and plants possessing the sensation of touch. The mobile beings are from two-sensed beings onwards. The senses are five, viz. touch, taste, smell, sight and hearing. The senses are also of two kinds, the physical sense and psychic sense. Earth, water, plants etc. have one sense of touch and the worm, the ant, the bee and man etc. have each one more sense than the

preceding one. These living beings possess some essential characteristics called *Prāṇas*, viz. *bala, indriya, āyu* and *ucchvāsa* (breathing).

The means of birth of beings are also discussed. It is of three kinds viz. i. spontaneous generation, ii. birth from uterus *(garbhaja)* and *Upapādajanma* (that is the seat to which the soul goes and in which it is born).

Ajīva Tattva: Ajīva Tattva is of five types, viz. *pudgala, dharma, adharma, ākāśa* and *kāla. Pudgala* has form and the qualities, *rūpa* etc. while the rest are without form. Except *kāla dravya*, all the *dravyas* are called *pañcāstikāyas.* Functions of the media of motion and rest or steadiness are called *dharma* and *adharma. Ākāśa* (space) accommodates completely all *jīvas* and *pudgalas. Kāla* (time) denotes an existential fact.

Pudgala (Matter) connotes that which has accretion and depletion, addition and bifurcation, conjunction and reparation. It is characterised by touch, taste, smell and colour. Sound, union, fineness, grossness, shape, division, darkness, image, warmth, light, are also qualities of matter.

The Karma Theory: The theory of *karma* comes under the purview of *pudgala* (matter). *Karma* in Jaina philosophy emphasizes that one will have to bear the result of one's own deeds. The vibrations *(yoga)* and the passions *(kaṣāya)* of soul attract karmic matter and transfer it into karmic body. Yoga is the action of mind, speech and body due to desire, aversion and cognition. Soul is pure in its intrinsic nature. The relation of *karma* is a cause that makes it subject to the cycle of births. There are two distinct causal agencies, viz. *nimittakāraṇa* or *dravyakarma* (remote or distant causes) and *upādānakarma* or *bhavakarma* (substantial cause).

On the basis of nature the *karmas* are of eight kinds, viz. 1. *jñānāvaraṇa* which conceals the light of knowledge 2. *darśanāvaraṇa* which obscures light intuition, 3. *vedanīya-karma* which obscures the pleasant feeling and unpleasant feeling, 4. *mohanīya-karma*, the *karma* which deludes faith, conduct, etc. All *karmas* proceed from the *mohanīya-karma.* As long the *mohanīyakarma* is powerful, all *karmas* remain powerful and as soon as it gets weaker, all the *karmas* lose their strength, 5. *āyukarma* that which determines the quantum of life in the states of existence as infernal beings, plants and animals, human beings and celestial beings, 6. *nāmakarma* the *karma* due to which the soul acquires *nāmarūpa* etc. that is body etc. 7. *gotra-karma* (status-determining karmas) are of two types, high and low, and 8. *antarāyakarma* that obstructs in making gifts, gain, enjoyment, effort etc. Of these, *jñānāvaraṇa, darśanāvarana, mohanīya* and *antarāya* karmas are called *ghātiyā karmas* which destroy the four main characteristics of soul —knowledge, perception, pleasure and effort and ii. the remaining four *karmas* are called *aghātiyā karmas* which do not destroy the virtues of soul. On the destruction of *ghātiyā karmas* one attains *Kevala-jñāna* and on the destruction of the remaining four *karma* he achieves salvation.

The theory of *karma,* as in Buddhism, rejects the theory of God as creator, supporter and destroyer of the world. Jainism does not believe in the principles of reward, judgement, incarnation, and forgiveness. One will have to bear the result of one's own deeds. They cannot be extinguished simply by the mercy of God. Jainism, of course, believes, unlike Buddhism, in Godhood, the *Paramātman* stage of soul itself and in innumerable gods. Every soul is potentially divine and the manifestation of divinity is called Paramarthabhāva.

Classification of Knowledge. Jainism classifies knowledge in two ways: 1. Canonical *(āgamika)*, and ii. Philosophical *(dārśanika).* The five kinds of knowledge based on the former are: 1. *matijñāna* (sensitive knowledge), ii. *śrutajñāna* (scriptural knowledge), iii. *avadhijñāna* (visual knowledge), iv. *manahparyāyajñāna* (mental knowledge), and v. *kevalajñāna* (perfect knowledge); while *pratyakṣa* (direct knowledge) and *parokṣa* (indirect knowledge) are developments of the latter. The *pratyakṣa* is defined as knowledge obtained by oneself without the assistance of an external agent. It is only to the Jainas that "*akṣa*" means "Soul". Thus *pratyakṣa* in Jaina *Āgamika* tradition does not mean empirical perception, i.e. knowledge obtained through sense organs. According to this definition the *avadhijñāna, manaḥparyāyajñāna* and *kevala-jñāna* are comprised in *pratyakṣa* and *matijñāna,* and *śrutajñāna in parokṣa.* Jinabhadra and Akalaṅka however, analysed it as *samvyāvahārika pratyakṣa* (empirical perception), while the real *pratyakṣa* of *Āgamika* tradition was called *pāramārthika pratyakṣa* (transcedental perception). Thus *matijñāna* which was put under *parokṣa* in the Āgamika tradition, came under the category of *pratyakṣa* in the philosophical tradition.

Jaina Ethics. According to Jaina tradition, right faith *(samyagdarśana)*, right knowledge *(samyagjñāna),* and right conduct *(samyakcāritra)* constitute the path of spiritual salvation termed as the triple jewel *(ratnatraya)* Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka explained the trinity with the help of medicine which cures the diseases by following faith, knowledge and conduct accordingly *(Tattvārtharājavārtikā,* 1. 47-8). Belief in the ascertainment of things in their true character is right faith. It can be achieved by avoiding doubts in the teaching of the Jina, desire for worldly enjoyment, admiration for the knowledge and conduct of the wrong believers and so on. Anger, pride, deceitfulness and greed are the passions which lead to endless worldly existences or transmigrations. When the *karmas* are completely destroyed, the perfect knowledge, perfect perception, fearlessness, and infinite enjoyment

are attained by the purified soul. Pūjyapāda defines *mokṣa* (liberation) as the attainment of an altogether different state of the soul, on the removal of all the impurities of karmic matter and the body, characterized by the inherent qualities of the soul such as knowledge and bliss, free from pain and suffering *(Sarvārthasiddhi,* p. 1).

The Lay Adherent. The Householder or Śrāvaka is one who listens to the Dharma with full faith from Ācāryas and Parameṣṭhins. He prepares himself gradually and steadily to renounce the world with right faith by observing the rules prescribed and then fulfils the responsibilities for the welfare of the family, ascetics, society, nation and mankind. Some of the important attributes of a householder are observance of non-violence, legitimate earning, hospitality, refraining from unnecessary criticism of Government, keeping good company, paying respect to parents, service to people, following religious preachings, gratefulness, generosity, fear of sin, honesty, appreciating the conduct, life and activities of spiritually advanced people, avoiding expenditure exceeding income and so on. Such rules make life pleasant *(Dharmabindu-prakaraṇa, Sāgāradharmāmṛta,* I, II). The spiritual status of a householder is decided on his performance as follows:

Pākṣika Śrāvaka. This is the first spiritual status of the Jaina lay disciple in which he first takes a vow with right faith not to eat meat, not to drink alcohol or wine and not to relish honey or any of the five kinds of figs containing souls. These are called *Mūlaguṇa.* Then he desists from injury, falsehood, stealing, unchastity and attachment to wealth. The pākṣika śrāvaka also takes a vow not to indulge in seven types of obnoxious habits *(vyasanas)* which make life disastrous. They are gambling and betting, meat-eating, alcoholic drink, prostitution, hunting, stealing, and sexual intercourse with another's wife or husband. He should also practise *āvaśyakas* namely, i. worship of the Tīrthaṅkaras, ii. service to spiritual teachers, iii. studying scriptural texts every day, iv. practising some form of self restraint every day, v. doing some form of penance daily, and vi. doing some kind of charitable act *(Padmanandi pañcaviṃśatikā,* 6.7). This is an introduction to spiritual discipline of a house-holder.

Naiṣṭhika Śrāvaka. One who fulfils his religious duties with constant vigilance is a *Naiṣṭhika Śrāvaka.* In order to prepare himself for the ascetic life the householder goes further to observe the eleven spiritual stages *(pratimā).* They are: 1. *darśana pratimā.* It requires true and unshakable faith in Jainism with firm conviction in the reality of seven fundamental principles of Jainism and devotion to the ***pañcaparameṣṭhis.*** After a long pratice he becomes *samyagdṛṣṭi.* He should not be proud of knowledge, worship, family, caste, wealth and beauty *(Ratnakaraṇḍakaśrāvakācāra,* 25). He will ponder daily over twelve points of meditation to realize self or deep-reflection *(dvādaśānuprekṣā)* as follows: transitoriness, helplessness, transmigration, lonelines, distinctness, impurity, influx, stoppage, dissociation, universe, rarity of enlightenment and the truth. 2. *vrata pratimā,* the stage of observing vows: In order to prepare himself for the ascetic life the householder goes ahead to observe the twelve vows for obtaining inner purity of the self. Firm conviction with right understanding in the reality of fundamental principles of Jainism generates benevolence towards all living beings *(maitrī),* joy at the sight of virtuous *(pramoda),* compassion and sympathy for the afflicted *(karuṇā),* and tolerance towards the insolent and the ill-hehaved *(mādhyasthya).* Violence, in all forms - caused by deed, word and thought should be avioded. Jainism directs the householder to fix boundaries for business, not to pursue commercial activities causing injury to living beings, to extend hospitality by offering food, implements, medicine and shelter and to bestow one's possessions upon one another for mutual benefit. He should also observe compassion towards living beings in general and towards the devout in particular. He should practise charity, contemplation, equanimity, and freedom from greed. (See *Ratnakaraṇḍa, Sāgāradharmāmṛta, Upāsakādhyayana* etc.).

Other pratimās like mediatation, fasting, renouncing eating after sun-set etc. should also be observed, for the attainment of gradual renunciation from worldly concerns and becoming prone to monkhood. The spiritual aspirant who reaches the eleventh stage is called *kṣullaka* (Junior) having three long pieces of cloth and a loin cover (langota), a broom and a water pot, and *elaka* (Senior) having only a water pot *(kamaṇḍalu)* and a broom and also a loin cover in Digambara tradition. In Śvetāmbara tradition he is called *Śramaṇabhūta* possessing a begging bowl and a whisk broom.

Sādhaka Śrāvaka. Sallekhanā, the spiritual death in Jaina tradition, is the third stage of a householder which is very close to that of an ascetic. It is defined as making the physical body and the internal passions attenuated by abandoning their sources gradully at the approach of death with pleasure and not by force *(Sarvārthasiddhi,* 7.22; *Ācāraṅga).* For various reasons one decides to perform Sallekhanā. According to the *Bhagavatī Ārādhanā,* old age, physical weakness, famine, incurable disease, calamities, etc. are such reasons which render the performance of Āvaśyakas impossible. Sallekhanā should be per-

formed at a Jaina temple or one's own house or in the jungle on the eve of death, so that one could achieve better prospects in the next birth.

Sallekhanā is also called Samādhimaraṇa. It should be observed through penance, internal and external tapas, renunciation of worldly affairs, forgiveness, *ālocanā, pratikramaṇa, dhyāna* etc. with a view to attain purification of mind. *(Pravacanasāroddhāra,* 982-3; *Bhagavatī Ārādhanā,* 253-4).

The daily routine of a Jain lay disciple starts with reciting the mahāmantra *"Namo arihantāṇaṃ, namo siddhāṇaṃ, namo āyariyāṇaṃ, namo uvajjhāyāṇaṃ, namo loe sabbasāhūṇaṃ* "in the Brahmamuhūrta (early) morning), thinking, "Who am I?, "What are my vows"?, "What is my *dharma*"? etc. He then meditates, studies scriptures, worships the Jinas and then takes his meals. *Āvaśyakas* and *Pratikramaṇa* are also to be observed by the householder *(Dharmabindu,* 3.46; *Sāgāradharmāmṛta,* 5. 1-9).

Another type of division of spiritual stages is called *Guṇasthāna* fourteen in number. It starts with *Mithyādṛṣṭi,* the lowest one which involves gross ignorance where the self accepts wrong belief as right, and therefore, the person cannot make a distinction between reality and unreality, and ends with *Ayogakevalī,* the last and most purified stage where all the passions and *karma* are annihilated by the third and fourth stage of *Śukladhyāna.* This is called *Siddhāvasthā.* The spiritual development in fourteen steps can be comprehended by the three main divisions, viz. the external self *(bāhirātman),* internal self *(antarātman)* and the transcendental self *(paramātman).*

The Jaina Mendicant. A stricter code of conduct is prescribed for the Jaina mendicant. It is called *samācāra* (Right conduct). A Jaina monk stays in a temple or retires to the forest. After observing the eleventh *Pratimā,* prescribed for a householder, one could decide to become a mendicant, dedicated to total renunciation and proper conduct. He accepts initiation from the teacher and becomes a mendicant by pulling the hair out from his head with his own hands. He proceeds to arrest karmic matter by controlling passions, careful movement, observing virtues, engaging himself in contemplation and conquering the sufferings by endurance and conduct. For curbing the threefold activity of body, speech and mind, an ascetic takes every care in walking, speaking, eating, lifting and lying down and depositing waste products for avoiding injury to organisms. Besides, he has also to endure twenty-two types of affictions *(pariṣahas)* such as hunger, thirst, cold, heat, insect-bites, nakedness, abstinence, pain, discomfort of postures, uncomfortable couches, scolding, injury, begging, lack of gain, illness, pain inflected by blades or grass, dirt, despair or uneasiness arising from ignorance and lack of faith. These afflictions are to be endured so as not to swerve from the path of stoppage of *karma* and for the sake of dissociation from *karma.* He follows 28 *mūlaguṇas* completely.

Acelakatā or nakedness is a requisite characteristic of the ascetics. The terms *Nigaṇṭha* (Pali) and *Nirgantha* (Sanskrit) in Buddhist literature reveal the qualities such as renunciation, purity, restraint, etc. of the Jain mendicant. As a result of later development, the scripture allowed afterwards in the Śvetāmbara tradition the mask for preventing the death of micro-organisms normally entering the mouth *(mukhavastrikā),* a piece of cloth *(avamacela),* blanket *(pādakambala),* broom *(rajoharaṇa),* pot *(pātra),* seat *(āsana-pīṭha), phalaka* etc. *(Uttarādhyayana,* 26.21-22). The mendicant strives to master the five causes of karmic influx, namely control *(gupti)* regulation *(samiti),* moral virtues *(dharma)* reflection or contemplation *(anuprekṣā)* and conduct *(cāritra).*

He is also required to practise *tapas* that is, penance or religious austerity. Penance *(tapas)* is of two types, namely external penance *(bāhyatapas)* and internal penance *(antarangatapas).* The external penance is of six types, viz. fasting *(anasana),* reduced diet *(avamaudarya),* special restrictions for begging food *(vṛttiparisaṅkhyāna),* giving up stimulating and delicious dishes *(rasaparityāga),* and mortification of body *(kāyakleṣa).* The main object behind the external austerity is to cultivate patient endurance of bodily pain and suffering in order to remove attachment to pleasure and to proclaim the glory of the teaching of the Jinas.

The internal austerities are also of six types, viz. expiation over negligence of duties *prāyaścitta),* reverence to holy personages *(vinaya),* services to the saints in difficulty *(vaiyāvṛtti),* study of the scriptures *(svādhyāya),* and meditation for controlling the mind. The auspicious meditations *(dharma-śukla-dhyāna)* became the cause for the attainment of various types of transcendental powers *(ṛddhi).* Eventually, the aspirant attains *Kevalajñāna* (omniscience) as a result of destroying the ghātiyākarmas and then finally reaches the 14th *guṇasthāna* or stage of spiritual development where all the karmas are destroyed. This the most purified stage of soul which is called *Nirvāṇa.*

To attain this highest position in the spiritual sphere an aspirant undertakes daily *sāmāyika* and *caityavandanā* and then goes out to beg for food with a certain *āhāramudrā* and eats in a standing posture from the hollow of his hands once a day, if he is a *Digambara* monk. A Śvetāmbara monk eats directly from the pots after returning to the monastery. Afterwards, they further engage themselves in studying the scriptures, writing books, preaching and performing penance.

Rites and Rituals. Jainism in the strictest terms does not prescribe invocation, propitiation, offerings, prayers and the like. But in popular practice, a devotee expresses his or her devotional attachment to idols, which symbolize the glorification of the spritual state and the attributes manifested in the idol namely, *Jinahood* itself.

A Jaina performs his or her worship in two ways; abstract worship *(bhāvapūjā)* which needs neither idol nor ritual, and formal worship *(dravyapūjā)* which needs an idol and some ritual performances.

The mendicants usually perform the abstract form of worship. There is a certain method prescribed for formal worship. After taking a bath and wearing clean clothes, the devotee goes to the temple and recites *Namokāramantra* (the *Mahāmantra*) with devotional songs and hymns, puts down a few grains of rice, bows and goes around a circumambulatory path three times and repeats *Arihanta-siddha* etc. Then on a rosary of 108 beads, he starts performing *aṣṭadravyapūjā*, starting with the bathing of the image of Jina with pure water and reciting verses. The *pūjā* is done by placing one after another the *aṣṭadravyas* (water, sandalwood paste, cleaned rice-grains, flowers or saffron coloured rice , a coconut, a lamp, incense, articles like cloves and almonds and as the last, mixed offerings — *argha)* in a platter placed on the table in front of him. This procedure of paying homage to the Jina or Tīrthaṅkara, the ideal *Guru* and the *Śāstras* or Scriptures may be done individually or in a congregation. After this, the devotee concludes his worship with the recitation of *Śāntipāṭha* expressing his wish for universal peace: "May Lord Jinendradeva, bestow peace on the land, the nation, the city and the state, and welfare on all the citizens, may the rulers and the administrators be strong, law-abiding and righteous, the rains be timely and adequate, all the diseases and ailments disappear, no one in the world be afflicted with famine or scarcity because of theft, loot, plunder and devastation, nor with epidemics, even for a moment: Peace be to all."

Other Jaina rituals include idol installation, *Jinabimbapratiṣṭhā* or *Pañcakalyāṇakapratiṣṭhā*.

There are some social ceremonies like *Saṃskāras* which are somehow connected with spiritual and physical purity. They are the three types of *Saṃskāras*, viz. i. 53 *kriyā* (rites) which cover the entire life of a person from conception to death (garbhānvayakriyā), ii. 48 rites which are related to new converts and their spiritual development *(dīkṣānvayakriyā)*, and iii. 7 rites which are meant for personality development of meritorious souls *(kartrānvyayakriyā)*.

Among festivals celebrated by Jainas are: *Pāryūṣaṇa*, or *Daśalakṣaṇa Parva* held during the rainy season for eight or ten days in Jaina temples where the sermons on thef *Daśadharmas*, (ten virtues of the soul described in the *Tattavārthasūtra* and *Kalpasūtra* Scriptures) are regularly read to an audience; *Kṣamāvāṇīparva* or *Saṃvatsarīparva*, is celebrated on the day of universal forgiveness, when every Jaina asks for forgiveness from everyone else, and he himself forgives others for wrongs done towards him during the past year; *Mahāvīranirvāṇa Jayanti*, the birth centenary of Jina Mahāvīra; and *Rakṣābandhana*, *Ṣoḍaṣākaraṇavrata*, *Akṣayatṛtiyā*, *Śrutapañcamī*, *Dīpāvalī*, *Siddhacakravidhāna*, *Aṣṭānhikāparva*, *Nandīśvaravidhāna*, some of which are social festivals of the community.

Jaina as a Community. The Jaina Community is characterised by the Jaina principle of equality and equanimity, which stresses the social and spiritual life of the individual, rejects the idea of God as mediator, and replaces it with the theory of *karma*. The Jaina Scriptures lay down that one's caste cannot be decided by birth but by one's own action or conduct. It is also said that by simply shaving the head, one cannot be a *Muni* (monk) and by only adhering to *kāṣāyacīvara* (saffron clothing) one cannot claim to be a *Tapasvī*, a person cannot be a *Śramaṇa* simply by residing in a jungle. As a matter of fact, they should possess the attributes like *samatā* (equality and equanimity), *brahmacarya* (celibacy), *jñāna* (knowledge), *tapas* (penance), and *cāritra* (conduct) with the right attitude.

Jaina Contribution to Indian Culture. The spread of Jainism throughout the Indian sub-continent is attested to by inscriptions and monuments, sculpture and literature as well as references in historical and literary sources of non-Jaina origin. Prior to Mahāvīra, Jainism has held sway not only in the Indus Valley as already discussed but also in Sri Lanka. The Jaina tradition is that Jainism was introduced to Sri Lanka about the eighth century B.C. (cf. *Paumācariya)*.

The Buddha and Mahāvīra were active in the same region in and around Magadha and the Jaina scriptures mention Vaiśāli, Pāvā, Mithilā, Siṃhabhūmi, Kauśambī and Avanti among the many centres where Jaina communities existed. Very early in its history, Jainism had spread to South India. Reference has been made to the sojourn of Bhadrabāhu and Viśākhācārya in Karṇāṭaka and the association of the Maurya Emperor Candragupta with their mission. This was in fourth century B.C.

Even if the tradition on the early introduction of Jainism to Sri Lanka is considered legendary, more cogent historical information comes from the *Mahāvaṃsa*. Paṇḍukābhaya is said to have built residences or monasteries for Nigaṇṭhas Jotiya, Giri and Kumbhaṇḍa. (*Mhv*. x. 97–99). The monastery of Giri had existed for at least three centuries before it was demolished by Vaṭṭagāmaṇī Abhaya. (*Mhv*. xxxiii, 43–44 and 80–82). A

statue of Pārśvanātha, found in the caves of Terāpur, is said to be from Sri Lanka. Jaina literature redords evidence for the existence of Jainism in the Island in the 10th century A.C.

The prevalence of Jainism in Afghanistan at an early date is established by the images of Tīrthaṅkaras in *kāyotsarga* or meditating posture found in Vahakarāj Emir. Ṛṣabhadeva is said to have travelled westwards to Bhali (Bactria), Panhave (Iran) and Greece and estwards to Suvaṇṇabhūmi (i.e. Myanmar) *(Āvaśyaka Niryukti,* 336-337). Kālakācarya is also believed to have visited Suvaṇṇabhūmi *(Uttarādhyayana Niryukti,* 120). It is surmised that gymnosophists referred to in Greek literature could be Jainas.

While no vestiges of the physical cultural heritage of Jainism have yet ben traced outside the Indian Sub-continent, monuments, epigraphical records, sculptures and other works of art abound in India to bear testimony to the significant impetus which this religious tradition has given to the promotion of art and architecture. . The earliest objects of art of Jaina origin to be recorded belong to the Nanda and the Mauryan Dynasties (4th - 3rd centuries B.C.). King Khāravela of Kālinga mentions in his Hāthigumpha inscription of the re-installation of a Jaina image which a Nanda monarch had taken away to Magadha from Kālinga in the fourth century B.C. The torso of the Jaina image of Lohanipur (Patna) is ascribed to Mauryan times. During the Sātavāhana period (60 B.C. - 225 A.C.), Mathura and Saurāṣṭra became the principal centres of Jaina culture. Mathura Jaina art is represented by the finds at Kankālītilā and the Nāgara Jaina art was contemporaneous with Gandhāra art which developed under the Kushanas.

Each of the golden ages of ancient Indian culture has seen substantial Jaina contribution in all realms of creativity. The grat Jaina scholars and philosophers of the Gupta age included Harigupta, Siddhasena, Hari-sena, Ravikīrti, Pūjyapāda, Pātrakakeśarī and Udyota-nasūri. Jaina art and architecture flourished in Mathurā, Hastinapur, Avanti, Ahicchatra, Bhinnamala, Kauśāmbi, Devagumphā, Vidiśā, Srāvasti, Vārāṇasi, Vaiśāli, Pāṭali-putra, Rājagṛha and Campā.

During the post-Gupta era, Jaina culture received remarkable support from the Pratihāra and Caṇḍela dynasties. Cittod, the capital of the Paramāras, was the scene of activity of Kālakākācārya and Haraibhadra. The Buildings and works of art of Tripuri, Khajurāho, Devagadh, Mahobā, Madanapur, Canderi, Ahār, Pappora and Gwalior reflect the continuing advances made by Jaina art and archietecture. Dhanapāla, Amitagati, Māṇikyanandi, Prabhācandra, Āsādhara and Dhanañjaya were prominent figures of the Jaina lite-rature of the time.

Bihar, as the traditional Parinivāṇabhūmi of many Tirthaṅkaras, had had a long history of Jaina cultural activity. Rājagṛha, Nālandā, Pārśvanātha Hill, Siṃha-bhūmi, Barābar Hill, Patna and Pāvāpurī have yielded remarkable vestiges of flourishing Jaina art. Further east, in Bengal, Surohar and Mandoil have produced Jaina images in Mathura style. In Orissa, particularly beautiful works of Jaina art and architecture are found in Udaigiri-Khaṇḍagiri (Udīsā) and such other places as Keonjhar, Mayurabharja and Cuttack. Andhrapradesh, too, had been a centre of Jaina culture, which traces its history to the days of Ācārya Kundakunda of the first century A.C. Cālukyas, Rāṣṭrakūṭas and Vaḍami Cālukyas patronized Jainism and constructed many institutions. With the fall of Jainism, here, most of these institutions have been taken over by Vīraśaivites and Liṅgāyats.

In its southward expansion, Jainism entered Karnāṭaka as far back as the fourth century B.C. Gangavadi dynasty, founded by the Jaina Acarya Simhananda, extended its patronage to Pūjyapāda, Prabhācandra, Jinasena, Guṇanandi, Pātrakeśari, Puṣpadanta, Vidyānanda, Anantavīrya and Goindu. Worthy of special mention is Rācamalla Satyavākya whose minister Cāmuṇḍarāya erected the famous collossus, the statue of Gomateśvara Bāhuvali at Sravana Belgola. A rich outcrop of Jaina monuments in this state (e.g. at Mangal, Nandirurga, Paṇḍitarahalli, Sarangipaṭṭinam, Halebid, Aihole) speaks of the grandeur which Jainism enjoyed in Karnāṭaka until its disapperance with the Lingāyatas who persecuted the Jainas.

In Tamilnādu, the Jaina age of cultural supremacy began with the missionary activities of Viśākhācārya in the fourth century B.C. and lasted until the eleventh century when it was replaced by Hindu sects such as Vaiṣṇavas, Alwars and Liṅgāyatas. Impressive rock-cut caves and sculptures bear testimony to the prevalence of Jaina art in Pudukoṭṭai, Madura, Tinnevely and North Arcot. Inscriptions of Kāñci record the patronage of the Pallava kings to prominent Jaina ācāryas like Kunda-kunda, Samantabhadra, Akalanka, Bhavanandi and Mallisena. The paintings and sculpture of Sittanavasala reflect the development of a remarkable Jaina tradition of art comparable to that of Ajaṇṭā and Sīgiriya.

If Jainism has receded from the south of India in recent years, it remains a vibrant living force in Mahārāshtra, Rājasthan and Gujarat. Parle inscription of first century A.C. commences with the Jaina salutation "Namo Arihantāṇam". Monuments of Keljhar, Pavanar, Nagpur, Bhandara, Ramtek, Akola, Karanja, Achalpur, Latur and Bhadravati bespeak a very high level of Jaina art and architecture. Jaina caves at Ellora, Nasik, Dharasiva are noted for their exquisite sculptures. Magnificent Jaina temples with huge images mark the continuing development of Jaina culture in Prātiṣṭhāna-

pur, Belgaon, Kolhapur, Ehol, Alaktakanagara, Kuntalgiri, Kandhar, Karad, Mahimagiri, Vatapi and Meghuni. Malakhed had been a flourishing Jaina centre even in the first century A.C. when Pādlipācārya visited it. The fifth century inscription of Mrgeśavarman records donations made to Digambaras, Svetambaras, Kūrcakas and Yāpanīyas. Equally generous were the Sīlāhāras of Konkana who built such magnificent temples as Adarāditya, Satyavākya, Candraprabha and Ratta. Noted as patrons of Jains culture were also Pulakesin I, KIrtivarman and Ravikīrti.

Śatruñjaya and Girnar have long been the Siddhakṣetras - the holiest sites - of the Jainas. In them is ample evidence of the glory of Jaina art and architecture developed by Raṣtrakūṭas, Cālukyas, Pratihāras, Paramaras and Cauhans. The monuments at Ranakapur, Udaipur, Sirohi, Jaisal Godhpur and Jaipur as well as the temples of Girnar attributed to Vastupāla and Tejapāla, the ministers of the Baghelas do indeed reflect the peak of perfection of Jaina culture. The magnificent temple of Abu with its most fascinating stone carvings - "the finest laceworks in stone" - is an unrivalled masterpiece of Jaina art.

Jaina art and architecture continue to develop as the munificence of the Jaina community of India, which is relatively affluent and well-placed, promotes the foundation of institutions dedicated to propagate the Jaina doctrines of non-violence, tolerance and strict discipline.

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JAMĀLGARHI (var. Jamalgiri), a modern town in eastern Afghanistan. Cunningham discovered here, in 1848 an ancient Buddhist monastic establishment buried in the ground. This discovery connected Jamālgarhi with other early Buddhist sites in the North-western frontier of the Indian sub-continent which was the seat of a powerful Buddhist monarchy under Kuśanas and Sakas before the Christian era.

Jamālgarhi is placed between the rivers Swat (Suvastu) and Indus (Sindhu) and is connected with other Buddhist cultural sites in the Kābul valley, like Peshawar (ancient Puruṣapura, Fo-lu-sha of the Chinese itinerants), Begram (ancient Kapiśa), Jalālābād (ancient Nagarahāra), Charsadda (ancient Puṣkalāvatī), Sare-Makhe-Dheri (Hārītī stūpa site of the Chinese), Takhti-Bahi, Sharhi-Bahlol, Shābaz-Garhi, Hadda (Hi-lo of the Chinese), and Bimāran. The region where Jamālgarhi is located, comprised the better part of Udyāna (U-chang-na of the Chinese) of the Gandhāra kingdom.

When Gunningham first discovered the Buddhist ruins of Jamālgarhi it belonged to the British occupied Yusufzai district of Afghanistan, a name eponymous by the occupation of it by Yusufzai Afghans. According to him Yusufzai corresponds with the ancient district of Peukolaitis or Puṣkalāvatī (*ASIAR*. V, 1872-73, p. 2).

Jamālgarhi lies at a close distance from the ancient caravan route via the Khyber pass which carried the east-west trade of the ancient world. Cunningham observes that there is abundant evidence to show, that the country

was once thickly populated, in the numerous mounds of ruined cities and citadels which still stud the Yusufzai plain in all directions. The present population is, scanty, dissolute and poor which hardly speaks of the glory of a once prosperous kingdom which flourished in the area.

Although Cunningham discovered the site in January 1848 when he recovered a very fine head of a Buddha statue in excellent preservation (*ASIAR.* V, p. 46), the first archaeological exploration was carried out only in 1852 by Lumsden and Stokes (J. Fergusson, *History of Indian and Eastern Architecture,* London 1876, p. 169). They excavated a considerable number of sculptures, which afterwards came into the possession of Clive Bayley who published an account of them in the Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal (1852) and took the collection to England where the entire lot was destroyed in the disastrous fire that occurred at the Crystal Palace where they were being exhibited in 1860 (J. Fergusson, loc. cit.). The assessment and the account given by Cunningham in his Archaeological Survey Report in India (vol. V), on the ruins at Jamālgarhi still holds much value as hardly any further research was done since, of any appreciable value at the site, (the account below is based mostly on Cunningham's discoveries).[1]

The Buddhist ruins at Jamālgarhi occupy the top of a hill overlooking the village. The style of the buildings (monastery, stūpa etc.) is the same as those which have been discovered at other places in Yusufzai viz. Takhti-Bahi, Shāhbaz-Garhi (see J. Fergusson, op. cit., p. 171 for a comparative study of the sites), excepting for variations in certain arrangements of the blocks of the buildings. The sculptures found at Jamālgarhi are more numerous and are in a better state of preservation than those found at related sites.

The principal group of buildings, consists of a stūpa, 22 feet in diameter, standing on a circular base and surrounded by a polygonal enclosure of small vihāras or chapels.[2] The basement of the stūpa is the only portion now standing. This is divided into 20 sides or faces separated by pilasters with a seated figure of the Buddha in each compartment. The whole is executed in coarse stucco, which bears many traces of having once been gilt and painted, with traces of red colour still remaining. The circular space between the stūpa and chapels was paved throughout with large slabs of dark blue slate. The chapels which formed the enclosure, stood on a continuous basement like that of the stūpa itself. This was divided into straight faces of unequal length, according to the size of the chapels above them. Some of these faces were covered with plain stucco; but most of them were ornamented with seated figures of the Buddha alternately ascetic and teacher (dhyāna and dharmacakra mudrās), and smaller standing figures of the Buddha between them.

The chapels vary in size from 8½ to 11 feet squre. Only the lower parts of the wall now remain. No single statue was found in situ. But while clearing the pavement below Cunningham had found several statues lying immediaely in front of the so called chapels. This factor induced him to infer that these statues had once stood in the chapels, or niches above them.

He also found several Corinthian capitals of pilasters which once formed the ends of the side-walls of the chapels. These capitals are all of the Indo-Coriathian style with boldly designed volutes and two tiers of acanthus leaves deeply and delicately chisselled. Some of them have small figures of the Buddha, either sitting or standing, amongst the acanthus leaves, and many of them still preserve traces of gilding. These capitals are of several distinct sizes which, Cunningham supposes, may be assigned to the several different sizes of the chapels.

"In the open space between the stūpa and the chapels was found a piece of a round Kankar shaft still standing in situ — besides which numerous pieces of small votive stūpas and of stone umbrellas of varying size were found," (*ASIAR.* V, p. 48). On the south of the stūpa chamber is an oblong court below, which was sorrounded by chapels on all sides. Crompton states that "a series of sculptures was found in situ on the risers of steps representing various scenes including Jātaka scenes. Some of these sculptures have been broken since their discovery by the bigoted Muhammadan people of the country" (*ASIAR.* V, p. 49). The sculptures found in this court were very good and interesting, writes Crompton, which included many statues of kings (Bodhisattvas), figures with moustaches and jewel necklaces and armlets, wearing sandals (letter of Crompton, K.E., dated 7th April 1873, see *ASIAR.* V, p. 49). There were also discovered with several half capitals of pillars or pillasters in excellant preservation without any traces of the pillars themselves. The best preserved specimens of these capitals and of the alto-relievos had the remains of a goldleaf about them indicating that they were once gilt in whole or part. The vihāra-court contains more than thirty chapels

1. A. Foucher and his mission followed by the French Archaeological mission and Italian archaeologists had made excavations in the Kābul-Swat area in the present century, which however have not made way for considerable alterations on Cunningham's earlier assessments of Jamālgarhi ruins.
2. This characteristic feature of encircling the principal stūpa by subsidiary monuments was modelled possibly to substitute the railing so conspicuous in the early pre-Christian Buddhist stūpas (H. Sarkar, *Studies in Early Buddhist Architecture of India,* Delhi, 1966, p. 57).

in the four sides and in the middle the remains of ten small stūpas.

On the northern flight of 10 steps leading to the vihāra-court many beautiful sculptures were found, still preserving traces of gild.

At the time Cunningham reported his excavations there were still more ruins yet to be exhumed. Cunningham concludes in his report that as all the existing buildings are of a religious character the site was simply that of a large monastic establishment with its stūpas and vihāras (Plates XLVIII, XLIX, of *ASIAR.* V, show the Indo-Corinthian pillar capitals with foliage patterns worked out in stucco).

The Buddhist cultural remains at Jamālgarhi have been assigned to the Gandhāra period of art which flourished from the 1st century B.C. to two or three centuries in the present era.[3]

Cunnigham's identification of the Jamālgarhi style of Architecture with the Indo-Corinthian school has been maintained by other scholars like J. Fergusson, J. Burgess, A. K. Coomaraswamy, and A. Foucher (A. K. Coomaraswamy, *History of Indian and Indonesian Art,* pp. 73, 110, H. Zimmer, *The Art of Indian Asia.* Vol. I, B. 13 d). He observes that the Jamālgarhi capitals of the Indo-Corinthian pillars are by far the most beautiful examples of Indo-Greek architecture which have come down to us, of which, although numerous remains are found, only very few perfect specimens remain (*ASIAR.* V, Appendix A, p. 191).

Although on archaeological and numismatic evidence the date of Jamālgarhi and related sites is assigned to the Indo-Scythian period i.e. the Gandhāra school of Art, the spread of Buddhism in these northern frontier regions of India goes back to the period of Asoka. Several inscriptions of Aśoka have now been discovered in this region very much close to Jamālgarhi, e.g. at Kandahar, Shabaz-Garhi (*EW.* vol. IX, Nos. 1 & 2, pp. 4 f.; *ASIAR, vol. V,* p. 8), which further strengthens the Mahāvaṃsa statement of the early spread of Buddhism in Gandhāra in Asoka's time. (*History of Ceylon,* University of Ceylon, vol. I, part I, p. 131; *Mhv.* XIII, 3). Early Chinese Buddhist travellers speak of monuments including stūpas built by Asokarāja in this region known to them as Udyāna (U-chang-na).[4]

The desruction of Jamālgarhi monuments is due both to nature and human hands. As a perennial catastrophe the flood waters of the vast number of rivers that surround the area had spelled doom to these citadels of Buddhist Art. The Hūna (Huns) invasions, too, had not spared them. But the final and a lasting destruction was wrought by the iconoclastic Arabs who stormed these cities since the invasion of Muhamed of Gazni up to still recent times.

A. D. T. E. Perera

JAMBHALA (Tib. gnod-hdsin) is a form of Kuvera, the Buddhist god of wealth, especially popular in Nepal, and Vasudhenā is his consort. As Yi-dam he is called Jambhala, probably deriving his name from Jambhana (lemon) which he always carries in his right hand. Under his left arm is the usual mongoose discharging jewels from its mouth. Kuvera in Jambhala form only carries the larrge mongoose under the arm, while all the other forms carry a small mongoose with a single jewel in its mouth. It is said that for having performed austerities for a thousand gems, he was rewarded by Brahma by giving him immortality and making him the god of wealth.

Jambhala existed at a time when the conception of the five Dhyāni Buddhas had not yet been accomplished. Therefore he could not be assigned to one particular Dhyāni Buddha from whom he sight have originated. According to the *Sādhanamālā* there are several forms of Jambhala said to be emanating either from Akṣobhya or from Ratnasambava or from Vajrasattva or from a combination of the five Dhyāni Buddhas.

The Jambhala form which emanates from the Dhyāni Buddha Akṣobhya who is one of the earliest Tathāgatas to have entered the Buddhist pantheon, is of blue complexion and possesses three faces and six arms. His crown bears the image of Akṣobhya (Akṣobhya jaṭāmukuṭinaṃ) and carries in his three right hands the citron, the goad and the arrow *(mātuluṅgaṅkusabāṇadharaṃ).*

3. This date has been more definitely assigned, after the discovery of Indo-Scythian coins (*ASIAR.* V, appendix A, p. 194; H. Sarkar, op. cit. p. 63). On stylistic grounds the stucco works of the Gandhāra school of Art, fall in the post-Christian era of late Kuśāna, known as Kīdara Kuśāns still indefinitely however (see, Sir John Marshall, *Greeks and Sakas in India, JRAS.* 1947, pp. 17-17).
4. Jamālgarhi could probably be the site of Shang-Mu-Kia of IHsuan-tsang; where he had found a stūpa, which is about 200 li (i.e. 34 mls.) from Po-lu-sha, which lies to the south-east of Shang-Mu-Kia (S. Beal, *Chinese Accounts of India,* Indian Edition, Vol. II, p. 161) A. Foucher identifies Shābazgarhi with ancient Polusha (var. Poloucha) also known in early times as Varṣapura (A. Foucher, *L, Art Greco Bouddhique Du Gandhāra,* Vol. I, p. 626 Map). Cunningham has discovered a cave at Shābaz-Garhi and some other ruins, which he tries to trace back to the Sudāna (Vessantara) legend. (*ASIAR. V, pp. 13 f; S.M. Sastri, Cunningham's Ancient Geography of India,* p. 60. But see S. Beal, op.cit., p. 161 note 99). Po-lu-sha was famed as the exile of Sudāna when Hsuan-tsang visited this area (S. Beal op. cit. p. 161).

He embraces Prajñā in one of his left arms and carries the mongoose with a lasso and the arrow with the other two arms.

The characteristic feature of Jambhala emanating from the Dhyāni Buddha Ratnasambhava is that he carries the mongoose in his right hand with the citron in the left. The mongoose is supposed to be the receptacle of all gems and jewels. When Jambhala presses the two sides of the mongoose it vomits forth the riches. As an emanation of Dhyāni Buddha Ratnasambhava Jambhala may be represented alone or in the embrace of his *śakti* in yab-yum; when represented in yab-yum he sits on the moon under which is the double lotus of eight petals. He with a protruding belly wears a variety of ornaments and has a golden complexion. Carrying with him the citron and the mongoose in the right and the left hands respectively he wears a garland of yellow lotus and remains in yab-yum with Vasudharā. The eight petals of the lotus seat are occupied by the eight *yakṣas* viz. Maṇibhadra, Pūrṇabhadra, Dhanada, Vaiśravaṇa, Kelimālī, Civikuṇḍalī, Sukhendra and Corendra. These attendant *yakṣas* are identical in all respects with Jambhala. They are all accompanied with a *śakti* with whom they remain in yab-yum in the same way as Jambhala remains with Vasudharā. The *yakṣiṇīs* are eight in number and they are Citrakālī, Dattā, Sudattā, Āryā, Subhadrā, Guptā, Devī and Sarasvatī. They are identical in forms with Vasudharā who is yellow in complexion and carries ears of corn and displays the *varada-mudrā* with her two hands.

The form of Jambhala emanating from the Dhyāni Buddha Vajrasattva is with three faces, six arms and has an image of Vajrasattva on his crown. He is white in complexion and has two faces, one red and the other blue on either side of the principal face. He sits in the Vajraparyaṅka attitude and embraces Vasudharā. He carries in his two right hands the mongoose and the jewel, and in the two left hands the citron and the sword. In all other respects he is identical with the form discussed under the emanation of the Dhyāni Buddha Akṣobhya.

Jambhala as an emanation of the five Dhaydni Buddhas carries in his two hands the citron and the mongoose and stands trampling on two semi-human beings Saṅkhamuṇḍa and Padmamuṇḍa and is in the Ālīḍha attitude.

Ucchuṣmā Jambhala being a variation of Jambhala bears also either the images of Akṣobhya or of Ratnasambhava on his crown. There are several *sādhanas* devoted to his worship and the *dhyāna* describing him with the image of Akṣobhya on his crown mentions that he appears like a child of five years *(pañcavarṣakumāra)*, dwarfish *(kharvam)*, stands on the lotus on the moon *(viśvapadmastham candropari)* and is decked in ornaments of snakes *(sarpābharaṇabhūṣitam)* and a jewelled headress *(ratnamukuṭim)*. Standing in the *pratyālīḍha* attitude, he trampels with his right leg the legs of the sleeping Dhanada of yellow complexion with his mouth vomitting out jewels, while the left leg rests upon his head. He is nude *(nagnam)* and his *membrum virile* is pointed upwards *(urdhvalingam)*. He has a protruding belly *(lambodaram)* and his eyes are fixed on the *kapāla* which he carries in his right hand against the breast. He carries in his left hand touching the left thigh the mongoose vomitting out jewels. His ears are large and unpierced and has a crescent on the crown. His face is distorted with bare fangs and his three eyes are red and round *(raktavarttulatrinetram)*. His forehead is distorted owing to the twisting of the brow *(kṛtabhṛkuṭilalāṭam)* and he has brown hair standing upright. He bears on his tiara the image of *Akśobhya* of blue complexion displaying the earth-touching attitude *(bhūsparśa-mudrā)*.

The images of Jambhala are found among the sculptures of Gandhāra, Mathurā, Sārnāth, Magadha, Bengal and Nepal.

There are eleven *Sādhanas* and three *stotras* (verses of praise) in Sanskrit extant in their Tibetan translations addressed to the deity Jambhala. They are:

T.M.: Nos. 3347, 3614, 3615, 3267, 3268, 3269, 3270, 3272, 3372, 3619, 3658, 3748, 3750, 3749.

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Indumati Karunaratne

JAMBUDĪPA, one of the four great continents *(mahādīpa*, included in the world system *(cakkavāḷa)* and ruled by a world-ruler *(cakkavattin)*. The four continents Jambudīpa, Uttarakuru, Pubbavideta and Aparagoyāna were grouped round Mount Sineru. In Jambudīpa is the Himavā with its eighty-four thousand peaks, its lakes, mountain ranges etc. This continent derives its name from the Jambu-tree (Rose-apple tree; also called Nāga) wihch grows there, its trunk fifteen yojanas in girth, its outspreading branches fifty yojanas in length, its shade one hundred yojanas (*Vin.* I, 30; *VinA.* I, 119; *SnA.* II, 443; *Vism.* I, 205 f.). On account of this tree, Jambudīpa is also known as Jambu-saṇḍa (Rose-apple grove: *Sn.* v. 552: *SnA.* I, 121). The continent is ten thousand yojanas in extent; of these ten thousand four thousand are covered by the ocean, three thousand by the Himālaya mountains, while three thousand are inhabited by men (*SnA.* II, 437; UdA. 300). Because of its extent it was described as great (*mahā DA.* II, 429). Five great rivers,

Gaṅgā, Yamunā, Sarabhū, Aciravatī and Mahī, after watering Jambudīpa, flow into the sea (cp. *Vin.* II, 237; *A.* IV, 101, *V.* 22; *S.* II, 135; B.C. Law. *Geography of Early Buddhism,* London, 1932, Intro. xvi f.).

Sometimes in Jambudīpa the are as many as eighty-four thousand cities; this number is sometimes reduced to sixty thousand, forty thousand or even twenty thousand, but never to less (*SnA.* I, 59; *J.* IV, 84 says sixty-three thousand; *PvA.* 111). Sometimes it is also said that in the time of Gotama Buddha this continent contained nine million six hundred thousand towns, nine million nine hundred thousand seaports and fifty-six treasure-cities (B. C. Law, op. cit.). In the Aṅguttara-Nikāya it is said that, on Jambudīpa trifling in number are the parks, groves, lakes etc., more numerous the steep, precipitous places, unfordable rivers, inaccessible mountains etc. Jambudīpa is also said to contain five hundred islands (B. C. Law, op. cit.).

While preaching the *Cakkavatti-sīhanāda Sutta* the Buddha predicted that Jambudīpa will be mighty and prosperous; the villages, towns and the royal cities will be so close that even a cock would be able to fly from each one to the next. It was also said that, at the time of Metteyya Buddha's appearance on earth, Jambudīpa will be pervaded by mankind even as a jungle is by reeds and rushes. There will be eighty-four thousand cities with Ketumantī (Benares) at its head (*D.* III, 75). Once again the Buddha is said to have declared that the people of Jambudīpa excel those of both Uttarakuru and Tāvatiṃsa in three respects, viz., courage, mindfulness and religious life (*A.* IV, 396; *Kvu.* I, 99).

Gold was collected from the whole of Jambudīpa (*MA.* II, 123). Numerous arts and sciences were taught there (*Miln.* p. 3). There were also disputants in arts and sciences (*ThigA.* p. 87). As there were heretics in the Order, monks stopped holding Uposatha for seven years (*Mhv.* p. 51, *v.* 235). Once there was a dreadfl famine (*DhpA.* III, 368, 370, 374). In the time of Asoka there were eighty-four thousand cities, in each of which he built a monastery (*Mhv.* p. 46, *v.* 176; *Vism.* 201).

The texts record that there were four sounds heard throughout Jambudīpa; the shout uttered by Puṇṇaka proclaiming his victory over Dhanañjaya Koravya in a game of dice; the bark of Vissakamma taken about in the guise of a dog by Sakka, threatening to devour all wicked beings after the decay of Kasspa's sāsana; the roar of Kusa challenging to battle the seven kings who sought the hands of Pabhāvatī; and the yell of Āḷavaka, proclaiming his same from the top of Kelāsa, on hearing that the Buddha had visited his abode (*SA.* I, 322).

It was believed that the Buddha and world-rulers *(cakkavattin)* are born only in Jambudīpa (*BuA.* 54). It was also accepted that in each world system *(cakkavāla)* there is a Jambudīpa (*A.* I, 227). Mention is made in the *Kakāti Jātaka* of a Jambudīpa samudda beyond which was the river Kebuka (*J.* III, 91). For the purpose of periodical tours *(cārikā),* the monks divided their tours in Jambudīpa into three circuits or *maṇḍalas* — the Mahāmaṇḍala which extended over nine hundred leagues, the Majjhima°, which extended over six hundred and the Antima° over three hundred. Those who wish to tour the first the Mahāmaṇḍala, start after the *mahāpavāraṇā* and complete their journey in nine months, for the Majjhimamaṇḍala the start after the *pavāraṇā,* the ceremony at the termination of the rainy season retreat, on the full-moon day of Kattikā (month of October - November) completing the tour in nine months, while for the Antimamaṇḍala they start on the first day of Phussa (December-January) and return after seven months (*VinA.* I, 197).

It is generally held that Jambudīpa is another name for India. Childers, too, points out that when opposed to Sīhaḷadīpa or Tambapaṇṇidīpa, Jambudīpa indicates the continent of India (*Dict.* of the Pali Languages, p. 165, s.v. Jambudīpa). Certain scholars show that the early Buddhist evidence suggests that Jambudīpa was a territorial designation actually in use from the 3rd century A.C., at the latest, and was applied to that part of Asia outside China throughout which the power of the great imperial family of Maurya made itself felt (Majumdar, Raychaudhuri and Datta, *An Advanced History of India,* London, 1961, p. 3). Cowell on the other hand, explains that Jambudīpa was one of the four islands or *dīpas* of which the earth was supposed to consist; it included India, and represented the iṇhabited world to the Indian mind (*J.* trsl. I, p. 137, n. 1). However, the Hindu cosmographyic tradition suggests that Jambudīpa was a large territory and it is only in its narrower sense that it came to be identified with Bhārata-varṣa, another name for India. According to the Purāṇic tradition, Jambudīpa was considered to be the innermost of seven concentric islands into which the earth was supposed to have been divided (*An Advanced History of India,* loc. cit.). Jaina writers, too, seem to have considered Jambudīpa to be of much wider extent than it was thought to be by the Buddhists (see also B. C. Law, *Historical Geography of Ancient India.* France, 1954, pp. 9 f.; *DPPN.* I, pp. 941 f.).

S. N. Nanayakkara

JAMBUKOLA-LENA, one of the ancient rock-hewn temples of Sri Lanka popularly known to have been founded by King Vaṭṭagāmani Abhaya (Vaḷagambā), 89-77 B.C.

Its present name is Dambulla, first identified by Wilhelm Geiger and later corroborated by others. See DAMBULLA.

JANTĀGHARA, an essential feature in early Buddhist monasteries in India. *Saddhammopāyana,* a late Pali text, equates Jantāghara to Aggisālā — a hall with a fire-place inside (s.v. *PTS* Dictionary). Buddhist texts in Sinhala use the term *Ginihalgeya* as a translation of this word (Buddha Jayanti *Tipiṭaka* translation).

It is stated in the *Vinaya (Vin.* II, p. 119) that the Buddha approved the use of a Jantāghara for bhikkhus at the request of Jīvaka Komārabhacca (q.v.) the famous physician.

A Jantāghara was used by bhikkhus living in a monastery, to warm themselves during cold weather, to take warm water baths and sometimes to do steam baths for health reasons.

Special instructions were aid down in *Vinaya* texts regarding the construction of a Jantāghara. The Jantāghara had to be built on an elevated spot so that it did not become inundated during rainy weather. If the Jantāghara was a very small one, the fire-place had to be in one end of the hall. If the hall was fairly large the fire-place was to be built in the centre with enough empty space all round the fire-place. There should be an outlet for smoke and a drain for used water (*Vin.* II, 120).

Fire-wood was used to keep the fire burning in the Jantāghara. Various kinds of herbal powders and fine clay were kept in bowls in the Jantāghara to be used by the bhikkhus when they used this facility. These herbal powders and fine clay were mixed with water and applied on the face and body before the bhikkhus exposed their bodies to the heat of the fire-place or before they took warm water baths (*Vin.* I, 47).

Duties of a pupil bhikkhu towards his teacher and preceptor or towards an elderly resident bhikkhu who wanted to use this facility, are clearly indicated in the *Vinaya (Vin.* I, 47). The pupil bhikkhu had to remove the ashes collected in the fire-place, adjust the fire-wood and kindle the fire, sweep the floor, keep the stool in its proper place, mix the powders and clay with water and provide the water.

When other resident bhikkhus wanted to use this facility, there were also conditions laid down for them to observe, in order to maintain the cleanliness and efficiency of the Jantāghara. The person who entered the Jantāghara first each day had to remove the ashes collected in the fire-place, sweep the floor, keep the stool in its place and wet the powders and the clay (*Vin.* II, 220).

The faction of bhikkhus of the group of six (Chabbaggiya, q.v.) occasionally resorted to mischief regarding the Jantāghara. When other bhikkhus entered the Jantāghara these Chabbaggiya bhikkhus used to lock the entrance door and windows from outside, preventing their opening from within for a long time, thereby causing much physical discomfort to those inside the hall. When such behaviour was reported to the Buddha he reprimanded them and laid down specific punishment for such acts (*Vin.* II, 220).

W. G. Weeraratne

JAPAN

Pre-Buddhistic Era: The earliest inhabitants of Japan were a Paleolithic (old stone age) people who used roughly chipped or shaped stone tools to eke out what was no doubt a precarious living. Hundreds of Paleolithic sites have been found all over Japan; yet we still know very little about these people.

From about 8,000 B.C., a transition from this Paleolithic period to the age of Neolithic people whose culture is usually designated as the Jōman culture (C. 8,000 - 300 B.C.) ws effected. The word Jōman comes from the characteristic ropelike designs found on much of the pottery made by the Neolithic people.

The Jōman period came to an end about 300 B.C. as major new cultural influences from the continent started pouring into the country and the most important of these was "wet-rice" (paddy field) agriculture. This new trend transformed the society of nomadic nature into a settled one based on agriculture and resulted in forming diverse social classes. Rice, from this time on, became the mainstay of the economy. This period (c. 300 B.C. - 300 A.C.) is known as the Yayoi period during which a number of unusual bronze artifacts such as 'dōtaku' (bells), mirrors, spears and other weapons too fragile to be functional were introduced. They must have been used symbolically in some form of religious rite.

Subsequent to this period evolved the Kofun (Tomb) or Uji (Clan) culture during the third century A.C. in which continental influence played a significant role in the construction of large earthen tumuli over the tombs of emperors and social leaders; hence, the name of the period. This period also marks the beginning of ancestor worship honouring deceased heroes and cultural leaders. Uji culture continued in the next few centuries and apart from the imperial leadership of the Yamato court, notable clans at the time of the introduction of Buddhism into the country were the Soga, Mononobe, Nakatomi etc., who in fact played an important role either for or against the acceptance of the new faith during the sixth century A.C.

The beginning of the Japanese nation was dated from the reign of Emperor Jimmu in 660 B.C., but in reality the process of unifying many semi-autonomous clans scattered over the Japanese isles began in the fourth century A.C. under the Yamato or Imperial clan who claimed descent from the Sun Goddess, Amaterasu Ō Mikami and were no doubt a vestigial remain of early shamanistic leadership. Other clans also claimed similar tutelary deities known as the 'ujigami', who safeguarded and looked after their interests.

The central feature of the native religion of Japan, Shintoism (the way of kami or gods), is indeed, its belief in Kami. Not only were there kamis as many as ujis (clans), but also varied objects of awe became elevated to the status of gods. The most famous definition of kami is, perhaps, the one given by the scholar and Shinto revivalist Motoori Norinaga (1730–1801 A.C.) of the Edo period (1600–1868 A.C.):

> The word kami refers, in the most general sense, to all divine beings of heaven and earth that appear in the classics. More particularly, the kami are the spirits that abide in and were worshipped at the shrines. In principle human beings, birds, animals, trees, plants, mountains, oceans — all may be kami. According to ancient usage, whatever seemed strikingly impressive, possessed the quality of excellence, or inspired a feeling of awe was called kami. (Quoted in Agency for Cultural Affairs, ed., *Japanese Religion*, pp. 37–38) (H. Paul Varley, *Japanese Culture*, third edition, 1984, p. 8).

Shintoism is not a religion in the strict sense of the term; it has no dogma, no moral code nor sacred book, and really consists in a somewhat confused mixture of the veneration of ancestors and nature worship. It is mainly concerned with existence in this world and its kami are associated with life as a vital, creative force. The early Japanese viewed life as a unity between man and his environment. Nature was never thought to be hostile to man, but in harmony with him. Kami are on the whole benevolent and capable of demonstrating human emotions. The belief in the innate goodness of life was prevalent in the Japanese of an early period. These factors in fact created a fertile soil for the coming of a new faith that was Buddhism.

The Introduction of Buddhism: The Nihonshoki (or Nihongi, Chronicles of Japan composed in 720 A.C) mention 552 A.C. as the date of the official introduction of Buddhism to Japan by the leader of the Korean Kingdom of Paekche (Jap. Kudara), who presented a bronze Buddha image and scriptures along with some articles for Buddhist rituals to the Yamato court. The mission was sent in an effort to foster a political alliance with Japan against the Korean states of Silla (Jap. Shiragi) and **Koguryo** (Jap. Kōkuri). The accuracy of the date for this event has long been disputed and the year 538 is now regarded as more precise. However considering the fact that the dominant faith of most continental immigrants settling down in Japan was Buddhism and merchants and traders were plying between Japan and Korea, it is no doubt that Buddhism had been known to the Japanese much earlier than this date.

The formal introduction of the alien faith to the Japanese court during the reign of Emperor Kinmei (531–571 A.C.) gave rise to a dispute as to its official position. For sometime competition had existed between the Soga and Mononobe clans, two most powerful aristocratic types of uji of the day. The Sogas, claiming closer ties to the Imperial family, were more liberal and had direct dealings with the utilization of the skills of foreign immigrants for the management of the Imperial estates, and as such favoured the acceptance of the new religion arguing that Japan should import superior civilization and an organized form of government prevalent in the continent. The Mononobe, who, on the other hand, were a strong military clan in charge of the guard of the Imperial family and were more conservative, strongly opposed it. The Mononobes were joined in their opposition by the Nakatomis who were in charge of the official ceremonies with a vested interest in the indigenous faith. Their disagreement was voiced on the ground that the native kami (gods) would be provoked. Though the issue on the acceptance of the new faith was not only the cause of the confrontation for supremacy between these clans, it was no doubt a testing opportunity for both the camps.

Emperor Kinmei finally decided as a compromise to allow the Soga clan to worship the Buddha image which was housed in a temple specially made for the purpose. No sooner had the temple been opened, however, than a plague broke out. Accordingly the Mononobe and the Nakatomi, proclaiming that the presence of the Buddha image was inauspicious and caused the indignation of native gods, burnt the temple and threw the image into the Naniwa canal.

The first Emperor to officially support Buddhism was Yōmei (Reign: 585–587 A.C.) who, when he had fallen gravely sick, requested an image of Yakushi (Bhaiṣajya-guru) to be made in the hope of his speedy recovery. But he did not live long ehough ot see the completion of the image which took almost twenty years and was finished by his sister Empress Suiko (592–628 A.C.) to be enshrined in the Mṝyūji Temple.

After the death of Emperor Yōmei in 587 A.C., the Soga waged war against the Mononobe and the Nakatomi over the dispute of the succession of the emperor and finally became victorious, which allowed the Soga to freely engage in the importation of continental civilization and to pave the way for the establishment of

Buddhism as a state religion. The Soga, from then onwards exercised more influence and pressure on the Imperial court and under these political circumstances, Prince Shōtoku, son of Emperor Yōmei, became the regent of Empress Suiko.

Buddhism under the patronage of the Soga clan was deemed as having magical power new to the native gods. It was associated with external glory and rituals. Buddha images were regarded with awe and as having powerful efficacy in promoting material prosperity, the cure of illness and aversion to calamities. This became the main characteristic of Buddhism since its introduction to Japan. Prince Shōtoku, however, found in Buddhism inspiration and ideals through which the nation could be guided in the right direction of development.

Shōtoku Taishi (Prince Shōtoku) and Buddhism: Shōtoku Taishi, or Prince 'Umayado' (Stable Door); so-called as he was born unexpectedly while his mother was visiting the Imperial stables, has been considered a great statesman and the father of the Japanese nation. There is no doubt that he was idealized to a considerable extent with the passage of time. Legends forming around him appear to have started as early as the Nihonshoki in which he is described as being able to speak the moment he was born and proved to possess such wisdom equal to an adult. He could comprehend utterances of ten men simultaneously.

Since he was born as the son of the first Buddhist Emperor Yōmei, it is most likely that he had received considerable education in Buddhism and Chinese culture. With the backing from the Soga, he became in 592 A.C. the regent of Empress Suiko, the first female head of state in the Imperial history. He was just 19 years old at that time.

Prince Shōtoku's understanding of Buddhism is best summarized in his last deathbed quotation from the *Dhammapada* to his subjects:

Avoid evil, undertake good, purify the mind:
This is the teaching of Buddhas. (Dhp. 183)

He saw in Buddhism the true meaning of life and embarked on a wide range of socio-political and cultural reform. He laid the foundation for the nation building based on Buddhist ideals. It was during his reign that a considerable degree of unity and peace was achieved under the banner of Buddhism.

Prince Shōtoku's vision into the future was manifest in various spheres. He valued learning and was responsible for setting up schools. In 607 A.C., he started dispatching official envoys and students to China to bring back advanced civilization and Buddhism. He promoted industry, constructed hospitals not only for the sick, but also for animals.

In 594 A.C., an "Imperial Ordinance for Upholding the Three Treasures" was promulgated; the three treasures being, (1) the Buddha; (2) the Dharma, and (3) the Sangha. This date, politically speaking, marked the end of a period extending over half a century of struggles between the two opposing clans of the Soga and the Mononobe since the introduction of Buddhism in Japan.

According to the Nihonshoki, the "Seventeen-Article Constitution" was promulgated on April 3rd 604 A.C. This constitution expounds many Buddhist ideals. The first article emphasizes the importance of 'Harmony'. The second article deals with how we should realize this principle. The same article continues to say that the Buddhist Law should be the guiding principle for good acts in our everyday life. Article III sets forth the relation between the emperor and the subjects. Article IV gives a list of things to be borne in mind by state officials when they execute duties. Some modern critics are, however, of the view that this constitution would have been composed after the Taika Reforms initiated in 645 A.C. and was subsequently attributed to Prince Shōtoku, for its contents can be understood and plausible only with the knowledge of the Taika Reforms.

In 606 A.C., Prince Shōtoku, according to tradition, gave a lecture on the Shōmangyō *(Śrīmālāsiṃhanāda-sūtra)* before Empress Suiko and later in the same year on the Hokekyō *(Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-sūtra)*. He is also said to have written commentaries on the three important Buddhist sūtras of the day; the two already mentioned above and the Yuimagyo *(Vimalakīrtinirdeśa-sūtra)*.

Whatever legends surrounding him may be, it is no doubt that Buddhism for the first time in the history of Japan gained currency and was accorded the status of a state religion during the period of regency of Prince Shōtoku. It was indeed a brilliant epoch in the history of Japan. As testimony to his service to the cause of Buddhism, it is recorded that there were some 46 Buddhist temples, 816 priests and 569 nuns by 623 A.C. The Hōryūji and Shitennōji temples are the monuments of Prince Shōtoku's dedication to the spread of Buddhism, which survived the ravages of time for centuries.

Taika Reforms and Buddhism: After the death of Prince Shōtoku in 622 A.C., the Soga clan became more and more the dominant force in the political scene until finally all those related to Prince Shōtoku were attacked by Soga no Iruka at the palace of Prince Shōtoku in 643 A.C. However, the Nakatomi conspired with Prince Naka no Ōe (future Emperor Tenchi, 661–670 A.C.) and a disillusioned branch of the Soga clan, staged a successful war and the Soga leaders were killed in the confrontation in 645 A.C. This date marked the beginning of the Taika Reform movement. It was inaugurated with the plan of establishing a new centralized government

modelled after the style of T'ang China. The Taika Reform was aimed, at least in theory, at abolishing private landholdings, the establishment of provincial governments and bureaucratic offices, a system of equal land distribution and means of collecting taxes.

Buddhism under the policies of the Taika Reforms was not much affected except for the fact that the new government (called the Ritsuryō Government) tried to alienate Buddhism from the hands of the Soga. The new government moved to make the emperor the supreme leader of the Buddhist faith. Following the T'ang Chinese practice of appointing Ten Masters in charge of Buddhist education, the government initiated a similar plan. After the initiation of the Ritsuryō government in 645 A.C. up to the beginning of the Nara period in 710 A.C., the most noticeable advancement in Buddhism was in the increase of court rituals, such as the 'Urabon-e' (Festival of the Dead), 'Yuima-e' (Yuima Lecture Meeting), 'Kambutsu-e' (Buddha's Birth Festival) and 'Ninno-e' (Benevolent King's Ceremony).

The 'Urabon-e' was started during the reign of Empress Saimei (655-661 A.C.) to be held on 15th July every year and the 'Urabonkyo' *(Ullambana-sūtra)* was recited in appreciation of what one owes to parents and ancestors going back seven generations. This festival is most widely observed in Japan even today.

The origin of the 'Yuima-e' is as follows: When Nakatomi no Kamako, who was the ancestor of the Fujiwara clan, was seriously ill, Empress Saimei, being concerned about his illness, caused the Yuimagyō *(Vimalakīrtinirdeśa-sūtra)* to be recited for him. With Empress Saimei's dedication and the power of the sūtra, Kamako is said to have fully recovered. In appreciation of this, he built a temple where the sūtra was read and studied every year. This festival became one of the most important annual Buddhist ceremonies observed throughout the Nara period (710-783 A.C.) and even in the Heian period (794-1185 A.C.) when the Fujiwara clan occupied the highest position as ministers of the state.

The 'Kambutsu-e' is the celebration of the Buddha's birthday which falls on the 8th day of the 4th month. This festival is characterized by sprinkling 'Ama-cha' (sweet tea) on to an image of the infant Buddha. The 'Ninno-e' also began during the reign of Empress Saimei. It was thought that by the right practice of Dharma natural calamity could be averted and peace achieved. During the Heian period, it became a national custom for the emperor to perform it at least once in his reign.

Buddhism during this period (645-710 A.C.) was primarily concerned with rituals and temple building as much the same as during the Soga domination before the Taika Reforms. The aristocracy, with the notable exception of Prince Shōtoku, were not yet ready to comprehend and apply the philosophy of Buddhism to human problems. This may be due to the fact that they were too much engrossed in the glory and splendour of court life.

Nara Period (710-794 A.C.) The Taika Reforms of 645 A.C. had necessitated a permanent seat of government. Materialization of it took some time, but finally in 710 A.C. the permanent capital city of Heijōkyō (Nara) was established. The city was modelled after Ch'ang-an, the great capital of T'ang China.

The Ritsuryō ('Ritsu' means penal codes and 'Ryō', administrative laws) system of government envisaged a vast network of bureaucracy with the Emperor and aristocracy at the head. There was a move by the aristocracy under the Ritsuryō government to issue an ordinance in 701 A.C. to enshrine and venerate the Sun Goddess Amaterasu Ō Mikami, the ancestral deity of the Imperial family, at Ise. This ordinance officially recognized for the first time in history the legitimacy of its ancestral deity, thereby establishing centralization of administration, though the real power was still vested mainly in the handful of aristocrats.

As for Buddhism, the Ritsuryō government's policy towards it remained more or less the same throughout the Nara period. With the establishment of the capital at Heijōkyō, leading Buddhist monks and nuns also moved into the capital city and within a short spell of time, the capital was studded with Buddhist temples and institutions. The government was, however, very much concerned about the power of individual monks and Buddhist institutions and in order to control them, it continued to have the Sōniryō (rules and regulations for monks and nuns). They were confined to dealing with the behaviour of those who had already entered the religious life and to limit their religious activity outside of government recognized temples and institutions. The government also deemed it fit to interfere in the lives of individual monks and nuns as and when such an interference was thought to be necessary in the interests of the nation. An edict was issued in 718 A.C., for example, to prohibit the missionary activities of the monk Gyōgi who, unlike other Buddhist monks, moved with the masses to fulfil his ideals. This was regarded by the authorities as a threat to the bureaucratic system. The government interpretation of priesthood at that time was that a monk or nun was simply a religious individual appointed and recognized by the authorities to contribute to the prosperity and protection of the nation.

The government control over the affairs of individual monks and Buddhist institutions was not necessarily resented by the community of monks and nuns. It may be perhaps due to the fact that serving within the Buddhist institutions as monks and nuns was considered to be one

of the easiest and surest ways to attain social advancement and recognition, particularly for those of lower classes.

By the time of Emperor Shōmu (724–749 A.C.), the country was unified under the emperor both politically and spiritually. The zenith of Nara Buddhism was reached during his reign. This period came to be otherwise known as 'Tempyō (heavenly peace)' period. It was Emperor Shōmu who contributed much to the spread and patronage of Buddhism not only as an individual, but also involving the state in its sponsorship. But even during his time, Buddhism was still deemed as possessing magical power to protect and foster the prosperity and happiness of the nation. Emperor Shōmu launched a programme to erect 'kokubunji' (state temples) in all provinces throughout the country in order to pray for the happiness of the people, to guard the country against calamities, sicknesses and plagues. Thus in each of 64 provinces of Japan were built one kokubunji (state temple for monks) and kokubunniji (state temple for nuns). In the year 728 A.C., 64 sets of the Konkōmyō-saishōō-kyō (*Suvarṇa-prabhāsottama-sūtra)*, a sutra said to protect the state and to benefit the people, were copied and distributed throughout the country. In 737 A.C., another ordinance was promulgated instructing the people of each province to make an image of Sakyamuni Buddha accompanied by two attendent images to be enshrined in their respective state temples. Further instructions were sent out to the provinces to erect a 'seven-storeyed stūpa' at each kokubunji temple and the copying of the Konkōmyō-saishōō-kyō and the Myōhōrengekyō *(Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-sūtra)* should be done. The Emperor also gave orders to station 10 monks at the kokubunji temple, 10 nuns at the kokubunniji temple who would be responsible for the studying and teaching of the above two texts and for the education of the people of the province.

In 745 A.C., the Tōdaiji temple, the headquarters of all kokubunji temples, was built and a colossal Mahāvairocana Buddha statue (Daibutsu), fifty-three and a half feet tall, was enshrined therein. It was perhaps the most magnificent single event which characterized the extent of support Buddhism received from the state. Such an undertaking must have been no doubt the result of close cooperation between the state and its subjects. It is to be expected that an event of this magnitude would have contributed, just as he wished, to further consolidate the position of the emperor as head of state. But, it was far from it. Some scholars believe that the Emperor Shōmu's undertakings to promote Buddhism taxed the public resources of the Nara court, so that far from consolidating the central rule, they stimulated a decline in national administration. However, the construction of the Tōdaiji temple and Daibutsu was the focal point of the epoch of the Tempyō era.

During the Nara period, the atmosphere was greatly conducive to the pursuit of Buddhist studies. It was during this period that practically all the then available Buddhist schools and traditions in China were introduced to Japan. The Nara Buddhism was confined mainly to the study of texts and did not positively attempt to convert the masses as a religion. Scholars often designate the Nara Buddhism as scholastic. It is however no doubt that the Nara Buddhism laid the foundation for further developments that could really be named 'Japanese Buddhism' particularly after the Kamakura period.

When Buddhism gained official recognition and government support, a move was initiated to unite the new religion with the indigenous faith, Shintoism. This is known as 'Shinbutsu shūgō' (unification of gods and Buddhas) in its early stages. This move was encouraged by the governfment as well as by other factions and shrine temples named 'jingūji' were constructed. Shinto priests also supported the development of 'Shinbutsu shūgō' with the idea of sharing benefits endowed upon Buddhism. It was viewed in the process of this movement that the native gods too embraced Buddhism and decided to protect the Dharma. Consequently, during the Nara period, the native gods (kami) began to develop two different roles towards Buddhism; the role of guardians to the Dharma and the role of suffering sentient beings seeking to attain salvation under the guidance of Buddhism. It was no doubt a distinct influence of Buddhism upon Shintoists. The assimilation of native gods as guardians of Buddhism has, in fact, been an important process in the evolution of Buddhism in Japan.

By the time of Emperor Kōken (Reign: 746–758 A.C.), there were 6 officially recognized Buddhist sects. They were the Sanron, Hossō, Kegon, Ritsu, Jōjitsu and Kusha. They are commonly known as the Six Buddhist Schools of Nara. It must be mentioned here that they rather placed emphasis on different texts and on different interpretations of fundamental philosophical points of Buddhism and were not mutually exclusive. Students of Buddhism could study in different schools under different teachers.

The Sanron Sect: This sect bases its philosophy on the following three treatises: a. Chūron *(Mādhyamakakārikā-śāstra)* by Nāgārjuna, b. Jūnimonron *(Dvādaśanikāya-śāstra)* by Nāgārjuna, and c. Hyakuron *(Śata-śāstra)* by Āryadeva. These texts were studied and commented upon ever since they were brought from India to China in 409 A.C. by Kumārajīva who translated them into Chinese. They were later systematized into a school by Kichizō (Chinese Chi-tsang, 549–623 A.C.). The school was according to records first introduced to Japan in 625 A.C. by a Korean monk named Ekan who was a pupil of Kichizō. Ekan lived at the Gangōji temple and spread the

teaching. Later, however, scholar monks such as Chizō and Dōji went to China during the T'ang period. Especially Dōji who went to China in 701 A.C. studied various subjects of Buddhism other than the Sanron, and on his return formulated a more complicated and profound system of the school than that of Kichizō. He lived at the Daianji temple after which the school was named, viz., 'Daianji school.' Likewise, some other temples later on became the centres of studies under different names within the Sanron sect.

The Sanron scholars of the Nara period were well versed in almost all the important Buddhist texts of both Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna Buddhism. The school criticized ways of the scholar monks of the Hossō sect against their involvements in politics. The Hossō sect was attached, doctrinally speaking, for their stand of the classification of men into 5 categories, of which a certain class was designated as being incapable of attaining Buddhahood.

Challenges to the Ritsuryō system of government were, however, posed by some individual monks from time to time during this period. One such instance was made by Gyōgi (668–748 A.C.). His missionary activities started after his mother's death. He then travelled far and wide in the countryside attracting thousands of followers. He was a social worker and idealist. During his travels, he is said to have built 49 temples, boat landings, bridges, dams, irrigation systems, wells, hostels, etc. for the benefit of the common masses. The people accepted him as a spiritual leader and saviour at a time when the government imposed severe taxation exploiting them. His popularity prompted the government to issue several edicts against him but they were of no avail. The government then changed its attitude towards him not because the authorities accepted him as a great personage, but because of the fear that the authoritarian system of administration would be at stake. Gyōgi was invited by Emperor Genshō to lecture in 721 A.C. and when Emperor Shōmu came to the throne in 724 A.C., the Emperor developed great respect for Gyōgi who was in fact to play a significant role in the construction of the Great Buddha image (Daibutsu) at the Tōdaiji temple later on. Gyōgi died in 748 A.C. and was the first individual in Japan to be posthumously given the title of Bosatsu (bodhisattva) by the Emperor.

Another incident of this nature took place when Ganjin (687–763 A.C.), the Chinese monk, at the request of visiting Japanese monks to that country arrived from China in 753 A.C. after several unsuccessful attempts to reach Japan. He was officially welcomed by the government in 754 A.C. and he took residence at the famous Tōdaiji temple. He erected a 'precept platform' (kaidan) for conducting ordination ceremonies and established a sect named the Ritsu (Vinaya) Sect of Japan. Later he moved to the Tōshōdaiji temple. Although Ganjin did not oppose the government control over ordination, his presence and subsequently established 'kaidan' posed a serious question as to the credibility of the government's claim to decide who was fit to enter the religious life. This question would linger on until the Heian period when Saichō, the founder of the Japanese Tendai School, established his own Mahāyāna kaidan.

The Hossō Sect: This sect is based on the Mahāyāna thought of the school of Maitreya (270–350 A.C.), Asanga (310-390 A.C.) and Vasubandhu (320–400 A.C.) of India. It was introduced to China by Bodhiruci (–535 A.C.), Paramārtha (–569 A.C.) and others, but it was not until Hsüan-tsang returned to China from India that many texts and treatises were translated into Chinese.

The transmission of this school to Japan was done by Dōshō(629–700 A.C.) who was a pupil of Hsüan-tsang while in China. After Dōshō, such monks as Chitsū, Chitatsu, Chihō, Chian, Chiyū, Gembō, etc., went to China and studied the doctrine of the school. After coming back to Japan, their residences became the centres of studies having different branch names within the Hossō sect. They are, 'Gangoji school' (started by Dosho at the Gangoji temple), 'Kobukuji school' (started by Gembo at the Kobukuji temple) and such temples as the following are associated with the Hossō sect: the Todaiji, the Saidaiji, the Yakushiji, the Daianji, the Horyuji, etc. Gyogi who became a great asset to Emperor Shomu in his construction of the Daibutsu at the Todaiji temple studied under Dosho.

The Kegon Sect: This sect bases its doctrine on the Kegongyō *(Avataṃsaka sūtra).* It was finally systematized by Hōzō (Ch. Fa-tsang, 643–712 A.C.) in China. The principal doctrine of this sect is the theory of 'Ekayāna' (One Vehicle). Hōzō classified the whole system of Buddhism into 1. 'Shōjō' (Hīnayāna Buddhism), 2.'Daijōshikyō' (First Teaching of Mahāyāna), 3. 'Daijōshugyō' (Last Teaching of Mahāyāna), 4. 'Tongyō' (Teaching of Abrupt Awakening), and 5. 'Engyō' (All-Perfect Teaching). This classification was also introduced to Japan. The Kegon with its 'Ekayāna' theory subsequently gave way to those of the new religions of the Heian period, namely the Tendai and the Shingon, but its principles were continued and further developed in those schools.

The Ritsu sect: The Ristu sect placed emphasis on the importance of the Vinaya. When Yōei and Fushō dispatched by Former Shōmu went to China in 733 A.C., they saw the real significance of moral precepts being the first requisite in admitting anyone into monkhood. They first requested Dōsen to come to Japan to perform the

same rituals of giving precepts. While remaining in China for several more years, however, they by chance had an opportunity to pay a courtesy call on Ganjin who was then reputed as the foremost teacher and requested Ganjin to send some disciples of his for the purpose of administering moral precepts in Japan. However, none of his disciples volunteered to take the risk to go to Japan as trips to Japan at that time were considered hazardous. Finallly Ganjin made a resolution to visit Japan himself. It was very fortunate that Japan would have a monk like Ganjin to spread Buddhism in Japan. After several unsuccessful attempts, Ganjin finally reached Japan in 753 A.C., and in 754 was accorded a state reception from the court. He was given residence at the Tōdaiji temple where he constructed a 'Kaidan' (precept platform) to give moral precepts to Japanese aspirants for ordinatin. Ganjin was the founder of the Japanese Ritsu sect. He later took residence at the Tōshōdaiji temple.

The Kusha sect: The sect is so named because of its dependence on the Kusharon *(Abhidharmakośa)*, as its main philosophy. It was introduced to Japan in 658 A.C by Chitatsu and Chitsū, both of whom studied under Hsüan-tsang while in China. Tradition has it that the sect was again introduced in 735 A.C. by the monk Gembō, who was also the master of the Hossō philosophy. Hence it was registered in 793 A.C. as a branch of the Hossō sect.

The Jojitsu sect: This sect has the Jōjitsuron *(Satya-siddhi-śāstra)* as its principal text. It was introduced to Japan by Ekan, a Korean monk who arrived at the Hōryūji in 625 A.C. This sect was treated as a subdivision of the Sanron sect.

Heian Period (794–1185 A.C.): Towards the end of the Nara period, domestic problems became overwhelmingly acute. Politically, the Ezo (Ainu) rebellion had to be dealt with. It was a trying period for the maintenance of Imperial autonomy as the governfment had become less and less authoritative, particularly after the time of Emperor Shōmu. In addition, the increase of ecclesiastical interference with politics reached the peak by the incident of the monk Dōkyō who even tried to succeed to the throne during the time of Empress Shōtoku (764–769 A.C.). This led to the issuing of an ordinance on the part of the Imperial court that only a member of the Imperial family descended from the gods was eligible to become emperor. When Empress Shōtoku died in 770 A.C., Dōkyō's power waned overnight and he died in exile in 772 A.C.

Emperor Kōnin who succeeded to the throne in 770 A.C. immediately took steps to remedy the conditions that arose from unstable government, country's economy and institutional Buddhism. Further he had to campaign against the Ezo rebellion. As far as his policy towards Buddhism is concerned, he allowed the freedom to take up residences in mountains and forest hermitages to the religious who once abhorred the secularization of Buddhism symbolized in Dōkyō's involvement in politics and took up the life of seclusion in mountains and forests with or without permission from the government.

When Emperor Kanmu ascended the throne in 781 A.C., he decided to move the capital from Nara and established his palace at Nagaoka with the belief that such a move would be conducive to the quelling of the Ezo rebellion. This move, however, was not successful. In 789 A.C., the army suffered disastrous losses in the campaign against the Ezo. This prompted the emperor to shift the capital again to a new site.

The selection of the new capital at Kyoto had distinct advantages. The place was strategically well placed surrounded by mountains. In addition, it could escape the hustles of the Nara Buddhism. Thus the new capital was established at Heiankyō (Peace and Tranquillity) in 794 A.C. and ushered in a new era named the Heian period.

Toshiichi Endo

Heian Period: Emperor Kwammu (Kanmu) shifted his capital to Miyako, the modern Kyoto. THis shifting of capital did not imply any hostility to Buddhism though the main reason to move say away from Nara appears to have been the Emperor's fear of the undue growth of eccelesiastical power there. The influence of religious bodies of Nara began to wane after the setting up the new capital. On the other hand, as new sources of Buddhist influence began to emerge the Emperor unhesitatingly observed such influence.

It is seen that the history of Buddhism of the early part of the Heian period was absolutely dominated by two extraordinary Buddhist leaders namely Saicho, better known as Dengyo Daishi (q.v.), and Kukai, commonly called Kobo Daishi (q.v.). These two who were contemporaries separately established in the vicinity of the capital two new schools viz. Tendai (q.v.) and Shingon (q.v.). Saicho, the senior of the two, was already settled near Kyoto when Kwammu decided to establish his capital there. It is said that Saicho, in 788 A.C., built on the mountain of Hieizan a monastery which afterwards became famous as the Enryaku-ji. Kwammu after deciding on the site for his capital there in 793 A.C., is said to have requested Saicho to perform a religious ceremony for the sanctification of the new site. Thus, it is seen that Kwammu was not hostile to Buddhism and that he began his rule in the new capital under the aegis of Buddhism. Once again, after visiting the temple, in 797

A.C., Kwammu is said to have worshipped it as the true guardian of his Empire. Kukai who first settled down at Koya in the Kii Province, later built the famous Koyasan at the same site.

It was pointed out that many schools of Buddhist thought were introduced during the Nara period. Though there was no oppositon among these schools, divergence of the subjects pursued and the methods of training followed happened to alienate those schools from one another. Moreover, personal ambitions and secular interests of some of the teachers of these schools to overshadow each other further widened the gap among them. Therefore there was a pressing need for a more synthesised form of Buddhism.

It is true that the tireless efforts of such eminent monks as Gyogi and Roben and Emperors such as Shomu helped to popularize Buddhism. Yet it cannot be said that the spirit of Buddhist teachings actually percolated into the masses. Buddhist schools that prevailed during the Nara period were far too scholastic for the masses, and there were too many schools to choose from. Hence, a need was felt for a more simple and less divergent form of Buddhism. Saicho and Kukai appeared to answer this need. It is seen that the two schools they popularized namely Tendai and Shingon respectively sought to present two systems of thought in which all major points of view, Buddhist as well as Confucian, Shinto and so on, would be assigned to their place. This somewhat all embraicng synthesis was successful in winning the support of the people and the government.

Despite the fact that Tendai and Shingon are different in origin, one cannot fail to observe the similarities between them. Tendai, the Japanese adaptation of the Chinese T'ien-t'ai, is an eclectic school recognizing various forms of Buddhism as different phases of the true doctrine culminating with the teachings of Tendai itself fundamentally based on the *Saddharamapuṇḍarīka Sūtra*. Unlike the Chinese proto-type, Tendai Buddhism made use of esoteric rites *(mikkyo)* as an essential feature, specially in order to vie for popularity with Shingon, which is the Japanese adaptation of Mantrayāna or Tantrism. Tendai being rather eclectic was able to accommodate Shingon, and hence, there was, at the beginning, much fusion between the two, and it is seen that the two founders, Saicho and Kukai, worked in collabaration for a time. But this cooperation did not prevail for long, and soon Shingon with its emphasis on rituals and ceremonies took precedence over Tendai whose emphasis was more on philosophy. Further, Saicho had to face a barrage of criticism levelled by the scholars of the Hosso school who rejected his view which upheld that every one possesses the Buddha-nature and hence all, without any distinction, are destined to attain salvation. Though Shingon Buddhism, too, accepted the position that all alike are capable of attaining salvation it does not appear that it ever became the object of criticism of the schools of Nara. This perhaps is more due to the conciliatory nature of Kukai who, unlike Saicho, did not get involved in polemics. Once again it was Saicho, who openly strove to break way from the domination of the Nara school of Buddhism. Though Tendai was recognised as a sect it was not allowed to conduct higher ordination on its own. All novices belonging to Tendai, therefore, had to go to Nara to recieve higher ordination. Saicho objected to this practice on many grounds. He correctly pointed out the anomaly of insisting on followers of Tandai, a Mahāyāna school to receive Hīnayāna precepts when obtaining ordination at Nara. He also found that many of the novices who went to Nara got either dazzled by the splendour of city-life and gave up robes or were won over by the Hosso school. Prelates of Nara were able to thwart all efforts made by Saicho, during his life-time, to establish a Kaidan (or *Sīmā)* independent of Nara, and it was only sometime after his death that the government acceded to his request. Though there was no discrimination on the part of the government, it is obvious that Shingon, with the help of the enigmatic personality of its founder and also owing to its elaborate and spectacular rituals, was able to extract a more favourable attitude than the Tendai. In popularity, of course, Shingon was far ahead of Tendai, for with less philosophy and more rituals it possessed the qualities desired by the common man.

In spite of the obvious differences between the two sects they appear to have shared the interest of establishing an organised Buddhist church to embrace all social work. Though this interest was never fully realised by either of them, the idea appeared to have been the strongst force motivating religious and social activities of the Heian period. This centralization of religion and social activities was openly backed by the government, and the two Buddhist centres in turn helped to stabilize the central government, thus bringing about a close collaboration between the state and the church.

Efforts of these two religious leaders in forming a uni-ed church that brought about a harmonious blending of Shintoism and Buddhism was felt even by the Shintoists themselves. However, the conciliatory approach adopted by both Saicho and Kukai hastened this process of assimilation, and this resulted in the Ryobu-Shinto. Kukai's teachings were well suited for this purpose. His teaching concerning the two aspects of cosmic life enabled to represent the Shinto *Kamis* as manifestations of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas. A majority of the Shinto shrines was furnished with an inner sanctuary (Oku-no-in) where Buddhist rituals were performed. The rise of the ascetic class of monks in both Tendai and Shingon, too, favoured this amalgmation of Shintoism and Buddhism.

These monks who were called yama-nushi (those who sleep on mountains), or Shugenja (those who practise austerities) frequented Shinto shrines and made them sacred to Buddhists as well. Yet in spite of the overwhelming influence of Buddhism indigenous beliefs did not lose their hold on the masses. This was more so because while taking into its fold the indigenous beliefs Japanese Buddhism always has been flexible enough to adapt itself to national needs and traditions. Thus, Shintoism was able to express itself through the medium of Buddhism.

It appears that the tendency seen among Japanese to assimilate and blend divergent religious beliefs is equally matched by their tendency to categorise and multiply divisions and create new sects. This is made evident by the appearence of numerous sects of Tendai and Shingon. Already by the latter part of the 9th century Tendai was divided into two major branches. The one which maintained its headquarters at Hieizan itself upheld the traditions of their teacher Jikaku. The other at Miidera favoured the views of Enchin whose posthumous title is Chigo Daishi. There was bitter enmity between the temples affiliated to these sects.[1] The conflicts became so grave that under the leadership of Ryogen (Jiei Daishi) Hieizan organised a body of mercenery monks called Sohei. This example was followed by monasteries such as Kokufuji and Todaiji. During the latter part of the 10th century A.C. there was open warfare between these temples over the possession of some rice-fields. Hieizan even attempted to use force against the central government and by about the eleventh century it became almost a common feature for monasteries which had any grievance against the government to send armed bands together with their religious emblems in order to win their demands by coercing the government. These threats became so frequent and grave that Emperor Shirakawa (1073–1086 A.C.) is said to have remarked that there were three things which he could not control: the innundations of the river Kamo, hazards of gambling and the monks of Hieizan.

Shingon on the other hand, though divided into sects, seems tohave had a comparatively peaceful history at the beginning. But at a later date, it too followed the precedent set by Hieizan and on two occasions it had to face dire consequences at the hands of Nobunage and Hideyoshi.

Though Confucianism appears to have had much influence in the sphere of education, undoubtedly, Buddhism was the main inspiration of the age. It became almost co-terminus with culture. Tendai with a blend of ritual, and Shingon with an abundance of rituals were most appealing to the court and nobles. Their rich pantheism and colourful rituals were extremely suited to cater to secular demands. The national taste for uniting ritual with enjoyment found a suitablee medium in these religions.

The severing of relations with China by about the beginning of the tenth century brought about a period of seclusion. Japan became independent of the vicissitudes of her great neighbour who from the time of the introduction of Buddhism served as the main source of inspiration in all spheres of life. This environment was conducive to the independent growth of Tendai and Shingon in accordance with national needs. By this time the influence of Buddhism over the court reached its peak. The emperors and nobles appeared to have developed a strong feeling of complacency. As the rulers cared more for a life of ease and enjoyment, administration and military organization gradually fell into neglect. Over-indulguce in luxury and enjoyment had serious consequences on the economy of the country. Sometimes the country was forced to support several courts simultaneously. This happened mainly due to the custom of emperors retiring prematurely and entering the Order. Under such circustances the affairs of the country were nominally in the hands of a child Emperor under the supervision of a regent. Yet it is the ex-Emperor who often wielded real power. This practice not only made inroads into the country's economy, but also greatly tended to increase the power of particular monasteries. Yet another somewhat similar circumstance, too, appears to have increased the wealth and power of monasteries. The Fujiwara bureaucracy monopolised the high positions in the administration to the exclusion of able members of other powerful families. Those members who were disgruntled with the administration sought refuge in the Order to build up their own power blocks. The latter part of the Heian period was well presented by such men who donned the monkish garb but used their talents, wealth and power not to propagate the religion but to further their secular interests. These circumstances naturally made monasteries the power bases of disgruntled nobles who, while being in robes raised armies among the monks not only to fight rival monasteries, but also to intimidate the central government.

Thus it is seen that the splendour and luxury of court life, prosperity of monasteries, frequent performance of rites and rituals and the bent towards aesthetic brilliance were all masks covering the corruption and rapid degeneration that was gathering momentum to burst out at any moment. In spite of this under-current of corruption there were pious men who sincerely devoted themselves to higher religious ideals. They strove to be above rivalries and struggles for power that were a redeeming feature in the monastic life of the time.

1. These two sects are known as Sammon and Jimon or Mie.

Many such men were trained in the philosphy of Tendai but were bent towards the worship of Amida. Worship of Amida was not unknown even in the Nara period, and in the Heian period it wsa mildly blended with Tendai and Shingon. In the tenth century a monk named Kuya, toured the whole of Japan, dancing and chanting the *nembutsu.*[2] Genshin, too, by his writings did much to popularize the worship of Amida. Ryomn founded the Amida sect known as the Yuzu nembutsu. Kakuhan or Kokyo Daishi who founded the great monastery of Negoro and also a new branch of Shingon accommodated Amidism in his teachings. The conditions prevalent during the eleventh century strengthened the belief that it was the period of degenerate doctrine or map-po[3], and the abuses of mystic ritualism both by Tendai and Shingon added momentum to this belief. Both Shingon and Tendai had outlived their usefulness by the eleventh century. Time and the conditions were demanding a change, and the gradual rise of Amidism suggests the nature of the change demanded.

Kamakura Period: By the middle of the twelfth century the long predominance of the Fujiwara family came to an end. The political authority passed into the hands of the newly ascendant military class the samurai. The transference of power was not smooth, and the country was torn by wars in which even the great monasteries actively participated. Consequently three of the most important monasteries Mildera, Kofukuji and Todai-ji were burnt. Besides, the country was devasted by pestilence and famine. Gloom and misery loomed over the country. The belief that this was the period of degeneracy *(mappo)* was gathering momentum. Tendai and Shingon Buddhism had outlived their usefulness and they failed to bring solace when it was needed most. This was not the time to indulge either in obtruse philosophy or extraordinarily complicated ritual. Though in the Heian period there were signs of Buddhism percolating into the masses, in fact Buddhism remained predominantly the religion of the aristocrats symbolizing power, culture and learning.

The Heian Buddhism appealed to the aristocrats who led easy luxurious lives and thus had all the time and inclination and also the money to be devoted to textual studies and performance of costly and complicated rituals. The newly arisen military class being more plebian, rustic, simple and practical, were repelled by intellectualism and externalism. Their bent was towards a simple and direct form of religion. The masses who had always been on the periphery of religious influence were becoming aware cf the need for a religion which would give them the assurance of some forms of compensation for the suffering they were undergoing. Constant wars, pestilence and famines made their need felt more acutely. The political revolution almost accomplished, and, the time and the condition were calling for a revolution in the religious sphere.

Three schools of Buddhism arose in answer to this general call. The Jodo (Pure-Land), Nichiren and Zen. Jodo chose the way of salvation through faith in Amida Buddha. Nichiren through teachings embodied in the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra and Zen through meditation.

As pointed out earlier, the belief in Amida was gradually gaining ground from the Heian period and such monks as Kuya and Ryonin taught the efficacy of the *nembutsu.* However, it was Honen (also known as Genku) who developed it as an independent school. The turbulent state of the country helped Honen, to bring to the forefront the notion that at a time like that the people simply did not have the capacity to achieve salvation by their personal effort *(jiriki),* and that salvation is possible only through an external power *(tariki).*[4] This religion of calling out the name of Amida, due to its simplicity made a strong appeal to the masses who were neither able to grasp the obtruse philosophy of Tendai nor perform the elaborate rituals of Shingon. Honen's teaching was further developed and popularised by his eminent disciple Shinran, the founder of the Jodo Shinshu. He laid more emphasis on faith in Amida's grace and discarded the distinction between *jiriki* and *tariki* and proclaimed that Amida's compassion and saving grace are universal. He urged all to abandon personal effort and surrender themselves to the grace of Amida. Even faith came to be regarded as a gift of Amida. As Amida's saving grace was universal, all, regardless of any difference that exists between individuals, were considered as destined for salvation. Further he maintained that there was no difference between monastic-life and household-life and acting true to his teaching he himself married and raised a family. This abolition of any distinction between monastic and secular life was an innovation which certainly contributed to the rapid and wide spread of Jodo-

2. Nembutsu is the name of the well-known formula Namu Amida Butsu which is the equivalent to the Sanskrit adoration 'Namo Amitābhaya-Buddhāya. The two Chinese words 'nien fu' of which it is made appears to have originally meant thinking of the Buddha. See further AMIDISM.

3. The Japanese Buddhist tradition also accepts the popular Buddhist belief of the three different stages in the history of Buddhism. The first stage is the period in which the true doctrine *(saddharma)* prevails and this is called Sho-bo. The second stage is when the doctrine prevails only in name *(pratirūpa-dharma)* and this is referred to as Zobo. The third period is of currupt doctrine *(paścima-dharma)* or Map-po as known in Japanese.

4. *Jiriki* is self-reliance and *tariki* is reliance in some external power, in this case, in the saving power of Amida.

Shinshu. Besides these two, such teachers as Benna, Shoku and Ippen did much to popularize the Pure-Land school. In this respect Ippen, who is known as the 'Itinerant Sage', performed yeoman's service for this school. Following the precedent of Kuya, he toured the country encouraging the practice of chanting the name of Amida, and maintaining registers of those who profesed faith in Amida. He combined social service with his missionary work, and this further helped the spread of Pure Land teaching.

The other school of Buddhism that came into prominance at this time is Zen. It was fairly well known in Japan since the introduction of Buddhism but did not become popular until Eisai (Yosai) began propagating, it in the twelfth country. Zen marked a break with the traditional Buddhism in as much as it rejected obtruse philosophy and elaborate rituals, and the stock Zen Slogans such as *Kyoge betsuden* (transmission that does not depend on teaching), *furyu monji* (written words are useless), *Jikishi minshin* (direct communication that goes direct into the heart), *kensho Jobutsu* (to discern one's true nature is to attain Buddhahood) amply illustrate the essence of Zen Buddhism. Unlike Pure-Land Buddhism, Zen relied on personal effort as the only means of attaining Enlightenment. The samurai class patronized Zen for more than one reason. The political antagonism with the Kyoto based aristocracy which upheld it naturally prompted them to direct their attention towards a non-traditional form of Buddhism. Being thus prompted they were drawn towards Zen for there seemed to be a natural correspondence between the simple and direct character of Zen and the ethos of the samurai.

Not long after the introduction of the Rinzai branch of Zen by Eisai, Dogen introduced the Soto branch. Though at the beginning there was not much difference between the two branches, as time went by they developed on different lines. The Rinzai Zen was predominantly patronized by the high-ranking somurai while Soto Zen was followed by the provincial samurai and commoners and hence the saying *Rinzai Shogan Soto domin* (Rinzai for the Shogun and Soto for the peasants)..

The third current of Buddhism that arose in the Kamakura period is the teachings of Nichiren known by the founder's name itself. Unlike Jodo and Zen which have prototypes in China, Nichiren can be truely labelled as indegenous, and hence, of the three schools that flourished during this period Nichiren is most markedly Japanese. This teaching, too is based on the *Saddharma-puṇḍarīka-sūtra*, and hence, basically agrees with Tendai. Yet, while Tendai is predominantly a religious philosophy, Nichiren seems to represent the practical application of this philosophy. Nichiren, the teacher, denounced all the schools of Buddhist thought. He declared that Nembutsu is the path to hell, and said that Amida and Bhirushana (Vairocana) are figments of imagination. Instead, he brought to the forefront the belief in Sākyamuni. To him it is not Sākyamuni the man that is important, but Sākyamuni symbolizing the eternal omnipresent Buddha-nature. This Buddha-nature is innate in everything. He expanded this idea to such an extent that he pronounced that every grain of dust can become a Buddha. In substance there is little that is new in Nichiren's teachings. What made his teachings capture the hearts of many is his personal touch which added vigour and momentum to these old teachings. His blunt, pugnacious spirit and his downright denouncement of other schools of Buddhist thought brought him and his teaching into conflict with eminent teachers of the day. His prophetic statements naturally added weight to his teaching and even his opponents were forced to recognise them. Above all, he tried to blend religion with nationalism, and this task was made easy by the the natural calamities and social unrest that plagued this period. This worldliness is a marked characteristic of Nichiren Buddhism and the characteristic Japanese patriotic spirit is a natural outcome of this.

In spite of much opposition and harassment Nichiren was firm in his stand. It was really in the latter part of his life that his teachings began to take a foothold in the country, and it was really after his death that his pupils such as Nichizo, Nichiryu, Nichimo, Nichison and Nichiju did much to popularise his teachings. As Nichiren Buddhism began to win more and more adherents among the masses, it became inevitable that it should give concessions to popular demands, and consequently magico-religious elements crept into it.

Muromachi Period: The fall of the Kamakura power and the attempts to restore the imperial regime ushers in the dark age of the history of Japanese Buddhism. For over half a century relentless strife was rampant in the country. The dynasty was divided and the parties contending for power used Buddhist institutions to further their own ends. These circumstances were not in the least favourable to the growth of Buddhism. Shinshu flourished, but its record is not edifying. As a consequence of the sanctioning of marriage to the clergy, high ranking positions in the ecclesiastical hierarchy and the institutions attached to them became hereditary. This led to much malpractice and mismanagement of ecclesiastical property. The Jodo sect, though less prominent, appeared to have steadily increased its influence thus incurring the wrath of the Hieizan monks who were not hesitant to burn down Jodo temples and destroy their religious literature. Perhaps it is Zen that fared best during this period of turmoil. They were close to the rulers but were wise enough to keep aloof from political conflicts.

In the midst of political unrest and frequent conflicts between ecclesiastical factions some ardent missionaries

were active in propagating the religion. While some of them concentrated their efforts on cities, others toured the country. Religious and educational centres were established in the provinces thus bridging the gap created by the over-centralization that took place in the Heian period. It was these centres that managed to preserve learning and culture from the destruction which devastated the capital and neighbouring cities.

The country took a turn for the better when the Ashikaga rulers ascended the throne. The reign of Ashikaga Yoshimitsu was most favourable to Buddhism. Once again intercourse with China, which had recently overthrown the Mongol supremacy, was resumed on a large scale, and the result was a major impact of Chinese influence on Japanese monks. The Japanese monks received anew from the Chinese monks who came over to Japan instruction in Zen and the arts based on Zen. Arts of this period influenced by Zen culture were the source from which the renaissance of the sixteenth century derived its inspiration. The Tea Ceremony and the Japanese flower-arrangement are two of the major aspects of the Zen culture of this period that greatly contributed to the unique artistic growth of Japanese culture.

After Yoshimitsu the Ashikagas degenerated rapidly. The country was once again ravaged by war and strife. The ruler and monasteries suffered under financial stress. In the period of war and stress the headquarters of all the important religious bodies were competing to strengthen their position in the capital. While they were engaged in establishing themselves in the capital, minor sects arose abundantly in the provinces, and this was connected to the rise and fall of numerous minor feudal states. Thus it is seen that even sectarian divisions were promoted by feudal divisions and that both reflected the political turmoil that prevailed during the period.

In the midst of this turbulent state of affairs the adherents of the Nichiren school due to the zealous efforts of such leaders as Nitcho and Nisshin, were able to establish numerous centres throughout the country.

The followers of Shinran organized themselves as a new sect by the name of Ikko and established several strongholds in the central and north central provinces. They, under the guidance of their able leader Rennyo, became both a religious and a political force. They waged war against feudal lords as well as against other religious sects. In the last and the bitterest battle fought in 1536 A.C. the soldier monks of Hiei in alliance with Ikko followers attacked the followers of Nichiren and burnt twenty-one of their great temples and drove them out of the capital. By about the same time arose another Shinshu sub-sect called the Hiji Monto perhaps composed of a considerable section of the followers of Ikko. They were apparently organized as a protest against the autocratic administration of the Hongwan-ji at Kyoto. Shinzeir founded a new sect which is reckoned as a subdivision of the Tendai rather than of Jodo Shinshu. He enjoined the repetition of the Nembutsu, but at the same time insisted that it should accompany the observance of the Buddhist code of ethics and discipline.

Even in the midst of constant unrest and turmoil Zen maintained its position and came near to being the state religion. Eminent Zen monks were the advisers to military rulers, and hence, Zen institutions were generously patronized by them. To a great extent the Zen monks were also able to keep aloof from religious strife devoting their time more to educational and cultural activities. And they were also largely responsible in sustaining intercourse with China whose influence enlivened the Japanese culture of the period.

The interval between the Ashikaga and Tokagawa periods marked the climax of the military exploits of the main religious institutions which were finally crushed by Nobunaga and Hideyoshi. Nobunaga was no friend of Buddhism. Fearing the power of great monasteries he began to favour the newly introduced Christianity. In revenge for joining hands with his enemies Nobunaga completely destroyed Hieizan. His successor Hideyoshi meted out the same treatment to the Shingon monastery at Obegoro. Thus those two important institutions paid dearly for their participation in politics. Even Shinshu at Osaka did not escape the wrath of Nobunaga. Shinshu clergy who remained as practical rulers of Kaga were ultimately driven out by Nobunaga. However they were able to establish themselves once more in Kyoto under the patronage of Hideyoshi, this time with their influence greatly reduced.

Tokugawa Period: Restoration of peace and order which commenced with the ascendency of Nobunaga to the throne was consummated when Tokugawa Iyeyasu became the ruler at the beginning of the 17th century. By then religious militarism had completely disappeared. Yet Buddhism had not lost its hold over the lives and the culture of the people. Hence Iyeyasu felt the necessity of protecting Buddhism, yet keeping it within its proper sphere of influence. As an initial step of fostering Buddhism Iyeyasu completely prohibited the propagation of Christianity. A commission for Ecclesiastical Affairs (Ji sha Bugyo) was appointed to supervise all religious activities. The monasteries were richly endowed. But at the same time steps were taken to check all religious strife whether over temporalities or over political issues. Being well looked after the majority of the clergy became bent on helping the government to carry out its policies.

A marked feature of this period was the isolation of Japan from the rest of the world. The Japanese were

forbidden to leave the country while foreigners were barred from entering it. This largely prevented the importation of new religious teachings, Obaku branch of Zen being the only new sect that was founded in Tokugawa times. Under these circumstances there appeared no religious innovators. Instead there were quite a number of elaborators and systematizers. Being well provided, the majority of the clergy lived in ease and inoffensive idleness, a way of life favoured by the government which feared the rise of new religious movements and consequent growth of ecclesiastical power.

The patronage extended to Buddhism by the Tokugawa regime was merely an act of political prudence than an act of religious piety. Iemitsu, and Tsunayashi, the third and the fifth Tokugawa Shoguns respectively were devout champions of Buddhism. Yet the general religious policy of the Tokugawa regime was geared at assisting the smooth functioning of government. Every family was required to attend the Buddhist temple in the area and register its members as supporters of the temple *(danka)*. All births, marriages, deaths etc. were registered at the temple. All Buddhist sects had to function within their respective spheres of influence and to regulate it and a system called *'hatto'* was formulated. All these were effective protective measures which preserved even sects which might otherwise have disappeared. Yet, these measures crippled the growth of religion and completely stilled religious enthusiam. The result was stagnation, and lack of genuine interest in religion. Buddhism was reduced to the status of a mere label and religious practice to a mere mechanical process. This situation was further aggravated by the patronage extended to Buddhism by the newly emergent merchant class. Prohibition of foreign trade helped the growth of internal trade. Fairs were often held in temple premises on festive occasions, and the merchants, in order to carry on their trade, were obliged to be generous towards monks. Their generosity increased the prosperity of the monks who became more prone to enjoyment of worldly pleasures. Peace and general affluence in the country made the people look for more and more worldly pleasures, and religious observance became a mere rite, a heritage of the past. Rites and rituals grew and new shrines were erected to help the performance of these rites.

During the Tokugawa regime all the important Buddhist sects prevailed but with their vigour considerably reduced and their sphere of influence limited. Jodo was more favoured than the other sects by Iyeyasu. Tendai and Shingon headquarters were reduced to modest institutions which the rulers used as part of the government machinery in ruling the country. Isolation of Japan from the rest of the world and the strict check on the activities of the monks forced the monks either to while away their time in idleness or to get engrossed in abstruse religious studies. Once again it was Zen that showed some vitality in this period of religious stagnation. Zen teaching had much impact on the Samurai who were the real power behind the ruling class. Their way of life (Bushido) was partly an inheritance from Zen training. The spiritual influence of Buddhism was kept alive by Haiku poetry (also referred to as Haikai or Hokku) which was popularised by Bashu. It perpetuated the spirit of Zen culture and associated itself with the tea-ceremony, flower arrangement, making miniature landscapes etc. Besides, there were eminent Zen masters such as Hakuin, considered by the Rinzai school as its second founder, and Tenkei of the Soto school.

Meiji Period

Due to strict government supervision of religious activities and lack of religious zeal on the part of Buddhist monks during a period of more than two centuries of Takugawa rule Buddhism was at its weakest when the Tokugawa rule collapsed and the Meiji era commenced. On the other hand, the Shinto movement with its ultra-patriotism had become a national force. Undoubtedly Shintoism helped the restoration of the Imperial house to power. Therefore it was natural that Shintoism was favoured during this period. The rulers however, did not stop at extending preferential treatment to Shintoism. In 1868 they declared Shintoism to be the state religion and dis-established and dis-endowed Buddhism. Buddhist monks and images were removed from Ryobu-shinto shrines. Thus severance of Shintoism from Buddhism was ruthlessly carried out putting an end to the Ryobu-Shinto syncretism which influenced the faith of the nation for over ten centuries. But this persecution of Buddhism did not last long for, ruthless suppression awakened the Buddhist leaders who worked strenuously to exert influence upon the government to modify its religious policy. Among these leaders were devout agitators such as Ekido, Dokuon, Sesso, all of the Zen school, Nisshu, a Nichirenite, Tetsujo from the Iodo school, Unsho of the Shingon sect and Mokurai of the Shinshu sect. Their agitation made the government realise that complete suppression of Buddhism is neither desirable nor possible and subsequently the religious policy was modified to accommodate Buddhism too. By 1884, the Ministry of Public worship (Jingi-kan) which was instrumental in carrying out anti-Buddhist activities was abolished and the administration of religious activities was entrusted to ecclesiastical bodies of different sects. The constitution of 1889 granted religious freedom to all, also removing all restrictions placed on Buddhism. The Meiji constitution in Article 28 declares, "Japanese subjects shall, within limits not prejudical to peace and order, and not antagonistic to their duties as subjects, enjoy freedom of religious beliefs."

Thus, the direct governmental obstruction considerably waned and it became possible for the Buddhist leaders to propagate Buddhism. But by then Buddhism had to face problems that had arisen anew. New trends in education and its social implications were bringing about a change in attitude and outlook of the people. Hereditary values and beliefs were losing ground. The gradual rise of industry and commerce was bringing with it disturbances and distress that usually accompany industrialization. The people were becoming more concerned with political and social reform and individual and social prosperity. The traditional religions had very little to offer to their growing secular demands. A considerable section of the elite did not hesitate in rejecting their belief in religion. Not only the elite even common people, under new socio-economic conditions, found traditional religions less effective in the face of growing secular demands which required immediate help and solution. These factors were instrumental in the rise of 'new religions' which catered to the needs of the masses. Though arisen anew these are not totally independent of the traditional schools, and in fact some of them were adaptations of ritualistic beliefs prevalent in the latter part of the Tokugawa regime. Under the Meiji constitution, which was effective until 1945, religious organizations had to obtain official approval from the government to maintain legal existence, and it was customary on the part of the government to withhold permission for new religious bodies. Therefore the new religious sects that arose during this period generally carried on their activities under the wing of an officially recognised religious sect.

Tenri-Kyo and Konko-Kyo are two such new religions both affiliated to Shinto. This sudden rise of popular Shintoism revealed that the prevailing religions lacked ingredients that appeal directly to the heart of the people. This lack was made more conspicuous by the rapid socio-economic growth and rapid urbanization which were taking place in Japan. People were becoming too busy to concern themselves with problems connected with the next world. Problems in this life were demanding immediate attention. Traditional Buddhism was too theoretical and elite-oriented and even a more liberal sect like Shinshu was not properly equipped to meet the popular religious demand. The Buddhists were quick enough to sense this changed focus of concern on the part of the people. Such sects as Kodo-Kyodan, based on Tendai teachings and Soka Gakkai, inspired by the teachings of Nichiren bear evidence to the successful attempts made by the Buddhists to adapt themselves to the needs of the contemporary Japanese society. They also indicate the path Buddhism was forced by circumstances to follow in this process of adaptation.

S. K. Nanayakkara

The Modern Period: Shinkō shūkō (Newly Established Religions) in its widest sense refers to sects founded as far back as the beginning of the nineteenth century. It is however used today in a more restricted sense to designate sects which came into being in the twentieth century, particularly in and around World War II and thereafter. There is yet another classification of the new religions. According to it, religious movements are divided into three periods of their origin and development: the first booming period of new religions soon after the war. Their emphasis was more on the eradication of poverty, sickness and war. The second boom started about the time of the Korean war when Japan's economy was achieving rapid development. The third one, which is otherwise known as Shin Shin-shūkyō jidai' (Period of New new-religions), started from about 1970. This is the period in which attention is being paid more to a kind of mystic experience.

During the Meiji period, the degeneration of Buddhism as a result of the government policy of Haibutsu-kishaku' (Disbanding of Buddhism) was inevitable. A revival of Shintoism backed by the government and old Buddhist schools hitherto existing were not the kind of religion that met the needs of the people at that time either. New religions, therefore, had to be accepted in one way or another by the masses if they were to survive or get recognition. There are in fact common features among the new religions which were the reaction against such old schools. For instance, new religions tend to avoid distinct divisions between secular believers and priests. They dismissed the rather rigid hierarchical structure that existed within the old schools and encouraged to give equal opportunities to all in their religious practices. They are, moreover, primarily lay organizations. New religions further demonstrate a high degree of tolerance towards each other. In 1952 A.C., a League of New Religions (Shinshūkyō Renmei) was formed to provide mutual assistance in the propagation of various teachings.

Of the new religions, it is interesting to note, almost one half started with revelation of some sort; through a Buddhist divinity, often Amida Buddha, or the founder acting as medium for communication between the spirit and the believers. Hence, quite a number of new religions resort to the working of miracles. Another feature of the new religions is the simplicity of their doctrines which appeals more to the people of modest intellectual attainments than to the educated. The following are some of the new religions including those founded during the 19th century.

Tenrikyō (Religion of Divine Wisdom): Miki Nakayama, the foundress of this sect, was born in 1789 and married into a family which belonged to the Jōdo sect of Buddhism. This environment gave her strict discipline,

and she practised the Nembutsu with great faith and zeal. She was later praised for her filial piety to her in-laws.

It is said that when her son became seriously ill, a 'mountain sleeper' (yamabushi) was called in, and she acted as medium for the magical healing ritual. It was at this time that she was said to be possessed by a 'heavenly general' (ten no shōgun), who, through her, revealed himself to be the 'original and true god'. This incident is said to have marked the beginning of this sect. She is said to have practised magical power and subsequently people flocked increasingly to her to obtain all kinds of material and physical benefits

The doctrine of the Tenrikyō shows parallels with traditional Shintō mythology. The original state of the world is a sea of mud (doro umi) or chaos. Then God the Parent created the first two divinities called Izanagi and Izanami, the male and female principles respectively. This God is sometimes referred to as 'Tsuki-Hi' (Moon-Sun), or as 'Oya' (Parent). One of the central themes of this sect is the disclaiming of personal property. All possessions, according to the sect, are things which have been lent to man by God, and one must return all to Him with gratitude. The mind tends to gather dust (hokori) because it can be freely disposed of by man. Hence it is important to cleanse one's mind of this dust. The mind thus cleansed brings about long life. The Tenrikyō also stresses the importance of social work. The sect is famous for the 'dancing service' (kagura zutome) which was a mixture of popular songs and dances first conceived by the foundress and then developed later.

Konkōkyō (Religion of Golden Light): This sect was founded in 1859 by a humble farmer who had neither education nor religious training. The founder, who called himself 'Konkō daijin' (Great god of Golden Light), claimed that he obtained revelation from a god and was asked to commence the sacred mission of saving men. The sect advocates that man is the child of 'God of Heavenly and Terrestrial Brightness' who is the embodiment of infinite mercifulness. Everything in the universe is the creation of this god. Suffering and calamities occur when man forgets his relation to the god and his love. The relationship between the god and man is that between the parent and the child. The parent god revealed his love through the founder of this sect.

The sect stresses the importance of physical health which is considered to be the source of the blessings of life. Over-eating and over-drinking are to be avoided. Filial piety is emphasized. Educational and research activities are given a prominent place as the Konkō belief stresses the [illegible]ity of creation. Social services are also their great [illegible]

Tensnō K[illegible]yō: The sect was founded in 1945 by the wife of a [illegible], Sayo Kitamura. She, after a three year period of religious austerity, began to preach her doctrine in the streets. The folly of the degraded human world was highlighted in her message. At a time when the war and its disaster was experienced in Japan, her movement became increasingly popular specially in the countryside. She proclaimed that she was the saviour and her mission was the establishment of God's Kingdom.

The teachings of this sect are based on the recognition of a supreme god who is omniscient and omnipotent. This god is not only the first principle of all things but also one that rules and creates eternally. According to its teachings, the mind is polluted by 'six roots of evil'; regret, desire, hatred, fondness, love and being loved. Man must therefore polish his soul worthy of the divine kingdom. The sect emphasizes the life of religious practice. Three things are necessary in so doing; courage to give everything to God, sincerity to perform all action with a true heart, and prayer.

Ananaikyō: This sect was founded by Yōnosuke Nakano. He was first a believer in the Ōmotokyō (Religion of the Foundation) founded in 1892, which was a new religion having affinity with Shintoism. Nakano came to realize that he was the medium between the spirit world and the world of men. Through his religious experience, he came to believe that there was but one universal religion which he named the Ananaikyō. The aim of the Ananai is to bind man to God. It stresses union with the great spirit of the universe. It is a minxture of Christian and Shinto ideas.

Seicho no Ie (House of Growth): It is said that the founder, Masaharu Taniguchi, was suddenly seized by a revelation in 1929 and started a movement. According to him, there is only one True Being (Jisō). This True Being may be designated in several ways such as the Shinto kami, Buddha of Buddhism (specially Amida Buddha), or Jesus Christ. Hence the sect owes much to the teachings of various religions; Shintoism, Buddhism, Christianity etc.

It is believed that all men are the sons of God. Realization of this principle leads to limitless possibilities. Belief is in eternal growth. All things are constantly in a process of growth. Since life is growth, the sect emphasizes a basically optimistic view of things. This sect is indeed one of the most influential of new religions.

Sekai Meshiyakyō (Sekai Kyūseikyō): It was founded by Mokichi Okada in 1934. Okada was at first a believer of the Ōmotokyō. He is said to have been prone to illness when young and used to receive native treatment. One day he was possessed of the wonder working power of the Kannon Bodhisattva (Skt.Avalokiteśvara). Hence the sect is based on healing. Okada's aim was to establish an earthly paradise by eradicating sickness, poverty and war.

Reiyūkai (Society of Friendship with Souls): The sect shows considerable shamanistic influence, but still has Buddhist connections. It was founded as a lay movement by Kakutarō Kubo in 1919 and was again restarted in 1925 with the help of his brother-in-law. The sect derives largely from the teachings of Nichiren Buddhism. The main teaching is the devotion to the Lotus sūtra and filial piety and duty towards ancestors. It also stresses the importance of confession.

One of the main religious activities of this sect is the offering of memorial services to the dead. Social activities are also given a prominent place. It is said that this sect was the forerunner of all the new religions which branched from Nichiren Buddhism.

Risshō Kōsei-kai (Society for the Establishment of Religious and Friendly Relations): Another new religion based on the Lotus sūtra is the Risshō Kōsei-kai founded jointly by Niwano and Naganuma in 1938. This sect separted from the Reiyū-kai. During the Sino-Japanese war, the sect relied on Naganuma's inspirational ability in its propaganda, but after World War II, it became increasingly popular through institutional developments. The sect stresses the importance of ancestor-worship and confession. It incorporates popular beliefs into its teachings. It also emphasizes the importance of moral discipline in moulding one's character.

After World War II, Niwano became deeply involved in the organization called "World Conference on Religion and Peace (WCRP)" and is playing an important role in the movement of the promotion of world peace.

Sōkagakkai (Value Creating Study Group): This sect was started by Tsunezaburō Makiguchi with the help of Jōsei Toda in 1930, but was suppressed during the Sino-Japanese war. It was revived in 1946. This is the largest religious organization among the new religions in Japan. The sect derives its main teachings from the Nichiren school of Buddhism.

According to its teachings, happiness has three values: profit, goodness and beauty. These values must be understood by a detailed study of them. The sect aims at the establishment of an ideal society through the unification of Buddhism and politics. Hence a political wing of this sect called "Kōmeitō" (Clean Government Party) was established by the initiatives of Daisaku Ikeda, the successor of Toda, in 1964.

PL-kyōdan (Brotherhood of Perfect Liberty): This sect was founded in 1924 by Tokuharu Miki, who was born into a merchant family in Shikoku. It has a strong influence of Shintoism.

Miki renounced the world and became a Buddhist monk of Zen Buddhism. During his monkhood, however, he met a Christian minister named Kanda whose influence changed his life completely. He gave up his monkhood to become a disciple of Kanda. Upon Kanda's death in 1919, Miki erected a Shinto shrine in his memory. It was during the course of 5 years worship at the shrine that Miki is said to have received three revelations, the result of which was the commencement of a movement called 'Hito no Michi' (Way of man). However, the movement was suppressed for some time. It was finally revived by his son Tokuchiku in 1946 and was renamed as 'PL-kyōdan' (PL stands for Perfect Liberty).


The teachings of this sect centre on the worship of the supreme being of the universe, and ancestral spirits are given considerable attention. Artistic life based on free-will is much valued in this sect.

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
Toshiichi Endo

PLATE I




The Calcutta - Bairat Rock Edict of Asoka - recommending the Study of Buddhist Texts.


Girnar Rock Edict No. 1
of Asoka prohibits animal slaughter
and festive meetings.



Courtesy: *The way of the Buddha.*



Asoka's Girnar Rock Edict No. II recording the establishment of medical facilities for men and cattle planting of trees and digging of wells.



Asoka's Girnar Rock Edict No. XII, a precative for restraint in speech and religious tolerance.

Courtesy: *The way of the Buddha.*

PLATE III



Eleven-headed and eight-armed Avalokitésvara; gold bronze from Sikkim, 19th Century.

Courtesy: Art of the World Series Burma, Korea, Tibet.


PLATE IV



Eleven-headed, thousand-armed Avalokitésvara painting in Southern Tibetan style, 19th Century

Courtesy: Art of the World Series *Burma, Korea, Tibet.*


PLATE V



The facade of cave 10, Ellora.


Courtesy: Heinz Bechert, Richard Gombrich *The Art of Buddhism* Thames & Hudson, London, 1984, p.67.

PLATE VI



The Buddha flanked by Bodhisattvas, Caitya Hall, Ellora.

Courtesy: D. L. Snellgrove, *The Image of the Buddha.*
Serindia Publications, UNESCO, 1978, P. 121.



A line drawing of th above by H. Prustel.

Courtesy: D. Seckel, *The Art of Buddhism.*



Buddhas seated in meditation, Rock-cut relief in the eastern wall of the 3rd floor, cave No. 12, Ellora.
Courtesy: David L. Snelgrove, *The Image of the Buddha*, Serindia Publication, UNESCO, 1978, p. 120.


PLATE VIII



Emerald Buddha.

Courtesy: *World Fellowship of Buddhists, Thailand.*


PLATE IX



The Temple of the Emerald Buddha

Courtesy: *World Fellowship of Buddhists, Thailand.*


PLATE X



Routes taken by Chinese pilgrims –
Fa-hsien
Hsüantsang
I-Ching

Courtesy: D. Seckel, *Art of Buddhism.*

PLATE XI



Buddhist Flag as designed by the Committee.



Buddhist Flag as altered by Col. H. S. Olcott.

Courtesy: National Archives Department, Sri Lanka.


PLATE XII



Gaḍaladeniya Temple.

Courtesy: Department of Archaeology, Sri Lanka.






Stone Carving from Gadaladeniya.

Courtesy: Department of Archaeology, Sri Lanka.

PLATE XIV



Galvihāra Complex, Polonnaruva, *Cira 12.*

Courtesy: Department of Archaeology, Sri Lanka.